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MASTRIUS
OF MELDULA,
OF THE ORDER OF FRIARS MINOR CONVENTUAL, MASTER
VOLUME FIVE:
CONTAINING DISPUTATIONS ACCORDING TO THE MIND OF SCOTUS
ON THE TWELVE BOOKS OF ARISTOTLE THE STAGIRITE'S
METAPHYSICS
SECOND PART
NEWEST EDITION PURGED OF ERRORS

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Disputations on the Twelve Books of Aristotle the Stagirite's Metaphysics

Posterior Part

Disputation VII: On the Divisions of Being

In the preceding volume and in the disputations that came before it, we treated the common concept of being and its principles, properties, and attributes, prescinding from the particular characteristics of individual beings. Now, in this posterior part, we must descend to the definite and distinctive characteristics of beings, insofar as the abstraction proper to this science and the breadth of its subject matter permits. Since such a descent cannot be made except through the various divisions of being into its members, we begin this second volume with a disputation on the divisions of being.

Here it is worth recalling what we said above in *disp. 4, q. 2, n. 29 and 32*: certain modes or differences that co-divide being in general — such as finite and infinite, necessary and contingent, and so forth — can be taken in two ways. Taken together simultaneously, they circumscribe a single attribute of being convertible with it adequately; in this sense they were treated in the preceding disputation. Alternatively, taken disjunctively, they signify diverse intrinsic modes by which being is contracted and divided; and it is in this latter sense that we treat them in the present disputation.

Question I: On the Multiple Division of Being

Being is customarily divided into its members in many and almost innumerable ways. We shall here set forth and examine the principal and most important of these divisions. The Formalists among us treat these divisions of being in *tract. Formalitat., artic. 1, princip.*, and dispute especially about their ordering among themselves and which of them is the most primary. But before examining that difficulty, the individual divisions must first be explained in themselves. We shall therefore present them promiscuously, in no fixed order among themselves, and afterward we shall address their ordering and inquire which is the most primary — for the order to be observed among them can only become clear from their precise explanation.

First Division

Being is customarily divided, first, in its greatest amplitude: into real being, which has or can have existence apart from any operation of the intellect, that is, with no intellect taking it into consideration; and into being of reason, which cannot have existence except through the consideration of the intellect. This division is one of an equivocal or analogical term into its equivocates or analogates, as the

Author of the *Formalitates* noted in *artic. 1, princip.* at the beginning. Since this division has been sufficiently explained in what was said in *disp. 2, q. 9, artic. 2* — where it is disputed whether there is a being prescinding from real being and being of reason that is univocal to both — it requires no further examination here. Vallo in *artic. 1, Formalitat.* derives this division from Aristotle, *6. Met., tex. com. 8*, where Aristotle says that composition and division are not in things but in the mind, and that being taken in this way differs from those things that are properly beings. Vallo's interpretation is that composition and division belong to the intellect and mind and are called beings of reason, and that this being of reason, so understood, differs from and is separate from those things that properly are beings — that is, from real being. From this passage, and also from *lib. 11 Metaph., sum. 3, cap. 2*, the aforementioned division is derived, for in those places Aristotle presents the famous division of being into being in the soul and being outside the soul, whereby being in the soul is understood as being of reason and being outside the soul as real being, as all interpreters commonly explain. Scotus also recounts this division at *1. d. 36, qu. unic. F.*

A difficulty arises here among the Scotists: whether the division of being into being in the soul and being outside the soul, which the Doctor mentions in the cited place, truly coincides with the division of being into real being and being of reason. Bargius denies this in his commentary on *1. dist. 36, q. un.* His reason is that after the Doctor there distinguished being into being in the soul and being outside the soul, he then subdivides the latter into being in act and being in potency, and adds that either of these can be in the soul — which he would surely not have said if by being in the soul he meant being of reason, since real being cannot become a being of reason. But Bargius is plainly mistaken, for by being in the soul and being outside the soul the Doctor truly means nothing other than being of reason and real being, as Lichetus and Vigerius note there — whom Bargius wrongly refutes. Vulpes, *tom. I, part. 1, disp. 28, art. ult.*, and the more refined Scotists concur in this, as is clearly evident from the Doctor's own reasoning. For the Doctor's intention in that passage is to explain the condition of the cognitive being that creatures had from eternity in the divine mind, and to show that this is not some real and unqualified being but a being of reason and being in a qualified sense. To that end he divides being into being in the soul and being outside the soul, and places the cognitive being of creatures under being in the soul, saying that this being in the soul is entirely different from all being outside the soul, whether that outside being is understood as being in entitative act or as being in objective potency. Therefore by being in the soul the Doctor precisely means being of reason — that is, what has being only objectively in the intellect and in no way outside it, neither actually nor potentially. This follows also because the Doctor says there that this being in the soul differs from all being outside the soul, whether actual or potential; therefore that being in the soul excludes all the reality of real being, which consists in the fact of being actually in the nature of things or at least being able to be so.

Finally it follows because if that being in the soul involved something real and were not pure being of reason, then the cognitive being that creatures have from eternity in the divine mind would be some real being — which is shown to be false in the Doctor's view from *disp. seq., q. 1, artic. 1*. The inference holds because the Doctor in the cited place reduces that cognitive being of creatures to being in the soul.

Bargius's contrary argument does not press, for although the Doctor subdivides being outside the soul into being in act and being in potency and says that either of these can have being in the soul, he does not thereby confuse being outside the soul with being in the soul — on the contrary he adds immediately that this being in the soul is other than all being outside the soul. He says only that being outside the soul, whether actual or potential, can have being in the soul insofar as a thing's true being outside the soul can be understood not to be repugnant to it; but even in that case the being that a thing would have outside the soul potentially is not formally identical with the being it has in the soul as thus known, for this known being is a being of extrinsic denomination from the knowing intellect, and it is a being of reason, not a real being.

You will perhaps ask again whether chimerical being is contained under this division — namely, under one of its members, being of reason. I once heard, when I was young, a certain Scotist now deceased denying this, relying solely on the authority of Scotus, *Quolibet 3, ab initio*, where Scotus says that chimerical being, which implies a contradiction, is utterly nothing, and as nothing it excludes all being both outside the intellect and in the intellect; for that which involves a contradiction as it does cannot be something intelligible or any being in the soul, because a contradictory term with another contradictory term never constitutes one intelligible thing.

The opposite must, however, be held as entirely certain, as I showed in *disp. 3, Logicae, q. 7*. And I refuted that very Scotist with an inescapable argument, saying: you who dispute about chimerical being of reason and deny it — do you either conceive what you are saying and denying, that is, do you apprehend this term "chimera" which you deny can exist in the intellect, or do you not? If you conceive and apprehend it, then such a being of reason does exist in your intellect, and in the very act of denying that it exists, it already exists. But if you do not conceive this term, how do you dispute about it?

Nor does Scotus in the cited place intend to deny that chimerical being has some objective being in the intellect. Indeed, in *Quaestio 3, universalium, in fine*, he concedes that a fictum (a mental fiction) is a certain kind of being of reason contradistinguished from another kind called founded being of reason, and he distinguishes it from founded being of reason — such as a second intention — not because the latter alone has objective being in the intellect while the former does not, but because the latter has a foundation in reality on the part of the thing outside, while a fictum has nothing corresponding to it in reality outside. This too

has been explained in the cited place. The Doctor thus presupposes that both have being in the intellect and differ in that one has a corresponding reality in the external thing while the other does not. What he intends to deny, then, is only that a fictum has being in the soul as something intelligible per se in the way that other founded beings of reason do — as I have already explained in *disp. log. 3, cit., q. 6*. This is the common interpretation of the Scotists: Tatar., Lichet., and Gadius, who raise this very difficulty in their expositions and unanimously assign the response I have given. A clear sign that Scotus did not exclude fictions from the number of beings of reason as such is that if this had been his intention, there would have been no need for his expositors to raise this difficulty, or they would have straightforwardly conceded that in Scotus's view fictions are not beings of reason because they can have no objective being in the intellect. See Gadius in that same place, where he says several things quite consonant with what I said in *disp. 3, log. cit.*, about beings of reason in relation both to the created intellect and to the divine intellect — from which it will be clear that that doctrine is neither contrary to Scotus nor to the early Scotists, as some among us mutter.

Second Division

Being is divided, second, into finite and infinite. This is a division of real being taken transcendently, as common to God and creature; whereby by finite being is understood the creature and by infinite being is understood God and whatever is really identified with him, whether essential or notional — for all of these are infinite, either formally, as the essential attributes common to the three divine persons, or at least really and identically, as Scotus teaches regarding the relations of origin in *Quolibet 5*, where he admits they are infinite only identically and really, by reason of their real identity with the divine nature, but not formally in themselves. This suffices for the said division to be called adequate to being in its entire breadth, for just as nothing can be conceived in the whole breadth of being that is not either God or creature, so likewise nothing can be conceived whose essential perfection is not either finite and limited or infinite and unlimited in one of the aforesaid ways — formally or identically — which I add so that the relations of origin may also be said to be comprehended under this division.

The sufficiency of this division can further be shown as follows: whatever has perfection either has partial perfection or total perfection. If it has total perfection — if it contains all the perfection compatible with being — then it is infinite being, which is God, since infinity of perfection is not repugnant to being. But if it has only partial perfection, that is, does not include all the perfection of being that is compatible with being, then it is finite being, namely the creature. This proof is drawn from Scotus, *Quolibet 6*, where, though he denies that the relations of origin in God can be called formally finite or infinite because they are not quantified beings, he nonetheless admits they can be called infinite identically and really on account of their identity with the divine essence; which suffices for them to be

comprehended in some way under this division. For we shall speak later of the division of being into quantified and non-quantified in the following question.

It should be noted here that this division of being is not an essential and quidditative one, since it is not given through essential and quidditative predicates of God or creature, but through intrinsic modes. Finiteness is the intrinsic mode of the creature and infinity is the intrinsic mode of God, as the Doctor frequently notes. Suarez himself acknowledges this in *disp. 28, Met., sec. 1, n. 3*, saying that through this division being is divided into God and creature, but because we cannot conceive what is proper to God as it is in itself — indeed not even through simple and proper positive concepts of God — we use negative ones, so as to separate and distinguish that supremely excellent being, which differs most from all others and has least in common with them, from those others; and in this way we form the said division by taking something in which all created or creatable things agree with each other and removing it from a more noble being, because that being has a more excellent grade of essence or entity, and so we bring the whole breadth of being under those two members. So Suarez in the cited place. This is a point greatly to be noted, since from it we shall afterward judge whether this is the most primary of all the divisions of being in itself, as Suarez himself maintains in that same passage.

Suarez also disputes in *sec. 3* whether this division is univocal or analogical, and because he denies that being is univocal to finite and infinite and holds it to be purely analogical, he consequently asserts this division to be analogical and not univocal. For our part, since we admit the univocation of being to God and creature, though mixed with analogy, as is established from *disp. 2, de natura entis*, we must consequently hold this to be a division that is univocal yet also mixed with analogy.

This division is also recounted by the Master of the *Formalitates, art. 1, princip.*, along with the other Formalists, but they adduce it as a subdivision of quantified being, from which they accordingly exclude the relations of origin in God, as being non-quantified entities prescinding from all essential perfection and imperfection. On this account, so understood, the division would not appear to be wholly adequate and exhaustive of the entire breadth of being. But since the Doctor at *1. d. 3, q. 2 and 3*, when asserting the univocation of being to the finite and infinite, speaks universally of all per se intelligibles found in any manner in God and creatures, he seems consequently to hold that this division is adequate to the entire breadth of being. So, in order to preserve the sufficiency and adequacy of this division, we should not understand finite and infinite here precisely for what is formally and strictly such in itself, but for what in any way is such — whether formally, whether only identically, whether by reason of itself or by reason of another with which it is identified — for in this way of understanding the members of this division, the relations of origin are also included under it, since they are at least really and identically infinite. Nor does Scotus in *Quolibet 5*

deny that they fall under this division in this sense, but only in the first sense. Hence the Doctor does not absolutely deny that this division is adequate, as Suarez attributes to him in the cited place. And accordingly, in the sense just explained, Meurissius among us, *lib. 1, fuae Met., qu. 5, concl. 1*, concedes that this division is adequate.

Third Division

Being is also divided, third, into dependent and independent — as Sirectus notes in the cited place. By independent being is understood God and whatever is found in him, because he depends on nothing in any genus of cause — neither efficient, final, material, nor formal — as the Doctor proves at length in *1. d. 2 and d. 8*. By dependent being is understood that which derives from another in some genus of cause. Since all beings other than God depend on him in the genus of efficient cause, every creature will be a dependent being. Aristotle, *12. Metaph., tex. com. 52*, holds that all things have an essential ordering among themselves and a still more essential ordering toward one first being, namely God; from which he concludes that since this order is an order of essential dependence, all things essentially depend on the first being, and since nothing is essentially dependent on something in its being unless in some genus of cause, he intends that all things depend on God as efficient and final cause.

Although many commentators explaining this Aristotelian position say that the second intelligence does not depend on the first efficiently as on an efficient cause but only as on a final cause, thinking Aristotle does not admit that the second intelligence is efficiently caused by the first, we showed the opposite at length above in *d. 6, q. 6, art. 1*. From which it is clear that this division also is adequate to being in its entire breadth, since no being in the nature of things can be conceived that is not either dependent or independent; since these terms include an immediate contradiction, that disjunction must belong to any being whatsoever. Therefore this division is adequate and sufficient, since no member can be found contained under the whole divided that is not contained under one of the dividing members.

Suarez, *disp. 28, cit.*, appears to wish this division to be the same as the preceding one. This must be accepted with care. If he means they are the same insofar as they have the same amplitude, and insofar as both have the same divided — namely, being — and the same dividing members — for God is infinite being and independent, and creature is finite being and dependent — in this sense it is true that this division coincides with the preceding one. But it cannot be verified in another sense, as if the reasons and modes of division were also the same in both; for although what is infinite is also independent and vice versa, and what is finite is correspondingly dependent, nevertheless finiteness and dependence, infinity and independence are diverse modes and diverse dividing rationes, since one is the reason for the other and can be demonstrated through the other. Infinity can be demonstrated through independence and finiteness through dependence, as

the Doctor notes in *Quolibet 7, sub lit. T*, where he deduces God's infinity from his independence, arguing that what has something from itself has it in the full plenitude that is compatible with it, since nothing is had in a limited way in something unless it is held from some agent determining it to a certain grade of perfection. Therefore this division is not entirely the same as the preceding one.

This division does, however, well coincide with certain others, such as the division of being into being from itself and being from another, being by essence and being by participation, created and uncreated, caused and uncaused, and the like — for these terms express the same mode of possessing entity in the dividing members. For to be a being from itself is to have an entity independent of and not communicated by another; to be a being from another is to have an entity dependent on and communicated by another. Likewise, being by essence is said of that which has its being from and by itself, unreceived and unparticipated from another; being by participation, conversely, is said of that which has its being only as communicated and participated from another. The terms created and uncreated likewise express the same dependence and independence, and differ only in that the others — dependent and independent, from itself and from another, by essence and by participation, caused and uncaused — express a general relationship of dependence or independence as such, while created and uncreated adds a specific relationship taken from a particular action called creation. But since creation is the first emanation from another with dependence on it, and is in some way common to all beings dependent on another as such, in common usage it is taken chiefly for the relationship of one that depends on another as such, prescinding from specific modes of dependence — and conversely uncreated is taken in the same spirit. Therefore it must be concluded that these and similar divisions entirely coincide.

Pasqualig, *tom. p. Metaph., disp. 28, 29, and 32*, rejects all the aforesaid divisions of real being, because he acknowledges no concept of real being common to God and creatures — not even by analogy, let alone univocally — admitting such commonality only with respect to substance and accident. He consequently acknowledges no other true and proper division of being except into those members. But we pursued this singular fantasy — it is more a fantasy than an opinion — of Pasqualig at length in *disp. 2, de natura entis, q. 2*, demonstrating that being is univocal not only to substance and accident but also to God and creature. And we shall shortly show that the division of being into substance and accident is not an immediate division of being as such, but a division of finite being — for it is finite being that is immediately divided into substance and accident.

Fourth Division

Being is further divided, fourth, as Sirectus notes in the cited place, into necessary and contingent. Here necessity and contingency are not taken complexly, in which sense they belong to propositions; nor are they taken as relationships of an effect to a cause acting naturally or freely, or capable or incapable of being

impeded — since in this sense they pertain to actions. Rather, they are taken absolutely, as expressing intrinsic modes of the being of things. In this sense, a being that is necessary in its being is said to be that which cannot not-be by any power whatsoever, because it is from itself and not from another; for this reason it cannot simply not-be, since it can neither destroy itself nor be destroyed by another, having no dependence in its being on any other. Only God and whatever is identified with him enjoys this grade of necessity. Conversely, that is called simply contingent in its being which can be and not-be, because it does not have being from itself and by itself but from another distinct from it in nature; and since it does not have being from itself, it is not repugnant to it on that score not to be, and since it depends on another in its being, it can through that other's power cease to be. Every creature stands thus with respect to God, including spiritual substances said to be by their nature incorruptible — because they lack physical matter, which is the primary root of corruption — for which reason they are accustomed to be called necessary beings in a qualified sense, though it is consistent with this that they are simply contingent beings, insofar as there is no intrinsic repugnance in them to not-being and to being annihilated by God.

From this it is clear that this division of being into necessary and contingent depends on and is proved through the preceding division into being from itself and from another — that is, independent and dependent — since necessity is demonstrated of God through his being from himself and independent, and contingency is demonstrated of creatures through their being from another and dependent, as was said above in n. 8.

Note here that by being from another is meant that which receives its being from another through true causality and dependence in a diversity of nature, and not merely through simple production within a unity of nature — in which sense the theologians say that in the divine persons the Son proceeds from the Father and the Holy Spirit from both. For only in the former sense is a being from another called simply contingent and opposed to what is simply necessary. Other things that could be said for understanding this division are sufficiently established from what was said in *disp. 6, q. 6, art. 1 and 2*, where necessary and contingent are treated.

Fifth Division

Being is divided, fifth, as Sirectus also notes, into simple and composite. For understanding this division he assigns several modes of simplicity and the opposed composition. In the first mode, something is said to be supremely simple — and this is what is neither physically nor metaphysically composite, that is, neither composed of thing and thing nor of reality and reality, nor composable with another in this way — and so only God is supremely simple, while all other beings are composite, as the Doctor explains in *1. d. 8, q. 1*. In the second mode, something is called simply simple, that is, having a concept that is simply simple — a concept not resolvable into further concepts of which one would be

quidditative and another qualitative. In this way entities, the attributes of being, intrinsic modes, and all ultimate differences are called simple, as is sufficiently clear from what was said in *disp. 2, q. 7, artic. 1*; while those that have concepts further resolvable into a quidditative and qualitative component can be called composite by a composition opposed to this mode of simplicity. For this reason God does not have a simply simple concept and is not called simple in this mode — which is no inconvenience, since simplicity of this kind does not express a perfection simply, but only simplicity of the first mode does, according to Scotus in the cited place. In the third mode, something is called simple that is not physically composed of thing and thing — that is, of matter and form — and thus simple entities are all accidents, matter, form, the angel, and the soul, for all of these are considered to be without physical composition, though they admit metaphysical composition of genus and difference. The physical composition of matter and form is opposed to this mode of simplicity. In the fourth and final mode, something is called simple because it is not a mixture, and in this sense the heavens and elements are customarily called simple bodies, while others are composite, because they are mixtures.

When therefore being as such is divided into simple and composite, so that this is an adequate division exhausting the entire breadth of being — with God contained under the first member and every creature under the other — simplicity must be taken in the first mode, so as to exclude all composition, both physical and metaphysical, and all composability as well. This is so first because it is only in this sense that simplicity expresses a perfection simply, belonging to God alone; and second because no being outside God can be conceived that is not in some way composed in itself, either physically or metaphysically, or at least composable with another.

This division is also true and proper, and a division of a univocal term into its univocates, because as is clear from what was said in *disp. 5, q. 2*, even a per se one being with unity of composition is truly and properly a being and not merely improperly or metaphorically. It is nonetheless true that this is a division dependent on the preceding ones, since simplicity is demonstrated of God both through the ratio of infinity and through the ratio of necessity, just as conversely composition or composability is shown of creatures from the ratio of finiteness and contingency, as one may see in the Doctor at *1. d. 8, q. 1*, where he demonstrates divine simplicity by these two ways: from necessity, because what can enter into the composition of another is in some way potential with respect to that other component and is therefore not from itself necessarily being and in ultimate actuality; and also by the way of infinity, because everything composable can be a part of some composite whole composed of it and another — but every part can be exceeded by the whole, which is contrary to the ratio of the infinite, since everything composable would lack the perfection of that with which it is composed, otherwise it would not be composed with it. But the infinite contains within itself perfectly all entity in the way that is possible for it to contain

everything in itself. Therefore what is infinite is not composed in itself, nor composable with another, but is supremely simple. The Doctor reasons in the same way in *Quolibet* 5. This division of being therefore depends on the second and fourth divisions, for it can be proved and demonstrated through them.

And to this division is reduced, or rather with it coincides, another division of being into pure act and potentiality, such that under the first member falls only God and under the other every creature. For pure act is called that which is neither composed in itself nor composable with another but is supremely simple; and potentiality is called that which is either composed in itself or at least composable with another. Hence it is clear that this division entirely coincides with the one dividing being into simple and composite.

Sixth Division

Being is customarily divided, sixth, into being in act and being in potency. Here by being in act should not be understood what is in itself simple and most actual, and by being in potency what is composite or composable — for the division taken in this sense would entirely coincide with the preceding one. Rather, by being in act should be understood that which has actual existence in reality and in effect, and is called entitative being in act; while by being in potency is understood that which does not yet exist in the nature of things but can be the object of some power and can be produced by it, and is customarily called being in objective potency, insofar as this potency is opposed to entitative act. In this sense the Doctor presented this division in *1. d. 26, qu. unic. F*, where he divides real being outside the soul into being in act and being in potency — both of essence and of existence — and since the members of this division were explained at length above in *disp. 6, q. 2*, nothing more need be added here.

The Master of the *Formalitates*, in the cited place, presents this same division but under different terms: in his fourth principal division he divides being into being simply and being in a qualified sense — or into being in subjective potency and being in objective potency — so that being simply and in subjective potency is that which actually exists, while being in a qualified sense and in objective potency is that which, though not currently existing, can exist. This way of speaking is not fully satisfactory, because in common usage being simply means real being and being in a qualified sense means being of reason, as Sirectus himself acknowledges in the cited place. And indeed the Doctor in the now-cited passage uses language accordingly, calling being in the soul being in a qualified sense and being outside the soul being simply — which he then subdivides into being in act and being in potency.

It is also objectionable to call being simply and in act being in subjective potency — for although in order for something to be said to be in subjective potency it is required that it exist in the nature of things, so that what does not yet exist — such as the Antichrist or a rose in winter — is not said to be in subjective potency, it is

further required that something be capable of receiving something by way of a subject, as was said in *disp. 6, q. 2, n. 64*. For subjective potency is passive and receptive potency, as the very name makes clear. Therefore, since God, being pure act, can receive nothing, he cannot be called a being in subjective potency — and yet he is rightly called being simply and being in entitative act. Therefore this member is badly explained through being in subjective potency. To remove all confusion, this division should be presented through being in act and being in potency — that is, in entitative act and in objective potency — under which terms it was presented by Scotus in the cited place and at *2. d. 12, qu. 1*, and by Aristotle himself in many passages cited in *disp. 6 cit., qu. 2, n. 74*. Also because being in subjective potency is properly not opposed to what is in objective potency, but to what has a form or is in formal act.

Whether this division is sound and a division of a univocal term into univocates, or rather of an equivocal term, depends on the resolution of a difficulty to be treated below in *disp. seq., q. 1, art. 3, n. 45*: whether a possible being, or being in objective potency, can truly and properly be called real being. If it does not truly and properly participate in the ratio of real being, as many even among the Scotists hold — and as Scotus himself seems to consider probable in *9. Met., q. 2* — then this division will not be univocal but equivocal. But if it truly and properly participates in the ratio of such being, then the division will be univocal. And since the Doctor embraces this latter position as the more probable in the cited place, and also at *1. d. 36, cit.*, where he divides real being outside the soul into being in act and being in potency, we may conclude that this division is true and univocal — which will be still more firmly established below from the total resolution of that difficulty.

Seventh Division

Real being is divided, seventh, into per se being and per accidens being, a division assigned by Aristotle in *5. Met., c. 6*. For understanding it, it must be noted from Scotus, *6. Metaph., qu. 2*, that real being can be called per se or per accidens in two ways. In one way, in the ratio of an effect and with respect to being caused: in this sense, that is called per se which proceeds from a determinate cause and from the intention of the agent, while that is called per accidens which proceeds neither from a determinate cause nor from the agent's intention, such as casual and fortuitous effects. In another way, in the ratio of being and with respect to its being — and this in two ways: in one sub-way, by reason of being per se or in another, whereby substance is called being per se and the rest may rather be called being in another; in the other sub-way, something is called in the ratio of being a being per se or per accidens not by reason of the mode of being but by reason of unity — so that what is per se one is called being per se, and what is only accidentally one is called per accidens being. It is in this sense that the present division speaks of per se and per accidens in the ratio of being — for something is called being per se or per accidens by reason of the unity it has. The former mode of per se or

per accidens in the ratio of being, as expressing modes of being, pertains to a different division of being, namely the one dividing it into substance and accident, of which we speak below.

Since then being per se and per accidens — as members of this division — are taken from the unity of the thing per se or per accidens, we must see what per se unity and per accidens unity say among beings, and in what they differ — for from this distinction the members of this division will be made clear. We treated this at length in *disp.* 5, *q.* 2, explaining per se unity as an attribute of being, and concluded in n. 24 that a being that is per se one is said to be that which imports a single true essence subsisting in the indivisible — whether it is per se one by unity of simplicity or by unity of composition. Conversely, a being that is accidentally one is said to be that which does not import a single essence subsisting in the indivisible but several — and so it is not so much one being as several per se beings from which it arises. This can again be briefly shown because either per accidens being, as such and formally, adds some ratio of being over and above the per se beings from which it arises, or it does not. Not the first, for this directly contradicts the ratio of per accidens being, which is distinguished from per se being with unity of composition precisely in that it adds nothing over the per se beings from which it arises, according to Scotus at 3. *d.* 1, *q.* 2. If it adds nothing, then it is not so much one being as several per se beings.

From this it is plain that this is not a true and proper division, in which real being is divided as something truly common to being per se and being per accidens; nor is it univocal — because per accidens being does not truly and properly participate in the ratio of being as such, so that the particle per accidens is wholly distractive. Also, in every true and proper division two dividing rationes intervene that determine one common ratio to its proper grades of being; if therefore there is no such one common ratio of being with respect to per se being and per accidens being, this will not be a true and proper division, but rather a kind of assignation in which on one side a single being is assigned and on the other an aggregate of several beings.

Some dispute here whether this division coincides with the one dividing real being into substance and accident. Scotus resolves the question briefly and negatively at 5. *Met.*, *tex.* 13, because the division of being into substance and accident proceeds according to accident considered absolutely — for accident considered in itself is called being, and likewise substance is called being — but the division of being into per se and per accidens being is made according to being considered in relation, namely by comparing accident to substance (as in "white man") or accident to accident (as in "the musical is white"), which thus constitutes per accidens being. But with that comparison set aside — taking man by himself or whiteness by itself — it becomes a per se being. So the Doctor there and Alensis.

It must therefore be absolutely denied that this division coincides with the one dividing being into substance and accident — since the division under discussion is equivocal, as was said, while the division of being into substance and accident is univocal, as we shall say shortly. Also because, as we were saying, *per se* and *per accidens* are not taken here by reason of the mode of being *per se* or in another — whereby substance is called *per se* being and accident is being in another — but being *per se* and *per accidens* are taken in the order of unity.

Eighth Division

Being is divided, eighth, into one and many by Aristotle in *10. Met.* The commentators labored greatly over this division, and the reason for the difficulty is that one is an attribute of being, coextensive with it, as was said in *disp. 5, q. 1*, and Aristotle himself teaches this in the same *lib. 10. Met., tex. 6 and 8*. Therefore one cannot be a divided member co-opposed to many, since a dividing member never is coextensive with the whole divided, by the rules of good division.

Some commentators, to save this division and escape the difficulty raised, said that the one that co-divides being against many is not the transcendental one, which is an attribute of being, but the predicamental one, which is the principle of number. Tatar. at *4. Met., q. un., dub. 1*, and Faber at the same place, *disp. 7, in fine*, embrace this explanation. But it is easily rejected, because one and many in this sense are dividing members of the genus quantity to which they belong, not of being in its entire breadth. Also because the one by which Aristotle at *tex. 9* divides being against many is the same one of which he had spoken above at *tex. 6 and 8*; and the one of which he speaks in those texts is the transcendental one, not the predicamental, since he holds it to be convertible with being.

Others explain the matter following St. Thomas, *p. 1, q. 11, art. 1, ad Id 2*, as Suarez also does in *disp. 4, Met., sect. 4*: what is divided in one way can be undivided in another. Thus what is divided numerically can be undivided specifically, and what is divided specifically can be undivided generically. Hence the same thing can be one and multiple in different respects. Similarly, a whole is undivided in act and thus is one; it is divided by aptitude, that is, divisible, and in this way participates in the ratio of multiplicity. A subject is one according to substance and many according to accidents. For this reason, they say, being is divided through one and many as through what is simply one and what is many in a qualified sense.

This way of speaking is commonly attacked on the grounds that it does not preserve a sufficient opposition between one and many, since it concedes that the same being is both one and many, whereas the members of a good division must be opposed and not coincide. But this attack is frivolous, because it is not always required that the members of a good division be so opposed that they cannot even materially coincide — for cause is divided into efficient, final, material, and so on, and yet the same thing can be efficient cause and final cause, and can be material and efficient cause with respect to the same accident. Good is divided

into the honorable, the pleasurable, and the useful, and yet the same thing can be honorably and pleurably good. This could be confirmed with other similar examples. It suffices, therefore, if the members of a good division do not coincide formally — that is, according to their formal rationes — and so the Thomists teach that the same thing can be one and many, but under a different ratio, so that the formal ratio of unity and the formal ratio of multiplicity never coincide.

For a different reason, then, this Thomist way of speaking must be attacked. First, because being is divided by Aristotle in the cited place through one and many as through opposed members, as is clear from the context itself. But one and many are opposed only if taken in a uniformly parallel manner — either both simply or both in a qualified sense. Therefore it is not well said that being is divided through what is simply one and what is many in a qualified sense, since in this way they are not opposed. Moreover, when it is said that being is divided into what is simply one and what is many in a qualified sense, either by this plurality in a qualified sense some ratio of multiplicity is expressed, or some ratio of unity that has multiplicity annexed to it. Not the first — because then the original difficulty remains intact: how can unity, which is opposed to multiplicity, be an adequate attribute of being, if it is at the same time a dividing member which must extend less than the divided? Not the second — because St. Thomas himself acknowledges in the cited place that this plurality in a qualified sense, insofar as it divides being, imports some unity, since multiplicity would not be contained under being unless it were in some way contained under one; for which he cites Denis the Areopagite, *cap. ult. de divinis nominibus*. And Suarez understands it this way in the cited place, n. 4, saying that formally and properly speaking being is not divided into many as they are actually and formally many, because such many, insofar as they are such, are in truth not being but beings. If then they concede the second point — namely that those many divide being insofar as they import some unity and not formally multiplicity — then this division will not be through one and many as such (which is how Aristotle presents it and they are opposed), but through one and one, or through various modes of one. And this is not the division that is here under discussion, nor the one Aristotle intends to assign in the cited place.

Others therefore explain the matter differently: when being is divided into one and many, by one is understood that being which is so one and undivided as to be wholly simple and absolutely indivisible into several; while by many is understood that being which is composed of several and is divisible into several. So the meaning would be: some being is simple, actually undivided and potentially indivisible; some being is composite, actually undivided but potentially divisible into the several from which it is composed — and these are truly two opposed kinds of being. Aversa in his *Philosophia*, q. 5, sec. 1, considers this exposition probable and tries to prove it from the context itself. Pasqualig, however, attacks it at *tom. 2, Met., disp. 4, sec. 3, n. 4*, because even on this account the difficulty raised against the preceding Thomist position recurs: when

divisible, or what is many in potency, is said to be opposed to what is wholly one and indivisible, the question presses again — is what is many in this sense the formal ratio of multiplicity itself, or some ratio of unity? If the first, the original difficulty remains: how can unity, which is opposed to multiplicity, be an adequate attribute of being if it is at the same time a dividing member co-extending with being along with multiplicity? If the second, then this division will not be through one and many as Aristotle presents it, but through one and one, or through such-and-such a unity.

But Aversa easily escapes this difficulty, saying that in this division of being so explained, the unity that divides being against multiplicity is not that common unity adequate to being, but the proper unity of simple being. For a different reason, then, must this explanation be attacked — namely because it confuses this division with the fifth one already assigned, which divided being into simple and composite, which Aristotle however presented as distinct from the one now under discussion, as Vallo shows in *tract. formal., in conformatione illius divisionis cum Arist.* And if we also wish to use against this explanation the argument employed against the preceding Thomist position, as Pasqualig does, we can attack Aversa's solution as manifestly contrary to Aristotle, who when dividing being through one and many, certainly takes one as the transcendental, as an attribute adequate to being.

The Scotists commonly explain this division as follows: one can be taken in two ways — either commonly, broadly, and simply, or strictly, determinately, and in a qualified sense. Taken in the first way, it is an attribute convertible with being, so that of whatever being is said, one is also said, and thus it is not distinguished against multiplicity nor does it co-divide being with it; indeed in this sense multiplicity is itself one, just as it is being. Taken in the second way, one is distinguished against multiplicity and opposed to it, and in this way co-divides being with it. So Antonius Andreas, 4. *Metaph., quaest. 3, art. 3*; Trombeta, 10. *Metaph., qu. 1*; Faber, *ibid., disp. 2*; and other Scotists commonly. But this explanation fails first because, as I said in *disp. 5, q. 1, n. 5*, it does not explain the distinction of terms — what exactly is signified by one taken commonly, broadly, and simply, and what by one taken strictly, determinately, and in a qualified sense. And then because however the terms are explained, the difficulties raised against the preceding positions always return, as one who thinks through the matter will see.

Others say that when being is divided into one and many, the whole divided is being common to being per se and being per accidens, abstracting from both; and that being per se is indeed one, while being per accidens is simply many. And when it is said that unity is an adequate attribute of being, they say this is to be understood of per se being, which is truly being, and not of that which abstracts from being per se and being per accidens. But this is commonly and rightly rejected, because in so saying this division is confused with the seventh — and yet Aristotle presented them as distinct, as is clear from his explanation. Also because,

as was said there, it is false that there is such a superior being common to per se and per accidens being, abstracting from and superior to both. Also because, even if such a common concept were given, just as per accidens being is per accidens being, so it would also be per accidens one — since being and one advance at equal pace, and to whatever being corresponds a proportionate unity. Therefore to this common concept adequate to per se and per accidens being there would also belong a unity preceding and abstracting from per se unity and per accidens unity, and so it would have to be divided into being and one per se on one side and being and one per accidens on the other — not into one and many.

Since therefore no way of saving this division and solving the proposed difficulty (stated in n. 14) is found, it remains to say that this is truly not a proper division, but only a kind of assignation in which on one side a single being is assigned and on the other beings with multiplicity, so that one and many are opposed to each other as being and beings. Hence it is not a true and proper division, but has only some resemblance to one. This is what Scotus explicitly says at 4. *Met.*, q. 2, §. *de secundo se*, where he states that this division is not properly through opposites, but is as if one were to say: this being, that beings — for which view he cites Avicenna, 3. *Met.*, cap. 6. The more recent authors follow this: Aversa, *loc. cit.*; Pasqualig., t. 1, *Met.*, disp. 31, sect. 1 and tom. 2, disp. 4, sect. 3; Meurissius, lib. 2, *fuae Met.*, c. 3, q. 8; and others.

This is first demonstrated by the difficulty proposed in n. 14, which is inescapable. Second, because every true division of something real and positive must be through members that are likewise positive; but one and many are so related that one of them is a negative member, as is clear from what was said in disp. 5, q. 4, art. 1. Therefore being cannot be divided through them by a true division. The major is clear because the common ratio divided, although not contained in the differential contracting rationes, is nevertheless included in the dividing members or in its species — and it cannot be included and contained in them, the common real and positive ratio, unless they too are real and positive. Finally, this is clear from Aristotle's whole procedure in lib. 10, *Met.* — for nowhere does he ever propose that assignation of being into one and many as terms of a true and proper division. And especially at tex. 9, from which this division is commonly taken, he does not explicitly say that one and many divide being; rather, he says that one and many are opposed. He speaks in the same way at 5. *Met.*, tex. 12.

It can nonetheless be said that this assignation has some resemblance to a division, insofar as being can be considered under two states — that of unity and that of division. For if it is considered in itself, as it has its own being, it possesses unity as its adequate attribute; but if it is considered in conjunction with another, it is then in a different state and is found under multiplicity. Thus unity and multiplicity, as constituting in this way a different state of being, can also be said in this sense to divide being — though not according to the very ratio of being

itself. And in this way it is well preserved that unity is adequate to being as considered according to the ratio of being itself, and yet that being is at the same time divided by multiplicity in the manner just explained.

You will say that so explained, this division seems to coincide with the division of being into per se being and per accidens being, since per accidens being, as we said, is not properly one being but several beings. The consequence is denied — because per accidens being is called such on account of some unity proportionate to it, namely some accidental unity; but many is said in the order of division prescinding from all unity, since multiplicity formally is a negation of unity. Hence per accidens being can be considered in two ways: either with some per accidens unity — of aggregation, or of order, or of accidental information, as the Doctor says at *1. d. 2, q. 7, Hh.* — and in this way it is properly called per accidens being; or it is considered without any unity whatsoever and with multiplicity alone, and in this way it cannot in any way be called being but only beings, and in this sense it pertains to this division.

The authors also customarily dispute here in what genus of opposition one and many are opposed — on which see *Ant. And., 10. Met., q. 1*; Faber, *ibid., disp. 2*; and other Scotists commonly. But we have already addressed this in *disp. 5, q. 4, art. 1.*

Ninth Division

Being is divided, ninth — still following Sirectus in the cited place — into absolute and respective. The absolute, he says, is that which is not formally or quidditably ordered to another, such as God and all the attributes in God, and the three most general genera only — namely substance, quantity, and quality. He deliberately said not formally and quidditably ordered to another, because it can well be ordered to another denominatively, or through the predicamental relation it can found — in which sense substance is said to be the same as or different from another, quantity equal or unequal to another, quality similar or dissimilar — or even through the transcendental relation really identified with it, in which sense cognition is said to be essentially conformed to its object, especially a necessary one; the creature is essentially dependent on God; matter is apt for form; and so on. Respective being, by contrast, is that which is formally and quidditably ordered to another — such as in God the notional properties and common relations, and the seven other categories in creatures — namely the relative, action, passion, when, where, position, and habit — which are then divided into relations or intrinsic respects, such as all the relations of the category of the relative, and extrinsic respects, which are the last six categories.

From this it is clear that absolute and respective, as such, are transcendentals. For absolute is common to the finite and the formally infinite — namely God and creatures — and likewise respective is common to created relations, which are all formally finite since they are contained under finite being that divides into the ten genera, and to divine relations, of which the common ones are conceded to

be formally infinite since they are common to the three persons, while the notional ones — or relations of origin — although Scotus does not posit them as formally infinite, he does concede they are at least identically and really infinite. Therefore absolute and respective, from their formal ratio as such, express concepts transcending everything — for everything that is in this way common to God and creature is transcendent, according to Scotus, *1. d. 8, q.*

The Formalists among us say that this division is not only true and proper but also univocal and quidditative. Trombeta proves this at *p. 2, art. 2, formalit.*, because being as such is quiddatively predicated of absolute and respective, since being is first divided into absolute and respective before it is divided into the ten most general genera. Since then being is quiddatively predicated of those ten genera as of its first subjective parts, it consequently is so predicated of absolute and respective as well, which mediate between being and the ten genera.

Against this, however, Trombeta himself raises a serious difficulty in the cited place, over whose solution both he and other Scotists labor greatly. The difficulty is: if being as such is quiddatively predicated of absolute and respective — which are common to God and creatures — then the categories will not be most general genera, which is false. Proof of the consequence: then absolute and respective would be quiddatively predicated of things differing in species, and therefore every category would have a genus superimposed on it.

This difficulty seemed arduous to the early Scotists, who thought those ten genera were simply and absolutely supreme, such that no concept superior to them having the ratio of a genus could be conceived. But we have already shown in *disp. 9, Log., q. 1*, that finite being is a genus to them absolutely speaking — for this is what is immediately divided into them, as Scotus explicitly teaches at *1. d. 8, q. 3, lit. H* and *Quolibet 5, in fine*, and as we established above in *disp. 2, de natura entis, q. 6, art. 2, n. 161*. For this reason we were saying that the ten genera should not be posited as simply and absolutely supreme, but only in a qualified sense and in a certain order. Given this way of speaking, that difficulty carries little weight — for it must be conceded that being is first divided into absolute and respective before it is divided into the ten genera, since those concepts are prior and more immediate than the concepts of the individual genera. It must further be conceded that the absolute quiddatively predicated of the three first categories — substance, quantity, and quality — is a genus to them, and likewise the respective is a genus to the seven posterior genera. For what descends into those first three is the concept of finite and limited absolute being, and what descends into those seven is likewise the concept of finite and limited respective being.

I adduce a weightier difficulty, however, against the Formalists' position that this division is univocal and quidditative: if being as such were quiddatively predicated of absolute and respective, as they are common to God and creatures, then the relations of origin in God would be quiddatively beings — which will be seen to be false in the following question, because they are the ultimate

constitutives of the divine persons. Since then these are not beings quiddatively and formally but only identically and really, as will appear below, it must be acknowledged that this is indeed a division of some univocal common to the dividing members, but not one quiddatively predicated of both — with regard to all the inferiors contained under them. This is no inconvenience, because, as has often been said, it is not the same thing for something to be a univocal predicate with respect to inferiors and to be univocally predicated of them in quid, as Sirectus himself notes, *art. 1, prin.*, following Scotus, *1. dist. 3, qu. 3, and dist. 8, qu. 3*.

Pasqualig, however, at *tom. 2, Metaph., disp. 31, sect. 2, n. 6*, says that although both the absolute and the relative truly have the ratio of being, and although every being is either absolute or respective, so that absolute and respective are adequate to all beings, still being as such does not divide through them by a true and proper division. He proves this because the relative is by its nature founded in the absolute — which is sufficiently clear of predicamental relations — and transcendental relations necessarily have an admixture of the absolute. How then can the absolute and the relative have a differential opposition by which they exclude each other from the same subject and are entirely impossible? Moreover, a relation — whether transcendental or predicamental — by its genus requires a plurality of things, since it must be between a term and a foundation. Since then no plurality of things can exist without some prior division of being, the relation by its genus presupposes the divisions of being. How then can such a ratio be divisive of being as such?

However, even though the division is not quidditative — as we said — that is, it is not a division of something univocal and essentially predicated of each dividing member on account of the divine relations of origin (which are not beings quiddatively), it cannot be denied that it is a true and proper division of some univocal common to the dividing members, even if not univocally predicated. As for that doctrine that Pasqualig frequently employs to attack certain divisions — namely that one species contradistinct from another cannot be founded in it, since it is constituted by an opposed difference and is impossible with the difference of a contradistinct species — we have already addressed that in *disp. 5, qu. 7, n. 183*: species are said to be impossible and opposed insofar as one cannot formally coincide with the other, since they are constituted by opposed differences, so that one does not intrinsically concur in the formal constitution of the other, as he himself explains there at n. 11. Yet nothing prevents them from sometimes materially coinciding, in which respect they are not opposed — as we showed there with clear examples. Moreover, the argument can be turned against him: he himself holds in that place that the division of being into substance and accident is a true and proper division. Yet it is certain that accident is founded in and depends on substance no less than the relative is founded in the absolute. If therefore these rationes of absolute and respective do not divide being as such by a true division, the same would have to be said of substance and accident. The

other argument at most proves that the division of being into respective and absolute is not the most primary division but presupposes another — it does not prove absolutely that it is not a good division. Nor does even that prove its point well, because the extremes between which the relation obtains are absolute beings, so that the argument only proves that one member of the division — namely the relation — presupposes absolute being, which does not prevent it from still being able to divide being as such together with the absolute.

Tenth Division

Being is divided, tenth — as Sirectus says in *art. 1, cit.* — into substance and accident, and he says this is a division not of being as such (which is transcendently common to creatures and God, in whom there is no accident) but of finite and created being. For understanding this division, Trombeta together with Sirectus notes in that place that substance — as the term "substance" comes from "subsisting" or "existing per se" — is taken in three modes. In the first mode, for that which exists per se, from itself and by itself — in which sense God alone is called substance. In the second mode, for that which exists per se and from itself but not by itself — in which sense substance is said of everything properly in the category of substance, beginning from the most general genus down to individuals inclusive. In the third mode, for that which does not exist per se from itself, nor by itself, but in another — not by way of inherence as accident is said to be in a subject, but in the way that a part is said to be in a whole, whether essential or integral. I am therefore much surprised that Trombeta in the cited place said that substance taken in this third mode is not said of integral or essential parts — since parts of substance cannot fall under any of these three modes of taking substance except the third, and the Author of the *Formalitates*, as is clear from the context, adds this third mode precisely for the parts of substance.

They further note that accident can be taken in two ways: either for what is extraneous to the quiddity of a thing — in which sense even a proper attribute is called an accident of its subject, even if it belongs to it in the second per se mode of predication, and accident is taken this way by the Metaphysician — or in another way, for that which perfects something accidentally, having its own complete being to which it is added, in which sense accident is taken by Porphyry, *cap. de accidente*, when he defines common accident as that which is present and absent, etc. Applying this to the present case, Trombeta says that when being is here divided into substance and accident, substance is not taken in the first or third mode but in the second, and accident likewise in the second mode of the two assigned, not the first.

This doctrine of Trombeta, however, is not satisfying. Because substance and accident in this division, as the Master of the *Formalitates* says — and as Trombeta himself concedes — divide finite and created being. Since then substance taken in the third mode is not contained under accident, it must be acknowledged that it is contained under substance as a member of this division. And therefore when

finite being is here divided into substance and accident, substance should be taken not only in the second mode but also in the third — and this is the intention of the Master of the *Formalitates*, *loc. cit.*, for when he assigned that threefold acceptation of substance there, he excluded only the first from this division, not the second or third. That substance taken in the third mode cannot be contained under accident is shown as follows: although substance taken in the third mode is said to be in another, this being in another is very different from what belongs to accident, as is clear from Aristotle, 4. *Phys.*, and Boethius, *cap. de subst.* — for accident is in another by inherence and subordination, while the parts of substance, if essential, are said to be in another by simple information, and if integral, as part in a whole, as Scotus teaches in *quaest. 15, praedicament., 1. dist. 8, qu. 3, quol. 4. §.* and *quol. 8. A.* And indeed Aristotle himself in the *Praedicamenta, de substantia*, has these words: "let us not be troubled by the parts of substances, since they are not in a whole as in a subject, lest we be compelled to confess they are not substances — for those that are parts are not said to be in something as in a subject." It must therefore be said that when finite being is divided into substance and accident, substance should not be taken only in the second mode, as Trombeta held, but also in the third, since finite being is quiddatively said not only of complete substances directly in the category but also of incomplete ones that are in it reductively — such as matter and form — according to Scotus, 1. *d. 3, q. 3.* It is true, however, that if finite being is taken precisely for what descends directly into the ten genera, then substance should be taken only in the second mode — and perhaps Trombeta intended only to signify this. But when finite being is divided into substance and accident, it is not generally taken in so strict a sense, but more broadly for any created being, whether directly or only reductively in the category.

Likewise unsatisfying is Trombeta's claim, together with Sirectus, that the accident which co-divides finite being with substance here is taken for the fifth predicable — accident as defined by Porphyry as what is present and absent, etc. For it was said in *disp. g. Log., q. 5, art. 2* that the fifth predicable accident is not opposed to substance; indeed substance can be called a predicable accident and can found the intention of the fifth universal. Therefore accident in this division should not be taken for the predicable accident but for what they call the predicamental accident, ranging through the nine genera of accidents, and defined as that whose proper characteristic is to inhere and to make one per accidens with the subject. For in this way it is directly opposed to substance and can co-divide finite being with it.

Pasqualig, *disp. 31, cit.*, not only holds this to be a good and proper division but says it is also through the immediate and primary members of being as such. He proves the first claim: for a good division two conditions are especially required. The first is that the dividing rationes be so related that one does not follow from the other and presuppose it as a foundation in which it is rooted — for the dividing rationes must bear themselves equally and immediately to the divided

ratio, and not one of them come to it by reason of another, otherwise they would not divide the common ratio. From this follows the other condition: that the dividing rationes do not maintain an order of prior and posterior among themselves, but stand equally immediately to the divided ratio. And this is how substance and accident stand in relation to being, which they divide. He proves the second claim: because no ratio can be conceived that comes to being more primally than the ratio of substance and accident — since when being expresses the having of an essence, if this essence is to be determined to some more particular mode of being, certainly it can be contracted to nothing more immediately than to existing per se or to existing in another.

Confirmation: because if these were not the first modes of being determining being, one would have to concede some being that is neither substance nor accident — namely that which would be constituted by modes of being more immediate to being itself — and this cannot even be conceived.

But although the first of what this author asserts is true — namely that this division is true and proper — his proof does not hold, since he assumes both the major and the minor to be false. The major, because the conditions of a good division were assigned in *disp. 1, Log., qu. 5, art. 1* from the common view of all, and none of those two conditions he recounts is listed there. For it often happens that a common divided descends into one dividing member dependently on another: number descends first into two before three; vitality is first contracted to vital power before vital act, since the latter is vital dependently on the former; being descends first into God before creature — which could be confirmed by other examples. Therefore those two conditions are not necessary for a good division, but only intervene when a common genus descends into its species in the same order. And this does not even occur in the present case, since substance is prior to accident through the whole genus, as appears from 7. *Met.* — where from the beginning of the book accident is called being because it is being in another sense, that is, dependently on substance — both in the genus of material cause and of efficient cause, as Scotus teaches at 4. *d. 12, q. 1*. Both the major and the minor assumed by Pasqualig are therefore false. It must therefore be said that this is a good division, since the conditions assigned in logic belong to it, as one who works through the matter will see — and also because the divided being in substance and accident is a common univocal to them, as is sufficiently clear from what was said in *disp. 2, de natura entis*.

The other assertion of the same Author — that this is a division of being as such — is against Sirectus in the cited place, who holds this to be a division of finite and created being. But for the correct resolution of this doubt, it must be recalled from what was said in *disp. 7, Log., q. 1, art. 1, ab initio*, that substance can be taken in two ways: most broadly, as importing any being per se, insofar as per se-ness excludes all inherence of accident — both actual and by aptitude — whether it has such a mode of being from itself or from another. In this sense it comprehends

God and all created substances, both simple and composite, and their parts whether essential or integral. Or it can be taken less broadly, as expressing being per se and in itself, existing and not in another after the manner of an accident, yet not from itself but from another. If substance is taken in the first way, it is true that together with accident it immediately divides being as such, transcendently common to God and creature. But if it is taken in the second way, substance together with accident divides only finite and created being — and in this sense Sirectus spoke. When being is divided into substance and accident, substance is taken in the second mode and not in the first, as Sirectus rightly observes. To his argument, then, the assumption must be denied. To the confirmation: although on the part of the thing in subjective being no being exists that is not either substance or accident, there does exist such in objective being and before the abstracting intellect with a foundation in the thing — in which sense there is also substance abstracting from corporeal and incorporeal, although on the part of the thing no substance exists that is not corporeal or spiritual.

You will further ask whether, taking substance in the second mode as Sirectus does, the division of finite being into substance and accident is immediate, such that it precedes the division of the same finite being into ten genera. Mauritius denies this in his marginal notes to the *Formalitates* of Sirectus in the cited place, where Vallo follows him, saying that Sirectus would have done better to divide finite being immediately into ten genera, but that he can be excused either for brevity — since it is shorter to say substance and accident than to enumerate the ten genera — or for circumlocution, since by saying accident he circumlocutes all nine genera. But in *disp. d. 6, log., q. 1* we showed at length that the division of finite being into substance and accident is truly prior in the nature of things to its division into ten genera, since those two concepts are prior and more immediate than the individual concepts of the ten genera. And this is indeed how the Master of the *Formalitates* understood it when he presents this division immediately through those two members — substance and accident. And it is altogether ridiculous to respond that he spoke thus for brevity — for what verbosity would there have been in saying that finite being divides into ten genera, even if he did not wish to enumerate them individually? But for this, see *the cited logical disputation*.

Finally, real being is customarily divided by some through other divisions of lesser moment and less frequent occurrence: into real positive being and real negative or privative being — placing all positive entities under the first member and all negations and privations, verified of their subjects on the part of the thing without any thinking intellect, under the second. But we have said enough about this division in *disp. 2, de natura entis, q. 9, art. 3*, where it was concluded that this division is a mere division of an equivocal into equivocates, because no one ratio of being is given prescinding from the positive and the negative — since real being as such, from its formal concept, expresses something positive, so that real

negative being is a contradiction in terms. This we also proved in *disp. 4, Phys., q. 1, art. 1*.

Being is also customarily divided into the possible and the impossible, a division found in Aristotle, *5. Metaph. 17* and *9. Metaph. 6, 7, and 8*. The same judgment must be rendered about this as about the preceding one — namely that it is a division of an equivocal into equivocates, since the ratio of real being is entirely excluded from impossible being. For real being is called that which either exists in the nature of things or at least such existence is not repugnant to it; so that from the very fact that something finds existence in the nature of things repugnant, it cannot in any way be called real being — otherwise a chimera and a goat-stag could also be called real being. Since then impossible being is called that to which, from its formal ratio, existence in the nature of things is repugnant, it must be acknowledged that it cannot include the ratio of real being as a member contradistinct from possible being, and is called being only in a purely abusive sense.

Being is also customarily divided into material and immaterial, or corporeal and spiritual. But although both members of this division are positive and include the ratio of being as such — so that it can be called a true and univocal division — it still does not appear to be a proper division of being as such, since spirituality and corporeality are certain particular rationes determinative of substance and accident. Some substances are material, some immaterial; some accidents are corporeal, some spiritual. These divisive differences therefore do not belong immediately to being as such, but through the mediation of substance and accident — and therefore the division given through these members should not be assigned to being in its entire breadth but to substance and accident.

Question II: Whether Real Being Is Well Divided into Quantified and Non-Quantified

Beyond the divisions of being already cited and explained, Scotus assigned another principal one at *Quolibet 5, in solutione ad primum principale*: namely into quantified being and non-quantified being. He notes there, and also at *Quolibet 6*, that quantity is customarily taken in two ways: in one way for quantity of mass or bodily quantity, according to which bodies are extended, which belongs to the category of quantity; in another way for quantitative perfection or quantity of power, of which Augustine speaks in *6. de Trin., c. 7*, when he says: "In those things that are not great by mass, that is greater which is better." This latter is transcendent, and is found in corporeal and incorporeal things alike, in created things and in the divine. Nor is it without reason that the term quantity has been transferred from corporeal things to signify the grade of perfection of things — for in bodies we apprehend that this body is of such and such a magnitude and no greater, because it reaches this limit and extends no further; and that would be called infinite mass or infinite magnitude if it had no limit but extended to infinity. Since then we conceive things only through the senses, proceeding from

bodies and by proportion to them, we use a similar analogy to explain the entitative perfection of all things — whether corporeal or spiritual. We apprehend in them a certain breadth of entitative perfection in which various grades of perfection are contained, and we say that one is finite and limited in perfection — having such and such a degree of perfection and no more, neither formally nor eminently — and that another is infinite in perfection, because it contains all possible grades of perfection in the entire breadth of being, either formally or eminently, in the way in which it is possible for all of them to be contained in one.

When therefore being is divided into quantified and non-quantified, quantity is not taken in the first way for quantity of mass but in the second way for quantity of power and perfection. And from this the Doctor infers in the cited place that the division of being into finite and infinite, presented above, depends on this one and is a kind of subdivision of one of its members — namely quantified being — which he proves because finite and infinite belong to quantity in *1. Phys. 15*. This is true of finite and infinite and quantity properly taken; and so extending the language in the same way, finite and infinite as attributes of being belong precisely to being that has quantity of power in itself — that is, some perfection.

The whole difficulty arising around this division is that it seems impossible to assign — or at least very difficult — the second member of this division, namely non-quantified being. For since this is posited as a division of real being, as common to God and creatures, it seems to involve a contradiction: since no real being can be given that does not have its own perfection, finite or infinite in the entire order of entities, and consequently quantity of power. The assumption is proved because good is said of every being, since it is its adequate attribute. Therefore also perfect — for good and perfect are the same, as Scotus acknowledges at *4. d. 31, q. 1, §. Ad questionem*, following Aristotle, *5. Met., cap. de perfecto*. If therefore every being is good, it will also be perfect and quantified.

Nor does it avail what many Scotists say, following Lichetus, *1. d. 8, q. 2*, and Vallo, *tr. form., art. 1, prin.* — that good and perfect are attributes of quantified being and not of being taken most broadly as common to quantified and non-quantified. For against this it holds that unity, truth, and goodness are attributes of real being in its entire breadth — as it is common to God and creatures, as it is the adequate object of Metaphysics, and as it is opposed to nothing and to being of reason. Being cannot be taken in a broader and more extensive sense in which it is still real. Therefore good is an attribute of real being in the greatest possible breadth applicable to it. Also because these attributes are proved and demonstrated of real being through its quidditative concept — namely that it is what is not repugnant to existing in the nature of things — as is clear from *disp. 4, de passionibus entis*. Therefore either that concept belongs to the being superior to quantified and non-quantified being, or it does not. If not, then what is divided into quantified and non-quantified will not be real being, which is contrary to the assumption. If yes, then unity, truth, and goodness also belong to it adequately — and so it is

repugnant to it to be divided into quantified and non-quantified being, since it already belongs to goodness as an adequate attribute, and consequently will be throughout quantified being.

Nor does it help what other Scotists say, as Rada indicates at *contr.* 27, p. 1, in *solutione ad 4. princ.*, where he says something can be called perfect in two ways: first, with transcendental perfection, which only excludes a negation of being or defect according to proper nature — and in this sense he concedes every being is perfect and appetible; second, something is called perfect with quantitative perfection, according to which something is apt to be a measure or measured, exceeding or exceeded in relation to another. This perfection, he says, is proper to quantified being alone, according to Scotus in the cited place, and it is in this sense that in the said division perfection is excluded from non-quantified being; and a being can exist in the nature of things that is not quantified and not perfect in this second mode. I say this response does not help — because perfection taken in the second mode is not distinguished from perfection taken in the first mode, or if it is, and is not an attribute of being, it is still at least an intrinsic mode of it, as we said above in *disp.* 5, q. 12, ar. 1, n. 259, following Scotus, *Quolibet* 6, §. *Contra ista*. And goodness, which is an attribute of being, is founded on the perfection of being thus taken. Therefore if perfection taken also in the second mode is an intrinsic mode of real being as such, then again the argument returns that no real being can be assigned that is not quantified and perfect. And thus the division of real being into quantified and non-quantified appears to be contradictory in terms. This is the arduous difficulty that seems to entirely undermine this division, and which the more recent authors commonly employ to attack it — though not always with the same evidence and with the same multiplicity of objections as we have now adduced. So Suarez, *disp.* 4, *Metaph.*, sect. 8, and again *disp.* 28, sect. 2; Pasqualig., *tom.* 1, *Metaph.*, *disp.* 32, sect. 2; Acerbus, *lib.* 1, *quaest. Peripatet.*, *quaest.* 1; and commonly both recent and older Theologians in the tract on the Trinity, while disputing whether the relations of origin in God express perfection.

Notwithstanding all this, it must be said that this division of real being into quantified and non-quantified must necessarily be admitted — though not in such a univocal and strictly proper sense as is commonly assumed by the Scotists, as if the concept of being common to quantified and non-quantified were a concept distinct from the concept of being common to finite and infinite, and truly superior to it. This conclusion has two parts.

As for the first part — that such a division must be admitted — this is held by all Scotists, since it is plainly posited by Scotus in the cited place. They prove it by assigning and clarifying the member that caused the difficulty, saying that those non-quantified beings — which express neither perfection nor imperfection but prescind from both — are the constitutive relations of origin of the divine persons: Paternity, Filiation, and Passive Spiration. And so they freely concede

that this division of being is not philosophical or Metaphysical but purely Theological, and that its light has come to us from nowhere else than from the hidden mystery of the Trinity. Therefore it is no wonder that the philosophers did not recognize it and said that every being is quantified with quantity of power and possesses in the entire order of entities its own proper perfection in its grade. So Vallo in the *tract. Formalit.*, with many others there, in the explanation of this division.

That the relations of origin in God express neither perfection nor imperfection formally, as they are distinguished from the divine essence by a distinction from the nature of the thing, the Scotists prove commonly in the cited place and in the tract on the Trinity from reasons drawn from the Doctor, *Quolibet* 5, where he proves it at length from three or four nearly demonstrative reasons, which can be seen in him and in the other Scotists around that passage. But the more recent authors not only endeavor to refute those arguments but also accuse Scotus and the Scotists of manifest begging of the question and of a vicious circle in this matter: when they are asked why the relations of origin in God express neither perfection nor imperfection formally, or why they are neither formally finite nor infinite, they respond from Scotus, *Quolibet, cit., in fine*, that this is because they are not quantified beings with quantity of power — just as finite and infinite in extension belong only to what is quantified by quantity of mass, so finite and infinite in intension belong only to what is quantified by quantity of power. But when in turn they are asked why the relations of origin are not also quantified, they respond that it is because they are neither formally finite nor infinite, and every quantified being is either finite or infinite. But who does not see that this is a manifest begging of the question and a vicious circle, since each is proved by the other in turn?

However, if Scotus and the Scotists are read carefully in this matter, anyone will see that they commit neither a begging of the question nor a vicious circle. They assert that the relations of origin do not formally express perfection or imperfection — or are not formally finite or infinite — because they are not quantified beings. But they do not then prove that they are not quantified beings by the fact that they are neither finite nor infinite nor perfectly nor imperfectly formal, stopping there. Rather, they show it through other arguments: namely, if they expressed infinite perfection, then in one person there would be an infinite perfection not found in another — just as there is one relation not found in another — and so none of the divine persons would be supremely perfect, since it would not unite within itself all infinite perfection. Also because then there would be several formally infinite things really distinct from each other, since the relations of origin in God are really distinct from each other. Also because every quantified being compared to another is either exceeding or exceeded — but a divine relation can be neither: not exceeded, because then it would be formally finite; not exceeding, because then it would be the measure and standard of beings, which is false, since the first measure of all is necessarily one, since in any

one genus there is only one first thing that is the measure of the rest, while the divine relations are several and really distinct from each other. By these and similar arguments, I say, Scotus and the Scotists prove that the divine relations do not formally express either perfection or imperfection — not simply and absolutely from the bare fact that they are not quantified beings without further reason, for then they would indeed be committing a begging of the question and a vicious circle.

I concede, however, that the more recent authors were not entirely without reason in accusing the Scotists of begging the question in this matter, insofar as they wish to comprehend under non-quantified being only the relations of origin in God — for in so asserting they appear to adduce an instance only in the precise point under question, which is to commit a begging of the question: for what ought to be proved and falls into controversy is assumed as true and certain. To make this clear: the point being agitated between the Scotists and the Thomists is precisely this — whether the divine relations, precisely considered, express infinite perfection formally. The Scotists deny this because they are not quantified beings. The Thomists press: all beings individually possess their own perfection in their order, and at the very least it is an intrinsic grade and mode of being; and they say the division of being into quantified and non-quantified is a mere fiction, invented for no other purpose than to save this Scotist assertion about the divine relations, since under non-quantified being we assign no beings other than the divine relations — which are precisely the thing in question. This is to adduce an instance in the very point at issue and to commit a begging of the question. And this instance seems to me difficult to escape if we place only the relations of origin under non-quantified being, since when no non-quantified beings other than themselves are assigned, an instance is adduced only in the precise point under question.

Confirmation: to assert that all individual created beings — even the relations themselves — express their own perfection in their order and are quantified beings, while denying this only of the divine relations, seems to prejudice the infinite divine perfection — since nothing in God can be worse than a created thing. And so, to avoid this inconvenience and not appear to beg the question, we must assign other non-quantified beings even in creatures, besides the divine relations, and say that this division of non-quantified being is not purely Theological but philosophical and Metaphysical — such that even if by the impossible the divine relations did not exist, there would still be non-quantified beings in creatures and the division of being into quantified and non-quantified would still stand, contrary to Vallo and other Scotists in the cited place.

Therefore it must be established that under non-quantified being are contained not only the divine relations, but also the attributes of being, intrinsic modes, ultimate differences — especially individual and hypostatic ones — and in short all the ultimate realities of things, which are called aliquidities of being. For just

as these do not directly and quiddatively include the formal ratio of being, as was said in *disp. 2, q. 7, art. 1*, so neither do they include proper and formal goodness — which is an attribute of being — nor consequently in a direct line the proper quantity of perfection — which is an intrinsic mode of being — since the latter is the foundation of the former. And indeed the Doctor himself clarified the matter this way in *Quolibet 19*, where he explicitly teaches that all hypostatic realities are non-quantified beings. For at *art. 2, infra litt. D*, he has these words: "And to the point: the hypostatic entity does not have essential priority with respect to the creature, because essential order is per se among essences, distinguishing essences against hypostatic entity — for forms, that is, the quiddities of things, are related as in *num. 8, Viet., Metaph. 10*. Also the hypostatic entity is not simply perfect or simply a perfection, as was said in the question raised about this" — by which question he understands *Quolibet 5*, as is noted there in the margin. And he speaks still more clearly below at *litt. R*: "And when it is added that what terminates dependence must be perfect — although a distinction can be made here — properly speaking perfection does not seem to belong except to quidditative entity, because hypostatic entity is not that according to which something is formally perfected, but that according to which it receives perfection, or at least is determined to the received perfection." Hence the true and proper a priori reason why the relations of origin in God are not quantified beings is that they are hypostatic rationes and ultimately constitutive and distinctive of the divine persons. And the Doctor himself assigned this very reason in *Quolibet 5, in fine*, when he says: "It could also be said that quantitative virtuality belongs only to quidditative entity, as it is distinguished from hypostatic entity; and consequently neither finiteness nor infinity. Yet this entity, though it is in a certain way quidditative in itself, as such is only hypostatic." And although he adds there that this response assumes certain dubious points about hypostatic entity — namely that it does not have quantitative virtuality — he says this not because the response is not good, but because he had not yet determined this point: whether hypostatic entity expresses perfection — which was to be resolved in *Quolibet 19*. Since he then resolves there assertively that all hypostatic rationes formally include no perfection, he consequently approves that response adduced in *Quolibet 5* as good — and this he did especially in those words already cited: "the hypostatic entity also is not simply perfect or simply a perfection, as was said in the question raised about this." For by these words he indicates that the response adduced in *Quolibet 5* is good — namely that the relations of origin in God do not formally express perfection precisely because they are hypostatic entities.

You will say that active spiration in God displays no infinite perfection, and yet it is not the ultimate constitutive relation of any divine person, as theologians commonly teach. Therefore it is false that the relations of origin in God do not express infinite perfection formally because they are hypostatic rationes and ultimately constitutive. I respond: there are those who say that active spiration is the constitutive relation of the Son in personal being, or in some way pertains to

the constitutive of the Son — as Aureolus at *1. dist. 1, qu. 1, art. 3, prop. 4*. And on this view the proposed argument would have no difficulty. But this way of speaking is not only against the common view of Theologians and the Fathers who unhesitatingly teach that the Son in God is ultimately constituted in personal being through Filiation, but also against reason. For the constitutive reason of some individual in individual and personal being, and what distinguishes it from any other in such being, must be proper and peculiar to it, not common to several — indeed this directly contradicts the ratio of the hypostatic, which must be incommunicable. Since then active spiration in God is common to several persons — namely to the Father and the Son — it is plainly repugnant that it should constitute the Son in personal being. Also because the Thomists, although they assert the Son is personally distinguished from the Holy Spirit through active spiration, such that if the Holy Spirit were not distinguished from the Son he would no longer be really distinct from him — nevertheless they dare not say that the Son is constituted in personal being through active spiration, for they acknowledge that active spiration is a property as it were adventitious to the Holy Spirit already constituted in his personal being. Therefore it is false and erroneous to assert that the Son is constituted in personal being through active spiration — and to pursue this error further pertains to the Theologian.

I respond therefore: the Doctor does not prove through a single argument in *Quolibet 5* that the relations of origin in God do not display infinite perfection formally, but through several. Even if therefore the stated reason does not hold for active spiration, since it is not an ultimately constitutive reality and a hypostatic reality, it still holds for the other relations of origin, which are ultimately constitutive. And for active spiration the same can be proved through the other arguments briefly indicated above in n. 29, which Scotus adduces in *Quolibet 5* and which prove indifferently for all and each of the relations of origin, whether they are ultimately constitutive or not. Nor do I assert that only ultimately constitutive realities and hypostatic rationes are non-quantified beings — I say only that these also are contained under non-quantified being, since besides them other non-quantified beings are also found, as is clear from what was said.

This is a very easy way of explaining the ratio of non-quantified being — which the Scotists have hitherto not explained clearly enough without the danger of begging the question. According to it, the division of being into quantified and non-quantified is also easily understood and defended, and whatever is contained under the second member can be assigned without difficulty: for whatever does not include the ratio of being formally and quiddatively, but only denominatively and really, is called non-quantified being and is contained under non-quantified being.

From this same doctrine the difficulty proposed in n. 27 can also easily be addressed. It is now clearly established what the second member of the division

of being into quantified and non-quantified is. It is also established that what is divided into quantified and non-quantified being is not real being common to God and creatures, such that the members are properly inferiors in which it is essentially included — since non-quantified beings are not real beings essentially and quiddatively but only identically and really, being really identified with real being and, by reason of such identity alone, outside nothing. Hence one may not infer — as was argued there — that each of the members of this division must have its own proper perfection, finite or infinite in the entire order of entities, and consequently quantity of power. For this would only follow if each of those members contained the ratio of real being formally and quiddatively within itself — which does not belong to non-quantified being. Finally, it is established that this division on this explanation is not purely Theological but Metaphysical and philosophical.

From this, the other part of the conclusion stated in n. 28 is proved — namely that this division of being into quantified and non-quantified is not so univocal that the concept of being common to quantified and non-quantified is a concept distinct from the concept of being common to the finite and infinite, and truly superior to it, as the Scotists commonly think. The reason is that the Doctor at *1. dist. 4, qu. 3* and frequently elsewhere teaches that being — which is common to God and creature, to finite and infinite — has a concept that is simply simple. But this would be false given that hypothesis, because then real being — which is divided into finite and infinite — would quiddatively include another, more common concept, namely that of being superior to quantified and non-quantified being, and so the concept of real being common to finite and infinite would be resolvable into further concepts — namely the determinable and the determining — and would thus not be simply simple.

Confirmation: if such a concept of being — divided into quantified and non-quantified — is posited as distinct from the concept of being divided into finite and infinite, and as truly superior to it, then the difficulty raised at the outset of the question in n. 27 concludes perfectly well against the division of being into quantified and non-quantified. For either this concept is of real being or of being of reason. Not the second, for then quantified and non-quantified being would be beings of reason. If the first, then plainly such a division appears altogether repugnant, because — as was argued there — it is impossible to give any real being that does not have its own proper perfection, finite or infinite in the entire order of entities, and consequently quantity of power. For just as no real being can be given devoid of all goodness — since goodness is the adequate attribute of real being as such — so neither can a being be given without its own proper perfection. For perfection is either the same as goodness, or at least the latter is founded on the essential perfection of a thing — as has often been said. And it is altogether unreasonable to wish to separate and divide one from the other.

Furthermore, from another angle too this division cannot be properly univocal, as of a superior to inferiors: because whenever some superior is divided into two or more members as into its inferiors, through various differences or modes, then one member or one species constituted thereby exceeds or is exceeded by another — since as is held in *10. Metaph. 16*, one of the differences or contracting modes is more perfect or less perfect than another, and hence in *8. Metaph. 10* the species are said to be related to each other as numbers. If therefore this is a true and proper division of a superior into its inferiors, then each of the dividing members compared to another will be more perfect or less perfect, just as one contracting difference or mode is more or less perfect than another. And so each dividing member will be quantified being — the consequence of which is proved because quantified being is called that which compared to another exceeds or is exceeded.

And it would be from this being — taken most broadly in the acceptation according to which it is posited as the adequate object of the intellect and the subject of Metaphysics — that being which is common to God and creatures, to finite and infinite, as is clear from the Doctor at *1. dist. 3, q. 3*, and is called by the Scotists being taken transcendently. Therefore no concept superior to this can be given that would still be called a concept of real being and be said to be common and superior to quantified and non-quantified being — since then being under that more common acceptation would have to be posited as the adequate object of the intellect and of Metaphysics, not merely as it is common to finite and infinite, or to God and creatures.

Therefore when the Doctor suggests at *Quolibet 5, in fine* that being must first be divided into quantified and non-quantified, and then quantified being into finite and infinite — as if the latter were a subdivision of the former — this should not be understood so rigorously as to make both of them true and proper divisions of a univocal superior into its inferiors, with the concept of being common to quantified and non-quantified being truly distinct in reality from the concept of being common to finite and infinite and truly superior to it. Rather, it should be understood that being can be considered in two ways: either in relation to those things in which it is essentially included and of which it is quiddatively predicated, or also in relation to those things that it contains only really and identically, not as inferiors in which it is essentially included — such as the attributes of being, intrinsic modes, and ultimate differences of things, especially individual ones, as was said in *disp. 2, qu. 7, art. 1* — according to the twofold primacy the Doctor assigns to it at *1. dist. 3, qu. 3, §. quantum ad 2. art. 5*, of community and of virtuality.

According to the first consideration, being is divided into finite and infinite by a univocal division (though mixed with analogy) and properly so called, because it is divided as a superior into its inferiors in which it is essentially included; and with respect to these it is a univocal predicate, and also univocally and in quid predicated of them. According to the second consideration, being is divided into

those members not as a superior into inferiors — since it is not essentially included in each of them quiddatively — and so although with respect to them it is a univocal predicate, it is not univocally predicated of them in quid, as the Doctor notes in the cited place. This was explained at length in *disp* 2, *q.* 6, *art.* 2. And because the division of being into quantified and non-quantified entirely coincides with this second consideration, it has therefore been rightly said that this is not a wholly univocal and fully proper division — as if the concept of being common to quantified and non-quantified were properly distinct from the concept of being common to finite and infinite and truly superior to it. For in reality it is the very same concept of real being, which compared to those things in which it is essentially included is called quantified being and is divided into finite and infinite; and compared to those things it also contains only identically and really — such as its attributes, modes, and ultimate differences — it is said to abstract from quantified and non-quantified being and to be divided into them, as a more common and superior concept. And it is precisely for this reason that the division of being into quantified and non-quantified is said to precede the division of being into finite and infinite: because being has a greater breadth and scope according to the primacy of virtuality — according to which it also regards its attributes, modes, and ultimate differences — than according to the primacy of community or predication, according to which it regards only its inferiors in which it is essentially included. It is in this sense, then, that the Doctor in *Quolibet* 5, *in fine* is to be understood when he says that being is first divided into quantified and non-quantified before it is divided into finite and infinite.

Objections Resolved

Both early and more recent Thomists and neutrals attack this division of being into quantified and non-quantified with many arguments.

First, Pasqualig., *tom.* 2, *Metaph.*, *disp.* 22, *sect.* 2, *n.* 8, proves this division to be altogether repugnant. Just as it is contradictory for some real being to express no goodness — since goodness is an attribute of being taken most broadly — so neither can any be given without its proper perfection, since entitative perfection is either the same as the goodness of a thing, or the latter is founded on it. Also because the perfection of each thing — speaking of essential perfection — is not distinguished from the essence but is entirely the same as it; hence as great as the essence, so great the perfection; and if the essence is finite or infinite, so too the perfection.

Moreover, non-quantified being would have to express some ratio of being superadded to being as such, and a proportion ought to be preserved between the contracting ratio and what is contracted — namely that what is inchoated in the contracted thing is completed by the contracting. Being as such, then, just as it is the foundation and beginning of any real entity, is also the foundation and beginning of any perfection; and moreover any ratio superadded must in some way perfect it, since it is contracted through them to some grade of essence.

Finally, this division is to be refuted because it is given through contradictorily opposed differences, which is impossible. For a positive ratio that is divided must be divided through positive rationes, so that diverse positive members emerge. The assumption is proved because quantified and non-quantified are contradictorily opposed — since what one asserts, the other denies.

And one should not say that non-quantified being circumscribes something positive, yet does not express any perfection — because this implies a contradiction in terms: since what is not perfect must formally express the negation of what expresses perfection; and if perfection as such expresses something positive, then "not perfect" must express something negative.

I respond: these and similar arguments proceed from the fact that our adversaries think we are asserting this to be a true and proper division, through which real being is divided into quantified and non-quantified as into inferiors in which it is essentially included. Granted this, the arguments would certainly have force. But it is now clear from what was said that being is not divided into quantified and non-quantified in this sense — since what is contained under the second member, namely under non-quantified being, does not include being formally and quiddatively but only really and identically, and therefore does not express either its own goodness or its own perfection distinct from the goodness and perfection of real being, with which it is really identified.

To the other objection, the response is equally clear through the same: because the argument presupposes that in this division of being into quantified and non-quantified, real being is divided — which is the beginning and inchoation of every reality in beings — as into inferiors through differences; which is false. Also because if this were posited as a true and proper division, then the divided common being should not be posited as the beginning and inchoation of every perfection — for this would belong only to quantified being precisely, while being abstracting from quantified and non-quantified would be indifferent to being or not being the inchoation of perfection, just as we say of anything common in relation to its contracting elements.

To the last I say it is not novel for one member of a division to be explained through a negation that conveys a positive grade of being — and so in the present case non-quantified being imports something positive that formally expresses no grade of perfectional quantity. Just as when being is divided into quantified and non-quantified speaking of quantity of mass — that is, into corporeal and incorporeal, or non-corporeal — by non-quantified and non-corporeal being something positive is circumscribed, namely spiritual being, and not a simple and pure negation.

Second, Suarez, *disp. 28, Metaph., sect. 2*, proves that this division of being into quantified and non-quantified is repugnant in many respects. But in truth this author, as he declares there from n. 4, attacks this division as explained chiefly by

Lichetus, not as presented absolutely by Scotus. Therefore his reasoning does not trouble me, since I do not explain this division in the way Lichetus presents it. Yet another argument can be derived from Suarez in the cited place and in *lib. 3, de Trinit., cap. 9 and 10*, which shows absolutely that this division is repugnant. For quantified being is called that to which perfection is owed in some grade, while non-quantified being is called that to which by its nature no perfection whatsoever is owed — and therefore as far as concerns itself it prescinds from all perfection and imperfection. But from the very fact that non-quantified being is explained this way, it is no longer posited as prescinding from all perfection or imperfection. For who would not acknowledge that it is the height of imperfection to be such a being to which no perfection is owed according to its proper ratio? Therefore this division from its very explanation appears repugnant.

I respond easily by denying the minor with its proof, because imperfection is not just any lack and negation of perfection, but of a perfection that is owed and possible. Hence if no perfection is owed to something, that thing cannot properly be called imperfect — since it lacks no perfection due to it. Therefore when it is said that to be a being to which no perfection is owed is the greatest imperfection, the response is: this would certainly be true if perfection were possible for it. But a being that is called non-quantified is not capable of any perfection — indeed perfection is impossible to it and repugnant to it insofar as it is such — and therefore it cannot properly be called imperfect, but only in a negative sense, insofar as imperfect means the same as not-perfect.

Third, Aureolus, *1. dist. 19, ar. 3*, argues: every being is quantified, because it is either finite or infinite, and therefore non-quantified being is repugnant. He proves the assumption: because no thing can be posited without expressing some grade of entity and some actuality, and that actuality is necessarily either finite or infinite.

Confirmation: although not every thing is finite or infinite by dimension — since the angel, abstracting from all dimension, is not; nor even virtually and actively, since not every thing is a principle of acting — yet everything is finite or infinite: finite and limited, as every creature; or infinite, as God. And therefore we ourselves said above in n. 4 that the division of being through finite and infinite is adequate.

I respond by denying the assumption with its proof, since it falsely supposes that non-quantified being is a thing and formally and quiddatively a being — which we deny, since it is a being only identically and really. In which sense also it can be called finite and infinite.

To the confirmation: every being is finite and infinite — either formally and directly by reason of itself, or by reason of another with which it is really identical. And in this sense we said above that the division of being through finite and

infinite is adequate, and that non-quantified beings in this sense are comprehended under it.

Fourth, they further argue from the divine relations, which if they are once proved to express perfection are thought to have destroyed this division, since non-quantified being is posited for the divine relations as the Scotists commonly concede. They prove thus: the relations insofar as they are distinguished from the essence are good, therefore they express perfection. The consequence is clear from what was often said. The assumption is proved: whether you take goodness as the integrity of the thing — for it is certain that relations have everything required for their concept — whether as the conformity of one thing to another, for the relations truly conform to the divine essence, being the term demanded by its communicability; whether as appetibility, for they are the object of divine complacency; whether as some dignity, for they are the object of adoration.

You will say: all these belong to the relations by reason of the essence. Against this: the discussion is about the relations insofar as they are distinguished from the essence. If then those definitions of goodness belong to them as such, they must also have goodness itself.

Confirmation: the relations, insofar as they are distinguished from the essence, are intelligible and have some modal intelligibility, and therefore they must also have some similar goodness.

I respond: first, the arguments drawn from the divine relations press us little, since besides the divine relations we also recognize other non-quantified beings in creatures, as is clear from what was said. But since the Scotists' famous position is that the divine relations are contained under non-quantified being, it will not be unworthwhile to touch briefly on the stronger arguments against it and dissolve them. To the proposed argument I say it coincides with those already adduced — for it supposes that the divine relations, as distinguished from the essence, are formally beings, and consequently good. But this is false, since as they ultimately constitute and distinguish the divine persons, they consequently do not formally include the reality of being in themselves. Otherwise there would be a process to infinity, as the Doctor proves at *1. dist. 3, q. 3, E*. Therefore they are neither good, nor do those definitions belong to them, except by reason of the essence with which they are identified — as was being said in the argument. And finally this argument drawn from goodness and intelligibility must be solved in the same way as it was dissolved above in *disp. 2, q. 7, art. 2*, when it was adduced to prove that the attributes of being, modes, and ultimate differences are formally good, intelligible, and therefore formally beings.

But the argument is urged against this doctrine from the Doctor himself in several places. For in *1. dist. 1, q. 2, §. Ad argumenta principalia*, responding to two arguments, he has that the good which is convertible with being is found in every genus, and that unity in God is posited essentially and notionally; therefore if the

relation is formally one, it will also be formally good, since there is no greater reason for one attribute than for another. And at *1. dist. 2, q. 7, KK.*, he says that being is predicated per se and in the first mode of such relations. And again at *dist. 11, q. 2, in solutione ad p.*, he says that the relation — both according to quiddity and according to being — remains in God, since in whatever mode something remains according to quiddity, it also remains according to being, by which he suggests that the relation in God retains its own entity and existence formally distinct from the divine essence. He signified the same at *Quolibet 3*.

There is also a special difficulty about active spiration: even if it were conceded that the other relations are not beings quiddatively because they are ultimately constitutive of the divine persons, this should not be conceded of active spiration, since it is common to two persons. Therefore at least active spiration will not be contained under non-quantified being.

To these and similar places the Scotists customarily respond from the Master of the *Formalitates*, *art. 2, minus prin.*, that being and thing are customarily used in two ways: first, for everything positive that by its nature is outside nothing — and in this sense intrinsic modes and ultimate differences are called things and beings; second, more strictly, for that which is precisely quidditative being or thing — and in this sense being or thing is predicated precisely of God and creature, absolute and respective, and of those that are in the direct predicamental line, and of matter and form. And in this sense neither the attributes of being nor the ultimate differences are called things or beings, but are said to be something of a thing and not a thing — taking thing in the second mode. And so in the present case they say that Scotus in the cited places calls the divine relations beings and things in the first signification, not the second, and therefore it may not be inferred that goodness or modal entitative perfection belongs to them, since goodness is an affection of being taken in the second mode.

This solution is not satisfying. First because that distinction taken from the Master of the *Formalitates* is useless and vain, as was noted in *disp. 2, q. 7, ar. 2, n. 211*: for real being is defined as that which is outside nothing and apart from all operation of the intellect, and by this it is distinguished from being of reason; and goodness is the adequate attribute of being thus taken. Therefore from the very fact that something is in this way from its nature outside nothing, it must and can be said formally and quiddatively to be a being and a thing. Therefore being and thing in the second signification are not distinguished from being in the first signification — so that what is a being and a thing in the first mode will also be a being in the second mode, and consequently good and perfect with modal entitative perfection. Therefore if once it is conceded that the relations of origin are things and beings in the first mode, it cannot be avoided that they are also beings in the second mode and formally participate in goodness, which is an attribute of being.

Moreover, even granting that distinction about the names of being and thing, it is still not well applied to the present case — because the Doctor in the cited places,

especially at *1. dist. 1, qu. 2*, speaks of being whose attributes are goodness and unity, as is clear from the very context. Therefore those passages maintain that the relations of origin are beings also in the second signification, not merely in the first.

Briefly, it could be said of these passages that the Doctor speaks in this way because he had not yet determined whether the ultimately constitutive realities are formally distinct in themselves and from themselves — for this was to be determined below in *dist. 3, q. 3*, and *dist. 7*, and *dist. 8, q. 2*, and *dist. 13, 23, and 26*. And I think this solution is the most complete of all.

To address each individual passage: for the first, it must be noted that although the Doctor in the arguments seems to be speaking of relations, in the response he speaks of persons, as is clear when he distinguishes being into quidditative being and being that has a quiddity. And it is one thing to speak of the person and another of the relation itself by which it is constituted — since it can be conceded that the divine supposit, as it is formally a being, is also formally one and good, while this cannot be conceded of the relation, because it is the ultimately constitutive of the divine person.

For the second, Bargius labors greatly at that passage in its explanation, and disputes about the resolution of the doubt whether ultimately constitutive realities can be called formally and quiddatively beings, adducing several arguments for the affirmative side; ultimately holding the opposite together with the common Scotist way, he dissolves them, and for the solution of the seventh — which consisted in Scotus's authority, where he says that being is predicated per se and in the first mode of the relations of origin — he says that the expression per se primo should not be expounded in the first mode of per se predication, but should be understood thus: that according to its formal ratio the relation is being and not merely insofar as it is really identical with the essence, just as we would say that rational is a thing per se primo — that is, according to its formal ratio — and not merely insofar as it is really identified with man. He says this passage of the Doctor, which is most difficult, cannot be expounded in any other way, and he greatly congratulates himself on this solution, saying he labored most intensely on it to resolve it.

But I am sorry that Bargius wasted his effort on a solution that is worth nothing at all. For it neither fits the text, where the Doctor says not per se primo but in the first mode of per se predication that being is predicated of the divine relation; nor does it resolve the difficulty, because if Paternity in God, for example, according to its formal ratio is being and not merely insofar as it is really identified with the divine essence, then it plainly follows that being is included in the formal ratio of Paternity. It is therefore better to say, as I indicated: that the Doctor speaks thus because he had not yet determined whether the ultimately constitutive realities are formally diverse in themselves.

For the other passage from *11. dist. 1*: it must be said that Scotus does not there take the being of the relation rigorously for the entity or existence of the relation, but broadly for any being on the part of the thing independently of the intellect — in which sense being and existing also belong to ultimately constitutive realities, and suffices for grounding the formal distinction that the Doctor there endeavored to preserve between the relation and the essence.

For the difficulty drawn from active spiration: it is very probable that none of the divine relations of origin has its own proper and peculiar entity and existence in the direct line, but that all and each of them exist obliquely by reason of the divine nature with which they are identified — as the Doctor expressly indicates at *1. dist. 5, q. 2, infra litt. Q*, where he says that the essence is as it were the form of the relation, because it is that by which the relation is. Therefore the relation in God does not exist per se and by itself, but exists through the essence as through its proper form. Following this way of speaking — which Vulpes endorses and approves at *disp. 53, de Trinit., art. 8*, with other refined Scotists — active spiration, even though it is not the ultimately constitutive of any divine person, is still not quiddatively a being and not in the direct line, and is therefore contained under non-quantified being. But if it is conceded that active spiration is formally a being, I acknowledge that the proposed difficulty presses — because, as has often been said, quantity of power, or entitative perfection, is either the very goodness that is an attribute of real being, or some intrinsic mode of it, and the one cannot be found without the other, as Scotus says at *Quolibet 6, M*.

Fifth: the created relation is a quantified being, therefore so much more the divine relation. The consequence is clear because the divine relation is nobler than the created relation. The assumption is proved from the Doctor at *Quolibet 5, in fine*, where he says that the created relation is contained under quantified being; and at *1. dist. 28, q. ult.*, he says the genus of relation is divided through opposed differences, of which one is more perfect than the other.

Vulpes responds at *disp. 53, de Trinit., art. 9, n. 15*, denying the assumption with its proof — for the Doctor never taught in *Quolibet 5* that the created relation is formally contained under quantified being as a quidditative being. He adds that only three genera are beings in this way, such that being, immediately indifferent to the ten genera, is precisely finite being but not equally divided into the ten genera as if all of them were quiddatively beings. Since then created relations are said to be beings only identically and obliquely, not formally and directly, they formally include only imperfection and only identically perfection — unlike the divine relations, which identically include the infinite perfection of the divine essence.

This response involves much that is false and repugnant. First, it is false that the Doctor at *Quolibet 5, in fine* does not place the created relation under quantified being — for he says that being, as immediately indifferent to the ten genera, is precisely finite being; but finite being is quantified being; therefore the Doctor

there clearly teaches that the created relation is contained under quantified being. Indeed Vulpes himself acknowledges this when he says that being immediately descending into the ten genera is finite being.

Moreover it is false that finite being does not descend into all ten genera such that each of them is a quidditative being. For although not all that divides being is equally perfect, each nonetheless formally participates in the ratio of being, as Scotus rightly teaches at 2. *dist.* 1, q. 5, §. And if he also speaks at *Quolibet* 3, *ab initio*.

And when Vulpes at n. 16 says that all relations are habitudes of being and its circumstances, and therefore are not beings quiddatively, that is, formally and directly, but only identically — this is a false deduction. For as the Doctor argues in the second cited place: although the relation is a habitude of being and its circumstance, it is not therefore absolutely nothing. For although a mode is not as much a thing as that of which it is the mode, it is not therefore no thing at all, since what is absolutely nothing is nothing — and so the relation falls under the division of being in itself, according to Aristotle, 5. *Met.* Therefore although the relation may be called a mode and circumstance of being, yet if it is posited as outside the intellect and as something really superadded to the foundation, and not as its intrinsic mode, it must still be called a being formally and quiddatively, not merely identically and obliquely.

Moreover: either Vulpes concedes that the predicamental relation is really distinct from its foundation and is something really superadded to the extremes, or not. If not, he lapses into Nominalism and departs from Scotus. If yes, then it is repugnant for the relation to be called a being only identically — since this means being called a being by reason of real identity with the foundation, which does not at all belong to the predicamental relation, which we hold to be really distinct from the foundation according to the Doctor in the cited place, as was said in logic.

Finally, it is repugnant what he says — that the created relation formally includes imperfection: it is repugnant, I say, to what he had said just above — that the created relation is not contained under quantified being. For quantified being is that which compared to another is more perfect or less perfect, exceeding or exceeded, while non-quantified being is that which prescinds from both perfection and imperfection. Therefore if the created relation formally includes imperfection by reason of itself, by this very inclusion it must be called quantified being, not non-quantified being as Vulpes maintained.

Trombeta, 1. *Metaph.*, qu. 1, art. 1 and in the *tract. form.*, laboring over this division adduces a response to the proposed difficulty from those who say that it was not the Doctor's intention to remove from the relation all quantity of power, but only that which pertains to the ratio of active principle — wishing that the relation cannot be an active principle, just as it cannot per se terminate an action or motion, according to 5. *Phys.* Trombeta attacks this solution because on it, it would

similarly follow that he denied quantity of power to quantity of mass — which is a genus and a category — just as he denied it to the relation, since quantity of mass is equally not among the active forms, just as is the relation. And so he himself responds differently: the created relation is quantified because it is formally finite; while the divine relation is not quantified because it is neither finite nor infinite.

But he neither refutes the others' solution well nor responds well himself. He does not refute it well, because his attack presupposes that the others' solution would say the Doctor denied the relation all quantity of power because he denies it the perfection of the active principle. Hence against them he infers that the Doctor would similarly have denied quantity of mass the quantity of power for the same reason — since quantity of mass is equally not among the active ones. But the others' solution does not assume this; indeed it says the opposite: that although the Doctor denied the relation that quantity of power which pertains to the ratio of active principle, it was not his intention to remove from the relation all quantity of power whatsoever. Trombeta therefore badly draws that consequence against the stated solution.

And nor does he respond well himself — for when he says the created relation is quantified because it is finite, and the divine relation is not quantified because it is neither finite nor infinite, this is plainly a manifest begging of the question: for this is precisely what is being asked — why just as the created relation is finite, the uncreated is not similarly formally infinite; and why just as the created relation is placed under quantified being, so also the divine, which is far nobler than the created relation. To avoid begging the question he adds afterward the reason assigned by the Doctor at *Quolibet 5, in fine*: namely that finiteness is repugnant to the divine relation because it would then have the ratio of a part and would be an imperfect entity, and it cannot be formally infinite because it would then be formally the first being, which is false; while finiteness is not repugnant to the created relation because being a part is not repugnant to it — and hence the created relation is quantified but not the divine.

More briefly it could be said in response to the proposed argument, following the doctrine presented above: the created relation is contained under quantified being, and not the divine, because it is not the ultimately constitutive of any supposit or person — as is the divine relation. And this response is also indicated by the Doctor himself at *Quolibet 5, cit., in fine*.

Sixth: the divine intellect is formally infinite, as all concede — for otherwise it would not comprehend the divine essence. But it is infinite not except because it is identical with the divine essence, which is primarily infinite. And Paternity is identical with it, therefore Paternity for the same reason is formally infinite.

For resolving this difficulty — which the Doctor raises in the cited terms at *Quolibet* — he adduces under *litt. X* notable doctrine, and finally in the form of

the argument he denies the minor, because the mere identity of the essence is not the sole reason for having formal infinity, but is a sufficient reason for everything to which infinity is not formally repugnant. But infinity is formally repugnant to every personal relation, as was proved, and to none of the essential attributes, such as the intellect.

And if you ask why infinity is compossible with the latter and not with the former, he says it can conversely be asked why communicability is repugnant to this one and not to the other, which all concede. And the response is the same: because of the ratio of the formal principle — because formally this is this and that is that.

Against this solution Suarez acutely presses at *disp. 23, Metaph., cit., n. 6*: in the divine relation, the aptitude to be able to be entirely identified in reality with the divine essence is itself a great perfection. Therefore that relation, however much it may be formally prescinded, insofar as it is understood as capable of being identified with the divine essence, is understood to be of the greatest perfection. The assumption is proved: because in the created relation the limitation of entity — by reason of which it cannot be infinite either formally or identically — is an imperfection. Therefore in the divine relation the aptitude of being identifiable with the divine essence in reality will be a perfection arising from its unlimitedness.

I respond by denying the assumption: for although in God what includes another by identity is supreme perfection, yet what is included is not — since this argues perfection on the part of the including, not on the part of the included. And thus it is in the present case: the relation is the divine essence by reason of the infinite perfection of the essence itself, by reason of which it identically includes it. But to be thus included in another is neither perfection nor imperfection in the included, but only in the includer. Hence from the fact that the divine relation is apt to be identified with the essence, all that can be deduced is that it is not limited or finite by reason of itself — not that it is infinite and unlimited.

The assumption is then proved: just as the inaptitude for identification with the divine essence in the created relation is a great imperfection and argues its limitedness, so conversely in the divine relation the aptitude for identity with the divine essence will be a great perfection and should argue its unlimitedness.

The parity is denied. For as Denis says: good and perfect arise from an integral cause, while evil arises from any defect. Hence more is required for perfection than for inducing imperfection, since imperfection creeps in from any defect. And therefore, although that inaptitude for identity with the divine essence in the created relation induces imperfection, conversely the aptitude for it in the divine relation does not induce perfection or argue unlimitedness — for to constitute something as perfection simply and infinite something more is required, namely that it be a quiddity by its nature communicable, according to the definition of Anselm in the *Monologion*: that in any domain it is itself better than not itself. This

does not belong to the divine relations. Therefore from that aptitude found in them to be identified with the divine essence, at most it can be deduced that they are not finite and limited — not that they are infinite.

Lastly, Rubion. at *1. dist. 33, quaest. 1*, proves at length that the relations of origin are formally infinite, and his sole foundation consists in this: that infinity does not express something positive in the infinite thing in any way distinct from it by a distinction from the nature of the thing, but expresses only a pure negation of finiteness. Hence just as invisible is what lacks visibility, so infinite is what lacks finiteness formally speaking. And just as invisible materially or fundamentally is nothing other than the very thing itself to which being seen is repugnant — and the negation of visibility is grounded immediately and proximately in that thing itself, not in something positive distinct from it by a distinction from the nature of the thing — so likewise infinite fundamentally is nothing other than the very thing itself to which finiteness is repugnant.

This is clarified in God, to whom infinity properly belongs: the reason finiteness is repugnant to God is that God himself, by reason of his Deity alone, exceeds every possible finite thing beyond all proportion and it is impossible for him to be finite. But God, by reason of his Deity precisely, setting aside everything else, exceeds every possible finite thing beyond proportion, and from his formal ratio — not through something added — it is repugnant to him to be finite. Therefore, etc.

Given this supposition, the infinity of the relations of origin formally is deduced as follows: everything not-finite is formally infinite, because infinite formally taken expresses only the negation of finiteness, while fundamentally it expresses only the thing itself that the infinite predicate denominates, and not any grade of perfectional quantity. But the personal properties of God are not finite — indeed they are not-finite, since they are from the divine essence really indistinct. Therefore, etc.

Confirmation: because the divine essence is not called or formally infinite insofar as infinite stands for something distinct from it, but only insofar as it stands for that to which, from itself, all finiteness is repugnant through the very infinite predicate negated. But for the same reason the relation itself is infinite — namely because not-finiteness is repugnant to it no less than to the essence, since it is indistinct from it no less than the essence is indistinct from itself. Therefore, etc.

I respond: the supposition is false that infinity does not express something positive in the infinite thing, but only the negation of limit and perfection. For then such a negation would be outside genus, which — requiring absolutely nothing — would in some way be said of being and of non-being, and so a chimera could be called infinite because not-being-finite belongs to it, that is, the negation of finiteness. Therefore, although according to the meaning of the name and according to that by which we explain it, infinity expresses the negation of

limit and perfection, yet according to the meaning of the thing it imports a true positive ratio in the infinite thing — indeed one in some way distinct from it by a distinction from the nature of the thing, at least as an intrinsic mode is distinct from the thing of which it is the mode, as the Doctor notes at *Quolibet* 5, *litt.* C; *Quolibet* 6, *E*; and 1. *dist.* 31, *q. unic.* B. And the reason is derived from the Doctor's teaching at 1. *dist.* 23, *q. unic.* and 3. *dist.* 1, *qu. I, litt.* G and elsewhere frequently: that a negation belonging necessarily to a thing, with the repugnance of the opposite affirmative, must belong to it through something positive that is the reason for founding such a negation. As if the negation of spirituality inheres in man, this is certainly because of materiality, in which it is founded. Since then the negation of limit and term belongs to the divine perfection on the part of the thing in such a way that having a limit is altogether repugnant to it, it is plainly necessary that such a negation belong to it through some positive ratio. Hence it is concluded that infinity adds some positive ratio to the Deity itself.

It is nonetheless true that this positive ratio is not something really distinct from the Deity — and this alone is genuinely proved by the arguments that Rubion. amasses against our position in the cited place, as is clear from what he has at *art.* 2, where he says that if finiteness and infinity expressed a perfectional grade really distinct from the thing itself, then it would not be impossible for man to be not more perfect than the ass — because such a grade would be really distinct from man and consequently could be separated from him by divine power. The arguments of Rubion. therefore only prove the real indistinction of the perfectional grade from the thing of which it is a grade, not the modal indistinction from the nature of the thing — which alone we posit and no more.

And in this sense it is true that God from himself alone, setting aside anything else really — indeed even formally in the strict sense — distinct, is infinite, since infinity is his intrinsic mode.

And thus equally must the example he adduces of the invisible be answered: because as Smiling. rightly notes, *de Deo uno, tract.* 2, *disp.* 6, *n.* 15, invisibility — as it expresses the inaptitude of some being for terminating vision — is not a pure negation, but a positive intrinsic mode of such a being founding the negation, since that inaptitude for terminating also arises from a certain limitation or unlimitedness intrinsic to such a being.

Hence to the arguments by which he proves the relations of origin to be formally infinite, the easy response follows. To the first: the major must be denied — that everything not-finite is formally infinite — because not-finite is a negation outside genus, which is said equally of being and non-being. But infinite expresses a negation in genus, founded in something positive which is the proximate and immediate reason for founding such a negation, and which cannot belong to the whole thing that is called infinite — as Rubion. maintains — but to some particular ratio of it. Just as the negation of spirituality belongs to man not by reason of the whole of humanity but by reason of materiality precisely — in which

it is proximately and immediately founded — and the negation of brutality belongs to him precisely by reason of discourse; and so of other negations that belong to some subject not by reason of its whole entity but by reason of some formality contained in it.

To the confirmation: it is true that the divine essence is not formally called infinite insofar as infinite stands for something really distinct from it — but rightly insofar as it stands for some reality that is its intrinsic mode really identified with it and entirely inseparable, in which sense it is said to be infinite by itself. But for this reason the relation of origin cannot be called formally infinite by itself, since it does not include such a perfectional mode.

You will say: not-finiteness is repugnant to it no less than to the essence. The assumption could be denied, because finiteness is repugnant to the relation by reason of the real identity it has with the essence, and therefore it seems more repugnant to the essence on that account, since in everything such-and-such. Also because finiteness is repugnant to the essence by reason of its own and formal infinity, while it is repugnant to the relation by reason of the infinity of another with which it is identified. Or it may be said that even if not-finiteness were repugnant to the relation no less than to the essence, this does not occur in the same way — for to the one it belongs by reason of its own proper infinity, and to the other by reason solely of real identity with another infinite thing.

The other arguments that Rubion. adduces in the same place against our position are easily dissolved from the doctrine already laid out. Other arguments for the infinity of the relations of origin are also commonly adduced, which I pass over since they pertain to the proper investigation of the tract on the Trinity. I was pleased to adduce those already put forward here because they are not commonly presented by others and seem to carry greater difficulty.

Question III: On the Ordering of the Divisions of Real Being, and Which Is the Most Primary of All

The reason for the difficulty of this question is touched on by Mauritius in his marginal notes to the Master of the *Formalitates*, *art. 1, princip.*, where the Formalists treat of the divisions of being explained above. For Mauritius says there that the reader should be cautious about these divisions of being, because no order can easily be established among them, nor any system of subdivisions as in a predicamental tree. Rather, some member of one division contains and is contained by members of another; so one is not subordinate to another as its subdivision, but some seem equally and immediately to divide being and to be adequate to it. This is the case especially with those divisions by which being is customarily divided into God and creature, dependent and independent, finite and infinite, caused and uncaused, and others of the kind — in all of which the divided is the same and the dividing members are the same, since creature, finite being, caused being, and dependent being signify the same, just as God, infinite

being, uncaused being, and independent being signify the same on the other side. Indeed the same also happens with certain other divisions whose dividing members are not the same but different — as the division by which being is divided into God and creature, and the division into absolute and respective: for each is adequate to being and exhausts the whole of being, and neither is contained under the other.

From this arises a first view, which admits many and various divisions of being, but says all are equally primary and immediate: as when being is divided into God and creature, substance and accident, absolute and respective, spiritual and corporeal, or any similar way — for all these divisions are equally and immediately adequate to being, since none is a division of any particular member contained in another division; rather each distributes the whole of being, and therefore all are equally primary and immediate. So Aversa in his *Philosophia*, *qu. 17, sect. 1*. He acknowledges, however, at *sect. 2*, that if the divisions of being are compared among themselves, one or another can still be said to be prior in various acceptations and explanations. If for example one is taken positively and really for being itself that is either simple or composite, and perfect is taken for an attribute of being divided through finite and infinite, then plainly the former division is prior, just as the ratio of being itself is prior to its attributes. If conversely one is taken for a negation and attribute, and perfect, finite, and infinite for the very entity of the thing, then the latter division will be prior. And in this way he thinks he can reconcile the various and differing opinions about the ordering of the divisions of being.

Not far from this position is Zimara in his *Concordantiae Averrois super 6. Metaph.* — after making Averroes doubtful and irresolute, and almost self-contradictory, on this matter — he finally asserts there are several primary divisions of being in their own genre: the first division of being in the subjective part is into the ten categories; the first division of being through modes or analogical differences is through act and potency; and the first division of being through attributes is into one and many, and necessary and contingent.

A second and nearly common view enumerates many and various divisions of being, but does not acknowledge all of them as equally primary and immediate — rather it concedes that there is one most primary and immediate of all. But as to which this is, there are as many views as heads. The Thomists say the most primary division of being is into one and many: so Soncinas, *10. Met., q. 1*; Zanardi, *ibid.*, where they contend especially that this is prior to the division into infinite and finite. Yet Javellus in his *tract. 1. de Transcend., cap. 1* — though he also defends with other Thomists that the division of being into one and many is prior to the division into finite and infinite — still holds other divisions prior to this very one, and absolutely wants real being to be divided in its primary division into being per se and being per accidens, then into absolute and respective, then into one and many, then into the five transcendentals, and finally into finite and infinite.

The Scotists on the contrary teach that the most primary division of being is into quantified and non-quantified, and not only contend it is prior to the division of being into one and many (which the Thomists wanted to be primary), but also that it precedes that most universal division of being into finite and infinite — indeed they hold the latter to be a subdivision of the former, since finite and infinite divide only quantified being. They collect this from the Doctor, *Quolibet 5, in fine*. So Trombeta, *q. 1, Metaph.*; the Master of the *Formalitates, art. 1, princip.*; and other Formalists there.

But since the Doctor in the cited place — although saying that the division of being into quantified and non-quantified is prior to the division into finite and infinite — does not expressly say this is the most absolutely primary, the Scotists also disagree among themselves. Vallo, *tract. Formal., art. 1, princ.*, says that speaking of the division of real being in itself, it is first divided into God and creature before it is divided into quantified and non-quantified or into finite and infinite. But with respect to us and to an intellect that conceives confusedly, being in its first division is divided through finite and infinite, or through quantified and non-quantified, before it is divided into God and creature.

Aretinus, *tract. Formal., art. cit.*, says that if the discussion is about the division that is simply first and immediate, real and Metaphysical, the first division of real being considered simply in its greatest community is through quiddity and mode — or through what and how much — since all other divisions of being are reduced to it and presuppose it, as it is the immediately contained subdivision through which the quidditative distinction of all beings and their modal distinction are preserved. And he says this is the Doctor's view at *4. Metaph., q. 1*, where he teaches that what and how much are the immediate parts of being, so that being does not descend into other parts before it descends into these. He then adds that if the discussion is about the division of being made through quiddities, the first division of being is into God and creature; and finally concludes that the first division of being through modes is through quantified and non-quantified.

Meurissius, *lib. 1, fuae Metaph., q. 5*, says being must be divided in the very first division of all into God and creatures, because this is the most universal and given through the most distant extremes. Then can follow the division into finite and infinite, necessary and contingent — since these too are given through maximally distant extremes. Then follow other divisions that are equally universal as the preceding ones, yet whose extremes are less distant, among which is the one dividing being into absolute and respective — for this is universal like the preceding, since it exhausts the entire scope of being no less than they, but its extremes are less distant, since even among created beings some are absolute and others respective, so that these members do not differ infinitely. The third and final place is held by those divisions that subdivide being — as when being is divided into finite and infinite, and finite being into substance and accident.

Bargius, *1. dist. 36*, says the first division of being absolutely speaking is through possible and impossible being, found in *5. Met. 17*; the second is through positive and negative being, found in *9. Met. 21*; the third is through per se and per accidens being, found in *5. Met. 13*; and the fourth is through being in the soul and being outside the soul, which he says is not the same as the division dividing being into real being and being of reason.

I was pleased to recount individually this variety of opinions among the Scotists about the most primary division of being, since they are commonly cited as if all were unanimously holding it to be the division of being into quantified and non-quantified.

Others — and this is a fairly common view — assert that the most primary division of being is that through which it is divided into finite and infinite, which Suarez chiefly defends at *disp. 4, Metaph., sect. and 8*, and again at *disp. 28, sect. 2*. Bonetus, *lib. 9, fuae Metaph., cap. 1*, teaches that the most primary division of being is into limited and unlimited — where he expressly says he does not mean by limited and unlimited finiteness and infinity, but says he wishes to convey two per se divisive differences of being, one of which — namely unlimitedness — together with being constitutes the quiddity of the first Intelligence, while the other — limitation — together with being constitutes the creature, which is distributed into the ten categories. Algazel, *1. fuae Metaph.*, held the most primary division of being to be into substance and accident. Albertus in *1. Metaph.* said being is first divided into being from itself and being from another. Acerbus, *lib. 1, qq. Peripatet., q. 1*, says the chief divisions of being are into act and potency, substance and accident. And others hold various views.

A third and final view, to avoid all difficulties, posits only one division of being that is most primary and immediately related to being itself — and many think this to be that by which real being is immediately distributed into the ten genera. And they assert this in order to preserve that the ten genera are the supreme and highest genera — for if being could be first divided into higher and more immediate grades, such as into finite and infinite, substance and accident, absolute and respective, then the ten genera would certainly not be the highest genera, since they would have superior grades above themselves; and nothing prevents those from having the ratio of a genus, since if, for example, finite being is subdivided into the ten genera, nothing prevents it from being divided as a most general genus into inferior genera. This seems to have been the view of Henry of Ghent, *Metaph. 5, q. 13*. Pasqualig. also defends the same view — one and only one division of being — but says this is the division into substance and accident. His chief reason is that since none of the divisions commonly circulated about being is a true and proper division except the one dividing being into substance and accident (as he thinks), he consequently concludes this is the most primary of all divisions. So he argues precisely in the cited *tom. r. Metaph., disp. 32, sect. 3 and 4*, and in *disp. 21, sect. 2, n. 12*. Hurtado, however, at *disp. 10, Metaph., Tect.*

1, although he acknowledges several divisions of being, also says the most primary and immediate is this one — namely into substance and accident.

Article I: Resolution of the Question

For the resolution of this question, it must be noted that the discussion here is about real being and about its true and proper divisions — those, namely, in which some common univocal or at least analogical term is divided, participated by the dividing members. From this observation, immediately excluded from our consideration are all those that are not true and proper divisions of being — such as, from what was said in the first question, the division into real being and being of reason, into per se being and per accidens being, into one and many, into positive and negative, into possible and impossible. For these and similar ones are divisions of an equivocal into equivocates, since there is no common divided term distributed into those members — and they should therefore be regarded not so much as divisions as interpretations of an equivocal term.

Retaining therefore the other divisions more properly so called — presented and explained above — the order among them must now be investigated, and which is the most primary. Here it must further be noted that one division can be called prior to another in two ways: either according to dignity or according to nature. In the first sense, that is called prior whose dividing members are nobler than others; but that is prior according to nature whose dividing members precede others by nature — and it is this priority that is properly sought among the members dividing being in the present inquiry.

Furthermore, authors are accustomed to derive this priority of the divisions of being from three sources: first from greater universality — so that the division is called prior that is more universal and superior and contains the other under itself. In this sense the division of being into quantified and non-quantified is said to be prior to the division into finite and infinite, since the latter is a subdivision of the former, for only quantified being is divided into finite and infinite. Second, this priority of the divisions of being can be regarded from the greater distance of the dividing extremes, since it does not always happen that the division whose extremes are more distant is the more universal — for it can happen that the extremes of one division are less distant than those of another, and yet both are equally universal. This is clear with the divisions by which being is divided into absolute and respective, and into God and creature: the extremes of the former division are less distant than those of the latter, since God and creature are infinitely distant, while absolute and respective are not, since both are found among created beings, some of which are absolute and others respective. Hence where from the first source both divisions would be equally primary — since each exhausts the whole of being and neither is contained under the other — from this second source the division of being into God and creature is said to be prior to the division into absolute and respective. Finally, the priority of the divisions of being can be regarded from the greater or lesser intimacy or proximity of the

dividing rationes with the common divided — for those that come first to the common divided also first divide it by nature. And it was this route that Trombeta took at *1. Metaph., q. 1*, in investigating the most primary division of being.

And indeed these three routes are sufficiently apt for finding the priority of some division with respect to the common divided. The first, taken from universality, because more universal things by nature precede less universal ones, and so a division made through more common differences should rightly precede one made through less common ones. The second, taken from greater distance or diversity of the dividing extremes, is also very suitable — because what is more distant appears more contrary, and since the rule of good division is that it be given through contrary members, it follows that what is given through more distant members should be regarded as most primary by nature. Also because what is more distant has less mutual agreement, since distance arises from diversity; and therefore they have fewer rationes above themselves in which they agree than those that are less distant. Hence following the order of nature they divide the common ratio to which they come earlier than members that are less distant — since they do not divide through other rationes that they would have above themselves, as less distant members do. And lastly the third route, employed by the Scotists, is also well suited for finding the priority of the divisions of being: because since some common term can be divided as it were through essential differences, through intrinsic modes, and through its attributes, just as by the nature of the thing the differences precede the intrinsic modes in the thing and the intrinsic modes quiddatively precede the attributes, so likewise the divisions made through essential differences precede those made through modes, and those made through modes are prior to those made through attributes.

And if in the series of several divisions of some common nature or concept one division were found that from all the aforesaid sources simultaneously — or at least from two of them — preceded the rest (which is not impossible, as will appear), namely because it were more universal and made through more distant extremes expressing proper and essential differences and not attributes and modes, then plainly this must be regarded as the most primary and immediate of all. With these preliminary points noted:

The first conclusion: there is not only one division of real being, but several that are true and proper divisions. The conclusion is common against the third view, and that several such divisions exist is sufficiently clear from the preceding questions — especially the first — where we assigned several true and proper divisions of being: into finite and infinite, God and creature, absolute and respective, simple and composite, substance and accident, etc. These and similar ones are true and proper divisions, because in all of them some common univocal is divided, which is quiddatively participated by the dividing members, as was

shown there. And the arguments by which Pasqualig. tried to undermine certain ones were dissolved there, and others will be dissolved below.

It is further proved because no unique and immediate division of being can be identified. For if it is said to be that by which real being is immediately divided into the ten genera, this is immediately refuted from what was said in *disp. 6, Log., q. 1*, where it was shown at length that real being can and must be divided into grades more immediate and superior to the ten genera. And this can happen in various ways: being can be divided into infinite and finite, and this into absolute and respective, and the absolute then immediately distributed into substance, quantity, and quality, while the respective is distributed into the other seven genera; or if one prefers, finite being can be divided immediately into substance and accident, and this into the other nine genera, either immediately or mediately through absolute and respective — since among accidents some are absolute and others respective, as was shown at length in the cited place. Therefore there is no need to divide real being immediately and proximately into the ten genera, but it can well be divided into higher and more immediate grades, which also have the ratio of a genus. Hence in *disp. 2, de natura entis, q. 6, art.* it was established that finite being is a genus to the ten categories. Nor does any absurdity follow from this, since those ten genera should not be posited as simply and absolutely supreme, but only in a qualified sense and in a certain order and coordination of things, as was said there.

Confirmation: if it is true that God is not included in the predicamental series — as was demonstrated in Logic following the Doctor at *1. dist. 8, q. 3* — that division of being into ten genera would not only not be most primary nor immediate nor unique, but would not even be adequate and sufficient, since uncreated being would escape it.

And it is similarly proved that the unique and immediate and adequate division of being cannot be the one Pasqualig. posited into substance and accident — since first of all the foundation from which this author was moved to assert this is that he acknowledges no concept of real being common to God and creatures — not even by analogy, let alone univocally — but acknowledges such commonality only with respect to substance and accident. Hence he consequently concludes this alone is the true and proper division of being. But this foundation is entirely shaky and ruinous, as is sufficiently clear from what was said in *disp. 2, de natura entis, q. 2*, where the univocation of being was solidly demonstrated not only to substance and accident, but also to God and creature. Therefore this is not the unique and primary division of being.

Moreover, when Pasqualig. asserts that real being is divided precisely and adequately into substance and accident, he speaks of finite being — since he says only finite being, that is, the creature, truly and properly participates in the ratio of real being, and denies that God is a being, saying he is something more eminent than being, as he argues at *disp. 29, tom. 1, sect. 6*. Therefore this division

would not only not be unique but also not adequate, since it does not include uncreated being — which however does not escape the ratio of real being. For by the Fathers calling God super-being and super-substance, they certainly did not wish to exclude from God the ratio of true being and substance, but only to indicate that the ratio of being is found in God in a nobler and more excellent mode than in creatures, as I explained in *disp.* 2, q. 2, n. 38. Finally, that this division is not simply and absolutely primary, I shall show below.

The second conclusion: there cannot be several equally primary and immediate divisions of being simply and absolutely, but only in a qualified sense — from some source, that is, of the three assigned in n. 51. And therefore there is only one most primary and immediate division of being simply and absolutely speaking. The conclusion is against the first view insofar as it admits without qualification several equally primary and immediate divisions of being, and is proved and clarified as follows. It was said in n. 51 that the primacy of some division can be regarded from three sources: greater universality, greater distance of the dividing extremes, and finally greater intimacy or proximity of the dividing rationes with the common divided. But it is impossible for being to be contracted or divided through several similar divisions all simultaneously having all the conditions stated — and so the minor is proved by comparing all the individual customarily circulated divisions of being with each other. For making such a comparison, it immediately appears that none except one has all those conditions together and simultaneously — since if it has one it lacks another. For example: if you compare simultaneously the division of being into God and creature and into absolute and respective, plainly neither is more universal than the other — for each is adequate to being and encompasses its entire breadth, and neither is a subdivision of the other. So from this source both can certainly be called equally primary and immediate. But the other two conditions are lacking: because the extremes of the second division are less mutually distant than the extremes of the first division — for the entire diversity between absolute and relative is preserved among creatures without infinite distance, which is however found between God and creature. The third condition is also lacking, because the first division is given through more intimate things or things more proximate to the common divided — namely through the very quiddities immediately contained under it, which are God and creature.

Again: if you compare simultaneously the division of being into God and creature with that into infinite and finite — understanding by finiteness and infinity the intrinsic modes of being that contract and constitute God and creature in their grade of entitative perfection — although both are equally universal and the extremes of each are distant in the same way — namely infinitely — still the third condition is lacking, since the first division is given through more intimate things, since its dividing members are the very total quiddities of things; while the other proceeds through intrinsic modes.

And this result one can verify for oneself by working through the other divisions. Therefore several divisions of being cannot be equally primary and immediate simply and absolutely — but always from some source one precedes another, and only one among all can be called simply and absolutely primary: namely the one that has all those conditions, or at least more of them in comparison with the other divisions.

You will say: certain divisions of being seem equally primary and immediate from every source — as when being is divided into God and creature, infinite and finite, uncaused and caused, independent and dependent, from itself and from another, by essence and by participation, etc. For in all of these the divided is one and the same, and the dividing members are the same — since God, infinite being, uncaused and independent being signify the same, and likewise creature, finite being, caused and dependent being. Therefore these and similar divisions are equally primary and immediate, since they entirely coincide, as we said at the beginning of the question.

I respond: first, it is false that these divisions entirely coincide, since the dividing rationes are not the same in all of them — although God and infinite being import the same thing materially, and what is infinite is also independent, and vice versa, and creature imports the same as finite being, as independent, still the first division is assigned through the very immediate and pure quiddities prescinding from any mode, while the others are assigned through intrinsic modes — which are also of different rationes, since one is the reason for another and can be demonstrated through another from the quiddity itself: finiteness through dependence, and infinity through independence, as was noted above in n. 7. Therefore only those divisions of being into caused and uncaused, dependent and independent, from itself and from another, by essence and by participation, and the like entirely coincide as regards the whole divided and as regards the dividing members — for these terms express the same mode of possessing entity in the dividing members. Hence these divisions can be called equally primary and immediate in their own order, insofar as one in no way precedes another; but not simply and absolutely — since all of them are preceded by the division of being into God and creature, which also precedes the division of being into finite and infinite itself. For infinity and finiteness too can be demonstrated of God and creature through the very rationes of Deity and creatureliness — as can dependence and independence.

The third conclusion: the most primary and most immediate of all the divisions of being is that by which being is divided into God and creature. This conclusion belongs to the better Scotists, and there is no reason for others to object from *Quolibet* 5 that the most primary division of being is into quantified and non-quantified — for the Doctor does not assert this there. Rather, he only compares this division with the other division of being into finite and infinite, which some were positing as most primary, and says the latter is not the most primary division

of being, since being must first be divided into quantified and non-quantified. The Doctor therefore does not say absolutely that the division of being into quantified and non-quantified is most primary — only that it precedes the division into finite and infinite. Similarly, when Trombeta, *4. Metaph., q. 1*, together with other Scotists asserts that the most primary division of being is into quantified and non-quantified, they do not speak absolutely either, but are making a comparison with the division of being into one and many, which the Thomists were claiming to be absolutely primary.

The conclusion is proved first from the doctrine already presented: for among the divisions of being that division should be regarded as simply and absolutely most primary which has all three conditions or at least more of them in comparison with the others. But the division of being into God and creature alone is of this kind in comparison with the others. Therefore it alone can be called simply and absolutely most primary and immediate among all.

The major is clear from what was said. The minor is proved by comparing this division with the rest. For as is clear from the second conclusion, when such a comparison is made, this division always surpasses others in some condition. If compared with the division of being into absolute and respective, or into substance and accident taking substance transcendently, although neither is more universal than the other — since both adequately encompass the whole of being — still the members of the first division are more distant from those of the second, since God and creature are infinitely distant, while absolute and respective, or substance and accident, are not — since both extremes of those are found among creatures, of which some are absolute and others relative, and the same holds of substance and accident. If compared with the division of being into finite and infinite, although neither is more universal than the other and the members of each are equally distant — namely infinitely — still the first division is given through more intimate things than the second, for the former is assigned through quiddities and the latter through modes. And the same appears when working through the other divisions. Since therefore this division of being into God and creature always surpasses the others in some of the aforesaid conditions when compared with them, it must be acknowledged that it is simply and absolutely most primary and immediate above the rest.

Confirmation: any superior can be divided and contracted to its inferiors in three ways — through attributes, through intrinsic modes, or through the essential differences themselves or at least through the very quiddities (modes and differences suppressed), as when animal is divided into man and brute without formally expressing rational and irrational — the rationes that divide animal and constitute man and brute. And just as by the nature of things essential differences precede intrinsic modes and modes precede attributes, so likewise the divisions observe the same order among themselves: those made through differences

precede those made through modes, and those made through modes precede those made through attributes.

Since then being can be divided into its inferiors in all three of these ways — through attributes, as when divided into one and many; through intrinsic modes, as when divided through quantified and non-quantified or through finite and infinite; or through differences or the very quiddities, as when divided into God and creature — it must plainly be acknowledged that the division made through quiddities precedes all others.

Further confirmation: from Scotus, *1. dist. 19, q. 1*, following *10. Metaph.*, any being is something, how much, and how qualified, and it is first something before it is how much, and first how much before how qualified — since it is something through its essence or difference, how much through intrinsic modes pertaining to virtual quantity, and how qualified through attributes. Therefore correspondingly the division made through what will be prior to that made through how much or how qualified. But the division of being into God and creature pertains to what; the others pertain to how much or how qualified, insofar as they are through modes or attributes. Therefore this division is absolutely and simply most primary and most immediate of all.

Following this doctrine, the order among the other divisions of being is to be investigated: the division that surpasses another in any of the aforesaid conditions will be prior and more immediate. By this reasoning the division of being into quantified and non-quantified will be prior to the division into finite and infinite, because the former is more universal than the latter, since the latter is a subdivision of the former — for quantified being is what is divided into finite and infinite. Here note that finite and infinite are not taken here for the very dividing extremes themselves — since in that case this division would entirely coincide with the one dividing being into God and creature — but for the intrinsic modes of being by which it is determined and the opposed members are constituted.

Then being must be divided into absolute and respective, because although this division is universal and adequate to being no less than the division into finite and infinite, still since the members of this division are less distant — since both members can belong to created as well as uncreated being — the division into finite and infinite must therefore precede it. The same judgment must be made of the division of being into substance and accident — if substance is taken transcendently — since even so taken, substance is less distant from accident than finite being is from infinite being, since the entire diversity of accident and substance even thus taken is preserved among creatures without infinite distance. And therefore the division into finite and infinite must precede it, as given through members more diverse and more distant. I said "if substance is taken transcendently, as common to God and creatures" — because if taken predicamentally, then together with accident it does not divide being as such, but only finite being precisely, and this is indeed how it is taken when being is divided

into substance and accident, as was said in *q. 1, hujus disp., n. 22* in the explanation of this division. Hence in no way can this be the most primary and immediate division of being, as some have thought, in whatever way it is taken.

You will say: the division of being into finite and infinite must for this reason also precede the very division of being into quantified and non-quantified. For since even in creatures there are non-quantified beings as was said in *q. 2*, certainly quantified and non-quantified will be less distant than finite and infinite — and therefore on account of the greater distance of dividing extremes the division into finite and infinite will be prior.

I respond by denying the parity: the reason well proves this for absolute and respective, and for substance and accident — that they divide being after finite and infinite, since these are more distant — but it does not hold for finite and infinite in comparison with quantified and non-quantified. For although finite and infinite are more distant, since both finite and infinite are contained under quantified being, the same being must first be divided into quantified and non-quantified before it is divided into finite and infinite — since the latter is a division of one particular member contained in the former. But the divisions of being into absolute and respective, and substance and accident, do not bear this subordination to the division into finite and infinite, but are entirely universal and of the same breadth as it. Hence just as when two divisions are equally universal but the members or extremes of one are more distant from those of the other, the one with more distant members is regarded as prior — because given equality of universality it surpasses the other in greater distance of extremes — so when two divisions are so related that one surpasses the other in universality and the other in distance of extremes, the more universal one precedes the one with more distant extremes, because the first condition — namely universality — is of greater force than the second for inferring natural priority among them.

The order of the divisions of being into quantified and non-quantified, finite and infinite, absolute and respective, and substance and accident could also be confirmed by the third route — from greater or lesser intimacy of the dividing modes — by investigating whether being is first characterized as limited or unlimited, as ordered toward itself or toward another, as in itself and per se or in another. For whatever order those intrinsic modes observe of priority among themselves, the divisions based on them will observe the same.

Although the aforesaid division of being into finite and infinite precedes many others that are made through modes, as has been explained, it does not precede all of them. For as was said above in *n. 7*, finiteness or infinity can be demonstrated through dependence or independence. Hence just as it belongs first to being to be from itself or from another — that is, independently or dependently — the division of being into independent and dependent, from itself and from another, must precede the division into finite and infinite itself. Hence Meurissius is greatly mistaken in *loc. cit., concl. r., in fine*, when he says the division of being into

dependent and independent, from itself and from another, and similar ones are the last and most recent — because he says these are the most recent rationes through which God and creature can divide being. This, I say, is false: if these were the most recent rationes, finiteness and infinity could not be demonstrated a priori of God and creature through them.

Then, just as necessity is demonstrated of God through independence and being from itself, and contingency of creatures through dependence and being from another, so likewise the division of being into necessary and contingent depends on and follows from the division into being from itself and from another — that is, independent and dependent — as was said above in n. 8. Finally, just as divine simplicity is demonstrated through the ratio of infinity and necessity, and composition or composability of creatures from the ratio of finiteness and contingency, so likewise it must be acknowledged that the division of being into simple and composite is posterior to the divisions of being into finite and infinite, and into contingent and necessary, as was said in n. 10.

Hence neither from the first route nor from the second can the order among those divisions of being — namely dependent and independent, finite and infinite, contingent and necessary, simple and composite — be ascertained, since all are equally universal and adequate to being, and moreover the extremes of each are equally distant — since none of those divisions has both of its extremes found in the creature. Therefore the order among them can only be investigated from the third route — namely from the greater or lesser intimacy and proximity of the dividing rationes to the common divided.

Furthermore, not only the division of being into God and creature, but also the division into finite and infinite, precede the division of being into one and many. Proved first from the general reason noted at the beginning of the article in n. 51: that the discussion here is about true and proper divisions of being — and this division is not such, but is improper and resembling one, as I said in *q. 1, n. 18*. Then proved by another general reason: even granted that it is a good division, and that one and many are true attributes of being, still it must be acknowledged that the division into finite and infinite is prior, because the former is a division made through intrinsic modes, while a division made through modes precedes throughout a division made through attributes.

Finally it is also proved from those three routes for knowing the priority of one division over another. Although it might be conceded that neither is prior to the other by reason of universality — since each exhausts the entire breadth of being, for no real being can be found that is not finite or infinite formally or at least identically, and likewise no being that is not one and many — still the extremes of the division into one and many are less distant than those of the division into finite and infinite. For under one member of the former are contained God and creatures that are strictly and rigorously one per se; while under the other are only other creatures that are not so rigorously one. But finite and infinite are more

mutually distant than any ratio of created being from any other ratio of created being. Therefore from the second route the division into finite and infinite precedes the division into one and many.

And it is especially shown from the third route — from the intimacy of the dividing rationes — since finiteness and infinity express intrinsic modes of being, while unity and multiplicity are attributes. But intrinsic modes are more intimate than attributes. Therefore, etc. Trombeta develops this argument from the intimacy of the dividing rationes at length at *1. Metaph., q. 1*, and Suarez proves it at *disp. 4, Metaph., sect. 8*. But what displeases me in Suarez's argumentation is that he says quantity of power belongs to the thing in quidditative and essential being — for he argues thus at the beginning of *art. 2*: what belongs to a thing in quidditative being is more intimate than what does not belong to it in such being. But so it is that quantity of power belongs to the quiddity and nature in quidditative being, while unity and multiplicity do not, since they are only its attributes. Therefore quantity of power is more intimate, etc.

This doctrine, I say, is not satisfying — because this quantity of power is not a difference of being but a grade and intrinsic mode of it, as he himself acknowledges there. An intrinsic mode, however, although it can in some way be said to pertain to the first mode of predication insofar as it is more intimate than an attribute, as I explained in *part 2, Instit., n. 15*, nevertheless does not constitute the thing in quidditative being, nor does it pertain to such being, even though it immediately follows it — as was said above in *disp. 2, n. 72*. And certainly to conclude against the Thomists that the division of being into one and many is not prior to the division into quantified and non-quantified — or into finite and infinite — it was not necessary to invoke so great an intimacy of intrinsic mode, but it was sufficient to show that quantity of power, or the grade of entitative perfection, belongs to any thing in its own order before unity and multiplicity do. And this is perfectly demonstrated through the argument made there by Trombeta, to whom I refer the reader.

Finally, that the very first division of being is not into quiddity and mode — as Aretinus said in the cited n. 49 — is proved from this: the discussion here is about true and proper divisions of real being, in which some common univocal is participated by the dividing members and essentially included in them. But although the quiddity of a thing essentially includes the ratio of being, the mode does not — since it is only identically and really a being, as was often said following the Doctor. Therefore such a division is not only not first, but should not even be counted among the true and proper divisions of being.

Aretinus responds that when being is thus first divided, it should not be taken for what is precisely and formally and quiddatively being — for in this sense he himself concedes in conclusion 2 that being is first divided into God and creature — but it should be taken more broadly for everything positive that is outside nothing and does not depend on the work of the intellect in its being. For in this

sense real being not only abstracts from God and creature but also from quiddity and mode, in which the former is preserved — and taken this way as opposed to being of reason, being is first divided into quiddity and mode.

But I rejected this distinction and this double acceptance of being — so familiar to the Scotists — above in n. 40. For real being as common to God and creatures is defined as that which has or at least can have being outside nothing and apart from all work of the intellect. Therefore what is thus a being is from this very fact formally and quiddatively a being. Hence the one acceptance coincides with the other. And it is false that this double acceptance of being is taken from the Doctor at *Quolibet 3, ab initio*, as Aretinus claims — for the Doctor there assigns a triple acceptance of being and thing: most broadly, commonly, and most strictly. Under the first member he says being of reason is contained and also whatever real being is contradistinguished from being of reason; under the second, real and absolute being; under the third, real, absolute, and per se being — as substance. And although Scotus says thing and being in the first acceptance are taken as common to thing and mode, and in the second as thing distinguished from mode, the Doctor plainly was not speaking of intrinsic mode — as Aretinus thinks — but of extrinsic mode of the thing, as he makes clear there. For in the first acceptance he says thing and being are indifferently said of all ten genera, and in the second only the three first absolute genera are called thing, while the others are circumstances and modes of thing. He is therefore not speaking of intrinsic modes but extrinsic ones — which are of course quiddatively and formally beings.

Moreover, even granting that first acceptance of being as legitimate, it is still false that being taken in that way is a real thing prescinded not only from God and creature, but also from quiddity and mode — in which it is preserved. For such a prescission is entirely fictitious, as I showed above in *disp. a, q. 7, art. 1, n. 182*. For if such a commonality of being with prescission from quiddity and mode were given, those things would not have a simply simple concept but could still be resolved into further concepts — namely into that of being common to both, and the indeterminate of each — which contradicts what this author himself asserts there.

Finally, the Doctor at *4. Met., q. 1, ab initio*, is most injudiciously adduced for this assertion: for when he says there that being is immediately what and how much etc., since those are immediate parts of being — so that being does not descend into other parts before these — he cites this as a dictum of Aristotle, *4. Met. 4*, and *lib. 8 and 16*. And by what and how much he does not mean quiddity and mode, but substance, quality, quantity, and the other categories, as is plainly clear from the context itself. Hence this authority is usually adduced in favor of the opinion that immediately divides being into the ten categories — the understanding of which I gave in *disp. a, de natura entis, n. 28 and 174*.

Article II: Replies to Objections

Against the first conclusion Pasqualig. presses at *tom. 1, Metaph., disp. 32, sect. 3*, proving that being can be divided by only one division that is most primary and immediate. He argues: being cannot be divided by several equally primary and immediate divisions, unless several dividing rationes fall upon the essential ratio of being contradistinct from attributes. But this is impossible — because if more than two dividing rationes fell immediately upon the ratio of being, they would either affect it immediately one by one or one through another. If the first, the point is had — since then there would not be several divisions but only one, made through several dividing members, since then being would be coextensive with all those dividing members and not with just some. If the second, the point is likewise had — because then only one division would be most primary and immediate, while the others would be mediate, since one dividing ratio would affect being through another, and hence those rationes would also preserve among themselves an order of prior and posterior.

Second: once one most primary and immediate division of being is made, there either remains a capacity for another similar division or there does not. If the second, the point is had. The first cannot be said — because through that first division being is already adequately divided, so that the dividing members adequately fill the breadth in which being is first contractible to its inferiors, and so no other capacity or breadth divisible equally and primarily by other members remains in it.

Third: every division must be through opposed members and consequently through maximally distant ones, or at least be reducible to such members. Therefore once some division of being is made, it is asked whether being can still be divided through members that are more distant and diverse, or not. If not, these will be the maximally distant extremes that coextend with its whole breadth. If yes, proceed further — either in infinitum or until we arrive at the maximally opposed and distant extremes.

Fourth: the first contracting rationes of being must bear proportion to its contractible ratio — namely that just as being expresses the first inchoation of every reality, so all those rationes begin to determine being first. Therefore it can only be immediately conjoined with those grades of being that are the first determinations of being itself. Hence since all those rationes that divide being immediately are in one certain genus — namely within the genus of rationes that are the first determinations of being — it follows that there is only one most primary and immediate division of being.

Fifth and finally: what divides some common ratio cannot be assumed again to divide some inferior. Therefore it is not well done to divide being first and immediately through absolute and respective, spiritual and corporeal, substance and accident — since these also divide accident, which is inferior to being. The

assumption is proved because then the same ratio would differentiate primarily and simultaneously secondarily, or remotely and proximately, and the same ratio would bring the first determination to being and also a later one — which implies a contradiction.

I respond: these arguments, if they prove anything, prove only what was said in the second conclusion — namely that there cannot be several equally primary and immediate divisions of being simply and absolutely — but do not prove that there cannot be several primary and immediate divisions in a qualified sense — namely from some source of those assigned in n. 51, explained in the second conclusion. Hence there was no need to reply to them. But because Pasqualig. intends through them to prove that several simply and absolutely primary divisions of being cannot exist, I am pleased to respond to each individually.

To the first: the minor is denied. To its proof I say that in the supposed case those several dividing rationes would affect the ratio of being immediately, and because they would contract it according to diverse rationes, there would be several divisions by reason of the diversity of the dividing elements; and each would be adequate to the divided being, since through each of them the whole of being would be exhausted. For example: if being is divided through finite and infinite, absolute and respective, spiritual and corporeal, substance and accident, etc. — all are equally primary and immediate by reason of universality, since none is more universal than another. God and creature, finite and infinite being are equally primary and immediate from two conditions — namely by reason of universality and distance of extremes — since the extremes are infinitely distant in both cases. This does not occur with the other divisions assigned, and so it is clear in what sense and in what respect several divisions of being can be equally primary and immediate from some source only, but not from all. For the extremes of one division always precede those of another either in universality or in distance and diversity, or in greater intimacy or proximity to the common divided.

To the second: once one division of being — such as through substance and accident — is made, there still remains a further divisibility of being by another similar division — namely through the first and immediate one — but not through members of the same kind; namely through finite and infinite, absolute and respective, etc. — which in their own order again adequately exhaust the breadth of being. For although the breadth of being would be adequately exhausted through the first division in one order of dividing elements — namely through substance and accident — it would not be exhausted in another order or genus of dividing elements.

To the third: there can be several divisions of being through maximally distant extremes — as when being is divided into God and creature, into finite and infinite, into necessary and contingent, into simple and composite, etc. These and similar divisions are given through maximally distant extremes — since in all of

them the extremes are infinitely distant and neither extreme can be found in the other member. This does not occur with absolute and respective, substance and accident, etc., which are found in creatures.

To the fourth: being can be first determined to several grades of being — but of different rationes: to be from itself or from another, toward itself or toward another, in itself or in another, and so on. And any of these combinations of rationes can first determine the concept of being in its own order. Hence although all those rationes are in one certain genus — within the genus of rationes that are the first determinations of being — they are not in the same order; and this suffices for several divisions of being to be regarded as equally primary and immediate in the qualified sense explained.

To the last — which is the most forceful of all — the assumption and its consequence are true: and it is indeed true that if absolute and respective, spiritual and corporeal, substance and accident are once assumed to divide being as such — common to God and creatures — they can no longer be assumed again to divide some inferior as its proper differences. Hence when it is said that among accidents some are absolute and others respective, and some spiritual and others corporeal, we only mean to say that these dividing extremes are not so distant as to prevent their diversity from being preserved under the same divided member — namely under accident. We do not mean that something inferior to being is properly divided; for although it is of the nature of dividing members to be opposed and incapable of coinciding — so that both do not intrinsically concur in constituting the same thing — it is not however of the nature of the dividing members to be so distant that the diversity of both cannot still be preserved under the breadth of the other member in the manner just explained — as in the examples adduced of absolute and respective, spiritual and corporeal, which equally and primarily divide being and are adequate to it, just as finite and infinite, and yet are not so distant that their diversity cannot be preserved in a creature.

But if the opposition of the members dividing being requires so great a distance between them that their diversity cannot be preserved in God and creature, then it must be said that being is first and immediately well divided only through God and creature, through finite and infinite, through necessary and contingent, through dependent and independent, through simple and composite, and through whatever other extremes are infinitely distant. And thus, still following this way of speaking, several divisions of being must be admitted as equally primary and immediate — insofar as all are equally universal and have equally distant extremes.

It is nonetheless true that several equally primary and immediate divisions of being from all three conditions assigned cannot be given — since there cannot be given more than two dividing rationes that first reach and immediately attain the contractible common ratio as essential differences. Hence once this division through the first intimate differences is assigned, the others are lacking the third

condition of primacy taken from intimacy. And in this sense the arguments of Pasqualig. well conclude that there cannot be several equally primary and immediate divisions of being, because they can only be equally primary by the primacy taken from universality and distance of the dividing members, but not from intimacy.

Second, Aversa presses against the second conclusion, proving that being can be divided equally and immediately through several divisions: being is divided immediately in one way into substance and accident, in another way into God and creature, in another way into absolute and respective, into spiritual and corporeal, and there are other similar ones. All of these are equally and immediately adequate to being itself, since all exhaust the entire breadth of being, and none is a subdivision of another. His foundation is: there is no inconvenience in one and the same common predicate being capable of being divided in various ways proximately and adequately, since it is not necessary that a common predicate — even if properly called a genus — have its differences determinable in only one certain way. Rather it can perfectly well be contracted and determined to species through various combinations of differences, and thus can be divided in various ways, and its species can be designated in various ways — which he says he proved in *log., qu. 13, sect. 1*.

I respond: if this author intends to admit several equally primary divisions of being only in a qualified sense — namely from some source, but not from all the sources from which primacy is taken — then, from what was said in the second conclusion, the whole thing is freely conceded. And the examples he adduces plainly prove nothing else, since the divisions of being he mentions are equally primary only by reason of universality, not by reason of distance of extremes, nor by reason of intimacy of dividing elements. For in this respect the division into God and creature is prior — indeed if it is required of the elements dividing being, as some want, that there be such distance and diversity of extremes that their diversity cannot be preserved in creatures alone, then the examples adduced by Aversa will not be to the point. For it will be absolutely denied that being is first and immediately divided into substance and accident, absolute and respective, spiritual and corporeal — since the diversity of these extremes can be preserved in creatures alone. Hence to defend the second conclusion, more apt examples will be those of the divisions of being into finite and infinite, necessary and contingent, dependent and independent, and similar ones — in which the extremes are infinitely distant. His foundation I attacked at length in *disputat. 6, logicae, qu. 4*.

Third, it is argued against the third conclusion, proving that the most primary division of being is not into God and creature, but rather the division of being into quantified and non-quantified. First, because the Doctor so teaches at *Quolibet 5, in fine*. Second, because a manifest reason urges this: for the division of being into quantified and non-quantified precedes the division into finite and infinite.

Therefore it also precedes the division of being into God and creature — since this division entirely coincides with the former, especially if finite and infinite stand not for modes of being but rather for beings themselves — the finite and the infinite. The consequence is clear; the assumption is sufficiently clear from what was said.

I respond: the Doctor in the cited place never said the division of being into quantified and non-quantified precedes all others, but only says it precedes the division of being into finite and infinite, which many were holding to be most primary — lest the divine relations be entirely excluded from the series of beings. To the reason: granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied. To its proof: I say the divisions of being into God and creature, and into finite and infinite, coincide materially — insofar as infinite being is God and finite being is creature — but do not coincide formally, since the division of being through finite and infinite is given through modes, while the other is through the total quiddities themselves. Hence it is that when being is divided through finite and infinite, by the way of speaking, by the names finite and infinite there must be conceived what formally and per se has the ratio of infinity or finiteness; but when it is divided into God and creature, the total quiddity is signified. And therefore under the name of God can be understood whatever is in the divine things — whether formally infinite, as the divine essence and attributes, or only identically and really, as the relations of origin. Therefore the ratio of both divisions is not entirely equal in the strict sense of speaking. Since then under the name of God even the relations of origin can well be comprehended — though not under the name of infinite in the strict sense — the division of being into God and creature can be posited as most primary of all, but not the division into finite and infinite.

I add, however, that taking infinite and finite broadly — namely for what in any way is infinite or finite, whether by reason of itself or by reason of another, which is how they are commonly taken when being is divided into finite and infinite, as I said above in *n. 4* in the explanation of that division — in this sense it can be admitted that this is the most primary division of all, and that the division of being into quantified and non-quantified need not precede it. For the Doctor places the latter before it so that the relations of origin in God are not entirely excluded from the breadth of entities — but they are not excluded when the division of being into finite and infinite is explained in this way, since under the latter member they are comprehended, because if not by reason of themselves, at least by reason of another they are infinite — namely by reason of the divine essence with which they are really identified.

Fourth, Aretinus argues in the cited conclusion 1, proving that the most primary division of being is into quiddity and mode — or through what and how much. He argues: those dividing elements that more primarily and immediately divide real being than God and creature, or than any other dividing elements, are those into which the concepts of God and creature and any other concept contained

under being are resolvable. But into quiddity and mode — what and how much — are resolvable the concepts of God and creature. Therefore quiddity and mode, what and how much, divide real being more primarily than God and creature.

The major is clear. The minor is proved: every resolvable concept is first resolved into the determinable and determining concept. But the concepts of God and creature are resolvable, since they are not simply simple. Therefore, etc.

I respond: from what was said in n. 61 it is sufficiently clear that the division of being into quiddity and mode is not a true and properly so called division. But even if it were an apt division, the reason is entirely inept for proving what is intended — since the members contracting some common term, or dividing it, have the ratio of how much, however much they may behave as contracting and qualifying differences, and only the common divided has the ratio of the determinable. Therefore although the concepts of God and creature can be resolved into the determining and determinable concept, it does not follow that they are resolved as into the first dividing rationes of being. For all dividing rationes, as such, have the ratio of the determining and not of the determinable. Also because the concepts of God and creature are resolved into being and their determining — into what and how much. Hence if that reasoning holds, it concludes that being is the first divisive element of itself. The major must therefore be denied, since what the concepts of God and creature are resolved into can well be called constituting and composing rationes of those resolvable concepts, but not dividing rationes of being.

Fifth, Suarez argues at the cited place, proving that the most primary division of being is into infinite and finite: that division is prior that is given through more intimate things. Finiteness and infinity are something more intimate to the thing than any other attribute of being — whether unity, goodness, or anything else — since they import the perfection of the thing, which is the same as the very being of the thing.

Confirmation: finiteness and infinity are said according to essence, and consequently the division made through them also precedes all others made through modes or attributes — since what pertains to essence is prior to what pertains to attributes.

Finally, that division is prior which is given through more distant members. But this division is of this kind with respect to the others, since its extremes are infinitely distant — while one and many, substance and accident, absolute and respective, and the other dividing members customarily assigned are not. Therefore, etc.

I respond: in truth the mind of Suarez was not to prefer the division of being into finite and infinite absolutely above all others, but only to make a comparison with the division into one and many — which the Thomists boasted was prior — and

to demonstrate the contrary through those arguments. But lest anyone think those arguments prove it absolutely, I respond.

To the first: although finiteness and infinity more closely touch the ratio of being — since they divide being according to the ratio of entitative perfection, which is its intrinsic mode — they are nevertheless not essential predicates of God or creature, such that the division made through them would be essential and quidditative, but they are their intrinsic modes — finiteness of the creature and infinity of God. And although the grade of entitative perfection of a thing is really and formally the same as the essence of the thing, it is still distinguished modally in the way intrinsic modes are customarily distinguished from the thing of which they are a mode; and it always presupposes the essence as constituted in its quidditative being. Therefore although the division of being into finite and infinite can be called prior to others that are made through modes and attributes, it is not prior to that which is given immediately through the very quiddities contained under being — namely into God and creature.

Indeed — as must be noted in n. 59 — it is not even prior to all those made through modes, since still prior to it is the division of being into dependent and independent, or from itself and from another. For through dependence the finiteness of creatures is proved a priori, and through independence the infinity of God, as the Doctor notes at *Quolibet* 7.

To the confirmation: through the same. Finiteness and infinity are not said according to essence, as if they were quidditative predicates of the thing, since formally speaking they do not import the very essence of the thing, but only the mode of participating in it. Therefore they must presuppose the essence — which is participated in — as constituted in its being. Hence since the essence is prior to the mode by which it is participated, the division made through essential grades or through the essences themselves — such as the division of being into God and creature — will precede the division made through finiteness and infinity.

To the last: from what was said, one should not argue the absolute priority of one division over others from the distance of extremes alone, but also from the other conditions. Moreover, in this very condition the division of being into finite and infinite is equaled by many others — such as the division into dependent and independent, from itself and from another, necessary and contingent, and similar ones — in which the extremes are infinitely distant just as are finite and infinite. Therefore that argument only concludes that the division of being into finite and infinite, from the greater distance of extremes, precedes those divisions in which the extremes are not infinitely distant — such as those enumerated in the argument.

Sixth, Hurtado argues to the same effect at *disputatione* 10, *Met.*, *sect.*, *prima*, proving that the immediate division of being is into substance and accident and not into God and creature. He argues: those dividing elements are immediate to

the divided under which no other essential conformity exists between them, and that division is more universal that contains under each of its members all the inferiors that in the other division are similar opposites to each other's inferiors. But a division through particular concepts must confuse the rationes of the divided. Therefore the division of the universal concept must immediately be given through more universal dividing elements. But being is the most universal concept; God however is the most singular — who agrees with others more in the ratio of being than in any other, and many features of the other dividing element must necessarily be repeated in the explanation of God — namely the concepts of living substance and the rest — which does not happen in the division of substance and accident. Therefore being should not be immediately divided into God and creature, but into substance and accident.

Moreover, being is the same as the ratio of being; therefore it must be divided through the immediate and opposed rationes of being. But to be God and to be creatures are not modes of being. Therefore they do not well divide being. The minor is proved: because the modes of being are per se-ness and inherence, not finiteness and infinity. Hence since substance and accident are the modes determining being, being must be divided immediately through them and not through God and creature.

I respond by denying that it is of the nature of a good division that the dividing members be constituted such that in the explanation of one the other is not included — as Hurtado says there. It suffices only that the members do not coincide — so that the constitutive ratio of one is not also formally the constitutive of the other. And the fact that in the explanation of one dividing member the rationes common to the other are sometimes mixed in matters little and does not impede the goodness of the division. For this also happens in the very division of being into substance and accident, which Hurtado posits as immediate and excellent — as he himself well foresaw there. Indeed in certain divisions this cannot be avoided.

Therefore just as this does not remove the goodness of the division of being into substance and accident, neither does it remove the goodness of the division into God and creature. And although the concept of being is most universal and God is most singular, still God can be assumed as one member for dividing being together with creature — since under such singularity it is still infinitely distant from the other member. This cannot be said of substance and accident, for as was said above, the primacy and universality of some division must not be taken only from the universality of the extremes but also from their greater distance.

To the other argument: just as God and creature are not diverse modes of being but diverse grades of being, so likewise accident and substance are not modes determining being but certain determined entities under being. And therefore just as for that reason our division of being into God and creature is not good, so neither is Hurtado's division of being into substance and accident good. It must

therefore be said that when being is divided into God and creature, it is not divided as into diverse modes of being — rather it is divided as into the very members constituted through the division, just as also when divided into substance and accident.

But if the division must be made through the very rationes of dividing and not through the members resulting from the division — as being is divided into substance and accident through per se-ness and inherence — then likewise being can be divided into God and creature through being from itself or from another, or through infinity and finiteness. For being from itself, or infinity, is equally a mode of being as per se-ness; and being from another as much as inherence. Indeed just as the mode of being from itself, or of being with the whole plenitude of perfection, or from another with less than such plenitude, precedes by nature the mode of being in itself per se or in another, so the division taken from those modes precedes the one taken from these.

Seventh, Pasqualig. argues to the same effect at the cited *disp. 32, sect. 4*. Two things must constitute the most primary division of being: first, that the dividing rationes formally fall upon the very ratio of being, as contradistinct from attributes; second, that they first determine being itself to some certain mode of being. But these two things are preserved in the ratio of accident and substance. Therefore this is the most primary and immediate division. The minor as to the first part is clear, since to be per se and to be in another — which are the rationes of substance and accident — do not divide being according to what is one, true, or good, but according to what is the primary ratio of being and the foundation of all reality. As to the second it is proved: first because per se-ness and inherence, each in its own genus, are the primary ratio — so that in such a genus there is nothing prior. Therefore they must be the first rationes determining being according to the mode of being, and consequently dividing it first and immediately. Second, per se-ness and in-another-ness contain an immediate contradiction in relation to being; therefore they are also rationes first contracting and dividing being according to a determined mode of being. The assumption is clear, and the consequence is proved: since they are immediately opposed in the ratio of being, there must be no ratio above them that imports a determined mode of being — for if they had one, they would agree in that ratio of being and thus would not be totally and immediately opposed. Third: everything must have its proper mode of participation by which it participates in its being. Either then it participates in being in itself in such a way that it does not need the support of another — in which case it is substance — or it needs the support of another, so that to possess its being it must be sustained by another — in which case it is accident. Since then no other modes can be conceived by which entities hold their being, it must be said that being is first and immediately divided through these modes. Finally: if those are not the first modes of being determining being, but there were others superior and more common to them, there would be found

some being that has being and not through any of those two modes, and would therefore be neither accident nor substance — which is impossible.

I respond by denying the minor as to its second part. To the first proof: granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied — because with the fact that per se-ness and in-another-ness are the first rationes of being each in its own genus, it still stands well that there are other rationes of being prior and more common above those genera. For example, being from itself or from another, having being in a full and unlimited way or in a limited mode, by essence or by participation, etc.

To the second: the consequence with its proof is denied — because with the fact that per se-ness and inherence are immediately and totally opposed, it still stands that they have some superior ratio that imports a determined mode of being (even if not as determined as they import). For example, being from itself or from another — since per se-ness and inherence are not thereby said to be from itself or from another properly speaking, but the thing that is per se, or in another, still immediately stands opposed in such modes of being per se or in another.

To the third: it is conceded that every being has its proper mode of participation by which it participates in its being. But it is denied that these are only per se-ness and inherence — for there are other modes of being besides these and prior to them: to be from itself or from another, to have being limited or unlimited, defectibly or indefectibly, and the like. For it is first conceived — or should be first conceived — that some being has being from itself or from another, before it has being in itself or per se or in another.

To the last: it was said in a similar case that although on the part of the thing in subjective being no being is found that is not substance or accident, there is found such in objective being and before the abstracting intellect with a foundation in the thing. And this can be similarly proved in any genus: in the genus of substance there is substance prescinding from material and spiritual, yet on the part of the thing no substance is found that is not corporeal or spiritual; in the genus of accident there is accident abstracting from absolute and respective, yet on the part of the thing no accident exists that is not absolute or respective. On this see again above in *q. 1, n. 24*.

Finally, the Thomists press by proving that the division of being into one and many precedes the division into quantified and non-quantified, and into finite and infinite. They argue: being is by the nature of the thing prior to being one than to being finite or infinite. Therefore it is first divided into one and many before into finite and infinite. The consequence is clear, since divisions observe the order of those things from which they are taken. The assumption is proved: being is distinguished from the nature of the thing — at least modally — from finite and infinite, according to Scotus. But whatever is distinguished from another is first one in itself, since anything through its own unity is undivided

from itself and distinguished from anything else, since distinction is founded on unity, from 5. *Met.* Therefore being is prior to being infinite or finite. This consequence is proved: in the sign in which being is understood as distinct from finite and infinite, it is not understood that finiteness or infinity belongs to it — otherwise it would not be distinguished from them. And in that sign it is one. Therefore unity is more intimate to being than finiteness or infinity.

The Scotists respond by denying the antecedent. To its proof they respond with Trombeta, 1. *Met.*, q. 1, art. 3, that distinction can be taken in two ways: positively, as it is an attribute of being, or negatively, as it coincides with non-identity, which is common to being and non-being, and something can have it in some sign for which it does not yet have distinction. Hence they respond that finite and infinite belong to being before unity or multiplicity do, since intrinsic modes precede attributes; and that in that state being is distinguished from infinite and finite — not positively but negatively — as it is not identical.

You will say: what is not identical to another is first identical to itself; but anything that is identical to itself is first one in itself, since identity, according to Aristotle, 5. *Met.*, is founded on unity. Therefore what is thus not identical is first one in itself — and so it is had that being in that prescission is first one before being finite or infinite.

Trombeta again responds at the cited place that identity can be taken in two ways: formally or fundamentally. Identity taken in the first way is an actual relation presupposing the extremes according to their own unity. Taken in the second way, identity is nothing other than the foundation itself — so that what is not identical to another is identical to itself fundamentally, that is, there is some foundation to which non-identity and identity-to-itself are not repugnant. And this is nothing other than being itself.

This common Scotist solution is not satisfying. For although it is true that infinity in God and finiteness in creatures precede divine and created unity and goodness — since they are intrinsic modes by which being is intrinsically imbued in the essence of each thing prior to attributes — still if they are compared to being as such, prescinding from finite and infinite, it is false that they precede transcendental unity in being. For in this way one belongs to being before finite and infinite and the other contracting modes, just as in all genera the adequate attribute of a genus belongs to the genus before the contracting differences do — since the contracting difference belongs to the genus by reason of the inferior, while the attribute belongs to the genus according to itself precisely, abstracting from inferiors. For the same reason, then, one belongs to being before finite and infinite belong to it, since being is formally one according to itself, abstracting from inferiors; but it is not formally finite or infinite except by reason of its inferiors.

Hence it must be said it is one thing to speak of finiteness and infinity, and another to speak of quantity of power abstracting from both. Although unity belongs to being before finiteness and infinity, still quantity of power prescinding from both belongs to being before unity itself — since it is the intrinsic mode of being as such. For just as to any essence what follows is quantitative perfection in a determinate grade, so to essence in common as such there accompanies quantitative perfection as such, abstracting from every determinate grade. Even if then being as such is first one before being finite and infinite, still because being divided through finite and infinite belongs to it not as one but as quantified, it is therefore that the division made through finite and infinite is said to precede the division made through one and many.

There is further the point that for the division through one and many to assume some resemblance of a good division, it should not be explained through transcendental unity taken most broadly — as if unity itself is the member dividing being against many, since as a convertible attribute of being it is repugnant for it to be a divisive difference of being, as is clear from what was said in n. 4 in the explanation of that division. Therefore it must be understood of some more determinate unity superadded to transcendental unity. And even if so explained this division still always falls in some way short of the conditions of a true division, still granted that so explained it is a good one, it still is not concluded that it is absolutely most primary among all — since such a division would fall upon being not according to its essential ratio, as contradistinct from attributes (which is required for the primacy of the division), but insofar as being expresses unity, which is its attribute. From which it immediately follows that it is not absolutely the first division of being, but presupposes another — one that would be given according to the first ratio of being and would pertain to being as what, not as how much. And this is the division of being into God and creature. Indeed it would also presuppose another that pertains to being as quantified — which is the division into finite and infinite — since being is still prior as quantified than as qualified. Being is quantified through modes and qualified through attributes. Therefore however the Thomist division into one and many is explained, not only can it not be established as most primary of all, but it cannot even precede the division of being into quantified and non-quantified, or into finite and infinite. For other arguments of the Thomists against this point, see them resolved in Trombeta at the cited place.

Disputation VIII: On the Essence and Existence of Finite Being

Since in the preceding disputation we said that the principal division of being is into finite and infinite, its members must next be explained and presented. And although following the order of nature we would have to treat first of infinite being — as the prior and principal member and the primary analogate, which we therefore established in *disp. 1, Metaph.* as the primary object of principality — still the order of teaching, which begins from what is more known and easier for us, requires that we treat first of finite being, which is obvious and close to the senses, before infinite being, which is most remote from them, following the Apostle's word in *1. ad Corint.*: the invisible things of God are known through the visible things.

Question I: Whether the State of the Essence of Creatures, Insofar as It Prescines from Existence, Is One of Pure Possibility Only, or Also of Some Actuality

It is established among all that creatures, before they come to be in act, have their state of possibility, from which through production they are transferred to the state of actuality — for if a thing were not possible, it could in no way come to be or be produced in the nature of things. For by this are possible things distinguished from impossible ones, such as chimeras, which have no presupposed possibility. Since the essences of things are customarily explained through the ratio of possibility and non-repugnance — as we said at the beginning of *disp. 3* — because as soon as they prescind from existence, they are understood to be in the state of possibility, the difficulty is: what do they signify under such a state, and whether this state is one of mere possibility or also of some actuality in which such possibility is founded.

A first opinion, whose author is considered to be Henry of Ghent in his *summa*, *art. 2, qu. 23 and 25, quol. 8, qu. 9; quol. 9, q. 1 and 2; and quol. 11, q. 3*, holds that creatures — or the essences of things — considered precisely in the state of possibility prescinding from existence, are not mere nothing, nor have they only potential being in a cause in which they are virtually contained, but further have in themselves from eternity an actual intrinsic quidditative being of their essence. This being is on the part of the thing outside the divine intellect, according to which being they are the object of divine science — which is called simple intelligence — so that when they are afterward produced in time, they acquire only the actual being of existence. In favor of this view Egidius, *opusc. de ente, & essentia*, and Capreolus, *a. d. 1, q. 2, ad 4*, are also cited; and among more recent authors Albertinus, *to. 2, princip. 1, Philosoph., diff. qu. 1, concl. 1*, follows it, adding that creatures have this actual being independently of God as efficient cause — for they depend on him in this being only as on an exemplar cause. This had been taught before by Capreolus in the cited place, following Henry himself.

Another opinion is also usually cited in this question, which, although it does not attribute to the essences of things from eternity any actual being that is true and real — as Henry did — still admits some diminished being, intermediate in some way between real being and being of reason. The Thomists customarily attribute this opinion to Scotus at *p. 1, q. 14, art. 5 and 6* — because not understanding Scotus, they think that the cognitive being the Doctor attributes to creatures from eternity in the divine mind is some real being distinct from the being of God. And so they sharply rebuke him as wretchedly lapsed into the error of Wyclif, who asserted that creatures in the divine mind had some real being distinct from the being of God, as Waldensis reports in *lib. 1, doctrin. fider antiq., cap. 8*.

From this most grave calumny not only do all Scotists unhesitatingly defend and vindicate their Master, but also others outside our school who understand Scotus better than the Thomists. For two leaders of the Society — Vasquez at *qu. 1, disp. 70, cap. 2, n. 8* and *disp. 104, cap. 3, n. 9* — say Scotus never dreamed of this even in sleep; and Suarez says at *disp. 31, Met., sect. 2, n. 2* that Scotus is so far from having asserted this that he rather seriously and at length attacked Henry for this very reason — because in various places Henry said that the essences of things have from themselves some being of essence, which he calls real, eternal, and unproduced, belonging to creatures independently of God, and presupposing it before not only the efficient causation but also the knowledge of God, as the ratio by which they can be objects of divine science — which the Theologians call science of simple intelligence.

But what I greatly lament is that when Scotists and other Doctors not hostile to Scotus endeavor to vindicate him from so great a calumny, Poncius, *tom. 3, fui cursus Scotici, disp. 18, q. 5*, favoring the lies of Bannes, Cajetan, and other Thomists who attribute that opinion to Scotus, holds it as the mind of the Doctor. For he says at *concl. 4, n. 52* that the being creatures have from eternity is some diminished being, quasi-intermediate between being of reason and simply real being, and says this conclusion is Scotus's with all his followers — although neither Scotus nor any of his disciples I have seen ever asserted this, and indeed sharply condemn it as a calumny imposed on Scotus by the Thomists, as we shall see below.

But what is more surprising is that Poncius also attributes to Scotus a still worse and more pernicious opinion than the Thomists cited had done. For they attribute to Scotus the view that creatures had from eternity some diminished being intermediate between real being and being of reason, dependently on the knowledge of God. But Poncius at *concl. 5, n. 53* and following says creatures have such being from eternity from themselves independently of God and apart from the operation of the divine intellect — from which it is clear he attributes a worse error to Scotus than the Thomists did, and defends it as his opinion. And Francisco Herrera, *1. sentent., disputat. 16, quaest. 3*, although he too embraces this

way of speaking as Scotist, does not however posit that being as quite independent of God, as Poncius does.

The common view teaches that the state of the essence of creatures from eternity is one of mere possibility, such that they have no real actual being apart from existence, nor any being intermediate between real being and being of reason. The Thomists, Scotists, and Neutralists all hold this commonly. Scotus adds that if creatures that are possible have any actual being from eternity, this can only be being of reason — or cognitive being — which they receive from the divine intellect from the very fact that they are known as possible, as will be explained more fully below from article 3.

Article I: Creatures Have Not Had from Eternity Any Real Actual Being of Essence

This conclusion is taught and proved by the Doctor at length at *1. d. 36, q. un.*, against Henry, and is embraced by everyone — both early and more recent authors: Suarez, *disp. 31, Met., sect. 2*; Aversa, *q. 8, Philofoph., sect. 2*; Pasqualig., *tom. 2, Met., disp. 66*; Hurt., *disp. 8, Met., sect. 2*; Arriag., *disp. 2, Met., sect. 1*; Ovviéd., *contr. 2, Met., punct. 1*; Fonsec., *5. Met., c. 3, q. 1*; and among ours: Rada, *p. 1, controverf. 26, art. 3*; Faber., *9. Metaph., disp. 1*; Canon., *2. Phyf., q. r.*; Meurifc., *lib. 1, fuae Met., q. 15*; Smifing., *tract. 2, de Deo uno, disp. 2, q. 3*; Vulp., *to. 1, p. r., disp. 28, art. 1*; Nolan., *in fua Pinac., q. 13*; Saxius, *in fua Cataftros., tom. 1, disp. 14, q. 1*; and finally all interpreters of Scotus at the cited *1. dist. 36*, where he proves it with most efficacious and plainly demonstrative arguments.

The Doctor first proves it because from the opposing view it follows that no creature can truly and properly be created, nor can any be annihilated. The consequence is proved: because creation is production from nothing. But if a stone had beforehand a true real being from eternity, then when it is produced by an efficient cause it is not produced from nothing — and in the same way it is proved that it cannot be annihilated, since just as it is produced from being according to essence, so it seems to return to being according to essence and not to nothing.

They respond that to be created is to come to be from the nothing of existence, not of essence, and similarly to be annihilated is to be resolved into the nothing of existence, and that this suffices for preserving the creation and annihilation of things. But this solution is rightly rejected by everyone as insufficient, following the Doctor in the cited place — because something is truly created when it is produced from absolutely nothing of itself. For creation is the production of the whole being from nothing; and this is clear from the difference between creation and other productions, which presuppose something, even though they terminate primarily to the whole. Otherwise the generation of a composite could be called creation, since if not from nothing of matter, at least it is from nothing of form. But if a thing beforehand had true and real being of essence before being

created, it would not be a total production. Therefore it would not be creation. The minor is proved: because it would presuppose more — or at least no less — than generation does; for generation merely presupposes matter, while that production would presuppose the whole essence of the thing.

Confirmation: because if a thing when created comes to be from the nothing of existence only and not of essence, then only existence would be created, not the whole existing thing itself. The consequence is clear since only existence would come to be from nothing and not the totality. Indeed existence itself would not properly be created — since then existence would come to be received in the essence as a mode in a thing and a form in a presupposed subject. But a form that comes to be in a presupposed subject is not created. Therefore if likewise existence does not come to be from nothing of essence — that is, from the nothing of a subject — it would not truly be said to be created; for even if it came to be from the nothing of itself, it would not come to be from the nothing of a subject. Finally, the same solution is refuted by Suarez in the cited place and by Vulpes with him: for either what has nothing of existence is simply and absolutely nothing, or not. If not, then the production of things by God from the beginning of time would not have been creation, since not from absolutely nothing. If yes, then that being of essence, said to be presupposed to it, would not be true and real being, as was being said.

But this instance is easily evaded by that same solution, saying that what has nothing of existence is not simply and absolutely nothing, but has true being of essence, and from this it does not follow that the production of things by God was not creation — since for creation it suffices that things be produced from the nothing of existence. And so the solution is better overturned by the objections we made.

The Doctor proves it second because that production of things according to being of essence would most truly be creation — for it is simply from nothing as the terminus a quo, and to true being as the terminus ad quem. And since things had had such being from eternity, it follows that things would have been created from eternity and not in time — which is contrary to faith, which teaches us in *Genesis 1* that in the beginning of time God created heaven and earth.

Some respond that such a production could not be called creation, since creation properly speaking is the production of a thing in the being of existence, not of essence alone. Against this: it is certainly true that the being of essence and the being of existence cannot be separated in reality since they are entirely the same in reality. But given the hypothesis that things have from eternity true being of essence, then real being of essence is already separated from being of existence; and therefore on the hypothesis it follows that being of essence is a sufficient terminus of creation apart from being of existence. For since nothing comes out of the power of an efficient cause except through production, it must consequently be asserted that essence has been the terminus of production, by

virtue of which it was made actual and extracted from its possibility. And again, since that production was made from nothing, nothing will be lacking to it for the ratio of creation.

Moreover it is false that things through the force of existence alone terminate creation and not through the force of essence — since when God created man, his creation redounds to the existence of man, but also terminates to his essence, insofar as through such production he communicated to man the essential being through which he is constituted in the being of man. Also because things demand to be produced in diverse ways: some through creation, as angels; some through generation, as composites — not by reason of diversity of existences (which appear similar), but by reason of diversity of essences, since the mode of production is not proportioned to the existence of a thing but to its essence. Hence we also see that productions are not specified by things insofar as they express existence, but insofar as they express essence. Therefore essence according to itself is an apt terminus of production and creation — so that if once it is posited as separable from existence, as Henry maintained, it immediately follows that it can of itself and apart from existence terminate creation.

Moreover, speaking absolutely and not from a hypothesis: every true effectuation attains the essence of a thing together with its existence — since in truth the essence cannot be posited actually outside causes without being posited as existing. Therefore from the very fact that the essence of things is posited outside God and extracted by virtue of the first cause to act, it is thereby regarded as existing, from the true principle we shall teach below — that essence is not distinguished in reality from existence. Hence if the essence of things had from eternity some true, certain, and real being in themselves outside God and distinct from the divine being, it follows that creatures were produced from eternity even as to existence — since existence is nothing other than the essence of the creature outside causes.

You will say: creatures are outside God from eternity as to being of essence, not of existence. Against this: to exist — as is also clear from the force of the name — is to stand outside causes. If therefore creatures have from eternity their essence outside God and their being of essence distinct from the divine being, they will also have being of existence from eternity — since being of essence outside causes is the very being of existence.

Furthermore, actuality from the force of its formal ratio makes a thing actual — for this is its formal effect. If then actuality falls upon the essences of things from eternity, it will certainly render them its formal effect, which is to posit them actually on the part of the thing, extracting them from their causes and from the state of their possibility. Therefore an essence having such actual being from eternity will no longer be under the state of possibility, nor will it any longer prescind from existence, but will truly be existing.

Moreover, from the force of essence posited in being and outside causes, all its connate modes and attributes flow, just as light would flow from the sun and heat from fire. But existence has a far greater connection with essence posited in act and outside causes than heat has with fire. Therefore if essence had its actual being from eternity outside God and distinct from divine being, certainly existence would necessarily flow from it at once as a mode formally rendering it existing. Therefore from first to last, in the opposing view, things would have been produced from eternity.

Finally, whether that eternal production of things in being of essence be called creation or not matters little — it suffices that it is a true production. Since then such a production, of whatever kind, terminates to existence — as we said in Physics — from which actions are said to be of singulars, it follows that things possess from eternity not only being of essence but also of existence.

Indeed one can again ask whether that production of things from eternity in being of essence by God is free or necessary. The latter cannot be said, since God with respect to what is outside himself is a free agent. If the former, then God could have not produced from eternity the being of essence of things — in which case God could not afterward have created the world in time, which is false.

And again: if that being of essence is produced by God, it can be asked whether it was first at least in priority of reason possible to be produced — for it cannot be said that it was impossible. And if that mere possibility sufficed for it to be produced from eternity as to being of essence, similarly it can and must be said that that alone suffices from eternity for things to be able to be produced in time.

Those therefore respond by denying that the essences of things were truly produced from eternity — since the essences of things are ingenerable and incorruptible, but are such from themselves and by themselves, and in such being do not depend on God as efficient cause. Nor does it follow from this that they are not creatures — since for this it suffices that in the being of existence they depend on God, nor can they exist without depending on God.

Against this: that actual being of essence, which they would possess from themselves from eternity, would be the being of existence — as was proved — since to exist is nothing other than to be actually found in the nature of things and outside nothing. Also because it is of the essence and quiddity of the creature as such to depend on God, and to be a participated being. Therefore it must depend on God not only as to being of existence, but also of essence. Also because creatures could boast that they have some being from themselves independently of God — indeed their better and more perfect being, which is being of essence (far exceeding being of existence, which is a pure mode) — and so creatures would be a kind of demi-gods, since they would have the better portion of their being from themselves.

You will perhaps say: to have being from itself as to existence is proper to God, but not as to essence precisely, as belongs to creatures from eternity. Against this: not only being from itself as to existence is proper to God, but also as to essence — for God is essentially an unparticipated and independent intellectual nature. Therefore being from itself as to essence cannot belong to a creature. Also because it implies that something is from itself as to essence and yet not also from itself as to existence — since existence must be proportioned to essence, and so a necessary and independent essence is accompanied by necessary and independent existence, as is clear in God, who as necessary and independent being as to essence is also such as to existence.

Finally, the same essential predicates are said of man from eternity in the state of possibility and in time in the state of actuality — as is sufficiently clear of itself, since otherwise the essence of man existing now would not be the same as that which was possible. But the essence of man that now exists is essentially dependent and participated. Therefore it was so also from eternity, if it imported anything real in itself.

Albertinus in the cited place, not daring to assert that that being is unparticipated and independent of God, says that although it does not depend on God as efficient cause, it still depends on him as exemplar cause — which suffices for it to be participated and dependent on God. This was the response of Henry and Capreolus. But it is rightly rejected by Scotus in the cited place, because according to Aristotle, 2. *Phys.* 49, the exemplar or ideal cause is not a cause different from the efficient — since it is nothing but the efficient cause acting through intellect and rationally. Hence the effect of the exemplar cause is the same as that of the efficient cause. Therefore what depends on God in the genus of exemplar cause depends on him also in the genus of efficient cause.

Confirmation: because the idea by its nature is ordered to operation and effectuation — for its function is to represent to the efficient cause what it is to produce and how. And therefore the exemplar is defined as that which the agent looks to in working. Therefore it implies contradiction that an effect should depend on something in the genus of exemplar cause and not of efficient cause.

Finally, that being of essence of creatures, whatever kind it may be, will be finite. But it is of the ratio of finite being to depend on God not only in the genus of exemplar cause but also of efficient cause — since through physical causality it receives being from him. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved: first, because the dependence of creatures on God is dependence especially in the genus of efficient cause, since whatever is in a creature is made and depends on God. Second, because the exemplar cause as such does not physically influence an effect but only morally and directionally. Hence the holy Fathers rightly say that what is not produced by another is either God or nothing — by which way of speaking they teach the dependence of creatures on God in the genus of efficient cause. So

Augustine, *lib. 1, de Trin., cap. 6*; Cyrillus, *lib. 1, in Joan., cap. 6*; Justin, *in expositione fidei*; and others commonly.

The Doctor's third principal argument destroys the chief foundation of Henry. For Henry attributed this actual being to creatures from eternity so that according to this being they may be objects of divine science — which is called science of simple intelligence. But Scotus presses at §. *concedo conclusionem istarum*: because God from eternity knew the existences of things no less than their essences, since according to Augustine, *5. super Genes., cap. 7*, God does not know things made differently from things to be made. Therefore he foreknew the being of existence just as the being of essence — and yet because of that founded relation, no one concedes that the being of existence of the creature was a true real being from eternity. Therefore by equal reasoning it should not be concluded of being of essence. And just as from the fact that God knows through the science called vision of the theologians the existences of things from eternity, it is not said that things have real actual being of existence from eternity, so neither from the fact that he knows the essences of things from eternity through the science of simple intelligence should it be said that things have real being of essence from eternity.

Perhaps you will say with Albertinus in the cited place that not only by reason of divine science but especially by reason of the possibility of things and their non-repugnance must their actual being of essence from eternity precede — in which such possibility or non-repugnance is founded. And this need not be said of the essence of existence itself — because the essence, for example, of the existence of stone, from the very fact that it presupposes the actual being of essence of stone, is understood not to be repugnant to existing. For through that being stone is formally constituted as not repugnant to existing — which is to be constituted as not repugnant to the existence of stone — and so there is no need for the existence of stone to presuppose the actual being of its own essence to be supposed formally not repugnant. Against this: it will be shown below that the possibility of things from eternity can well be preserved without actual being of essence preceding it. Also because if such being were to be supposed, the same would have to be asserted of the essence of existence itself — since the essence of such a mode is distinguished from any chimera by itself and is not repugnant by itself; for any entity is constituted in itself and distinguished from everything else through its own essential predicates. Since then in this view existence is really distinguished from essence, certainly the existence cannot be constituted as non-repugnant and distinct from the chimera through the mere non-repugnance of essence — or through the actual being of essence preceding from eternity, as Albertinus said.

Maironis responds differently to this argument drawn from existence at *1. dist. 42, quaest. 1*, where he seems to favor this view, saying that the parity does not run between essence and existence — because nothing is posited in potency except what is producible. But actuality and existence is not what is produced, but that by which or to which the produced is brought; and consequently subjective

potency cannot belong to it. This can be clarified by a similar case in analogous modes: substance is said to be extended through quantity, but quantity itself extends by itself; a body is said to be in a place through presence, and presence does not need another presence; and so of other modes. The universal ratio is that what is for something the reason for being such is itself such by itself, lest there be a process to infinity.

Against this: on the contrary, the authors of this opinion customarily say that the essences of things are ingenerable and incorruptible, and only existence is produced. Therefore existence is not only that by which, but also what is produced. Also because that rule for constituting a mode distinct from the thing — namely when we see the thing indifferent to receiving or not receiving the formal effect of that mode — is the reason in the cited examples for distinguishing quantity from substance and presence from body. For substance can be extended and non-extended in an impenetrable way, and a body can be and not be in this place. Since then existence can be and not be actually in the nature of things, the same must be said of its essence — that it has real essence preceding it from eternity — if this is necessary in other things for founding their possibility. Or just as there is no need for existence to have had some real being of itself from eternity to be able to be in time, the same can and must also be said of the essences of other things.

The Doctor's fourth and final argument states that the reasons he urged at *1. d. 8, qu. 5* against Avicenna, proving that nothing other than God can be posited as formally necessary, immutable, and actually eternal, can be urged against this opinion — since those arguments (says the Doctor) conclude as much about quidditative being, if it is true being, as about being of existence; for the will does not more necessarily will that another be in quidditative being than that another be in the being of existence, since the reason is the same in both cases, and similarly for the other means he adduces there against Avicenna.

Maironis still tries to respond to these at the cited place, saying that the essences of things from eternity are not necessary to be, but prescind from necessity and contingency. For whenever a subject prescinds from two things, if one befalls it, so does the other — and so since contingency belongs to creatures accidentally, necessity does likewise. And to what was said about eternity, he responds that just as quiddity prescind from existence, so it also prescind from duration — for duration is only of what exists, and eternity is the measure of duration; and therefore it prescind from eternity just as from time.

Against this: it is false that contingency belongs to a creature accidentally and that a creature is indifferent to contingency and necessity. For these two modes divide being in common in such a way that necessity belongs per se to infinite being and contingency to finite being — since it is of the ratio of the creature that it can be and not be. Otherwise the creature would not be a creature. Also because then necessary and contingent would not sufficiently divide being in common into

infinite and finite — since the essence of the creature according to itself would be neither necessarily nor contingently.

Nor is what he says about eternity satisfying. Since when eternity is said to be the duration of an existing thing, and duration belongs to an existing thing, this must be understood as belonging to a thing that is actually in the nature of things and actually has its being outside nothing. From which it follows that if once it is conceded that creatures have true and actual being of essence from eternity distinct from divine being, they will also endure with their own duration through the whole eternity — since through the whole eternity they persevere in that real being of theirs. But duration is regularly assigned to existence, not to essence prescinding from existence — since essential being prescinding from existence is not a real and actual entity in the nature of things persevering. But if essence prescinding from existence is also posited as persevering in the nature of things and as belonging to creatures from eternity, then duration must consequently be assigned to essence no less than to existence — since any actuality persevering in the nature of things has its own duration.

The objections for the opposing view — since they cannot be easily dissolved without first having an exact explanation of the Scotist view, to be had below in article 3 — we do not adduce in this article but below more conveniently in article 4.

Article II: Creatures Have Not Had from Eternity a Diminished Being Intermediate Between Real Being and Being of Reason; Where It Is Explained What the Cognitive Being Is That They Had

The conclusion is Scotus's from the places cited just above, and is common among the Scotists against Poncius and Herrera cited above — who alone in our school approved the calumny imposed on Scotus by the Thomists, and indeed defend it as the Scotist opinion. This is held by Rada, *1. par., contr. 29, art. 3*, where he calls those Scotimastixes who attribute this opinion to the subtle Doctor. Nolanus, *in fua Pinacot., q. 13*; Vulpes, *tom. 1, par. 1, disp. 28, art. ult.*, where he says this fiction is attributed to Scotus from ignorance of his doctrine; Smisfinch., *tract. 3, de Deo uno, disp. 2, q. 3*; Saxius, *to. 1, fuae Cataftros., disp. 14, art. 2*, where he says those who do not understand Scotus impose this foolishness on him; Posnaniensis, *in 1. sent., dist. 35, disp. 2*; and all earlier Scotists, especially the expositors at *1. dist. 35 and 36*. I find only Maironis who at *1. dist. 42, q. 2, in fine* says the quiddities of things from eternity are neither beings of reason nor real beings — which can also be understood in a good sense, as we shall explain below.

First, therefore, it is proved that this diminished being — intermediate between real being and being of reason — which Poncius, following the suggestion of the Thomists, attributes to creatures from eternity in the Scotist view, is entirely chimerical and fictitious. Especially because he posits it as intermediate between real being and being of reason by participation of the extremes, saying at the cited

disp. 18, n. 52 that it is intermediate between simply real being and being of reason, insofar as it partly agrees with one and partly with the other: it agrees with being of reason in this, that existence is not repugnant to it. I say this is shown to be a pure fiction, because it implies to give an intermediate in this way between contradictories. But real being and being of reason in their formal concepts and rationes are contradictory. Therefore, etc. The major is clear. The minor is proved: because real being is called that which is, or at least is not repugnant to being, in the nature of things with no intellect considering it — as is clear from the common concept everyone has of real being. While being of reason is called that which is not and cannot be, except through the consideration of the intellect alone. Therefore in their formal rationes they mutually contradict each other. Therefore no intermediate through participation of extremes can be given.

Also because being is divided first by an equivocal division into being in the soul and being outside the soul — that is, into real being and being of reason — as the Doctor teaches at *1. d. 36, qu. un., lit. F*. Therefore every being is either in the soul and thus being of reason, or outside the soul and thus real — and there is no intermediate between them. Therefore this diminished being of creatures from eternity, which is partly real and partly being of reason, is entirely fictitious and chimerical.

You will say with Herrera, *1. sentent., disp. 16, qu. 3* — from whom Poncius perhaps took the occasion for his error — that this diminished being can be posited as intermediate between real being and being of reason at least through the negation of extremes and indifference to both, in the way that animal mediates between man and lion. But the arguments adduced, if carefully weighed, exclude both intermediates — both through participation of extremes and through indifference — since contradictories admit no intermediate of either kind. Also because granting such an intermediate between real being and being of reason, then a being taken most transcendently, common univocally to them, could be given — the opposite of which the Doctor teaches at *1. dist. 29, quaest. unic.*, and we with him in *disp. 2, qu.* For this would more properly be called an intermediate through the negation of extremes and indifference to both than that diminished being of creatures from eternity.

Also because such mediation through indifference customarily belongs to any universal insofar as it prescind from contracting differences — by reason of which it descends to constitute this and that species. But the diminished being of things from eternity is not a universal being but a particular being of any possible creature. How then can it be said to mediate between real being and being of reason through indifference, in the way animal mediates between man and lion? Plainly, if it were so, it would have to be said that just as animal through diverse contracting differences can be man and lion, so that diminished being could sometimes be real being and sometimes being of reason — which cannot even be conceived. Therefore it must be concluded that in neither way can being be said

intermediate between real being and being of reason — neither through participation of extremes as Poncius was saying, nor through indifference to both as Herrera asserted.

Second, it is still less rational that Poncius attributes this diminished being to creatures entirely independently of God and apart from the operation of the divine intellect or will — because, as we were arguing against Henry and Albertinus in the preceding article, creatures could certainly boast that they have some being at least diminished from themselves entirely independently of God. Also because it is of the ratio of the creature as such that in whatever being it has that departs from nothing — whether it be diminished or complete — it depends on God, since the whole being of the creature is participated. Also because what is once unparticipated is always thereafter such, since it is regarded as such from its intrinsic and essential nature. Therefore if once from eternity this diminished being of creatures is unparticipated and independent of God, when it is afterward completed in time it cannot be participated — since then the essence of the thing would be changed and it would not be the same thing essentially which is now produced and which was possible.

Also because this way of speaking is still more absurd than Henry's opinion — since Henry, although he appeared to posit things having from themselves from eternity being of essence independently of God in the genus of efficient cause, still admitted dependence in the genus of exemplar and ideal cause. But Poncius posits this diminished being of creatures also independent of God in the genus of exemplar — since he says at n. 13 that that diminished being is not produced through an act of the divine intellect.

Also finally because this is directly against the mind of the Doctor, who at *1. d. 36 and 39 and dist. 43* and from *quol. 14, art. 12* and elsewhere frequently proves at length that creatures from eternity have that being formally from themselves and principiatively from the divine intellect.

Poncius responds that it is only of the ratio of the creature that it should be from another as to simply real being — which is the being of real existence — and not as to possible and diminished being. And he says there is no reason why for creating a creature greater dependence should be required than that by reason of which it could not have simply real being without God. And such dependence would still be in a possible creature even if it did not receive its possible being from God through the operation of the divine intellect. And finally he says this is not against Scotus — since when the Doctor says that possible being belongs to creatures formally from themselves and principiatively from the divine intellect, he means this of proximate possible being and not remote possible being, since the latter they have entirely from themselves and independently of God.

This solution is rejected from what was said — because it is of the ratio of the creature to depend on God as to all its being that it has outside God and really

distinct from God, whether it be being of essence or existence, whether complete or diminished. Also because, as we were saying, unparticipated being renders the thing entirely independent of any other and excludes from the essence of the thing any dependence. Therefore if once a creature were from eternity independent of God in that diminished being of hers, she would be such also in time as to being of existence.

Also because, as we argued above in n. 7, existence of a thing is proportioned to essence — since essence receives existence as its ultimate complement and ultimate act. Therefore if the essence of the creature — considered precisely in that diminished being that she would have from eternity — were independent, such also would have to be her existence.

Also because when a thing is produced in time in the being of real existence, it either still retains that diminished being that it had from eternity or not. Not the latter, since existence is its complement and the former is as it were the beginning of the latter. But the creature that is now produced and exists depends on God as to her whole being however small. Therefore also from eternity that diminished being, which she was said to have, was participated. Otherwise the same essence of the existing thing and the possible thing would not be.

Also because God certainly would not be God if he had independent being as to existence and dependent being as to essence — since from the ratio of Deity he demands to be independent in all his being. Therefore conversely the creature will not be a creature if she is posited as dependent only as to being of existence but not as to being of essence or the diminished being she was said to have from eternity — since from her own ratio she demands to be dependent in all her real being, however small.

Moreover, without any doubt this way of speaking closely approaches the error of Wyclif, who attributed to creatures from eternity some real being distinct from the being of God — and indeed exceeds it, in that this diminished being is attributed to creatures from eternity entirely independently of God, which Wyclif does not appear to assert.

What Poncius says — that this way of speaking is not against Scotus, since when the Doctor asserts that things have possible being principiatively from the divine intellect, he is speaking of proximate possible being and not remote possible being — is also entirely false and gratuitously said. For as we explain at length in the following article, the Doctor asserts this especially of remote possible being, which is logical possible being. But proximate possible being — which is called objective possible being — does not originate from the divine intellect according to the Doctor, but is ordered toward the divine will — since from the ordering toward divine omnipotence creatures have that they are called objectively possible, as we shall say in the following article. Finally, the Doctor says that diminished being is in its way participated at *1. d. 30, qu. 1, lit. O.*

Third: for correctly understanding what that cognitive being is that Scotus attributes to creatures from eternity in the divine mind — so hateful and abominable to the Thomists — it must be established that all must acknowledge as certain, not only in our faith but also in true Philosophy, that the divine intellect knows from eternity all possible creatures as to their possibility through the science called science of simple intelligence. Therefore if things known from eternity by divine knowledge receive from it a denomination, then plainly — as Suarez says at *disp. Metaph. 31, sect. 2, n. 2* — for the same necessity it must be acknowledged that this being belongs to creatures from eternity, since it belongs to God himself to know creatures. Hence just as it would be quite irrational to concede that the eye sees the wall and then deny that the wall is seen, so in the present case it would be sheer madness to concede that God from eternity through the science of simple intelligence knows possible creatures and yet deny that these have cognitive being from eternity in the divine mind.

Since therefore this alone is what that cognitive being signifies — which Scotus attributes to creatures from eternity and which he calls diminished, in a qualified sense, and produced from the divine intellect — to distinguish it from simply real being, which they afterward receive in time from the divine will through true and physical production, consequently all must acknowledge that they had from eternity in the divine mind such cognitive being, in a qualified sense and diminished — as Vasquez rightly noted at *1. par., qu. 15, disp. 70, num. 8*, where he also adds that Waldensis, *1. de antiq. fidei, cap. 1, 2, and 3*, concedes such diminished being to creatures from eternity together with Scotus, following Augustine, *v. super Genef., ad lit., c. 14*. And therefore the Thomists labor in vain trying to prove against Scotus that things did not have from eternity that diminished being — understanding it as something real existing outside causes, or at least as some intermediate between real being and being of reason, which Scotus never even dreamed of. For by that cognitive and diminished being that he attributes to creatures from eternity in the divine mind, he means only that possible being of creatures — according to which they are objected to the divine intellect by virtue of his intellection — by reason of which they are said to be produced in a qualified sense by that very divine intellect, that is, represented. So the Doctor is explained and understood by Vasquez in the cited place, well and according to his intention.

Fourth, for a still greater understanding of this cognitive being that things have from eternity in the divine mind, it must be especially noted — as Lichetus acutely observed at *1. dist. 30*, and Vulpes with him — that the cognitive being that possible creatures formally receive in the knowing divine intellect must be entirely distinguished from that being which is attained by divine cognition as not repugnant to them, by reason of which they are said to be in logical potency, and also in the objective potency of God himself, by whom they can really be produced.

For although this being, which is known as not repugnant to them and is the terminus of divine cognition as it were its secondary object, is real potential being — customarily called real being nominally — as we shall explain at length in the following article, still that prior cognitive being that flows into possible creatures from the termination of divine cognition is not some real being, nor something intermediate between real being and being of reason (as the Thomists fabricate not understanding Scotus's idiom), but is pure being of reason — like the being of being-seen in a wall, and being of being-understood in an object represented to the intellect — not formal and fabricated being of reason, but material and derelict, as we already explained in *disp. 3, logicae, q. 1, art. 1, concl. 2*, at the end of the conclusion. And this is manifestly collected from many places of the Doctor himself, which it will be helpful to cite here so that it may be clear how unjustly the Thomists bark against him.

For at *1. dist. 8, q. 5, §. contra istam conclusionem, in fine, lit. 1. N*, explaining this cognitive being of things from eternity he speaks thus: "for a being to be understood in relation to some object does not posit that object as something in real entity other than the first object, since to be known by the divine intellect does not posit that object as being in itself but presentially in the intellect." And at *dist. 13, q. unic. §. aliter ponitur*, he speaks thus: "being of reason has being only in the intellect, since being of reason is not caused by the object except insofar as it is known, and as such has being only in the intellect — which is diminished being, from *7. Meth.*" Nothing therefore, insofar as it is diminished being, is the proper ratio of true being. But he has this more expressly at *1. distinct. 36, q. unic.*, throughout, where he speaks at length about this cognitive being. And first at *§. contra istud obiicitur, sub lit. E*, he says the cognitive being of creatures is of the same kind as the being of the exemplated and represented Homer while he is in someone's opinion — which being-opined is sufficiently clear of itself as pure being of reason.

Then at *lit. F* he divides being first by an equivocal division into being in the soul and being outside the soul — that is, into real being and being of reason, as he explains there — and says that being in the soul, under which he constitutes the cognitive being of creatures, is entirely different from all being outside the soul.

Then at *lit. G*, responding to the second argument, he says that this production of creatures in cognitive being is of a different kind from all simply real being — and he says such being is entirely of the same kind as the being of Caesar represented in a statue, if he were simply annihilated. And there a little later, to exclude all doubt about that cognitive being — whether it was in some way real being or pure being of reason — he adds these words: "and if you want to seek some true being of this object as such, there is none to seek except in a qualified sense, unless it be said that this qualified being is reducible to some simply real being, which is the being of the intellection itself, but this simply real being is not formally the being of what is said to be qualified being, but is its being terminatively or

principiatively — namely as the known in the knowing." The Doctor also teaches this doctrine in *4. d. 1, q. 1, lit. Q*. Again at *sub lit. M* he says that man from eternity, from the fact that he had cognitive being from God, has no more being than a chimera — that both are equally nothing, as Scotus says with these words: "to man in eternity belongs the non-being of something, and to chimera the non-being of something. But to man the affirmation — which is the being of something — is not repugnant; but only the negation inheres to it because of the negation of act or of a cause not placing it in being. But to chimera it is repugnant, since no cause can cause being-something in it." And finally at *2. d. 1, q. 1, lit. H*, the Doctor compares the cognitive being of creatures to the being that second intentions have in our intellect — which no one doubts to be being of reason.

Fifth, it must be still further explained in what way Scotus said that creatures are produced from eternity in cognitive being, in a qualified sense and diminished, at *1. dist. 35, 36, and 39* and *2. dist. 1, qu. 1*, from *quol. 14, art. 12* and frequently elsewhere. And this is done to exclude the calumnies of the Thomists, who not having followed the mind of the Doctor — as Vasquez says in the cited place, more sharply than is fitting — condemn this way of speaking. Hence Cajetan, *par. 1, qu. 3, art. 3*, calls this production of creatures in cognitive being chimerical and dangerous.

The Doctor says therefore at *1. dist. 36, q. unic., §. concedo conclusionem istarum*: not only does it belong to the divine intellect, when it understands and knows things, to produce them in some cognitive and intellectual being, but this is common to it with the created intellect — which also in its way, when it understands objects, is said to produce them in some cognitive and intentional being. For just as the Doctor says, since being white is only qualitative being, to produce in white being is not to produce in the being of substance or simply, but only in that qualitative being — since a production is denominated from the term or form produced, according to the simply real or qualified being that it confers. So in the present case, since the denomination of known and understood object, when it befalls an object, confers on it no being simply and outside the soul, but only qualified being and in the soul and intentional being, consequently such a production of things in cognitive being by the divine intellect from eternity is only a production in qualified and diminished being.

The Doctor however notes in the same place that this difference obtains between the divine intellect and the created intellect as regards the production of things in cognitive being: that when the created intellect understands things, it does not confer on them through such intellection the first altogether being — since in their own being they are presupposed to its intellection; for with respect to the created intellect things are first intelligible before being understood. But the divine intellect, when it understands things, produces them in the first intelligible — or understood — being. For things cannot have intelligible being proper and formal before being understood by the divine intellect; they can have it only

virtually in the divine essence. The reason — as is said in the tract on divine science — is that the divine essence, as prior to intellection, precisely according to the ratio of essence, is not an actual and formal exemplar of creatures, nor is it their mirror as such, but only virtually and eminently, as Bassolius declares at *1. dist. 36, q. 1, art. 2*. Hence before the act of the divine intellect, a creature has no proper formal being in God — neither known nor possible nor intelligible. Yet it has these quasi-virtually and radically in the divine essence, because of its virtual and eminent containment of all things as to entity and intelligibility — as the Doctor himself teaches expressly at *2. d. 1, q. 1, §. sequitur secundum instans nature*, where he accordingly compares this production of creatures in cognitive being to the production of second intentions in our intellect — in which they are not said to have intelligible being prior to being understood.

From this it is deduced that the cognitive being attributed to things by our intellect is not the first altogether being of theirs (except in beings of reason and second intentions) but secondary. But the cognitive being distributed to things by the divine intellect is entirely the first being of theirs — before which there is none earlier through which things are said to be formally. And this is the reason why the divine intellect is rather said to produce things in cognitive being than the created intellect is — not because from the force of divine intellection things from eternity receive some simply real being or some intermediate being between real being and being of reason (as the Thomists wrongly understood) — but because the first formal being they have is this cognitive and diminished being. Through this fall all the arguments amassed by the Nominalists against this production in cognitive being, especially by Rubion., *1. d. 43*.

Fifth: here it can finally be resolved that question which is customarily proposed — whether this cognitive being posited by Scotus is said to belong to them through extrinsic or rather through intrinsic denomination. For many Scotists want it to belong to creatures through extrinsic denomination only, and Vulpes in the cited place seems to presuppose this. Against them Nolanus argues sharply at the cited *q. 13*, contending it belongs to them through intrinsic denomination. But the dispute is almost about a name — since it is certain on one side that divine cognitive being does not belong to things through a denomination as extrinsic as the cognitive being attributed to them by the created intellect. For since cognitive being from our intellect attributed to things is not their first being but secondary, it follows that it is entirely extrinsic and adventitious to them and puts in them only a pure extrinsic denomination.

Conversely, since cognitive being from the divine intellect attributed to things is entirely their first formal being, before which there is none earlier through which things are formally said to be, it follows that it is in some way intrinsic to them — insofar as it is that by which they first and formally have being, however diminished and qualified. As Rada rightly notes at the cited place, *notab. 4*. Hence just as for this reason the being that our intellect attributes to second intentions

is not extrinsic to them, nor does it belong to them entirely through extrinsic denomination — which presupposes the thing to which it befalls in its own being — but is intrinsic and formal to them, however qualified and diminished; yet it is extrinsic to first intentions. So the cognitive being in which creatures are produced by God is intrinsic, proper, and formal to the creatures themselves — though diminished and qualified.

But on the other side it must also be certain that that cognitive being attributed to things by the divine intellect is not so intrinsic as to posit something in creatures by reason of which they can be said to be in themselves absolutely speaking — as Nolanus at the cited place appears to want. For in the strict sense of speaking it cannot be conceded that a thing in cognitive being is absolutely in itself — since as that being is entirely diminished and qualified, in no way should it absolutely be conceded that it is in itself through that being, as Rada rightly noted at the cited *concl.* 4. Rather only in the divine mind, as known in the knower.

Sixth and finally, for it to be clear in what way the Doctor at *1. dist.* 36 calls this cognitive being of creatures a diminished being and absolute being of reason, it must be noted from him in the same place at *littera E* that there are two kinds of determination: one diminishing and one entirely distracting. The first is that which does not remove the entire signification of the term to which it is added but diminishes the greater and principal part of it — as when we say someone is white according to the teeth, the phrase "according to the teeth" is called a diminishing determination, since it does not remove the entire signification of whiteness but diminishes it. A distracting determination is one that removes the entire signification of the term to which it is added and introduces the opposite — since to distract is to remove the proper signification of a term and introduce the opposite, as when it is said "dead man," the word "dead" is a distracting determination, since it not only removes the proper signification of man but also introduces the opposite — namely the privation of humanity.

So in the present case: the cognitive being of creatures — which they have from eternity in the divine mind — the Doctor calls qualified and diminished; since the word "known," although it is not a distracting determination (since it does not remove the signification of creature, nor introduce the opposite, namely the complete privation of possibility), is nonetheless a diminishing determination, since it diminishes the being of creatures and constitutes it in qualified and diminished being.

But as for why the Doctor calls this cognitive being "absolute being of reason" — that founds a relation of reason toward divine cognition, as produced in a qualified sense by it — this depends on what was said in *disp. 3, logicae, q. 7*, where we taught that being of reason is divided into absolute and respective after the manner of real being (after the manner of which it is both conceived and divided). Absolute being of reason is that which can be conceived after the manner of being toward itself; respective being of reason is that which is conceived in the manner

of being toward another, as all second intentions are. Since therefore the cognitive being of creatures can be conceived in the manner of a foundation of a rational relation toward divine cognition — or toward the divine intellect as producing in a qualified sense — for this reason it is excellently called absolute being of reason, for the proper function of the absolute is to found a relation.

I add that Scotus in that question often understands by that absolute being of creatures from eternity the logical possible being — since logical possibility, as it is distinguished from objective possibility (which is precisely attended to regarding the ordering toward divine omnipotence), is customarily called absolute possibility, since it consists in the mere non-repugnance of the thing prescinding from the fact of whether that thing can be produced by another or exists by itself. For this reason Scotus calls it being of reason — not considered precisely and nakedly, since thus it is real potential being, as we shall see in the following article — but as known reduplicatively. For as it underlies that diminishing determination it is called being of reason, just as a stone as known is said to have in our mind only rational and objective being.

From what has been said so far, whatever objections the Thomists are accustomed to heap against this cognitive being of creatures can easily be dissolved. When they prove it is an intermediate between real being and being of reason — since either that cognitive being is real being or being of reason: not the first, as Scotus himself concedes; not the second either, since this also belongs to chimeras; therefore it is something intermediate between both. Then, because creatures known from eternity by God are truly effectable and creatable, therefore they are not pure beings of reason — otherwise chimeras too would be producible. Since then from the other side they are not simply real beings, they will have being intermediate between real being and being of reason. Finally, this cognitive being that creatures have from eternity is not simply real being, as is clear of itself; nor is it simply being of reason, since it has no repugnance. And it agrees with being of reason in not being simply real being; and with simply real being in this — that it is not repugnant to it to exist, which is more perfect than being of reason because of the non-repugnance, and less perfect than simply real being. Therefore it is intermediate between being of reason and what is simply.

I respond: the Thomists too are obliged to address the proposed difficulty — since they too must acknowledge that God knows possible creatures from eternity, which is the same as the creatures being known by God in their possibility through the science of simple intelligence. And since they are known by God as possible and producible, they will not be pure beings of reason — since these are not producible to the outside. Yet they are not simply real beings either, as the Thomists themselves freely concede. Therefore they will be something intermediate between real being and being of reason.

Hence it must be said: it is one thing to speak of creatures known from eternity, another of the possible being that is known by the divine intellect as not

repugnant to them, and another thing again of the simple denomination of the known — which they take from the fact of terminating divine cognition. For this being of simple denomination is pure being of reason, as we said; while the possible being of creatures, which is attained by divine cognition, is real potential being — or nominal being, as we shall say in the following article. And a creature, if taken precisely according to that possible being, is real potential being; if taken reduplicatively as it underlies the denomination of the known, it is being of reason. And so creatures themselves for this reason can be said to be partly real beings and partly beings of reason: real beings according to that being which the divine intellect knows as not repugnant to them; beings of reason insofar as according to that being they underlie the denomination of the known — since considered thus they are regarded only as having objective being in the divine mind.

But that cognitive being taken for the simple denomination is entirely being of reason. Hence the Thomists injudiciously confuse this cognitive being with the very creatures that are known, so as to show it to be being partly real and partly being of reason.

But if the discussion is precisely about the possible being of creatures — as the last confirmation seems to proceed — this is absolutely and in the strict sense real being, since through this being the creature is distinguished from eternity from beings of reason and chimeras. Yet it could also be called in some way intermediate between real being and being of reason — if by real being is understood the being of real existence. For in this sense it certainly mediates between being of reason and verbally taken real being — that is, existing. But because absolutely and in the strict sense the name real being is not to be understood only of what exists in the nature of things outside causes — as the confirmation appears to suppose — but also of what is not repugnant to being thus in the nature of things, hence it is that absolutely and in the strict sense it should not be called intermediate between real being and being of reason, but rather real being, as we shall see in the following article.

Second, you will object, proving with Herrera that this cognitive being is at least intermediate through indifference between real being and being of reason — since it can belong to both when they are conceived by the intellect. For then both have cognitive being in the intellect. Therefore this cognitive being is neither formally real being nor being of reason, but something intermediate through difference and something common to both.

Confirmation: it has a wider scope than real being and being of reason, since it also belongs to chimeras and impossibles — which equally have cognitive being in God as do possible creatures themselves.

Finally, it has less entity than real being, as is clear of itself, and more than being of reason. For when it is conceived by the intellect through reflexive

understanding, it receives being less than what it has in itself — since a thing taken insofar as it is known is always diminished from its own being. But this is the formal being of reason.

I respond, presupposing the distinction given in logic between material and formal — or fabricated and derelict — being of reason: I deny that cognitive being taken precisely for the denomination of the known flowing from a knowing power into an object is something common to real being and being of reason — comprehending both formal and material being of reason — since it is contained under being of reason accepted so as to comprehend both formal and material being of reason.

To the confirmation: the assumption is similarly denied that cognitive being for the simple denomination accepted is contained under being of reason in that generality that comprehends both formal and material being of reason.

To the last: the assumption is denied as to its second part with its proof, since when cognitive being in an object is conceived through reflexive understanding, it acquires greater being within the breadth of being of reason — for where before it was only material and derelict being of reason, it acquires through reflexive understanding formal being of reason. But when it was said that a thing insofar as it is known is always diminished from its own being, either this is to be understood only of real beings, or if it pleases to extend this also to beings of reason, this must be understood within the sole breadth of being of reason. Hence it only follows that cognitive being is less than specifically taken being of reason — namely for formal being of reason — but not generically, insofar as it comprehends both material and formal. For the correct understanding of these, refer to *the disputation on being of reason in Logic*.

Third, it is argued from Cajetan, Bannes, Zumel, and other Thomists at *par. 1, qu. 14* who took their arguments from the Nominalists at *1. dist. 43*. The production of creatures in cognitive being from eternity is chimerical and dangerous — since from it it follows that God cannot exist without that cognitive and diminished being, which is scandalous to say. Second, because then things would have been created from eternity, since that diminished being would be participated being, and everything of that kind is created by God. Third, because then creatures in that intelligible being would be in themselves, but would not be created. Therefore they would be creatures. Fourth, cognitive and represented being does not posit anything in the thing known beyond a mere extrinsic denomination. Therefore cognitive being in creatures posits nothing beyond an extrinsic denomination from divine cognition. Fifth, if an angel now knew some possible or impossible thing, through knowing it he would not produce it outside himself in some intelligible and diminished being. Therefore if God understands something without an act of will by which he wills it to exist, he produces nothing outside himself. Sixth, from this it would follow that God produces creatures from natural necessity and not freely in that cognitive being. Seventh, when God

produces creatures in cognitive being, either he produces them while understanding or not; if the first, this new production in cognitive being is futile, since they were already known. If the second, he produces them naturally, like fire produces fire. Eighth, either he produces them through ideas or without them; not the second — since God produces nothing outside himself except through ideas. But not the first either — since ideas precede production only of creatures in simply real being. Finally, creatures in that diminished produced being would be eternal, and afterward when they are produced in time they would not come from nothing but from such cognitive and diminished being.

I respond: these and similar arguments amassed by the Thomists proceed from a false understanding of Scotus's view. Just as therefore it is neither dangerous nor scandalous, but indeed entirely necessary, to assert that God through the science of simple intelligence knows possible creatures from eternity, so neither is it objectionable to posit these as objectively present to the divine intellect from eternity — for this and nothing else the Doctor intends to convey by that production of things in cognitive being in the divine mind, since for Scotus to understand things is formally to produce them in cognitive being.

And just as it is not absurd for the Thomists that God cannot exist from eternity without relations of imitability and participability toward creatures — through which the divine essence is constituted in the ratio of idea — so for Scotus it is not inconvenient to be unable to exist without the cognitive being of creatures. First because this is not some being of creatures in themselves, but only in the divine mind. Second because, as the Doctor notes at *Quolibet* 8, §., properly speaking this being is neither pre-required nor co-required for the being of God, but rather necessarily follows from his supreme perfection — by virtue of which he is said, in necessarily understanding all possible things, to consequently produce them in cognitive being. And this argues no dependence of God on creatures in his being, but rather the contrary.

To the second: the consequence is denied — since creation terminates to truly simply real being, not to qualified and diminished being, which alone is the being of creatures from eternity. And consequently that being cannot even be called participated except in a qualified sense.

To the third: it is denied that creatures in cognitive being can properly be said to be in themselves, as if they were real things having being of essence or existence outside God. Rather they are objectively only in the divine intellect according to the real being that the intellect knows is not repugnant to them. And therefore they are neither creator nor creature — since these belong only to real being.

To the fourth: it is sufficiently clear from what was said in n. 19.

To the fifth: it is also clear from what was said in n. 18 — what difference intervenes between the production of things in cognitive being made by the divine intellect and by the created intellect, and how God in producing things in cognitive being

does not properly speaking place them outside himself — since he confers on them no real actual being through such production.

To the sixth: the Doctor concedes the consequence without any absurdity at *1. distinct. 8, q. 5, litter. N*, saying that the divine intellect does not relate to its intelligibles other than itself in the way the will relates to other objects of will — since that intellect can be necessarily productive of all intelligibles insofar as they are present to it in cognitive being. For through this nothing else formally necessary in real being is posited besides God. But the will cannot be necessarily the will of some other objects of will, unless those were at some point necessary in some real being other than divine being. He says this of the efficacious will, not of the will of simple complacency. For speaking of such love, it would be no absurdity to concede that God necessarily loves creatures in cognitive being and their possibility — since commonly all theologians admit this, at least by necessity excluding freedom of specification if not of exercise.

To the seventh, which is an argument the Doctor himself made against Henry at *1. d. 36, litt. B*: one must by no means conceive of two quasi-distinct acts intervening in the production of things in cognitive being by the divine intellect — as the adversaries imagine: one of producing and another of understanding creatures. Nor consequently that the divine intellect first produces before understanding, or conversely. Rather there is one and the same most formal act by which truly understanding it produces in a qualified sense, and by producing in a qualified sense it truly understands — for to understand them is formally to produce them in cognitive being, and conversely.

To the eighth: since an idea is a ratio in the divine mind according to which something is formable outside — as the Doctor teaches at *1. d. 35* following Augustine — and cognitive being as such is neither formed nor formable outside, consequently it has no need of an idea in its production. Rather it is itself the very idea of the possible creature outside. And when it is said God produces nothing outside through anything except ideas, this is true as to simply real existence — since moreover, as has often been said, through the production of things in cognitive being he properly speaking places nothing outside himself, since he confers on them no real actual being through it.

To the last: creatures in that state — namely in cognitive being — are called eternal only in a qualified sense and in objective being, which is no inconvenience. Otherwise in the being of real essence and existence they are simply contingent. And although this cognitive being does precede in eternity, it is nonetheless false that from it the creature is produced in real being as from something positive. Rather from it the creature is produced as from an exemplar, looking to which the supreme craftsman is said to produce the creature outside in real being — as the Doctor teaches at *2. d. 1, qu. 1*.

Note here finally — as Meurissius in the cited place observes — that Scotus is so far from holding the opinion the Thomists attribute to him that, rather, they themselves are compelled to fall into it if they wish to speak consistently with their own principles about the real distinction of existence from essence, and that the essences of things according to real being of essence are eternal. For from this especially they derive the real distinction of existence from essence — because things according to being of essence are eternal, but not according to being of existence. As we shall see in the proper question below. Therefore it is rather their own principles that this opinion follows from, not from the principles of the subtle Doctor — who always most firmly denied the real distinction of existence from essence.

**Article III: The Essence of Things, Insofar as It Prescines from Existence,
Consists in Real Possibility Alone; Where It Is Explained What the Possible
Being of Things Is and Whence It Arises**

The conclusion of this article is common both among the early and more recent authors, and follows manifestly from what was determined in the preceding articles. For if creatures from eternity do not have some real actual being of essence — as the first opinion cited from the beginning of the question maintained — nor some diminished being intermediate between real being and being of reason — as the second opinion cited there maintained — and finally have no other actual being from eternity except the pure cognitive and objective being that is being of reason derived into them from the divine intellect when through the science of simple intelligence it attains them according to that being that it knows from their nature is not repugnant to them (as was said in the preceding article): then plainly it follows that nothing remains by which the essence of things can be explained from eternity, as it prescins from existence, except the sole real possibility — by which precisely possible creatures are distinguished from eternity from chimeras and other impossibles.

Three arduous difficulties arise, however, around the correct understanding of this conclusion. The first is how this possibility of things is to be explained. The second is whether it has causes and what they are. The third is whether it is real in such a degree that the essence of a possible thing, setting existence aside, can be truly called real being.

Concerning the first difficulty, Hurtado, *disp.* 8, *Met.*, *sect.* 1, explains the possibility of things through the denomination of possible taken from divine omnipotence — which, from the very fact that it can produce some effect, denominates it possible. This seems to have been the view of Henry, *quol.* 6, *qu.* 3, and Gabriel, *1. d.* 43, *qu.* 2, and of Canonicus, *2. Phyf.*, *qu.* 1, *art.* 2. The Doctor rejects this way of speaking — so stated absolutely — in several places. First at *1. d.* 26, *ad 2. princ.*, because setting aside active omnipotence in the nature of things, many things would still be called possible in logical potency — that is, many things would not be repugnant in the nature of things, such as that man is a rational animal, a horse

irrational, etc., since these predicates are not repugnant to each other. And many things would also be impossible — such as an irrational man, a rational horse — since such propositions are implying. Therefore things do not have it that they are called possible or impossible logically through a relation to divine omnipotence, but rather from their own formal rationes.

Then the Doctor argues at *1. d. 43*: nothing is simply impossible unless it simply contradicts its own being. But what is repugnant to something is so repugnant from its own formal ratio — essentially by itself and prior to any affirmative or negative relation of it to anything else. For the repugnance of any extremes is from their own formal ratio, with any relation of either extreme positive or negative to anything else set aside — just as white and black are contrary to each other per se from their own formal rationes and have formal repugnance with every relation to anything else set aside, even by the impossible. Therefore what is simply impossible is what per se is repugnant to existence — and what is from itself primarily such that existence is altogether repugnant to it — and not by reason of some relation to divine omnipotence, positive or negative. Indeed it would be repugnant to it to exist even if by the impossible God did not exist.

Confirmation: if a chimera is impossible, certainly that impossibility cannot be attended to on the part of divine omnipotence — since divine omnipotence from its own side is infinite power, and consequently equally able to produce man and chimera as far as concerns it. The defect therefore proceeds on the part of the chimera, insofar as it has in itself some repugnance to being produced — which man does not have. And therefore man is called possible and the chimera impossible. Therefore such possibility or logical impossibility is not a mere extrinsic denomination to be taken from the power of God, but from the formal rationes of man and chimera.

Perhaps you will say this only proves that the impossibility of things cannot be attended to on the part of divine omnipotence — since this would argue an imperfection in it. But well can the possibility be attended to from there — since this implies no imperfection, rather the greatest perfection in divine omnipotence. Against this, the Doctor presses at the cited *1. d. 42*: because in precise causes, if the affirmative is the cause of the affirmative, so also the negation is the cause of the negation, from *1. post., tex. com. 30*, where Aristotle says that if having lungs is the cause of breathing, not having lungs is the cause of not breathing. Therefore if active power — which is omnipotence in God — is the precise reason for possibility in the creature, then the negation of active power in God will be the cause of the negation of possibility in the creature.

Also because just as this proposition is false — "because God cannot produce a chimera, the chimera is repugnant" (for rather the opposite is true: "because the chimera is in itself repugnant, God cannot produce it") — so by parity this proposition will be false: "because God can produce man, man is not repugnant"; and rather the opposite will be true: "because man is not in himself repugnant,

God can produce it." Therefore not only impossibility but also possibility is to be attended to from the formal rationes of things, and not from the part of divine omnipotence.

Finally: God knows some ratio in stone by reason of which it is possible and can have the denomination of possible from divine omnipotence — which he does not know in a chimera. Therefore a chimera has in itself some repugnance that stone does not have — by reason of which it is called impossible — and stone has some non-repugnance that is not found in a chimera, by reason of which it is called possible — independently of divine omnipotence.

Something can therefore be called possible in two ways: logically or also objectively. These are not the same, especially according to Scotus and Aristotle, as we said in more detail in the proper place in *disp.* 6, *q.* 2. For logical potency, as the Doctor explains at *1. d.* 7, *qu. un.* §. *ad questionem*, expresses the mode of composition made by the intellect — and this notes the non-repugnance of extremes. Of this Aristotle speaks at *5. Met., cap. de potentia*, saying that is possible whose contrary is not necessarily true. Hence the Doctor adds that if before the creation of the world the world not only had not existed but even — by the impossible — God had not existed, still there would have been some intellect composing this proposition: "the world can be" — and the world would have been possible in logical potency, since the terms would not be repugnant.

Objective potency, however, as Scotus teaches at *2. d.* 12, *qu. 1*, §. *est igitur videndum*, is that by which something is called possible as the terminus of the active potency of an agent. Hence in this way a thing is said to be in potency when it does not exist except in the productive power of its cause. In this way the rose in winter is said to be in objective potency — since whiteness, says the Doctor, is in objective potency when it is not, though it is in some way in a qualified sense — because it is in the power of its cause or causes.

From this it follows that neither logical nor objective potency posits anything in the thing that is thus in potency, nor does it prefigure any reality in the things themselves — since one is attended to from the ordering toward an intellect connecting non-repugnant extremes, the other from the ordering toward the productive power of an agent. From this in turn it follows that objective potency presupposes logical potency as its foundation — so that a thing is first called logically possible before objectively. For if something implied in itself, it certainly could not be the terminus of the active power of an agent, as the Doctor indicates at *1. decision.* 36, *M*, where he says that logical possibility is followed by objective possibility — given the supposition of divine omnipotence, which regards everything possible other than itself.

To respond therefore to the proposed difficulty: it must be said that it is one thing to speak of the logical possibility of things, another of their objective possibility. For if the discussion is about objective possibility, it is true that things are called

possible from divine omnipotence — possible, I say, extrinsically and objectively, as is clear from the explanation of objective possibility just given. Since for a thing to be in objective potency is to be objected to the power of some agent capable of producing it, and the first of all active powers is divine omnipotence, therefore the first objective possibility of things is to be taken from divine omnipotence — so that if by the impossible there were no such omnipotence in God, things would no longer be called objectively possible but impossible.

Confirmation: this universally occurs in any effect compared to its cause. From the fact that a cause is called capable of producing its effect, there immediately results in the effect a certain extrinsic denomination of producibility by such a cause. Therefore likewise it must be said of all created effects with respect to divine omnipotence.

But speaking of logical possibility — which the more recent authors call intrinsic — it is false that this denomination is taken from omnipotence. Rather it is to be taken from the formal rationes of the possible things themselves, as the arguments made against the stated opinion evidently show. And the Doctor proves this at the cited *d. 36, M*, quasi a priori: for whatever is formally repugnant to something is repugnant to it from itself — and what is not formally repugnant, is not repugnant from itself. Nor is this to be fabricated — that it is not repugnant to man because he is a being in potency, and that it is repugnant to a chimera because it is not a being in potency. Rather the converse — because it is not repugnant to man, he is possible in logical potency; and because it is repugnant to a chimera, it is impossible with the impossibility opposed to it. Hence he finally concludes that the primary reason, not reducible to any other, why existence is not repugnant to man is that man formally is man — and this whether in reality or conceptibly in the intellect. And the primary reason why existence is repugnant to a chimera is the chimera insofar as it is a chimera. And this way of speaking is embraced by all Scotists and especially by recent authors: Arriag., *disp. 2, Metaph., sect. 1, subsect. 1*, and Ovved., *controv. 2, Metaph., punct. 1*.

But you will object: possible creatures cannot be conceived before God is conceived as capable of producing them. Therefore that non-repugnance of things — or their intrinsic possibility — does not precede divine omnipotence. The assumption is proved: because the aptitude of a creature for existing is not except for existing with dependence on another. Otherwise the creature would not be a creature.

Confirmation: possible creatures as such essentially regard God. Therefore they cannot be possible before divine omnipotence is understood — since a relative cannot be understood before its correlative.

Furthermore: if things were supposed possible before divine omnipotence, so that it were true to say "this can be done by God because it is not repugnant,"

divine omnipotence would depend on creatures — so that if those were not possible, God would not be omnipotent.

Finally: to whatever passive potency some active potency corresponds. Therefore things cannot be conceived as passively possible without the corresponding active potency.

I respond: these and similar arguments conclude only about objective, extrinsic, and proximate potency — since this is truly constituted through a relation to the active power of an agent. But they do not conclude about logical, intrinsic, and remote potency — which prescind from such a relation. And hence it is customarily called absolute possibility — since it consists in the mere non-repugnance of the thing prescinding from the fact of whether that thing can be produced by another or exists by itself. For this reason God himself is called logically possible — which could certainly not be said if this possibility implied a relation to the active power of an agent. Hence the Doctor says in the cited place that logical possibility can subsist even if by the impossible no power regarded it. So he speaks at *1. d. 7, q. un. L* and *d. 35, M*.

Hence to the first: the assumption is denied about logical possible being with its proof — since although the creature is not objectively possible except with dependence on another (since such possibility is proper to it), it is nonetheless logically possible prescinding from such dependence; since such possibility is common to it with God and therefore does not include such dependence in its concept.

To the second: through the same; and it is false that logical possibility is a relative possibility whose correlative is active potency. Rather it is absolute possibility prescinding from all active potency.

To the third: the inference is denied — since God is not said on the part of the thing to be omnipotent through some transcendental relation that he has from the nature of the thing with respect to possible creatures, but from the intrinsic absolute perfection apt to found a rational relation to them if they are possible. Hence if man were impossible and every other creature, God would still be omnipotent as to the intrinsic perfection that omnipotence expresses in him. With this solution all authors who deny transcendental relations of God to creatures commonly employ it — which is familiar doctrine of Scotus, *1. d. 35 and 36 and 43* and frequently elsewhere, discussed in *disp. 8, log., q. 5, ar. 1, in fine*.

To the last: the famous assumption holds of subjective or objective passive potency — but not of logical passive potency, for the reason stated. Since this also belongs to God, since he is called logically possible even though he is not objective.

You will say: therefore removing divine omnipotence — given the aforesaid response — it would not follow that all possibility of things is entirely removed. I

respond: it is so, if the discussion is of the logical and intrinsic possibility of things, and this the Doctor expressly concedes at the cited *1. d. 7, qu. un. L* and also at *d. 36, M*. And this is no inconvenience.

There is still some difficulty in explaining this logical and intrinsic possibility of things. Although all acknowledge with Scotus in the cited place that it expresses the non-repugnance of a thing — or the non-repugnance of extremes through a composition made by the intellect — not all have the correct understanding of this. For some, so as not to appear to attribute any positive being to creatures from eternity, want that non-repugnance to mean not a positive aptitude for existing, but a mere negation of repugnance and impossibility — which they call privative reality. So Smisfinch. speaks at *tract. 2, de Deo uno, disp. 4, q. 4, num. 99* and following. And Fonseca spoke similarly at *4. Met., c. 5, qu. 1, sect. 4*, where he explains the connection of extremes that logical possibility imports through the negation of the diversity of predicate from subject.

This way of speaking is not satisfying. Because the objective concepts of things in the divine mind are positive and import the essential being of things, which is positive being. Also because the negation of a negation is something positive — as the negation of darkness is light, the negation of blindness is sight. But the negation of repugnance is the negation of a negation, since it is the negation of impossibility. Therefore it must import something positive. Also because as the Doctor says at *1. d. 36, M*: "to man it is not repugnant to exist, and to a chimera it is repugnant, because man has a nature of a different kind from a chimera." Therefore such non-repugnance is not a mere negation of impossibility, but is founded in something positive. Finally because below I shall show that the possible from eternity signifies that positive being that will afterward exist in time. Therefore the logical non-repugnance does not consist in merely negative non-repugnance to existing, but is a true and positive possibility.

It must therefore be said that logical non-repugnance imports some positive possibility — not merely negative — and is to be explained through a positive quasi-conditional connection of extremes. So that for a man to be logically possible is nothing other than this: if the connection of animal with rational were to exist in the nature of things, no contradictories would thence follow. The Doctor explains logical possibility in this way in the cited *5. d. 7, qu. un.* and *d. 36*, and especially at *d. 43*, where conversely he expresses logical impossibility through this: that if such a connection of predicates — for example, of a chimera — were given, contradictories would be posited as it would be partly rational and partly irrational. And this way of speaking is embraced by all recent authors, especially Arriag. and Ovviéd. in the cited places.

It is proved first from the common manner of speaking about the possibility and impossibility of things: for when we ask whether something is impossible, we inquire only whether if it were to exist contradictories would follow — and if they do, we say immediately it is impossible and repugnant. If they do not follow, we

assert it is possible. Therefore the possibility of a thing is well explained through this conditional: that if it were to exist, no contradictory would be inferred. And since such conditionals are from eternity in the divine mind, hence we say possibles have from eternity in the divine intellect cognitive and objective being.

Indeed Aristotle himself at 9. *Metaph.*, *tex.* 7 explained logical possibility in this way, as the Doctor notes at 9. *Met.*, *quaest.* 2, *ad argumenta* 1. *quaest.* — when he defined the logically possible as that to which, if the act belongs of which it is said to have the potency, nothing impossible will follow. And from this way of speaking it is clear that possible man does not differ from impossible chimera through some reality that is actually, since as the Doctor says: both man and chimera are equally nothing as to this — but through some reality that would be, if man were to exist in the nature of things. And the reason is: for a thing to be possible as such does not express something that is physically actually — but what is actually objectively in the divine intellect and would be physically without any implication if it were placed in the nature of things outside God.

Confirmation: through this way of speaking the intrinsic difference of the possible thing and the impossible thing is expressed — even if both are nothing from eternity in the sense that excludes any actual reality. And again through that conditional a reason is rendered why God can if he wills produce man but not a chimera: namely because if man were to exist no contradictories would follow, as they would if a chimera were to exist.

Although this conditional explains the possibility of both necessary connections — such as the connection of rationality with man — and of contingent ones — such as the connection of whiteness with the same — still the necessary connections have a greater conditional necessity than contingent ones. For the conditional expressing necessary connections not only expresses that if man, for example, were to exist no contradictory would follow (which is common to contingent connections as well) but further expresses that if he were to exist, he would have to exist with such predicates — namely animality and rationality — and in whatever instant he is posited, he must be posited with such a connection of predicates. This does not belong to contingent connections. And hence those connections are called of eternal truth, and not the latter — since it is not true that for whatever instant man is posited he must be white, but only that if he is posited white no contradictory follows.

And since the essences of things properly consist in the connection of necessary predicates, the possibility of an essence, insofar as it prescinds from existence, should not be expressed through just any conditional but through one that implies necessity of the connection of predicate with subject. From this it also follows that necessary connections are represented to the divine intellect through a conditional of being in the way: if man were to exist, he would be rational. While contingent connections are represented through a modal conditional of possible:

if man exists, he can be white. Though God understands all these things most simply and without any composition whatsoever.

Concerning the second difficulty proposed in n. 26 — whether the possibility of things has a cause and what it is — it must be known that the discussion here is not about a cause properly and strictly so called. For since a creature from eternity imports no real and actual being, and its possibility imports no actual reality whatsoever, in vain would any such cause be sought. Cause is therefore taken for ratio or reason — and in this way a cause can be sought not only of possibility but also of impossibility (of which it is certain it prefigures nothing of reality). And so the meaning of the question is: where is the first reason of the possibility and impossibility of things to be attended to — on the part of God or rather of the things themselves, such that from themselves and by themselves they are said to be possible or impossible independently of God?

The latter is asserted by many Thomists: Cajet., *1. post., c. 6, circa finem*; Soncin., *5. Met., q. 19*; Suarez, *disp. 31. Met., sect. 12, n. 46*; Vásquez, *1. p., disp. 104, c. 4*; Molina, *in 1. p.*; Aversa, *q. 8, sect. 4* — to whom Ponc., *disput. cit. 18, conc. 5*, subscribes.

The exact opposite is defended by others who take all the possibility or impossibility of things from the part of God — some from divine will or omnipotence, as Gabriel, *1. d. 43, qu. 2*; others from the divine intellect through the divine ideas, as Pasqualig., *t. 2, Met., disp. 77, sect. 2*, who thinks the possible essences of creatures depend in their possibility on divine ideas as on an exemplar cause.

A middle view is taught by Scotus at *1. d. 36 and d. 45*, where he says the possibility and also impossibility of things is extrinsically and principiatively taken from the divine intellect, but intrinsically and formally from their own formal rationes. And so the Doctor speaks openly in those places — so that Vasquez in the cited place most injudiciously attributes to him the view that the possibility of things is totally caused by the divine intellect and not in any way taken from their formal rationes. For the Doctor says at *littera M* that "the primary reason, not reducible to any other, why existence is not repugnant to man is that man formally is man — and this whether in reality or conceptibly in the intellect." And he speaks similarly at *distincione quadragesima tertia*, saying at *littera B* that "a stone produced in intelligible being by the divine intellect has these things from itself formally and quasi-principiatively through the intellect." The Scotists all embrace and declare this way of speaking around those passages.

It must therefore be said that things do not have their possibility or impossibility entirely from themselves and by themselves independently of God — nor entirely from divine omnipotence or the divine intellect through ideas — but intrinsically and formally from themselves, extrinsically and principiatively from the divine intellect. So the Doctor in the cited place. This is proved and declared for each part. And first: that they do not have possible being totally from themselves and

by themselves independently of God was already proved above in n. 14 and 15 against Poncius.

But so that the absurdity of this assertion may shine still more in the present context, it must be noted that it is one thing to say that things have possibility from themselves, and another that they have it by themselves. The first is entirely true — since by this it is signified only that they are intrinsically so constituted as to not involve any implication, nor is existence repugnant to them, which is most true. But the second is entirely false — since it signifies that they have that intrinsic possibility by themselves and not communicated by another, independently of anything extrinsic, which cannot be asserted without falsehood.

Confirmation: the possible being of creatures from eternity — which God knows as not repugnant to them — although it does not posit something actually real in the creature thus possible, still expresses potential reality, not merely negative but also positive, as we were saying in n. 32; indeed it can express real being nominally as we shall say shortly. Therefore it must be posited as in some way dependent on God even in that potential reality of its.

Further confirmation: if the creature had intrinsic possibility by itself, then also by herself she could have actuality — since we observe in God that because his possibility is independent, therefore he is from himself and not from another.

Then, that creatures do not receive their possibility from divine omnipotence was already proved in n. 27 — since the discussion here is not of objective possibility (which we indeed concede is taken from divine omnipotence) but of logical and intrinsic possibility, which precedes objective and extrinsic possibility in things. That they do not even receive it from the divine intellect precisely: this is proved because if things receive possible being precisely from the fact of being known by the divine intellect by virtue of that cognition, then also a chimera would be possible — since God equally knows possibles and impossibles. Therefore the possible being is not produced in things in a second sign of nature precisely by reason of the cognitive being as such — nor should the Doctor be understood in this sense at *1. disp. 43, §. aliter dico*, as Vasquez in the cited place and certain Nominalists — especially Rubion., *1. d. 43* — understood him, from which false understanding they raise many objections against him. The Doctor's meaning, as Lichetus explains it in the same place, is not that stone, for example, receives possible being precisely from the ratio of its being known as such — for if it were precisely from the ratio of being known as such, a chimera would also receive it, since it too has cognitive being in the divine mind. Rather: the quiddity of stone has possible being formally from itself — since through its intrinsic ratio it is not repugnant to itself to exist. And through that same quiddity the aptitude for existing can be demonstrated a priori, as is clear from the Doctor at *a. dist. 1, quaest. 2*. But reducing this to the first extrinsic principle — in the manner of an originating or productive cause giving such and such being — the divine intellect will be the one that gives stone its possible being. Thus just as the divine will

produces things outside to be simply and actually in time, as they are by their nature producible with these or those predicates that belong to them from their formal rationes, so the divine intellect from eternity produces things in cognitive being with the possibility or impossibility annexed to them, as the natures of things require. This can be explained by the example of the sun: through the same calefactive power the sun liquefies wax and hardens clay. Similarly, the divine intellect through the very same act attaining stone principiatively communicates to it that possibility that stone demands from its formal ratio, and attaining a chimera through the same act communicates to it the impossibility belonging to it from its formal ratio. Therefore possibility does not flow in things from cognitive being alone, but also from their formal rationes.

Finally, that the possibility and impossibility of things must be taken principiatively and extrinsically from the divine intellect, but formally and intrinsically from the formal rationes of the things themselves — which is the Doctor's view — is proved first from the very ratio of logical potency assigned above. For logical potency, from the Doctor himself at *1. d. 7, littera K*, is some mode of composition made by an intellect judging a predicate to belong to a subject in some proposition — and that there is no repugnance between them arising from their own formal rationes. Therefore logical possibility in things arises from their formal rationes with the intervention of the judgment of the intellect — and one without the other does not suffice.

Confirmation: if no intellect capable of judging that some extremes are compossible or impossible with each other were given, no logical possibility or impossibility would be given — since this is attended to in the order toward an intellect judging thus or otherwise. Nor would any be given if there were no terms mutually agreeing or repugnant to each other from their formal rationes. Therefore both together solidly concur to constitute logical possibility or impossibility.

Furthermore, this is the difference between logical and objective potency from what was said above: that the former is attended to from the ordering toward an intellect judging the possibility of extremes, while the latter is attended to from the ordering toward the active power of an agent. Just as therefore the first objective possibility of things is taken from the first will — which is divine omnipotence — so it is very consonant that the first logical possibility of things be attended not only from the intrinsic rationes of things, but also principiatively from the divine intellect, which is the very first of all.

Furthermore, from whom things first have that they are in some being, from him too they have that they are such and such. But things receive from the divine intellect the first being in any way, when they are known according to the true being that is known from their nature to be not repugnant to them, as was said in n. 18 and 19. Therefore from him principiatively and extrinsically they have also

their formal rationes — by reason of which they are compossible or impossible, agreeing or repugnant.

Finally: from whatever agent heat and cold are produced, from that same agent they are said effectively and principiatively to have their formal rationes by which they are formally repugnant to each other. If therefore the quiddities of things receive the first altogether being — whatever it may be — from the divine intellect, which operates first regarding them before the divine will does, then their formal rationes — by which they are mutually repugnant or agreeing — must be regarded as having them principiatively from that very divine intellect. And this way of speaking is also embraced by Pasqualig. in the cited place — for although at *sect. 2* he says the possibility of things is to be taken principiatively from the divine intellect through divine ideas, he still acknowledges at *sect. 3* that it must also be attended to intrinsically and formally from their formal rationes. Which is the very Scotist view.

The Doctor further adds at *1. d. 43* that things are not said principiatively impossible from the divine intellect in the same way as they are said possible — since possibility proceeds from the divine intellect proximately and immediately, while impossibility does so remotely and mediately. He declares this at *sub litt. E* in these words: "Just as God through his intellect produces the possible in the possible being, so he produces two entities — each formally in the possible being. And those two produced entities are of themselves formally impossible, so that they cannot simultaneously be one, nor some third thing from them. This impossibility that they have formally, they have from themselves, and principiatively from the one who produced them, that is, quasi-mediately and remotely."

And from this he deduces shortly after that it is vain to seek impossibility in some one thing, since everything impossible as such includes the rationes of several mutually repugnant things — so that it is not primarily nothing by reason of itself, but from the rationes of those things it is understood to include, because of the formal repugnance of those several included things.

And from this dictum of the Doctor, Bassolius, Bargius, and other Scotists explain why the Doctor in that question said that from the cognitive being of creatures there results in them possible being. For they deny that a chimera or anything else impossible is objected to the divine intellect as one per se primary or secondary object and is immediately understood by it. Rather, it is said to be known only insofar as the Doctor knows those several possibles that are mutually repugnant. And therefore, just as it has no one nature proper to it, so neither should it be said to have its own intelligible being in which it is intentionally produced by the divine intellect, as possibles are said to be produced.

Poncius presses in opposition at the cited place, proving that creatures do not have possible being principiatively from the divine intellect but precisely from

themselves. First, because the object of speculative science is not made by it but is presupposed to it. But the science by which God knows creatures from eternity is speculative. Therefore it does not give creatures that being according to which it knows them.

Second: because by the nature of things science terminates first to the primary object before the secondary. But in that prior, creatures have at least remote and fundamental possible being — for they were not repugnant. Therefore they do not receive that being from divine science by which they are known.

Third: because if by the impossible God did not know creatures, yet could naturally as an agent produce them in time, they would have possible being from eternity. And the fact that they cannot be produced in that way does not arise from their nature but from the mode of acting and the perfection of God. Therefore they do not have their possible being from divine science or from the divine intellect.

Fourth: because that being that they would then have would be of a different kind of being from the being of a chimera. But we want nothing else than that creatures from eternity have some being of a different kind from the being of a chimera — and this independently of the operation of the divine intellect.

Fifth: unless creatures had some possible being from themselves independently of the act of the divine intellect, there would be no reason why man would be possible rather than a chimera — for the divine intellect understands both as a secondary object, and there would be no reason why it would attribute possibility to one rather than to the other.

Finally: a creature would not have the being of a creature from having being from the divine intellect. Therefore from the fact that it is a creature, it does not follow that it is from the divine intellect. The consequence is proved: because the divine Son has being from the divine intellect and yet is not a creature. Therefore from the mere fact that something has some being from the divine intellect, it does not follow that it is a creature.

To the first, which is an argument taken from Vasquez: the major is true only of the primary object of the divine intellect — which is the divine essence — not of its secondary object, which is every created being. For the latter is not presupposed to divine cognition but rather receives being through it. Because as the Doctor notes at *1. d. 2, qu. 1*, creatures before the divine intellect are not first intelligible and then understood — since they are not first formally in the memory before being in God's understanding, and therefore are called his secondary object and purely terminative. And the reason is that if creatures were first formally possible from themselves and actually intelligible — and did not receive that being rather through the action of the divine intellect through the motion of the divine essence — then they would no longer be a secondary object but primary, just as the divine essence is. They would then have the same

relationship to the divine intellect as the divine essence does — and hence the divine essence would not be simply first in the genus of intelligibles.

But if one were to concede with Lichetus at *1. disp. 43* that creatures even before the divine intellect are in some sign formally intelligible before being actually understood (which I do not think is said in quite the Scotist way — since cognitive being is the first altogether being that creatures receive from God, which is why the Doctor assimilates them to second intentions, which through the act of the intellect simultaneously receive intelligible and understood being, and hence Nolanus at the cited *qu. 13* argues against him as having spoken somewhat un-Scotistically) — even granting this, the argument still does not press. For then with Lichetus it would be said that in that act of understanding, the creature is first produced in intelligible being before the act terminates to it; and so in some prior sign she is produced in intelligible being and in a posterior sign in cognitive being. And thus it would always be saved that she receives possible being, as well as intelligible being, from the divine intellect.

When Vasquez presses that the divine intellect is for Scotus merely speculative and therefore not operative of things, this does not prevent it from being operative of them and productive in cognitive being. But only it cannot dictate to the divine will that things are to be made outside through the mode of a rule, as the Doctor lucidly explains at *1. d. 38, ad 1*.

To the second, which is an argument taken from Rubion., *l. c.*, where he asks whether in that prior sign — before a creature is produced in cognitive being — she is possible or impossible. If the first, the point is had. If the second, then it is repugnant to her to be produced and placed in possible being. To this argument Bargius at *disp. 43* gives various responses, and finally the one that seems most forceful to him is that the creature then in that prior has logical possible being but not objective possible being. Which solution certainly concedes everything the argument intends — since the discussion here is about logical possible being, not objective. And it is false — because things do not receive from the divine intellect, when produced in cognitive being, objective possible being but logical possible being. Objective possible being they receive afterward when compared to the divine will as the productive power of things simply. This doctrine Bargius himself frequently teaches from Scotus elsewhere.

Hence it must be said, as we said above, that a creature before the act of the divine intellect attaining it through the science of simple intelligence has no proper formal being in God — neither known nor possible nor intelligible — but has these only virtually and radically in the divine essence through its virtual and eminent containment of all things as to entity and intelligibility. Nor let Poncius say that this suffices for creatures to be called logically possible and non-repugnant. For this does not suffice: the virtual and radical being of a thing in its cause is not its formal and proper being, but is the being of the cause itself capable of producing the effect. Hence the being of heat in the sun is not any formal and

proper being of heat itself, but most formally is the being of the sun capable of producing heat. And the being of stone in God as cause is nothing other than the being of God himself capable of producing stone. The present discussion, however, is about the proper and formal being of the creature distinct from the being of the cause — which we say is first received through the act of the divine intellect producing it in a qualified sense and intentionally. And afterward it is received simply and really from the efficacious act of the divine will when produced outside.

To the third, which was also an argument of Vasquez in the cited place, where he says that if otherwise God existed, even if he did not know things, yet through an intrinsic locus the creatures would be possible — that is, from themselves they would not imply a contradiction — and could be produced in time, if in another way than through knowledge and will God were omnipotent: to this I say that given one impossible many things follow, and therefore from the impossible case adduced by Vasquez this other impossible follows in our view — that things would be objectively possible but not logically. For this first possibility in things is attended to originatively from the first intellect, which is the divine intellect.

Do not say that it implies to give objective possible being that is not logically possible — since according to Scotus himself objective possibility is founded in logical possibility at *1. disp. 36, M*. Do not say this, since it is equally impossible for God to be omnipotent and not omniscient, yet Vasquez admits this case to prove his point. And therefore our case must also be admitted — especially since just as removing all science from God does not remove through an intrinsic locus omnipotence, so neither does it follow through an intrinsic locus that objective possible being is removed with logical possible being removed, as Vulpes rightly notes in the cited place.

To the fourth: if the "then" refers to the case of the preceding argument, the assumption is conceded — since given one impossible many things follow. But it is denied that the matter thus stood from eternity, since we are outside the case. But if "then" refers to that prior sign in which divine science terminates to its primary object, then it is denied that creatures have in themselves a being of a different kind from the being of a chimera. For then they have no other being than the being of their cause — and therefore can be said to be distinct from chimeras only virtually, insofar as they are contained in the power of their cause capable of producing them, but not the chimera.

To the fifth, which is a common argument of the Nominalists: it is clear from what was said in n. 37 and 39 — why from the same divine cognition things extrinsically receive their logical possibility, but not chimeras.

To the last: just as a creature receives from the divine will the simply real being of a creature through its efficacious act, so she receives the qualified being of a creature from the act of the divine intellect. And when it is said that from the

mere fact that something has being from the divine intellect it does not follow that it is a creature — since the divine Son has being from the divine intellect and yet is not a creature — one could argue in the same way regarding will: it does not suffice for something to have being from the divine will to be called a creature, since the Holy Spirit has being from the divine will as the Son from the intellect, yet is not a creature. Therefore what being is attributed to the produced thing by the divine intellect or will must be inspected, to determine whether the produced thing is God or creature. If the being is entirely necessary, then the produced thing is God. But if it is being compossible with contingency, then it is not God but a creature. Such is the logical possible being that creatures receive from the act of the divine intellect — since it is non-repugnance compossible with contingency. For a creature from eternity in that produced being is so called possible to be as also to be possible not to be; such is not the logical possible being of God, who can be in such a way that he cannot not be.

Second, Vasquez argues that just as things are not called future or of such nature because they are known by God — rather they are known as future or of such nature because they are future — so also things are not possible because they are known, but they are known because they are possible, that is, known to be able to be and to imply no contradiction, because they in truth can be.

There is added: some sins are not evil because known to be evil or because prohibited by God, but rather conversely. So in the present case things are possible or impossible, not because known by God, but because by their own nature they are such.

I respond: if by these arguments Vasquez intends to prove that things do not totally have their possibility or impossibility from the divine intellect (as he thought Scotus held), they do not oppose us — since we do not assert that things totally receive their possibility from the divine intellect, nor was this the Doctor's view. But because they seem to prove something more — namely that things are precisely possible or impossible from themselves entirely independently of the divine intellect — the response is: the ratio of science of simple intelligence is entirely different from that of science of vision in relation to possibles and futures. For things do not receive futurity — or future being — from the science of vision but from the decree of the divine will, as the Doctor teaches at *1. disp. 39*, which the science of vision and free science then follow. But they well receive from natural or science of simple intelligence their own possibility. For this reason the latter is customarily called the cause of things — which should not be understood as regards existence (since the divine will is the cause of things as regards existence), but as regards possibility. Insofar as it communicates to things possibility in its genus of quasi-efficient cause in the way explained above.

To the confirmation: let it pass that some things are evil from their object and not chiefly because prohibited. Yet with the fact that from themselves they are

formally evil, it still stands that they are principiatively such from the divine intellect — from which the first formal rationes of them originate intentionally.

Third, others argue: because possibility seems so intrinsic to any possible essence that it does not receive it from elsewhere but has it entirely from itself. For if we ask why a chimera has repugnance to existing while man does not, the perfectly apt response is: because the chimera involves intrinsic impossibility and man does not. Therefore the essences of things have their possibility precisely from themselves and not from any extrinsic cause.

Confirmation: if the possibility and impossibility of things is not attended to precisely from the part of the things themselves, but also from the part of the divine intellect, then the defect of producing a chimera will also rebound on God — which is against the common way of speaking, whereby the defect is assigned on the part of the thing, not on the part of God.

I respond by conceding the formal and intrinsic reason of possibility or impossibility is to be attended to on the part of things, and the Doctor does not deny this. But he denies that this reason is not to be reduced to some first extrinsic principle — since all being of creatures, whether possible or actual, must in its way be participated and dependent. Also because repugnance or non-repugnance of terms is not the absolutely and simply first reason of possibility or impossibility in every genus, but is first only in the genus of formal cause. The divine intellect is the first reason in the genus of quasi-efficient cause.

To the confirmation: the inference is denied — since as was said in n. 39, the divine intellect does not produce proximately and immediately except knowable things, which when afterward compared to each other and found to be mutually repugnant from their formal rationes, from their combination the impossible arises. For this reason the Doctor says at *1. disp. 43* that things are not said principiatively possible and impossible from the divine intellect in the same way — for possibility originates from the divine intellect proximately and immediately, while impossibility does so only mediately and remotely. And hence it is that the defect of producing a chimera is properly to be assigned on the part of the thing and not on the part of God.

Other arguments to this effect that are customarily adduced — since they only prove that possibility and impossibility of things must be formally and intrinsically sought from their rationes, which we do not deny — are passed over.

Concerning the third difficulty proposed in n. 26 — whether the essence of a possible thing setting existence aside can be called truly real being or can possess the true ratio of being — even among those who deny real actual being of essence to things from eternity (for in the opinion admitting such actual being from eternity there is no doubt it must be called true real being), there are various ways of speaking. For some absolutely deny it can be called real being, and say it rather ought to be called non-being and nothing. So Hurt., *disp. 8, Met., sect. 2*, contends,

and Faber., *theor.* 32, c. 3, *ab initio*; and Suarez appears to speak this way at *disp.* 31, *Meth.*, sect. 2, where he says the essence setting aside being of existence is not some thing but is altogether nothing. And Scotus appears to favor this way of speaking at 1. d. 36, M, where he says that man from eternity is as much nothing as a chimera — whose words are: "to man in eternity inheres the non-being of something, and to chimera also the non-being of something. But to man the affirmation — which is the being of something — is not repugnant; but only the negation inheres because of the negation of act or cause not placing in being. To chimera however it is repugnant, since no cause can cause being-something in it."

And this way of speaking is followed by the authors cited in n. 32 who deny that the possibility of things from eternity is positive and say it imports mere negation of repugnance and sole privative reality. All of these, I say, say the essences of things are mere nothing, and that the ratio of being, as contradistinguished from nothing, in no way belongs to them. So Smisfinch., *loc. cit.*, and *tract.* 1, *disp.* 2, na. 46, ad 3, 50, and 54; Canon., 1. *Phyf.*, qu. 9, art. 1, where he says that no thing in objective potency expresses any entity but is pure nothing; Meurisc., *lib.* 2, *fuae Met.*, capit. 3, par. 6, *quaest. pro*, adducing the Doctor — not only at 1. d. 36 but also at 5. *Metaph.*, cap. 7 — where he denies being in potency can be called simply and absolutely being, since that particle "in potency" is distractive, for potency distracts from being.

It must nonetheless be said that the essence of a possible thing, even setting existence aside, truly has the ratio of being as contradistinguished from absolutely nothing — and therefore in this sense can and ought to be called true real and positive being. This is manifestly collected from Scotus at 1. d. 36, as we shall shortly see, and at 9. *Metaph.*, q. 2, where he explicitly raises this very doubt and inclines to this part — though he also appears to admit the opposite as probable. The following authors hold this view: Aversa, qu. 8, *cit.*, sect. 3; Pasqualig., *disp.* 76, *cit.*, sect. 5; Arriaga, *disp.* 2, *Met.*, sect. 1, *subsec.* 3, where he says it is not rightly established that the possibility of things consists in a merely negative non-repugnance to existing; Ovviéd., *controv.* 2, *Met.*, *punct.* 1, n. 14, where he says this predicate possible does not destroy, nor indeed diminish, the true ratio signified by the name real being; and others.

Cajetanus appears to have taught the same at cap. 4, *de ente, and essentia*, q. 6, where he notes that real being is taken in two ways: as distinguished from nothing and from being of reason, and as contradistinguished from existing being. And finally all those who admit the famous distinction in the schools between being nominally and verbally — or participially — taken must hold this. As we explained in *disp.* 2, *de natura entis, ab initio*, n. 1. For we intend nothing other through this conclusion than that in the essence of a possible creature, prescinding from actual existence, the ratio of being nominally taken is well preserved — which for the Metaphysician is its most powerful acceptance, as better adapted to the sciences.

And a possible thing can be called and denominated real being in this sense. And Suarez himself concedes this in the cited place at n. 10.

It is therefore proved and explained from the Doctor himself at the cited *1. d. 36*: at *§. ad 1. principale* he says that "ratum being" — that is, firm and true being — is either called that which has firm and true being whether of essence or of existence (since one is not without the other however they may be distinguished), or "ratum being" is called that which is first distinguished from fictions — to which, namely, true being of essence or existence is not repugnant. If ratum being is taken in the first way, he says man is not from himself ratum being but from the efficient cause, from which he has true being both of essence and existence. If ratum being is understood in the second way, he says that possible man is from himself ratum being — since formally from himself existence is not repugnant to him. So the Doctor.

So every creature is called being precisely insofar as it is capable of being through the active power of its cause; and whatever the existence is that it is said to have, of such a kind also must be regarded the ratio of being it claims. If existence is actual, it is called being verbally. But if existence is only potential, it will be called real being only nominally — and in a potential mode — which posits no real actual being in the essence, as Henry maintained. At *§. ad 1. principale*, responding to the second principal argument, he concedes that the intellection of stone from eternity was Metaphysical and real on the part of the object. Therefore possible stone, even prescinding from existence, can and ought to be called real being — otherwise the divine cognition attaining stone from eternity could not be called real objectively, which the Doctor denies there.

You will say: some want the possibility of a thing to be nothing but a mere negative non-repugnance to existing, and therefore not sufficient for a possible thing to be called real being as contradistinguished from nothing. Against this: the opposite was shown above in n. 32. Also I show now what I promised there — that the possible being from eternity formally and in a direct line signifies that positive being which will afterward exist in time. For as the Doctor teaches at *2. dist. 16, q. un., §. rationes ifte*, being in act and being in potency from *9. Metaph., tex. com. 13* are not only of the same genus and species but also of the same number. For that individual which is now in act, that same was in potency. A manifest indication of which is that we form the very same essential concept of an existing man and a non-existing one, and we predicate possible man in a direct line of the man already existing: "this existing man is the one who was possible." But man who now exists is true real being and is explained through a positive concept. Therefore even before he was existing, he was real being and should have been explained through a positive concept.

Perhaps you will say there is no need for them to be positively the same for them to be able to be predicated of each other — it is sufficient that they be the same negatively, that is, that they not be two distinct positive things. Against this: when

we say "this existing man now is the one who was possible," the copula not only negates real distinction but further posits real identity. But this cannot obtain between a positive and a negative extreme.

Furthermore, against this solution Arriaga presses: man and non-being are not distinct in this sense — they are not two distinct positive entities — yet they cannot be predicated of each other. Therefore neither could the possible be affirmed of the actual precisely because they would be indistinct negatively. Indeed this instance is not very pressing — since those who respond through negative identity do not mean the aforesaid indistinction, which also obtains between man and non-being, but a mere and pure non-diversity, which does not equally obtain between them. For it is false that man and non-being are not diverse — and conversely it is true that the existing man now is not diverse from the one who was possible. Rather therefore it must be pressed from the fact that the copula is, not only negates diversity but further affirms real identity, as Arriaga himself afterward argues.

You will say: the predicate possible would destroy or at least diminish the force of the signification of being itself. Against this: although that predicate — cognitive being — diminishes the signification of being itself, as was said in n. 20, from Scotus at *1. dist. 36, littera E*, this is not diminished by the predicate possible. For with this predicate the whole and entire intrinsic ratio of being is still preserved — only through this predicate in a proposition the force of the signification of the copula is itself diminished, which taken simply and absolutely signifies from itself actual and existential being. Hence it does not follow: "this stone is possible" or "is possible being, therefore it is" — that would be a fallacy from the qualified to the unqualified. And this is Scotus's doctrine in terms at *9. Met., qu. 2*, where at *in solutione ad 4* he says that although being in potency is not being as simply as being in act — so that the ratio of possible diminishes being — it nonetheless does not entirely destroy the ratio of being. So when it is said "stone is possible being," the predicate possible does not destroy or diminish the intrinsic ratio of being to which it is added — as if the meaning were that stone is not being, or is being only in a qualified sense, destroying or diminishing the reality of being. Rather it only destroys in the copula the force and mode of its signifying — so that from the force of this predicate possible there is not signified simply and absolutely that being or existing, but a prescission is made from this rigorous mode of being, and the subject is left indifferent so that — the truth of the proposition being preserved — it can simply be (that is, exist) and not simply be (that is, not exist). And in this sense the Doctor in the cited *fifth Metaphysics, cap. 7* is to be understood when he says being in potency cannot be called simply being.

The whole of this reasoning is finally confirmed: because nothing, and non-being as opposed to properly called real being, is signified as that which neither is nor can be in reality any being outside the soul and outside the intellect, as the Doctor teaches at *quol. 3, cit., ab initio*. And so in order that something not be called

nothing — as negations and fictive entities are — it is not absolutely necessary for it to exist in the nature of things, but it suffices that it can thus exist. For by this sole logical or objective potency it is sufficiently distinguished from being of reason and from nothing — since this too pertains to the opposition between being and non-being, or between thing and nothing. Therefore when the discussion is about the essence of some real being — such as the Antichrist or another possible world — even though not existing, it should not be said absolutely speaking that such essence is nothing, is non-being, as Hurtado wanted. For by such a way of speaking not only would it be signified that the Antichrist or another world does not actually exist on the part of the thing outside causes, but further it would be denoted that they cannot exist and are as it were a negation or pure being of reason. Rather therefore absolutely speaking it ought to be called real being and a true thing — for by this it is not signified that the Antichrist or another world actually really exists, but that at least it can really exist. Or if you prefer, to avoid an amphibology in the word, you can add that it is real being that is potential. And this proof suffices for the conclusion — since this question is more about the mode of speaking than about the thing itself.

But the authority of Scotus cited in n. 45 for the opposing way of speaking explains itself: for when he says that possible man is nothing and not something, it is clear from the very words that he is speaking of actual real being and saying man is nothing — not some actual thing. And he says man from eternity is as much nothing as a chimera, but then adds that to man the affirmation — which is the being of something — is not repugnant, while to chimera it is repugnant. And this distinction posited by the Doctor between a chimera and a possible man suffices so that absolutely speaking a chimera is called nothing and non-being, but not a possible man.

Against this Hurtado objects with authorities of Aristotle and Anselm. Aristotle at 9. *Met.*, *cap.* 3 places among non-beings those things that, though they can exist, do not exist. And the reason why he says they are non-beings and are not is that they are not actually. For he speaks thus: "of non-beings some are in potency but are not, since they are not in *endelecheia* (that is, in act)." Anselm teaches the same in *Monologion*, *c.* 8, with these words: "everything made is made from nothing — that is, what was previously nothing is now something."

Confirmation: because potency excludes act, hence being able to be excludes being. Therefore since the possible can be, it does not have being.

Moreover: the predicates that belong to something in potency are said to belong to it only in a qualified sense and not simply. But to the actually non-existing possible this predicate being belongs only in potency. Therefore they are either non-beings or beings only in a qualified sense and not simply.

I respond: these and similar authorities are to be expounded as the authority of Scotus was just being expounded — that possibles are called non-beings taking

being verbally, so that the meaning is that they are not existing; but taking being nominally and essentially, it is false that being can be denied of possibles — for truly of man whether existing or not it is enunciated that he is being, substance, rational animal, etc. To the confirmation: potency excludes being, insofar as being is the act of the potency for being — but the act of such potency is only the act as it expresses actuality of being and of being something in itself. And therefore potency only excludes being in this sense — that is, being really and actually outside causes — from which it does not follow that it excludes the true ratio of being as contradistinguished from nothing, in which acceptation it not only comprehends actual being and existing things, but also possibles. To the other: actual being certainly belongs to the possible being only in a qualified sense and not simply — that is, in potency and not in act, and therefore cannot be called simply actual being. But essential predicates, as we said, equally belong to existing and possible things. And therefore taking being nominally and as it is an essential predicate, it should not be said to belong to those that are not actually as only in potency and in a qualified sense, but essentially and simply.

You will say: if possible being, in the aforesaid sense, can be called something, it would follow that God could create no thing nor annihilate it — since before its production that something would precede from which it would be produced; and after its destruction that itsomething-ness would always remain. As we were arguing above in art. 1 against Henry together with Scotus. And again: if possible things have essential predicates belonging to them, it follows we can know what a thing is while ignoring whether it is — the opposite of which Aristotle teaches at *1. Post.*, where he wants the precognition of whether it is to be prior to the precognition of what it is.

I respond: by denying the first consequence — for to save creation and annihilation it suffices that no real and actual being of a thing precede its production, nor remain after its destruction. For in this sense creation is said to be production from nothing, and annihilation the resolution of a thing into nothing. And it was in this sense the Doctor argued against Henry, who admitted real actual being of essence preceding things from eternity. The other consequence is also denied. For when Aristotle says about a thing it must first be known that it is, and then what it is, this is not to be understood of the being of existence — that is, that it exists — but as we said in *Logic*, it is to be understood of its possibility: namely that it is not repugnant to the thing to exist. For as was said there, the sciences prescind from the actual existence of things which they contemplate.

Though Pasqualig. agrees with us on this question at the cited *sect.*, nonetheless at *sect. 3, cit., concl. 2*, he says that the essence of things, as it sets aside existence, just as it should not be called actual being since it does not actually exist, so neither should it be called potential being. His reason is: because potential being as it differs from actual being is understood negatively — namely that it does not

actually exist. But the true essence is truly essence and is essentially being even when it actually exists, and of its ratio is not that very negation of existing. Therefore the essence according to itself should not be called potential being, but absolutely being, abstracting from both actuality and potentiality.

But this seems contrary to himself in the same place, because immediately above *concl. 2* he maintains that essence setting aside existence simply and absolutely ought to be called a true thing, real being — since by this it is not signified that the Antichrist or another world actually really exists, but that at least it can really exist. If therefore it is so, then essence setting aside existence, and considered according to itself, can be called potential being — insofar as it can really exist, which is no inconvenience. Also because essence prescinding from existence participates, according to him, the ratio of nominally taken being. But nominally taken being is said of that which, though it does not exist, is nonetheless not repugnant to existing. Therefore it can be called potential being.

Although therefore it cannot be called potential being by objective potency (since this is truly opposed to act, and in its ratio involves the negation of existence), it can nonetheless be called potential being by logical potency. For this is not destroyed but rather perfected by act — from which in relation to this potency the affirmative consequence holds. For God always exists and has logical potency to exist — and this potency in its ratio does not express the negation of existence, but as far as concerns itself prescinds equally from existence and its negation, and is compossible with both disjointly.

Article IV: Objections Proving the Real Actuality of the Essence of Creatures from Eternity Are Resolved

Until this article we have deferred the solution of the arguments proving that creatures from eternity had some real actual being called being of essence as distinguished from being of existence — because, as we said at the end of the first article, they could not be adequately addressed without having first knowledge of the state of possibility of creatures from eternity — which we explained at length in the preceding articles. From that explanation it will now not be difficult to address all individual arguments customarily adduced in favor of Henry's view.

First, arguments are customarily drawn from the possibility of creatures: because a creature before it is created is possible, otherwise an impossible thing would be created. But everything possible is true real being — since real being is divided through act and potency. Therefore, etc.

Second: because if a creature is a possible being, this potency cannot be conceived except as founded in some entity of the creature — for by this essentially real being is distinguished from fictive being. But this being cannot be except real being of essence as preceding existence. Therefore, etc.

Third: because a creature as possible from eternity is either real being or being of reason. Not the second — since being of reason is not producible outside. Therefore the first.

Fourth: because if a creature did not have this actual being of essence from eternity, one nothing would be no more nothing than another — since because existence is not repugnant to the creature and is repugnant to a chimera, a chimera would be more nothing than a possible creature.

Fifth: because if it has no real actual being whatsoever but is nothing, when afterward in time the essence becomes existing, what was nothing would become being — which is absurd, since non-being would be converted into being, and nothing into something.

Finally, they adduce an argument from permuted proportion: as being is to non-being, so possible is to impossible. Therefore in permuted proportion: as being is to possible, so non-being is to impossible. But every being is possible. Therefore everything that is purely non-being is impossible.

I respond: these arguments drawn from the possibility of the creature can be retorted against existence itself — since existence is no less possible than essence, as I showed in *art. 1, n. 9*. Just as therefore from the fact that the existence of things was possible from eternity, it is not rightly deduced that they had some real actual being of existence from eternity — so likewise it must be said of being of essence.

To the first therefore: Rada at the cited *controversy* 29, responding, denies the minor. For its proof he says that objective potency and the act opposed to it — as the Commentator notes at *1. de anim.* — are opposed differences and divide being, as living and dead divide man. Hence just as a dead man is not simply a man, so neither is man in objective potency simply a being. Therefore it does not follow that if a creature is possible, it is true real being. Indeed the opposite follows — since just as man in potency is not man, so being in potency is not simply being, but being in potency.

But the falsity of this solution is clear from what was said in n. 49 and following — where we showed that the predicate possible does not destroy or diminish the intrinsic ratio of being to which it is added, and that man even if not existing is called simply man, rational animal, substance, being, etc. Wherefore from what was said there, the minor must be conceded — that a possible thing is true real being, not indeed verbally said being — that is, actual being — but only nominally said, and potential, which posits no real actuality of essence, as Henry wanted.

To the second: the Thomists — whom Aversa follows at the cited *q. 8, sect. 2* — say that a creature before it is denominated possible or capable of existing is not denominated through a positive potency found in the creature or its essence, but receives the extrinsic denomination from the effective power of the agent. And therefore it does not follow that before existence there must precede some

potency or positive entity of the creature. But apart from the fact that this doctrine is false, as is clear from what was said in n. 27 and 30 and 32 and 48, it still does not avoid the difficulty — since there is no extrinsic denomination without a denominated, and extrinsic denomination presupposes a subject it must denominate. Therefore if possible being in a creature from eternity expresses an extrinsic denomination taken from divine omnipotence, it will have to import something through which it is denominated possible.

Granted therefore that the possibility of a creature for existing is positive as well as extrinsic, it is still denied that such a potency must be founded in some actual entity of the creature that it has from eternity. For as is clear from what was said in n. 33 and following, for a thing to be possible does not express something that is physically actually — but what is actually objectively in the divine mind, and would physically be without any implication if God willed to produce it. Hence precisely through this, Peter constituted in the divine mind is possible from eternity — because he terminated the knowledge of this complex: "if I will to produce Peter, Peter will exist without any contradiction." Just as therefore an object can actually terminate cognition that is not — but would be — so a creature can be called actually possible that is not but would be. The Scotists however customarily say from the Doctor at *1. distinct. 36, M* and *distinct. 43, D* that the possibility of a creature is founded in the cognitive being that it has from the divine intellect. But this is to be understood as we explained above in n. 38 — insofar as extrinsically and principiatively it has that possibility from the divine cognition that it terminates.

To the third: it is clear from n. 46 that a possible creature from eternity is real being nominally, though not verbally. It is also clear from what was said in n. 21 that it can be called being of reason — insofar as it underlies divine cognition and has objective being in the divine mind. Yet it is not called creatable according to this latter reason but according to the former.

To the fourth: the Doctor at *1. dist. 36, littera L* denies the consequence — for from this it only follows that the negation of being belongs differently to creatures and to chimeras. For to creatures, he says, the negation of existence belongs only from the negation of an act or cause not placing them in being; while to chimeras it belongs not only from this source but especially because existence is formally and intrinsically repugnant to them. One could also deny from what was said in n. 50 that a possible creature is simply nothing — since simply nothing is that (from *quod. 3, ab initio*) which neither is nor can be anything outside the soul. And therefore since a possible creature can be something in the nature of things, it can be called real being nominally, and cannot be called simply and absolutely nothing — only insofar as it excludes actual and existential being. In which sense it can be called less nothing than a chimera — which is altogether nothing, since its very ratio excludes both actual being and possible being. And in this way it is

no inconvenience for one nothing to be more nothing than another; nor did the Doctor in the cited place intend to deny this.

To the fifth, which causes some considerable trouble, one easily responds from the same doctrine: although it is impossible for what is simply and absolutely nothing — as a chimera is — to become something, since such nothing is altogether impossible and has no potency for existing, yet what is something in potency and nothing only in act (insofar as it excludes actual and existential being), as a possible creature is, can well through creation become something actual by passing from potency to act. Here it must be noted — to remove all possible quibbling in the argument — what Bassolius notes at 2. *dist. 1, qu. 4, ad 6*: that a creature before it is produced is not called nothing intrinsically and quiddatively — as if it were the very negation of actual entity and existence — but only denominatively and connotatively, insofar as before it is created it coexists with that negation, which recedes after creation. Hence it never follows that in creation non-being is converted into being and nothing into something — that is, that the negation of existence is converted into actual existence itself — which is altogether repugnant. It only follows that what was not begins to be, and what did not exist begins to exist. And I find no other mystery more worthy of reflection in this argument.

To the last, the Doctor himself responds excellently at *littera K*, where from Euclid he elegantly demonstrates that the legitimate mode of arguing from permuted proportion — which is not at all observed in the argument — is as can be seen in the text. We briefly say: that mode of arguing holds in convertible terms, of which two and two are convertible and contradictory. But this does not occur in the proposed case — since non-being and impossible are not convertible. But if you contend they are convertible, then finally from the doctrine of the preceding article it must be denied — denying that a possible creature is non-being simply and absolutely speaking — since it is real being nominally.

Second, arguments are drawn from divine cognition: because the essence of a creature, before it exists, terminates the science of God called science of simple intelligence. And so that it may terminate such knowledge and found a relation to the knowing divine intellect, it requires some real being.

Confirmation: because the science by which the divine intellect knows a possible stone is real from eternity, as the Theologians say. Therefore the known object is real.

Finally: sciences are about real and eternal things. But sciences are about essences and quiddities. Therefore the essences of things are eternal and real.

I respond: these arguments can equally be retorted against existence itself, as is clear from what was said in n. 9 — since God knows the essences of things from eternity no less than existences. And yet from this it is not rightly inferred that things have real actual being of existence from eternity. Therefore neither from

the fact that he knows the essences of things from eternity is it rightly deduced that they have from eternity real being of essence simply.

To the first therefore: from the theological tract on divine science, it must be said that God does not know possible things from eternity in themselves, as if they were to have in themselves some being through which they move the divine intellect or primarily terminate its act. Rather God attains them through the mode of a secondary and purely terminative object, and knows in them that they are nothing and can only be something if he communicates being to them (which he can do). And according to this real being that he knows is not repugnant to them, they found a relation of the known to the knower and terminate divine cognition. This we also experience in ourselves: when an object not actually existing but nonetheless capable of existing — such as a rose in winter — presents itself to our intellect, then a true real being is objected to us, not indeed as actually existing in effect, but as capable of existing.

To the confirmation: through the same — the science of possibles in God is real, not because it terminates at some real being that creatures actually possess from eternity, but insofar as it terminates at the real being that is not repugnant to them. This suffices for denominating divine science as also real on the part of the secondary object, as the Doctor notes at *1. d. 36, ad 2. princ., lit. K*, and Bassolius in the cited place, at *ad 5*, where he also notes that the reality of divine science is especially to be attended to on the part of the primary and motive object, which is the divine essence.

To the last: similarly sciences are said to be about real and not rational beings — since they consider the quiddities of things not according to the objective being they have in the intellect, but according to themselves or insofar as they are apt to exist on the part of the thing with such natures and properties. They are also said to be about eternal things, insofar as they abstract from the existence of things here and now — which are conditions inducing contingency. But the essences of things are customarily called eternal not simply and incompletely — since only God is eternal in this way — but in a qualified sense and complexly, as the Doctor notes at *1. d. 3, q. 3, §. ad quaestionem*: insofar as when we predicate proper and essential predicates of them we form propositions of eternal truth. They are also called eternal, as the Doctor notes at *3. d. 22, qu. un., littera C*, insofar as they are not proximately corruptible — for fire is not in a near potency to corruption except in the being of existence.

Third, arguments are drawn from the eternal truth and from the immutable character of necessary propositions: because propositions of the first and second mode of per se saying are always true and necessary even before existence. Therefore the very essences of things — of which they are verified — will be real before existence. The consequence is clear since every real truth is founded in some true being.

Confirmation: because it was true from eternity to say that man is a rational animal, and hence that proposition is said to be of eternal truth and not to depend on the actual existence of man. But it does not appear how it can be true if man did not have some real being from eternity.

I respond: this argument in truth proves nothing — since it can be retorted against non-beings and beings of reason, in which a similar necessity of essential propositions is found. For blindness is a privation, a chimera is a being of reason, non-being is non-being, etc. It can also be retorted against existences themselves — since it was no less true from eternity to say man is a rational animal than that existence is a mode of essence, and is really or not really distinguished from essence. Just as therefore from these propositions it is not rightly deduced that existence existed from eternity — nor in beings of reason or privations do they argue some real being of essence in which their truth is founded — so neither in the present case.

For a richer doctrine and solution of the doubt, it will be helpful here to explain whence depends the necessity of those propositions and how they were also true from eternity — although no real being of essence preceded in which their truth was founded. Various ways of speaking are recounted by Maironis at *1. dif. 3, q. 5* and again at *1. dif. 42, qu. 6*.

The first way of speaking asserts that the perpetual truth of necessary truths arises from the necessity of the necessary terms — that is, from the fact that the terms from which they are formed are in themselves necessary, and therefore says such truths cannot be formed except about an immutable object — namely God. And around created objects it says there is no truth thus necessary. Hence with all men annihilated he says this is false: "every man is an animal." This was the opinion of Ockham, *quol. 3, qu. 5* and *quol. 4, qu. 37*. The same was indicated by Hervaeus, *quol. 1, qu. 10*, and Jandun defends it at *4. Metaph., qu. 15*, where he teaches it is true to say "Sortes is a man" only as long as Sortes actually lives — and once he dies, it cannot truly be said "Sortes is a man." Averroes also signified this when at *1. Physic., com. 63*, he said a thing in substantial corruption loses its name and definition.

But Maironis rightly refutes this way of speaking in the same place — because from it it follows that all science besides Theology is about contingents, or that no science is found except Theology. For all other sciences have contingent extremes of propositions, and consequently all those propositions would be contingent and not truly knowable. Also because then it would be impossible to take any necessary principle that is verified of God and creatures — the opposite of which Augustine teaches at *1. de Trin., cap. 1*, where he teaches that this principle — "no thing begets itself" — is necessarily verified of both God and creatures. And hence Suarez rightly says at *disp. 31, Metaphyf., sectione 12* that the aforesaid opinion is not only contrary to philosophers but also to the Fathers of the Church, as he plainly demonstrates there.

Finally: as is clear from what was said, it is truly said of man whether he exists or not that he is being, substance, rational animal, and other essential predicates are attributed to him with truth in the common way of speaking among philosophers.

You will object: Aristotle at 2. *Post.* 32 and 39 says that it cannot be known that a thing is without first knowing whether it is. Therefore essential predicates cannot be affirmed of a non-existing thing. And at 2. *Periher.*, chapter 2, he says that a dead man is not truly called a man. And in the *Praedicamenta*, of substance, he says that from the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is said to be true or false.

Then it is argued by reason: man imports a soul united to a body. But with Sortes corrupted, such union is corrupted. Therefore with Sortes dead it is no longer true to say "Sortes is a man."

Finally: when it is true to say "Sortes is a man," it can also be inferred from this that Sortes is. But this is not true unless Sortes exists. Therefore neither is the former.

I respond: it was already explained in n. 52 that Aristotle by "whether it is" does not mean actual and existential being, but possible being — namely that the knowable object is not prohibited being nor is existence repugnant to it. In the second place Aristotle speaks of a dead man as such — reduplicatively taken — since the word "dead" is a distracting addition, not of man considered according to himself and with respect to his essentials. In the third place Aristotle is truly speaking only of contingent propositions, as is clear from the very context. But that dictum is also verified in necessary ones, if the copula is taken as signifying not indeed the actual existence of the subject but the essential identity of it with the predicate. In which sense it is true to say man is a rational animal — that is, is identical with rational animal. And this is clearly verified even with man not existing — since an existing man is identified with an existing rational, just as a possible man with a possible rational.

To the argument: the consequence is denied — since man considered according to his essential predicates considers a composite of soul and body abstracting from actual existence of the parts and the union. Therefore with the actual union of those parts destroyed, it is still true to say Sortes is a man, though it cannot be said he is an actually living man — since for this the existence of the parts and their actual union is necessary.

To the other: in necessary propositions the logicians say the inference does not hold from a proposition with a third term adjacent to one with a second term adjacent, since the subject of such propositions has no state and abstracts from here and now. But in contingent ones it does hold since their subject has a state and does not abstract from here and now, as was said in the first part of the *Institutiones Logicae*, tract. 1, cap. 11. The Doctor signifies this at 1. *Perhier.*, qu. 8, ad 3.

The second way of speaking acknowledges these truths to be immutable not as to the being things have in themselves, but as to the being they have in our intellect objectively and in diminished being. For about quiddities as conceived by us these necessary truths are formed. So certain Scotists seem to hold — such as Canon., 2. *Phyf., qu. 1, art. 2* — saying that necessary truths are not founded in the real being of things of which they are formed, but in the cognitive and diminished being they are said to have in our intellect objectively. But this is well rejected by Maironis — since it befalls quiddities accidentally that they are conceived by us, so that with such cognitive being removed, the truth of those propositions would collapse. Furthermore, nothing is any more immutable in diminished being than in that simply real being to which it is reduced — but both the conception or act of conceiving and the intellect itself are mutable. Therefore the conceived being of the terms is also mutable. Therefore the necessity and immutability of those propositions cannot be founded in such cognitive being.

The third way of speaking therefore says these truths are immutable as to the being they have in the divine intellect alone — since their extremes are always immutable there, and in no intellect are they immutable except in that one. So St. Thomas indicates at *par. prima, quaestione decima, artic. 3, ad 3, qu. 26, artic. 7, ad 1*, and *quaest. 1, de veritate, artic. 5, ad 11* and *artic. 6, ad 2 and 3* — where he says that with the existence of creatures destroyed, these enunciations are true not in themselves but in the divine intellect, and were not true from eternity except insofar as they were objectively in the divine mind. But this way of speaking is also rightly rejected by everyone — since not only enunciations in which essential predicates are affirmed of their subjects, but also all contingent propositions have thus perpetual truth in the divine intellect — since God knows both equally from eternity. Also because when these propositions are said to be necessary and always true, this is said not only with respect to the divine intellect but with respect to any intellect — created or divine. For the evidence of these propositions arises formally from their terms especially in per se known ones. But the terms of those — for example of "every whole is greater than its part" — are also in the created intellect. Therefore immutable truth will be in it as well.

The fourth way of speaking had asserted the perpetual truth of those propositions to arise from the immutability of the terms in quidditative being however posited. For quiddities and quidditative being are abstracted from all being in the soul and real being. Some habitudes belong to terms from the formal rationes of terms — such as "man is an animal." Others do not — such as "man is white." The first follow quidditative being; the second perhaps real being or being in the soul. And this way of speaking Maironis himself appears to embrace. But this too is not satisfying — since it entirely coincides with Henry's opinion of founding these truths in being of essence as distinguished from being of existence, as Bargius notes at *prima distinctione tertia, quaestione quarta*. And it is easily refuted through the very instance adduced by Maironis, which he does not well resolve. It is this: since the terms of these complexes — whether taken according to being of

existence or according to being of essence — are always contingent and can cease to be either through creation or through annihilation.

Also because either that habitude belongs to them as they are in the soul or as they are outside the soul. And whichever is given, it follows that it is contingent — unless explained otherwise. Maironis responds to the case of essences: that the formal rationes of terms abstract from those predicates — namely from being created or annihilated — and therefore according to such being the habitude between them can be immutable. To the other he similarly responds that the evidence or habitude does not belong to them as they are in the soul or outside the soul, but according to quidditative being that abstracts from being in the soul and outside the soul.

But as Lichetus notes at *1. distinctione 36*, this doctrine of Maironis about the quiddities of things — which he always has in his mouth: that they are from eternity, yet are not something produced or unproduced, not something in the soul or outside the soul, but abstract from these — is entirely voluntary and irrational. For this is a manifest implication: that such quidditative being should be true being of essence distinct from existence, and yet be neither real nor of reason, neither produced nor unproduced. Since everything other than God in the mode in which it is other than God is also produced — so that if it has qualified being, it is produced in a qualified sense, and all the more so when it has being of essence, which is simply being, will it be produced. And thus it is vain to say (says Lichetus) that such being is neither produced nor unproduced. It also implies that an intermediate being be given between real being and being of reason, from what was said in art. 2. Therefore this solution of Maironis is a mere evasion.

The final and last way of speaking teaches that these propositions are of necessary and immutable truth — since given the terms and apprehended by the intellect, whether created or uncreated, it is impossible through any power that the habitude and connection between them should not arise. And this is the Doctor's way of speaking, as Bargius notes in the cited place. He taught it at *1. Perihier., quaest. 8* and at *1. d. 3, quaest. 4, art. 3*, where he says there is a twofold necessity and immutability of connection: one simply, which belongs to extremes not subject to failure; another in a qualified sense, which falls between extremes that though in themselves corruptible, the habitude between them can never be changed into false, whenever they are apprehended by an intellect. And he says this is the necessity pertaining to science — as we also said in *disp. 12, log., qu. 1*, explaining the fourth condition of science. For the first necessity belongs to God alone.

It must therefore be said that necessary propositions are called of eternal truth quasi-conditionally — that is, they are such that whenever they are either inwardly apprehended by an intellect or outwardly uttered, they are always true and necessary, even if they had been uttered from eternity. And thus from eternity it was true to say "man is an animal" — not because from eternity man

coexisted with animality, but because in any instant of eternity this conditional is true: "if here and now man were to exist, he would be an animal." And this is not verified of contingent propositions — for it is not true that for whatever instant man is posited he must be white, since he can exist in some instant in which he is not white. And this way of explaining the truth of necessary propositions has been embraced by all recent authors: Suarez, *disp. 31, sect. 12, num. 45*; Aversa, *qu. 8, citat. qu. 4*; Ovvied., *controv. 2, Metaph., punct. 1, num. 12*.

From this it is clear that the truth of those propositions is well preserved in things even if they do not exist in themselves — neither as to being of existence nor as to being of essence — when we say through those propositions not any actuality of being is expressed but only the connection of predicates prescinding from actuality. So that the meaning of this proposition "man is an animal" is this: an existing man is an existing animal; a possible man is a possible animal. And if we wish to explain it with respect to actuality, we must explain it quasi-conditionally: that in whatever instant man will be, he will have to be such as is enunciated — namely animal. From this way of speaking it is also excellently declared how this necessity of propositions can in its way be transferred to beings of reason and to privations themselves — for a being of reason is also necessarily according to itself regarded as having such and such essential predicates: namely if here and now through the intellect it were to exist, it would have to exist with such and such predicates.

From this it is finally inferred that the truth of necessary propositions — though not founded in some real actual being that the extremes possess — is nonetheless founded in real potential being. For when we say "if here and now man were to exist, he would be an animal," we presuppose through that conditional that man and animal are possible in the nature of things. And the truth of that conditional is founded in such possibility and in their possible identity.

And this must also in its way be applied to beings of reason — since the truth of necessary propositions in them will be founded in this: that the essence of a possible being of reason can be, and actually be placed in being through the intellect. For whatever we say simply and truly of real being, all of this through a proposition must be said of being of reason as in its tract was said in Logic.

Against this way of speaking Maironis presses in the cited place: because if the truth and necessity of essential propositions is reduced to the conditional meaning just explained, it follows that there is no absolute truth in creatures, but all truth is conditioned. And since this does not suffice for the certainty of science, it follows there is no science about creatures.

Second: nothing posterior can be more necessary than the prior. But that habitude is posterior to the extremes, and the extremes themselves are contingent. Therefore the habitude is also contingent.

Third: the very connection of extremes has a cause from which it is made. Therefore it cannot be enunciated unless when it is actually made. And if it results from extremes, it cannot be enunciated unless when extremes are actually.

Fourth: through the proposition "man is an animal," not only is it expressed that man can be an animal, but that he actually and necessarily is a rational animal. Therefore the mere potential identity of those extremes does not appear to be a sufficient foundation of its truth.

Finally: nor does that conditional appear sufficient for expressing the necessity of essential propositions. For then also this proposition "man is existing" would be necessary — since it is reduced to that conditional: "if man is, he exists" — and "it cannot come to be man that is not existing."

I respond: denying that the truth of essential propositions is not absolute but conditioned. For it is one thing to say that their truth is not absolute but conditioned; another that it is explained through a conditional. We assert the second, not the first. With the second it still stands that their truth in itself and on the part of the thing is absolute. It is therefore absolute truth of them — since it consists in the absolute identity of the extremes, either objective and possible or actual (if the extremes are taken with proportion — that is, of existing man with existing animal, and of possible man with possible animal). And it is true that this absolute truth is excellently explained through that conditional in the order of actuality of being. Then it must also be denied that the truth of conditionals does not suffice for the certainty of science — since that conditional "if man is, he is an animal" or "if he runs, he moves" is of perpetual truth and in truth and necessity is equivalent to those absolutes "man is an animal" and "running is motion."

To the second: I freely acknowledge that just as the extremes are corruptible, so also the habitude between them can cease as to actuality of being — for which reason the Doctor said that that connection is not simply necessary but in a qualified sense and from supposition — namely given that the extremes are on the part of the thing, or at least objectively in the intellect. There is added that the truth of those propositions is founded especially in the possible being of the extremes — which is not contingent but necessary. See Bargius in the cited place, resolving these two objections of Maironis less clearly.

To the third: many authors deny that the truths of necessary propositions have a cause of themselves — since although there may be a cause that makes man actually exist with his animality, no cause can be assigned that makes it true that man is essentially animal, and that animal is of the essence of man. So Soncinas at *4. met., quaestion. 10* and *lib. 5, quaestion. 10*, and Aversa in the cited place follow this. But briefly it must be said that just as all creatures from eternity had it intrinsically and formally from themselves that they were possible of such and such a nature and condition, and extrinsically and principiatively from the divine intellect producing them in a qualified sense in cognitive being (as was explained

from n. 38, following Scotus at *p. d. 43*), so the necessary truths formed about them derive from their natures in the genus as it were of formal cause, and from the divine intellect as it were in the genus of efficient cause. And in this sense they are said to have a cause of themselves. So the Doctor elegantly explains the matter at *p. d. 3, q. 4, §. ad quaestionem* with these words: "to the understanding of the first I say that all intelligibles through the act of the divine intellect have intelligible being, and in them all truths about them shine forth; so that the intellect understanding them and understanding through their virtue necessary truths about them, sees in them as in objects those necessary truths. Those moreover, insofar as they are secondary objects of the divine intellect, are truths because they conform to their exemplar — namely the divine intellect. And they are immutable there and necessary; yet they are eternal in a qualified sense, since eternity is the condition of the existing, and those do not have existence except in a qualified sense." So the Doctor. From which is deduced that necessary truths are caused both from the very natures of things and from the divine intellect in the way just explained.

Hence it is ineptly said by Faber at 9. *Met., d. p. 6, c. ad 6* that the cause of the truth of necessary propositions is the divine will — for this is the cause of contingent truths. And it is again false what he says there, that contingent truths differ from necessary ones in that the latter depend only on the divine will while the former also on a created will — since "Antichrist will be" is contingent and does not depend on created will.

To the fourth: every truth of an affirmative proposition is founded in some identity of extremes — just as conversely the truth of a negative one is founded in their diversity. But identity and diversity, as affections of being, are found in every being and in every state of being. Hence just as man is the same in reality as an existing animal, so a possible man has identity with a possible animal — and indeed in its own way actual identity. Insofar as this extreme, possible animal, is actually of the ratio of this extreme, possible man — since a possible man intrinsically and quiddatively is a possible animal. And therefore this identity is a sufficient foundation of the truth of that proposition "man is an animal." Since although the extremes are merely possible, the identity between them in objective being is actual.

To the last: if the predicate existing is taken with proportion either in act or in potency, that proposition "man is existing" could be admitted as necessary. But because that predicate, as simply said, from the force of its signification does not signify a potency for existing but the exercise and actuality of being, therefore the proposition absolutely stated should not be admitted — since it does not render the conditional meaning but the absolute. Hence if it were admitted as necessary, it would absolutely signify that existence and actuality of being necessarily belongs to man — which is false. As Suarez rightly noted in the cited place.

Fourth and finally, arguments are drawn from the very concept of essence: because in creatures being of essence and being of existence are customarily distinguished, and the former is said to be prior as prior, and the latter as posterior. Therefore setting aside existence, creatures still retain being of essence.

Confirmation: the essences of things are arranged in the categories prescinding from existence. But what are arranged in the categories are real beings. Therefore real being belongs to creatures independently of existence.

I respond: because essence from the force of its signification does not denote actuality of being — as existence does — it is therefore customarily taken in two ways: either for the possible being of things, in which way it is attributed in common usage to creatures even non-existing — and in this sense it is not some true real and actual being in the creature as Henry conceded, but is pure possible being that has no actual being except cognitive and objective in the divine intellect, as was shown above. In another way, being of essence is taken as it actually belongs to already existing creatures — and this indeed is real and actual being (however it may be distinguished from existence). But it does not belong to creatures except through creation and the production of an agent and through real conjunction with existence. And therefore setting aside existence, creatures do not retain being of essence except in the first mode described — in which mode it is not some real actual being that they have in themselves from eternity, but only possible being, that they have in their causes in the way explained above.

But when it was said that essence is prior to existence, if the discussion is about priority of duration, this can only be verified of essence taken in the first mode — for by this priority the possible being of creatures certainly precedes the real actual being they have in time. But essence taken in the second mode does not precede existence by this priority, but only by that priority of nature which the Doctor calls natural presupposition — which obtains between two things that although inseparable, one is necessarily presupposed to the other when understood, but not conversely. In which way the subject is said to be prior by nature to the attribute and the intellect prior to the will — of which priority we said enough in *disp. 9, Log., qu. 2, art. 1*.

To the confirmation: granting the major, the minor is denied — things arranged in the categories prescinding from actual existence are called real beings taking being nominally for that to which true being is not repugnant outside causes. But not verbally for what actually exists outside causes. And therefore it does not follow that creatures can possess real and actual being of essence independently of existence.

You will say: the thing as possible and as made is entirely of the same species and number. For the rose in spring and in winter is of the same species, and the same humanity of existing and possible Peter is numerically the same essence. But

while the rose exists and Peter exists, their essence imports some real and actual entity. Therefore even before they exist.

Nor does the common response that is usually adduced for this hold — namely that the producible thing and the produced thing are of the same species and number only negatively, insofar as they are not diverse. Since we already said in n. 48 that there is positive real identity between them.

I respond: we said this there — not to indicate that the essence even prescinding from existence imports some actual entity, but to show that it does not import a merely negative concept explained through simple negative non-repugnance (as some maintained). Since we form the very same essential concept of an existing and non-existing man, and possible man is predicated in a direct line of the man already existing: "this existing man is the one who was possible." From this however it is not rightly deduced that if the humanity of Peter while he exists imports some actual reality, it did so also while he did not exist — since it is the same thing. For that would similarly allow deducing that before production it had the reality of existence that it possesses after production, since producible Peter is the same as himself produced. From this therefore — that it is the same thing that is now produced and was already producible — it only follows that in both states it retains the very same essential concept. For the same is conceived when this is said to be possible and when it is said that this exists, though under a diverse state. And only in this sense can they be said positively the same — not because in both states they retain some same actual reality. For the essential concept common to both states prescinds from all such actuality.

You will say: therefore a possible thing will be in some way really diverse from itself already produced and existing — since the existing one includes some real and actual reality that the possible one does not include.

Some concede it to be in some way really diverse — not indeed positively, as if they had two species or essences, but negatively. That is, they are not really the same. And they prove this thus: nothing and something are not really the same. But a possible essence in objective being is nothing, while real existence is something. Therefore they are not really the same. So Meurissius, *lib. 1, fuae Met., q. 21, concl. 1*. And this dictum is also customarily familiar to some other Scotists.

But this doctrine has never pleased me — since then between the same Peter as possible and as existing there would be found a greater difference than between himself and a stone. The consequence is clear because the difference would be that of being and non-being, nothing and something — which are more different from each other than Peter and stone (which agree in many things quiddatively). There is added that it rests on a false foundation — since, as is clear from n. 46 and 56, it is false that possible essence is simply nothing. For it is one thing that a creature purely possible not yet produced is not — or does not exist — another that it is nothing, or the negation of existence. The first is certainly true, but the

second is entirely false — since a possible creature is not that negation but coexists with that negation as long as it is not produced. But according to itself it is true real being and positive — not indeed actual but possible. Hence in the state of possibility and existence considered it does not relate as being and non-being, or as nothing and something (as Meurissius said), but as previously possible and afterward existing being. And it is certainly the very same being that was first possible and afterward exists — for if what is posited in act and is actual is not the same as what was in potency, one may ask whether what was in potency can be brought to that very act. If not, therefore it was not in potency but rather impossible. If yes, the point is had. Therefore it is entirely the same being — the possible and the same posited in act or existing. And it is explained by the very same essential concept, and only a diversity of state can be assigned: because before it is produced, it is conceived under the state of possibility; when then it is produced, it is found under the state of actuality.

All of this most elegantly was declared by our Alensis at 7. *Met.*, *tex.* 22, in the last small question with these words: "this non-prohibited being, or possible being, and being in act are not two beings, but one and the same under another mode. Yet this other and other mode is not another and another thing. And this coming to be can be saved — since for this coming to be nothing more is required than that the same whole reality first be under the nature of possible and the same wholly afterward come to be in act."

Question II: What the Existence of Things Is, and How It Is Distinguished from Actual Essence

So far we treated of the essence of creatures in the state of possibility in which they are before being produced outside by God. Now of the same under the state of actuality — which they possess when they are produced outside — must be treated. And since in that state it is actually existing and in reality conjoined with existence, in this question we must see what this existence is, through whose benefit the possible essence is drawn from the state of possibility to the state of actually existing outside causes, and how it is distinguished from essence thus placed outside causes. For in what way it is distinguished from essence considered under the state of possibility is sufficiently clear from what was said in the preceding question — especially from n. 69 and 70.

As to the meaning of the name then: just as to exist is as if to stand outside (*extra sistere*), so existence in the abstract is as if outside-standing-ness (*extra sistencia*). Insofar as what exists stands outside its own nothing — since before it was actually nothing; stands outside potentiality of being — since before it was only in potency; stands finally outside causes — in whose power it was previously contained. And therefore as to the meaning of the thing, existence is said by all to be the very ratio through which the essence is formally constituted as actual and outside causes — which definition is collected from Aristotle, 9. *Met.*, *tex.* 11, when defining existence he said: "to exist in act is not for the thing as we said in potency."

From this it is first deduced that existence is something real intrinsic to the existing thing — since a thing is not said to exist through an extrinsic denomination but through its own intrinsic being, or through something intrinsic to it. The reason is that existence must render a real effect — namely to constitute the thing outside causes. And because it must render this effect in the genus of quasi-formal cause, it must render it through the intrinsic exhibition of itself to the existing thing. Which is common to all formal causes when they render a real effect and do not merely denominate — for formal cause, as was said in Physics, renders its effect by exhibiting itself.

It is deduced second that it is as it were a certain act of essence through which it is constituted in actual being — or on the part of the thing. For to exist is nothing other than to be actually — since before it was only in potency. Hence it is called act — since it corresponds to objective potency and totally actuates what before was totally and wholly possible. It is also customarily called first and last act, or first and last actuality — which is explained in various ways by the Thomists. But briefly, as the Doctor teaches at 2. d. 3, q. 3, *in fine*, it is called last act with respect to all the essential predicates it presupposes — since it presupposes the whole being of essence complete and constituted in itself. Not indeed according to real being — as is clear from the preceding question, for creatures before production are nothing in themselves — but according to objective being. For when an existing thing is objected to the intellect, the intellect abstracts essence from existence, considering it as prior and the latter as posterior — and as it were the last act of it.

It is however called first act: both because it is first with respect to all operations and accidental attributes — which presuppose an existing thing — and because it primarily belongs to essence as soon as it is placed outside causes. Indeed it is formally what the essence itself is placed as on the part of the thing and in the nature of things.

From this it is third deduced that existence — as it imports the exercise of existing, in which sense we are speaking of it in this question — bears itself contingently to essence and is not a part of essence nor its quidditative predicate. For as we said, existence presupposes the whole being of essence already complete and constituted. And in created things we can conceive their whole essence while not thinking of existence in the meantime. And it is proper to God alone that he exist through the force of his essence. Hence it cannot come about that God is essentially conceived without also being conceived as existing — as we shall say in the proper place.

It is deduced fourth that existence is something belonging to created things through the force of production — since as it is the act reducing a thing from objective potency to actual being, and objective potency is attended to in the order toward an agent, it follows that an act of this kind is communicated to things through the action of an agent. Hence it is customarily said that existence is the

first and proper effect of efficient cause, as the Doctor notes at *4. d. 1, q. 1, §. Sed iste rationes* — since when the efficient cause operates, it communicates existence to the possible thing through causing the whole actual being it afterward possesses in itself.

From what was said it is finally deduced that existence from the force of its formality prefigures something positive. For thus are indicated the functions already related as belonging to it. And therefore that negative existence must not be given — which certain recent authors devise so as to show how primary matter by itself is outside causes and yet does not have its own proper existence. And they say it differs from positive existence in this: that things through positive existence become positively outside causes, while through negative existence they have this alone — that they are no longer in causes. This negative existence, I say, is purely chimerical and fictitious. For less of existence — as existence — is to extract a thing from the potency of causes and render it actually existing on the part of the thing. But this effect is altogether positive, as is sufficiently clear of itself. Therefore all existence from its genus is positive and negative existence cannot be conceived. Also because, as we said, it is the first and proper effect of efficient cause. But such effect is altogether positive. Therefore, etc.

Nor is that distinction about being outside causes and not being in causes of any use. For from the very fact that a thing is no longer in causes, it is at least outside causes — since for a thing to be no longer in causes formally is nothing other than to have departed from causes and been extracted from them by the power of some agent. Also because for a thing to be outside causes and not outside causes — that is, to be inside causes and not inside causes — are contradictories, of which only one can be verified. Therefore if a thing is not inside causes, it is already outside them. And if it is not outside causes, it is still inside them. And this is so certain and clear that it needs no further proof. Pasqualig. argues more at length against this new contrivance at *tom. 2, Met., disp. 81, sect. 3*.

With these things presupposed as conceded in every school — namely that existence is something real and positive and intrinsic to the existing thing, bearing itself to essence in the mode of act, and receiving it as it were contingently — the doubt is: what is this act? Is it some common accident of actual essence itself and separable from it? A proper accident? Or rather some intrinsic mode of it? And in what category is it placed?

A first opinion asserts it is a certain accident superadded to created things and received in the very essence — formally rendering it outside nothing. So certain Arabs taught, as Avicenna and Alpharabius — as St. Thomas reports at *4. Met., sect. 2* — whom many Latins followed, distinguishing existence from essence in reality, though not all in the same way nor placing it in the same category. For Molina, *par. 1, q. 3, tra. 4, disp. 2*, indicates it is an absolute accident belonging directly to some certain one of the nine categories of accidents — not distinct from duration, since duration and existence are the same. Hence it is placed in

the category to which duration pertains. But Henry, as the Doctor reports at *1. d. 36*, taught at *quol. 9 and 10* that existence is a relation to the productive cause of essence superadded to it — through which it is ordered to the efficient cause as to a principle from which it received being. Pasqualig., most injudiciously, attributes this way of speaking to Scotus at the cited *sect. 1, nu. 6*, since the Doctor expressly attacks it there.

Another opinion asserts that although it is not a common and predicamental accident, it is still a proper accident — since it accompanies the created essence as its proper attribute and flows from the intrinsic principles of essence in the manner of a property. So Ferrar. teaches at *2. contragentes, cap. 55* — although he speaks specially there about the existence of angels and the rational soul. And Sanch. in *log. q. 74* also seems to speak this way.

Other Thomists, however, commonly — although they really distinguish existence from essence — still deny it is a predicamental accident of the existing thing. They say that as far as it concerns itself, it is neither substance nor accident, but the existence of substance is substance and the existence of accident is accident. So Cajet. speaks at *lib. de Ente, and essentia, cap. 5, qu. 11, ad 8* — so that existence according to itself pertains to no category directly but only reductively to that of which it is the existence. Hence the existence of substance will pertain to the category of substance, and the existence of accident likewise to the category of accident — namely of that of which it is the existence. And so they acknowledge existence to be indeed a predicable accident (as they say), not however a predicamental one. So the early Thomists commonly, and the more recent following St. Thomas, *qu. 5, de potent., art. 4, ad 3*; Cajet. in the cited place; Soncin., *4. Met., qu. 2*; Flandria, *ibid., qu. 3, art. 7*; Bannes, *p. 1, qu. 3, art. 4, dub. 1*; Ledesma, *de perfect. divin., qu. 12, art. 3*; Navaret., *p. 1, controver. 14, §. 1*; Javellus and Masius, *tract. de transcendent.*; Nazarius, *part. 1, qu. 3, art. 4, controuv. I, concl. 9*; Blasius a Conceptione, *disp. 6, Met., qu. 2*; Manca, *1. Phyf., qu. 5, dub. 1 and 2* — who cite others.

What was the mind of Scotus on this point I shall say below.

As to the other part of the question — the distinction of existence from essence — all Thomists cited around the same places unhesitatingly affirm it is really distinguished with all proper characteristics — namely really entitatively and as thing from thing. The principal author of this view is considered to be St. Thomas, *p. 1, qu. 3, art. 4* and *2. contra gentes, cap. 52* and *de Ente, and essentia, cap. 5*. And it has so prevailed in his school that it is an undoubted principle among the Thomists that existence is really distinguished from essence. Certain Averroists follow them, and especially all those who say existence is a predicamental accident of essence itself — even though not all want to call that distinction real, but modal.

The exactly opposite view affirms that existence does not differ in any way on the part of the thing from essence, but only through the intellect, so that existence on the part of the thing is the very same altogether actual entity of essence. And this is the most common view, received commonly among Nominalists and Neutralists. It was taught by Alensis at 4. *Metaph.*, *tex.* 4 and *lib.* 7, *tex.* 22; Aureol., 1. *d.* 8, *qu.* 1; Durand., *ibid.*, *qu.* 2; Greg., 2. *d.* 6, *qu.* 1; Gabriel., 3. *d.* 6, *q.* 2, *art.* 1. And among the more recent: Pererius, *lib.* 6, *fuae Philofoph.*, *cap.* 4; Suarez, *disp.* 31, *Metaph.*, *per totam*; Vásq., 3. *part.*, *tom.* 1, *disp.* 72 and 1. *part.*, *disp.* 179; Valentia, *tom.* 1, *disp.* 1, *qu.* 3, *punct.* 4; Ruvius, 1. *Phyf.*, *tract.* 1, *de materia*, *q.* 4; Averf., *qu.* 8, *cit.*, *sect.* 6, 7, and 8; Pasqualig., *cit.*, *disp.* 82, *sect.* 3 and *seq.*; Hurtad., *disp.* 8, *Met.*, *sect.* 4; Arriag., *disp.* 2, *Metaph.*, *sect.* 3; Ovviéd., *controv.* 2, *Met.*, *punct.* 2 and 3. All of these (I say) and many others outside the school of St. Thomas say that essence and existence are distinguished by reason alone. It is true, however, that not all agree in explaining this rational distinction — for some want it to be a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing and on the part of the object, which they customarily call a distinction of ratiocinated reason. And Suarez seems to hold this, saying at *disp.* 31, *cit.*, *sect.* 6, *n.* 23 that essence and existence are distinguished by reason as two formalities found in the same thing. Others explain this distinction of reason as having no foundation on the part of the object, but differing only on the part of the mode of conceiving — so that it is only a distinction of rationalizing reason. And more modern authors posterior to Suarez speak in this way: Pasqualig., *disp.* *cit.*, *sect.* 6, *nu.* 5; Averf., *sect.* 8; Arriag., *sect.* 4; Ovviéd., *punct.* 3. Indeed Hurt., *disp.* *cit.*, §. 53, says essence and existence are neither distinguished by thing nor by reason — saying they are not two formalities distinguished by reason, but one thing diversely conceived. This was the opinion of Aureolus in the cited place.

The middle view is that of Scotus from the places to be cited below, and of the Scotists — who admitting a middle distinction between a simply real distinction and a simply rational one, which they customarily call formal from the nature of the thing — as anteceding all work of the intellect — consequently also admit it between essence and existence. And since existence behaves as an intrinsic mode of essence (as we shall say shortly), taking the denomination from the part of the mode, they call it a formal modal distinction.

Hence it is false that this Scotist view coincides with the second one just related, as Smisfinch. thinks at *tract.* 1, *de Deo uno*, *disp.* 2, *quaest.* 1, *nu.* 42, and Posnaniensis, 1. *d.* 36, *disp.* *un.*, *concl.* 3 — because they think that the distinction of ratiocinated reason, which the authors of the second view acknowledge between essence and existence, coincides with the Scotist formal distinction. It is false, I say: since although certain of those authors acknowledge a distinction of ratiocinated reason between them, the greater part of them deny it and at most admit only a distinction of rationalizing reason, as we saw. Also because even if all among them admitted a distinction of the former kind — ratiocinated reason and with a foundation in the thing — still it would be false that it coincides with the Scotist

formal distinction, which antecedes all work of the intellect, as was shown in *disp. 1, Log., quaest. 5, art. 2*, in the declaration of the distinction of reason, and again above in *disp. 6, quaest. 11*.

And those altogether err who say that the opinion of certain Thomists positing a modal and not real distinction between essence and existence coincides with our view. So Scotus, 2. *Phyf., qu. 2*; Molin., *loc. cit.*; Fonséc., 4. *Metaph., cap. 2, quaest. 4*; Albertin., *tom. 2, princ. 1, Philofoph., disp. 2, quaest. 1*; and certain others speak in this way — since these do not speak of modal distinction as it is customarily accepted in the school of the Scotists, which is assigned between a thing and its intrinsic mode (as we explained in the cited places, and above in *disp. 2, q. 6, art. 1, num. 150*). But they speak of that modal distinction that recent authors are accustomed to assign between a thing and its extrinsic mode — such as the union with respect to matter, sitting with respect to the sitting person, etc. This distinction, as was said in the cited places, in our school is a real distinction. And therefore their opinion is very different from Scotus's view — since neither does the Doctor call existence a mode in this sense with respect to essence, nor do the Scotists call their distinction modal in this sense. And for this reason we said their opinion belongs to the first and common view of the Thomists — however much they call existence a mode of essence, and their distinction modal.

This third middle view — as declared by us — is held commonly by all Scotists and Formalists passim in the *tract. Formalit.*; Lichet., 2. *d. 3, qu. 1*; Tatar., *ibid.*, and 4. *Met. 9, de ente, and uno, dub. 2*; Smisfinch. and Posnaniensis in the cited places; Faber, *theor. 32*; Meuriscius, *lib. 1, fuae Metaph., quaest. 21*; Poncius, *disp. 18, de ente, quaest. 4*; Trombeta, 5. *Metaph., qu. 6*, from Scotus at 1. *d. 36, q. un.* and 2. *d. 1, q. 2* and *d. 16, qu. un., §. rationes ifte* and 3. *d. 6, q. 1* and 4. *d. 11, q. 3, §. ad rationes* and *d. 23, q. 1, art. 3, versicul. ad argumenta*.

Article I: Existence Is Neither a Common Accident nor a Proper Accident of Actual Essence, but Rather Its Intrinsic Mode

The conclusion of this article belongs to Scotus and the Scotists in the passages already cited. It is proved and clarified with respect to all its parts individually. Regarding the first part — that existence is not a common, that is, predicamental, accident of actual essence — this view is shared even among the better class of Thomists, and it is proved by an evident argument. A common or predicamental accident is generally understood to be that which supervenes upon a being already existing in act, inheres in it, and is sustained by it, depending upon the subject as upon a material cause with respect to its reception and sustenance. It is further said to be present or absent without the corruption of the subject. But this cannot hold of existence as compared to essence. Therefore existence is not an accident in relation to essence. The major is clear from the common conception of a predicamental accident. The minor is proved as follows: whether we speak of the existence of a substance or of an accident, it is false that existence can be present or absent without the corruption of the actual essence. For although one

may say that when existence departs the essence of a substance or accident remains in possible being, the actual essence is nonetheless destroyed when existence ceases. Again, it is false that existence — whether in a substance or in an accident — supervenes upon essence as upon a being already existing in act, since it is rather through existence itself that the essence is constituted as a being in act and rendered existent. Therefore, existence cannot be called a common or predicamental accident of essence — not merely with respect to substantial essence, but not even with respect to accidental essence — but will be called an accident only by identity or by proportion, insofar as there must be a relationship between essence and existence, namely that existence belongs to the essence that is itself an accident. Confirmation: because existence does not compose a unity per accidens with essence but a unity per se, even if existence is supposed to be really distinct from essence. And this is true both of substance and of accident: a man existing is just as much a per se unity as a quantity or quality existing is. But a common and predicamental accident forms an aggregate per accidens with the subject upon which it supervenes. Therefore, and so forth.

Second, existence has the same scope and range as the being it belongs to. For every real being is ordered, by virtue of the potency it has from its intrinsic principles, toward an existence proportionate to it — a substance that is possible, toward substantial existence; a possible accident, likewise toward accidental existence. But being as such does not belong to any particular genus; rather, it transcends all the categories and ranges through each of them. Therefore, in the same way, existence will not be confined to any particular category but will range through all of them individually, so that the existence of a thing belongs to the same category as its essence. Confirmation: if existence were to be confined to some category, it would have to be either the category to which the duration of things belongs — from which, as some authors of this opinion said, it is not distinct — namely, the category of quantity in the case of the duration and existence of successive things, and the category of when for the duration and existence of permanent things — or at least it would have to be placed in the category of relation, insofar as it expresses a relation to an efficient cause, as was Henry's position. But neither of these is correctly asserted. The minor is proved with respect to the first part: as was seen in *disp. 14. Phys.*, many deny that duration and existence are really identical; and those who grant such identity, as we indicated there as the more probable view, deny that duration considered in itself is an accident, but say rather that the duration of substances is substantial or substance-like, and the duration of accidents is accidental — just as we now say of existence. Moreover, if duration is not distinguished from existence, then duration should rather be brought to its category through existence, as was said there, than existence through duration. The minor is also proved with respect to the other part: as the Doctor shows in *d. 36*, against Henry, it is false that existence consists in that simple relation to an efficient cause, because if a creature were brought into the being of existence only according to a new relation to an efficient

cause, there would seem to be no production into being simply, but only into being in a qualified sense, and creation would be less a production simply speaking than alteration, in which there is at least the production of something with respect to absolute being. Furthermore, in the same foundation and an unchangeable terminus there cannot be a new relation; but this foundation is the same — namely, the being of essence — and the terminus is unchangeable, namely God. Therefore no new relation to such a terminus can exist, of the kind that is supposed to be imported by existence. Furthermore, although when a thing is produced it receives existence from the efficient cause and founds a relation to it as produced to producer, this relation does not formally import existence itself, but is rather founded in existence already produced, or in the effect already existing. Finally, existence by virtue of its formal concept has only this: that it constitutes a thing in itself, or in actual being; whereas a relation has this: that it orders and refers a thing to something else. These are formally diverse notions, as is sufficiently clear of itself, and one presupposes the other, since a thing must first be supposed to be constituted in itself before it can be said to be ordered to something else.

Third and finally, it is shown even more evidently that the existence of a substance cannot be an accident, because the being and existing of a substance is to be simply, per se, and substantially; therefore it cannot exist by means of an accident, which can only confer a qualified being. Furthermore, existence must be proportionate to the essence it is said to actuate; but accidental existence, of the kind that can be had from an accident, is not proportionate to the essence of a substance. Furthermore, the generation of a substance would then not be a production simply, as Aristotle teaches in *5. Phys. cap. 1*, but only in a qualified sense, since existence is either the terminus of generation or is at least per se included in it — for it is not the essence precisely as essence that is produced, but the essence together with existence, or the essence as actually existing. Finally, this derogates altogether too much from the perfection of substance over accident, if substance must beg its being and existence from an accident, and if within its own proper genus it is the accident that has existence by which it exists, but not the substance.

Regarding the second part — that existence is not a proper accident of essence — Suarez proves this in *disp. 31* cited, *sec. 7, n. 2*: a proper accident follows from and results out of a thing already existing, and therefore it does not come to be per se and primarily through generation or creation, but results from the thing produced through generation or creation. This argument, however, does not prove the point absolutely, because an adversary could deny the assumption, since risibility, for example, belongs to man whether he exists or not. Hence it is customary to say that propositions of the second mode — in which passions (proper accidents) are predicated of their proper subjects — are necessary and abstract from actual existence. For if they depended upon it, just as the existence of the subject is contingent, so too the connection of the proper passion with the

subject would be contingent, not necessary. Accordingly, Pasqualig in *disp.* 81 cited, *sec.* 4, proves it differently: a passion simply belongs to a subject prescinding from whether it exists or not, whereas existence belongs to no created thing simply, but only when things exist. Hence existence does not belong per se to things but contingently; and consequently, when existence is predicated of things, the proposition is contingent, whereas when a passion is predicated of its subject, the proposition is necessary — called of eternal truth because it is always true independently of any temporal difference — and therefore a passion can be truly demonstrated of its subject, but not so existence of a created thing.

But first, this author does not appear consistent with himself, because in the same disputation, *sec.* 2, *n.* 2, he used Suarez's argument for this very purpose, saying that proper accidents emanate from the subject, and such emanation cannot be understood unless the subject is conceived as existing; hence passions are also said to be naturally posterior to their subject. He therefore concludes that existence cannot function as a proper accident of essence. Furthermore, from that proof it would follow that passions are more intrinsic to things than their own existence, which is false, because existence in every created thing is its intrinsic mode, which is more intimate to it, as a whole, than passions are — as was said in *disp.* 2, *n.* 148 in explaining the nature of an intrinsic mode. Therefore that argument must be resolved by saying that although a passion belongs to a subject prescinding from its actual existence, it does not prescind from its aptitudinal existence, because as Aristotle teaches in 2. *Post. cap.* 2, it must be known in advance of a subject whether it is — that is, whether it is possible and not repugnant in nature — before a passion is demonstrated of it. And further: although existence befalls possible essence, or essence considered in itself — which, as such, abstracts from the states of possibility and actuality, as was said at *n.* 53 — it does not entirely befall actual essence, because it is its intrinsic mode, really identified with it no less than a passion is. Yet this does not prevent the creature from still existing contingently, as will be established below at *n.* 90.

In this manner, then, the argument that Suarez touches upon must be constructed if it is to prove the intended conclusion: because in whatever state the essence of a thing is considered — whether of possibility or of actuality — existence is understood as belonging to it by nature prior to any other passion, however intrinsic. Therefore existence is not a passion of essence. The assumption is proved as follows: as we said from Aristotle, before a passion is demonstrated of a subject, whether it is must be presupposed. Furthermore, if human nature, for example, is considered in the state of actuality, it is certain that the existence of risibility depends on the existence of humanity, and this causal statement is true: because humanity exists, risibility exists, and not conversely. If it is considered in the state of possibility, again it is true to say: because humanity is possible, or apt to exist, therefore risibility is also possible. Therefore, preserving the proportion and speaking uniformly about subject and passion — whether in the state of

possibility or of actuality — it is always true that the existence of a thing precedes any of its passions.

Pasqualig also adduces another argument for this, which may be admitted: a passion follows from the intrinsic principles of its subject, such that if left to its own nature, the passion immediately flows from it even without any intrinsic agent concurring — as is clear from coldness with respect to warm water, which returns to its original coldness once removed from fire (though coldness is not a logical but a physical passion of water, as they say). But existence does not follow upon a thing from its intrinsic principles in this way; rather, it is the effect of an efficient cause, which, when it communicates being to an effect, simultaneously communicates existence, since the action of the efficient cause tends to constitute the thing in act, which it cannot do without communicating existence.

Regarding the third part — that existence is an intrinsic mode of actual essence, just as possible existence is, preserving proportion, an intrinsic mode of possible essence — this follows from and is proved by what has been said. For since existence in creatures is not the quiddity of a thing, nor something of its quiddity — not genus, nor difference, nor matter, nor form — and since furthermore it is not a common accident nor a proper accident, as has been proved, it remains to say that it is a certain intrinsic mode of essence, by which a thing is formally said to be in act, or outside its causes. For before existing, a thing was said to be only potentially and as if latent in its causes; but when it bursts forth by the power of causes, it then begins to exist. And since a mode follows the thing of which it is a mode, it follows that if the essence is substantial, its existence is also a substantial mode; and if the essence is accidental, its existence is likewise an accidental mode.

Furthermore, this can be proved as if a priori, by an argument drawn from the definition of an intrinsic mode, which is used by Mairon in *1. d. 2, q. 1*, Trombeta in *5. Met. q. 6*, and other Scotists passim. Existence does not alter the formal character of the essence to which it is joined; therefore it is an intrinsic mode of it. The consequence is clear from the locus a definition to what is defined, for that is the definition of an intrinsic mode which we assigned and explained in *disp. 2, n. 151*. The assumption is proved because a man in potency and afterwards in act is formally the same man; therefore existence does not alter his formal character. However, Vigerius in *1. d. 2, q. 2* attacks this argument of Mairon's on the grounds that if it were valid, it would also prove that an accident is an intrinsic mode, and likewise a passion, since neither alters the formal character of its subject. But this objection proceeds from a mistaken understanding of the definition of an intrinsic mode; if that definition is correctly understood, all objections of this kind cease, as we showed in the passage cited.

Confirmation: from what was said there, an intrinsic mode is called a mode because it properly does not pertain to the essence of the thing but rather to its complement; it is called intrinsic, however, because it is like an internal degree of that quiddity, insofar as it perfects it within itself. For if a thing is to be conceived

with the perfection it possesses in the whole order of beings, it must necessarily be conceived together with its intrinsic mode, as was explained there at length, n. 148. But existence so exactly answers to essence by comparison that it is its intrinsic mode. The minor is proved: although essence can be conceived without existence with respect to all its quidditative predicates, it is never said to be adequately and perfectly conceived unless conceived together with the degree of perfection due to it in the whole order of beings. But that intrinsic degree is existence itself, since every possible thing has from its intrinsic principles that it can be brought to its own perfect state and ultimate complement — such that in its own proper genus it has this perfect state: substance in the genus of substance, and accident in the genus of accident. Therefore existence pertains to the complement of the thing of which it is existence, as its intrinsic degree, because it perfects it internally and, as it were, from within. Hence the existence of a substance is a kind of complement to it within the genus of substance, for through it the substance is reduced to actual being, toward which it is ordered by virtue of its possibility. For a substance in the state of possibility, even though it retains all its quidditative predicates, is nevertheless not substantially complete nor in its perfect state in the genus of substance; but it can be further advanced in its own proper being — namely up to actuality — and this is formally accomplished through existence. Thus it is never adequately and perfectly conceived unless together with existence, or in relation to existence.

Finally, essence, considered precisely according to its quidditative predicates, abstracts from possibility and actuality as from different modes under which it can be considered. If it is to be grasped more perfectly and adequately — that is, with the degree of perfection due to it in the whole order of beings — then he who conceives a man, for example, as existing conceives not only human nature but also applies a mode under which it is conceived, namely as outside its causes. Therefore, properly speaking, existence with respect to essence is a mode, because it lies entirely outside the whole quidditative being of a thing, as Scotus teaches in *2. d. 3, q.*, at the end; and at the same time it is a more intimate degree than any passion, as has been proved — which is the proper and peculiar condition of an intrinsic mode. Alensis also signifies this in *7. Met. tex. 22*, last question.

From this it is gathered in what sense existence can be called an accident of essence and its accidental act. For accident or accidental can be taken in two ways, as the Doctor notes in *1. d. 2, q. 7*. Either it is taken properly for that which is contradistinguished from substance and supervenes upon a subject already existing and completely constituted in its own being — and in this sense it is certain that existence is not an accident of essence or its accidental act, as has been proved; or it is taken for what is extraneous, or for what lies outside the essence of a thing. In this way, a substantial form is called an accident of matter, and a substantial difference an accident of genus, and everything that is said in some way to be accidental to something else insofar as it lies outside its quidditative

character. In this sense, since existence in creatures is not part of the quidditative character of the thing of which it is existence, but only its intrinsic mode, it can be called an accident of essence and its accidental act. Thus the Doctor teaches in 4. d. 3, q. 3, at the end, where he says that actual existence is the ultimate act posterior to the entire predicamental coordination, and that it ultimately distinguishes — but with a distinction that is outside the whole per se predicamental coordination — which distinction is in some way accidental, though it is not truly an accidental distinction; yet it follows the entire distinction according to quidditative being. The Thomists also teach this in different terms when they say that existence is a predicable accident with respect to essence, but not a predicamental one. For a predicamental accident is that which is distinguished against substance and belongs to one of the nine categories; but a predicable accident is what does not belong to the essence of a thing, whether it be something substantial or something accidental. This doctrine is taught clearly by St. Thomas in q. 5 de potentia, art. 4, ad 3, where he says: "To the third it must be said that being is not called an accident in the sense of being in the category of accident — if we are speaking of the being of substance — for it is the act of essence; but it is called so by a certain likeness, because it is not part of the essence."

Finally, since existence cannot be confined to one category but must range through all of them — just as essence itself does — it must be determined in what way existence is placed in a category and how it can be distributed through all and each of them. Aversa in sec. 5 cited says that existence can be considered either as possible in the formal act or as placed in act and exercised, and that in both ways, taken per se and directly, it belongs to a category and can be distributed through the individual categories. For considered in the first way, it stands as an essence. Considered in the second way, however, although it does not belong to the categories if they are taken precisely with respect to essence, nor directly nor reductively, yet if they are taken also with respect to existence, it can be directly placed in them. Hence, he notes, just as the categories are coordinated through the essences of things — and substance is taken according to its essence, body according to its essence, and so with all the categories under that acceptance of being according to which being is divided according to essence into all the categories — so likewise the categories can be coordinated according to existence, so that we take a substance existing, a body existing, and all the way down to individuals, Peter existing. And in this way the existences of things, or things insofar as they exist, are directly constituted in the categories. He had taught this earlier in his *Logica*, q. 16, lect. 5.

This doctrine, however, is false, because as Scotus teaches in 2. d. 3, q. 3, at the passage beginning "Against this," a proper coordination of existences other than the coordination of essences cannot and should not be constructed, as Aversa does. This is proved first by an argument a posteriori: in the categories, superiors are placed as essential predicates of inferiors, these being conceived as

quidditatively including those; but existence is not predicated quidditatively of any creature; therefore it is not suited to be directly placed in a category. Then it is proved by an argument *as if a priori*, which the Doctor touches upon in the same place: the being of existence does not have its own differences distinct from the differences of the being of essence; therefore it cannot constitute a proper coordination distinct from the coordination of essences. The consequence is clear, because a category is constituted out of generic and specific degrees through various differences, and therefore what lacks proper differences cannot constitute a distinct category. The assumption is proved as follows: when animal existing is contracted to man existing, the contraction is made either by the same difference by which animal nature in the category of essences was contracted to the specific nature of man — namely, by rationality — or by another, different difference. Not the second, because then man existing, or man in the being of existence, would be a different species from himself considered in the being of essence, since in such being he would be constituted through a different specific difference. If the first, then existence does not constitute a category different from that of essence but is reduced to the category of essence, with which it is identified. Furthermore, if there were one contracting difference of animal to the species man as such, and another contracting difference of animal existing to man existing as such, such that a predicamental coordination of existences distinct from the coordination of essences were given, then by the same token there ought to be, as Lichet argues in *2. d. 2, q. 2*, a coordination of passions distinct from the coordination of essences and the natures of which they are passions. The consequence is clear, because a passion is more distinct from essence than an intrinsic mode is, such as existence — a truth that will be even more apparent from what will be said below in *qu. 4*.

Therefore it must be said that existence does not constitute a proper predicamental coordination, nor does it belong directly to a predicamental series, but only reductively to that same category to which the essence directly belongs — the essence of which that existence is — as something really identified with it. In the same way the subject is placed in the category with which it is really identified. Thus the existence of a substance will be reduced to the category of substance, the existence of quantity to the category of quantity, and so with the rest; nor do existences have differences distinct from those of essence. Hence, as Lichet says in the passage cited, human nature with respect to one individual is contracted to individual being by one individual difference, and by that same difference everything pertaining to man is concomitantly contracted, whether it be essential being, or passion, or intrinsic degree — for nature, wherever it is, can never be separated from its intrinsic degree, nor from its passions. Therefore the same difference that primarily and immediately contracts nature to individual being consequently and concomitantly contracts everything that is included by real identity in that nature itself. Bassolis also taught the same in *3. d. 6, q. un., art. 1*, saying that the being of actual existence always belongs to the same genus and

category as essence, though in a different way: essence per se, existence only by reduction. And what I say of actual existence must be said, preserving proportion, of possible existence in the formal act: namely, that it belongs reductively only to that category in which possible essence is placed. For it is false, as Aversa said, that possible existence stands as possible essence, since — as Lichet notes in *2. d. 3, q. 1*, at the section beginning "ad quaestionem" — just as actual existence is an intrinsic mode of actual essence, so too, preserving proportion, possible existence and existence in formal being is an intrinsic mode of possible essence. Therefore we must speak of possible existence in relation to possible essence in the same way, preserving proportion, as we speak of actual existence in relation to actual essence. This doctrine is clearly handed down by the Doctor in *prim. dist. 36, q. un.*

Against this it is argued that existence is an accident of essence, because it is received in it as act in an actuable potency — which is why it is called the act of essence and is said to actuate essence. Therefore it is an accident. Do not say that it is indeed an act of essence but is not received in it as an accident is; for there is no contradiction in essence existing through an existence not received in it, otherwise one thing could exist through the existence of another. Confirmation: because existence supervenes upon the essence of a thing already constituted in its own quidditative being, and is predicated of it contingently and accidentally; therefore it is truly an accident. Finally, in creatures it is present and absent without the corruption of essence — for when the being of existence is destroyed, the being of essence remains; therefore it is an accident.

To this it is replied that even granting the antecedent, the consequence can be denied, since it does not follow that whatever is received in something else is an accident; for substantial form is received in matter and yet is not an accident. Thus existence of a substance could be received in its essence as a certain substantial mode, not per accidens. This is how the Thomists usually respond who distinguish existence from essence really. But for us who deny such a distinction, not only the consequence is to be denied but also the assumption. For when existence is called the act of essence, this should be understood not physically — as if essence were a certain passive entity in the manner of matter, receiving within itself the entity of existence supervening in the manner of a form, as the Thomists understand it, from which they then deduce the real distinction of one from the other, as of a form received from a receiving subject — but only metaphysically, by comparing existence to essence insofar as essence has objective being, or is conceived as being in objective potency. This is expressly explained by Alensis in *7. Met. tex. 22, last question*, where he says that before a thing is produced it has no actual being of essence, but only possible and unprohibited being; but when it is produced, the same thing that was said to be in potency is then said to be in act and to exist. From this Alensis deduces that existence is not some partial act, as a physical form is — which presupposes matter in which to be received — or as a difference, which presupposes the genus it actuates; but it is a certain total act by which the whole thing, which previously

was in objective potency in its causes, is made actual and placed outside its causes. The same doctrine was handed down by Scotus in 2. d. 12, q. 1 and frequently elsewhere, when he says that existence is not any formal act corresponding to some subjective potency, as the Thomists imagine, but is an entitative act corresponding to objective potency, or to a thing possible by such potency — in the manner explained. Therefore we conclude that existence cannot truly and properly be called an act of essence except insofar as essence is possible and exists only under objective potency in the manner explained; but how it can also be called the act of actual essence I will say below at n. 147.

To the confirmation: existence is said to supervene upon essence already constituted, and to be predicated contingently of it, insofar as it is precisely not a part of essence or a quidditative predicate of it, as was said at n. 73. Therefore the only thing that can be deduced is that it is a predicable accident, or accident taken for what is extraneous, but not a predicamental accident. Otherwise the same would have to be inferred of all passions and intrinsic modes, since all of these likewise supervene upon essence already constituted and are predicated contingently of it in the aforesaid manner. Trombeta adds in 5. *Metaph. q. 6, ad 2. princip.* that existence is said to be an accident not only in the sense of what is extraneous, but also in another sense — taking accident for what is mutable and contingent in being — for in this sense too existence in creatures is an accident and contingent, insofar as such being is mutable. The contingency of the creature's existence does not arise from its being contingently united to its essence, but because it depends upon efficient and conserving causes without which it cannot exist. Hence it follows that even though a creature has existence really identified with it, it still exists contingently. To the last part the answer is clear from what was said at n. 78: actual essence is destroyed along with the destruction of existence, and only the possible and objective being remains — which abstracts from the here and now, that is, from existence and any temporal difference. It will be objected that the essences of things are said to be eternal, necessary, and incorruptible. The answer, from what was said at nn. 57 and 58, is that they are called such not according to actual being — which they have contingently from an efficient cause — but according to possible and objective being, which they have formally from themselves and principiatively from the divine intellect; and it is according to this being that they found propositions of eternal truth, as was explained at length there. Trombeta in the passage cited, 5. *Metaph. q. 6*, at the end, says that this eternity and necessity is negative, not positive: for eternity positively is a condition of what exists and has coexistence with every temporal difference formally from itself; but essence is called eternal only insofar as it abstracts from every temporal difference, which is to be eternal only negatively. Similarly, necessary in a positive sense is said of that which of itself has indefectible existence — which does not belong to created essence and quiddity — but it is called necessary only negatively, because it is not possible for it to be otherwise in its formal character. Finally, essence is said to be ungenerable

and incorruptible insofar as it is not proximately and in exercised being generated and corrupted except when conjoined with existence, as the Doctor explains in the passage cited, 3. d. 22, q. un.; on which see the same Doctor in 1. d. 3, q. 4, at the beginning of his response.

Second, duration and existence are the same, since to endure is nothing other than for a thing to exist; but duration is an accident, either of the category of quantity or of the category of when; therefore existence is an accident. Confirmation: the existence of a substance is not substance, since in a sufficient division of substance it would have to be either matter, form, or composite — and none of these can be said, because the composite is the whole essence, and matter and form are its essential parts; therefore it will be an accident. To this it is replied from what was said at n. 39: either duration and existence are not entirely the same — because to endure is for a thing to remain and persist in being, which presupposes that it exists, or coexists with differences of real or imaginary time — or if they are the same, then just as existence is identified with the existing thing, so duration is identified with the enduring thing; and thus in substances, duration will be substance or substantial, and in accidents accidental; nor will it belong to the category of when, except by reason of coexistence with temporal differences, as was explained in *disp. 14. Phys.* To the confirmation it must be said that the existence of a substance is that substance three ways identically and really, insofar as the existence of each of them is a substantial intrinsic mode really identified with each individually.

Third, Suarez in *disp. 31* cited, *sec. 7, n. 4*, argues that existence cannot even be placed reductively in a category: when something is reduced to some category as a constituting act, it is at least necessary that what is constituted should be directly placed in that category; but a thing existing, as existing, is not placed in any category, because the predicamental series abstracts from actual existence — since in a category things are placed only according to those predicates that necessarily or essentially belong to them. Therefore existence cannot belong to a category even reductively. To this it is replied: when we say that existence belongs reductively to the category in which the essence directly belongs — the essence of which it is existence — we do not assert this because a thing existing, as such, is some predicamental being. For as we said from the Doctor in 2. d. q. 3, before any existence is conceived, the entire predicamental coordination is complete, since such coordination is constituted exclusively from quidditative degrees, which existence is not. We assert it only insofar as the things from which the category is constituted must exist, or at least can exist, since a category cannot be constituted from what is impossible and contradictory. Hence when it is said that a thing existing as such is not placed in a category, this is true taking the "as" reduplicatively, because under the aspect of existence a thing does not belong to a category. But this does not prevent things from being in a category if "as" is taken specificatively; for in that sense the meaning is that a thing which exists, or at least can exist, is placed in a category — which is sufficient for existence to be said to

belong to a category at least reductively. Fourth and finally, Pasqualig proves in *disp. 82, sec. 4, n. 6* that existence is not a mode of essence, because it cannot be an extrinsic mode — since that presupposes the thing as existing — nor an intrinsic mode — since that pertains to the essence of the thing which it modifies, and existence does not enter into the concept of essence. The reply is that it is an intrinsic mode, and it is false that an intrinsic mode enters into the concept of a thing, as we said in *disp. 2* from n. 151 in explaining its definition.

Article II: Existence Is Not Really Distinct from Actual Essence but Is the Same Entity as Actual Essence

The conclusion of this article belongs to Scotus and the Scotists in the passages cited at n. 77, and is common among all, both ancient and modern, outside the School of St. Thomas. By this we intend to exclude every real distinction between existence and actual essence — not only what is called a real entitative distinction, as between thing and thing or between two entities, but also what the moderns call a real modal distinction, held to obtain between a thing and its extrinsic mode, insofar as although the mode cannot be without the thing of which it is a mode, the thing can nonetheless be without that mode. In our school this distinction coincides entirely with a real distinction properly so called, as it is set apart from a distinction of reason and a formal distinction *ex natura rei*, which entirely excludes all separability between the thus-distinguished extremes, whether mutual or non-mutual. This conclusion is proved by various arguments which in my view are demonstrative; I will pursue them at length, since the matter is of great importance, as it is directed against the foundation of a large part of St. Thomas's doctrine and a kind of universal principle within it, as Soncinas testifies in *4. Metaph. q. 12*.

First, it is proved by an argument drawn from the very notion of existence assigned at the beginning of this question at n. 71. That by which a thing is placed outside nothing and outside its causes is existence, as is clear from what was said there. But a thing is placed outside nothing and outside its causes through its own actual essence. Therefore the actual essence of any thing is really its existence, and consequently existence will not be something really distinct from essence as posited in act — neither as thing from thing, nor as modal entity in the sense the Thomists contend. A brief argument, to be sure, but entirely convincing. It was the argument of Trombeta in *5. Met. q. 6, art. 1*, though under different terms, when he argued from a fourth middle premise as follows: being and essence have the same contradiction — where he understands by "being" to exist — for nothing deprives a thing of being without depriving it of essence, nor is there another nothing that deprives essence from the nothing that deprives being; and therefore the affirmation will be the same. Therefore being and essence are the same.

Manca in *1. Phys. q. 5, dub. 10* replies from Cajetan, *c. 5 de ente et essentia*, in response to this argument of Trombeta's, that just as being is taken for the act of essence

and for existence, so nothing is taken for nothing quidditatively — which is opposed to the act of essence — and for nothing existentially — which is opposed to the act of existence. And so in the present case he says that by the act of essence a thing is extracted from the first nothing, and by the act of existence from the second; and therefore it is false that by its own actual essence, existence wholly excluded, a thing is placed totally outside nothing, since it is placed only partially outside nothing — namely outside the nothing of essence, according to Cajetan's doctrine cited.

Against this: because this distinction destroys that definition of existence which is received by all, namely that it is that by which a thing is placed outside nothing. The consequence is proved: because this entire definition would as a whole apply to actual essence just as much as to existence, since by either of them a thing is in some way extracted from nothing. For the definition to be preserved, then, it must be understood such that through existence a thing is placed totally outside nothing — which is not twofold but one: namely, the single negation of the total entity of the effect communicated to it when produced by an agent, as Trombeta said. Furthermore, when a thing is understood to be placed outside the nothing of essence through its own actual essence, either it is something in the nature of things, or it is entirely nothing, or something intermediate between nothing and something. Not the second, as they concede; not the third, because between nothing and something there is no medium, since they are contradictories. Therefore the first; but by the very fact that something is understood to be produced by an efficient cause, it is understood as existing, because existence is the terminus of the action of an efficient cause, as we said at n. 73. Therefore, and so on.

You will say: when a thing is understood as placed outside the nothing of essence, it is certainly something in act in the nature of things, not by the actuality of existence but by the actuality alone of essence; and therefore existence is further required so that it may be said to be in act not only by the actuality of essence but also of existence.

Against this: that is mere tautology and a begging of the question. For this is precisely what is asked — what actual being with respect to existence adds beyond actual being with respect to essence. We say it adds nothing else, and that by the very fact that a thing is outside nothing essentially, it is also outside nothing existentially; and that the actual being of existence is nothing other than being extracted from the state of pure possibility, since existence itself is the act opposed to objective potency; and what you call actual being of essence we call existence itself, because a thing is formally conceived as existing when it is understood as placed outside its causes and led out from nothing. And so we will continue to press until you assign and declare what the actuality of existence adds above the actuality of essence posited outside its causes; what it contributes and what distinct purpose it serves. For if you say merely by playing with words and

forcing their meaning that it serves so that a thing may be said to be in act by the actuality of existence and not of essence alone, then one could delude himself by saying — as Aversa rightly presses — that beyond the entity of essence and existence there is given another entity that might be called "subsistence" or "persistence," or named otherwise; and if asked what it contributes and why it is required, he will answer that it is necessary for a thing to persist or subsist, nor can he be moved from this stubbornness or refuted otherwise than in precisely the way in which we are now attacked over existence being distinct from essence.

Confirmation: because to the entity of a thing, by the very fact that it is understood as placed outside that nothing you call the nothing of essence, all the functions and attributes customarily assigned to existence belong. Therefore that entity thus placed outside nothing will itself be existence, and will accordingly be said to be also outside the nothing of existence. The assumption is proved: for by this entity the thing terminates the action of the agent, is placed actually outside its causes, is contingently in the nature of things, and can exercise the operations proper to it. But these are the functions and attributes customarily ascribed to existence, or to a thing existing. Therefore, and so on. Suarez proves this even more fully and evidently in *disp. 31, sec. 4, n.*

Father Blasius of the Conception, in *supplement to Met. Compl., disp. 6, q. 1, § 2*, seeing that the aforesaid response plays only with words, replies that existence is not that by which in any way whatsoever a thing is placed outside nothing, but that by which as ultimate terminus and ultimate complement a thing is placed outside nothing completely and perfectly in the order of being. Hence although a thing is placed outside nothing according to its essential degrees through the actuality of essence, yet because it is not placed outside nothing according to those degrees as by an ultimate terminus and ultimate complement in the order of being, but as by something terminable by the ultimate terminus and ultimate complement in the order of being, it follows that actual essence does not require for any reason to be really identified with existence; but on the contrary, it requires rather to be really distinguished from it, as the terminable from its terminus, and as potency from its act.

But this solution also consists either merely in words or certainly does not resolve the argument. For when he says that beyond the actual essence of the thing — by which the thing is placed outside the nothing of essence — existence is necessary as the ultimate terminus and ultimate complement by which the thing is placed outside nothing completely and perfectly in the order of being: either he understands this in such a way that existence is the pure terminus of actual essence posited outside its causes — as subsistence is said to be the pure terminus of substantial nature, and indivisibles in continuous quantity are pure termini, without which it cannot naturally happen that substantial nature or quantity exists in the nature of things — or he understands it such that by actual essence a thing is said to exist, or to be outside its causes, only incompletely and incipiently, and

that through supervening existence it is then afterwards said to exist outside its causes completely and perfectly. And however one understands it, it runs into all the difficulties of the preceding response, and greater ones besides.

For if it is understood in the first way, the formal character of existence will no longer consist in the actuality of being and in its being that by which a thing is placed outside its causes — as its definition signifies — but in its being the terminus and complement of such actuality of being. Since this is not even remotely suggested in the commonly received definition of existence, that definition will not be a good one. Furthermore, entities that are pure termini of things presuppose those things as already existing: subsistence presupposes the existence of substantial nature; similarly, indivisibles presuppose the existence of the parts of continua. If then existence exercises only the function of terminus with respect to actual essence, it will no longer be that by which essence formally exists, but actual essence will of itself be formally existing. Furthermore, if actual essence is of itself formally existing, another entity of existence as its complement will be superfluous, for it will be said to be sufficiently completed — substantially through subsistence and accidentally through presence, duration, and other accidents. And again, who would be able to say that existence is not the ultimate terminus and complement of actual essence, but some other entity which might be called "consistency" or "persistence"?

If it is understood in the second way — as Manca in the passage cited seems to explain, when he says that actual essence considered as terminating the action of the agent, and before it receives existence in itself, does not exist perfectly, but is on the way to existing, nor is it perfectly outside its causes, because although it is outside the efficient cause, it has not yet terminated the causality of existence through which it is ultimately completed and formally extracted from the nothing of existence — so that only then is it understood as being outside all its causes, and consequently perfectly and completely existing, when it has received existence in itself; and in this sense he does not seem to call actual essence something intermediate between something and nothing.

Against this the prior difficulties recur, and further: that actual essence placed outside nothing, as he says, of essence, is a real being; but either it is a real being only nominally — that is, one that exists only in the state of possibility without any actuality — and this cannot be, for such a being is said to be only in the state of possibility short of all actuality; or it is also a real being verbally, and thus it will be existing. Furthermore, such essence is seen intuitively by God as produced in the nature of things here and now; therefore it is existing. The consequence is clear, because intuitive vision terminates at an existing thing, and a thing exists when it does not abstract from here and now. Finally, at that point it is outside logical potency, because it is no longer under mere non-repugnance; it is outside objective potency, because it is no longer in the active potency of an agent alone. Therefore it is perfectly and completely outside its causes. To say moreover that

it is not yet understood to have terminated the causality of existence through which it is drawn entirely outside nothing, is a manifest begging of the question; for this is precisely what is being attacked — namely, that such causality is in no way necessary for actual essence to be said perfectly and completely to exist, since it exists formally and completely of itself by the very fact that it is placed outside its causes together with its quidditative predicates.

Others reply, from Capreolus in *1. d. 8, q. 1, art. 1*, that essence is outside nothing formally through existence — taking nothing as opposed to that being which actually exists — while it still holds that essence of itself is outside nothing, taking nothing as opposed to that being which has the essence of some predicate. This distinction is entirely the same as Cajetan's distinction just adduced, and must be rejected in the same way: for either real essence without existence is in act, or in objective potency; if in act, then it exists; if in potency, then it is in no way outside nothing. Furthermore, a thing that is outside its causes in act according to its essence is thereby understood to be also outside them according to its existence, for to exist is nothing other than to be in act, not as in potency, as is found in *9. Met. n*. Finally, as has often been insisted, it is futile to posit another actuality of existence, if once essence can be in act outside its causes without that actuality of existence; for the actuality of essence itself will be formal existence. For that is formal existence by which a thing is formally in act as opposed to objective potency, since existence itself is the act opposed to such potency. Therefore if the actuality of essence makes a thing in act, not as in potency — as Aristotle says in the passage cited, and in act as opposed to objective potency — then that actuality of essence is most formal existence itself. And this argument is so evident that it can in no way be glossed over. The words of Aristotle in the passage cited, *9. Met. tex. 1*, are these: "And to exist is for a thing to be not as we say it is in potency." Hence too the Doctor in *quodl. 9, l.* said that by being is understood that by which something formally and primarily recedes from non-being; but a thing recedes primarily from non-being through that by which it is outside intellect and the potency of its cause; but in this way essence is not outside nothing through existence, but through its own proper actuality.

Second, principally: actual essence, as it is a thing distinct from existence, either depends upon and is produced by God, or it does not. If it depends upon and is produced, then it exists — because to formally exist means only that a thing is constituted outside its causes, for existence is posited for no other purpose than that through it a thing may formally be outside its own causes. If independent, then there is an actual entity in the nature of things independent of God.

Manca in the passage cited replies that actual essence, before the advent of existence, is said only inadequately and as it were incipiently to be the effect of an agent, but is completed in the character of an effect, and in its own being, through the reception of existence which it receives from the agent — because through existence it is totally led outside nothing.

Against this: essence, as contradistinguished from existence, is by their concession placed outside its causes through efficient action, and formally through its own entity; therefore, adequately and completely by that very fact it is understood to be and to exist — not incipiently only. The consequence is proved: because through the action of the agent terminated at itself as contradistinguished from existence, the whole entity of essence is extracted from nothing, since nothing further remains to be extracted; therefore it depends perfectly and adequately in its own being upon an efficient cause. You will say it is totally extracted from nothing in the genus of efficient causality, but not yet in the genus of formal causality, since in that genus it is only extracted through existence received in itself. Against this: then it already depends perfectly and adequately upon the efficient cause in its own being even before the advent of existence, and not only incipiently, as was said; but I prove further that it is then also understood as extracted from nothing in the genus of formal causality, since it then terminates a production through its own formal entity and is extracted from possible to actual being; therefore even in the genus of formal causality it is understood as extracted from nothing through its own entity, and does not need an extrinsic form really distinct from it by which to be thus denominated.

John of St. Thomas therefore replies in *q. 7 Phys., art. 4* that essence cannot be conceived as produced without existence, because existence is the formal character by which a thing is said to be placed outside its causes and outside nothing; and thus if something is conceived as produced in accomplished being, by that very fact it is conceived as outside its causes, and consequently with existence. But yet at that point it is not conceived as mere essence quidditatively, but also with something accidental to it — namely, with that existence or passive production by which it is in fact outside its causes — and this is accidental to it contingently.

Against this: when there are two entities really distinct from each other, even if by reason of some affinity between them they must be produced together, they are still produced by distinct actions, since for us actions are distinguished. When therefore essence and existence are things really distinct, they will clearly be produced by plainly distinct actions, and therefore essence could be thought of as produced in itself and placed outside its causes, prescinding from existence. Furthermore, this solution is effectively countered by the example of the humanity of Christ, which the Thomists say is deprived of its own existence and exists through the existence of the Word. For from this response it follows that one cannot say it is created and dependent upon God as its efficient cause; the consequence is proved, because the existence of the Word, through which Christ's humanity exists, is uncreated and independent; therefore it cannot be the formal character by which Christ's humanity is said to be placed outside its causes and thus dependent. If the humanity of Christ does not depend according to its essence, nor according to the existence it has in the Word, it follows that it is entirely independent of God in the genus of efficient causality. Some reply that

the humanity of Christ is produced *de novo* and depends, because it is united to the existence of the Word, or because the union with the Word is produced. Against this: then the mode of union will be the formal character by which the humanity of Christ is said to be placed outside its causes, not existence itself. Furthermore, as Arriaga rightly noted, the same argument can be made about the union as was pressed about the humanity of Christ: for I ask about the production of that union — does the essence of it alone terminate the production, or does it terminate together with existence? If it alone terminates, then the essence of union can be conceived as produced without existence — indeed, the essence of union is in fact given as produced without existence. If this is true of the essence of union, the same must be said of others as well. If it terminates together with existence, then for the same reason by which they assert the hypostatic union to have in the Word its own existence, the same can and should be said of the humanity of Christ itself.

Third, if essence were really distinct from existence, then it would not be intrinsically, formally, and in itself a being and existing, nor according to its intrinsic being would it be formally outside its causes; hence the composite that the Thomists constitute from being and essence would not have all its parts intrinsically existing. The consequence is not proved, because something cannot be constituted intrinsically and formally in the character of being through something really distinct from it. For whatever is, is whatever it is really and formally of itself; otherwise it would of itself be nothing, if it were what it is through something distinct from itself.

Manca in the passage cited replies that essence is not constituted through existence in the character of actual real positive being, but through its own real quiddity and actuality; but through existence it is constituted in the character of existing being, when it receives existence in itself.

Against this: if essence through its own real quiddity and actuality is constituted in the character of actual real positive being, then also in the character of something existing. The consequence is proved: because among philosophers by a being existing nothing else is understood than a real actual positive being; for what more could supervening existence confer upon essence than to render it a real actual positive being? And if essence has this formally of itself, it will need no other distinct existence; rather, its actuality itself will most formally be its own existence. Furthermore, however much existence supervenes and essence receives and subjects it to itself, essence is never rendered intrinsically and formally existing — therefore it must be said that essence is such of itself through its own proper actuality. The assumption is proved: because from the fact that it receives existence, the character of existing is not posited and absorbed intrinsically into essence itself, since existence always remains as something contradistinguished from it; therefore essence would not exist intrinsically, but

only denominatively, just as a wall is only denominatively called white through whiteness.

Confirmation: either essence intrinsically and formally is outside its causes and in act as opposed to objective potency, or only denominatively and through another. If the first, then it will be intrinsically and formally existing through its own proper actuality, because — as has been said repeatedly — actuality excluding objective potency is most formally existence itself. If the second, then it will be intrinsically and formally possible and in objective potency; and however much existence is united to it from without, it will still intrinsically leave it in its possibility — just as form, however much it is united to matter, does not intrinsically change anything of its being, but still leaves it in its potentiality. Finally, when there are two possible entities that are mutually diverse, the positing of one in the nature of things does not formally posit the other; for just as they have distinct possibilities, their possibilities must be removed by distinct actualities. If therefore essence and existence are diverse entities, the possibility of one cannot be removed by the actuality of the other, but each must have its possibility removed by its own peculiar opposed actuality. Therefore real essence will be led out of the objective potency corresponding to it through its own proper actuality, not through the actuality of existence posited as really distinct from it. This can also be confirmed from what we cited from the Doctor in *quod. 9, l.*, that that is reckoned to be the proper being of something which primarily and formally recedes from non-being; but real essence primarily recedes from non-being through its own proper and intrinsic actuality, not through anything adventitious and really distinct from itself.

Fourth, this is proved further *ad hominem* from the functions which the adversaries say are exercised by essence with respect to existence. They say that existence is united to essence and is received in it as act in subjective potency; and therefore that essence exercises true material causality with respect to existence — since a form is truly caused by the subject in which it is received and sustained, and a mode by the thing of which it is a mode. But existence could not be united to essence, or received and sustained in it, nor physically caused by it, unless essence were supposed as existing at least for some prior instant of nature; for what is united to something presupposes it as existing, otherwise it would be united to nothing; what is received and sustained in another presupposes that other as existing, otherwise it would be received in nothing; and finally, what is caused by another presupposes it as existing, because existence is the ground, or at least the condition prerequisite, for the exercise of physical causality. Confirmation: it is clearly altogether incapable that an actual subject of a form should receive existence from that very form which it receives and sustains; and that a cause should receive existence from an effect which it produces. Since therefore essence is the subject receiving and sustaining the mode of existence, and this mode flows from and is produced by it at least in the genus of material causality, existence should not be said to be drawn by essence from such a mode,

but rather the reverse. And this is one of the chief reasons that led to the conclusion in *disp. 2. Phys., q. 2, art. 1*, against the Thomists, that matter does not receive its existence from form.

John of St. Thomas replies in the passage cited that for reception one does not require pre-existing existence in the receiver, but it suffices that in reality it is never found without existence; and thus there is no contradiction that it is rendered existing by what it receives. He adduces the instance of the relation of dependence of a being upon God, which is something received in the creature — since it is distinguished from the subject as a thing of the real part, at least as a mode — and yet the subject before that actual dependence upon God is nothing. Therefore it is consistent that something is received without which the subject itself would not be anything real. Regarding causality, he says that since that priority is only a priority of that-by-which, not a priority of that-in-which, it is not necessary that for that priority the existence of the cause be made explicit.

Against this: it is one thing to say that existence is not required in the receiver for what is received, and another — that the receiver itself receives existence from what is received. Even if the first were conceded — namely, that simultaneous existence of both suffices for one to be said to be received in the other — the second is altogether incapable: for what is received in something must be received in what exists independently of itself. And this is especially true if the receiving subject is not only receiving but also sustaining what is received — which he himself concedes in *q. 3 Phys., art. 2*, where he says that when reception is not merely potential but also sustentative, it presupposes existence in the material cause. But this is the case in point, because the mode of existence is not only received but also sustained in essence — this being common to all material forms educible from a subject. Nor does the instance of the relation of creaturely dependence upon God carry any weight, because since such a relation is transcendental, it is the same as the creature, and therefore is not said to be received in the creature but identified with it. And it matters little whether the priority of causality is of that-by-which or of that-in-which; for even conceding that it is only a priority of that-by-which, and that the existence of the cause need not be made explicit for that priority, it does not follow that the cause does not really exist at that instant — for if the effect were coeval with the efficient cause, the cause would at no instant exist at which the effect did not also exist, and yet in that genus of causality even the Thomists concede the cause to be presupposed as existing relative to the effect; and the same is conceded by that author in the material cause that sustains. Therefore, for essence to cause materially the mode of existence, and to sustain it, it would have to be presupposed as existing; and in every genus of causality existence must necessarily be presupposed for the exercise of physical causality, as was proved at length in *disp. 7. Phys., q. 4, art. 1* — even if for that prior instant of nature one need not make explicit the existence of the cause, since existence is usually made explicit through an instant of time, not of nature, and through a priority of that-in-which, not of that-by-which.

From this also the solution of Blasius of the Conception in the passage cited, n. 8 — which coincides with this one — is rejected.

Manca in the passage cited accordingly replies that essence is receptive of existence insofar as it has the actuality of essence and is understood as on the way to existence; and so for that prior instant we understand essence as independent from existence, but only as extracted outside the nothing of essence by the agent. And this is how the efficient cause differs from the material: the efficient cause causes as something perfect and ordered to being further perfected by something distinct from itself, namely through action; whereas the material cause — indeed also the formal cause — causes either by constituting the composite or by receiving existence; and so it suffices to understand these with their partial essence, without existence being required. This is the doctrine of the Complutenses in *1. Phys., disp., q. 5*, which was afterwards adopted by John of St. Thomas in the passage cited, at the end of the article, where he says that the essence receiving existence is not nothing — since nothing is not capable of existence, nor receptive of it, but is contradictorily opposed to it — but it has only subjectively, or in the manner of a capacity, the being of outside nothing, while being outside nothing formally only through existence; and in this sense he concedes it to be something intermediate between nothing and something. For although between these absolutely taken there is no medium, yet between something as formally existing and the nothing opposed to it there is given a medium — namely, a capacity, and an entity subject to that formality of existing. Manca likewise concedes this in the same place in his own words.

But this Thomistic doctrine has already been refuted in *disp. 2. Phys., q. 2, art. 1*, and is now again rejected from what has been said: because if essence in that prior instant in which it is understood as receiving and causing the mode of existence is outside the efficient cause according to its own proper actuality, and is outside nothing, then in our view it will already be existing — since by the being of existence we understand nothing other than the being of essence placed outside its causes. And it matters little to say that it is by itself only subjectively outside nothing and in the manner of a capacity, while outside nothing formally only through supervening existence. For these are mere words with no solid content beneath them — indeed a begging of the question. For by the very fact that something is outside nothing and is no longer in objective potency, we say it is formally existing — as Aristotle taught us in *9. Metaph. tex. 11* — without expecting anything extrinsic and really distinct from it to make it formally existing. Furthermore, objective potency connoting the negation of a thing's existence denominates the thing formally as possible and non-existing; therefore the act opposed to such potency will denominate the thing formally as existing. But actual essence, by the very fact that it is understood as outside objective potency, has an act opposed to such potency prior to the advent of anything really distinct; therefore through such act, or through its own proper actuality, it will be said to

be formally existing outside nothing — for the act opposed to objective potency is what denominates and makes a thing formally existing.

Fifth, this is argued from the nature of real distinction: that distinction — especially the one that holds between thing and thing — requires real extremes, both of them existing in reality, since it imports a real relation, which must necessarily exist between two really existing real extremes; and things are not distinguished actually in reality except when they are actually in reality, and consequently exist. Therefore essence is not really distinct from existence, because for this it would be necessary for essence taken by itself and as contradistinguished from existence to actually exist — which is manifestly self-contradictory.

Manca replies that such a real distinction is founded on the part of essence in its potential quiddity, and on the part of existence in its actuality; and when it is said that the extremes must be really existing, the meaning is that they exist either through several existences or through one, since existence is required only as a condition, and what is the condition in one and the formal ground in the other is sufficient. Bannes similarly replies in *1. p., q. 3, art. 4, dub. 2*, where he says that essence itself is actually in reality, though actuated by existence really distinct from it — in the same way that matter and form are really distinguished and there is a real relation between them.

Against this: when they say that the real distinction is founded on the part of essence in its potential quiddity, they mean either its objective possibility or its subjective and relative possibility according to which they posit it as outside nothing in reality. Not the first, because then that would not be an actual real distinction on the part of essence, since what is in objective potency is in fact nothing and cannot found an actual real distinction. Furthermore, as we said at the beginning of this question, the question is whether essence is distinguished from existence — and this question concerns actual essence which is actually in reality, not possible essence. If the second, then as contradistinguished from existence it is a real actual being outside nothing, which in our view is to be existing. Confirmation: because the actual real distinction which essence founds has its own existence; therefore also the essence in which it is founded — otherwise the founded would be of greater entity than the foundation. You will say with Bannes that it is founded in essence insofar as actuated by existence — in which sense it is existing. Against this: because essence insofar as actuated by existence is not distinguished from existence, otherwise it would be distinguished from itself. Therefore the relation of real distinction is not founded in essence so actuated, but in each extreme taken separately; and since as such each extreme of the distinction must actually be found in reality, it follows that both must exist.

Moreover, in the opinion of many Thomists, the real distinction between essence and existence is of such a kind as to entail separability between them — at least such that essence can be without that mode of existence from which it is supposed

to be really distinct. If therefore essence can remain thus separated by virtue of such a distinction, the sign is that it has its own intrinsic existence by whose help it can remain alone — for it could not so remain if it did not have such existence of itself. You will say that the real distinction on the part of essence is founded in the real actuality of its own quiddity which it has as contradistinguished from existence. Against this: we contend that such actuality is the proper and intrinsic existence of essence, really identified with it.

Sixth, continuing along the same path of real distinction, our Scotists usually argue that if essence and existence are really distinguished, they can at least through God's power be separated from each other and preserved separately. If they are posited as distinguished as thing and thing, or at least essence can be preserved without existence if they are distinguished as thing and mode — for it is customary in those schools to explain this real modal distinction which they call "modal" in such a way that although a mode cannot be separated from the thing of which it is a mode, the thing can be separated from the mode. But the consequence is false: for if the existence of a stone, for example, could be separated from its essence, then the stone would exist and would not be a stone, because it would lack the quidditative predicates of stone that constitute its essence. Or conversely, if the essence of a stone remained separated from its existence, it would exist and not exist: it would exist because it would actually remain in the nature of things outside its causes, like other things produced by God; it would not exist because it is supposed to be deprived and stripped of all existence.

The first consequence — that from the real distinction of essence and existence such separability follows — is proved because certain Thomists especially, just as they customarily assign actual and potential separation as a sufficient and adequate sign and ground of real identity, so conversely they are bound to assign actual or potential separation in being as the adequate sign of real distinction — such that things that are really distinct are either actually separated from each other or can at least be separated by divine power. Furthermore, as Scotus argues in *2. d. 12, q. 2*, at the passage beginning "Respondeo ad quaestionem": every absolute thing prior to another absolute and really distinct from it can at least through divine power be separated from it; and if some absolute cannot be separated from a posterior, and if such impossibility is from within, this can only arise from the real identity of the posterior with it — as is evident of subject and passion, as the Doctor himself notes in *2. d. 2, q. 2*, at the passage beginning "Contra istud." Since therefore essence is something absolute prior to existence itself, if it is posited as really distinguished from it, it necessarily follows that essence can be separated from it and preserved separately; and if it cannot be separated, and if this is intrinsically repugnant to it, this will certainly be by reason of the real identity of existence with it.

Bannes replies in the passage cited, denying the consequence with its proof, because even if two things are distinguished as thing from thing, yet if one of them has an intrinsic order of dependence upon the other with respect to the character of being, it cannot be preserved without it; and because essence in the character of being depends upon the being received in it, it is a contradiction for it to exist without existence.

Then John of St. Thomas absolutely denies that whatever is really distinguished from another can be separated from it, and offers instances: in relatives, because a relation cannot exist without its terminus, nor one relative without the other; in absolutes, because matter cannot be without any form, and a whole cannot be without its parts, even if it is posited as really distinguished from them taken together; and similarly for essence and existence, because since existence is the terminus of production by which an agent leaves a thing outside its causes, it is a contradiction for essence to be understood as outside them without such terminus, by which it is formally placed outside causes.

Against this: although it is true that essential dependence sometimes prevents the separation of two things even if they are really distinct — as is clear of a whole and its parts, and of a vital act with respect to a vital power, which Bannes cites: by reason of such dependence neither can the whole be without its parts, nor can a vital act be separated from the vital power, for the Thomists, even though these are really distinct from each other — yet it is false that in the present case a similar dependence of essence upon existence intervenes. For every dependence simply, as the Doctor says repeatedly, is toward something prior — for the prior gives being to the posterior, not conversely — as is clear in the very example of a vital act cited by Bannes. But essence is prior, existence posterior; therefore in the character of being, essence cannot depend simply upon existence. Confirmation: it cannot be explained in what genus of causality essence depends upon existence in the character of being. Not in the genus of efficient causality, because real essence is communicated to an effect by an agent, not by existence; not in the final, because existence is rather for the sake of essence than conversely; not in the material, because essence is posited by the Thomists as the subject of existence, not conversely; not in the genus of formal causality, because it cannot be said that existence formally and intrinsically constitutes the actuality of essence, since nothing is intrinsically constituted in its own proper and intrinsic actuality by something really distinct from itself, from what was said at n. 100.

From this, therefore — from the fact that actual essence is intrinsically repugnant to remaining without existence and to being separated from it — it must be deduced that such impossibility argues rather for the real identity of essence with existence than for the dependence of the former upon the latter. This is proved by the rule which the Doctor assigns in *2. d. 1, q. 5, M.*, where he says that the intrinsic impossibility of the separation of two things can arise from three sources: either because they are simultaneous by nature, as with two relatives; or

because one is prior, upon which the posterior essentially depends; or because they are really the same. Hence in 2. d. 2, q. 2, at the passage beginning "Contra istud", he then infers that what, if it were distinct from something, would be naturally posterior to it, must necessarily be the same as it, if it is impossible for that other to be without this. Since therefore in our case it is intrinsically repugnant for real essence to be separated from existence, and since such impossibility does not arise from their being simultaneous by nature — for essence is naturally prior to existence, as a thing is prior to its intrinsic mode — nor from the fact that essence depends in being upon existence, because the prior does not depend in being upon the posterior, what remains from a sufficient division is that such impossibility arises from the real identity of both, as we say. The instances that John of St. Thomas adduces to undermine the Scotist maxim — that every absolute thing prior to another absolute and really distinct from it can be without it — are frivolous. The instance of relatives does not impugn the Scotist maxim, which speaks of absolutes; moreover, even if one relative cannot remain in such correlative being when the other is destroyed, they still actually exist separately insofar as they are not necessarily mutually conjoined and connected — as is clear of Father and Son and of two similar things. The instance of matter and form is nothing for us, since we teach that matter can be stripped of all form by God; indeed, the maxim is adduced by Scotus in 2. d. 12, q. 2 for precisely this purpose. The instance of whole and parts also fails, because a whole is posterior to its parts, and the Scotist maxim speaks of what is prior.

Some therefore reply by conceding the consequence — that essence can be separated from existence — but to avoid the absurdity of the consequent, namely the contradiction that it would simultaneously exist and not exist, they say essence can indeed be preserved without this or that existence taken distributively, which is sufficient to show their real distinction, but not without all existence — just as we say that a body can be without this or that local presence, and quantity without this or that figure, but not without all; and this suffices to indicate the real modal distinction of figure from quantity and of location from body. Although a thing can be separated from some mode, there are some modes from which the thing cannot be entirely separated, because it has a necessary connection with some mode — though not with this or that one determinately — as is clear in the examples cited. John of St. Thomas also accepts this solution in the passage cited, where he further adds from Cajetan, *cap. 5 de ente et essentia*, q. 11, that created existence can be consumed and divine existence substituted — as they say happened in fact with the humanity of Christ, which exists through the existence of the Word, according to St. Thomas in 3. p., q. 17, art. 2.

But this solution is also insufficient. For if once it is conceded that essence can be separated from this or that existence distributively, it must consequently be conceded that it can also be separated from all existence, at least through divine power; and the connection between them will not be so necessary as to be unable to be prevented by God. For modes that naturally follow upon things are of two

kinds: some follow upon things through natural emanation from them without the action of an extrinsic agent — as figure with respect to quantity, intensity and remission with respect to quality; others do not so emanate from things but belong to them by means of the action of an agent — as union with respect to matter, presence with respect to body, subsistence with respect to substance, the inherence of an accident, and so on. Although therefore a thing cannot be stripped of modes of the first kind in any way, by reason of the intimate and necessary connection of the thing with them, it seems however that it can be deprived by God of all modes of the second kind — since these belong to things from without through the action of an agent, and do not have the connection with the thing that modes of the first kind have. For this reason it is possible for God to deprive a substance of all existence, an accident of all inherence, and a body of all presence — as many hold with probability. Since therefore existence with respect to essence is a mode of the second kind — because it does not immediately emanate from essence itself through necessary connection, but is communicated to it by an agent in the production of the whole effect, as that author concedes in the same place — it seems to be gratuitously denied that a thing cannot be stripped by God of all existence, even collectively.

But even granting that this cannot be done except distributively, I argue as follows: either when essence changes and exchanges one existence for another, it persists according to some being intrinsic to it under those existences it successively acquires — as matter is said to persist when it passes from one form to another — or it does not. If a new essence is continually generated, if the first alternative holds, then that being which always persists in the nature of things will be the being of existence itself, not the adventitious being successively acquired. If the second, this will be because essence is identified with its existence and therefore simultaneously comes to be and perishes. Furthermore, even speaking thus, contradictions follow: for Socrates, for example, changing his existence, would be the same actual being as before and would not be; he would be, because the same numerical actual essence is supposed to remain in the nature of things; he would not be the same actual being, because he changes his existence. Finally, what was added from Cajetan about the consumption of created existence in the humanity of Christ and the substitution of the divine: this carries no weight, because it is false and denied by all outside the School of St. Thomas that the humanity of Christ lacks its own existence in the Word — as will be treated more fully in the matter on the Incarnation.

Finally, the strongest argument comes from Trombeta in the passage cited, *Tat. dist. 3, q. 3*, and other Scotists passim, destroying the chief foundation of the adversaries. For they chiefly distinguish essence from existence in creatures because the essence of the thing itself can exist and not exist; and from this it is deduced that when it exists, it has something really distinct from itself that it did not have when it did not exist. But the very same indifference is seen in existence itself: for neither does existence itself necessarily exist; it sometimes exists and

sometimes does not — as is clear from the existence of Antichrist, which does not now obtain but will obtain in the future. Therefore if that foundation of the adversaries is valid, not only essence but also possible existence itself will have to be assigned another existence really distinct from it by which it then exists — which I think no Thomist would concede. Just therefore as possible existence is constituted by the Thomists as actually existing without anything really superadded, by the sole fact that it terminates through itself the action of the producing cause, so in the same way it must be said of essence that it is constituted as actually existing in the nature of things from this precise fact — that it terminates such a production — with nothing really superadded to it.

Cajetan replies in the passage cited by denying that existence is indifferent, since it cannot be conceived except as existing — just as man neither can be conceived nor can exist except as an animal; for nothing is indifferent to two alternatives when one of them is determined for it in its own definition. Therefore, since to exist actually is of the concept of existence, it is repugnant to conceive existence as indifferent to being and non-being. Soncinas adds that existence is not in potency to existence, just as whiteness is not in potency to whiteness, but essence properly speaking is that which is in potency to existence; and therefore it is very improperly said that the existence of Antichrist does not now obtain — for properly speaking it should be said that Antichrist himself now does not obtain.

Against this: my existence, which I now enjoy, was not from eternity, and yet it could have been produced from eternity, and before God produced it he knew it as possible and producible. Therefore my existence was no less possible from eternity than my essence, and no less in the order of existing. You will say that non-existing existence is not existence, since to exist actually is of the concept of existence. Against this: I will equally say that non-existing essence is not simply essence. We must therefore return to the doctrine handed down at n. 88: parity must always be preserved in speaking of essence and existence, so that possible existence corresponds to possible essence as its intrinsic mode in that state, and actual existence to actual essence or essence posited in act; nor can essence be possible, or be known by God as possible, in any other way than through existence itself. Nor does it follow from this that if existence is conceived as possible, it is conceived without existence; but only that what is conceived through the name of existence can sometimes truly be in reality of its own part, and sometimes only in objective being — just as man, though he neither can be conceived nor can exist without being an animal, can sometimes actually be an animal in reality and sometimes only in objective being, as when he has not yet been produced.

It can also be denied that to exist actually is of the concept of existence taken absolutely; but of the concept of potential existence it belongs to it to be the ground by which essence can exist, and of the character of actual existence it belongs to it to be the ground by which essence actually exists in the nature of things. And from this the addition of Soncinas is also refuted: for since existence

no less than essence has its own reality by participation — since it is not a being by essence — it is understood as being in possible being prior to actual being, since both the thing and the mode of a thing are said to be first in potency before in act. This Soncinas himself concedes in *q. 13*, the immediately following question, at the second heading. But this possibility of existence must not be explained as if existence were in potency to existence — otherwise I would equally say that essence is in potency to essence with respect to the actuality of essence and of its quidditative predicates, which the Thomists grant as distinct from the actuality of existence — but it must be explained such that existence, which was first possible, is afterwards in act, just as possible whiteness is afterwards in act; and therefore it is not said to be in potency to itself. Nor therefore should the possibility of things before they come to be explained through the mode of subjective potency, as Soncinas does in order to have something to cavil at, but through the mode of objective potency.

Albertinus in *In praedicamento substantiae, disp. 1, q. 1, n. 43* says that existence is possible and not repugnant not through any possibility proper to it by which it is said to be possible from eternity, but from the sole possibility and non-repugnance of the essence of which it is posited as the mode; so that the existence of a stone, from the precise fact that it presupposes the essence of a stone as possible, is said to be non-repugnant. I rejected this solution above at n. 9: for although this doctrine could be admitted in our view, which does not really distinguish existence from essence, in the opposing view it can in no way stand. For as was argued there: just as nothing is constituted in its own proper and intrinsic actual entity through the entity of something else really distinct, so neither is anything constituted as possible or non-repugnant through the non-repugnance of something else really distinct from it. To each producible entity its own objective possibility corresponds; since therefore in the opposing view existence is really distinguished from essence, existence can in no way be said to be possible and non-repugnant through the non-repugnance of essence alone, but its own objective potency must correspond to it no less than to essence. From this you see that this argument concludes *ad hominem*.

Other Thomists therefore reply — and John of St. Thomas follows them — conceding indeed that existence can be and not be, yet maintaining that in order to be and exist, it does not need another superadded mode nor another distinct existence, because it is itself the formal ground of existing, and thus the "whereby" such that it cannot be the "what," just as we say that presence does not need another presence to be present, nor whiteness another whiteness to be white; whereas man and other entities and essences are not grounds of existing, and hence need another mode. But this solution too was attacked above at n. 9: because if from the indifference which essence has to existing and not existing, it is rightly deduced that it needs a superadded mode in order to exist, then since we show the same indifference in existence, the same must equally be concluded of it. Just as, by parity, if we could show that presence and union are indifferent

to being united and not united, to being located and not located, it would equally have to be concluded that union needs another union, and presence another presence.

Finally, others reply that the statement that existence can be and not be can be understood in two ways: either so that it can be produced and not produced — and in this sense it is true; or so that it can have and not have existence — and in this sense it is false, because existence is never said to have existence, but always is existence. Hence they say our argument proves only that the production of existence is distinct from it, not that another existence is given distinct from it by which it exists. Against this: this response concedes what it strives to avoid; and from the fact that existence can be and not be in the first sense, it necessarily follows that it can be and not be also in the second sense. For when existence is newly produced, that production terminates at the actual being of existence, which then remains after the productive action has passed. Therefore not only can it be in the first sense — that is, be produced or not produced — but also in the second — that is, have existence which is the terminus of such production. And so it follows *ad hominem* that the being of existence must be distinguished from the quiddity of existence itself, such that existence itself abstracted from actual being is the essence of existence, and actual being in the nature of things is the existence of that same existence.

Article III: Responses to the Arguments of the Thomists

First, the Thomists argue that without a real distinction of created existence several chief differences commonly posited between God and creatures cannot be sustained. The first difference is usually said to be that God is his own being and his own existing, and exists through his own essence, for no other reason than that in him essence is not distinguished from existence. But this would be verified also of creatures, if their essence is not really distinguished from existence. The second difference is that God is said to be an unparticipated being, while creatures are participated, insofar as their essence participates in existence. But this participation of existence in a creature cannot be sustained without its real distinction from essence, since what participates differs really from what is participated — for nothing participates in itself. The third difference is that God is supremely simple, and every creature is truly composite; but this difference too would be lost unless essence and existence were really distinguished in creatures and made a true composition in them, since some creatures admit no other composition than this — such as prime matter, the substantial and accidental forms of things, and the ultimate termini of things. The fourth difference is that a creature has received being, whereas God has unreceived being; for if a creature did not have received being, its being would be unlimited, lacking anything to limit it; but if the essence of a creature is the same as its existence, it cannot receive it, since nothing receives itself.

To the first: the moderns first turn the argument back against the Thomists in existence itself, which is a creature and yet is its own being and existing, since it does not exist through another really distinct from it. They then say that the statement that God is his own being and his own existing, and being through essence, is verified of God but not of creatures — not because essence and existence are identified really in God but not in creatures, but because God exists independently of any efficient cause, whereas a creature exists dependently; and by reason of this dependence and independence in being, those predication are valid for God but not for creatures, even if here and there essence is identified with existence. Thus Suarez signified in *disp. 31, sec. 6, n. 14*, whom others follow passim. I approve the turning of the argument back against the Thomists, but do not fully approve its solution. For although I hold it true that when the Fathers call God "being through essence" they mean that he has being from himself and not communicated by any cause — since he is not a being by participation — yet I do not believe that the truth of those predication, or their falsity, must be attended to precisely from dependence or independence, such that being in God would be his quidditative predicate because it is found in him with independence, but not in creatures because found in them with dependence. For if it were so, no quidditative predicate could be assigned to a creature, since it has all its predicates dependently from God; and conversely in God all predicates, even attributive ones, would be quidditative, since they are in him without any dependence upon an extrinsic cause. Therefore to depend upon God does not remove the character of a quidditative predicate, provided there is formal identity between it and the subject — just as man is a being by participation from God, and yet the proposition "man is a being" is essential and quidditative. If therefore between essence and existence there is not only real but also formal identity, as the moderns hold, existence will be a quidditative predicate also of created essence — nor will dependence be able to prevent this.

Therefore it must be said, regarding the truth of those propositions, that this difference holds between God and creature: that those propositions are verified of God not only in the identical sense but also in the formal sense, because actually to exist is of the essence of God; whereas in creatures they can be verified only in the identical sense, because actually to exist is not essential and necessary to a creature.

You will say that those propositions cannot be verified even in the identical sense of a creature, because such identity alone would suffice to prevent contingency in its being, and would also suffice for existence to be said to belong to a creature through its own essence and through its very entity. The assumption is denied with its proof, because as I said at n. 90, contingency in the being of a creature does not arise from the real distinction of essence and existence and from the contingent conjunction of the latter with the former as act with potency — as the Thomists hold — but because a creature depends in its actual being upon an extrinsic cause that can preserve and destroy it at any instant. And this is what is

always contingent, and what can always not exist, however much it has existence really identified with it. Finally, this real identity also suffices for existence to be said to belong to a creature through its own essence and entity, because such a manner of speaking — according to the common usage of the Fathers and Theologians — signifies having existence from oneself and independently of another, which belongs to God alone. But if by such a manner of speaking were indicated only that existence belongs intrinsically and immediately to a creature through its own essence and actual entity, and not through anything adventitious really distinct from it, then in this sense it could indeed be conceded that existence belongs also to creatures through their own essence and proper entity.

To the second: created essence is said to participate in existence not because it does not identify it with itself, but because it does not have it from itself but from an extrinsic efficient cause. And when it was said that what participates really differs from what is participated, the answer is that created essence is not called participating with respect to its own existence, but with respect to the efficient cause — of whose being it participates something. From which it follows only that there is a real distinction between God and creatures, not between essence and existence. To the third: the argument is turned back with Scotus in *1. d. 8, q. 2, A.*, because such composition — which they say is universal in every creature — does not belong to essence itself and existence itself according to themselves. Therefore it is denied that a creature is really composed from being and essence. For to distinguish the simplicity of a creature from the simplicity of God, it suffices that if not every creature is truly composed from things, it is at least composed from the realities of genus and difference, or at least can be composed with another — which can belong to every creature, as Scotus teaches in the passage cited. It also suffices that the composition from being and essence, although in creatures it is not a real and proper composition, is nonetheless a formal composition, or quasi-composition, insofar as existence is not so completely identified with created essence as with divine essence — as we will say below. Moreover, other formal compositions are also found in creatures, by which they greatly differ from divine simplicity, as the Doctor notes in the passage cited, *1. d. 8, q. 2.*

To the fourth: if by "received being" is understood "being accepted from another" — meaning the same as "participated" — then certainly the being of a creature is necessarily received being, since it depends upon another. But if by "received being" is understood "being received in another really distinct, as in a subject" — as the force of the word denotes — then it is denied that the being of a creature need be received being. Nor does it follow from this that such being would be unlimited, because the very being of essence, according to the Thomists, is not received in another, and yet is not unlimited. It is therefore false that for something to be limited it must have a subject in which it is received from which its limitation is taken; for of that subject itself it could be asked whence it has its limited being, and if it has unlimited being, how it can limit forms received in

itself. Therefore every creature is formally limited from itself and efficiently from its causes; and indeed the limitation of created existence consists in this: that it does not necessarily exist, nor makes the essence corresponding to it necessarily existing — which is clearly seen to arise from the fact that it is produced by an efficient cause that can preserve and destroy it at any instant, not from the fact that it is received in essence as really distinct. Hence this argument, which the Thomists are so fond of magnifying, concludes nothing at all. And when it is said that unreceived being is infinite and unlimited, the same distinction must be made: if by "received being" is understood "being not accepted from another," then certainly every such being is unlimited, and in this sense the being of God is called unreceived; but if by "unreceived being" is understood "being not received in another as in a subject," it is denied that every such being is unlimited — for rationality in man is not received in another really distinct in man, and yet it is not unlimited, nor is animality, nor other substantial metaphysical degrees.

Cajetan in the passage cited tries to prove the opposite: because separated whiteness would include every possible perfection appropriate to whiteness, and would be infinite in that nature — and Soncinas makes a similar argument about separated heat. Therefore the limitation of such a form is not drawn from the agent by which it is produced. But this argument is entirely invalid, because either the case is posited that whiteness is separated from a subject, or that God produces it *de novo* outside a subject. If the first: since by separation alone nothing accrues to whiteness that was not already there, just as before it was not infinite, so neither after separation. If the second: I do not see how God is compelled to produce infinite whiteness precisely from the fact that he does not produce it in a subject.

Blasius of the Conception further instances that the eternal Son has being from the Father, and yet does not have finite and limited being; therefore finitude and limitation of a creature are not inferred from the fact that it receives being from God. On the contrary, from the fact that something receives being from an infinite being, it would seem rather to be inferred that such being is infinite than finite. Therefore if nothing intrinsic to the creature is given from which its existence is limited and made finite, it would sooner follow that it has infinity than finitude and limitation. The reply is to deny the parity: for the Son in *divinis* is necessarily produced by the Father, such that he cannot not be produced, and he does not proceed from the Father in an otherness of nature but only in an otherness of person; whereas a creature is not produced by God necessarily, for it can be produced or not produced; and when it is produced, it proceeds and comes forth from him in an otherness of nature. Therefore the Thomists resort in vain to some potency really distinct from it — in which existence is received — in order to trace the limitation of created existence, since its limitation is sufficiently gathered from the fact that it is not produced necessarily by any cause, nor does it of itself necessarily exist, nor does it necessarily make another existing.

Second, the Thomists argue from the fact that many things are attributed to the essences of creatures which are not attributed to their existence — indicating thereby a real distinction between them. First: existence belongs to a thing independently of an efficient cause, whereas essence does so independently, since the essential predicates of things belong to them with all effective causality excluded — for there is indeed a cause why a man is, but not why a man is an animal. Second: propositions formed about the essence of a thing are necessary and of eternal truth, whereas those formed about existence are contingent. Third: existence is the terminus of generation and corruption, but not essence, which is said to be ungenerable and incorruptible and to have been from eternity; so when a man dies, existence perishes, not essence. Fourth: things are said to be first in potency before in act with respect to essence, but not with respect to existence; essence is also said to be in potency to existence, but nothing is said to be in potency to itself. Fifth: according to the being of essence things fall under science and predicamental coordination, but not according to the being of existence. Sixth: different questions are resolved through them — namely, through existence the question whether it is, and through essence the question what it is. Seventh: essence is said to be necessary, existence contingent; essence is said to abstract from place and time, but not existence. Finally: essence belongs to a thing *per se*, existence *per accidens*; but if the real distinction were removed, existence too would belong to a creature *per se*, since no act can be really the same as something and not belong to it *per se*.

To this it is replied that not only a real distinction, but sometimes even a merely formal distinction *ex natura rei* — which is less than real — suffices to verify contradictories of the same thing according to diverse formalities in reality. Therefore not every contradiction in reality always infers a real distinction, as was said in *disp. 1. Log., q. 5, art. 2* in explaining the nature of a formal distinction, and again above in *disp. 6, n. 130*. Hence in the present case too, even if some contradictories are verified of essence and existence, a real distinction between them should not immediately be inferred from them; rather, the nature of those contradictories must be attended to — whether they are sufficient to induce a real distinction or not. But for greater clarity it pleases to reply to each individually.

To the first: it is denied that essence does not belong to things dependently upon an efficient cause, insofar as they actually participate in it, since in truth they have it communicated by an efficient cause, no less than existence — and Soncinas himself, whose argument this is, readily concedes this; but he insists that no efficient cause is given for the connection of essential predicates. But this matters little to us here, because the truth of such propositions is not founded in the actual essence of things as spoken of here, but in possible essence, as we said above at n. 66, where it was also explained in what way the divine intellect can be called the efficient cause of the truth of those propositions. To the second: necessary propositions are formed about essence in its possible and objective being, as was said there, not in actual being — in which mode it does not abstract from

existence and is really the same as it. To the third: it is denied that actual essence — as it is in reality — is not the terminus of generation and corruption, because the adequate terminus of generation is the whole thing as produced both according to essence and existence, and the same is the terminus of corruption when it perishes according to both modes of being. How essence can be said to be ungenerable, incorruptible, and eternal has already been explained above at n. 90. To the fourth: what was said at n. 119 makes clear how also existence in its own mode can be and not be in act, just as essence; and therefore just as things are said to be in potency before they come to be, with respect to actual essence, so they must likewise be said to be in potency with respect to existence in exercised being. And when essence is said to be in potency to existence, it must not be understood that it precedes as something real in subjective potency for receiving existence as something really distinct from it, as received from receiver; but it is said to be in objective potency insofar as it is that which can pass from potential being to actual being — not indeed by receiving something in itself, but by coming forth from the power of causes. To the fifth: things are not placed in a category according to the actual being of essence as spoken of here, but according to possible and objective being, in keeping with which they abstract from existence and actuality, as is clear from what was said at nn. 69 and 88. To the sixth: the diversity of those questions is denied to infer a real distinction between essence and existence; for even in God those distinct questions are assigned, although essence and existence there are not really distinguished. For distinguishing those questions a lesser distinction suffices; moreover, the question whether a thing is does not always seek actual existence of the thing as spoken of here, but sometimes only potential. To the seventh: essence is said to be necessary and to abstract from time and place according to possible and objective being; whereas according to actual being, which it has in reality, it is just as contingent and connotes place and time as existence itself.

To the last: essence is said to belong per se to a creature and existence per accidens — not because existence is really distinguished from essence, but because it does not enter its quidditative concept; nor does it follow from its being identified with created essence that it belongs per se and not per accidens. For rational in man is identified with animal, and yet rational belongs per accidens to animal. You will say that at least it follows that a creature necessarily exists, since it exists through an existence really identified with it and consequently through its very entity. The reply, from n. 123, is that this no less follows because the contingency of a creature in being is not founded in the connection of existence with essence — as the Thomists think — but in the fact that it has being communicated by an efficient cause, in which communicated being both existence and essence of the creature are equally involved; and just as the whole being is communicated to a creature contingently, so too actual essence — and for this reason a creature is said to exist contingently, even if existence is posited as really identified with it. Therefore these and similar arguments do not rightly conclude, because — as has

often been said — a creature can be considered in two states: namely, actuality and possibility; and since existence is an intrinsic degree of essence in whatever state, as we said at n. 88, and consequently always necessarily connected with it, existence too can be considered in both states. And thus there is actual existence corresponding, as an intrinsic degree of being, to actual essence, and possible existence corresponding to possible essence. Hence when we ask whether existence is really distinguished from essence or identified with it, we must speak uniformly about essence and existence — that is, either about each in the state of potentiality or about each in the state of actuality; for speaking uniformly thus, existence will always be found identified with essence as its intrinsic degree. But the arguments made here conclude about actual existence, or existence in exercised being, compared to essence — not to actual essence, but to essence under possible and objective being. Therefore they do not rightly proceed. How neither actual possible essence is really distinguished from actual existence has already been said at n. 70.

Third: those things are really distinct of which one remains when the other does not; but essence can remain when its own natural existence is destroyed. Therefore, and so on. The minor is proved because the humanity of Christ exists in the Word and not through its own natural existence but through the existence of the Word; and likewise the accidents of bread and wine in the Sacrament of the Eucharist exist with a new and supernatural existence outside their subject, with their prior natural existence — through which they existed in the subject — destroyed. If therefore the existence of an accident can be separated from the accident, and the existence of a substance from the substance — as is clear in the aforesaid mysteries — it must certainly be concluded that every created existence is distinguished from its essence.

The reply is to deny the minor with its proofs, because both the humanity of Christ and the Eucharistic accidents exist through their own natural existence, though they lack some connatural mode of existence, a new mode having succeeded — either positive, such as the mode of hypostatic union of the humanity of Christ with the Word, or negative, such as the privation of the union of the Sacramental accidents with the substance of bread and wine. Hence those who argue thus confuse the existence of a substance with subsistence, and the existence of an accident with inherence — which must not at all be done. For by the name of existence is understood that by which formally a possible being is constituted outside its causes in the character of a being in act, whether it be substance or accident; for in the character of a being in act, or in the character of what is existing as such, substance and accident do not differ. But they differ in their peculiar modes of existing: substance exists per se, and an accident exists in another; and the first mode of existing is called subsistence or per se existence, proper to substances; the other is called inherence, proper to accidents. The formal effect of each is far different from the formal effect of existence as such: for subsistence is not posited to constitute substantial nature outside its causes

and in the character of a being in act, but to render it so existing in and through itself as not to need to be sustained in another after the manner of an accident. Nor is inherence posited to constitute accidental nature outside its causes in the character of a being in act, but to unite it to something as to its subject, by which it is sustained. To explain more precisely how the mode of subsistence in substance and of inherence in accident differ from their existence is not the business of the present inquiry, but will be done below in the proper Disputations. Meanwhile, for the solution of the argument it suffices that the accidents in the Sacrament of the Eucharist retain their natural existence and lack the mode of inherence, and that the humanity of Christ likewise in the Incarnation retains its natural existence and lacks only the mode of its own subsistence — as I now presuppose with the common teaching of Scotists and Scotus in 3. d. 6, whom all moderns outside the School of St. Thomas follow *passim*.

You will say that subsistence is really distinguished from substance, and inherence from accident; therefore also existence from a thing existing. The consequence is denied, since it has been shown that existence cannot really be distinguished from the thing existing; but below in the proper Disputations the necessity of the distinction of subsistence from substance and of inherence from accident will be shown. It is also false that subsistence, taken for *per se* existence — as we speak of it here — is distinguished from substance; this is verified only of subsistence taken for incommunicable existence, as appears below in *disp. 11, q. 2*.

Fourth: essence is indifferent to being and non-being — since it sometimes is, and sometimes is not — therefore it is really distinguished from being. The consequence is proved: that which is successively subject to opposites is distinguished from each of them, and by this argument Aristotle in 1. *Phys.* 60 proves that matter is really distinct from form and privation. Confirmation: nothing can be understood under the opposite of what is really identified with it — for one cannot understand that man is not an animal; but essence can be understood under the opposite of existence, for I understand in winter that the essence of a rose does not exist. Therefore, and so on. So argues Soncinas in the passage cited.

To this it is replied that this argument has already been turned back above at n. 119 against existence itself, which also can be given in act and not given in act, and yet when posited in act, no actuality of being distinct from it is superadded to it by which it is said to exist. For the argument to conclude and proceed, as Aristotle's argument in the passage cited does, it would be necessary for essence to precede existence as something positive in subjective and receptive potency with respect to it — as we say of matter with respect to form; but this cannot at all be verified of actual essence, which is then determined toward being. Hence essence can only be said to be indifferent to being and non-being when conceived under the state of possibility — in which sense essence is not the subject of discussion here. Moreover, even in that state considered, it cannot be said to be

really distinguished from actual existence, since then it is not in subjective potency — which presupposes being a real being in reality, which thus denominates something possible — but only in objective potency, which posits nothing real in reality that could be really distinguished from something else.

Or it must be absolutely denied that the assumption — that essence is sometimes under existence and sometimes under its negation — is true: for speaking uniformly, essence is always found with its proportionate existence — namely, actual essence with actual existence, and possible essence with possible existence. Hence when a mutation occurs with respect to existence, the same mutation also occurs with respect to essence, insofar as it is sometimes potential and sometimes actual. Therefore essence can only be said not to exist when speaking of it in its possible being and regarding the actual exercise of existence.

To the confirmation: the answer is clear through the same: for it is false that essence is ever given or understood without existence proportionate to it — neither real essence without actual existence, nor possible essence without possible existence. Possible essence can indeed be thought of without actual existence, in which way that proof proceeds about the rose in winter; but then the argument does not prove the intended conclusion, since in this question we ask whether essence is distinguished from existence, speaking of both uniformly — that is, of actual essence with respect to actual existence, and of possible with respect to possible.

Note also here that this confirmation can be turned back against the Thomists in existence itself, because existence too can be understood as not existing in act, and thus understood under the negation of existence; and yet it is not really distinguished from itself.

You will insist that actual essence is also said to be indifferent to being and non-being — otherwise it would exist necessarily and not contingently. Therefore it is false that essence is only in the state of possibility said thus indifferently, and when it is actually existing, it is still indifferent to being and not being; therefore also in such a state it can be understood under the opposite of existence, and so the arguments made prove the real distinction of actual essence — and not only of possible essence — from existence.

To this it is replied: one must not think that real essence in reality stands as some third thing indifferent to being and non-being, as the Thomists imagine; but it, having being, can not-be — not indeed in the composite sense, for in that sense everything that is, when it is, must necessarily be, as Aristotle says — because in its being and conservation it depends upon an efficient cause at every instant capable of destroying it. From this indifference and contingency of things the intellect can also understand essence apart from existence — not indeed divisively, as if it were thinking of actual essence outside its causes without

existence, which would be an error; but abstractively and precisively, for which a distinction of reason sometimes suffices.

Fifth, many accidents are received in a creature, but they cannot be received in existence — since it is the ultimate act — therefore they are received in essence together with existence; and consequently essence and existence are distinguished as receiving and received. Moreover, in composites of matter and form, existence is not composite but simple and indivisible, falling upon each part — otherwise matter would not be pure potency if it had its own proper existence. Therefore existence cannot be identified with matter and form, which are really distinguished from each other. Again, I do not have the same existence today that I will have tomorrow, since today's existence is present and tomorrow's future; and yet I have the same essence. Therefore they are not only really distinguished but are also in fact separated. Finally, the essence of existing Peter is the same as his possible essence, for it is the same thing which is now produced and which from eternity was producible; but the existence of Peter is distinguished from his essence which was from eternity. Therefore, and so on.

To this it is replied by denying the minor: for all accidents can be said to be received in existence, insofar as all are received in the existing subject — since one of the chief conditions for accidents to be received in something as in their subject is the existence of that subject. And existence is called the ultimate act — as we indicated at the beginning of this question — not indeed with respect to accidents; with respect to these it is rather called the first act, insofar as the other accidents supervening upon a thing already presuppose it as existing; but in the order of essential predicates, which it presupposes.

To the second: the assumption is denied, from Scotus in *4. d. 11, q. 3*, at the section on arguments: as is clear from what was said in Natural Philosophy, the parts composing a material substance each have their own proper existence — where we also showed that matter is not such pure potency as to lack its own existence and entitative act.

To the third: the assumption is also denied; for the very same existence, intrinsically and formally, by which I exist today is that by which I will exist tomorrow. And today's and tomorrow's existence cannot be distinguished except extrinsically by reason of coexistence with different times. Hence at most a distinction in today's and tomorrow's duration can be inferred, but not in existence itself; but how not even in duration is there an intrinsic and formal distinction but only an extrinsic one and by reason of what is connoted, was explained in *disp. 13. Phys., q. 1*. By the same reasoning, Peter's existing in Rome and existing in Venice are not intrinsically different, as if there were a different existence of Peter here and there, but differ only extrinsically from coexistence with different places.

To the fourth: the minor is denied; for as is clear from what was said at nn. 69 and 70, even comparing possible essence with actual existence they are not really distinguished — as if possible essence were from eternity something positive and in subjective potency to existence which it then receives in time; rather the very same thing which was possible later becomes in act; and the same argument can equally be made about existence itself before it is produced — asking in what way it comes to be in exercised being.

But here Soncinas presses: either when a stone does not exist, something must be added to its essence for it to be said to be existing, or not. If the first, the intended conclusion follows; if the second, then one contradictory is changed into another — that is, non-existing is changed into existing. To this the answer is sufficiently clear from what was said at n. 56: since a possible being becomes existing, one contradictory is not thus changed into another — as if nothing became something — but what was in the power of a cause comes forth from it and thus becomes in act; and by reason of this coming forth the other contradictory is verified. Hence the same essence of a thing under different states can found the contradiction: for when it is outside its causes it is called existing, and when it was only in its causes it was called not existing. But for a more exact solution see what was said at n. 56, where this quibble is solidly refuted.

Sixth, Blasius of the Conception argues from St. Thomas: "That whose quiddity is its own being cannot be except one alone; therefore it is self-contradictory that creatures are their own being." The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved: in a thing whose quiddity is its own being, no cause or reason of multiplication can be given; therefore it cannot be except one. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved: that one thing should be multiplied can happen only in two ways. First, by the addition of a difference, as genus-nature is multiplied into species; and in this way the thing whose essence is its own subsisting and unreceived being cannot be multiplied, because since existence is ultimate actuality, it consequently cannot be multiplied as generic potency through further actualities, as it would have to be if it were multiplied in the manner of generic potency into different species. Second, a thing can otherwise be multiplied numerically, namely through the reception of a form in different parts of matter, as specific nature is multiplied in different individuals; and this too is not possible for subsisting and unreceived being, because nothing is multiplied in this way except what is received in another as act in potency. Therefore unreceived being in essence as in its proper potency is in no way multipliable, but is only one.

To this it is replied: it is true that the antecedent with its proof holds for that whose quiddity is its own being — not only really, but also formally and quidditatively, such that existence belongs to its quiddity, as in God — but not for that whose quiddity is its own being only really and identically, as in a creature. For with such identity and non-reception of existence in essence, the reason for both specific

and numerical multiplication in created nature is still consistent. Nor does the fact that existence is called the ultimate actuality obstruct this: for it is called such only with respect to all the essential predicates which it presupposes in nature; this does not prevent it from being also actuable and contractable by posterior differences. Nor does existence by reason of its actuality remove what belongs to essence, since what by virtue of its being is in potency to something remains in the same potency even when it exists. Therefore the nature of animal, for example, can well be multiplied through essential differences contracting it — even if existence is not received in essence. Furthermore, it is false that nature is numerically multiplied through the reception of form in different parts of matter, as will be shown below in *disp. 10*; for it is rather multiplied and plurified through various individual differences, which are customarily called the haecceities (individual "thisnesses") of things. Therefore specific nature is well understood as plurified through the advent of individual differences, even if its existence is not received in essence — which will be clearer from the disputations below on common and singular nature.

Finally, those things that are apprehended by different cognitive powers — one intellectual and the other sensitive — are really distinguished, since the real distinction of powers is drawn from the real distinction of objects. But the essence or quiddity of a creature is apprehended by the intellect — since quiddity is the object of intellect — and its own being or existing is apprehended by sense, which is cognitive only of particulars and of actually existing things. Therefore, and so on. Confirmation: even in God the knowledge of simple intelligence — which is said to be of possible things — is distinguished from the knowledge of vision, which is of future things. But this difference cannot be preserved unless it is said that existence is distinguished from essence, and that through the knowledge of simple intelligence the essence alone of things is known, and through the knowledge of vision existence is attained. Therefore existence must be distinguished from essence.

To this the reply is given, from Scotus in *1. d. 3, q. 3, part 2*, at the section on arguments, and in *quol. 13*, at the section on the second major: the maxim holds for disparate cognitive powers, such as the five exterior senses compared with each other, but not for subordinated powers, such as intellect and sense — since the same object can be perceived by each; for whatever is sensed can be understood, since the intellect is concerned with the whole of being. The minor can also be denied; for as Bassolis notes in the passage cited, actual essence can be understood and can be sensed. The very same thing that sense sees, intellect knows; hence both sight and intellect know the essence of color — differently, however: because intellect can know it quidditatively by defining it and abstracting from being, or also from its singular, whereas sight cannot; and this is why quiddity is said to be appropriated to intellect as its object. Finally, even granting this — that intellect knows essence and sense knows existence — a real distinction between them does not thereby necessarily follow; just as from the

fact that intellect is of universals and sense of singulars, a real distinction of nature from its singular or individuality would not rightly be deduced.

To the confirmation: the moderns first turn the argument back, because of existence itself — even as contradistinguished from essence — God has the knowledge of vision when he knows it determinately as future at a certain time, and the knowledge of simple intelligence when he knows it precisely as possible. They then set forth various solutions, which Ovvied accurately reports and refutes in the passage cited, *punct. 4*, where he says that this difficulty concerning the distinction of the object of the knowledge of simple intelligence and of the vision of God is a major one currently disputed in the Schools of the Society, and so arduous that some consider it insoluble. Hence finally he concludes with Arriaga that those knowledges in God are not distinguished by their objects but rather by the different mode of knowing the same object. The reason a priori — says Arriaga — why these knowledges cannot be distinguished by objects is that no entity or state of entity, or condition, can exist that is not possible; and conversely, nothing possible is such that it could not be existing. Therefore nothing can be seen through the knowledge of vision that was not known through the knowledge of simple intelligence; hence there is no difference between these knowledges on the part of the object, but on the part of the mode of knowing: the divine intellect through simple intelligence apprehends the essence and existence of a thing, but without judging it — neither affirmatively nor negatively — by an act expressed through these words: "if such an essence existed, contradictories would not follow"; by which act things are attained precisely under the character of possibility. But through the knowledge of vision it affirms not only that contradictories would not follow if such a thing existed, but absolutely affirms that it will exist at such or such a temporal difference.

I, however, either do not perceive the mystery of the matter or do not find so great a difficulty in this point as these moderns boast. I confess that the distinction of those knowledges in the divine intellect can be preserved — as they say — from the different mode alone of attaining the same object; since even thus it has been shown by Scotus that the abstractive and intuitive knowledge are distinguished from each other in *disp. 6 de Anim., q. 11*: for no formality on the part of the object is expressed through one that cannot also be expressed through the other; hence nothing remains from which they can be distinguished save a diversity in the mode of expressing the same object, as was explained at length there. Nevertheless, in the present case there also seems to remain something from the part of the object by which the said natural and free knowledge are distinguished, because things — though before any act of the divine will they have possible being — do not receive future being except from the free decrees of the divine will, as the Doctor notes in *1. d. 29, N.* and in *quol. 14, art. 2*, and all concede. Therefore the divine intellect can well know before the free decrees all essences and possible existences ordered toward all temporal differences; yet it can never attain the futurity of a thing, or a thing's being future, except after the decree of the divine

will concerning the production of that thing in a determinate temporal difference. From this it is clearly deduced — as Smisinch rightly notes in *tract. 3 de Deo Uno, disp. 6, q. 1*, at the end — that even on the part of the object there is something in the divine intellect attained in the posterior sign after the decrees of the divine will through the knowledge of vision that was not attained in the prior sign before them through the knowledge of simple intelligence. For in that sign the intellect understands only possible existence of the thing and with every possible order toward any temporal difference, but not with actual order — which depends upon the decree of the divine will and is afterwards attained through the knowledge of vision. John of St. Thomas, for his own opinion, constructs an obscure argument that either proves nothing or at most a formal distinction *ex natura rei*, not a real one.

Article IV: Real Essence and Existence Are Distinguished Not Only by the Intellect but Formally from the Nature of the Thing, after the Manner of a Modal Distinction

This conclusion is established against the second position mentioned at n. 76, which acknowledged between essence and created existence only a distinction of reason — whether of reasoning reason or at most of reasoned reason. It belongs to Scotus and the Scotists in the passage cited at n. 77, and is gathered from all the passages where the Doctor calls created existence an intrinsic mode of essence — in distinction from divine existence, which enters into the quidditative concept of God, as he expressly teaches in *quodl. 1, art. 1*. From this it consequently follows that between essence and created existence there must be posited, in the Doctor's view, such a distinction as is customarily posited in his school between a quiddity and its intrinsic mode. This distinction, though the smallest among all distinctions short of the work of the intellect — as is clear from *disp. 1. log., q. 5, art. 2* and *disp. 6. Met., q. 10* — is certain from what was said there to actually precede all work of the intellect, and therefore to be contained rather under the distinction *ex natura rei* than under the distinction of reason, which arises through the work of the intellect. Nor should anyone be troubled by the fact that Scotus in *3. d. 6, q. 1*, at the section "Respondeo," said that being and essence differ only in the mode of conceiving — which is a pure distinction of reason — since there he takes "being" not for the being of existence as distinguished from essence, but as the concrete of the name "essence," and holds these two to differ only as concrete and abstract, which is certainly a distinction of reason, since it bears only on the different logical modes of conceiving the same quiddity. Trombeta interprets him thus in *lib. 5. Met. q. 6*, at the section "dimissa ergo," *Tat. 2. d. 3, q. 5*, Posnan in *1. d. 26, disp. un.*, and all his commentators in that place. This is sufficiently clear from the very words of the Doctor, for there he distinguishes between the being of essence, the being of subsistence, and the being of actual existence, and of the being of essence he pronounces that it differs from essence only in the mode of conceiving. Hence certain moderns labor in vain to draw the Doctor against his will to their own position, having misunderstood him. And still

without justification, Suarez in *disp. 31, sec. 2, n. 19* and Pasqualig in *disp. 82, sec. 6, n. 3* attribute to our Lichet in *2. d. 1, q. 2* the view that essence and existence are distinguished for no other reason than that one is conceived in the manner of a concrete and the other in the manner of an abstract; for that most acute interpreter of Scotus never uttered such an absurdity. It is found only in a certain marginal note added by some unskilled hand. And since Suarez himself concedes this in the passage cited, I do not know by what reasoning he calls this the mind of Lichet and his gloss — since in the text of Lichet at that place one reads only that the being of essence and the being of existence are the same and entirely inseparable, not that they differ as concrete and abstract. This was also noted by Faber in *9. Met., disp. 2, cap. 1*, where he also draws this conclusion from the Doctor in *2. d. 3, q. 3* — in which passage Scotus posits certain differences between essence and existence that point to the aforesaid formal distinction *ex natura rei*.

But since this is the common and most widely received conclusion in our school, it is remarkable how lightly it is proved by the Scotists and passed over in stride, thinking themselves to have satisfied the matter and won the victory over the Thomists when they showed that essence and existence are not really distinguished. But they do not see that it is a matter of even more difficult proof that they are distinguished in some way from the nature of the thing and not merely through the intellect. For if we want to distinguish them at least as two realities or formalities found in the thing from the nature of the thing — or at least discovered by the intellect with a foundation in the thing, as those who distinguish them by reasoned reason say — the cited moderns Aversa, Arriaga, Hurtado, Pasqualig, Ovved, and others immediately turn back against us the arguments made against the Thomists, showing that — preserving the proportion — the same absurdities follow in the Scotist position distinguishing them as two formalities as followed in the Thomist position distinguishing them as two things. For just as in that position there followed an infinite regress in things, so here there follows an infinite regress in the objective formalities themselves. This consequence is proved: because that objective formality of existence that corresponds as contradistinguished from the formality of essence is apt to not-exist and can have two states — of pure possibility and of actuality; therefore in it again two formalities are distinguished, one that is essence and another that is existence; and of this in turn the same argument recurs, to infinity. Therefore we must solidly establish the stated conclusion and then show how, with a modal distinction of our school admitted between essence and existence — which I add to exclude the modal distinction in the usage of the moderns — that infinite regress in objective formalities does not follow.

First, then, it is proved that between existence and created essence a mere distinction of reasoning reason does not suffice, and that they are not distinguished precisely from the part of the mode of conceiving, because it is evident to all that they are distinguished more in creatures than in God — since in God existence is his quidditative predicate, as will be shown in its place, but

not in creatures. But in God they can be well distinguished by that kind of rational distinction and from the part of the mode of conceiving. Therefore by an even greater distinction they are distinguished in creatures. The major is clear; the minor is proved: taking the explanation which the moderns use to show what in their view is the distinction between essence and created existence, and applying it also to divine essence and existence — if with Arriaga and Ovviéd this distinction of reason drawn from the part of the mode of knowing is explained such that the same objective formality known only conditionally is called essence, and the same absolutely affirmed is called existence; then such a distinction of reason can plainly be assigned also in God, since it is not repugnant to conceive the divine essence conditionally without absolutely affirming it, as when one says "if God exists, contradictories would not follow" — and Arriaga himself concedes this in the same place. Again, if with Aversa this distinction of reason is explained such that the same objective formality known only as possible and non-repugnant is called essence, and known further as actually posited in the nature of things is existence — even thus it can be assigned in God, since before God is conceived as actually existing, he can be conceived as non-repugnant to existing, or as logically possible. Finally, because since a distinction of reason drawn entirely extrinsically from the part of the mode of conceiving posits no partition or imperfection in the object thus conceived, no absurdity follows if it is posited in God.

Aversa will perhaps reply, from what he has at the beginning of that section 8, that such a distinction of reason cannot rightly be thought of in God because no foundation on the part of the thing for constructing that distinction between essence and existence is found in him, as is found in creatures. For the foundation of such a distinction in creatures, says Aversa, is that since a creature is really contingent and can exist and not exist, it follows that the very entity of the creature — which can be and not be — can be conceived without our determinately conceiving it as actually being, either because in fact it actually is not, or because even if it actually is, this being actual is contingent to it and not of its necessity. The opposite holds in God, and therefore no such distinction can be assigned in him.

Against this: if, as Aversa says, there is a foundation in creatures for the distinction of reason of essence from existence, then it is false that they are distinguished precisely from the part of the mode of conceiving and not from the part of the object, as he teaches afterwards. The consequence is proved: because in this a distinction of reason regarding objective formalities identified with each other in reality differs from one that is attended to precisely on the basis of a different mode of conceiving: the former is with a foundation in the thing, and is called a distinction of reasoned reason or rationalizable reason; the latter is without a foundation, and only infers a different mode of conceiving the same formality — which is called a mere distinction of reasoning reason. Furthermore, from the fact that such a foundation exists in reality in creatures, I will show below that not only is this distinction between essence and existence found to be of reasoned

reason, but also that it is in some way from the nature of the thing and does not await the work of the intellect to actually distinguish them.

Arriaga replies by readily conceding that such a distinction of reason arising from the part of the mode of conceiving between divine essence and its existence can and must be admitted as well, and that no absurdity follows from this — because even without an objective precision of essence from existence in creatures, the difference of a creature from God is well preserved; and this difference consists in the fact that the formality of created existence can be corrupted, whereas the existence of God cannot. But this does not require that objective distinction, says Arriaga.

Against this: if no greater distinction is found between the essence and existence of a creature than of God — as this author concedes — then their identity will be the same here and there; and therefore if existence is the same essentially and quidditatively as God, it will also be the same quidditatively and essentially as a creature; from which it would then consequently be deduced that the existence of a creature is necessary, as in God, and not contingent — since it would be its quidditative predicate, as in God. It is therefore clear that if no greater distinction is admitted between created essence and its existence than in God, the difference between creature and God as regards the necessity of existing is lost. Furthermore, that distinction obtains between created essence and existence such that according to their different concepts, some propositions are formed that are contingent and some necessary: for according to the concept of essence, necessary propositions are formed; but according to the concept of existence, contingent ones are formed. But this is not verified in God, since propositions drawn from the concept of existence are just as necessary as those of essence. Therefore a greater distinction must be admitted between the essence and existence of a creature than of God; since therefore in God they can be well distinguished from a different mode of conceiving, a greater distinction must be argued for in creatures. Perhaps you will say that this can at most induce between essence and created existence a distinction of reasoned reason, not one entirely from the nature of the thing. This would now suffice for me, because at n. 136 I proposed to prove nothing more than that between created essence and existence a mere distinction of reasoning reason — drawn precisely from the part of the mode of conceiving — does not suffice.

But I now prove that neither does a distinction of reasoned reason suffice, as it is explained by the moderns; but that they are distinguished formally from the nature of the thing, such that no work of the intellect need be awaited to actually distinguish them. To prove this, the method and procedure which we handed down in *disp. I. Log., q. 5, art. 2* for discovering the formal distinction from the nature of the thing — the actual mean between a real distinction simply speaking and a distinction of reason — must be recalled. We said it is a contradiction that is the indication: for contradiction infers distinction, since it is self-contradictory

for contradictories to be verified of the same thing according to the same respect; and it infers such a distinction as the contradiction itself is. If the contradiction is one of reason, it infers a distinction only according to different being of reason — as when of Peter posited on the part of the subject in an identical proposition we affirm that he is the subject, and of the same we deny that he is the subject as it stands on the part of the predicate. If the contradiction is according to real being, it infers a real distinction — as when we say that Peter is, and Antichrist is not; such a contradiction infers a real distinction between those extremes. And finally, if the contradiction is according to formal being, it infers a formal distinction — or a distinction in formalities of the same thing — because many propositions are true in the real and identical sense that do not hold in the formal sense: as in divine things the proposition "paternity is communicable" is true in the identical sense, insofar as it is the same thing as the essence which is communicable; but it is false in the formal sense, which expresses the precise character of the thing which is primarily and per se signified — and through paternity in divine things what is primarily imported is an incommunicable reality. We further said there that a contradiction according to formal being and from the nature of the thing infers a distinction from the nature of the thing exactly as it is verified on the part of the thing: if it is verified formally and actually from the part of the thing, and not merely virtually or fundamentally, it infers an actual distinction from the nature of the thing according to formal being between the things of which it is verified, short of any work of the intellect; as when we say that man actually agrees with donkey on the part of the thing through animality, and actually disagrees through rationality. Because this contradiction is verified actually on the part of the thing, it infers in the same way an actual distinction from the nature of the thing according to diverse formalities between animality and rationality; but if the contradiction were verified only fundamentally, then only a fundamental and virtual distinction could be inferred from it, which then becomes actual with the accession of the work of the intellect — from which it then takes the name of a distinction of reasoned reason.

With this doctrine handed down there, I now show that the distinction which obtains between essence and created existence is not of reasoned reason or virtual, but is formal and actual from the nature of the thing. Of essence and created existence, contradictories are verified actually on the part of the thing, no intellect thinking of it — except insofar as it announces a contradiction found on the part of the thing between them. Therefore such contradiction infers between them an actual distinction from the nature of the thing; and since this distinction cannot be a real distinction from the nature of the thing, as was proved in art. 1, it remains that it is a formal distinction from the nature of the thing. Furthermore, the contradiction is not verified according to diverse real being — as will be proved presently — but only according to diverse formal being; therefore it can induce between essence and existence only a formal distinction.

The first assumption is proved: because from 7. *Met.* 53 essence is the quiddity of a thing; existence is neither quiddity nor of the quiddity of a thing; essence can be placed in a category, existence by no means; in essence are founded necessary propositions, in existence contingent ones. And these contradictories are verified on the part of the thing about essence and existence, not through the work of the intellect; for the intellect does not by its operation paint those attributes upon them or fabricate them in them, but discovers those diverse characters on the part of the thing in essence and existence — and with no intellect operating it is true to say that humanity is the science of man, whereas existence is not of his quiddity. Since therefore this contradiction is actual on the part of the thing, the distinction upon which it is founded will not be only of reasoned reason, but actual from the nature of the thing and preceding the work of the intellect.

You will say that those predicates are verified only of essence taken nakedly and as precisioned from existence — in which way it does not exist on the part of the thing but only has objective being — and therefore it is false that those contradictories are verified on the part of the thing.

Against this: although on the part of the thing essence is not found as precisely really separated from existence — that is, separated from it — but always conjoined with it and really identified with it, it is nonetheless found as formally precisioned, insofar as it has on the part of the thing its own quidditative concept which existence does not enter. Just as on the part of the thing there is not given humanity precisely really from risibility — in fact, risibility is not found included in the essence of man or in his quidditative concept — so those predicates are verified of essence on the part of the thing, and not merely as it stands under our objective concepts; and they are verified of existing essence, though not under the reduplication of existing. In the same way, in the following disputation we will say that many contradictories are verified of nature and individuality — by reason of which we will conclude a formal distinction from the nature of the thing between them — although on the part of the thing common nature is not given as really precisioned from individuality; it is nonetheless formally precisioned, insofar as in its quidditative concept individuality does not enter. And such objective precision is not made by the intellect because the intellect does not fabricate or forge in nature those predicates by which it is set apart from individuality, but discovers them included in the essence and quiddity of nature short of any of its operation. So likewise in the present case it must be said that on the part of the thing essence is formally precisioned from existence — insofar as the latter does not enter its quidditative concept — and that predicates are verified of it that are not verified of existence; and therefore between them, from such a condition found in the thing, there must likewise be concluded some distinction short of the work of the intellect, which is less than real and greater than a distinction of reason.

But it is nonetheless true that this distinction is the smallest among all distinctions from the nature of the thing, since it is not a formal distinction from the nature of the thing absolutely speaking, but a formal distinction with existence as a mode of essence — which is a diminishing condition. For as our Formalists teach, and as we explained in *disp. 2, n. 150*, an intrinsic mode properly cannot be called a formality; since a formality among the Formalists signifies an objective character adequately conceivable from itself without another, whereas an intrinsic mode cannot in any way be quidditatively conceived without the thing of which it is a mode — since it expresses a transcendental order to it — and therefore by its very nature it demands to be conceived with the thing of which it is a mode. Therefore, just as the distinction of a thing and its intrinsic physical mode is called a real distinction, though imperfect by reason of the one extreme that falls short of the character of a thing, so in the present case the distinction of a thing and its intrinsic metaphysical mode is indeed a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, though imperfect by reason of the other extreme that falls short of the character of a true formality. Hence, to indicate that it is the smallest of all distinctions from the nature of the thing, the distinction of a thing and a mode is not called absolutely formal, but formally modal — a diminishing determination; which is also why some are accustomed to call it a negative formal distinction. Since therefore in the present case the character of existence is not the character that quidditifies essence — for it is not involved in its quidditative concept — but only modifying it, because essence is complete in its quiddity prior to existence and only borrows from it the modification of its actuality, the distinction of essence and existence is therefore called formally modal.

From this it is clear that the arguments made above against the Thomists in art. 2 cannot be turned back against the Scotists, because all those arguments directly proceed against a real distinction or a modal distinction in the sense of the moderns — as will be clear to anyone who goes through them individually — but not against our modal distinction, which is the smallest among all distinctions from the nature of the thing. And in particular the last argument about the infinite regress placed at n. 119, which the moderns especially turn against us, does not well retort against formalities; because just as an infinite regress in things would follow if essence were really distinguished from existence, so an infinite regress in formalities would follow if they were posited as formally distinguished — since the formality of existence itself can be and not be. Hence another pair of formalities, one called essence and the other existence, would have to be doubled in it, and so on to infinity, as was argued above at n. 135. This argument, I say, is not well turned back against formalities; because as we said at n. 120, that argument against the Thomists does not conclude absolutely, but *ad hominem* — from the supposition, namely, that essence and existence are really distinct. Given that supposition, indeed, existence will also have its own objective possibility distinct from the objective possibility of essence; and to each will properly and distinctly correspond an actuality by which their possibilities are placed in being.

Thus to possible existence will correspond another actual existence, in infinite regress. But given the real identity of existence with essence, as we said there, the argument does not conclude, because possible existence will be non-repugnant through the sole possibility and non-repugnance of essence of which it is posited as mode. Just as too when existence is produced, it is not produced by another production, but is placed in being by the very same action by which the essence is placed in being — which action is identified with it. In the same way we speak of a passion in relation to the subject with which it is identified: it does not have its own objective possibility except that it can be produced externally by its own production; but this is proper to things, not to formalities — which are not produced per se and primarily, but receive being only concomitantly through the production of the thing with which they are identified. On this see again n. 150.

The turned-back argument at n. 135 also always supposes as false that existence is formally and positively distinguished from essence and adequately, and has its own formality distinct from the formality of essence — which is shown to be false from what has been said, because the mode of a thing — such as existence with respect to essence — does not have a distinct formality from the thing of which it is a mode.

But Arriaga still presses — and this is the first argument made against the Thomists at n. 93 — that actual essence, however much objectively precisioned from existence, by the very fact that it is conceived as actual, is conceived as existing, because to be actual is formally to be existing. Therefore neither existence can be objectively precisioned from essence, nor essence from existence. The reason a priori is — says Arriaga — that possible essence also expresses possible existence, and actual essence expresses actual existence; hence on the part of actual essence, in the mode in which it is conceived, possible existence must correspond if possible essence is conceived; or actual existence in act, if actual essence is conceived. Therefore one cannot objectively correspond without the other.

To this it is replied: when we say that essence and existence are modally distinguished from each other from the nature of the thing, this should not be understood of actual essence — since actual essence has all its actuality from existence — and we freely admit that existence is not distinguished from actual essence from the nature of the thing; indeed, that it can be said to belong to its quiddity in this sense, just as whiteness in this sense would be said to belong to the essence of the white wall, as such. For actual essence, as such taken reduplicatively, involves in its concept both the quiddity of its predicates and their existence outside causes. When therefore we say that essence prescindible from existence from the nature of the thing, this should not be understood of actual essence, but of essence taken precisely in itself according to its quidditative predicates; or if it is understood also of actual essence, it should not be taken under its actuality reduplicatively, but only specifically.

You will say that essence precisioned from existence no longer exists on the part of the thing, and therefore cannot in such a state of precision be said to be distinguished from existence from the nature of the thing. This assumption was already denied at n. 130, because the formal precision of essence from existence does not prevent it from still being said to be existing on the part of the thing by reason of its real identity with existence. This is clearly illustrated by an example: when we precision humanity, for instance, from risibility, considering it precisely according to its quidditative predicates, it is not valid to say that humanity is then not risible, because then it would be a divisive abstraction and not merely a precise one; it is only valid to say that humanity is not understood as risible. So likewise in the present case, when the intellect precisionshumanity from existence, it is not valid to say that at that point essence does not exist on the part of the thing, but only that it is not then understood as existing. And although essence is then not presented to the intellect as existing reduplicatively, it is nonetheless presented as existing specifically.

You will say: if such objective precision is made through the intellect, then it will be actual on the part of the thing. The precision of essence from existence is denied to be properly made through the intellect, because on the part of the thing essence excludes existence from its quidditative concept — which is to be formally precisioned from it on the part of the thing; hence such precision is not fabricated or constructed by the intellect, but is found by it already made on the part of the thing, since on the part of the thing the intellect discovers existence to be excluded from the quiddity of essence short of any of its operation. Nor does the reason Arriaga adds — as a priori showing the impossibility of such precision — show that impossibility; but it only proves that existence cannot be precisioned from essence, because a mode does not have its own distinct conceivability such that it could be conceived without the thing of which it is the mode. However, it does not prove conversely that essence cannot be precisioned from existence; or if it also proves this, it certainly proves it only of a completely perfect and adequate precision, insofar as if we want to conceive a thing completely perfectly and adequately, it does not suffice to conceive it with all its essential predicates but it must also be conceived with its intrinsic mode and the degree of perfection due to it, from what was said in *disp. 2, n. 148*.

But still, for greater elucidation of the difficulty, a mode of distinguishing existence in some way also from actual essence can be assigned: namely, that they are distinguished by the fact that actual essence says primarily and per se the quidditative character of the thing and connotes existence; while existence on the contrary primarily says the actuality of being and connotatively the quiddity of the existing thing. For given that the formal character of essence and the formal character of existence are different, when we say "actual essence" we involve both characters in such a way that, by its mode of signifying, the character of essence is imported more primarily, and the character of existence as it were connotatively; and the same, preserving proportion, must be said of possible

essence and possible existence — for as has been often said, just as actual existence corresponds to actual essence as its intrinsic mode, so possible existence corresponds to possible essence.

Furthermore, Pasqualig in *disp. cit.* 82, *sec.* 4, argues by turning back the argument made above at n. 104 against the Thomists: if essence short of the work of the intellect is distinguished from existence, it must certainly be taken according to what it is on the part of the thing, not as it is in the intellect — otherwise it could not found such a distinction from the nature of the thing. But by the very fact that it is taken according to what it is on the part of the thing, it is taken with existence; therefore it is self-contradictory for essence to be distinguished from existence from the nature of the thing. Confirmation: because essence cannot formally be distinguished from existence without excluding it from its formal concept; but essence with existence excluded is nothing on the part of the thing; therefore it cannot thus be distinguished from it.

To this it is replied: that argument made against the Thomists at n. 104 is ineptly turned back against us, since its force was drawn from the nature of real distinction — which, being a real relation and bearing between thing and thing, presupposes extremes with distinct existences, as was deduced there. But that reasoning has no application here, because a formal distinction does not import a positive real relation, as was said in *disp.* 1. *log.*, *q.* 5, *art.* 2, nor does it bear between thing and thing, but between formality and formality — which do not have distinct existences but both exist through the same existence, namely that of the thing with which they are really identified. Thus, to the argument: granting the major, I say to the minor that by the very fact that essence is taken according to what it is on the part of the thing, it is taken with existence through the real identity it has with it — but not through formal identity. Because taken with existence, this is still true to say: that existence is not of its quidditative concept. Therefore the consequence is denied.

To the confirmation: the reply is the same way: granting the major, the minor is distinguished. For if understood of a real exclusion, it is true that with existence excluded nothing of essence remains on the part of the thing; but this is false if understood of a merely formal exclusion, because such formal exclusion of existence from the concept of essence is consistent with the real identity and inclusion, which suffices for essence to be said to be on the part of the thing. The reason a priori of this solution is that essence is not considered to be existing by reason of its formal identity with existence, but by reason of its real identity; and therefore as long as that remains, however much essence is formally precisioned from existence, it is still said to be on the part of the thing, because such formal precision does not prejudice real identity.

It can also be said that when we assert that essence is modally distinguished from the nature of the thing from existence, essence is taken according to what it is on the part of the thing — not indeed reduplicatively, but specifically — so that

the sense is that existing essence, that is, the essence which exists, is formally distinguished from existence through which it exists; in which there is no self-contradiction. It would only be self-contradictory if it were asserted that existing essence taken reduplicatively is distinguished from existence.

Here you should note that Trombeta in 5. *Met.*, q. 6 proves the distinction from the nature of the thing of essence from existence by two arguments. The first is: those things are not entirely the same, one of which is indifferent to the other and to its opposite short of any work of the intellect; but essence is indifferent to existing and not existing; therefore, and so on. The other is that objective potency is repugnant to existence really, but not to essence; therefore they are distinguished from the nature of the thing. Neither argument concludes: for this is the motive of the Thomists — already resolved at n. 119 — by which they could conclude a real distinction; and Trombeta himself there, in turning back this argument of the Thomists, concedes that even existence itself is indifferent, as it can actually exist and not exist. Neither is pleasing a certain distinction of Faber in 9. *Met.*, *disp.* 2, *cap.* 1, at the end, that through the being of essence things are outside nothing really, and through the being of existence formally outside nothing. This is entirely false, since by existence all understand that actuality by which a thing is outside nothing; hence another actuality would be necessary — as was argued above against the Thomists who admitted essence as outside causes in some way prior to the actuality of existence.

Question III: Where Various Questions About Essence and Existence Are Resolved from What Has Been Said

First Question: Whether in Created Things Some Composition Is Made from Essence and Existence

The question is raised in order to discern what composition from essence and existence is made, of which kind the Thomists — really distinguishing essence from existence and considering the former as true receptive potency and the latter as true act received in it — consequently think results from their union a true and real composition, which some hold to be a composition with these as Cajetan taught in *de ente et essentia*, *cap.* 5, q. 11, *ad* 10, and others further concede it to be a composition from these, as Blasius of the Conception in *disp.* 8. *Met.*, q. 3, § 3 and Cabrer in 3. *par.*, q. 2, *art.* 4, *dub.* 6. This opinion is sufficiently attacked by what has preceded, where it was determined that essence is not really distinct from existence, nor is it a truly and properly receptive potency of existence in the strict sense the Thomists contend — and therefore in the present case needs no further refutation.

The moderns on the other hand, acknowledging no difference whatsoever between essence and existence save in the mode of conceiving, not only deny that they form a real composition, but further deny that they form even a composition of reason — for although they can be distinguished through reason and compared

with each other after the manner of potency and act through reason, such a distinction and comparison does not even suffice for a composition of reason, since it is not a distinction as of two characters on the part of the object conceived as joining and constituting the thing, but only a distinction in the mode of conceiving, while the very same entity is either simply conceived or affirmed as actually being. So Aversa reasons in *q. 8* cited, *sec. 10*. But neither is this manner of speaking to be admitted, because we have demonstrated that some difference must also be attended to on the part of the object between essence and existence; nor so great an identity to be found between them in creatures as in God. From which it is deduced that they can make some composition in creatures that is not found in God. Suarez finally mediates between these opinions in some way, saying in *disp. 31. Met., sec. 13, n. 7 and 8* that essence and existence in created things form a composition of reason with a foundation in the thing, which he calls an analogical composition, because it is not real but is conceived with a likeness to what is real.

For the resolution of the question it must be said that essence can be compared to existence in two ways: either insofar as it is still in objective potency, or insofar as it is already actually in the nature of things. If they are compared to each other in the first way, no real composition intervenes between them — as if essence were a truly receptive potency of existence as of its proper act. So the Doctor teaches in *1. d. 36, q. un.*, below B, and proves against Henry: because nothing seems to be there that would compose with something else; for if the whole whiteness pre-exists in potency as the terminus of potency, and afterwards the very same becomes in act, there is not for this reason any composition of thing and thing — since that very thing numerically which was in objective potency is afterwards in entitative act; and the same thing does not compose with itself. Furthermore, objective potency and the entitative act corresponding to it — which is called existence — are impossible, and one excludes the other. Therefore they cannot in any way make a composition, even through reason, because with a foundation in the thing they cannot be thought of as remaining simultaneously — for objective potency is entirely different from subjective potency, and therefore cannot be conceived after the manner of receptive potency with respect to existence. Alensis expressly handed down the same doctrine in *7. Met., q. ult.*, in *tex. 22*, as I said at n. 89, and cited his words at n. 70. For he there asks what distinction exists between essence and existence, and how the former is said to be in potency to the latter; and the question is resolved by saying that essence is said to be in potency to existence insofar as the whole nature of the thing was first all under potential nature, and the whole is afterwards in act — not that we imagine the whole thing to have preceded and been under potential nature and then to receive an act, but that the whole thing which preceded and was under potential nature is now wholly under act. Hence he finally concludes that one must not imagine that essence receives existence as some thing diverse from it, but rather that from the fact that the very same reality which first fell

under the concept of being made becomes the terminus of the same action and its object. Since therefore essence in the state of possibility is said only to be in objective potency to existence, and not in subjective and receptive potency, it is false that any true and real composition is made from them, as the Thomists contend.

You will object that it is the Doctor's assertion in *1. d. 8, q. 2* that every creature is composed of act and objective potency, insofar as it now has entitative act through which it is a being and something, and is in objective potency with respect to that possible perfection of which it is capable, insofar as it is a being. To this Meurisse replies in *lib. 1. suae Met., q. 23* that the Doctor does not thereby contradict himself, because when he denies composition to be made from essence in objective potency and existence, he denies this as if both were positive and one in receptive potency with respect to the other, as Henry and the Thomists held; and when he afterwards teaches that every creature is composed of objective potency and entitative act, he does not mean both to be positive, but expressly teaches that one is positive and the other privative. But this reply — though also suggested by Lichet — does not hold, because entitative act and objective potency are impossible — as the Doctor repeatedly notes, especially in *2. disp. 12, q. 1* — therefore they cannot make a composition not only as from positive and positive, but not even as from positive and privative; and therefore it must be said that composition is never made from entitative act and the objective potency corresponding to that act — because they are impossible in this way — but from act and the objective potency of that degree of entity which the creature lacks, either by reason of itself or at least in the character of being as such; because in this way entitative act and objective potency can coexist; and in this sense the Doctor is to be understood when in *1. d. 8, q. 2* he says that every creature is presupposed from this act and potency, as is clear from his express words.

But if existence is compared to essence already actual and actually posited in the nature of things, in this sense some composition is made from them — at least a modal one, which is the smallest among all compositions from the nature of the thing. This some accordingly call a composition of reason with a foundation in the thing; others call it a quasi-composition, because this composition is imperfect, since the composing elements are not adequately contradistinct — for although created quiddity can in some way be conceived without being or existence, nonetheless existence cannot be conceived without quiddity.

This composition can first be clarified from the general character of a mode and a thing: in every thing modified by some intrinsic mode, two things can be set apart in some way from the nature of the thing — namely, the mode itself and the thing modified by the mode. These, although on the part of the thing they are not two entities but one and the same thing otherwise or otherwise disposed, nonetheless the thing itself as modified and the formal character by which it is modified are two objective concepts — though inadequately distinct — of which

one has the character of quasi-potency and subject as affected, and the other the character of an effecting act. Therefore a thing and a mode in created things make some composition, because between them there intervenes some distinction and some comparison of act and potency — which two things suffice for the character of a composition. This can also be clarified from the special character of essence and existence: because essence has its own proper quiddity, which by means of existence can be on the part of the thing; and existence also has its peculiar quiddity — consisting in this: that it is a certain formal character that makes the thing in act. From these two quiddities one integral thing arises, which either actually exists on the part of the thing if these quiddities are actual, or at least can exist if they are only in the power of causes. Therefore, conjoined to each other, they make some composition from the nature of the thing — especially when they are taken as they are on the part of the thing. The consequence is proved: because these characters are so distinguished on the part of the thing that one adds something to the other — not indeed something really distinct but something formally distinct; since existence superadds to essence the character by which it can be in act, and one stands as act and the other as potency, because essence is subjected to existence by virtue of which it is formally said to exist — as through a form to which the whole being of the thing is subjected. Finally, existing essence seems to import more than essence alone simply so called; therefore the concept of essence as such is simpler than the concept of the same essence as existing; and therefore essence together with existence makes some composition.

In this manner therefore there must be admitted in every creature a composition from being and essence — which is a composition in some way from the nature of the thing, or if it is called of reason, it nonetheless has a real foundation in the creature itself — and it is a finite and limited perfection of the same, since from the very fact that it is of limited perfection it does not have the necessity of being, but can be and not be; and for this reason the character of existence is conceived as befalling essence. In God however such a composition cannot be admitted, because in him there is no foundation for conceiving the character of existence as befalling essence and as being outside its formal character; for God is not indifferent to being or not being, since he necessarily exists, and therefore his essence cannot be conceived as a subject that is determined by existence as by a form.

But Arriaga in *cit.*, *disp. 2. Met.*, *n. 71* attacks this way of explaining the composition from essence and existence — as if the intellect, because essence is indifferent to existing and not existing, apprehends it in the manner of a subject, and apprehends existence itself in the manner of an act. For existence itself too, under the concept of existence, is apprehended as indifferent to existing and not existing; therefore the intellect ought to apprehend it also in the manner of a subject, and so to infinity. This objection, for Aversa, would be of no moment, for he teaches in that section 8 that when essence is conceived as actual, it is already

conceived as existence; and conversely, when existence is conceived as potential and not exercised in act, it is conceived as essence; hence he would deny that existence is apprehended under the concept of existence as indifferent to existing and not existing — for in that case it is conceived under the character of essence. But I do not know with what consistency he says this, for above in *sec. 6*, in the eighth argument against the Thomists, he proves that existence under the concept of existence is indifferent to existing and not existing, and is contingent and variable as to whether it is or not, and that existence can be and not be in act no less than essence.

The answer rather should be given, from what was said at n. 142, that although in the opinion that really distinguishes existence from essence, it must be admitted that existence taken by itself is indifferent to existing and not existing — since to each thing its own proper existence and proper objective potency corresponds, from which it is extracted by existence — in our view, which really identifies existence with essence, this must not be admitted. Rather it must be said that existence is constituted as possible and non-repugnant through the very possibility of essence, to which in both the state of possibility and actuality existence always corresponds, preserving proportion, as an intrinsic mode really identified with it, from what was said at n. 127. Hence, just as in the direct sense existence is not said to exist, but to be that by which essence formally exists, so neither can possible existence be said in the direct sense to be able to be and not be, but to be that by which essence can be and not be.

The Thomists argue that the composition from being and essence must be real, lest a creature seem to equal the simplicity of God. But the solution is clear from what was said above at n. 123, where we said that there are other compositions in a creature by reason of which it can never equal the simplicity of God — as the Doctor notes in *1. disp. 8, q. 2* — and that by this very quasi-composition the creature can be distinguished from God, insofar as existence in creatures is not so supremely identified with essence as in God, because there it is its quidditative predicate, whereas here it is only an intrinsic mode capable of making some composition with the modified thing.

Others argue to the contrary that no composition from them is possible — neither real nor of reason — because the composing members exclude each other; but essence and existence do not exclude each other, since with existence excluded nothing of essence remains. But the solution to this is also clear from what was said at n. 145: they make a composition in the way in which they exclude each other. Although they do not exclude each other really — since essence without existence would leave nothing remaining — they nevertheless exclude each other formally, insofar as existence is excluded from the formal concept of essence; and in this way it makes with essence some composition from the nature of the thing, at least a modal one.

Second Question: Which Is More Perfect, Essence or Existence?

This comparison, though it cannot be made in the position that distinguishes them in no way, can nonetheless have a place in the opinion that distinguishes them really or at least in some way from the nature of the thing or through reason with a foundation in the thing. That existence is simply and absolutely more perfect than essence, the Thomists commonly maintain: Bannes in *1. p., q. 3, art. 4, dub. 3*, Navarrette in *controv. 14, §§ 7, 8, 9*, Ledesm in *de perfectionibus divinis, q. 12*, Blasius of the Conception in *disp. 6. Met., q. 4*, Manca in *1. Phys., q. 5, dub. 4*. The opposite is more reasonably maintained by the Scotists: Trombeta in *5. Met., q. 6*, Mairon in *1. d. 42, q. 5*, Meurisse in *lib. 1. Met., q. 24*; and some from among the Thomists follow this, such as Soncinas in *4. Met., q. 13* and Ferrariensis in *3. contra gentes, c. 28*.

It is proved: because the perfection or imperfection of things — their nobility and ignoble quality — is measured according to essence, not according to existence. Therefore essence is nobler than existence. The consequence is clear, and the assumption is proved: for man is more perfect than donkey because he has a nobler essential difference than the donkey's difference — not because he has a more perfect existence, since a donkey is just as much outside its causes as a man after their production. Confirmation: for this reason we said that existing man is more perfect than existing donkey — because man according to his essence is more perfect than a donkey, also according to its essence; but this would not be said if existence were more perfect than essence.

The reason a priori of this conclusion seems to be that through essence the various degrees of beings are constituted, and not through existence; for existence only provides that by its benefit things are said actually to be on the part of the thing; but in thus being on the part of the thing there is no degree — for substance does not more fully exist on the part of the thing than accident does, though one exists in a nobler mode than the other, since substance exists per se and in itself, while accident exists in another. This implies not a nobler existence but a nobler mode of existing, since substance exists in the nature of things by subsisting, and an accident by inhering. Therefore the perfection of things is not measured according to existence, but according to their essence.

Finally, even if the Thomists were to show that the perfection of things is also measured according to existence — and this were conceded to them — they would not thereby have their intention, since it would not yet be proved that the perfection of things is to be more measured according to existence than according to essence, as we assert. Hence it follows afterwards that the essences of things are directly placed in categories, but not their existences; and that the former are objects of sciences, not the latter; and that the former found necessary and eternal truths, not the latter — all of which plainly indicate that essence excels existence in perfection by an entire genus.

The Thomists reply — and Bannes chiefly — by denying the assumption: because it cannot be entirely denied that the existence of substance, for example, is more perfect than the existence of an accident; and therefore it is principally according to existence that things are measured in perfection. And although they are also customarily measured according to essence — as the proof of the assumption suggests — this is nonetheless done dependently upon existence, because no perfection belongs to man, even as rational animal, unless an intrinsic order to being is understood, as potency to act. Hence they say that essence would import no perfection if it did not have existence through which it would be.

Against this: if the existence of substance, for example, is said to be more perfect than the existence of an accident, this is not except by reason of the intrinsic order which existence imports to essence — as a mode to the thing; for every mode must be proportioned to the modified thing. Therefore from this the opposite is rather gathered — namely, that essence is more perfect than existence, since the greater or lesser perfection of existence is derived from the greater or lesser perfection of the essence which it affects. Furthermore, although existence places essence in act and is the ground why each thing participates in its own essential perfection, it is nonetheless not formally the very perfection itself — just as the approximation of a body to fire is the ground why it is heated, but that approximation is not itself the heating or the heat. Therefore it is false that things are measured in perfection dependently upon existence, as if it were the measure and standard of their perfection, though it is the ground why things actually participate in such perfection.

Moreover, existence makes things only to be in act in the nature of things as such; but the character of essence makes being in this or that act — for example, of substance, living thing, rational, and so on. But a determinate act is nobler and more perfect than act as such. Therefore, and so on.

Finally, the proposed argument presses, and the given reply has no place, if the formal and objective character of both essence and existence is taken prescinding from actuality, so that existence is taken not in the exercise of existing, but in the formal act — as what can exercise such a function. Certainly in this way, taken and compared to each other, they have their distinct formal characters, and each obtains its peculiar perfection. Nor can it be said that essence obtains it dependently upon existence, since we speak of essence in objective being and as precisioned from actuality.

Furthermore, principally: essence is the first substantial principle of operations; it is the root of passions and properties that follow the thing; therefore it is nobler and more perfect than existence. The consequence is clear; the assumption is proved: for example, the essence of an Angel is intellectual, volitional, capable of divine vision; humanity is rational, discursive, and so on. This existence does not have, which is only a condition for essence to perform these operations. The Thomists reply by denying the consequence, because operations as much as

properties do not belong to essence except through existence, since no operation or property belongs to non-existing essence. But this — as I said — proves only that existence is a condition for operating, just as approximation is a condition for acting upon a patient; which in it argues no greater perfection. Otherwise we could equally deduce that the application of an agent to a patient is nobler and more perfect than the nature itself that operates, because it cannot operate without such application.

Finally, the argument is made from Trombeta: it is certain that man as such exceeds a donkey in perfection more than man in act exceeds man in potency; but so it is that man exceeds a donkey through essence, and man in act exceeds man in potency through existence. Therefore essence is something more perfect than existence. The minor is clear. The major is proved: because man in potency and man in act are of the same species, since they have the same definition; but man and donkey are of different species. But those that are of different species have a greater dissimilarity in perfection and in equality than those of the same species.

Manca and Blasius of the Conception reply that between existing man and non-existing man there is an infinite distance — as between nothing and something — which is not the case between man and donkey; and therefore they deny the major. To the proof of the major they say that existing man and non-existing man are of the same species and essence only negatively and by reason of some non-repugnance, not positively.

Against this: First, it is false that between nothing and something there is an infinite distance absolutely speaking, as the Doctor teaches in *4. d. 1, q. 1*. Second, it is false that possible man is utterly nothing; for although he is nothing actual, he is nonetheless something possible and a real being nominally, from n. 46. Third, it is false that possible man and existing man are of the same species and essence only negatively, because we form the very same essential concept of existing and non-existing man, from nn. 32 and 48. Finally, of existing and non-existing man we can form the same propositions and show the same specific passions; but not of man and donkey. Therefore it is evident of itself that there is less distance between existing and non-existing man than between a donkey and man; and the reason is that this greater or lesser distance is not founded in existence or non-existence, but in the community and identity of essential predicates.

The Thomists object, first: act is in an entire genus nobler than the potency it actuates; but existence is the act of essence, since through existence essence is placed in act; therefore it is nobler and more perfect. And the common reply does not hold — that not every act is simply more perfect than the actuable potency, but only in a qualified sense, as is clear from accidents with respect to substance, which they perfect — this does not hold, says Blasius of the Conception, because accidents are compared to their subject not only as their receptive potency but

also as final and for the most part efficient or flowing cause; whereas existence is compared to essence only as act to its potency. And therefore although the subject is simply more perfect than accidents, this does not obstruct that existence is more perfect than essence; to which is added that the subject is compared to accidents only as its secondary acts, whereas existence is the act to which essence is primarily ordered.

Confirmation: because existence is the actuality of all things and realities that are in a creature; therefore it is the most perfect and excellent of all. Hence also in God the most perfect character of all, which we understand in him, is that he is subsisting being itself. Finally, actuality is the root of perfection, and the more actual something is, the more perfect it also is; but being is supremely actual; therefore supremely perfect. The minor is proved: because all things in relation to being are as potency, all are reduced through it to act, and finally existence is such an act that within the genus of the essence it terminates and actuates, it is not further receptive of another act by which it would be perfected — since it is the ultimate terminus in which the essence of a thing ultimately rests.

To the first: it is replied as there, and the comparison with the disparity of accidents in relation to the subject and existence in relation to essence does not hold. For although certain accidents connaturally related to the subject do stand in relation to it in such a way that they flow and stream from it in the genus of efficient causality — as is clear of coldness in warm water restoring itself to its former cold state — in other merely common and adventitious accidents this is not verified: for whiteness, for example, regards a surface as its purely passive potency, and is produced in it by an extrinsic agent. And when the example of accidents in relation to the subject for showing that greater statement not to be simply true does not please — an example of union, subsistence, and certain other substantial modes may be brought: these actuate and modify things and yet are simply more imperfect than they, as is clear of subsistence, which within the same genus of substance is the act of angelic nature and is far more imperfect than it; and similarly the substantial union with respect to matter and form, which is produced by an extrinsic agent between them.

To the confirmation: although existence makes essence in act and is the ground why each thing participates in its own essential perfection, from this it is not rightly deduced that it surpasses all these in perfection. Otherwise, by the same reasoning, we could assert that the productive action of an Angel is more perfect than the angelic substance itself — because through it the Angel is actuated and placed outside its causes. Nor is the same reasoning for the existence of God and of a creature, because existence in God does not make it to be in act, but makes it to be what it is and is of its essence — which does not happen in a creature.

To the last: the minor is denied. Otherwise existence would be the purest act, just as God. From the proof: it is clear from what was just said that existence is said to be the act of all realities only insofar as by its benefit they are formally said to be

placed outside their causes and reduced from objective potency to existential act; from which, however, it does not follow that it is the formal perfection of all those realities. It is also clear from what was said at n. 72 that it is called the ultimate act only with respect to all essential predicates — not however because it is not receptive of a further act absolutely speaking, since existence together with essence in the genus of substance adequately constitutes the receptive potency of accidents, since the very existing substance is the subject of accidents. Hence since existence no less than essence in the genus of substance is susceptible of accidents, it does not appear how from this existence is more actual than essence.

Furthermore, it is argued that Dionysius in *de divin. nomin. c. 5* asserts that among all the perfections we have received from God, being is something greater; and Aristotle in 8. *Ethic. c. 11* says that the greatest benefit conferred upon us by God is that we are. Second: what has the character of end in the production of an effect must be what is most perfect in the effect; but being is the terminus and end of the action by which an effect is produced. Third: in essentially ordered things of the same genus, the later is always more perfect; since therefore existence is in the same genus as essence and is posterior, it will also be more perfect. Fourth: that which formally gives to another what it is to be outside nothing, is nobler than it; but existence gives to essence formally what it is to be outside nothing. Fifth: that to which it is not repugnant not to exist is more perfect than that to which this is not repugnant; but to existence it is repugnant not to exist — since by force of the name it signifies the exercise of existing — but it is not repugnant to essence; therefore, and so on. Sixth: the first actuality of a thing is nobler than it; hence by this it is proved that substantial form is more perfect than matter; but being is the first actuality of essence, since essence before it is has no actuality. Finally, Cajetan gives a rule in *cap. sexto, de Ente et Essentia*, for recognizing which predicate is more perfect in created things, and says that among quidditative predicates, that is more perfect and actual which more approaches being, and that is more potential and consequently more imperfect which is more distant from being. He gives the example: Peter as substance is most distant from his existence — for to exist it does not suffice that he be substance; he must also be body — and as body he approaches being more, and still more as living, and more still as animal. Therefore the perfection of beings is measured according to existence.

To these and similar authorities it is replied that they are to be understood of being insofar as it involves both essence and existence together, and that it is compared to other perfections and benefits that subsequently supervene accidentally. To the second: the reply is similar — for not existence alone is the terminus of the agent's action, but being insofar as it involves essence and existence. To the third: it is true of the assumption with respect to quidditatively subordinated perfections — as the specific difference is last and nobler — but it is not true with respect to intrinsic modes, since the ultimate difference is nobler than the haecceity itself. So Mairon in the passage cited. To the fourth: the major is denied absolutely, otherwise the productive action of an Angel — because it

places it outside nothing in its genus — would be more perfect than angelic substance itself; which no one concedes. Only this much can be conceded: that existence is more perfect from this standpoint than essence — which is to be more perfect in a qualified sense. To the fifth: the minor is denied, because in the position especially that really distinguishes existence from essence, existence no less than essence itself must be posited as indifferent to being and not being; for before the production of a rose, just as the essence of the rose was not in the nature of things, so neither was existence. This is the solution offered by Soncinas in the passage cited, at the second argument — though in the immediately preceding question he had stubbornly denied it in the body of the question. But how in our view existence can be said to be possible and non-repugnant was said at nn. 142 and 150. To the sixth: it has been said repeatedly that existence is the first actuality of essence — not because it actuates and informs it like form does matter, but because it is that by which essence is formally said to be actually placed in the nature of things; which does not entail that it is more perfect simply than essence, as I instanced in the productive action of an Angel. To the last: that rule of Cajetan is false, because all quidditative predicates as such abstract from being, just as the entire predicamental series does; and if that rule were valid, then being this man would be more perfect than all predicates, since it comes closest to being — even though it is certain that haecceity states no quidditative perfection. The rule therefore for recognizing more perfect predicates in the predicamental series, and why inferiors are more perfect than superiors and less common ones, is that they include the whole perfection of the superiors and add another which they superadd to them; and so it is clear that the perfection of species is measured from the more or less perfect specific difference, not from existence.

Third Question: What Is the Proximate Effective Cause of Existence?

Some among the Thomists say that God alone is the effective cause of being itself, in no way a creature — or at most only an instrumental one: so Bannes in *part. 1, q. 43, dub. 4*, Fland. in *Metaphysicorum, q. 3, art. 6*, Blasius of the Conception in *disp. 7. Metaphys., q. 2* — though he also judges the opposite to be probable in the School of St. Thomas.

It must nonetheless be deduced that secondary causes also truly and properly cause the existence of their effects as principal causes — not only God. So Scotus in *4. d. 1, q. 1* and this is common outside the School of St. Thomas; indeed, quite a number defend that this was also the mind of St. Thomas himself, especially the two most eminent figures of that school — Cajetan in *p. 1, q. 45, art. 5* and Ferrariensis in *2. contra gentes, cap. 21* — and recently Manca in *1. Phys., q. 5, dub. 7*, who cites Ledesm. And this is manifestly deduced from our principles already posited: for if essence and existence are entirely the same really, it must consequently be said that existence has exactly the same causes as essence; and therefore if a secondary cause truly and properly produces the essence of its effect

— as a horse produces the essence of a horse — it must also be confessed that in the same way it causes the existence. Although this alone would suffice for the proof of this conclusion — as Suarez says in *disp. 31, sec. 9, n. 18*, since this is the most eminent reason a priori — it pleases nonetheless to adduce the complete argument made by the Doctor in the passage cited, at the section beginning "sed istae rationes," where he thus proves that also a secondary cause causes the existence or being of its effect: by whatever efficient cause a composite is generated, by the same as efficient the being of the composite is produced. But some composite is generated by some created cause, unless all action of a creature is removed. Therefore, and so on. Proof of the major: first, because according to Aristotle in *1 and 5. Phys. and 1. de gen. et cor. and 20. Metaph.*, generation is ordered toward being; therefore the efficient cause of generation is the efficient cause of the being to which generation terminates. Second, by reason: because by whatever cause a composite is generated, through its action form is in matter; but for form to be in matter is for the composite to have being — for otherwise being either naturally follows the composite, which is the terminus of generation, or naturally precedes. If it precedes, then the being of the composite is prior to the composite itself — which is unintelligible. If it follows, then without contradiction the composite could be produced by an agent without God giving that produced composite its being; and indeed God could simply not give being to that produced composite, since he does not act outside himself except contingently and freely. Nor does it hold to say — the Doctor notes — that being is not from the generating cause of the composite and yet necessarily accompanies it; for by that response it does not accompany it as the terminus of the agent's action. If then as the terminus of a first agent and not preceding the composite, then following — and thus without contradiction it could not follow.

If you say that in everything produced a distinction must be made between being of such a kind and being simply, and that in the second mode it is the effect of God or the most universal cause, while in the first mode it is the effect of the particular cause — which seems to be Bannes's reply in *1. c.*, where in conclusion 4 he says particular causes do not cause existence as such, but the determination of existence, that is, being of such a kind — this does not resolve the matter, the Doctor adds in *lit. D*. Because being of such a kind in this thing and being of this thing are not so distinguished that from one cause can be the being of such a kind without from the same being being simply, which is in this thing; since whether the distinction be one of reason in the intellect, or of whatever kind, that which gives this thing being of such a kind gives it simply being which is in this thing. The reason is that physical action does not attain a mode or some metaphysical difference in itself precisely, but the very thing in its entirety, with which such difference is identified.

You will say that Bannes does not mean it in this sense — that a particular cause effectively causes the determination of existence — but in this sense: that it prepares essence as the susceptible subject of such existence and not of another.

For he says that in the production of a created effect by a secondary cause two actions intervene: one from the secondary cause inducing form in matter only according to the being of essence; the other of God alone conferring existence. Against this: a special action of God is altogether superfluous, one that produces existence beyond the action of the secondary cause, by which the essence of the effect is produced. The assumption is proved: first, because considering precisely the action of the secondary cause as it is pre-understood before the action of God providing existence, the thing made immediately through it is brought outside its causes; therefore through it the thing acquires not only real essence but also existence — since this is nothing other than essence produced outside its causes. You will say that in the very instant in which the action of the creature tending toward essence is, there is also an action of God attaining existence; and in that prior of nature, the entity produced by the creature is understood only as on the way to being, which in the same instant is communicated through divine action. Against this: then there would be no real action preserved in a creature — which is that by which a thing receives real being. Since therefore in the effect there is found some real being communicated to it by the secondary cause, either this will be the being of existence — and the intention is had — or the being of essence; but since the latter cannot be in potency as such — for in a made thing it would be the being of essence outside causes, and consequently with existence — this holds. And indeed in this way and in almost the same words Manca attacks the already-mentioned replies of his Thomists in the passage cited; but with what consistency I do not see, since lower down in the same question, *dub. 10*, he uses those very solutions himself against arguments proving the real identity of existence with essence. Furthermore, against the same solution Suarez rightly presses, asking whether the action that proceeds from the secondary cause is existing or not. The second cannot be said, because since it is an action gone forth from the agent and outside causes, it will have a proportionate actuality, as other accidents do. If the first, again it is asked whether that existence is had from the secondary cause itself, or from another special action of God himself; if the first, then some existence is produced by the secondary cause; if the second, then an infinite regress in unions of existence with essence is given, and in special divine actions productive of existence. And finally, regarding this very special divine action by which existence is produced, it is asked whether it is creation or education: if the first, then every created existence would be subsistent and independent in being and becoming from any susceptible subject — which is clearly false in the existence of all material forms; if the second, it is attributed to God alone without cause and denied to a secondary cause, because such a mode of acting dependently upon a subject does not exceed the powers of a created cause, nor does the effect to be produced exceed the perfection of a created agent. For what the Thomists contrive about the great perfection of created existence appears clearly false from what has been said. And Manca again employs this attack against his own Thomists in the passage cited — though in the same

question, above at *dub.* 4, he agrees with them in what they assert about the perfection of existence above essence.

Other Thomists reply that although a secondary cause does not effect existence, it does effect what it is for existence to be united to essence — because it ultimately disposes and determines essence for the reception of such existence. Hence although it does not effect existence, it does effect the existing thing, just as man generates man without effecting the soul, because he unites it. And so they say the cited argument of Scotus does not conclude. So Blasius of the Conception in *the passage cited*, § 2. But this is easily rejected: because then the same arguments recur regarding the very union produced by the secondary cause. For since it too has its own existence, it must be asked whether that existence is produced by the secondary cause itself or not. If the first, the intention is had — that some existence is from a secondary cause; and since there is no greater reason for one than for the other, the same can be said of others. If the second, then an infinite regress in unions of existence with essence and in special divine actions productive of existence will be given.

It is also added that it is false that man generates another man because he unites the rational soul to matter — since he does not attain that union, from what was said in *disp.* 8 *de gen. et cor.*, n. 23; and if he did attain it, that union — although it is substantial insofar as it bears between substantial extremes — is in itself an accident, as we said in *disp.* 9. *Phys.*, q. 9, and an accident cannot be the terminus of substantial generation. But man is rather said to generate man because he produces toward the form of the rational soul in the mixed body, which is the proximate and immediate disposition for its infusion; and his action terminates at the body united to the soul, insofar as in the same instant in which the body is ultimately animated it is constituted as such, as was said in *disp.* 8 *cit. de gen. et cor.*, n. 35.

Furthermore, that a secondary cause is not merely the instrumental cause of the existence of its effects but truly and properly a principal cause is easily proved from the notion of a principal and an instrumental cause. For if they are distinguished — as the common opinion holds — such that a principal cause is that which acts by its own virtue proportionate and accommodated to the effect, such that the effect does not exceed the power of the cause neither in itself nor in the mode in which it is produced by the agent; then it is already clear that a secondary cause thus stands with respect to its own effects — fire, for example, generating fire with respect to the generated fire, since the generated fire does not exceed the power of the generating fire, both being of the same nature, nor in the mode in which it is produced, since it is produced naturally and dependently upon a subject. So too principal and instrumental causes are distinguished by the fact that the latter never attains the primarily intended terminus as the former does — this mode of speaking being truer and more conformable to the Doctor from what was said in *disp.* 7. *Phys.*, q. 5. It is still evident that fire, for example, is

the principal cause of another generated fire and not merely instrumental, because it attains not only a disposition toward the primarily intended form but truly the substantial form of fire itself as posited outside its causes; therefore it is the principal cause of the existence of its effect and not merely instrumental.

Some Thomists reply, as recorded in Manca in the passage cited, that no created cause can efficiently and physically principally confer upon anything a participation in any nature unless it had that nature through its essence — as nothing can principally ignite except fire. Since therefore being belongs principally to God alone, the consequence is that God alone can principally physically cause being itself.

Against this: from this reply it follows that a secondary cause cannot produce its own connaturally related effect not only as regards existence, but not even as regards essence — because God alone is his own real essence through his essence; all creatures have essence participated from God. Thus God alone will effect every essence. It is therefore false that for a cause to be called principal with respect to the being it communicates to an effect, it must possess that being through its essence — it suffices that it have it through participation from God himself.

In opposition Bannes argues: no creature of itself and from its own nature has being, but this is communicated and conserved by God; therefore no creature per se is the cause of existence — neither in common nor in particular — but existence is from God alone. The antecedent is clear, and the consequence is proved: for the causative power of existence presupposes being itself in the agent cause; therefore if the being of the cause comes and is communicated from without, it does not have the operative power of existence from itself — or at least does not have it except in the manner of an instrument, just as water, because it is not hot of itself, is not also per se and principally a heater but only per accidens and instrumentally. Second: every creature in its action presupposes something produced by God alone, since it cannot act from nothing, but only from a presupposed subject; therefore the action of a creature presupposes being, and consequently is not the cause of being itself. Third: prime matter is ungenerable and incorruptible, conserved by God alone; therefore God alone gives existence to prime matter; but matter does not exist except through the existence of the whole; therefore a secondary cause does not produce the existence of the composite. Finally: for no other reason can we explain that God is the cause of all being, except that he alone causes being — both of form and of matter and of the whole; or if creatures do this very thing, they will also be called causes of all being.

To this it is replied: the consequence is denied, because from the fact that a secondary cause does not have existence from itself and of itself but from God, it is not rightly deduced that it cannot attain the existence of its effect — otherwise it could not attain essence either, as we said, since it does not have this from itself either, but from God. And to the proof of the consequence, the consequence is again denied: for in order that a cause can confer upon an effect some being, it

suffices that it have it in itself — there is no need at all for it to have it from itself, unless we are speaking of the first cause. Nor does it follow that it is only the instrumental and per accidens cause of existence, as water is the cause of heat — since heat belongs to water not only from without but also entirely per accidens, because it in no way pertains to its constitution; but existence, though communicated to a creature from without, nonetheless intrinsically and per se belongs to it, because for a creature to be in act, it needs existence and cannot be called its accident except in the predicable sense, insofar as it is not its quidditative predicate.

To the second: the argument proves only that a creature does not effect the existence of prime matter, which is presupposed to its action and is produced by God alone; but it does not prove that it cannot effect the existence of a form or of the composite, which is the terminus of its action.

To the third: the assumed minor is denied — since from what was said in *disp. 2. Phys.*, prime matter has its own proper incomplete existence distinct from the existence of form and of the composite, since it is presupposed to every action of a natural agent as having its own proper being of essence in itself, and having its own efficient cause — which cannot be understood without the being of existence.

To the fourth: God is said to be the cause of all being, but not a creature, because God effects all and totally — that is, with respect to all and each of its parts presupposing none; which a creature cannot do. Hence only this can be deduced: that a secondary cause cannot effect the whole existence of its effect with respect to all and each of its parts; which certainly does not obstruct it from being said to effect the existence proper to the whole taken categorically. For just as a natural agent is said to generate the whole, though it does not generate matter — since for this it suffices that it produce form in matter, from the union of which the whole results — so for it to be said to produce the existence of the whole, it suffices that it makes the form to exist in matter, since as the Doctor says in *4. d. 1, q. 1, B.*: "for form to be in matter is for the composite to have being."

Second, an argument is urged, said to be from St. Thomas in *1. p., q. 45, art. 5*: more universal effects must be reduced to more universal causes; but among all effects being itself is the most universal effect; therefore it must be reduced to the most universal cause, which is God; and consequently it is his proper effect. Blasius of the Conception confirms this because in *Sap. 1* it is said "God created, that all things might be," and in many places of scripture it is said that God makes all things; and very many of the holy Fathers call being the proper effect of God. He also adduces five other reasons from St. Thomas in *3. contra gentes, c. 66* — which I do not adduce, both because almost all of them reduce to the argument now presented, and because from what has been said they are most easily dissolved, and finally because the author himself resolves them in sustaining with probability the opposing view.

The Doctor in *4. d. 1, q. 1, lit. C* replies that that argument concludes nothing unless the universality of cause and effect are taken in different ways. For the cause can be called more universal in two ways: according to power or perfection, or according to predication; and similarly an effect can be called more universal in two ways: according to predication, or according to power or perfection. That is called more universal by predication whose character is said of more; that is more universal by perfection whose perfection is greater in itself and contains more perfections. If therefore the universality of cause and effect are taken uniformly — such that the most universal effect in predication, such as being, must be referred back to a cause thus most universal, which is God — the major is false, because God is not the most universal cause in predicating. If however it is understood of universality in perfection and power, then it is indeed true that God is the most universal cause; but it is false that in this sense being is the most universal effect — since predicates that are more common are thereby more imperfect. If however they are taken differently — such that the sense is that the most universal effect in predication, such as being, must be reduced to the most universal cause in perfection, such as God — then St. Thomas's argument would indeed conclude something in the present case: namely, that being itself at large, as it comprehends whatever can be made, is the proper effect of God himself, because only the most perfect cause can produce whatever can be made; but it does not conclude that every particular being too is the proper effect of God alone, as the argument would have to infer in order to conclude against us.

To the confirmation: if the Fathers or Scripture ever say this, they must be explained in the same sense: that they speak of being in its whole breadth as it comprehends everything that can be made and caused. For if some secondary cause could range over all creatable and producible being in its whole breadth, it could range over itself, since it too is a certain creatable and producible being. It is also customarily said that being is the proper effect of God, because God alone produces the whole being of a thing and totally — presupposing none of its parts; and because God alone in every thing lays the foundation of existence without which a creature cannot effect anything of existence — since it always acts upon a presupposed subject.

Finally, it is proved that a secondary cause is not the principal but only the instrumental cause of being itself: for in the *Liber de causis* it is said that neither intelligence nor rational soul gives being except insofar as it operates by divine operation. From which Blasius of the Conception argues thus: what acts by the power of another and not by its own power does not act as a principal cause but as an instrumental one; but a secondary cause does not produce existence by its own proper power but by the power of God; therefore, and so on. Confirmation: if the entity of existence were produced by a secondary cause as by a principal cause, a corresponding operative power would have to be given in a creature, flowing from the existence of a substance — since substance is not immediately operative, and the existence of a substance is substantial, there would have to be

necessarily flowing from it some active power through which it would be ordered toward the production of existence. Since therefore no such power is found in a creature — as is clear — no creature will produce the entity of existence in the manner of a principal cause.

To this it is replied: a secondary cause is said to give being insofar as it operates by divine operation and in the power of God, because it operates dependently upon God and in subordination to God — both in being and in operating — as it has received from God the whole power of acting and exercises it dependently upon divine concurrence. But not because it is a pure instrument of God properly speaking of an instrument.

To the confirmation: the major could be denied — since in our position substance is immediately operative, as is clear from what was said in *disp. 8. Physicor., q. 6, art. 2*. The minor could also be denied, which is not proved; to which is added that the very same argument could be made to prove that a secondary cause cannot produce its effect not only as regards existence but not even as regards essence — and whatever is said in reply to that argument made against the production of essence will equally be said to the same argument made against the production of existence.

On the formal cause of existence it is also customarily inquired here, and the Thomists passim assert that in material things form is the formal cause of all existence, saying that matter and form are first united with each other to make the whole, and then existence supervenes upon the whole itself by virtue of form; and so both matter and form receive existence — and indeed not once did Aristotle signify that all substantial being proceeds from the substantial form in the genus of formal causality. For in *2. Phys. tex. 12* he says that things are in potency through matter and in act through form; and in *2. de Anim. 36* he says the soul is the cause of being — or why an animal is — and in *5. Met. 15* he says "there is another substance in things which is the cause of existence, as soul in an animal." Hence the Coimbra commentators in *1. Phys., q. 9* testify that it is a common axiom among the Peripatetics that existence is the ultimate actuality of every form.

However, it was already determined in *disp. 2. Phys., q. 1, art. 2* that matter has its own proper and intrinsic existence from its own merits — not by benefit of form precisely, as the Thomists think; and there the cited authorities are explained: namely, that they do not speak of being and existing entitatively or transcendently — which is common to all things insofar as they are beings — but of specific and complete being in a determinate predicamental species. For this both matter and the composite obtains by benefit of form and in the genus of formal causality: the composite in the genus of intrinsic formal causality — since form concurs toward its constitution as its intrinsic formal part — and matter in the genus of extrinsic formal causality, insofar as by receiving form in

itself it is drawn by it toward this or that species in a category, since it is of itself indifferent to all by reason of its indeterminate potency.

Here I add that also speaking of being itself taken entitatively and transcendently, it can in a good sense be said that all being is either form's being or depends upon form in its genus of causality. For if we speak of the being or existence of the composite, it is certain that this depends upon form in the genus of intrinsic formal causality — since form is the principal and more important part of quiddity; and in this sense we explained the cited authorities of Aristotle and other similar ones in *disp. 5. Phys., q. 12, art. 1*; which is why this is particularly attributed to form, even though the composite has its being also from matter, which is the other intrinsic part of it.

But although form in this way cannot confer the intrinsic existence of matter — since it is not a part of matter itself, nor does it intrinsically compose it in its entity — nonetheless the proper and intrinsic existence of matter can still be said to depend upon form in the genus of extrinsic formal causality, since for matter to be and to exist in the nature of things it needs the information of form, as was said in *disp. 2. Phys., q. 3, art. 1*. And thus it is established that what we said is true: that no being of existence in a composite is found — neither integral nor partial — that is not either the very being of form or depends upon form in some way.

Fourth Question: Whether Existence Is the Immediate Act of Essence

Many Thomists, led by Cajetan in *3. p., q. 17, art. 2*, assert that existence does not immediately belong to a substantial nature, but that subsistence comes first and then existence — such that existence supervenes per se and primarily to the entire supposit constituted from nature and subsistence. Nonetheless all others, both philosophers and theologians, hold it as established that existence is the immediate actuality of essence, and that nothing extraneous belongs to it antecedently to existence.

It is indeed true that nature must be presupposed as singular before existence — since existence makes in act, and so the whole integral being of the thing must be presupposed as what must exist. Also because nature does not exist immediately in itself but in singulars, with which it is identified. But there is no need for it to be understood as constituted into a supposit before existence; and this must especially be asserted in our position that really distinguishes subsistence from essence, but not existence. For if existence is really identified with essence, and subsistence on the contrary is really distinct and separable from nature, it follows that existence belongs to essence prior to subsistence — as being consubstantial and really identified with it. Indeed this must also be asserted in the Thomistic position that really distinguishes existence from essence; because subsistence either flows from nature itself, or is received in it. If the first, then nature is presupposed as existing — since a thing must first be in act before something flows and emanates from it. The same also follows if the second is said: for what

is not existing cannot receive any other real thing distinct from itself. Let it therefore remain that existence is the immediate actuality of essence, and that essence must be understood as existing prior to subsisting in substances, or prior to inhering in accidents.

It is also customarily disputed here by some in what way existence is required for operating — whether as a causative power or only as a condition; of which we already spoke in *disp. 8. Phys., q. 4, art. 1.*

Question IV: Whether Whatever Things Have Their Own Essence Also Have a Peculiar Existence

This question is raised to discern which things have their own proper existence. For the Thomists — really distinguishing essence from existence — ascribe their own proper essence to many things, but do not concede a proper existence; rather, they say that these exist through the existence of another. They customarily do so with respect to matter in relation to form, with respect to an accident with respect to its subject, and with respect to the assumed humanity of Christ in relation to the Word. For they hold that all these have their own proper essence, but not their own proper existence; hence they assert that matter exists through the existence of form, an accident through the existence of its subject, and the humanity of Christ through the existence of the Word. This they also assert a fortiori of relations, since although these have an essence distinct from their foundations, they nonetheless do not have a diverse existence but exist through the existence of the same foundations.

And some moderns assert the same of modes with respect to things — that they possess their own proper essence, but do not exist except through the existence of the things of which they are modes; because if a mode had its own proper existence, it would no longer be a mode but an entity. Others on the contrary, not distinguishing actual essence from existence, assert that every essence must have its own proper existence, and that one thing cannot exist through the existence of another — nor can several things exist through one existence; but just as the things themselves and their essences are distinguished, so their existences are multiplied and distinguished. Hence they consequently hold that matter has its own proper existence distinct from the existence of form, that accidents — not only absolute but also relative — have their own existence diverse from the existence of subject and foundation; and further that the humanity of Christ has its own proper created existence distinct from the existence of the Word. So Suarez in *disp. 31. Met., sec. 11*, Aversa in *q. 8. Phys., sec. 10*, Arriaga in *disp. 2. Met., sec. 5*, Pasqualig in *disp. 83, sec. 5*, Meurisse in *lib. 1. suae Metaph., q. 20*.

Of modes with respect to things they say that just as they have their own proper essence modally distinct from the essence of the subject, so they also have their own proper modal existence — by reason of which they can be produced and destroyed without the subject being produced and destroyed. So Suarez, Aversa,

and Arriaga cited. Or if modes are denied to have their own proper existence, their own proper essence must also be denied, as Pasqualig defends in the passage cited.

This latter opinion is true and is to be defended by us, and necessarily follows from the principle already established of the identity of essence with existence. It is proved, first in general: to whatever essence its own proper existence corresponds, and it cannot exist through the existence of another. For if existence is really nothing other than essence as it is in act, it manifestly follows that it can only exist through its own proper existence; and just as it is impossible for something to be a being through alien being, so it is also impossible for it to be actual or an actual being through alien actuality. The consequence is proved: because no less intrinsically is every thing in itself actual than it is a being, since actual being says nothing other than being found on the part of the thing according to its proper being.

Second, this is then proved in particular by going through the individual cases to which the Thomists concede a proper essence and deny existence. And indeed that prime matter not only has a proper essence but also an existence distinct from the existence of form and composite has been proved at length in *disp. 2. Phys., q. 2, art. 1*: a proper, that is, partial and incomplete existence — where sufficient reply was also made to all that the Thomists usually heap up in opposition.

That accidents also have their own existence distinct from the existence of their substance, not only does Scotus teach in *4. d. 12, q. 1*, at the section beginning "Hic dicitur," but also the sounder part of the Thomists, whom Blasius of the Conception in *disp. 6. Met., q. 3* reports and follows. Indeed Bannes in *1. p., q. 3, art. 4, dub. 5* says he once agreed with Master Soto in *1. Phys., q. 6* on the opposite view, but upon better reflection recognized it to be against the mind of St. Thomas. The Doctor in the passage cited proves this by this argument: whatever is outside its own cause and the intellect, and actually has its proper entity, has also its own proper being; therefore if an accident has its proper essential entity outside the subject and the intellect, it also has its proper being and so does not exist formally through the being of the subject.

The assumption is clear from the above, where it was proved that existence is nothing other than the essence and entity of a thing actually placed outside causes. The other proposition subsumed by the Doctor — that accidents have their own entity and essence distinct from the essence of the subject — is easily proved: those accidents that are newly produced in subjects and corrupted with subjects remaining have their own entity really diverse from the entity of the subject, and consequently also a distinct existence. The reason is that every production terminates at some existence, and by every corruption some existence is lost.

This is confirmed ineluctably from the mystery of the Eucharist, in which the same numerical accidents are preserved without their substance; and it is certain that they are not preserved without existence. This reason — as Suarez rightly noted — proceeds also in the Thomistic opinion that really distinguishes essence from existence. For what some among the Thomists said — that although after the Eucharistic consecration the essence of bread no longer remains, yet the substantial existence of bread remains, by whose benefit quantity and other separated accidents exist — is erroneous, because according to the doctrine of the Councils and the Fathers, after the consecration of bread nothing whatsoever remains that would pertain to the substance of bread, apart from the accidents of bread.

Some Thomist replies that God in the Eucharist creates a certain new being by which those accidents are preserved outside their subject. I have already attacked this solution at length in *disp. 3. Phys., q. 4, art. 2*, and the Doctor himself in the passage cited also rejects it: because since that new being is not divine being but created, it is either substance or accident. If that new being is in the genus of substance, it will be independent — and consequently will not be formally the being of any accident, since no accident can formally be independent or have being per se. Also, according to faith, no other substance is found in the Eucharist than Christ's. If however it is an accident or in the genus of accident, it will be equally dependent — as the form of which it is the being — and consequently through that being the separated accident will not formally be independent, as they assert, claiming that by virtue of such new existence the separated accident exists independently. Furthermore, if such new existence is accidental, then it is already conceded of its own accord what we here contend — namely, that there is given an existence of a lower order than substantial existence, proportionate to accidents. And this being admitted, it is better to posit this as connaturally and congenitally belonging to accidents than as new and miraculous.

Furthermore, this solution runs into all those inconveniences to which those are subject who say that the same numerical essence can be preserved with varied existence — which was attacked as altogether impossible at n. 118: because if the same numerical actual entity remains, that being will also remain from which the thing intrinsically has such actuality — which is the being of existence.

But you will object that the being of an accident is being in, and in 7. *Met. 2* it is said that an accident is a being because of a being — that is, what neither is a being nor has being except insofar as it participates in the being of its subject. Furthermore, if it had its own proper existence, it would no longer be ordered to the existence of a substance — since existence is the ultimate terminus of essence. Finally, if it has its own proper existence, this is either its actual inherence or its aptitudinal inherence — for nothing else is found in an accident; but neither of these, since in the Eucharist it loses the actual and the aptitudinal is its essence, not existence.

To the first: from the Doctor in the passage cited, an accident is said to have being in being — not because it is intrinsically constituted in the character of being through the being of its subject, such that there would be one being or entity of accident and subject (for then from them there would not result one per accidents), but because by reason of the weakness and imperfection of its being it expresses a transcendental disposition toward a subject — such that naturally it can only be sustained in another. But such dependence in existing of one upon another does not argue want of a proper existence in the thus-dependent thing; otherwise a composite would not have its own proper existence — since it cannot consist without its parts. But what it argues is a weak and imperfect existence, as in the present case of an accident, or a dependence for some other reason. And when an accident is called a being because of a being by Aristotle, the Doctor says in the same place, *lit. G.*, that "because" does not denote the note of a formal cause, but of some extrinsic causality which the subject exercises with respect to the accident by sustaining it and sometimes by effecting it. On this see Alensis in *7. Met., tex. 5, q. 1.*

To the second: whatever Blasius of the Conception may say here, it must be denied that existence as such is the ultimate terminus of essence; for this belongs rather to subsistence, as Scotus notes in *quol. 9*, at the section beginning "de secundo," where he says that subsistence is the ultimate actuality of essence, such that what subsists is not per se orderable to any simply further act beyond this one it has, which further act could be an act of it per se.

To the third: Bannes and Blasius of the Conception concede that the existence of an accident is formally its inherence, and that an accident is said formally to inhere or to inexist from its existence. It is nonetheless true — as was said at n. 128 — that just as in substance its existence is distinguished from its subsistence, so in accident its existence must likewise be distinguished from its inherence, both actual and aptitudinal. From actual inherence indeed really, because with its adhesion to the subject destroyed it can be preserved in the nature of things through the absolute power of God, as is clear in the Sacrament of the Altar; from aptitudinal inherence formally, because aptitudinal inherence formally imports an order to the subject, whereas existence entirely prescind from such an order and says precisely the mode by which formally and intrinsically the accident is constituted as a being in act as such — which can indeed be expressed through an absolute concept, or at least one prescinding from all order to a subject; which inherence necessarily connotes either actually or at least aptitudinally. Therefore it is false that on the part of the thing nothing is found in an accident beyond actual and aptitudinal inherence; for on the part of the thing there is found a mode to which it belongs in the character of existing absolutely as such; whereas inherence does not pertain to the character of existing absolutely, but to the determination and modification of existence itself.

Third: that the humanity of Christ does not exist through the existence of the Word but through its own proper and intrinsic existence, the Doctor teaches and proves — whom all follow outside the School of St. Thomas — in *3. d. 6, q. 1*: because Christ as man was the terminus of temporal generation from his Mother; but the terminus of generation, from *5. Phys. 7*, is the being of existence or something having being of such a kind; therefore some being of such a kind was the terminus of the temporal generation of Christ; but this is not the uncreated being of the Word — both because this being was not effected through temporal generation, and because it does not pertain to him insofar as he is man. Therefore it was the proper and created being of the humanity of Christ, by which it itself existed.

Confirmation: that nature which the Word took as a person, the whole Trinity produced in the character of efficient and conserving cause; it terminated only at some existing that is not uncreated — since nothing effects itself; therefore, and so on.

You will say, for the Thomists, that it is not always necessary for existence to be the terminus produced through generation, or to be produced through generation; it suffices that the existing thing is produced. So it happens in the temporal generation of Christ: that the Blessed Virgin, though she did not produce the existence of the humanity of Christ — since it exists through the existence of the Word — nonetheless produced the existing man, insofar as she produced the union by which the humanity is united to the existence of the Word, just as man is said to generate man though he does not attain the soul, for no other reason than because he unites it.

This solution has already been attacked above at n. 158: because union, being a certain relation, cannot be the formal terminus of substantial generation; also because it is false that the Blessed Virgin produced the union of the humanity with the Word — for God alone immediately conjoined the humanity with the Word. Also because union presupposes the unitable extremes already existing, not that they exist through it. Also because even granting that the Blessed Virgin attained the hypostatic union, the argument recurs regarding the union itself — whether it was produced by the Virgin with its own proper existence or not. If the first, the same could be said equally of the humanity itself — that it was produced as existing. If the second, then an infinite regress will be given, since this would be through another union to the existence of the Word.

And finally, against the essence of union all arguments can be made that are made against the essence of the assumed humanity as existing in the Word without existence; and again that the humanity does not exist except with one existence together with the Word — in which manner Sophronius speaks in the *6. Council, art. 11*.

This is also proved by reason: because all concede, and it is of Faith, that the humanity of Christ subsists through the subsistence of the divine Word; therefore equally, the existence of the same can exist.

You will say that accidents also exist in a subject, and form in matter, and yet it is not thereby deduced that the substantial form exists through the existence of matter, and an accident through the existence of the subject — indeed rather the opposite; for this fact of existing in another requires the proper existence of each extreme. If it existed in another through the existence of that other formally, the sign would be that that other too exists in another — for if it existed in itself, by what existence would it exist such that its existence could not formally denominate something else existing in another? Hence it is repugnant to say that accidents are in another through the existence of the substance itself, since the existence of a substance cannot produce such a formal effect.

When however the Fathers say that the humanity of Christ does not exist except with one existence together with the Word, they either take existence for subsistence — which is indeed one in Christ — or they only wish to intimate that it did not exist previously in time before existing in the Word.

To the reason: the parity is denied, because subsistence is a mode really distinct from actual essence, as we will say in *disp. 11*, and separable from it — since it does not pertain to the character of existing absolutely but to the character of being thus or in such a way; hence even if actual essence is separated from subsistence, one can still understand that the same actual essence remains, though under a different mode of being. But existence pertains to the character of being absolutely outside causes and constitutes essence in the character of a being in act; and it is what primarily and formally distinguishes it from the being in objective potency; and therefore in reality it is not distinguished from the very actual essence of the thing. But since this controversy is purely theological, let it be referred to theology for fuller treatment; it has however pleased to touch upon it here in passing, since it depends on metaphysical principles.

Fourth, furthermore: that real relations also have their own proper existence distinct from the existence of the foundation, Scotus teaches in *quol. 3, lit. C*, and it is proved first by that general argument: nor can God bring it about that any created essence is actual essence, or an actual being outside nothing, through an actuality extraneous and distinct from itself. Therefore if once it is conceded that relations have entities really distinct from their extremes — as is presupposed here — consequently their own entity outside causes will have a proper existence distinct from the existence of the extremes. Furthermore, even relations are newly produced in their foundations and corrupted with the foundations remaining; therefore they enjoy proper existence, because every production terminates at some existence, and by every corruption some existence is lost. Also because — as was said above — for any entity to be understood as having its own proper existence, there is no need for it to be apt to exist solitarily; many things

are unable to exist without the company of another, and yet clearly possess their own proper existence, as is clear of a creature — which cannot exist without God — and of one relative without another, and of a composite without its parts. It suffices that it be the terminus of physical and real action, since through it a thing is made existing and existence is communicated to the effect. Therefore, because a relation cannot exist without a foundation, its own proper and peculiar existence should not for that reason be denied to it; but only the conclusion can be drawn that it has rather weak and dependent existence.

You will say that relations do not have their own newness nor are acquired per se — which is why Aristotle denies there is motion toward a relation in 5. *Phys.* 10 — but are generated and corrupted by exactly the same action as their extremes; therefore they do not have an existence distinct from them. The reply is that this argument is usually used by Nominalists to prove that relation adds nothing real to its extremes; hence if it proves anything, it concludes not only that a relation does not have existence, but also not even an essence distinct from extremes. But here we presuppose that relations have an entity proper and distinct from the entity of the extremes, and from this we contend they are also owed their own proper existence — since existence is nothing other than the actual entity of the thing. As for the argument itself: it has been satisfied in *disp.* 8. *log.*, q. 3, art. 2, at the beginning, where we said that Aristotle in the passage cited does not speak of relations in general — since he there concedes motion toward "where," which nonetheless is of the genus of respects — but speaks of relations of the fourth category, which in our school are called intrinsically advening, and denies motion toward them. Not because they do not have their own production distinct from the production of the extremes, but because they are not acquired per se and primarily, but necessarily follow upon extremes already posited; and therefore he says there that they are not acquired, nor do they terminate motion, except per accidens — insofar as they presuppose the acquisition of another.

Finally, although it may not appear that such relations are generated and corrupted with the extremes remaining, it does appear that they are generated and corrupted compared to the foundation alone — since in the same foundation they sometimes begin and sometimes cease. This suffices for us to convince the adversaries who said that a relation does not have a distinct existence from the existence of its foundation; for they were not speaking of the existence of both extremes.

Fifth and finally, that modes also have their own proper existence is proved: because the modes of which the moderns and adversaries speak are physical and extrinsic modes of things — as figure with respect to quantity, presence, union, session, and so on. But these are truly and properly things, taking "thing" as convertible with real being. Therefore they will have not only their own proper essence but also their own proper existence. The minor is proved from Scotus in 2. d. 1, q. 5, at the section beginning "quod si adhuc," speaking of the aforesaid

modal entities that determine other things, and asking whether they can be called things; he replies that although they are called modes — because they are not things to the same degree as what they modify — they can nonetheless be called things insofar as they essentially fall under the division of real being.

They are also confirmed by the common argument adduced above for the rest: since even modes of this kind are produced in subjects and corrupted with subjects remaining — as is clear of presence with respect to a body and figure with respect to quantity — therefore they not only have their own proper essence but also their own proper existence distinct from the existence of their subjects.

But you will object that a mode is not properly an entity but a mode of an entity, and its function is not to bring some new entity but only to modify the pre-existing entity; therefore it does not require a new existence — for a new existence is only for the sake of new being.

To this the reply is: whatever the moderns may say here — who do not seem to speak consistently when in explaining the nature of these modes they say with full mouth that they are not things and entities, but modifications and determinations of things and entities; and yet afterwards not only attribute to them proper entity but also their own peculiar and proper existence — whatever, I say, they may say, we briefly meet the objection from Scotus in the passage cited, 2. d. 1, q. 5, D: although a mode is not a thing to the same degree as what it is the mode of, it is nonetheless not nothing at all, since then it would be nothing and no being — it is still a being falling under the division of real being, and thus in its own genus has its proper essence and proper corresponding existence, namely modal.

But a still more serious difficulty remains concerning common natures, intrinsic modes, properties, and other formalities of things found in the same thing from the nature of the thing — whether a proper existence also corresponds to each of them. And the reason for doubting is that all these have their own proper essence expressed by a distinct definition. Therefore if the principle posited above is true — that to whatever essence its own existence in its own genus must correspond — each individual formality will have its own proper existence. And this seems especially to have to be asserted in our view admitting a formal and actual distinction *ex natura rei* between them.

Arriaga in *disp. 2. Metaph., sec. 5, n. 75*, relying on that principle, says that to all those to which a distinct entity belongs, a proper existence must also be assigned — however modal or of minimal entity they may be. Hence he deduces that even superior degrees, in the way in which they are distinguished from inferior ones, have their proper existence; and in a word that in all things one must philosophize in exactly the same way about existence as about essence — for the often-stated reason that these two are entirely indistinct from each other. Aversa also reasons thus in *q. 8, sec. 8*, at the section beginning "*sequitur secundo*." Moreover, Meurisse

from our group in *lib. 1. Met., q. 20, concl. 5* says that to proper passions there corresponds a proper existence distinct from the existence of the subject, since they are said to flow and emanate from their subjects — since therefore that flow terminates at something actual following nature, it terminates also at something in its own mode existing. He further adds that the same must be said of common natures, given the formal distinction of superior degrees from inferior ones; for the degree of living, for example, is actually in Peter; therefore it exists in Peter; and since it is a degree formally distinct from Peter — either as included by including, or otherwise — its existence will also be formally distinct from the existence of Peter. Hence he concludes that superior and inferior degrees, just as they have diverse essences, so they also have diverse existences; but just as their essences are only formally distinct, not really, so the same must be said of their existences. And he gathers this view from Scotus in *2. d. 3, q. 3*, where he says that common nature has existence in individuals; and from Bassolis in *1. d. 8, q. 1, art. 2 and 3 and 3. d. 6, q. un., art. 2*. The same holds Smisinch in *tract. 1 de Deo Uno, disp. 2, n. 36*, Faber in *9. Met., disp. 2, c. 2*.

The opposite seems more probable to me: that individual degrees of things and their formalities which we grant as multiplied in the same thing and formally distinct from the nature of the thing do not have corresponding proper existences, but all exist adequately through the one and same existence of that thing with which they are identified, and to whose integrity they pertain. This mode of speaking was taught by Trombeta in *5. Metaph., q. 6* and in the *tractatus de formalitatibus* from the beginning, where he posits existence as corresponding to things and not to formalities. A thing he himself calls an entity that can exist alone; and because formalities cannot exist alone, he therefore denies them proper existence. In this explanation we differ from him, because then real relations and many other things that by natural connection with others cannot exist alone would lack proper existence. Hence we said in *disp. 1. log., q. 5, art. 2* and above in *disp. 6, n. 60* that by the name of a thing naturally apt to found a real distinction, one should understand not only what primarily and immediately exists or can so exist, but everything that by true efficiency and physical causality receives being — whether it can exist alone or not. And thus all physical entities stand: all substances, whether complete or incomplete, such as matter and form; all accidents too, whether absolute or relative. For all of these are truly beings in the direct sense, having proper essence and existence — though not all are naturally apt to exist alone.

By a reality or formality, however, that is naturally apt to found only a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, is understood what is something of a thing in the aforesaid explained sense — not in any way whatsoever, but through real identity. And thus by "reality" must be understood everything that does not per se and immediately receive being and directly from its proximate cause through true physical influence, but through simple metaphysical emanation. Therefore what is immediately and formally capable of existence is only that

which can be the terminus and effect of physical causality; since through such causality actual entity is communicated to the effect — which is existence. Because therefore formalities are not effects receiving being through some physical causality but through simple metaphysical emanation, it follows that they are said to lack proper existence, but all exist adequately through the single existence of the thing with which they are identified and to whose integrity they pertain. Vulp holds the same in *disp. 63 de Trinit.*, *art. 8*. See what was said above in *disp. 6, q. 7, art. 2, n. 160* and following.

You will say that indeed all formalities and degrees of the same thing exist through one real existence, but that formal existences are multiplied — formally distinct from each other — since formally distinct essences are multiplied; and to whatever essence its own proper existence corresponds, from the principle already established.

Against this: it was said that existence does not correspond to formalities but to things, and that there cannot be several existences that are only formally distinguished. For since what exists as such is the terminus of physical causality, it is naturally apt, according to its existence, to found a real distinction from any other thing existing with a distinct existence. But when it is said that each of those formalities presents its own proper essence expressible by a distinct definition through adequate concepts, Trombeta denies this assumption: because although each can be said to import proper quiddities, they do not import proper essences. For — he says — quiddity and essence differ in this: that essence is that entity to which it is not repugnant to be and to have being without another; but quiddity is what is expressed through the definition. This distinction is not pleasing, because it confines the name of essence too narrowly — for relations and many other things have their own proper essence and yet cannot exist alone.

Rather, according to the explanation given, it must be said that the name of essence can be taken in two ways: either for a thing to which it is not repugnant to exist and which can be the terminus of physical causality — and in this sense it is true that to every essence its own proper existence corresponds, for it receives this from an agent when it is produced; and in this way formalities are denied to have their own proper essence, since they cannot be the immediate terminus of physical causality. In the other way, essence can be taken more broadly for any essential character whatsoever, in which sense we say that whatever is, in the way in which it is, has its own essence, since nothing can be without its own proper and intrinsic essential character; and so it is indeed true that even formalities and various degrees of the entity of a thing have their own proper essence, but it is false that an existence proper and adequate corresponds to essence so taken — for all of them exist adequately through the one existence of that thing to whose integrity they pertain.

See above in *disp. 6, n. 180*, where it was explained to what essence a proper existence corresponds. And this mode of speaking — which I think is the Scotist

one — Pasqualig not obscurely suggests in *disp. cit.* 83, *sec.* 5, where at n. 1 — explaining that saying that to whatever essence its own proper existence must correspond — he says it must be so taken that it only proceeds of those essences that constitute one integral entity, and not of every quiddity; though in its own way every formal character also has its own proper existence, insofar as the existence of any thing equals all its formalities making each individually to exist.

And by this same reason it must be denied that to common natures, as precisioned from singulars, a proper existence corresponds — because in such a state nature, as Suarez rightly noted in *disp.* 31 cited, *sec.* 11, n. 2, is not capable of existence and cannot be the immediate terminus of production and physical causality. Since therefore it is not capable of existence except as it is under individuality, and only in such a state can it be the terminus of generation, it must consequently be said that existence adequately corresponds only to singular nature or nature conceived under individuality. And this Scotus expressly teaches in the passage cited from Meurisse for the opposing part in 2. *d.* 3, *q.* 3, where he says that existence follows nature even into individuality. Nor does the reply of Meurisse hold: that by this only this is proved — that nature is not capable in that state of existence by which it could alone exist outside individuals; but not that it is not capable of existence in individuals.

On the contrary, this reply rather favors us: for if nature is capable of existence only as conceived in individuals, then when conceived as common and precisioned from individuality it is not proximately capable of existence — since according to that state actual existence is repugnant to it. Therefore, in conceiving existence as the act of essence, it must not immediately be referred to nature as common, but as singular; and to the common as it has been made singular in an individual thing.

Nor finally does the argument of Meurisse cited at n. 173 prove the opposite: for it is conceded that the degree of living, for example, is actually in Peter and exists in Peter; but I deny that it exists through an existence formally distinct from that by which Peter exists. For in Peter two existences cannot be distinguished from the nature of the thing — one of Peter and another of man — but there is only one, through which immediately Peter exists and mediately man. And this very thing the Doctor signified whenever he said that common nature does not exist immediately but mediately in singulars; for if it had a proper existence at least formally distinct from the existence of singulars, it would then be said to exist not merely mediately but also and less mediately through its own proper existence. Nor does the argument less conclude — by which Meurisse tries to prove that a proper passion, as distinguished from the subject, has a corresponding proper essence — because the flow of a passion from the subject does not happen through true and proper physical causality, but through simple metaphysical emanation; insofar as the subject is not the physical productive cause of it, but is nonetheless the reason why it belongs to it. Therefore a passion with respect to

the subject does not have such an essence as could found proper existence distinct from the existence of the subject.

Faber in the passage cited presses: common nature — as man and horse — is on the part of the thing a real positive entity distinct from the individual entity; but existence is an intrinsic mode of every real positive being; therefore common nature must also possess its own proper existence. The major and minor are passim conceded in our school. The reply is that if common nature were an entity really distinct from the individual, the argument would indeed conclude — because every entity really distinct from another has its own existence distinct from the existence of that other. But common nature is the very same real entity as the individual; and because to a single entity a single existence corresponds, for humanity and Peter a single existence suffices by which both exist — Peter immediately and nature mediately. And that same existence is called an intrinsic mode of each, because each imports one and the same entity and essence; and though nature abstracted from individuality can still be conceived as apt to exist, it is not however as having such an order to being immediately and in itself, but mediately — through the individual in which it exists. And this mode of speaking is clearly gathered from the Doctor in 3. d. 22, q. un., *F and G*, where he does not attribute the being of existence immediately to nature but to the individual.

It is nonetheless still true that what I will say below at n. 185 — namely, that the opposing view is also very probable and Scotus often inclines toward it — which therefore I embraced as the more common in our school in *disp. 6 de Anim.*, q. 7, art. 2, where I also adduced a very clear passage from 4. d. 45, q. 3, *ad 2. prin.* for it; indeed I also promised to hand it down in the Metaphysics. But having considered the matter more carefully, I could not entirely stand by what I promised; let it suffice for you that I do not reject the opposite view — on the contrary, I judge it so probable that any Scotist can follow whichever of the two he wishes.

Question V: Whether Both Essence and Existence Are Composed of Metaphysical Degrees

Since the entire predicamental line from the highest genus to singulars appears to be a kind of scale consisting of various genera, species, and differences subordinated above and below each other — through which one ascends from individuals to the highest genus and descends from there to singulars — from this metaphor those higher and lower concepts are called metaphysical degrees, because they pertain to the composition of Metaphysics.

The first position assigns a plurality and diversity of degrees to both essence and existence, such that just as the essences of things coalesce from various predicamental, generic, differential, and individual degrees, so too do their existences; so that as many degrees of essence are found in a thing, so many existences will there be. This opinion is usually attributed to Henry in *quodl. 2, q. 1* and is defended by certain moderns: Ovvied in *controverf 2. Metaph., punct. 5*, at

the end; Aversa in *q. 8 suae Philosoph., sec. 8*, at the section beginning "sequitur secundo."

Another extreme position says that both essence and existence consist in what is indivisible: essence, because Aristotle in *8. Met. 10* openly declared that the essences of things consist in what is indivisible and have no breadth of degrees; existence, because if the essence of a thing already lacks such breadth, so too must the same be affirmed of existence — since if such breadth were given in existence, it could only overflow into it from essence. So certain moderns.

The common and true position mediates between these, and indeed in essence acknowledges a plurality of metaphysical degrees, which it however denies in existence — affirming that through a single degree of existence the whole essence exists. So Scotus expressly in *2. d. 3, q. 3*, Alensis in *5. Met. tex. 7*, St. Thomas in *2. contra gentes, cap. 52*, where Ferrariensis, Hervaeus in *de unitate Formarum, q. 5*, Suarez in *disp. 31. Met., sec. 11, n. 2*, Albertinus in *tom. 2 princip. 1. Philosoph., disp. 2, q. 4*, Pasqualig in *tom. 1. Met., disp. 84* — where he proves it excellently from all the foundations drawn from Scotus; though out of gratitude he does not mention him, as is the custom of the moderns, who pursue the spoils from the storehouse of the ancients.

Therefore it must be said with this last position that the essences of things indeed have a plurality of degrees from which they are composed and coalesce — but not existence; rather, there is a single and simple character indivisibly affecting all and each of the degrees of essence. So the Doctor in the passage cited, *2. d. 3, q. 3*. And indeed regarding essence, the matter is so explored that they coalesce from several metaphysical degrees that there remains no room for doubt. For we see that species consist of generic and differential degrees, that they coalesce from superior and inferior degrees in the predicamental line, and finally that the definition — through which the essence of things is usually expressed — consists of genus and difference. Therefore created essence necessarily is composed of several metaphysical degrees. Nor did Aristotle teach the opposite in the passage cited, *8. Met. tex. 10*; on the contrary, from that text it is distinctly gathered that essence is composed of metaphysical degrees — and he compares the quidditatives of things to numbers for this purpose, and makes four comparisons, which the Doctor elegantly expounds there.

The first is that just as a number does not admit division to infinity but one must arrive at indivisible units, so essence acknowledges a limit in division — for it is first divided into parts expressing it, which are the parts of the definition, and then there is a terminus in the ultimate difference, which cannot be further divided. And from this first comparison it is clearly gathered how essence is composed of several metaphysical degrees and how it is still said to consist in what is indivisible — by reason of the ultimate difference.

The second comparison is: just as if any part however small is added or taken away from a number, the species of the number is immediately varied — for by adding unity, which is the minimum in number, to the ternary itself, it immediately becomes a quaternary; and by subtracting, a binary; which are different species from the ternary — just so it is in the quiddity and definition of things. For if from the animated sensible substance — which is the quiddity of an animal — the sensible is subtracted, immediately the quiddity and definition of a plant is constituted; if rational is added, immediately the quiddity of man comes to be. From this comparison too it is evident how the essences of things consist of several metaphysical degrees, just as a number consists of several units, and in what sense they are said to consist in what is indivisible.

The third comparison is that just as a number is not merely an aggregate of units but beyond those material units also has a formal unity by which it is called one — as a ternary number is not merely the aggregate of three units but beyond those three material units has some formal unity, which together with them is not counted in addition to the number but is the specific form consequent upon the ternary number by which it is formally called one — so the essence of a thing does not consist merely in the composition of genus with difference, as of potency with act, but from these joined together there arises some third formal unity by which the essence of a thing is said per se and formally to be one — not indeed by a unity of simplicity, but of composition. From this comparison again it is clear how the essences of things are composed of metaphysical degrees, and how they can still be said to consist in what is indivisible — insofar as from the composition of those degrees there results what is per se one and not an aggregate per accidens.

The fourth and final comparison is that just as a number does not admit more and less, so neither does the essence of a thing — since humanity, for example, is not participated more by Peter than by Paul; because according to all its quidditative predicates it is found in one individual just as in another. And this indivisibility does not exclude composition from metaphysical degrees.

But that existence does not have a plurality of degrees as essence has, but is a certain simple actuality indivisibly affecting all and each of the degrees of essence, the Doctor expressly hands down in the passage cited; for he says there that existence is by nature posterior to the whole essence and to all its degrees; and in this sense he says that it is the ultimate act posterior to the entire predicamental coordination woven from essential degrees. Also that we can adequately conceive essence with respect to all its degrees, even individual ones, without conceiving existence — since "this man" — the Doctor says — does not more formally include actual existence than "man." If therefore existence so stands to essence that it supposes the whole of it complete and integral in its own order, it will plainly not be possible for existence to immediately affect any degree antecedently to the lowest — such that animal existing, or man existing, would be conceived prior to this man existing. The consequence is clear: because in the series of formalities

that are identified in one and the same entity but one is by nature prior to another from the nature of the thing, a posterior formality cannot by the nature of the thing be conjoined with a prior one without presupposing all the formalities that are prior to it.

Confirmation: since the order that those degrees preserve among themselves is essential and per se, it cannot be inverted but is always invariable; therefore existence cannot be conceived as affecting essence unless essence is first supposed complete and individual; nor can each degree of essence be conceived with its own proper existence; but all and each will exist through the same indivisible existence supervening simultaneously upon all and each taken together. But that existence is the immediate act of singular nature — such that it cannot be conceived immediately conjoined with common nature as such — has already been shown above at n. 174.

You will say that this proves only of total and complete existence, but not of partial and incomplete existence of this or that degree; and that just as in the essential degrees themselves the order can be inverted at least by the intellect conceiving inadequately — first contracting genus through individual differences before specific ones, as when one says "this being," "this body," "this animal" (as we concede in *disp. 5. log., q. 1, art. 1*) — so also in the present case the order can be inverted, such that existence is first conceived as conjoined with generic nature rather than with specific, and first with the latter than with individual, by saying "animal existing," "man existing," "Peter existing."

Against this: the Doctor argues in the passage cited that what is per se belongs from an entire genus prior to what is per accidens; but individuality belongs per se to the predicamental coordination and series, as its foundation and as it were the root of the predicamental tree, as was said in *disp. 6. Log., q. 3, art. 1*; whereas existence pertains to a category in an altogether per accidens manner. Therefore not only, preserving proportion, is partial existence posterior to partial essence, and total existence to total essence, but from an entire genus existence is posterior to essence — both partial and total.

Furthermore, the assumed parity with generic and incomplete individuals does not hold here, because those individuals are made by the intellect conceiving inadequately — as was explained in *Log.* in the passage cited; but since existence is understood as supervening upon essence already constituted in its own being complete and integral, it must be conjoined with essence by an intellect conceiving the thing adequately. And finally, even granting that parity, it does not follow from the intellect conceiving inadequately that existence can be immediately conjoined with common nature as such, but only with a generic individual — such that one says "this body existing," "this animal existing." Therefore it is always true that existence does not supervene upon nature except as it is completely or at least incompletely individuated. But the opposite would happen if different degrees of existence were given — for then we could conceive

each degree of essence together with the degree of existence corresponding to it, prescind from any individual difference.

The whole preceding argument is further confirmed from what was said at n. 174: nothing is immediately and formally capable of existence except what can be the terminus and effect of production and physical causality — both because only through such causality is actual entity communicated to the effect, which is existence; and because actual being is in relation to production and is its terminus; and finally because a thing cannot have existence unless insofar as it can terminate the action of the producer. But for something to be the terminus of a production, it must be individual — since universal degrees taken separately are not per se producible, but only as they are in singulars; which is why Aristotle said in *1. Met.* in the preface that actions are only of singulars and tend toward singulars. Therefore existence cannot be conjoined according to diverse degrees with diverse degrees of essence, but necessarily presupposes essence constituted as completely in itself as to include all subordinated degrees from the degree of being inclusive all the way down to the lowest individual one. And this argument concludes not only of essence compared to actual existence, but also of possible existence; since just as nothing can be conceived as actually existing in itself unless insofar as it has actually terminated the action of an agent by whose power it received existence in the nature of things, so preserving proportion, a thing cannot be conceived as able to exist unless insofar as it is able in itself and immediately to terminate the action of a producer.

Furthermore, the same is proved from what the Doctor teaches in the passage cited, *2. d. 3, q. 3*: namely, that no proper predicamental coordination of existences distinct from the coordination of essences is given, because existence does not have its own proper differences by which it can be contracted to constitute various predicamental degrees — which we also taught above at n. 87. From this it is manifestly deduced that diverse predicamental degrees cannot be distinguished in existence, because those degrees are distinguished only in essence, insofar as they consist of common and differential characters. If therefore existence does not have contracting differences, consequently neither will it have the degrees that are constituted through them.

That existence does not have its own contracting differences — beyond the Doctor's authority — is also persuaded by an evident argument: the plurality of degrees in essence multiplies essential predicates — for from the difference of "of itself" is derived the degree of substance; from the difference of corporeity, the degree of body; from the difference of sensibility, the degree of animal; and from the difference of rationality, the degree of man. Since therefore in existence no such multiplicity of predicates is founded, it must clearly be deduced that it lacks contracting differences. That no multiplicity of predicates is founded in existence is evident: because of an existing thing by reason of existence nothing else can be predicated except the very actuality of being — or that it actually is in the nature

of things. But where there is no diversity of predicates, there is no diversity of degrees — as is clear of rationality, which because it founds only one predicate is therefore a simple character and indivisible into further degrees. Therefore the same must be said of existence.

Finally, all things agree so much in this — that they exist — that in existing itself they differ in no way; since as soon as they are in act on the part of the thing, they have everything they can have by reason of existence. Therefore existence cannot import diverse degrees but only a single simple formal character that is the ground for placing essence in act.

Confirmation: even if we conceive existence as affecting diverse degrees of essence — animality and humanity of Peter, for example — it nonetheless stands in the same way with respect to all and provides the same formal effect for all — namely making us exist. Therefore the degrees of existence are not diversified in keeping with the diversity of the degrees of essence; for if diverse degrees of existence were given, each one according to its formal being would have to be diverse from another and exhibit a diverse formal effect — as happens in the degrees of essence. Finally, the adequate formal effect of existence is to make essence and all its degrees in act, and it extends to nothing further — nothing more can be imagined that existence provides to essence; for as soon as it is understood as in act, the effect of existence is understood as completely exhibited and consummated. Therefore diverse degrees cannot be distinguished in it in keeping with the variety of degrees of essence.

Ovviéd replies in the passage cited that the character of constituting a thing outside causes — such as existence — is indivisible intensively, since that very same formality cannot be more constituted outside causes; but it is divisible extensively, since distinct formalities formally distinct from each other are constituted outside causes — into which adequate existence is divisible, or the character of constituting outside causes adequate individual involving superior and inferior characters.

Against this: in this reply a manifest begging of the question is committed — for this is precisely what is being attacked: that existence is not divisible into more characters extensively, in keeping with the plurality of degrees of essence. Furthermore, if it is not divisible into more characters of existing intensively but only extensively, then there is no greater reason why the generic degree of existence should correspond to the generic degree of essence and the specific to the specific — as he defends — than conversely: namely, the generic to the specific and the specific to the generic. The consequence is proved: because all and each of the degrees of existence provide the very same formal effect of being outside causes — since they differ from each other only extensively; therefore if no other difference is found between them, the generic degree of existence could indifferently affect the specific degree of essence, and the specific degree of existence the generic degree of essence — since they provide the same formal

effect. Indeed, because all and each of the degrees of existence provide the very same formal effect, from this it must be deduced that there is not this diversity of degrees in existence; for where there is no diversity of formal effect, neither can there be a diversity of cause. Since therefore all degrees of essence are placed outside causes in the same way, and no diversity whatever is discerned among them in this regard, it clearly follows from this that existence is altogether indivisible even extensively; because if such divisibility were given in it such that it imported diverse formalities in keeping with the diversity of degrees of essence, there would also be diversity in the formal effect of existence.

Ovvied argues in opposition, proving that existence is divisible into distinct degrees corresponding to the diverse degrees of essence: when I conceive an animal on the part of the thing as actual being distinct from rational — which is also actual being — I conceive the same distinction between the actualities of animal and rational as between animal and rational; therefore just as I divide man through reason into animal and rational, so I divide the actuality of man into the actuality of animal and rational; and thus there will be an actuality of animal precisioned from the actuality of rational, and conversely — and neither will include the other.

Confirmation: being is not precisioned from the character of existing on the part of the object; therefore in the way in which being is apprehended, existence at least on the part of the object is apprehended — since it is not formally distinct from it on the part of the object; therefore to the degree of being a proper existence corresponds.

To this the reply is: it is indeed true that essence according to all its degrees is in act — but in such a way that it is subjected to existence as something complete from all its degrees inclusive of individuality; for only in such a state can it be conceived as immediately capable of existence and the suitable terminus of physical causality. I said "immediately" because nature, as precisioned from individuality, can still be conceived as apt to exist mediately — but mediately, through the individual in which it exists. Therefore the assumption in the argument is denied: that degrees of essence can be conceived separately as actual and actually existing. For just as taken separately they cannot terminate a production, so neither can they have a proper actuality or be conceived with a proper actuality. And this reply is confirmed: because those formalities of animal and rational are not conceived in any way as distinguished as existing — indeed under this aspect they entirely agree: for just as much is animality actually on the part of the thing in Peter as rationality. But they are conceived as distinct only under the special characters of animal and rational. Therefore it is false that the actuality of man can be so well divided into the actuality of animal and rational, as man is divided into animal and rational; and that distinct actualities of animal and rational can be so well conceived as distinct animal and rational are conceived.

To the confirmation: it is false that being cannot prescind in some way from the character of existence, because although a mode cannot be conceived without the thing of which it is the mode, the thing can nonetheless be conceived without the mode being conceived. But since for an exact and perfect conception of the thing it is also required that it be conceived with the mode, I say that when being is conceived as able to exist, it is not conceived as having such an order to being immediately and in itself, but through the individual in which it can exist.

Second, Aversa in the passage cited argues: just as we conceive all the intrinsic degrees of an individual not existing — for example, of Antichrist — and distinguish them through reason, so we conceive those same degrees as actually existing in an already produced individual; therefore not only do the degrees of essence themselves mutually differ, but also their actualities.

Confirmation: for it is not only true to say "Peter has his individuality actually posited" but also "Peter has his humanity actually posited" — that is, the actual entity of humanity itself. Therefore the actuality of being in Peter is not like a simple form through reason, but as there are essential degrees, so many actual entities do we distinguish through reason. The consequence is proved: because we understand all this actuality as supervening upon all essential degrees and each degree as affected by a peculiar existence; otherwise all would not exist.

Finally, one can affirm and know that man, for example, exists, and animal exists, abstracting from this or that man, from this or that species of animal; therefore through reason existence of man is distinguished from existence of individuality, and existence of animal from existence of the specific difference contracting it.

To the argument of Ovviéd: it is replied by denying that the degrees of essence, as existing reduplicatively, are conceived as distinct — since under the character of existence they do not found diverse predicates but entirely agree. To the confirmation: granting the antecedent, the consequence is denied. To the proof: we say indeed that all and each of the degrees of essence are affected by existence — but not taken separately, but insofar as they are all conjoined in the same essence; because so taken they constitute a certain third thing including all of them, which is the suitable susceptible of existence and can be the immediate terminus of a production. But if the degrees of essence are considered separately, then they do not have a proximate aptitude for being produced and for receiving existence through a production; and therefore it cannot truly and with a foundation in the thing be conceived that any degree is actual and existing precisioned from the others.

To the last: neither in that case would existence be immediately conjoined with the sole common nature of animality or humanity, but with some vague and indeterminate individual of man or animal — for the intellect would conceive some individual existing in the species of man, or in some other species of

animal; since the intellect knows that nothing can be on the part of the thing that is not individual or singular.

Third, it is argued: several things cannot exist through one existence; hence in a physical composite, beyond the total existence of the composite, we also admit partial existences of matter and form. Therefore so too in the present case several formalities and metaphysical degrees cannot exist through the single existence of singular nature; rather degrees of existence will have to be multiplied in keeping with the multiplication of degrees of essence — even in a metaphysical composite.

Confirmation: if this variety of degrees is not assigned even in existence, but it is a single simple and indivisible character, then the existences of all created things of the same kind would be of the same character and species — which is false, since existence follows the condition of essence, and therefore if essences are diverse, existences too will be diverse. Finally, some things we see to exist per se — as substances; others to inexist in another — as accidents. Therefore divided species of existence must be given, and consequently common and differential degrees corresponding to degrees of essence.

The reply is to deny the parity between things and formalities, and between a physical and a metaphysical composite; because — as is clear from n. 174 — a thing properly so called is that which has such an essence that its own proper existence must correspond to the thing, since it can in itself and immediately terminate physical action; and therefore since in a physical composite there are several things, several existences must also be multiplied adapted to them. But it is not so of formalities, since they do not have being through physical causality but through simple metaphysical emanation; they are not the sufficient subject of a peculiar existence, but all exist adequately through the single existence alone of the thing with which they are identified and to whose integrity they pertain.

To the confirmation: since by the precise inspection of existence things do not differ from each other — for all are equally placed outside causes through existence — there is no inconvenience in saying that the existences of things are of the same character, nor in their being multiplied by species or diversified in keeping with the diversity of essences. For this reason too it was said in *Phys., disp. 13* that the duration of things — which we did not there distinguish from existence — is of the same character even in things specifically diverse from each other, provided they have the same mode of persisting, with Scotus in *2. d. 2, q. 2*. Therefore the existences of things of diverse species differ materially and fundamentally by species — by reason of the essences they affect — but not formally.

To the last: the first consequence is denied, because subsistence and inexistence properly speaking are not differences of existence but rather of essence itself: for a thing's inexisting or subsisting does not come about by reason of existence taken

precisely, but by reason of essence — since it is of such or such an essence; hence to be of such a nature as to require being in another is the constitutive of an accident, just as requiring being per se is the proper and essential constitutive of substance. But even granting the first consequence, the second can still be denied: for from this that subsistence and inexistence are two species of existence as such, it does not follow that it is divisible into degrees corresponding to the essence it affects — but only that it is divisible into the degrees constituting those species.

Fourth and finally, it is argued that this is not the mind of Scotus in the passage cited, 2. d. 3, q. 3: first, because although he there says that existence does not have its own proper differences other than the differences of essence — since then one would have to posit a proper series of essences other than the series of essences — he nonetheless affirms that it has the same ones which essence has, and is determined by the determination of it. Therefore it can have degrees corresponding to the degrees of essence. Hence, moved by this, Lichet in the same place holds the opposite part as the mind of the Doctor, and distinguishes degrees of existence in keeping with the distinction of degrees of essence, and attributes to common nature even as it precedes individuality a proper existence.

Confirmation: because Scotus in the same place, *lit. B.*, denies that existence is the principle of individuation — since the same question is about existence: what it is and from what it is contracted so as to be this one; for just as the same specific nature is in several individuals, it has existence of the same character in them.

The reply is that the Doctor in the passage cited concludes at the end of the question that existence is the ultimate act of essence, and is posterior to essence even individuated and singularized — since "this man" does not formally include actual existence more than "man." And therefore he expressly stands for our view. But lest he appear self-contradictory in the same question, I say the Doctor does not affirm those things absolutely but hypothetically. For he says that existence does not have its own proper differences; and if it has any, they can be no others than the differences of essence itself. For if animal existing as such can be contracted to man existing, plainly it will not be contracted by any other difference than rationality, which is the contracting difference of animality toward humanity. He also attributes a common existence to common nature hypothetically — on the supposition that it is one and the same in singulars through inexistence. But this hypothesis is not true, as will be clear from the following disputation — since it is not the same except through indifference; nor will the Doctor be unwillingly thus interpreted if you attend to him carefully. For the chief reason by which he there denies that existence is the principle of individuation is that nature is presupposed as already individuated before the advent of actual essence, since this is the ultimate act posterior to the entire predicamental coordination even inclusive of individuals. Therefore he does not intend there that partial degrees of existence correspond alternately to partial

degrees of essence; otherwise that argument of his would conclude nothing and he would manifestly contradict himself.

I nonetheless confess that the opposing position is not without probability and even has a foundation in Scotist doctrine — which is why eminent Scotists embraced it, whom whoever wishes to imitate is left to his own freedom — provided he first takes care to satisfy our arguments.

Question VI. What is the nature and extent of the distinction between the metaphysical degrees of the same essence.

The essences of things are constituted by diverse metaphysical degrees, as was established in the preceding question. Since any complete nature involves a connected series of essential predicates, things also possess diverse generic, specific, and differential degrees by which they agree or differ among themselves. We must therefore examine the nature and extent of the distinction that obtains among these degrees. The question, however, does not concern transcendent metaphysical degrees — such as the concept of being, the true, the good, and the like — because concepts of this kind are not really distinct from their inferiors and their contracting principles on the part of the thing itself. Consequently they cannot ground any distinction on the part of the thing that would actually precede every operation of the intellect, as was demonstrated in *disp. 2, qq. 4 and 5*, at length. The present difficulty therefore does not consist in this point, but proceeds solely with respect to degrees contained within the predicamental series — generic, specific, and differential degrees. Since this disputation treats the essence of finite being, transcendent degrees — which are common equally to finite and infinite being — have no place here. The question is also posed concerning degrees of the same essence, that is, those found within the same individual. For if the degree of rationality in a human being is compared with the degree of animality in a horse, it is certain among all that these are not really identified with one another, but are distinguished from each other entirely prior to any operation of the intellect.

With this understanding of the question established, three celebrated opinions are in circulation — two extreme positions and one middle position. The first extreme opinion distinguishes essential degrees really, on the grounds that it considers them to be grounded in diverse physical forms, such that physical forms must be multiplied in proportion to the multiplication of degrees and essential predicates. This view is fairly widespread among the Averroists, being attributed to Averroes in *lib. 13 Metaph.* and *1 Metaph., tex. 17*, and followed accordingly by the Averroists throughout: Jandun, *1 de Anim., q. 8* and *2 Metaph., q. 9*; Vener., *7 Metaph.*; Burley, in *proœm. Phys.* and *1 Phys., tex. 5*. In support of this position, St. Thomas, *1 p., q. 50, art. 2*, cites Avicenna in his book *Fons Vitae*.

The other extreme opinion admits no real distinction at all among these degrees — and no distinction on the part of the thing prior to the work of the intellect —

but only a distinction of reason, produced through the work of the intellect. Some hold that this is merely a distinction of reasoning reason, accomplished by the intellect through purely formal precisions, such that the distinction must be located rather on the side of the mode of conceiving than on the side of the object conceived — as do the Nominalists and the Neutralists who follow them. Others hold it to be a distinction of reasoned reason, with a foundation in the thing, such that the intellect produces it through objective precisions as well, so that the distinction is not attributed precisely to a diversity in the mode of conceiving but also to a diversity in the formalities conceived. In this latter way, the Thomists generally speak. This opinion, explained in one way or another, has currency in the schools of the Thomists and the Nominalists, for which reason its adherents are nearly without number: *St. Thomas, loc. cit. and opusc. 42; De Ente et Essentia, cap. 3 and 4*, with the commentaries of Cajetan and Ferrara; *1 Contra Gentes, cap. 24*; Capreolus, *1, dist. 8, q. 2, art. 3*; Hervaeus, *Quol. 1, q. 9*; Durand, *1, d. 2, q. 2*; Javelli, *7 Metaph., q. 18*; Soncinas, *ibid., q. 36*; Bañez, *1 de Gen. et Cor., q. 8, art. 1*; Aresius, *ibid., q. 8, art. 1*; Aversa, *q. 13 Log., sect. 4*; Suárez, *disp. 6 Metaph., sect. 9*; Hurtado, *disp. 5 Metaph., sect. 3*; Morisanus, *disp. 1 Log., q. 9*; John of St. Thomas, *q. 3 Univ., art. 6*; Pasqualigo, *tom. 1 Metaph., disp. 79*; Arriaga, *disp. 5 Log., sect. 1, subsect. 2*; Oviedo, *controv. 4 Metaph., punct. 3*; and many others besides.

The third and final opinion is that of Scotus and the Scotists, which takes a middle position between the ones just described. It holds that among essential degrees there is a formal distinction on the part of the thing, which mediates between real distinction properly so called and a distinction of reason. This formal distinction is greater than a distinction of reason, insofar as it is not produced by the intellect but actually precedes every operation of the intellect. It is, however, less than a real distinction, insofar as those things that are formally distinguished are still formally identified in one and the same thing and entity — as was explained in *disp. 1 Log., q. 5, art. 2*, and also above in *disp. 6, q. 11*. From those passages we now presuppose that such a middle distinction, between real and rational, exists; and its necessity will become still more evident from what will be said in the present question. This opinion is defended by the Scotists throughout: Anthony Andreas, *7 Metaph., q. 7 and 14*; Trombeta, *ibid., q. 4*; Faber, *Theor. 73, c. 4*; Canonicus, *1 Phys., q. 7*; and others from Scotus, *2, d. 3, q. 1 and following*, and *7 Metaph., q. 19*.

Article I. The diverse degrees of essence are not really distinguished because they are always grounded in diverse physical forms.

The conclusion of this article is drawn from Scotus, who teaches universally that in every living thing only one soul is found, containing all the lower ones within itself: *2, d. 1, q. 5, O; d. 15, q. un., ad 1 princ.; 4, d. 11, q. 3, R; d. 44, q. 1, A*. In these passages he denies that three souls are found in the human being — one by which he is said to be living, another by which he is said to be sentient or animal, and a third by which he is said to be rational and human — because from the same rational soul, which unitively and really contains the lower souls, all those

predicates can be derived according to the diverse realities of that same soul, as was explained in *disp. 1 de Anim.*, q. 8. In the Doctor's view, therefore, a diversity and multiplicity of predicates does not necessarily argue a diversity and plurality of physical forms, since they can be derived from the same form according to its various degrees and realities within that form, as was explained in the passage cited and will be explained even more fully here and in the following article. And although the Doctor, in 4, d. 11, q. 3, admits a form of mixture or corporeity in living things in addition to the soul, he does not derive the necessity of a form of mixture from this source, but rather from the contradiction that is the immediate basis for distinguishing several things under being — namely, that when the soul departs, the body still remains. Therefore the living thing is not a body through the soul. He makes this clear in that same passage at the letter Hh. I have appropriately said that the degrees of essence are not really distinguished because they are always grounded in diverse physical forms, because I do not deny that this can sometimes occur. For this is what happens when one posits a form of corporeity in the living thing in addition to the soul: the living thing will then be said to be a body through the form of corporeity, and a living thing through the soul, as Scotus notes in 1, dist. 3, q. 3, O. To offer an example admitted by all: in the human being, everyone concedes two predicates — the capacity to receive quantity, which is derived from matter, and the power of intellection, which is derived from form. Between these two predicates the same distinction obtains as between matter and form in the human being, namely a real distinction; and just as those parts are really separable, so too are those predicates. On this point there can be no doubt, as Aversa also concedes in *loc. cit.*

The conclusion must therefore be proved with respect to the point where the difficulty presses, namely that the multiplication of degrees of essence and essential predicates does not necessarily require the multiplication of physical forms. For if it did, then in the case of an angel or of any accidental form, there would be as many distinct entities and physical forms as there are predicates said of them in the mode of "what it is." The consequent, however, is false. For in that case, in Michael, for example, there would be one physical form through which he is a substance, another through which he is a spirit, and another through which he is Michael — making him multiply and substantially composite. Likewise in whiteness there would be one entity through which it is a quality, another through which it is a color, and another through which it is whiteness — so that it would not be a simple form, as is commonly said. We must therefore say that through the same physical entity, whiteness is an accident, a quality, a color, and whiteness; and likewise that through the same physical entity Michael is a substance, a spirit, and Michael. One might object that the conclusion holds true only for substances and not for accidents, or again, for composite substances but not for simple ones. On the contrary: color and quality are predicated of whiteness essentially and in the mode of "what it is" no less than substance and body are predicated of fire, water, and other material composites. If, therefore, in an angel and in whiteness

several such predicates can be derived from the same form, and be grounded in the same physical entity — which has the capacity, without limitation, to communicate those several predicates — the same must be said, and indeed must be said, of material composites. Though less perfect than angels, these are still more perfect than accidents. I add this last point in order to exclude a tacit response that might be given, to the effect that in angels several predicates can be derived from the same physical entity because the angelic substance is more perfect than composite substance. One might perhaps say further that even in accidents physical forms are to be multiplied in proportion to the multiplication of essential degree. This solution is rejected by all. For the question is posed concerning whiteness itself, considered in abstraction from any other really distinct entity: does it confer the being of color or not? If it does confer the being of color, then already several degrees are derived from one entity. If it does not confer the being of color, it follows that whiteness is not a color, and that color cannot be predicated in the direct mode of whiteness. Furthermore, the question is posed concerning whiteness taken in itself: does it express an intrinsic dependence on a subject in which it is sustained, or not? Not the second, because then it would be a substance, not an accident. If the first, then it is intrinsically and in virtue of its own entity an accident, and thus from the same entity both a generic and a specific degree will be derived. Although this line of argument proceeds validly against the position that denies plurality of forms in the composite altogether, it encounters a difficulty in our own view, which admits such plurality in living things — for one could argue in the same way that the human being is not essentially and quidditatively a body, if it is not a body through the very same form through which it is a human being, but rather through a different one. For this reason, that response is better impugned by proving that an accident is not a composite of matter and form, but a simple form, as is held by Scotus, 8 *Metaph.*, q. 1, and Anthony Andreas, *ibid.*, q. 5. Nevertheless, within our own position the difficulty raised concerning the plurality of forms in living things can still be met, because in that case the body and the soul in the human being are produced by distinct productions and by distinct agents, and are again corrupted by distinct corruptions and perish separately; and upon the departure of the soul, the body still remains. From this posterior evidence we conclude that there is a plurality of forms in animate composites. This is not observed in accidents, since they are brought into the being of accident by a single production with respect to all their predicates, and they likewise perish by a single corruption. We therefore draw the opposite conclusion in their regard.

A second principal argument against this opinion comes from the considerations that Aureolus brings against us. If the generic degree were really distinct from the differences, then it could be transferred from one specific difference to another and transmuted — just as matter passes from one form to another. This consequence is proved as follows: every absolute reality that is prior to another and really distinct from it on the part of the thing can be separated from it by at

least divine power, because it does not depend on that other, as Scotus himself concedes in 2, d. 12, q. 2. But to give a genus without differences is altogether impossible, as shown in 2 *Metaph.*, c. 16 and 3 *Metaph.*, c. 3. Furthermore, it would follow that the animality of the human being could become the animality of the lion, and that rationality could perish while animality remained. Likewise, the very same generic entity of an accident could at one time become heat and at another time cold, by receiving successively this or that difference; and thus the character of whiteness could be corrupted while the character of color remained. And indeed this consequence is clear: given a real distinction among these degrees, it would follow that one essential degree could be produced or corrupted without another — just as a form or figure can be destroyed without destroying matter or quantity; and in our own view, the soul is destroyed while the body, as the other part of the composite, remains. Furthermore, each degree would then be produced by a distinct action from every other, just as the forms from which they are derived; and thus an accident, the rational soul, and an angel would be produced by several actions and would likewise cease to exist by distinct corruptions, as is the case with the soul and the form of corporeity. Finally, whatever is on the part of the thing and really distinct from something else must be in some determinate complete species, or at least an incomplete one — as we ourselves hold concerning the body as one part of the composite in animate things. But this cannot be said of the superior and inferior predicamental degrees, since the generic degree cannot be in the lowest species.

A third argument, and a very important one: I show that even the opponents must derive several metaphysical predicates from the same physical entity. For if, in proportion to the diversity of predicates that belong to fire, for example, entities and forms must be multiplied, it is certain that such forms must be mutually subordinate in the manner of act and potency, so as to constitute the essence of fire as a unity — otherwise from them there would not be made a being that is one per se. Therefore in the matter of fire, a form that gives the first generic degree — say, of substance — is a substantial act with respect to the matter that it informs. But since it must be united with another form that gives an inferior degree, namely that of body, it must have with respect to that other form the character of potency; otherwise together with it it would not make something that is one per se. Therefore in that same form and physical entity, degrees of essence are already doubled and multiplied — namely the character of substance, the character of act, and the character of potency. But if one were to say that in proportion to these degrees physical forms must also be multiplied, then clearly either an infinite regress results, or we must eventually arrive at some entity that is simultaneously act and potency. Indeed the same argument can be pressed even against the prime matter of fire itself, because matter is being, is substance, and is essentially potency — and all of these predicates belong to it as the primary subject of those forms. Therefore several predicates are already derived in prime matter itself from the same physical entity. And if one again says that physical

forms must be multiplied in proportion to these degrees, then that entity will not be prime matter, the primary subject of all forms, but rather some prior entity — about which the same argument can again be made — and thus we shall either proceed to infinity, or we must eventually stop at some entity that is of itself being, substance, and the primary subject of all forms.

A fourth and final argument, which is nearly a reason a priori: it is not repugnant that several predicates should be united and identified in one integral entity. Therefore a diversity of predicates does not necessarily argue a diversity of forms from which they are derived. The assumption is proved because in God, several perfections are united in one most simple entity, and several diverse predicates are derived from that same entity. One might reply that in God they are united in one entity by reason of his infinite perfection, by reason of which God really and identically includes whatever belongs to him, as Scotus shows in *Quodl.* 5; and that in creatures, by reason of their limitedness, a plurality of forms will be necessary in order to ground several and diverse predicates. On the contrary: there is no repugnance on the part of the predicates as they import diverse perfections, nor from the fact that they are limited characters. Therefore there is no repugnance from any source. The assumption is proved with respect to the second part — since the first is evident enough of itself — because, as the Doctor notes in *1, d. 8, q. 4, ad 1 princ.*, and *2, d. 3, q. 6, sub L*, although limitation prevents a superior and inferior degree from coalescing into one entity if they are considered precisely in themselves, it does not prevent them from being able to come together in some third thing that is essentially constituted by them, and thus being really identified with one another by reason of that third thing, according to the rule: what are the same as some third thing are the same as each other by reason of that third thing. That this is possible is proved as follows: these predicates, which stand to each other as superior and inferior, are mutually subordinate in their order to a single essence, and have an essential connection among themselves, such that one is the contraction of the other within the same genus, so that together they constitute a certain third thing. Therefore all these predicates are identified in the same entity that they integrate and constitute. The consequence is proved because, as can be gathered from the Doctor in *2, d. 12, q. 2, ad 1*, this is the difference between physical and metaphysical composition: the parts of a physical composite, being things in the proper sense and being genuine and proper causes with respect to the physical composite, are not identified with it, and therefore are not united to constitute it with a unity of identity, but only with a unity of union. The actual and potential metaphysical degrees, however, because they do not import things but rather realities of the same thing, and because they constitute the whole not through physical causality but through metaphysical causality, are united to one another for the purpose of constituting it not only with a unity of union but also with a unity of identity, as the Doctor says. This same disparity between physical parts and metaphysical parts in their order to the wholes they constitute was also noted by Tartaret, *2, d. 3, q. 6*, in the

solution to the first principal argument, in a certain difficulty that he proposes at the end of it.

This entire discussion is further confirmed and clarified by the admirable doctrine that Scotus teaches in *cit. 2, d. 3, q. 6, lit. K and L*, in order to explain metaphysical composition. He says that anything common and yet determinable can still be distinguished — however much it may be one thing — into several formally distinct realities, of which this is formally not that: this is formally the entity of the singular (for he is there attempting to track down the individual difference), and that is formally the entity of the nature. Nor can these two realities be things and things in the way that the reality from which the genus is derived and the reality from which the difference is derived can be things and things; rather they are always formally distinct realities of the same thing. These realities, when united together, make a composition, because the reality from which the specific difference is derived is potential with respect to this reality from which the individual difference is derived — just as if they were things and things. For the specific reality does not of itself have that by which it includes the individual reality by identity, but only a certain third thing includes both of them by identity. And this is the sort of composition that cannot stand with divine simplicity. For that simplicity is not only incompatible with the composition of thing and thing, of actual and potential, but also with the composition of an actual reality and a potential reality. For when any essential thing in God is compared to any other essential thing, it is formally infinite, and therefore of itself has that by which it includes by identity whatever can coexist with it. And those extremes are not precisely the same because some third thing perfectly includes both of them; but in the present case neither the specific entity includes the individual entity by identity nor vice versa, but only some third thing — of which both of these are, as it were, per se primary parts — includes both of them by identity. And so there is removed the most perfect composition, which is from thing and thing, though not every composition: for universally, whatever nature is not of itself this particular thing but is determinable to being this particular thing — whether it is determined by another thing (which is impossible in anything) or by another reality — is not simply simple. So the Doctor argues in *loc. cit.* By these words he indicates that several metaphysical predicates can be derived from the same thing and physical entity, though according to different and different realities within that same physical entity that are identified with one another by identity — one of which is potential and the other actual — and from the first the character of genus is derived, from the other the character of difference. Thus the same physical entity and nature — for example, humanity — although it is one physical entity, is nonetheless metaphysically multiple, because it contains within itself several realities unitively and identically; and by reason of this multiplicity, several and diverse predicates can be derived from it. I have perhaps proved this conclusion more laboriously than the matter required, since it is accepted by all. Yet all of this doctrine was necessary because, although it is received by all, it is

not proved and explained in the same way by all. The Thomists, for their part, wish to derive the essential predicates neither in terms of a multiplicity of things nor in terms of a plurality of realities — which they regard as Scotist fictions — but derive them from the same altogether simple physical entity of the thing, which is only fundamentally and virtually multiple. Moreover, many of the Thomists, and indeed some of our own, bring forward certain arguments to prove this conclusion that also tell against the plurality of forms in living things. It was therefore necessary to adduce those arguments that would establish the conclusion as stated without in any way undermining the plurality of forms in the composite. Other arguments to the same effect may be seen below in *disp. 9, q. 2, n. 30*, where it is specially proved that a common nature is not really distinct from singularity.

In opposition, one first objects on the authority of Aristotle, who in *2 Metaph., c. 2*, shows that there is no infinite regress in formal causes by arguing from the fact that there is no infinite regress in quidditative predicates. Therefore, in Aristotle's view, forms are multiplied in proportion to these predicates. Likewise in *7 Metaph., c. de definitione*, he says that the parts of the definition — namely, genus and difference — always correspond to the parts of the thing defined. Therefore one part of the thing defined corresponds to the genus and a different part to the difference. Finally, in *7 and 8 Metaph.*, he teaches not infrequently that genus is derived from matter and difference from form, and therefore that they are always derived from different parts.

To the first I respond by denying the consequence. For, as Aversa explains in that passage, Aristotle's intention is to prove that if there were infinitely many forms, there would likewise be infinitely many quidditative predicates — since at least one predicate would be derived from each form. By excluding an infinity of predicates, he consequently excludes an infinity of forms. He does not intend, however, that there are as many forms as there are quidditative predicates. Alternatively, if one follows others in saying that Aristotle's argument there proceeds from the greater to the lesser — proving that if there is no infinite regress in quidditative predicates, which are far more numerous than physical forms, there is much less one in formal causes, of which each contains several predicates — then the authority, understood in this way, tells rather in our favor. To the second I respond that it is by no means necessary for genus and difference always to be derived from diverse physical parts, since not every defined thing has such parts, as is evident in the case of the angel and of accident. The authority must therefore be understood accommodately: if the definition is physical, the physical parts of the thing defined correspond to it, as when the human being is said to be a composite of soul and body; if the definition is metaphysical, the metaphysical parts correspond — namely, the potential reality from which the genus is derived, and the actual reality of the same nature from which the difference is derived. So the Doctor explains in *q. 16 Univ.* and *7 Metaph., q. 19*, and *1, d. 3, q. 3, O*, and *2, d. 3, q. 6, G*, and elsewhere frequently. To the third I respond

in the same way: the Doctor says that genus is derived from matter and difference from form — not properly speaking, since this cannot hold in things lacking matter and form, but by a certain proportionality with metaphysical composition, as we explained at length in *disp. 5 Log., q. 3, art. 2, § Sed ad maiorem compositiones metaphysicae notitiam*.

They then press further with arguments. The same thing cannot be similar and dissimilar to something else according to the same form. But the human being according to its being as animal is similar to brutes, and dissimilar according to its being as rational. Therefore, and so on. Second, if the human being is a human being and is an animal through the same form, then every brute will be risible, because risibility belongs to the human being through the same form through which it is an animal, and what belongs to the human being as animal belongs to all brutes as well. Third, diverse quiddities are diverse forms, for the quiddity is the form, as shown in *7 Metaph.* But in whatever is contained under its genus, there are diverse quiddities. Therefore, and so on. Fourth, if in the human being there is not posited a physical form — namely a sensitive soul — through which it is called an animal, distinct from that through which it is called a human being, then the univocation of the human being with brutes in the being of animal is destroyed. Fifth, from a diversity of operations we infer a diversity of forms. But to the diverse essential degrees correspond diverse passions or operations — for example, to Peter as substance corresponds existing per se; as body, being extended; as living, vegetating; as animal, sensing; and as human, reasoning. Therefore the substantial forms are distinct in proportion to the distinct essential degrees. Finally, a single form gives a single act of being; therefore several acts of being derive from several forms.

I respond that these and similar arguments either do not conclude, or conclude equally with respect to angels and accidents and other simple forms. For even whiteness, according to its being as whiteness, differs from blackness, yet it agrees with blackness according to its being as color. We must therefore say that in the same physical entity there can be grounded both agreement and disagreement according to several realities identified in it, one of which is more common than the other. Thus the human being, through the very rational soul, agrees with brutes according to the sensitive degree and differs from them according to the intellective degree, as was said in *disp. 1 de Anim., q. 8*, where it was explained how the rational soul contains within itself the vegetative and sensitive souls. To the second argument: the same proof could be used to show that blackness possesses the property of dispersing sight, if whiteness is both whiteness and color through the same form. Accordingly the consequence is denied: even though risibility belongs to the human being through the same form through which it is an animal, it does not belong to it through the same reality of that form, but through a formally distinct one. For the rational soul gives the being of animal according to the sensitive degree, and gives the being of risible according to the intellective degree. To the third: "quiddity" does not always import diverse physical forms,

but either diverse forms or diverse formalities of the same form. In this sense, diverse quidditative predicates express diverse quiddities. To the fourth: the consequence is denied, because for metaphysical univocation — of the kind that obtains between animal and human being on the one hand and brutes on the other — it is not necessary that some real form be physically and really shared by all. This is proper to physical univocation. It suffices that the human being has one form with diverse degrees — generic and specific — and that according to the generic degree it is able to ground univocation and agreement with brutes, namely according to the sensitive degree contained identically in the rational soul. To the fifth: as we said in *disp. 1 de Anim.*, n. 90, it is false that a diversity of forms is always inferred from a diversity of operations, because the same soul understands and wills through diverse faculties, and the same will loves and hates. Therefore a diversity of forms is not well deduced from a diversity of operations, unless the diversity of operations is such as to argue a diversity of the complete physical being through which some complete form is constituted. This occurs when those operations are grounded in degrees so diverse that within the same physical entity they are incompatible. The following rule can therefore be observed for correctly deducing a diversity of forms from a diversity of operations: when operations are disparate and belong to diverse subjects — such as reasoning in the human being, neighing in the horse, heating in fire — then we must infer that these and similar operations proceed from diverse substantial forms. But when the passions and operations belong to one and the same subject, are mutually connected, and are subordinated to one another in accordance with the coordination of genera, species, and differences, then it is not necessary to multiply forms; they can all proceed from the same form according to its diverse degrees or faculties. To the last argument, the Doctor says in 4, d. 11, q. 3, § *Ad rationes*, that a single form gives a single complete, specific, and ultimate act of being; it can still, however, give several incomplete, generic acts of being, mutually subordinate according to diverse degrees.

Article II. The predicamental metaphysical degrees are not distinguished by reason alone, but by a distinction intermediate between real and rational.

The conclusion of this article is that of Scotus, 1, d. 8, q. 3, § *teneo meam mediam*, and 2, d. 3, qq. 1 and 6, with all of his expositors, and 7 *Metaph.*, qq. 13, 16, and 19, followed by all the Scotists cited above, and among others by Amicus, tr. 4 *Log.*, q. 3, dub. 4, art. 3; Fonseca, 4 *Metaph.*, cap. 2, q. 4, sect. 3, and 5 *Metaph.*, c. 7, q. 3, sect. 3; and Ferrara, 1 *Contra Gentes*, cap. 24 and 42. In proving this conclusion, however, one must proceed soberly and cautiously. For just as in proving the conclusion of the preceding article there was a danger of introducing arguments that would also support a plurality of forms in living things — in which the Doctor does admit such plurality — so in proving the present conclusion there is a danger of advancing arguments that would establish a formal distinction on the part of the thing, mediating between real and rational, not only among predicamental metaphysical degrees (as we intend to prove here) but also among transcendent

degrees. Although the Scotists are accustomed to demonstrate this conclusion by various routes, I shall not use all of them, but only those that are capable of demonstrating precisely what we intend with respect to predicamental degrees. Those arguments that seem to prove the point indiscriminately for all degrees — both predicamental and transcendent — I shall set aside as inappropriate and useless, because transcendent degrees are not distinguished by such a great distinction, nor are they really distinct from one another on the part of the thing in the character of actual and potential, by reason of their maximal transcendence, as was said in *disp. 2, qq. 4 and 5*.

The conclusion is first proved by way of metaphysical composition, which results from the generic and differential degree. This composition is of such a kind that it is repugnant to God, by reason of his supreme simplicity; it is therefore in some way real and not merely rational. Therefore those degrees are distinguished by more than reason alone. The consequence is evident, because without a distinction that is at least on the part of the thing, a true composition that is on the part of the thing cannot be understood — since composition is nothing other than the union of distinct things in the manner of act and potency. The assumption has been proved at length in *disp. 5 Log., q. 3, art. 2*.

Suárez responds in *disp. 6 Metaph., sect. 9, n. 21*, together with all the other recent authors, that this composition is indeed repugnant to God because of his supreme simplicity — since genus functions as something potential and perfectible with a foundation in the thing, while difference functions as something actual and perfecting, and genus is of determinate perfection and is therefore capable of receiving further perfection from the difference. Suárez adds, however, that this composition is repugnant to God not only because of his simplicity but also because of his divine unlimitedness and eminence. In the first place, for this reason God cannot have univocal agreement with creatures, and consequently no generic agreement. Furthermore, in God no common character can be abstracted and prescinded such that it is not included in every proper and particular character, by reason of God's supreme unlimitedness and simplicity — which is also repugnant to the composition of genus and difference. Arriaga further adds that even in God, according to Scotus's view, this composition would have to be admitted, since even in God there are common and particular predicates. Finally, Oviedo adds that the Scotists speak inconsistently here, because they hold that species is really composed of genus and difference by reason of their formal distinction, and yet deny that there is a real composition of essence and attributes in God, even though these are formally distinct from the essence on the part of the thing. For if that formal distinction is sufficient for real composition in the case of the species, why will the same formal distinction not be sufficient for a similar composition in God?

This solution, however, was refuted at length in the same passage in logic, and is now rejected again by showing that metaphysical composition from genus and

difference is repugnant to God above all by reason of his supreme simplicity. For it is not repugnant because God cannot have univocal agreement with creatures — for it was shown in *disp.* 2 that he can have such agreement in transcendent predicates. Nor is it because no common character can be prescinded in God that is not included in every proper and particular character — for the opposite was also shown in that passage. Furthermore, if such inclusion, as Suárez says, is repugnant to the composition of genus and difference, then this composition does not reside in concepts alone but is in some way also on the part of the thing — otherwise it would not be repugnant to God. It remains, therefore, that it is repugnant to God because of his supreme simplicity; and from this it is consequently deduced that the composition in question is in some way real or on the part of the thing. For if it were a purely rational composition, it would not be repugnant to God, since such a composition does not compromise supreme simplicity.

One might say that a rational composition, when it has a foundation in the thing, is incompatible with supreme simplicity, and that such is the composition in question. On the contrary: as Suárez himself admits, even a rational composition with a foundation in the thing is such that the composition properly resides only in objective concepts, while in the thing itself there is only an extrinsic denomination from mental concepts. On the part of the thing and in reality, therefore, simplicity remains and no composition is posited. Therefore, if the composition of genus and difference is not posited on the part of actual reality but only as a rational composition with a foundation in the thing, it will be possible to posit it in God as well. Furthermore, God too can be resolved into a common and a proper concept, at least by an intellect conceiving the thing inadequately and with a foundation in the thing. Either, therefore, the metaphysical composition of genus and difference is not repugnant to God, or — if it is repugnant — it must be greater than a rational composition with a foundation in the thing. This assumption was proved in *disp.* 2; and Suárez himself is obliged to admit it, since he admits the unity and community of the concept of being with respect to God and creature, though he less consistently denies univocation, as was shown in that passage. Nor is it true, as Arriaga said, that according to Scotus's view this composition must be admitted in God, because even if he admits common and particular predicates in God, he does not admit them with a precision and distinction on the part of the thing, as they exist in creatures, as was shown in *disp.* 2, *qq.* 4 and 5. The objection does, however, hold validly against those Scotists who maintain a precision of the concept of being on the part of the thing; indeed we argued above against them on this very ground: that if being in God expressed a reality expressible by one adequate concept, a composition in God would follow. Nor is it true, as Oviedo said, that the Scotists assert that the composition from genus and difference is in some way real by reason of the formal distinction between genus and difference — for if this were the precise reason, the objection would hold well. But the reason is rather that,

although the realities of genus and difference are really the same and are distinguished only formally on the part of the thing, their real identity is nonetheless not the supreme and perfect identity that obtains between essence and attributes in God, but rather an identity that flows back into them from their union in the third thing. If they were abstracted from that third thing, they would no longer be really the same, as the Doctor notes in *1, d. 8, q. 3, infra I*, and *2, d. 3, q. 6, near the end*. From this it follows that the generic reality, insofar as it precedes the differential, is truly potential with respect to it and perfectible by it, and consequently enters into a true metaphysical composition with it — a composition that can in no way be found in God. For however much the divine essence may be formally distinguished on the part of the thing from the attributes, and the attributes from one another, one cannot be said to be potential with respect to another because of their supreme real identity, which derives from the infinity of the divine essence and from the infinity of the attributes themselves. No place therefore remains for potentiality, because nothing is in potency with respect to itself. On this, see what was said in *cit. disp. 5 Log., q. 3, art. 2*, in the solution to the second argument — which was that of Ockham — and throughout that entire question, where the metaphysical composition from genus and difference was treated at length.

A second argument is derived from the order that obtains among these metaphysical degrees, and runs as follows: between those things among which there is an order on the part of the thing, there is also a distinction on the part of the thing. But between superior and inferior metaphysical degrees there is an order on the part of the thing. Therefore there is likewise a corresponding distinction. The major is proved from Scotus, *Quol. 1, art. 2*, because order requires a distinction among its extremes — for nothing is ordered to itself — and the quality of the distinction matches the quality of the order: if the order is rational, the distinction is also rational; if the order is on the part of the thing, the distinction is likewise on the part of the thing. The minor is proved because the superior and inferior degrees are essentially subordinated in the character of determinative and determinable, and among them there is a priority not only in terms of order but also in terms of a consequence of subsistence: the entailment from inferior to superior holds affirmatively — if there is a human being, there is an animal — but not conversely.

Some respond by denying the minor along with its proof, on the grounds that the subordination in the predicamental series between superior and inferior degree is brought about only by the intellect. On the part of the thing, Peter, for example, is one simple entity, in which several superior or inferior degrees are conceived according as it is in essential agreement with more or fewer things. On the contrary: in this solution, if examined carefully, there is a manifest begging of the question. For without any proof it asserts what is in dispute — namely that the entity of Peter is altogether simple on the part of the thing, without any distinction and multiplicity of degrees on the part of the thing. Furthermore, in

the entity of Peter the degrees of substance, body, animal, human being, and Petreity are included. These degrees stand to one another such that the prior can always exist without the posterior, but not conversely — and this on account of their nature and without any fiction of the intellect. For there can be substance without animality, and animality without humanity, and humanity without Petreity — but not vice versa. Therefore in truth there is an essential subordination among them.

Others respond that while this priority of the earlier degree over the later — according to the consequence of subsistence — does indeed obtain among predicamental degrees in fact, and prior to any operation of the intellect, this order does not belong to them from their own nature, but entirely from outside, by decree of the divine will that has arranged things in this way. If this arrangement were removed, no degree would be prior or posterior to another, nor would this degree be more capable of union with that one than with some other. They would stand altogether indifferently toward the various combinations of predicates that could be constituted from them. But quite apart from the fact that even if one grants this, the order among degrees that is on the part of the thing and prior to the operation of the intellect is sufficient to introduce among them the distinction on the part of the thing that we are claiming, it is wholly false to say that this order of priority and posteriority, of determinative and determinable, observed among predicamental degrees comes entirely from outside and does not rather arise from their own nature and exigency — as Pasqualigo, *cit.*, *sect.* 3, proves well, even though he subsequently denies that a distinction on the part of the thing among the degrees can be rightly derived from this. The matter is indeed so clear as to be almost self-evident. For although the existences of things certainly depend on the decree of the divine will — which is the first rule of contingents, as the Doctor teaches in *1, d. 38 and 39* — the essences of things, with respect to the combinations of their predicates, precede any decree of the divine will and have such and such connections among their predicates from themselves, in the genus of formal cause and principiatively from the divine intellect or from the divine ideas, which are the models and measures of essences, as was said above in nn. 38 and 66, following the same Doctor in *1, d. 43*. For the human being is not a rational animal, and the angel not an incorporeal substance, because it so pleased God and was so determined by the divine will, but because such is the exigency of those natures, and such is what the exemplar of the divine ideas demands — to whose imitation they are afterward formed in time. Furthermore, if this order of things that God has in fact established were removed, either the degrees of things — animality and rationality — would retain their own formality, or they would not. If they would not, the question as posed concerning these degrees that presently constitute humanity no longer arises. If they would, then given that hypothesis they would still retain the same order of prior and posterior, of determinative and determinable, because such order proceeds from their formalities as they stand in relation to one another. Again:

one degree is said to be prior or posterior to another because it stands in the mode of a potential or actual part — for this order of prior and posterior is grounded in the character of act and potency. But given any hypothesis, the character of actual and potential cannot be removed from these degrees. This is proved because from their intrinsic nature they possess the property that one is act and the other is potency; and hence one is called *per se* act and the other *per se* potency. For if they had this condition of act and potency only from outside, they would be act *per accidens* and potency *per accidens*, and thus there would not be from them a being that is one *per se*. Finally, if the aforesaid order did not belong to the degrees from their intrinsic exigency, but entirely from without and *per accidens*, then science would no longer be certain and concerned with necessary things that cannot be otherwise. The consequence is proved because the certainty and necessity of scientific cognition is grounded in the necessary connection of predicates — and this connection cannot be preserved unless the degrees of essence are intrinsically connected from their nature. See Pasqualigo, *cit.*, where he proves this at length and resolves certain arguments to the contrary.

Other authors respond — and Pasqualigo himself concurs with them — that while the aforementioned order of prior and posterior does indeed belong to the degrees from the part of the thing and not merely from outside by decree of the divine will, it is nonetheless impossible to deduce from this an actual distinction on the part of the thing between them, but only a virtual one. For this order is not altogether actual on the part of the thing, but only foundational — insofar as it has a foundation in the thing, by reason of which the intellect must conceive this degree (which is the principle of agreement with more things) as potential, and that degree (which is the principle of difference) as actual and determining. But on the contrary: given such a foundation and exigency on the part of the thing — such that animality is conceived in the mode of a potential degree and rationality in the mode of an actual and determining one — I ask whether the intellect can invert this order or not. If it can, then this order has no foundation in the thing, because by "foundation in the thing" we understand a motive or occasion that necessitates the intellect to conceive things in one way and no other. If it cannot, then these concepts presuppose realities that are formally distinct on the part of the thing and mutually orderable in this way — and not merely one reality conceived inadequately. For order requires a distinction among its mutually ordered extremes: nothing is ordered altogether to itself, and the quality of the distinction matches the quality of the order. Since therefore this order is fixed by the exigency of the thing itself and is not alterable by the intellect, the distinction too will be actual on the part of the thing and not merely virtual.

One might object that it follows from this that even in God there is this distinction among degrees, because in God too there is this subordination and priority according to the consequence of subsistence. For it holds in God: God exists, therefore a being exists — but not conversely: a being exists, therefore God. On the contrary: the priority of common predicamental degrees according to the

consequence of subsistence with respect to inferiors is not a mere logical priority, as it is in God, but a true and proper priority of nature. For they have the character of a potential part of a metaphysical composite, and a constitutive part precedes at least by nature what it constitutes — whereas God is the altogether most simple entity, and in all respects the first of all things. Furthermore, a common degree in the creature imports a true potentiality and a community in its order to many things — which is not the case with transcendent predicates common even to God. These latter import neither community nor potentiality, except by our mode of conceiving, with some foundation in the thing, as was fully proved in *disp. 2*. And this assumption will be fully shown also in the following disputation.

A third argument is derived from the way of contradiction, which always implies a distinction proportionate in kind and degree to itself, as was explained above in n. 139 and more fully in *disp. 1 Log., q. 5, art. 2*: for it is impossible that contradictory predicates should be verified of the same thing under the same aspect. From this way of contradiction the argument runs as follows: animality in the human being is the reason for agreement with the horse on the part of the thing, and rationality is the reason for disagreement. But it is impossible that several things should agree and disagree simultaneously with respect to one and the same reason on the part of the thing. Therefore, and so on.

As a first confirmation: animal in the human being grounds a real similarity with the horse, and rational grounds a real dissimilarity with the same horse. But the same thing with respect to the same cannot ground both real similarity and real dissimilarity. Therefore, and so on.

The entire argument is finally confirmed from Aristotle, *5 Metaph., tex. 20*, where for this reason he said that similarity and agreement are grounded on unity, while distinction and dissimilarity are grounded on multiplicity — that is, on diverse characters — in order to show that several things cannot at once agree and disagree according to altogether the same character.

Recent authors generally respond that several things can agree and disagree through the same simple entity, provided it is conceived inadequately. In this way, God and creatures agree and disagree, and yet in God there are not distinguished several degrees on the part of the thing through which they agree and disagree. For the degree of being and substance in God, through which he agrees with creatures, is not prescinded from other particular degrees through which he differs, on the part of the thing. Likewise the Petreity of Peter is similar to and dissimilar from the Paulinity of Paul: similar because both make their individual the one that differs ultimately from every other; dissimilar because this is not that — so they are said to be primarily diverse. And yet in the same simple Petreity diverse degrees are not distinguished that ground similarity and dissimilarity. The authors therefore conclude that a distinction of reason alone suffices between the character of agreeing and the character of disagreeing, of assimilating and dissimilating. But this solution is easily rejected. For the agreement and

disagreement between the human being and the horse with respect to animality and rationality is not brought about by the intellect, but is entirely on the part of the thing, with no intellect thinking it. For brute and human being agree actually and on the part of the thing in the degree of sensing, and in the same way differ through the degree of reasoning. This excludes the instances adduced in the argument. For it is false that God and creatures agree actually and on the part of the thing in the degree of being — for they agree in that way only foundationally and virtually, not actually, as was explained in *disp. 2, from n. 87*. The same must be said of ultimate differences: that on the part of the thing and actually they are primarily diverse, and do not actually agree except through the intellect conceiving them inadequately, as was said in *disp. 5 Log., q. 2, art. 4*, and will be said again below in the following disputation. Likewise, the similarity found between the human being and the horse in the character of sensing is actual and positive; but such is not the similarity found between God and creature in the character of being, nor between ultimate differences in the character of making things differ ultimately — as is sufficiently clear from the same passages. Therefore those instances do not undermine the force of the argument.

Others respond that contradictory predicates can be verified with a virtual distinction, and that similarity and dissimilarity can be grounded in a single simple entity, provided it is foundationally and virtually multiple — because contradictory predicates are predicated of that thing not insofar as it is one, but insofar as it is virtually multiple. This response too has been sufficiently refuted in *disp. 1 Log., q. 5, art. 2, § altera quoque solutio*, and in *disp. 9 Log., q. 1, art. 2, § quoad tertium*. For since those contradictory predicates are actually verified on the part of the thing concerning animality and rationality, and not merely virtually or foundationally, their distinction must surely be actual on the part of the thing and not merely virtual or foundational. For as we proved in those passages, a contradiction always implies a distinction of the same grade and condition as itself: if it is a contradiction brought about by the intellect, it implies only a distinction of reason; if it is verified on the part of the thing, it implies likewise a distinction on the part of the thing in precisely the manner in which it is verified on the part of the thing.

Furthermore, that similarity and dissimilarity are real relations on the part of the thing and actual. Therefore the foundations or characters of grounding them must likewise be on the part of the thing and actually formally distinct on the part of the thing, in proportion to the relations that they ground.

Moreover, the thing of which contradictories are predicated — even though it may be virtually multiple — is still, on the part of the thing, a single simple entity and formality actually. But contradictories are verified according to what is actual and what the thing actually has on the part of the thing. Therefore they cannot be verified of it merely as it is virtually multiple, but also actually and formally,

according to the diverse formalities identified with one another in that same reality.

One might say that this single and simple thing becomes also actually and formally multiple in objective being, when the intellect — from a foundation discovered in the thing — considers from one side the character of agreement and from the other the character of disagreement, and thereby divides it, as it were, into two objective formalities. But on the contrary: the truth and falsity of propositions consists not in their agreement or disagreement with the thing as it has objective being, but as it has real and actual being on the part of the thing. Therefore, even if in objective being that thing is multiple, if in real being it is one, then contradictories would already be verified of the same thing. By this reasoning there is also refuted what Oviedo says in *cit.*, n. 17: that the agreement and disagreement found between the human being and the horse is not real but rational, and that therefore a distinction of reason alone suffices between animal and rational as grounding the agreement and disagreement of the human being with the horse in the character of a predicate. Surely I hold it to be just as true, on the part of the thing and prior to any operation of the intellect, that the human being is diverse from the horse, as that the sun is luminous and snow is white. Indeed it is more true, because that proposition is of a greater degree of necessity. It is therefore false that animal and rational, in the character of a predicate, ground only a rational agreement and disagreement.

Others, as reported by Oviedo, respond that the human being is not of itself similar or dissimilar to the horse, but rather by reason of its operations. Hence similarity and dissimilarity belong immediately to the operations, and it follows only that the operations are similar or dissimilar to one another, not the human being and the horse. Oviedo also confirms this solution because Aristotle, in 5 *Metaph.*, says that similarity and dissimilarity are grounded in quality, just as equality and inequality are grounded in quantity. This solution is frivolous, because the human being of itself and immediately — even prescindendo from actual operation — is similar to the horse in what consists in the capacity to sense, and dissimilar in what consists in the capacity to reason. Therefore similarity and dissimilarity are not found only in the operations themselves but also in the operative principles themselves. Furthermore, the exact same argument can be made concerning the operations themselves: the sensation of the human being and of the horse agree and are similar in the character of sensation as such, but differ and are dissimilar in the character of being such particular sensations. Therefore they have diverse degrees that are distinct on the part of the thing, through which those operations are similar and dissimilar to one another. Nor does the point carry — that similarity and dissimilarity are grounded only in qualities — for this is indeed true when speaking of accidental similarity and dissimilarity. But not so of substantial similarity and dissimilarity, which consists in the uniformity or disformity of nature and of some substantial predicate, and which, properly speaking, Aristotle in 5 *Metaph.*, c. 15 calls identity and diversity.

He says there that unity in substance produces identity, just as in quality it produces similarity and in quantity equality; and these relations are grounded immediately in substance, just as those are grounded in quantity and quality, as was said in *disp. 8 Log., q. 5, art. 2*.

Arriaga responds in *cit., subsect. 4* that it is not repugnant for the same simple and indivisible physical entity to ground both similarity and dissimilarity — not, however, all-round similarity together with all-round dissimilarity. For being similar excludes being dissimilar from the same subject, but some similarity is compatible with some dissimilarity. He illustrates this with an example: heat that is not at its maximum is compatible with some degree of cold — for heat at four and cold at four can coexist in the same subject; but maximum heat is incompatible with any degree of cold. Thus, accordingly, the human being through the very same, indivisible entity of humanity is said to be both similar and dissimilar to the horse, because it is not supremely similar to the horse but only similar in some degree — a degree compatible with some dissimilarity, which only means that the human being is not supremely similar to it. This solution too consists only in words, and against it I argue as follows: even some similarity and some dissimilarity in the same subject require distinct characters of grounding on the part of the thing. Therefore the solution does not satisfy. The assumption is proved, first, because the arguments given above conclude equally for partial as for total similarity or dissimilarity. Second, because lukewarm water is said to be somewhat similar and somewhat dissimilar to water that is maximally cold — not, however, according to the same degrees, but according to different degrees: it is said to be similar according to its degrees of cold and dissimilar according to its degrees of heat, which it has mixed with the cold. Oviedo himself therefore rightly noted that the very example adduced by Arriaga destroys his response, because in a subject that is hot at four and cold at four there are heat and cold as distinct qualities, by which the subject is denominated hot and cold; and the same subject cannot be constituted, in virtue of the same form indistinct from another, as something hot in a qualified sense and something cold in a qualified sense. So in the present case it must likewise be said that in the same subject that is similar and dissimilar, the character of grounding similarity is distinct on the part of the thing from the character of grounding dissimilarity.

Finally, Oviedo responds that the same entity — say, of the human being — is said, with respect to the same term, namely the horse, to be similar in relation to certain operations that it contains within itself that are of the same kind as the operations of the horse, and dissimilar in relation to other operations of a different kind. Similarity and dissimilarity are therefore derived in relation to operations as characters of grounding, for if operations and accidents are removed, no similarity is found in substances. This response coincides with the one already adduced and refuted in n. 202. From what was said there, its falsity is sufficiently clear. And what is additionally asserted now is also altogether false — that the operations themselves are the characters of grounding the similarity and

dissimilarity found between the human being and the horse as regards the capacity to operate in this or that way. For it is one thing to speak of the similarity and dissimilarity between the operations themselves, and another to speak of those between the principles of those operations. The operations are indeed characters of grounding those relations insofar as the operations themselves are similar among themselves — as the sensation of the horse and of the human being — or dissimilar — as the neighing of the horse and the reasoning of the human being. But they are not characters of grounding those relations insofar as they denominate the principles; rather the character of grounding such relations, among the operative principles that are intrinsically similar or diverse, resides in those principles themselves. At most, therefore, it follows that similarity and dissimilarity of principles can be known only extrinsically and a posteriori from their operations, as things more known to us.

A fourth argument is derived from the very nature of the formal distinction on the part of the thing. This distinction is of such a kind that it holds between formalities that, although they are really identified with one another in the same thing according to their subjective and material being, are nonetheless expressed by different definitions and quidditative concepts, or such that one is not included quidditatively in the concept of the other — as is sufficiently clear from the disputation cited frequently on identities and distinctions, both in logic and here in metaphysics, where we explained the nature and condition of this middle distinction as it is separated from real distinction and rational distinction properly so called. But the metaphysical degrees stand in the same thing in this way and are distinguished in this way. Therefore, and so on.

The minor is proved: if we speak of the generic and differential degree, it is clear that they have altogether different — indeed opposite — definitions, and neither is included quidditatively in the other; rather they formally exclude each other mutually, as we proved at length in *disp. 5 Log., q. 3, art. 3*. If we speak of the generic and specific degree, it is also sufficiently clear that they have different definitions — for the definition of the human being is one and that of animal another. And although the superior degree, that is, the generic, is included quidditatively in the specific, the converse does not hold. Therefore all these degrees are formally distinguished from one another on the part of the thing.

Recent authors respond that definition, since it is produced through an act of the intellect, does not express things according to their real and subjective being as they have it on the part of the thing, but only according to their objective being as they have it in the intellect. The intellect, when by its precise power it prescinds one formality from another — which is nonetheless not prescinded in the thing — multiplies objective formalities in the same thing and causes a formal distinction. They say therefore that animal, which is in the human being on the part of the thing, is rational and is included in rationality, and conversely; and that they are distinguished only by the intellect in their objective concepts. They

conclude that this solution ought to be adopted by us as well — otherwise the argument just made would prove equally well for transcendent degrees as for predicamental ones, since those too are expressed by distinct objective concepts no differently than the predicamental.

Against this: as was said in logic, a definition expresses the nature of the thing as it is. For the being of the thing in the intellect does not give a thing its quidditative character, as the Doctor says in *Quol. 1, Q.* Things are defined in different ways because they have different natures in themselves, not because they are conceived differently by the intellect. By a definition is expressed the quidditative and formal being of the thing, not the being it receives through the intellect's apprehension. This is especially true when a definition is given through an adequate concept — one to which there corresponds on the part of the thing a proper reality adequately expressible by that concept — as is the case in our present problem with the predicamental degrees, each of which imports its own proper realities expressible through adequate concepts. By this point the objection concerning transcendent degrees is excluded: since transcendent degrees do not import such a reality, they cannot be expressed by this kind of definition — one that explains all that is on the part of the thing — but only by inadequate concepts, as is clear from what was said in *disp. 2*. It is therefore false that a definition given through an adequate concept does not explain the subjective being of the thing as it exists outside the mind, but only the objective being it has in the intellect. And even though the definition is produced through an act of the intellect, from this it does not rightly follow that it formally explains something intentional; rather it truly explains what is on the part of the thing.

Furthermore, it is altogether false that animal, as it is in the human being, is included quidditatively in rationality and conversely. For although animal as it is in the human being is really conjoined and identified with rational, and conversely, it is nonetheless not formally and quidditatively rational. Animal, as it is in the human being, is rational only by identity and by reason of its real union with that difference in that third thing — not by formal inclusion of one in the other. For if rational were included in the formal concept of animal, it could not be abstracted from it. Furthermore, if in the human being animal were constituted in the being of animal and in the being of rational through one and the same character on the part of the thing, then wherever there was an animal, there would also be a rational being — because on the part of the thing it is the same formal character that constitutes both. But one might say that in the human being animal is constituted through the same character as rational, while in the horse it is not constituted through the same character as in the human being, but through the same character as constitutes it as a horse, and similarly for other animals. On the contrary: then the character of animal could not be conceived as common to horse and human being any more than rationality could. The consequence is proved because the very same character that constitutes animal in the human being constitutes rational — but rational is constituted through a

character that is repugnant to being conceived as common to human being and horse. Therefore, and so on. Furthermore, the concept of animal is by its own nature multipliable into several essences or species, while rationality is not multipliable. Therefore they are not constituted through the same character. Finally, one must ask: through what is the concept of animal constituted formally as abstract? Whatever is assigned will immediately be pressed as the very character through which animal is constituted in the human being or in the horse — since when it is contracted to inferiors, it does not change its constitutive character.

Oviedo responds differently in *cit.*, following the Nominalists: the same physical entity can be defined by diverse definitions, even essential ones, and can be explained by diverse essential concepts, all of which import the same physical essence, signified in its order to diverse connotates. But from this it does not follow that the entity defined by a double essential definition has a double essence, or one explained in a double way — since both definitions, on the side of the direct objective concept and on the side of the thing defined, differ in nothing, but only in their diverse connotates or in their diverse manner of signifying the same connotates. Thus, if the human being — who is one simple entity metaphysically speaking — is considered in its order to sensations, it takes on the name of animal and is defined as sentient animate substance; if in its order to reasoning, it takes on the name of human being and is defined as rational animal. In truth, however, it is altogether the same thing, without any distinction in itself, which is explained and signified by both names and definitions — insofar as it stands in relation to diverse effects that can proceed from it.

But although this Nominalist doctrine appeals to many recent authors, it displeases many others as well. For first, many things that are not operative and do not belong to the category of active things can still be defined in various ways, since they can agree in genus and differ in species — such as non-active qualities, quantities, relations, modes, and so on. Therefore, generally speaking, the plurality of definitions of the same thing is poorly measured precisely by the plurality of effects possible from the same thing. Second, the same argument can be made concerning the operations themselves — for they too can agree in genus and differ in species, and yet they are not operative, nor can they be variously defined in relation to other operations (unless we wish to proceed to infinity), as Arriaga presses well. Third, we freely concede that some definitions — or rather descriptions — assigned of the same thing in its order to the various operations it can perform, do not always introduce a formal distinction in the principles of those operations, as is manifestly clear in the case of the intellect, which according to the same formality on the part of the thing, and through the very same power and faculty, is the principle of simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning; and insofar as it is considered in its order to reasoning, it does not have the same definition as when considered in its order to judgment or to simple apprehension. But this is false with respect to essential and quidditative definitions, which are

given of things considered in themselves and according to their essential predicates, prescind from any possible operation. For such definitions always introduce at least a formal distinction in the things or formalities defined. It is of such definitions that Scotus and the Scotists speak when they multiply the formalities of things and the degrees of their entity in proportion to the plurality of those definitions. One might say that no thing can be defined except in its order to its proper operation. On the contrary: as we said, some definable things do not belong to the category of the active. Furthermore, we would then have no essential and quidditative definition per genus and difference, but all definitions would be a posteriori. Furthermore, as the Doctor says in 2, d. 1, q. 6, § *Dico tunc ad quaestionem*: whatever is capable of acting is some being possessing a first act, and the character of first act in itself is prior in nature to the character of being compared with the second act of which it can be the principle, such that even though that by which such a being is the principle of second act is not other than its nature, still its first entity is not its nature insofar as it is the principle of such a second act, but its nature as it is in itself this particular thing. And so the primary distinction of being is not through its nature insofar as it is the principle of such an operation, but through its nature as it is this nature. And thus the primary distinction is the one that the distinction of operative principles follows — for because something is this nature, it is therefore the principle of this operation, and not conversely. From the Doctor's reasoning it is manifestly clear that a thing can be defined otherwise than in its order to its proper operation, and that definitions assigned in order to operation are not essential and quidditative — and it is of such definitions that the argument speaks. Finally, Canonicus, in the passage cited, argues that things that are distinguished according to their primary concepts and quidditatively are not distinguished by reason of what falls outside those concepts. But the concepts of genus and difference are distinguished, since genus cannot be predicated quidditatively of difference. Therefore they are not distinguished by operations, which fall outside their concepts.

Arriaga responds finally, insisting on the solution he gave to the preceding argument in n. 203: that for diverse definitions it suffices if in the same thing there is similarity and dissimilarity with something else, so that it may be defined by one definition insofar as it is similar and by another insofar as it is dissimilar. This solution has already been refuted in the passage cited, because the same thing cannot be said to be similar and dissimilar to another in accordance with the same character, if contradiction is to be avoided.

A fifth argument is derived from the way of predication. For if animality and rationality were the same, then of whatever animality was predicated, rationality would also be predicated — and consequently the horse could be called rational. Arriaga denies the consequence on the grounds that the animality predicated of the horse is not the same animality that is identical with rationality, but a different one; and so rationality does not follow as predicable. I admit that this argument is not effective for concluding a formal distinction on the part of the thing

between predicamental degrees — not, however, for the reason given by Arriaga. For it is false that what is asserted in that solution — namely, that the animality attributed to the horse is not the same one predicated of the human being, but a different one — is true. For if that is so, then being an animal will not be a predicate common to both; or if it is a predicate common to both, then animal, as predicated of the horse, is the very same thing as what is predicated of the human being. This argument therefore proves well enough that the common degree has a unity and a precision of concept from its inferiors and contracting principles, according to which it can be predicated of them in the mode of a universal. But it does not prove that this precision must be on the part of the thing prior to any operation of the intellect — because for the character of a universal, such a precision on the part of the thing is by no means necessary, since the universal is made by the intellect and has its being through the operation of the intellect, not through such a precision. Furthermore, if this argument were to sufficiently prove such a precision in predicamental degrees, it would prove it equally well for transcendent degrees, since in those too the superior degree is not predicated of whatever the inferior is predicated of, and yet that superior degree is not prescinded from the inferior on the part of the thing. The reason for this was given above in *disp. 2, n. 94, ad 3*: because predication in transcendents does not occur through what is imported on the part of the thing integrally and adequately taken, but through objective precisions made by the intellect conceiving inadequately with a foundation in the thing. And since for predication simply and absolutely taken it suffices to have an objective precision of an intellect conceiving inadequately — and a precision on the part of the thing is not always necessary — the argument derived from it is not sufficient to establish what is proposed.

A sixth argument is derived from the univocation of predicamental degrees. If such a distinction on the part of the thing among them were removed, all univocation would seem to be destroyed. For all common predicates would be analogous by proportion, because if their distinction on the part of the thing were prescinded away, no difference could be assigned between what is univocal and what is analogous by proportion. The weakness of this argument, however, is sufficiently clear from *disp. 2 Log., q. 4, art. 2, dub. 2*, where it was shown that while for perfect and pure univocation that precision on the part of the thing of the superior degree from its inferiors and contracting principles is indeed necessary, for imperfect univocation mixed with analogy it is by no means necessary. A precision through inadequate concepts with a foundation in the thing, and a virtual or reasoned-rational distinction between the superior and inferior degree, suffices for that. Consequently, speaking consistently, in *disp. 2* we established the univocation of being and other transcendent predicates, even though they are not distinct and prescinded from their inferiors on the part of the thing. Therefore this argument from univocation taken simply and absolutely does not conclude the proposed point — namely a formal distinction on the part of the thing

between predicamental degrees — because in that case it would conclude equally well for transcendent predicates. But it can conclude only with respect to the lowest specific degree, or the lowest species — the atoma species (the species that is not further divisible) — which alone among all predicamental degrees is perfectly univocal.

A seventh argument is derived from the way of separability, which provides the most evident sign of a distinction on the part of the thing between any two things. Superior degrees are commonly separated from inferior ones: animal can exist without rational, and indeed is found in fact without rational — namely in the horse. Therefore they are distinguished on the part of the thing.

Oviedo responds that it is false that the animality of the human being can ever be separated from rational, and false that the animality of the horse can be separated from neigh-ability. What is true is that the animality of the human being can be separated from neigh-ability, and the animality of the horse from rationality. And from this it follows only that the animality of the horse is distinct on the part of the thing from rationality, but not the animality of the human being. Likewise the animality of the human being is distinct on the part of the thing from neigh-ability, but not from rationality. This solution does not satisfy, because it seems to deny all community of animal to human being and horse. For it posits the animality of the horse and the animality of the human being as distinct from each other as are neigh-ability in the horse and rationality in the human being — which is evidently false, since the human being and the horse agree in some way in the predicate of animal, but in no way in the predicates of neigh-ability and rationality.

Suárez gives a clearer and more apt response in *disp. 5, lect. 2, n. 15*, and *disp. 6, sect. 9, n. 25*: animal as contracted to rational cannot be separated from rational, nor as contracted to irrational can it be separated from irrational. Only animal as it is conceived by the intellect as common to both can be separated from this or that determinate difference. Since, however, this commonness is not real — in the sense that there would be one and the same animal entitatively in human beings and brutes — but only the same by reason and abstraction, the only thing that can be concluded from this is a distinction of reason, which may have some foundation in the thing — namely some incomplete and imperfect similarity among diverse natures that can be in the thing without any actual distinction.

This solution too is invalid, because it is false that the nature of animal and of any other generic or specific predicamental degree has only an objective unity in the intellect and not its own formal unity on the part of the thing — which is a lesser unity than numerical unity, being more remote from numerical unity in proportion to its degree. But since this must be treated at length in the following disputation, I pass over it here. I say that this argument is insufficient to prove what is proposed for the following reason: it would conclude in the same way for transcendent predicates and degrees, and for that reason it was answered in *disp.*

2, n. 92. Furthermore, unless the force of this argument is rightly understood, the mode of separation of common characters from proper ones could plainly imply among them not only a formal distinction on the part of the thing but even a real one — since one can be found where the other is not, and such a separation is a sufficient sign of a real distinction. The argument could, however, conclude in the present case if by separability we understand a certain real indifference that every common predicamental nature has from within, by reason of which, as far as its own character is concerned, it is no more repugnant to it to be found under this contracting difference than under another. In this respect, common predicamental degrees differ from transcendentals, which do not have such indifference on the part of the thing, but only objectively in the abstracting intellect, as was shown in *disp.* 2. Therefore, since contracting differences do not possess on the part of the thing such indifference, this is a sign that they are distinguished on the part of the thing from the common degree that is contractible to them and indifferent toward them. This indifference will be explained at length in the following disputation.

An eighth argument is derived from experience: at a distance we see that a thing is colored or an animal, but we cannot see what color it is or what animal it is. Therefore the character of color is distinguished on the part of the thing from such a particular species of color — say, whiteness — and animal as such from such a particular species of animal. This argument too does not please me, and it proves more than is needed — namely a real distinction among metaphysical degrees. For the sense of sight cannot see the same thing as both seen and not seen any more than the sense of touch can feel the same thing as both felt and not felt. But from the fact that through touch only heat is perceived and not cold, or vice versa, a real distinction of heat from cold is deduced. The same must then be said, by parity of reasoning, of color and whiteness. The argument is easily dissolved from what was said in *disp.* 6 *de Anim.*, q. 8, n. 295, where we said that the universal does not move the sense at a distance, but that the most specific thing acts both at a distance and close up. For since the specific character is more perfect and actual than the generic, it is also more active — as is sufficiently clear in the other senses. When heat burns the hand, it does not act according to the character of sensible quality or tangible quality in general, or of primary quality, for then all qualities of the same kind would burn; but it burns according to its most specific and proper character. So likewise it seems we must say of other sensibles in relation to their proper senses: that when a white thing is seen from a distance as colored, what determines the sight is whiteness itself, not the generic degree of color — because a universal neither is seen nor can be the object of sense. The reason why the object seen from a distance does not represent itself according to its specific degree is that at such a distance it cannot diffuse a species that is perfectly similar to itself; and so it represents itself only in an imperfect mode. But when it comes within the proper distance, it manifests itself in the specific concept, as Scotus noted in q. 16 *de Anim.*, *ad ult.* and 1, d. 3, q. 2, *lit.* O — just as fire

at a distance, by reason of disproportionate distance, heats imperfectly and weakly. When white comes closer to the eye, the eye does not see a different color, but sees the same one more distinctly, because of a more perfect species. Otherwise, if there were two objects each moving by its own power — color and whiteness — then when white is seen close up, the eye would also distinguish those two objects: color and this particular whiteness. For from proximity this color is not less visible than it was before when seen at a distance, but more so.

A final argument: the nature considered according to itself — that is, according to its essential predicates — is neither singular nor universal. Therefore according to itself and on the part of the thing it is distinguished from singularity, because no created nature is singular and this particular thing of itself. This argument is indeed excellent and sufficiently valid. But it proves specially the distinction on the part of the thing between the specific nature and its Petreity (haecceity — "thisness"). Since a special disputation is devoted to this — which will be the following one — I do not pursue the force of this argument further, but refer it to the following disputation.

Finally, the conclusion is proved from Aristotle, *5 Metaph., cap. 2, tex. 11*, where he denies that there can be an infinite regress in essential predicates — because if they were distinguished only by thought, there would be nothing inconvenient about an infinite regress among them of this kind. And in *7 Metaph., cap. 10, tex. 33*, having said that a definition must consist of parts — namely genus and difference — he adds that just as the definition stands to the whole thing, so do the parts of the definition to the parts of the thing. Therefore among them there is some true distinction proportioned to the one found among the parts of the thing.

Suárez responds in *cit., n. 22* that the parts of a definition are not properly said to signify parts of the thing, but have a certain proportionality with the parts of the thing — since genus and difference stand in the manner of matter and form, which are parts of the thing, and from which genus and difference are therefore said to be derived. He says this is the explanation of St. Thomas in *7 Metaph., sect. 9*. This response, however, does not satisfy. For we are not contending, through this authority, that parts of a definition are parts of the thing — that is, matter and form — but that there is something proportioned to them in the manner of an actual and potential part, as genus and difference stand to each other. And therefore, in order for the proportionality to hold, there must be some distinction on the part of the thing between the parts of the definition as well, even if not to the same degree of reality as obtains between matter and form. Furthermore, as the Commentator there explains, the proportionality between definition and thing defined is such that, just as the whole definition signifies the whole quiddity of the thing, so a part of the definition signifies a part of the quiddity of the thing. Therefore the genus — that is, the generic degree — must be distinguished on the part of the thing in some way from the differential, otherwise the genus would be

the whole quiddity and the whole reality of the species on the part of the thing. How genus is said to be derived from matter and difference from form, as Aristotle indicated there, we have already explained in *disp. 5 Log., q. 3, art. 2, § Sed ad maiorem*.

Article III. The arguments of the Thomists and Nominalists are answered.

The more ancient Nominalists — Ockham, Aureolus, and others — first argue as follows. If essential degrees are distinguished from one another on the part of the thing — for example, genus from differences — then genus could pass from one specific difference to another and be transmuted, just as matter passes from one form to another. This is unheard of in philosophy. The consequent is proved because every absolute reality that is prior to another and distinct from it on the part of the thing can be separated from it, since it does not depend on that other — as Scotus himself concedes in 2, *dist. 12, q. 2*. Second, from this it would again follow that one essential degree could be corrupted and produced without another — just as a form or figure can be destroyed without destroying matter or quantity — and in fact each degree would be produced by a distinct action from every other, so that the rational soul would be created by several actions, which is equally absurd. Third, there would be a universal on the part of the thing. For if animal, for example, is distinguished on the part of the thing from rationality, it would also be distinguished from irrationality; and thus, as distinct from both of these, it will have a unity — and therefore also a community constitutive of the nature of the universal. For it will have a unity such that it can be under many differences and in many species — which is what it is to be a universal. Fourth, whatever is on the part of the thing and distinct from something else must be in some determinate species, which cannot be said of these degrees, since the generic cannot be in the lowest species, as is self-evident. Fifth, everything that is distinguished from something else on the part of the thing is an individual by virtue of its being. Therefore the generic degree, as such, would be individual. Sixth, the animality of the human being — considered still as distinct from rationality — is specifically different from the animality of the horse, because it still asserts an essential order to rationality that the animality of the horse does not assert (since the animality of the horse asserts an order to neigh-ability). Therefore it is not rightly said that animality is distinguished from rationality on the grounds that in the former it agrees with the horse and in the latter it differs — because in animality itself they already differ. Finally: the degree of one essence cannot be more distinguished from another than the degree of essence is distinguished from individuation. But the degree of essence is not distinguished on the part of the thing from individuation — for even a nature prescinded from singularity is still singular, since under that precision it is still undivided in itself and divided from every other nature. Therefore it is not distinguished from singularity.

Even the opponents themselves — Pasqualigo and Arriaga in the passages cited — voluntarily admit that these arguments do not convince, since they proceed from a false understanding of formal distinction as posited by the Scotists. Those who call this distinction a distinction on the part of the thing confuse it altogether with a distinction that is rigorously real, which also implies separability between the extremes thus distinguished.

To the first argument: the Doctor, in *7 Metaph.*, *q. 13, n. 20*, denies the consequence. For even granting a formal distinction between genus and difference, there is no real distinction; and therefore by reason of their real and entitative identity, the Doctor says that the realities of genus and difference are inseparable. For in a transmutation, the subject must really differ from both terms and must be really separably distinct from them, in order to be able to pass from one to the other. Scotus in *2, dist. 12, q. 2* is speaking of really distinct entities, as matter and form are.

To the second argument: the consequence is likewise denied, for the same reason. By reason of their real identity, one degree cannot be produced or corrupted without the other, nor produced by a distinct action — since those are the effects of a real distinction. And production tends toward entitative being, and therefore only where there are distinct entities and things are there distinct productions.

To the third argument: the consequence is likewise denied. Even though the nature has on the part of the thing a formal unity and a negative community, this does not suffice for univocity properly so called. That would require a positive community — namely that it actually be in many, or at least in proximate potency to being so. Indeed more than a greater community is required for the universal; a greater unity is also required — more than the nature has on the part of the thing — as is clear from what was said in *disp. 4 Log.*, *q. 2*, and will be even clearer from what will be said in the following disputation.

To the fourth argument: the assumption holds for that which per se and immediately exists, and is really and entitatively distinct from something else — for everything of this kind is in some lowest species. But it does not hold for what exists only for the existence of something else, with which it is really identified — as the essential degrees are ordered to the species or individual that they constitute through metaphysical composition.

To the fifth argument: it is clear by the same reasoning, for no superior degree is of itself individual. Rather it is individuated together with all the other degrees by the last degree that supervenes — namely individuation itself, or Petreity (haecceity). Nor does it please me that some Scotists say that every formality has its own partial and incomplete individuation, because for all the degrees of essence a single individuation on the part of the thing is sufficient — since they all coalesce into one and the same individual entity, as will be established below in *disp. 10*.

To the sixth argument: the assumption is denied along with its proof. For the animality of the human being, as distinct from rationality, asserts no determinate order to rationality. On the contrary, under such a precision it is altogether indifferent between being in a human being or in a horse. And in each animal, the animalities, insofar as they are distinct from their contracting differences, are altogether of the same character — as will be said in the following disputation.

To the last argument: Arriaga says that the Scotists can easily respond by the distinction between complete and incomplete singularity, such that a nature as distinct from singularity is an incomplete singular but not a complete one, and needs a distinct singularity in order to be the latter. But these partial and incomplete singularities — which Albertinus invented in *tom. 2, Princ. 1 Philos., disp. 1, q. 10, dub. 2* in order to show the probability of our view — do not sit well in our school, and the probability of our opinion does not need such weak supports. I am grateful meanwhile to Albertinus for his goodwill toward Scotus and the Scotists, but I do not accept his partial and incomplete singularities. A single individual difference is sufficient to individuate all of the degrees, as I will show below in its proper place. Furthermore, the arguments of ours that would prove the distinction of nature from complete singularities would prove the same of incomplete ones. Accordingly, in response to the argument, the minor is denied along with its proof: from the fact that the nature, even as prescinded from singularity, is undivided in itself and divided from every other nature, it does not follow that it has singular unity, but only entitative or formal unity.

Second, Suárez argues in *disp. 6 Metaph., sect. 9* as follows. All the metaphysical degrees in one and the same individual are individuated by a single individual difference, from which they are distinguished by reason alone. Therefore they cannot be distinguished among themselves on the part of the thing. The consequence is proved: those things that are altogether the same on the part of the thing as the same individual and indivisible difference cannot be individually distinguished from one another. Therefore they are in no way distinguished on the part of the thing, because a distinction on the part of the thing cannot intervene except between individual and singular things as such. Furthermore, all these degrees — of this animal, this living thing, this human being in Peter — are grounded in a single simple physical root, namely the soul. But in the soul, the rational, sensitive, and vegetative do not constitute degrees distinct on the part of the thing. Therefore neither do the degrees of human being and animal. The minor is proved because the soul is a simple physical entity, containing no parts or distinct entities properly speaking. And there is no sufficient sign of an actual distinction among those degrees. For the fact that the soul is the efficient principle of all the operations of the human being does not require us to feign various entities or real modes distinct on the part of the thing, through which it is the principal and radical principle of those operations. Otherwise, even in the form or light of the sun, various modes of entity would have to be feigned because of its various operations of illuminating, heating, drying, and so on. Furthermore,

the common sense perceives heat, taste, and sound, and yet for this reason there are not formally distinguished various modes of entity; rather a single faculty formally suffices. Therefore in the same way, the soul in the genus of formal cause confers on the human being all the degrees of living, animal, and human being according to altogether the same reality, without any actual distinction. The consequence is clear, both because the reason is the same for the soul considered under one and the other genus of causality, and because the soul is the radical principle of operations through the very thing through which it is the principle formally constituting the one who operates — indeed, the degrees are not otherwise distinguished by us in the soul than in their order to operations. If therefore in their order to operations a distinction on the part of the thing is not necessary in their principle, neither will it be necessary in the character of informing.

Finally, he argues as if a priori: this abstraction of genera and species — insofar as it is produced by the intellect — has a sufficient foundation in both intellect and things without any actual distinction preceding it in the things themselves. Therefore such a distinction is not to be posited. The consequence is clear, because the occasion for introducing this distinction was drawn from our mode of conceiving and consequently from our mode of speaking, which is grounded in our mode of conceiving. The assumption is proved, because in order for the intellect to form those concepts and make those precisions, the following suffices on the side of things: an agreement and similarity among them, more or less perfect, together with some disagreement and dissimilarity. On the side of the intellect, it suffices that it can conceive what things have in common through a single concept, conceiving only that. But this can be done without any actual distinction of degrees existing in the thing itself. For two human beings agree with each other by reason of the common nature of human being and are distinguished as individuals, without there being in the thing a distinction between the common character and the individual difference. Likewise God and creature agree in the character of real being and differ in the character of such being, without there being a distinction between the common and proper character — otherwise a composition in God would follow. This too Suárez proves there with other examples.

To the first argument I respond by denying the assumption with respect to its second part (the first part being conceded), whose proofs — since he refers them to the disputation on the principle of individuation — we likewise refer to the solutions given there. From this the consequence is also denied; and as to its proof, the antecedent being conceded, the consequence is again denied along with its proof. For it is false that a distinction on the part of the thing holds only between individual and singular things, as such. This is true only of a real distinction in the proper sense — not of a formal distinction on the part of the thing, which is a middle distinction between real properly so called and rational. Indeed this is not even verified of every real distinction, because it does not hold

of the real distinction of natures, of which the Doctor speaks in *1, dist. 2, q. 7, FF*, and which coincides with the essential distinction. For the nature of Peter, even as prescinded from its proper singularity, is really diverse from the nature of Bucephalus and vice versa, by a real distinction of natures — even if not of supposita — as will be examined more precisely in the following disputation.

To the second argument: the minor is denied, speaking of a distinction on the part of the thing in the same sense. As to its proof, it must be said that although the soul is one simple form in the physical sense — since it is not composed of parts properly so called — it is nonetheless metaphysically multiple through a multiplicity of formally distinct degrees and faculties. Now, Amicus, in *loc. cit.*, says that in order to determine from what source this multiplicity is to be derived (which is the crux of the difficulty), it should not be measured from any consideration of operations in general, but from those operations that argue connaturally separable potencies. For from connaturally separable potencies a distinction on the part of the thing in the radical principle is inferred. Just as from operations that bear on the same formal character of the object — even if there are several of them — a specific unity of faculty is inferred, so from faculties as from passions the unity or distinction of the radical principle is inferred. For when we see that from some principle there arise various potencies, and we then observe that in some subject all of those potencies are present in union, while in another not all are found, we rightly infer that in the subject where they are found united, they do not arise from the same principle formally but only materially. For example, in the human being both intellect and sensitive potencies are found; in the brute, sensitive potencies are found but not intellect. We rightly infer, therefore, that intellect arises from a formally different principle than the sensitive potencies. Likewise, among the sensitive potencies, because not all senses are found in every animal — for example, touch is found but not sight — we rightly infer that touch and sight arise from formally different principles. And so on for the others.

Oviedo, however, in *cit. controuv. 4 Metaph., punct. 3, n. 10*, impugns this solution. For separability argues a distinction only in those things in which the separation occurs. Therefore, even if the sensitive of a non-rational animal — say, the sensitive of a horse — is distinguished from the rational from which it is separated, it does not follow that the sensitive of the human being is distinguished from the rational, from which it is never separated. Just as in fire the power productive of heat and in water the power productive of cold are distinct realities — since in them these powers are separated — while in God, who can produce heat and cold and in whom these powers are not separated, they are in no way distinguished (but rather the same omnipotence, taken indivisibly, is the productive power of heat and cold). This objection is rendered invalid by what was said above in n. 207 against the same author, because it rests on the false assumption that the sensitive of the human being and the sensitive of the horse are distinguished on the part of the thing just as much as the rational of the

human being and the irrational of the horse — which is utterly false. For on the part of the thing, horse and human being agree in the being of sensitive and differ by rationality and irrationality. And the same objective concept of the sensitive of each, through which is expressed what it imports on the part of the thing in both human being and horse, is entirely the same — without any fiction of our intellect. Even though, therefore, it is true that the sensitive of the human being is never really and entitatively separated from the rational (since in the human being it is really identified with it), it can nonetheless be said to be separated objectively and formally — because, considered according to its formal character, it is not confined to the human being alone (in whom rationality is found) but extends also to the brute (in whom it is not found). In this sense it can be said to be separable, and this separability is sufficient to introduce the formal distinction — of which we are here speaking — between the sensitive and the intellective. Nor does the example adduced by Oviedo concerning the omnipotence of God (which is the productive power of cold and heat according to the same indivisible entity) sufficiently prove the proposed point. For in God there is no faculty that is formally calefactive or frigefactive in the way that heat and cold are, whereas in the human being there is a faculty that is formally sensitive (through which it is formally constituted as sentient in the genus of formal cause) and one that is formally intellective (through which it is formally constituted as intellective). Therefore there is no necessary distinction there between a calefactive and a frigefactive power — but there is in the human being between the sensitive and intellective power.

Although therefore the response given by some Scotists seems sufficient to them for the solution of the argument, it does not please me at all. For if the multiplicity of potencies in the soul must be derived from the source assigned by Amicus — namely because they are connaturally separable (as is evident of the sensitive, which is found in brutes separated from the intellective) — then from such separability between the sensitive and the intellective there seems to be inferred not only a formal distinction on the part of the thing but even a real distinction, since separability is the greatest sign of such a distinction. Furthermore, as was said in n. 207, on this basis a formal distinction on the part of the thing would have to be posited not only between predicamental degrees that are more and less common, but also between transcendentals. For being, for example, is found in the creature where the character of infinity and dependence is not found, and would thus import in God a reality formally distinct on the part of the thing from God's proper characters. Furthermore, such separability is not found between the intellective and volitive, and yet in the human being the intellective and the volitive faculties are formally distinguished on the part of the thing. That rule of separability is therefore not universal and adequate for finding the formal distinction and multiplicity of potencies.

A better response is therefore given from what was said in *disp. 2 de Anim.*, q. 1, art. 2, nn. 19 and 20: not just any diversity of operations always argues a real or at least

formal diversity in the principles — as the examples adduced in the argument prove well. Rather, principles of acting in some thing must be multiplied at least formally only when the operations proceeding from it require, by their own characters, some prior distinction in the principles — as the Doctor teaches in *1, dist. 13*, responding to the arguments of Adam, and as was explained in the passage cited. Thus, from the same radical principle (except in the case mentioned), in the genus of efficient causality, operations that are diverse even in species can proceed, since from diverse concurrent causes the action of that principle can be determined — as is evident from the example of the sun that melts wax and hardens clay. But this cannot occur in the genus of formal causality, because there is no source of determination there for various effects in species, unless the principle itself contains determined and distinct principles in itself. For a form that gives being by information gives that being that it formally has in itself substantially — through which the solution of the example of the sun, which Suárez adduces, is clear. In the form of the sun there is no need to assign various principles that are really or formally distinct for heating, drying, moistening, and so on, because those effects proceed from it in the genus of efficient causality, not formal causality. For the sun is not formally said to be hot or dry. But because the effect of illuminating the medium it illuminates it not only in the genus of efficient causality but also in the genus of formal causality — since the sun itself is also formally denominated as luminous — it is for this reason that we place light formally in the sun itself. Since therefore in the present case the rational soul in the human being exercises the functions not only of vegetating, sensing, and understanding in the genus of efficient causality, but also of formal causality (since through the rational soul the human being is formally denominated as living, sensing, and understanding), for this reason we formally multiply in it the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual faculty — as we said in *disp. 1 de Anim.*, q. 8. It is therefore false, as Suárez said, that the same reasoning applies under one and the other genus of causality — and that if a distinction is not necessary in the effective principles with respect to diverse operations, neither is it necessary in the formal principles with respect to diverse informings.

One might say: if the vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual potencies are formally multiplied in the rational soul, then either the principle from which one of them flows is formally distinct from the principle from which another flows, or it is not. If not, if it is the same formally, then the same could be said of the potencies themselves that flow from it. If it is formally distinct, there will be an infinite regress.

I respond from what was said in the disputation on the soul: all the individual potencies flow from the essence of the same soul in the genus of, as it were, efficient causality, as the properties of one and the same radical and remote principle — and one unlimited in its order to them. It cannot reasonably be asserted of the potencies themselves that they are one and the same formally, because through them the soul exercises diverse and specifically different effects

not only in the genus of efficient causality but also in the genus of formal causality. Therefore they must be posited in the soul's substance itself as, as it were, inherent to it according to their proper formalities, through which the human being is formally denominated as living, sensing, and understanding.

To the final argument of Suárez: the assumption is denied. As to its proof, the minor is denied along with its proof with respect to the first part. Since the similarity and dissimilarity of two things that agree in genus and differ in species, or that agree in species and differ in number on the part of the thing, is real, actual, and positive — not merely virtual and foundational, as is the agreement between God and creature in the degree of being, as was said above in n. 200 — they cannot be grounded in one and the same simple formality, but there must be diverse characters of grounding that are at least formally distinct. For it is contradictory that two things should actually and formally agree and differ on the part of the thing through the very same formality and reality — as was explained in the passage cited. Hence the agreement of Peter and Paul in the character of human being and the agreement of God and creature in the character of being are far from being different only in degree — one being more perfect or less perfect similarity. They differ even more fundamentally, because one agreement is actual and positive — namely that between Peter and Paul in the character of human being — while the other, between God and creature in the character of being, is only foundational and, as it were, negative.

Third, Hurtado argues in *disp. 5 Metaph., sect. 3*: if animal and rational are formally distinguished on the part of the thing, then the proposition "the human being is formally an animal" will be false. For what is not the same on the part of the thing cannot be predicated of each other as really the same — since predication signifies the identity of subject with predicate. One should not say that the predication is true by reason of real identity, because, says Hurtado, a formal distinction is also real, in that it subsists on the part of the thing prior to the operation of the intellect. Furthermore, some common characters cannot be formally distinguished from their inferiors on the part of the thing. Therefore no common character, by reason of its commonness, is distinguished from its inferiors. For if this arose from commonness, it would have to be posited wherever such commonness is found. The antecedent is proved of the most common concept of being, which is not distinguished on the part of the thing from the degree constituting substance — since substance is essentially being. Nor should one say that the concept of being is transcendent and therefore cannot be distinguished from its inferiors on the part of the thing. For once it is conceded that some common character is not distinguished, the same must be said of all, since the reason is the same in all. Furthermore, the concept of predicamental substance cannot be formally distinguished from the difference constituting the human being, since that difference is a determinate being — and since it cannot be an accident (for an accident cannot be the constitutive of a substance), it must be a substance. Likewise this can be argued of the concept of body: that it is not

distinguished from its differences, since the difference of stone is a substance — either indivisible or divisible; not the former, because then stone as stone would be spiritual; if the latter, it would be corporeal — and body is a divisible substance corporeal in nature. Furthermore, the basis for positing this distinction between metaphysical degrees is taken from their diverse formal definitions and concepts. But the same indivisible thing on the part of the thing can acquire diverse definitions: for example, the same most simple entity of the human being, as it is the principle of sensation, acquires the definition of animal and is called animal; as it is the principle of intellection, it is called human being and acquires the definition of human being as rational animal. The intellect according to the same formality is the principle of simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning, and from the diversity of these operations acquires diverse definitions, and yet is a single formality. Therefore a formal distinction between things is not sufficiently inferred from diverse definitions, since the same most simple thing can have diverse definitions insofar as it stands in relation to different things. Finally, if we wish to multiply formalities and introduce a formal distinction among metaphysical degrees from the agreement or disagreement of things, an infinite regress will result. For Petreity and Paulinity, as distinct from humanity, agree in the character of difference — since this concept can be abstracted from both of them. Therefore the character of difference is distinguished in them by reason of such a character of difference. About which the same argument can again be formed, proceeding to infinity. Nor should one say that those singularities agree not univocally but only proportionally and analogically — both because Petreity and Paulinity agree in the character of difference in the same way as do others, and because the same difficulty arises in an analogical concept.

To this I respond: the proposition "the human being is an animal" is true not only by reason of the real identity of predicate with subject, but also in some sense by reason of formal identity. For formal identity, as we declared in *disp. 1 Log., q. 5, art. 2*, has two senses: in one, those things are said to be formally the same that communicate in the same conceivability and objective character; in the other, what is included in the formal concept of something is said to be formally the same as it — in which sense the superior is said to be formally the same as the inferior, because it is part of its formal essential concept. When therefore it is said "the human being is formally an animal," the proposition is true not in the first sense of identity — as if the formal constitutive character of the human being were also the constitutive of animal — but in the second sense, insofar as animal is part of the formal concept of the human being. It must be noted, however, that formal distinction and identity are not rightly discerned from predications in the concrete, but in the abstract. For terms taken in the abstract purely signify their own formal characters; but when taken in the concrete, predication is sometimes merely material and holds only by reason of the subject — as when we say "the white is sweet." As for Hurtado's claim that a formal distinction is also real because it subsists prior to the work of the intellect: this is entirely false, and the error

proceeds from his not grasping — or refusing to grasp — what the Scotists understand by real distinction as it is separated from formal distinction.

To the second argument: Amicus concedes in *loc. cit.* that this argument impugns not so much the distinction of degrees as their univocation. He therefore concedes that predicates that are not univocal are not distinct, and thus that being and other transcendents stand in that way. As to the objection from the concept of substance and body, he says these concepts are taken in two ways: first, completely, in which case they are predicated only of those placed in the direct line and univocally; and thus they are distinct from their inferiors. Second, incompletely, in which case they are predicated of all things that participate the character of corporeal substance — such as matter, form, and differences — and are not predicated univocally but analogically; and in this sense they are not distinct. This solution deviates from the truth in many points. First, it is false that this argument impugns the univocation of degrees — because even if we were to concede that superior degrees do not perfectly prescind or separate themselves on the part of the thing from inferiors, from this it does not follow that all univocation is destroyed and taken from them, as was said in n. 206 examining the sixth argument. Second, it incorrectly denies univocation to transcendents and calls those predicates merely analogical — because such purely analogical predicates do not exist, from what was said in *disp.* 2. Third, if such analogical predicates exist and have some unity of concept (as he himself seems to wish), they will also have some distinction in their concept from their inferiors. Therefore he incorrectly denies that, according to that character, they are not in some way distinct from their inferiors. Finally, whatever may be said about that distinction of complete and incomplete substance — on which we have spoken elsewhere — it does not help even if admitted. For as was said in *disp.* 5 *Log.*, q. 3, art. 3, § *Responderi solet*, the same difficulty can be raised about that concept of incomplete substance: substance as such can be divided through the spiritual (such as soul) and the corporeal (such as any other substantial form), with respect to which it would not be so analogical as to exclude the character of univocal genus, as was said in *disp.* 7 *Log.*, q. 1.

To the second, then: when Hurtado assumes that some common characters cannot be distinguished from their inferiors, if the discussion concerns the distinction and precision on the part of the thing in strict sense — as it is wont to hold between realities and realities — and if being is a transcendent predicate common to God and creature, then the assumption with its proof is true. For transcendents do not express a concept really prescinded from their inferiors on the part of the thing, as is clear from *disp.* 2, q. 4. But if the discussion concerns finite being as common to substance and accident, or a transcendent being not in the full rigor of a precision on the part of the thing, then the assumption with its proof must be denied. For finite being is formally separated from the constitutive degree both of substance and of accident — in the way that genus is wont to be excluded from and distinguished from differential characters — since finite being

truly and properly has the character of genus with respect to substance and accident. Being, however, as common to God and creature, although it does not have the character of genus, and therefore cannot be distinguished on the part of the thing from the constitutives of God and creature, still has its concept perfectly one — and in this sense perfectly prescinded from its inferiors. In which sense indeed every superior — whether predicamental or transcendent — must be held to be distinguished from its inferiors and perfectly prescinded from them by reason of its superiority and community, insofar as the inferior is not actually included in the superior's concept, either explicitly or implicitly. Note also that the assumption is not well proved by Hurtado in the case of being — that being is not distinguished from substance because substance essentially includes being. For this reasoning would hold equally of any generic concept with respect to its inferiors, since they include the genus in their concept. Either by "inferior" is understood what is contractive of the superior, and then there is a mutual precision between them (since neither is included in the formal concept of the other — for what is contractive always excludes the formal character of the contractible, and vice versa); or by "inferior" more properly is understood what is some subjective part of the superior, and then it is true that the inferior in this sense always includes the superior in its formal concept, but it does not follow that the superior does not prescind from the inferior — only that the inferior does not prescind from the superior, not conversely. Thus, even though substance does not prescind from being (because it includes it in its formal concept), being nevertheless perfectly prescinds and is distinguished from substance and from each of its inferiors, since it actually includes none of them in its formal concept, either explicitly or implicitly.

It is nonetheless true that neither the concept of being nor of any other transcendent is distinguished on the part of the thing from its inferiors. Not, indeed, for the reason given by Hurtado in that response — namely that since they are transcendent concepts they are essentially included in every thing — for this is absolutely false, since they are not included in their contracting principles in that way. And even if it were conceded, it would not prevent a precision of the superior concept from whatever inferior. The reason why transcendent concepts cannot be distinguished on the part of the thing from the realities of inferiors is that they are not adequate concepts, importing adequately one common reality, but import only the very realities of inferiors conceived inadequately. All of this is clear from what was said in *disp. 2* on the concept of being, the exact understanding of which the whole of this response presupposes.

When Hurtado then argues in the same way about other common predicamental characters — namely substance and body — that they are not distinguished on the part of the thing from inferior degrees, because substance is essentially included in the difference that contracts it to the being of the human being, and likewise body in its contracting differences: this is in the first place false. For neither genus nor a superior difference is essentially included in an inferior, from

what was said in *disp. 5 Log., q. 3, art. 3*. And Hurtado himself holds the same in *disp. 6 Log., sect. 3*. Hence the differences of the genus of substance are not formally substance, nor accident, but something that is substance by identity — insofar as they are determinations of substance — and they cannot be called substance except really and identically. Hence in the common manner of speaking, the differences of that predicament are called "substantial" not "substances." And proportionately the same must be said of the differences of any other genus and predicament: the differences of relation will be "relative" not formally and essentially, but only identically and really, because they are not formally relations but the "suchnesses" (talities) of relations, as was fully explained in *loc. cit.*

But even conceding that those common degrees are essentially included in their contracting principles, it still does not rightly follow that they are not distinguished or prescinded on the part of the thing from them. It follows only that inferiors are not formally distinguished from superior degrees, since they include them in their formal concepts. One might say: it is contradictory for the superior to be distinguished on the part of the thing from the inferior but not conversely — for distinction is always mutual between whatever extremes it obtains. For by the very fact that this is not that, it is contradictory that that should be this; and by the intrinsic locus it is contradictory that this is distinct from that but that is not distinct from this — just as it is contradictory that this is the same as that and yet that is not the same as this.

I respond that, speaking of distinction in the proper sense for aliterity (being other), it is indeed mutual: if this is other than that, then that is likewise other than this, whether really, formally, or by reason. But taking distinction in the sense of precision of one from another in its concept, and identity in the sense of inclusion of one in another, in this sense it is not necessary that identity and distinction be always mutual. For it is not necessary that if this is included in the formal concept of that, then that is also conversely included in the concept of this. Therefore, since the superior is always included in the formal concept of its inferior (which is its subjective part) but not conversely, we say that the superior is distinguished from the inferior — that is, prescinds from it — but not conversely. In this signification one might also conversely say that the superior is formally identical with its inferior, insofar as it enters into the inferior's formal concept, but not vice versa. For this is one mode of formal identity that our Formalists sometimes use, as was said in its proper place. I wished to note this lest confusion and ambiguity arise in the manner of speaking — as long as the thing itself is clear. Whether we say that the superior is formally distinguished from the inferior because it does not include the inferior in its formal concept, or we say that the superior is formally identical with the inferior insofar as it is included in the inferior's concept, we say what is true in both cases, according to the varied senses of formal identity and distinction assigned in *disp. 1 Log., q. 5, art. 2*, declaring that distinction in the solution to the last argument.

To the third argument: from what was said in n. 205, it is freely conceded that a formal distinction is not to be gathered from just any definitions and descriptions of things — especially when definitions are assigned in relation to operations. For such definitions are usually given rather to intimate the various functions of the same thing than to explain its essence and formality, as the argument proves well. But it is denied that a formal distinction is not sufficiently gathered from definitions through which things are defined in themselves and not in relation to extrinsic things — for then a definition properly explains the essential and quidditative concept of the thing. One might ask: how can we recognize that something is described in itself and through its essentials, and not in its relation to operations or other extrinsic connotates? I respond: since the proper differences of things are hidden from us, this is difficult to know. But a sufficient sign can be found when, from several definitions given of the same thing, one can apply to something to which another cannot apply. For example, since the definition given of animal as sentient animate substance can apply to something to which the definition given of rationality cannot apply — namely to the brute — from this it can be deduced that it is not the same formality that is defined by both definitions, but diverse formalities.

To the last argument — by which one attempts to block the path derived from the agreement and disagreement of the same thing with others, leading to multiplying the formalities of the same thing — Amicus says that the agreement of Petreity and Paulinity is not univocal but proportional, and thus an infinite regress is avoided. For an analogical concept is not distinct from its inferiors, and he denies that the same difficulty arises for an analogical concept as for a univocal one. But surely Amicus was obliged to give the reason for this denial — because Hurtado will never stop pressing that Petreity and Paulinity agree in the character of difference in the same way as do Peter and Paul in the character of human being, until a disparity is assigned and a reason for the denial given. Furthermore, Amicus is obliged to teach why Peter and Paul agree univocally in the character of human being, while Petreity and Paulinity agree only proportionally in the character of difference — for the objection will be pressed until a distinction is assigned. Otherwise one will have to concede that both agreements are univocal, or that both are analogical. Furthermore, if proportional analogy imports some unity of concept (as Amicus seems to wish), then Hurtado presses well that the same difficulty arises for an analogical concept as for a univocal one. Finally, I proved in *disp. 5 Log., q. 2, art. 4*, that the agreement of Petreity and Paulinity in the character of difference is itself univocal.

The Scotists generally respond that it is not univocal, because individual differences are primarily diverse, and they would not be primarily diverse if they agreed quidditatively in some character. But this response too does not satisfy; indeed it seems to commit a begging of the question. For by the very fact that Petreity and Paulinity agree quidditatively in the concept of difference — just as Peter and Paul agree in the character of humanity — it is proved that they are not

primarily diverse. I must therefore concede that Petreity and Paulinity agree univocally in the character of difference — not, however, in the same way as Peter and Paul agree in the character of human being. For the agreement of Peter and Paul in the character of human being is a real and actual agreement on the part of the thing, grounded in the common reality of humanity. But the agreement of Petreity and Paulinity is only foundational, and is actualized by the intellect conceiving them inadequately. On the part of the thing, they are primarily diverse. By this the infinite regress is sufficiently avoided, as I explained in *disp. 5 Log., cit., q. 2, art. 4*, in the solution to the first argument. Therefore the path derived from the actual and formal agreement and disagreement of the same thing on the part of the thing is sufficient for multiplying the formalities of the same thing, as was explained in the preceding article, in nn. 200 and following.

Fourth, Arriaga argues in *disp. 5 Log., sect. 1, subsect. 5*: if the superior character is of itself indifferent to being determined by this or that specific difference, then the character of being and substance found in the angel and in the rational soul could of itself be in a stone. Therefore neither the angel nor the rational soul would be altogether spiritual, which is absurd. The consequence is proved because nothing spiritual can be found in a stone; but the same numerical character of substance that is in the angel can be in it. Therefore this character is not spiritual. Therefore the angel, composed of it, will not be altogether spiritual.

Furthermore, if in God there is some common character — say, of being and substance — in which God, whether univocally or analogically, agrees with creatures, and which is of itself indifferent such that the same numerical character could be in creatures; and conversely in some creature there is a character indifferent of itself to being really in God — then this would be erroneous. For it would posit in the order of things something that is neither created nor uncreated: not created, because it can be in God, in whom nothing can be created; not uncreated, because it could be in a creature, in which nothing can fail to be created.

Furthermore, he argues, as it were, a priori: it is repugnant for the character of substance to be distinguished from the character of being, and the same holds for other inferior degrees with respect to their superiors, which they essentially include. This was the second argument of Hurtado, already answered.

I respond to the first argument by distinguishing its first consequence: if the character of being or substance found in the angel is considered in itself and with a precision from the difference through which it is already contracted to constitute the angelic being, then in this sense it is true that the same character of substance (the same, I say, formally and not numerically — as Arriaga mistakenly says, since a common nature under precision from its individual difference does not have numerical unity but only formal unity, which is a lesser unity than numerical unity, as will be clear from the following disputation) that is in the angel can also be found in a stone. For this belongs to a generic nature by reason

of the indifference that it intrinsically has of itself toward constituting this or that species. If, however, it is considered reduplicatively as it is in the angel and as it actually subsists under the contraction of the angelic difference, then it cannot be in the stone — because through such contraction it has been identified with the angelic difference, and by reason of this identity they are inseparable.

As for the other consequence — that then the angel or the rational soul would not be altogether spiritual — the consequence is denied. For from the fact that the character of substance that is in the angel could, as far as it is concerned, be in a stone, it does not follow that that character is corporeal and not spiritual. Rather it follows that of itself it prescinds from both materiality and spirituality and is formally neither — being both permissively, by reason of the differences that contract it. As is said commonly in every school of every generic concept with respect to its own differences: when it is contracted to the angel, the entire angel is said to be spiritual, because the substance that was indifferent to material and spiritual, through the contraction of the angelic difference, has been made spiritual by identity. And through the contraction of the material differences to a stone, it is conversely made material by identity. In this sense the entire stone can be said to be material, even though it is true that the angel is called spiritual formally and the stone material by reason of the contracting difference, not by reason of substance, which of itself is indifferent to both. All of this can be explained by the example of the human being, who is entirely said to be rational and intellective, because animality contracted by rationality, as it is in the human being, has been made intellective by identity. Otherwise, formally speaking, the human being is constituted in its intellective being through rationality alone, while the superior degree of animality, as far as it is concerned, formally prescinds from both rationality and irrationality, and is formally neither of itself — being each of them permissively from the fact that it is contracted to the human being or to the brute.

To the confirmation: Poncius, in *tom. 3 of his Cursus, disp. 20, n. 63*, freely concedes that in the order of things there is some reality or formality that according to its formal concept is neither created nor uncreated, and says that this is so true and so commonly admitted in our school that it should not seem surprising except to one ignorant of our principles. But I show the falsity of this solution sufficiently in *disp. 2, q. 4, art. 1, n. 77*, and it is not admitted by the more distinguished authors who follow Scotus. Hence it is rather too bold to say that this should not seem surprising except to one ignorant of our principles.

Consequently, following what was said there, the consequence is denied. For, as has frequently been said, the reason for predicamental and transcendent degrees is diverse: since transcendents are common to God and creatures, they cannot present any common reality, otherwise the inconvenience stated in the argument would follow — that there would be something in the order of things that was neither created nor uncreated. This inconvenience does not follow in the case of

predicamental natures, as was fully explained in the passage recently cited. The rest is clear from what was said to Hurtado in n. 213. And even though inferior degrees include superior ones in their concept — as the specific degree includes the generic (for the differential degree does not include it, and is rather a lateral degree than an inferior one) — it does not therefore follow that they are formally identified in the sense that the constitutive character of the human being is the constitutive character of the animal. It follows only that the superior is formally identical with the inferior insofar as it is part of the inferior's essential concept — which is another sense of formal identity from the one we are here discussing and excluding from predicamental degrees. This properly pertains to essential identity, as was said in *disp. 1 Log., q. 5, art. 2*, in the declaration of formal distinction and identity at the end, and above in *disp. 6, q. 9*. With this identity there still stands a formal distinction importing an aliter of formalities and concepts of the superior and inferior degree, as we speak of it here.

Fifth, Oviedo argues in *controv. 4 Metaph., punct. 3*, proving the first conclusion — that the individual difference is in no way distinguished from the specific nature. For either a nature distinct from an individual difference would have a unity common to many, or it would not. If the second, the intended conclusion is had, because if there is no common nature it will be singular and individual of itself. If the first, there will be a universal on the part of the thing. Furthermore, if the specific nature is distinguished on the part of the thing from the individual difference, then if the individual difference were removed it would be understood to be constituted in its own being — since nothing is constituted by that from which it is distinguished. And so it would also be understood to exist prior to the arrival of the individual difference; therefore as thus existing it would already be of itself individual and singular, and there would be no need to add another formality to make it such. The consequence is proved because the nature, as thus existing, would terminate per se the action of agents; but actions are of singulars both as originating and as terminating, since nothing is produced per se in nature unless it is singular.

Again: if the specific nature is distinguished on the part of the thing from the individual difference, the human nature in Peter could not differ from the human nature of John through the individual difference, but rather through itself. And since it would not differ in species from that of John, it would differ only numerically — and thus the conclusion would be had: that it is individual through itself without the addition of another distinct formality. If one says it is in no way distinguished prior to the individual difference, then the human nature in Peter would be intrinsically the same entitatively with the nature of John. And thus when Peter perished, only his individual difference would perish, and his specific nature (being altogether the same) would remain in the surviving John.

Finally, in a second conclusion, Oviedo subsequently proves that the superior predicates found in the same individual enjoy no distinction among themselves

prior to the operation of the intellect. But since he uses the arguments already adduced by Suárez and answered above — even if somewhat modified — there is no need to repeat them here in other words.

To these arguments I respond: for their exact solution, the discussion of the following disputation — on the common nature — is required. Let a summary solution for now suffice. To the first argument: the nature as such, formally distinct from the individual difference, has a common unity — but since such community and difference, such that it be in many, is not positive but negative as found on the part of the thing, and does not become positive except through the intellect, it therefore does not have universality on the part of the thing but only through the intellect, as was said in *disp. 7 Log., qq. 2 and 3*.

To the second argument: the consequence is denied. For as was said above in this disputation in n. 176, existence does not belong to the common nature as prescinded from singularity, but only insofar as it is conjoined and identified with singularity; and only in this state does it terminate the action of the agent — as the argument itself rightly shows.

To the third argument: the Doctor responds in *7 Metaph., q. 13, n. 20*, where he asks whether the nature of Socrates is really distinguished from the nature of Plato when the Petreities (haecceities) are set aside. He says that the nature of Socrates, when the numerical difference is removed, does not remain one with the maximum unity that is in it, but only with that lesser unity that is common. Nor is it divided from the humanity of Plato by a numerical division, nor by any other — for the Doctor does not specify what kind it would be there. And thus it follows that the human nature is the same in Peter and in John — not numerically, and not by inexistence or entitatively, but formally the same, essentially, and by indifference. This unity and identity of nature does not prevent the human nature of Peter from perishing when Peter perishes together with his individual difference. Indeed this is necessary by reason of the real identity of one with the other. Nor does it follow that when the nature of Peter perishes the nature of John perishes too — as will be more fully explained in the following disputation, from n. 59 onward.

Sixth, Pasqualigo argues in *tom. 1 Metaph., disp. 79, sect. 2* as follows. A distinction on the part of the thing between any two things cannot be posited unless there is a proportionate distinctive factor. But this is not found in the degrees of essence taken separately. Therefore, and so on.

The minor is proved: entitative being is what constitutes a thing on the part of the thing, for only by virtue of it can the thing be posited on the part of the thing. Therefore only it distinguishes the thing on the part of the thing. But metaphysical degrees taken separately do not import such entitative being, because taken separately they cannot terminate the causality of an agent.

Therefore they cannot ground among themselves a distinction on the part of the thing.

Second: if the degrees of essence were distinguished on the part of the thing by a true distinction, this distinction would be essential — since it would fall upon the essential being of each degree. It would differ from the distinction of complete essences only in that it would not be a distinction according to some complete being, as the latter is, but only according to some incomplete being. But this cannot be said, because if they had so great a distinction, they could not be identified in the same entity — just as those differential degrees that constitute diverse essences cannot be identified.

Third: the metaphysical degrees are mutually subordinate for constituting one integral essence. Therefore they cannot be distinguished among themselves on the part of the thing, since degrees that on the part of the thing require distinction have such diversity that they mutually exclude and oppose rather than subordinate one another.

Fourth: what by its nature requires on the part of the thing to be distinguished from another stands in such a way that one is not something of the other — since distinction makes one not to be the other. But the superior degree is something of the inferior, since it is included in the inferior's concept and is, as it were, the inchoation of it; and conversely, the inferior is something of the superior, since it continues such an inchoation and completes the superior. Therefore, and so on.

Fifth: if they were distinguished on the part of the thing, they would not stand as superior and inferior coalescing in the same essence, but as two opposed differences dividing the same genus. The consequence is proved because given such a distinction they would mutually exclude each other in their proper formal characters, and so the character of one degree would be opposed to the other — since essences of things are not divided or separated except by the opposition they have by reason of their differences.

Sixth: when some things are distinguished according to their being, they are also distinguished according to what follows upon that being. But physical being is prior in nature to formal being, since formal being is abstracted from physical being and grounded in it, and metaphysical formalities are derived from physical forms. It is therefore altogether false that entitative being follows upon formal being. If, however, by entitative being is also meant existential being, then in this sense it is indeed true that entitative being follows formal being — since formal being pertains to the essence of the thing taken metaphysically, and existence follows upon formal being in this sense. But in that case it is by no means necessary that, if metaphysical degrees are distinguished according to formal being, they must also be distinguished according to entitative being — since existence does not follow upon the formal being of any degree taken separately, but upon the formal being of the integral and complete essence that they

constitute. Just as the existence of the human being follows upon the formal being of humanity, and by this single existence all the individual metaphysical formalities immersed in humanity by identity exist — such as animality, rationality, and so on.

Finally: the metaphysical degrees are not distinguished from each other really and entitatively. Therefore they are even less distinguished formally on the part of the thing. The consequence is proved because the latter distinction is greater than the former — since a distinction according to quidditative being is more intimate and essential than one according to entitative being. For a distinction according to formal being is formal, whereas a distinction according to entitative being is material. Furthermore, a distinction according to entitative being is only individual, whereas a distinction according to quidditative being is essential, and consequently either generic or specific.

To these arguments I respond that they almost entirely coincide with other arguments of the same author already answered in *disp. 1 Log., q. 5, art. 2*, where he impugns in *tom. 2 Metaph., dispp. 59 and 60* the actual formal distinction of our school. Hence from what was said there, the minor is denied. As to its proof, one must say that entitative being — since it is nothing other than the existential being of things — is not a proportionate distinctive factor for the formal distinction as we here speak of it, but for the real distinction, which is principally measured by the diverse existence of things. The proportionate distinctive factor for a formal distinction is rather the diversity of essential concept and definition — which is perfectly found in the degrees of essence taken separately. For although all the degrees of the same essence — say, the human being — exist as one and the same, they are nonetheless not denoted by the same definition but by diverse ones. This suffices to introduce a formal distinction among them. When it is said that only by virtue of entitative being is a thing posited on the part of the thing, and therefore in it alone is grounded every distinction on the part of the thing, one must say that this is verified only of real and entitative distinction, and of what per se and immediately exists on the part of the thing (or at least can thus exist and does so in the direct mode) — not of what exists on the part of the thing obliquely and by reason of something else, of which it is something by identity. In this way the several metaphysical formalities are said to exist on the part of the thing in one and the same physical entity, of which they are said to be the suchnesses (*aliquitates*) and to which they pertain as constitutive parts. In this sense not only physical being is on the part of the thing, but also the metaphysical being grounded in it and immersed in it by real identity. Hence we say that in the human being not only soul and body are found on the part of the thing, but also animality and rationality, which are metaphysical realities or formalities.

To the second argument: Trombeta, in *5 Metaph., q. 6*, indicates that the formal distinction that falls among metaphysical degrees cannot properly be called essential — because although each imports its own quiddity, they do not import

their own essences. For this is the difference, he says, between essence and quiddity: essence is said to be that entity to which it is not repugnant to exist without another, whereas quiddity is what is expressed by definition. I divided this doctrine above in n. 175 with criticism, because in our view relations and many other things have their own essence and yet cannot exist in isolation. We must therefore say, as was said there, that the name of essence can be taken in the strict and proper sense for a thing to which it is not repugnant to exist and can be the term of an agent's action — in which sense to each essence corresponds its own existence, and what are essentially distinguished in this sense (or import diverse essences in this sense) cannot be identified in the same entity. In another, broader sense, the name of essence can be taken for any essential character and what is in its mode essentially conceivable — and in this sense it can be conceded that formalities and metaphysical degrees of the same thing have their own essence. But it is false that to an essence so taken there corresponds a proper and adequate existence. Therefore several formalities can be well identified in the same entity, because not each one of them has its own adequate existence — but all of them, one and all, exist by the single existence of the thing of which they are the suchnesses (aliquitates), whose integrity they constitute. This doctrine is also accepted by Pasqualigo himself in *tom. 1 Metaph., disp. 83, sect. 5, n. 1*: explaining there the dictum that to each essence corresponds its own existence, he says this must be understood only of those essences that constitute one integral entity, not of just any quiddity.

To the third argument: the consequence is denied along with its proof. For in a physical composite, matter is subordinate to form for constituting the same whole — and yet they are parts distinct from each other. They also exclude each other; indeed they in some way oppose each other in the character of physical act and potency, and yet they coalesce into the same physical entity through union. So, proportionately, the same must be said of metaphysical degrees — especially the generic and differential — and indeed from this subordination of one degree to another (especially since it is on the part of the thing and not merely arbitrary, as Pasqualigo himself holds in *cit., disp. 79, sect. 3*) a distinction among these degrees is rather deduced than unity and identity. As is clear from what was said above in n. 198: order on the part of the thing demands likewise a distinction between the things ordered, since nothing can be subordinated to itself.

To the fourth argument: although it is of the character of formal distinction in one sense that what is formally distinguished is not part of the concept of the other from which it is said to be distinguished (just as conversely that is said to be formally identical with something which is part of its concept) — in which sense we have often said that formal and essential identity and distinction coincide — nonetheless, properly speaking of formal distinction as we here speak of it, it is not of the character of formal distinction that what is thus distinguished is not something of the other. It is only required that the objective character or conceivability of one be other than the objective character of the other. In this

sense the superior and inferior are formally distinct on the part of the thing, even though the superior is part of the concept of the inferior — since the character of humanity is other than the character of animality, insofar as it adds something above it, and they are not denoted by the same definition.

To the fifth argument: the consequence is denied. For not everything that excludes the other according to its own proper characters is thereby opposed in the strict sense — as impossibles, such as two differences dividing the same genus. This is clear from the case of a thing and its mode, of subject and passion, of substance and accident — which mutually exclude each other according to their proper characters and yet are composed together without being said to oppose each other. And still more to the point it is clear from matter and form, which exclude each other not only formally but also really, and yet coalesce through union into the same physically composite essence. So likewise in the present case, the superior and inferior reality, even though they formally exclude each other through the diversity of their concepts, can still coalesce by identity into the same metaphysically composite essence.

To the sixth argument: the minor is denied. For entitative being is physical being and formal being is metaphysical being. Physical being is prior in nature to metaphysical being, since the latter is abstracted from the former and grounded in it, and metaphysical formalities are derived from physical forms — as is especially clear in the human being on the view that admits a plurality of forms in it. For from the form of the mixture the formality of corporeity is derived; from the sensitive soul the formality of animality; from the intellectual soul the formality of rationality. It is therefore altogether false that physical being follows upon formal being. If, however, by entitative being is also meant existential being, then in this sense it is indeed true that entitative being follows formal being — since formal being pertains to the metaphysically taken essence of the thing, and in this sense the proof of the minor proceeds. But in that case it is by no means necessary that, if metaphysical degrees are distinguished according to formal being, they must also be distinguished according to entitative being — since existence follows not upon the formal being of any degree taken separately, but upon the formal being of the integral and complete essence that they constitute, as the existence of the human being follows upon the formal being of humanity. By this single existence all the individual metaphysical formalities immersed in humanity by identity exist — animality, rationality, and so on.

To the last argument: the consequence is denied along with its proof. For as is clear from the treatise on Formalities, the formal distinction in the school of the Scotists is less than the entire genus of real distinction; and the proofs to the contrary were answered above in *disp. 5, q. 11, art. 2*.

Seventh, Aversa argues in *q. 13 Log., sect. 4*, proving especially that genus and difference in the constitution of the species are not distinguished on the part of the thing but only by reason. Some of his arguments have been answered in *disp.*

5 *Log.*, q. 3, art. 2, and others of lesser importance are solved by what has been said. Note, however, that Aversa falsely imputes to Scotus that the distinction he posited in specific essences between genus and difference was also posited by him in the highest genera between being itself and the contracting differences of being. This is falsely imputed to Scotus — as I have frequently noted — since according to the Doctor's view one must not reason in the same way about predicamental and transcendent degrees. For predicamental degrees import common realities on the part of the thing, whereas transcendent degrees do not — but only inadequate concepts, as is clear from the entire *disp.* 2. That predicamental generic and specific degrees import true common realities and natures for many things — not indeed numerically the same by inexistence, but the same by indifference — will already be proved in the following disputation.

If, however, by being contracted to the highest genera, he understands finite being (since in our principles this properly has the character of genus, and the constitutive of each predicament has the character of its contracting difference), then in this sense it is indeed true that a formal distinction on the part of the thing holds between being and its contracting differences.

But here a difficulty arises: that between the realities of genus and difference, in the Doctor's principles, a greater distinction than the merely formal on the part of the thing must hold. For he himself says in 1, *dist.* 8, q. 4, *ad 1 princ.*, and 2, *dist.* 3, q. 6, *infra K*, that the realities of genus and difference have identity only with a third thing — and if they are abstracted from that third thing, the character of identity no longer remains. Therefore if one reality does not require of its own nature to be identified with the other but only from the exigency of the third thing, then the distinction between them is not merely formal but also real, to such a degree that they could be separated from each other by God's power.

I respond: some things can be united in a third thing in two ways, as the Doctor says in 2, *dist.* 12, q. 2, *ad 1 princ.*: either in the manner of thing and thing, with a unity of union; or in the manner of reality and reality, with a unity of identity. Those united in the first way are indeed really distinguished from one another and can be really separated from one another, because each extreme, just as it is properly a thing, possesses its own proper existence. But those united in the second way can be separated objectively and by precision — because one is not included in the quidditative concept of the other — yet they cannot be really separated, because they do not have in themselves a proper existence, but exist only by the existence of the third thing with which they are identified.

One will press further: if these realities, then, receive their real identity only in the third thing, they have a real distinction and separability in themselves. The consequence is denied, from Scotus in 1, *dist.* 2, q. 7, *sub Hh*, where he says it does not follow: "A and B are not really the same; therefore they are really distinct," because reality is denied in the antecedent and affirmed in the consequent. So likewise in the present case, it does not hold to say: "the realities of genus and

difference do not have real identity in themselves, therefore they have a real distinction." For just as real identity denotes an order toward the single existence of several things, so real distinction denotes a relation toward a distinct existence of the extremes. Since the realities of genus and difference do not have proper existences in themselves — because they are not apt to exist in the direct mode, but are suchnesses (*aliquitates*) of what exists in the direct mode — they are therefore, as far as they themselves are concerned, neither really identified nor really distinct. Of themselves they are not really the same; but they become the same in the third thing that they constitute.

Finally, John of St. Thomas argues in *loc. cit.*, *q. 3 de Univ.*, *art. 6* from two sources: first from the general destruction of the formal distinction on the part of the thing, to which I have already given full satisfaction in *disp. 1 Log.*, *q. 5, art. 2*, resolving his arguments against the formal distinction. Then from the particular character of the essential predicamental degrees that proceed from the same form — which coincides with the second argument of Suárez already answered in n. 210.

Question VII. Whether all essences of things are of unequal perfection.

Having now declared how the essences of things are constituted and how they are related to one another, and since each essence expresses its own peculiar essential perfection (which is as great as it is and no greater or lesser — for as has been frequently said, the discussion here concerns the essence of created things), we must examine whether all essences must be unequal in such perfection, or whether they can indeed be equal.

All concede that in fact there are different species under the same genus, of which one is essentially more perfect than another — and hence they are of unequal perfection. This is so well established that no person of sound mind can deny it. For under the genus of animal, the human species surpasses all irrational ones; under the genus of substance, spiritual substance is more perfect than corporeal; under the genus of quality, faculty is more perfect than habit; and similarly in many other cases. The reason is that such inequality in essential perfection is not repugnant in species, since it does not prevent them from being able to agree and communicate in some common character. For since in species one can assign both a generic and a differential degree, as was said above, their inequality in essential perfection can be measured by the diversity of their differences, while their agreement and similarity can be measured by the generic degree in which they communicate, prescinding from the differences.

The whole difficulty, therefore, is whether in fact there are — or at least whether there can be by natural or divine power — different species under the same genus that are still of equal essential perfection. In this celebrated controversy there are two opposed positions: that of the ancients and that of the moderns. Almost all

the ancients without hesitation taught that all specific essences must necessarily be of unequal perfection. Not only did some of them deny that two species of equal perfection are in fact found, but they denied this even in terms of what is possible under the absolute power of God. For they say it is of the character of species that one is always essentially more perfect than another: so Aureolus, *1, dist. 3, art. 1, prop. 2*; St. Thomas, *Quol. 3, art. 6*, and *q. de Spiritualibus Creaturis, art. 8*; Soncinas, *12 Metaph., q. 4*; Fonseca, *5 Metaph., cap. 28, q. 16, sect. 2*; Albertinus, *tom. 1, Princ. 6 Philos., punct. 7, diff. 1*; Suárez, *disp. 29 Metaph., sect. 3, n. 16*; Vásquez, *1 part., disp. 122, n. 12*. And Scotus himself seems to favor this view in several places, as do many interpreters of Aristotle in *lib. 10 Metaph.*

The moderns, however, generally teach the opposite: not only is this not repugnant under the absolute power of God, but it is even quite probable that there are in fact some species that, while essentially diverse, preserve equality in essential perfection — such that one is not quidditatively more perfect than another. So Aversa, *q. 11 Log., sect. 5*; Poncius, *disp. 5 Log., q. 3*; Arriaga, *disp. 1 de Anim., sect. 3*; Oviedo, *controv. 1 de Anim., punct. 8, § 5*; and many other moderns.

Pasqualigo, finally, in *tom. 1 Metaph., disp. 80, sect. 2*, says that properly speaking and in strict terms, the essences of things can be called neither equal nor unequal in perfection — as if they could be commensurated with one another with respect to perfection. For being quantitative and commensurable does not properly apply to the essences of things and to their substantial perfection, but only to magnitude, size, and other things that are in some way quantitative. He adds, however, in a second conclusion, that since equality and inequality can be understood not only commensuratively but also proportionally — that is, there can be equality or inequality not only from the fact that things are commensurated with one another, but also from the fact that the quantity of each is weighed according to a certain proportion, measured by some intrinsic third factor — he adds, I say, that among the essences of things there can be equality according to proportion. Though this equality according to proportion is not so properly called equality or inequality, in this sense he inclines toward the second opinion. And Scotus himself seems to favor this view in *Quol. 6, § Contra ista*, where he has these words: "for one species of things, however immaterial, is equal or unequal to another immaterial species according to perfection" — by which words he seems to assert that equality, as well as inequality, among species is possible.

Article I. Resolution of the question.

For the resolution of the question, it must be presupposed — with the common view and against Pasqualigo in *loc. cit.* — as was noted in *disp. 7, q. 2, from the beginning in n. 26*: the name of quantity has not improperly been transferred from corporeal things to signify the degrees of perfection of any thing in its genus. Hence we speak of the quantity of power (virtus) or of perfection, which ranges across all genera — for which reason it is called transcendent quantity, as distinct

from the quantity of mass (moles), which is properly confined to the predicament of quantity. The basis for this metaphorical transfer I explained there. Pasqualigo concedes this himself in *loc. cit.* But he denies that equality and inequality are equally well transferred to the essences of things — which I hold to be neither true nor sufficiently consistent. For by the very fact that the subject or its signification is metaphorically transferred to something external, the same judgment must be passed about its properties. For example, if "laughter" or "laughing" is transferred to signify the green joy of a meadow, the properties of laughter are likewise transferred to the meadow in the same way — such as being a source of human rejoicing, and so on. Since therefore equality and inequality properly belong to quantity, the transfer of quantity to signify the perfection of things must carry with it the transfer of equality and inequality as well.

This doctrine is confirmed because just as what is properly quantitative can with full propriety ground equality or inequality, so what is quantitative only metaphorically and by a certain analogy can in the same way be said to be equal or unequal. If therefore quantity is transferred by a certain analogy to the essences of things to signify their essential perfection, then equality and inequality can be transferred in the same way.

From this Scotus teaches in *1, dist. 19, q. 1*: just as beyond predicamental quantity — which is proper to bodies — there is admitted a transcendent quantity (which is the quantity of power or virtue proper to essences), so beyond predicamental equality and inequality (which are properties of predicamental quantity) there must be admitted equality and inequality of a transcendent kind. He says that concerning equality, similarity, and identity, we can speak in two ways: in one way properly and strictly — and thus they are relations appropriate to different genera: identity to substance, equality to quantity, and similarity to quality. In another way commonly and broadly — and thus they are found in every genus and even beyond genus. To understand this, the Doctor notes there, under "Second," that these three — namely substance or essence, quality, and quantity — can be taken in two ways: strictly and properly, in which case they constitute three predicaments; then commonly and improperly, in which case they are found in every being. Regarding substance: this is clear, since it is often taken for essence, which is found in every being — for every being necessarily has its "what," that is, its essence. Quality likewise in this signification ranges across all genera, since in this sense it is taken for the essential difference, about which mode of quality the Doctor says the Philosopher speaks — namely in *Metaph., cap. de qualitate*, where he calls the essential difference a quality; Porphyry also uses this phrase when he says it is predicated "in quale quid" (as what kind of thing). Quantity, finally, is transferred by analogy to all genera and is found even beyond genus, insofar as it signifies the magnitude of perfection — called the quantity of power. Of this Augustine says in *6 de Trin., cap. 7*: "in those things that are great not by size, to be better is the same as to be greater."

From this the Doctor concludes, with Aristotle, that every being can be considered in three ways: first as "what" — in the mode of having a quiddity and essence; second as "how much" — in the mode of having its own perfection; and third as "of what quality." According to this triple consideration, three relations can be grounded upon being, taken commonly: identity is grounded upon every being insofar as it is "what"; equality and inequality insofar as every real being is "how much" with a quantity of perfection; and finally similarity and dissimilarity insofar as it is "of what quality." Just as substance, quality, and quantity (which are the foundations of identity, similarity, and equality) can be found in every genus and being, so also those relations can be grounded in every being in the manner already declared.

Second, the Doctor further explains this specifically concerning equality and inequality in *Quol.* 6, § *de primo*, with these words: "Aristotle in 5 *Metaph.*, *cap. de quantitate* says: 'greater and less, and more and less, both in themselves and relative to one another, are attributes of quantity.' He means" (says the Doctor) "that 'greater' and 'lesser,' whether taken absolutely and in themselves, or relatively, properly belong to quantity in the strict sense, but are transferred translatively to other things." And this seems sufficiently evident by reason: Aristotle would not deny equality to be among the individuals of the same species in every genus, nor inequality among species. And since according to him, equal and unequal are said only with respect to quantity, quantity belongs in some mode to every being of whatever genus. Consequently, even though "great" and "small" are, according to him, proper passions of quantity, taken translatively they are transcendent and passions of the whole of being. Augustine, in 6 *de Trin.*, *cap.* 8, calls this magnitude — which Aristotle says is said translatively — the magnitude not of mass but of goodness and perfection: "in those things that are great not by mass, to be better is the same as to be greater." It is clear, therefore (the Doctor concludes), that "great" in the first mode — properly said according to Aristotle and "great by mass" according to Augustine — is not in God nor in anything spiritual; but "great" translatively according to the Philosopher, and "great in goodness and virtue or perfection," can be posited there, since this is a transcendent belonging in its mode to every being. So the Doctor argues in *loc. cit.* — from which it is evidently deduced, against Pasqualigo, that for discerning the essential perfection of things and the quantity or degree of each, not only quantity itself must be transferred to the essences of things, but also — and ought to be — equality and inequality by a certain analogy.

With these presuppositions, accepted as common by all, it seems to me that one must say, with the first opinion, that all specific essences must necessarily be unequal in essential perfection — such that it is contradictory for two to be found of altogether the same perfection. The Doctor intimates this conclusion several times, though he does not resolve this doubt in explicit terms but rather seems to presuppose it. For in 1, *dist.* 2, *q.* 1, X, and following, and in 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 10, when proposing that maxim of his — "where a plurality requires greater perfection, an

infinite plurality requires infinite perfection" — he presupposes that effects distinct only in number are of equal essential perfection, while effects distinct in species are always unequal and one is essentially more perfect than another. And in 4, *dist.* 12, *q.* 3, *F and G*, he says that a univocal cause — one of the same character and species as the effect it produces — is equally perfect as the effect produced, while an equivocal cause — one of a different species from the effect — is more perfect. And in *Quol.* 6, § *de primo*, he says that the equality of essential perfection is as proper to individuals under the same species, as inequality is proper to species under the same genus. He speaks in the same way frequently elsewhere.

Nor does it tell against this that in *Quol.* 6, § *contra ista*, he says that one species of things, however immaterial, is equal or unequal to another immaterial species according to perfection. For by this he did not wish to assert that several species can be equal among themselves — since that was not the dispute there — but only to suggest that each species possesses its own proper perfection, according to which, when compared to another, it is said to be equal or unequal to it. He therefore speaks without asserting anything about equality or inequality of species, but rather prescinding from that question. The same position is held by many Scotists, but especially by that most outstanding among them all, Trombeta, 1 *Metaph.*, *q.* 1, *art.* 1. Since this conclusion is usually proved by several arguments and authorities from Aristotle that convince of the complete truth of this conclusion, before presenting the true foundation, it will be useful to examine those arguments, lest someone be deceived in the proof of it.

It is first proved as follows: all specific differences are unequal among themselves in perfection; therefore so too are the specific essences constituted by them. The consequence is clear; the assumption is proved from Aristotle, 10 *Metaph.*, *tex.* 17, where he says that one difference always stands as form and another as privation. By "privation" he does not understand a simple negation, but the more imperfect difference, insofar as it participates less than the other in perfection — and is in some sense a privation, insofar as it deprives the species constituted by it of some greater perfection. So this is argued by Aureolus and Soncinas in 12 *Metaph.*, *q.* 4, who call this argument a demonstration grounded in the doctrine of Aristotle and the Commentator. But this argument does not prove the point. For the opponents will immediately deny the assumption and say it is not sufficiently proved by the authority of Aristotle adduced. Furthermore, Aristotle is there not really speaking of diverse differences contracting a genus, nor of all diverse species, but only of contrary ones; and he only intends to show there that habit and privation are the principle of contrariety, insofar as one contrary always has the privation of the other — though not similarly in all cases, as Scotus and Alensis gravely explain there. Furthermore, even if Aristotle were speaking there by design of all the differences dividing a genus, it is false that he takes "privation" to mean the less noble form — since frequently by poverty of vocabulary the nobler difference is expressed through the mode of privation: as "immateriality" is nobler than "materiality," and "immortality" than "mortality," and yet they are expressed

through the mode of privation. Finally, even if the Philosopher were so explained as to take the differences dividing a genus as contraries and take privation for the less noble difference, the argument still does not convince, because it will be said that Aristotle speaks for the most part and according to the common course of nature, not simply and absolutely — which is compatible with the opposite happening in an absolute sense.

The second proof is drawn from the fact that the species of things stand as numbers — from Aristotle, *8 Metaph., tex. 10*. Just as it is contradictory for there to be two species of numbers that are equal in discrete quantity, so it is contradictory for there to be two specific essences equal in the quantity of power or perfection. Trombeta in *loc. cit.* uses this authority. As a confirmation: in *3 Metaph., tex. 11*, it is held that in species there is a prior and a posterior — that is, better and worse. Therefore species must be of unequal perfection. But these authorities are no more forceful than the preceding one. Not the first, because Aristotle there certainly does not compare species to numbers simply and absolutely and with respect to every property, but principally with respect to this: as the Doctor explains there and in *1, dist. 17, q. 3, § ad istam quaestionem*, that just as any number added to another number varies it, so any essential degree added in a form varies the species. Aristotle therefore does not intend to teach that the species of things are like numbers by reason of inequality — as if they must necessarily be unequal among themselves like numbers — but only in this respect: that any addition or subtraction varies them essentially, just as it varies numbers. For this reason he says they consist in an indivisible. In the other passage, he says that in species there is found that priority and posteriority, or better and worse, that is not found in individuals of the same lowest species — but he does not say that this essential order is found in all species without exception and necessarily. Hence it can well be explained, without violence to the text, that he is speaking in the majority of cases and according to what regularly happens — which is compatible with the opposite being possible in an absolute sense.

The third proof is that of Vásquez: things distinct in species cannot be equal in perfection, because what are equal can be commensurated with one another, but what are diverse in character cannot be commensurated with one another. For what is commensurated must necessarily be of the same character. Therefore they cannot be equal.

The minor is grounded in what Aristotle teaches in *10 Metaph., tex. 4*: that the measure must always be homogeneous with the measured — that is, of the same character and order — so that the measure of quantity must be quantity, and so on for the others. But the opponents have rightly noted the defect in this argument, especially Oviedo and Aversa. For if it proved anything, it would also prove that distinct species are neither equal nor unequal with respect to each other. For commensuration is the unique foundation for detecting inequality no less than equality between any two things, and inequality connotes

commensuration no less essentially than equality does. Furthermore, just as we said that permanent and successive quantity cannot be commensurated with each other — because they are of different characters, that is, one palm or ell cannot be equal to, greater than, or lesser than one hour — by the same reasoning, because a human being and a donkey are of different characters, neither could the human being be said to be essentially more perfect than the donkey, nor the donkey less perfect than the human being. We must therefore admit that both equal and unequal quantities can be commensurated with one another — equal ones by application of one to the other, and unequal ones by excess or defect or by replication, in the way just explained. The Doctor notes in 2, *dist. 2, q. 2, § ad secundam partem quaestionis*: to measure is to certify an unknown quantity by a known quantity. This certification of the unknown quantity can be made in three ways: by a quantity that exceeds it — and then the intellect is certified of the smaller quantity by its approach to or distance from the larger; or by a surpassed quantity, because the known and lesser quantity is a part of the greater (and more unknown) quantity, and then the lesser quantity, by its replication, measures the greater whole; and thirdly, the unknown quantity is measured by some known, distinct, and equal quantity — and this is done by application or juxtaposition. He says that measure is placed in the quiddities of things in the first mode, and that the measure is more perfect than the measured (being said to be more known than it) — as whiteness is posited as the measure in the genus of colors, and in every genus there is one primary thing that is the meter and measure of all the others, from 10 *Metaph.*, *tex. 2*. And God is said to be the first measure of all things in whatever genus, as the Doctor says in *cit.* From this again it is gathered that in his view it is impossible for several quiddities to be equal in perfection — since he says they are measured only in the first mode, namely by the approach of the lesser quiddity's perfection toward the exceeding one. If they were equal, they could also be measured by application — which the Doctor denies.

From this doctrine it is clear that both equal and unequal things can be commensurated. Equal things by mutual application; unequal ones by approach, distance, or replication, as just explained. Hence in response to the argument, either the major must be absolutely denied, or it must be explained as referring to commensuration that occurs by the application of the measured to the measure — not to that which occurs by other modes, namely approach, distance, or application. The minor can also be explained in the same way, that it is true only of commensuration made by application; or it must be absolutely denied. As to its proof, that Aristotelian proposition in 10 *Metaph.*, *tex. 4* — that the measure must be homogeneous with the measured — has its truth principally and properly in quantities of mass, in which (since commensuration occurs either by contact of bodies with one another, as in continuous quantity, or by containment of one within another, as in discrete quantity, or by impulse, as in weight) measure and measured must be of the same character. For a palm of wood cannot well be commensurated with a pound of iron; weight must be compared

with weight, number with number, and extension with extension. This is clear from the very examples adduced by Aristotle when he says: "always the measure is of the same genus: of magnitudes a magnitude, of length a length, of breadth a breadth, of sounds a sound, of weights a weight, of units units." But when the character of measure is transferred from the genus of quantity to other genera, it is not necessary for so great a homogeneity to obtain between measure and measured. It suffices that there be some unity of analogy and of order by attribution of one to another — as Alensis explains there, where he expressly raises this doubt about how the measure must be homogeneous with the measured. He says the uniformity between measure and measured must not be taken in all respects and not as univocation in every mode — such as the specific — because whiteness is the measure of all colors, and yet is not of the same specific character as those colors. It suffices that there be a unity of genus or analogy. Vásquez therefore wrongly assumes in his argument that what is commensurated must be of the same specific character, since Aristotle says it suffices to be of the same genus. Indeed Alensis there says that specific unity is altogether unsuitable for this purpose — since those things that are of one specific character have no greater reason for one to be the measure of the other than the reverse, and similarly for one to be the measured than the other. He therefore concludes that the homogeneity between measure and measured is not the unity of univocation in every mode.

Fourth, Suárez proves: species cannot be distinguished from one another except by unequal differences. Therefore they cannot be equal in essential perfection. The consequence is clear. The assumption is proved: for if the differences were equal, they would be equally distant from the first being and from non-being, and would thus have no basis for distinguishing those species — since neither by approach toward the perfection of the first being, nor by recession from the imperfection of non-being. This was also the argument of Soncinas in *loc. cit.* The opponents deny the assumption and its proof. Oviedo says: just as in things that we can measure materially we find two terms equally distant from the same third thing or from the same center, distinct and opposed to each other (for example, a village distant from this house by one league in a straight line toward the east, and another house distant by another league in a straight line toward the west from the same house — two distinct and opposed terms with equal distance from the same center), so in positive species there can be found two distinct and opposed ones, each equally distant from the first being and from non-being through its own peculiar entity and perfection. So Pasqualigo responds in the same way, using the same example, on which the whole response rests.

But I do not think this example is to the point. For as Scotus notes in *1, dist. 2, q. 2, between litt. Z*, and *dist. 1, q. 1, § ratio secunda*: when there is no mediate distance between extremes, but they are said to be precisely distant by reason of the extremes themselves in relation to each other, then the distance is as great as the greater extreme. And in the present case, God and creature, being and non-being,

are at such a distance. For however great a creature may be (even the supreme one, if it were possible), God would still be infinitely distant from it — not because of some mediate distance between the extremes, but because of the infinity of one extreme. Likewise contradictories, such as being and non-being, are not distant by any media, since they are immediately opposed, from *1 Post.* — such that however little something recedes from one extreme, it immediately falls under the other. They are distant by virtue of the extremes themselves in relation to each other; and the distance is as great as the more perfect extreme. In quantities, however, as is evident from the example adduced, the distance exists because of some intervening medium; and accordingly the distance is measured by the quantity of the intervening space. It is therefore clear that the example is not to the point. Since between God and creature, between being and non-being, there is no intervening medium, the distance will not be a certain quantity except according to the quantity of the other extreme and of its perfection. The Doctor also suggests this by reason: for this distance is nothing other than the excess of one over the other. When the exceeding is immediate to the exceeded, as in the present case, the quantity of excess is according to the quantity of the exceeding.

From this doctrine it is clear where the argument is truly deficient. There is a fallacy of assuming a non-cause as a cause — since created essences are not properly distinguished from one another by their distance from the first being and from non-being, as the argument assumes. For all of them are infinitely distant from the first being, as is clear from the doctrine just given. Hence whether they are equal among themselves or unequal, they are always distant from the first being in the same way — namely infinitely. Therefore the distinction among them cannot be well discerned from such distance. The same follows when speaking of distance from non-being: if it is true, as is commonly said, that between nothing and being — and universally between contradictories — there is an infinite distance, then all species are also equally distant from non-being, namely infinitely. The Doctor, while not accepting this saying simply and absolutely as stated, does accept it if "infinitely" is taken as "indeterminately," as he explains in *4, dist. 1, q. 1, G.* It should further be added that, as Oviedo rightly notes, even given the equality of two species — say, lion and bear — it would still be false that they would be distant from non-being in the same way. For the lion recedes from non-being through the exclusion of the negation of lion — not through the exclusion of the negation of bear. For through the positing and existence of the lion, the non-being of lion (which falls under non-being) is destroyed, but not the non-being of bear. And conversely, the bear for the same reason recedes from non-being through the exclusion of the negation of bear, not of lion. Thus they are not distant from non-being in the same way.

This argument could, however, be pressed *ad hominem* against the opponents. For many of them hold, with St. Thomas in *1 part., q. 15, art. 2 and 3*, that the ideas of creatures in the divine essence are multiplied by diverse relations of imitability and participability — so that the same divine essence, insofar as it is participable

in such and such a degree of perfection, is the idea of the lion; insofar as it is imitable in more, it is the idea of the human being, and so on. From this doctrine the aforesaid argument can be pressed as follows: if two species were equal in essential perfection, then they would be distant from the infinite perfection of the divine essence in the same way. Therefore they would have no basis for being distinguished from one another. The consequence is proved because things that are ideated (i.e., have archetypes in God) are principally distinguished through their ideas — since to each real being, distinct from another, there corresponds in God its own proper idea, to the likeness of which it is fashioned. So Augustine says in *lib. 83, qq.*, as cited by Scotus in *1, dist. 35*: that one reason governed the creation of the human being, and another the creation of the horse, and so on — such that from the diversity of ideas the diversity of what is ideated is excellently argued. The minor is proved because, under the hypothesis that those two species would have the same degree of perfection in the order of beings, it follows that they would regard the divine essence under the very same aspect of imitability and participability. Therefore they would formally have one and the same idea, because (according to St. Thomas in *loc. cit.*) the multiplication of ideas in the divine essence can only be measured by the multiplication of aspects of imitability in it.

Fifth, Trombeta, in *loc. cit.*, proves: it is impossible to find two specific differences that are equally perfect. Therefore also two essences equally perfect. The assumption is proved because essential differences divide some one common genus, and whatever divides some one common thing is opposed and essentially ordered with respect to one another. Therefore necessarily one is nobler than the other.

Confirmation: since the divided genus stands in potency with respect to essential differences, and the same potency cannot equally and primarily be ordered to several essential acts without such an order, and since the potency of the genus is by nature more apt to be perfected by one act essentially than by another, it follows that the genus does not equally and primarily regard the essential differences as that through which it is perfectible.

Further confirmation: where the potency of the genus has a greater inclination toward one act, it is more apt by nature to be perfected by that act (toward which it is more inclined) than by another. But it is certain that the potency of the genus has a greater inclination toward one essential act than toward another. Therefore the genus is by nature more apt to be perfected by it than by the other. From all of this Trombeta finally infers that there is an essential order of perfection between the acts imported by specific differences in themselves and in their order to the potency of the genus that is perfected by those acts. But this argument does not conclude either, because the opponent will immediately deny the assumption along with its proof — namely that it is indispensably necessary for the things dividing a common character to be essentially ordered to one another. And with

equal ease he will deny everything assumed in the first confirmation, since what is in controversy is being assumed as granted and conceded — namely that the potency of the genus cannot equally and primarily, without any order, regard several essential acts, and that it must be perfected by one before another. To the last confirmation, the minor will likewise be denied — for under the hypothesis that there were several differences of equal perfection, the genus would have no greater inclination toward one than toward another.

Sixth, therefore, the conclusion must be proved with the most acute Aureolus: what agree in the same degree of specific perfection are necessarily of the same species. Therefore it is contradictory for there to be two essences equal in essential perfection that are still of diverse species. The consequence is self-evident. The assumption is proved as follows: whenever some things are the same really and formally and also by reason, those that agree in one of these respect agree also in the other. But the degree of specific and essential perfection and the specific essence itself are really and formally one and the same thing — and according to some, especially among the opponents, also by reason. Therefore whatever agrees in the same degree of specific perfection agrees also in the specific character. The major is clear: for if those two species agreed in one and differed in the other, it would then be plain that those are not the same thing, since altogether the same reality and formality cannot be both the reason of agreement and the reason of difference. The minor is proved: according to the common opinion of all, the essential perfection of the thing is not something in the thing really distinct from the thing itself whose perfection it is. For this essential perfection is held to be either the essence itself insofar as it occupies such and such a degree in the whole order of beings, or an intrinsic mode, or at least goodness itself as the passion of every being — according to the diversity of opinions. But these are not really distinct from the thing, or from the essence of the thing — since the passion is really identified with the essence of the thing, and the mode is even more intimate to it, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore, and so on.

This argument seems to me the most evident of all, though the opponents do not adduce it in these terms, but intimate it under other words — perhaps in order to conceal its efficacy. Nor should one say that essence and essential perfection are at least distinguished as thing and mode. For in the first place, this is false according to the opponents themselves, who do not distinguish them even by reason. And secondly, even if this were conceded, this modal distinction does not suffice — since it is the least of all real distinctions, as will soon be clear in the solution of the objections in the following article.

Poncius responds in *cit.*, n. 33: first by denying the assumption and giving an instance from divine attributes and relations, which are of equal perfection and yet are, as it were, of diverse species and of a different character. But he does not respond to the proof of the assumption, which he does not adduce, though it is

there that the whole force of the argument consists. The emptiness of those instances I will show in the following article in the solution of the objections.

He then adds that it can be said that those two species would agree in the same difference with respect to the fact that each of them would principiate as great a perfection — such that the perfection principiated by one would be neither greater nor lesser than that principiated by the other — but that they would differ in the same difference with respect to the fact that the great perfection caused by one would be of a different character from the great perfection caused by the other. But this solution rather consolidates our argument than weakens it. For the specific difference constitutes this species with the genus and not another precisely because it is the principle of as great a perfection and not greater or lesser — that is, because it constitutes the essence in such and such a degree of perfection and not a greater or lesser one. Therefore if those two agreed in the same difference with respect to the fact that each principiated as great a perfection, they would also agree in the difference with respect to the fact that each constituted the same essence and species.

Confirmation: because the essence or specific difference is the principle of entitative perfection — which is its intrinsic degree or passion — in such a way that such perfection is altogether commensurate with it, such that from the similar or equal essential perfection of two things their essential and specific identity can be argued (as is the case in individuals of the same species), and from inequality their diversity. It is therefore altogether repugnant for there to be two diverse species that are simultaneously equal in perfection.

One might say, with Oviedo in *cit.*, n. 41: an intense whiteness, at eight, and an intense blackness, at eight, have equal intensity and gradual perfection, even though their natures are diverse and specifically distinct. On the contrary: the example is altogether off the mark, since the discussion here concerns essential perfection, which is altogether the same as the very essence of the thing. The example, however, speaks of accidental perfection, which is really distinct from the essence and can be separated from it. For the degrees of intensity in whiteness — say at two, or three, or four — are separated from the nature of whiteness, as experience shows. Because of this real distinction and separability of such an intensity from whiteness and from blackness, whiteness can agree with blackness in intensity while differing in nature. Conversely, because of the complete identity of essential perfection with the specific nature, it is impossible for there to be two essences of equal essential perfection that still differ in nature. The force of this argument — which in my judgment is inescapable — consists in the fact that essential perfection is altogether the same as the specific essence on the part of the thing. How, then, can two species agree in essential perfection and not in essence? And again: since the character of a specific difference is explained precisely as the principle of as great an essential perfection and not greater or

lesser, how can another specific difference exist that is likewise the principle of as great a perfection and yet not be the same as the first, but diverse?

Seventh, and this is a confirmation of the preceding argument and the precise reason a priori: the precise reason why individuals under the same species are of equal essential perfection is that they are of the same species and of the same character — since the species expresses the entire quiddity of individuals. Therefore those that are of diverse species will necessarily also be of unequal essential perfection. The assumption is clear: since they have the same specific essence, the essential perfection in them is also the same or equal. The consequence is deduced through that maxim in precise causes: just as the affirmation is the cause of the affirmation, so the negation is the cause of the negation. If therefore the precise cause why individuals are equal in perfection is the identity of species, then by contrast the cause why species are unequal in perfection will be the diversity of essences. Therefore what are of equal perfection are altogether similar in essence, and what are of unequal perfection are dissimilar.

Confirmation: from this we infer a posteriori that Peter and Paul are of the same species, because they are of equal essential perfection. Therefore all those are of the same species that are of equal perfection. Poncius, denying the assumption of this confirmation, says that Peter and Paul are rather recognized as of the same species because we see no dissimilarity between their essential predicates, but rather the greatest similarity. On the contrary: even though this is also well inferred a priori, still the specific identity among several individuals of the same species is also well inferred a posteriori from their equality of perfection — which is what the argument says. Furthermore, from the fact that two individuals have similar essential predicates, it is well deduced both that they are of the same species and that they are of equal essential perfection. Therefore a posteriori from the fact that they are of equal perfection, it can likewise be deduced that they are of the same species.

Finally: a thing conceiving the intrinsic degree of the entity of some specific nature does not conceive anything about that nature that is really added to it or formally distinct, but the very nature itself in such and such a degree. Hence the intellect dividing the genus through differences conceives those dividing characters as certain degrees — which is why they are called metaphysical degrees. But it is impossible to conceive two degrees without conceiving one as superior to the other, otherwise they would not be degrees. Therefore it is necessary to conceive one of the differences in the mode of a greater perfection and the other in the mode of an inferior degree. So Aureolus argues in *loc. cit.*

Confirmation: the degree of specific perfection is within the concept of the specific character, or at least is not outside it according to our view, since an intrinsic mode is in some sense predicated of the essence in the first mode of saying per se, from what was said in *part. 2 Instit. Log.* Therefore by the very fact

that two things agree in a degree of essential perfection, they agree also in the specific character; and by the very fact that they disagree in essence, they disagree also in essential perfection — which follows upon the essence and is altogether commensurate with it.

Article II. Solution of the objections.

In opposition: first, Pasqualigo in *disp. 80 cit., sect. 2*, attempts to destroy the presupposition made above in n. 204 by proving that equality and inequality cannot be transferred to signify the degrees of essences and their variety. For equality and inequality belong to quantity precisely because quantities are mutually commensurable — so that if one does not exceed another, they are called equal; if it exceeds, unequal. But the essences of things cannot be mutually commensurated. Therefore they can be called neither equal nor unequal in perfection, if we wish to speak properly. For what are not mutually commensurable cannot be called equal or unequal to one another. The major is clear. The minor is proved: two species cannot be mutually commensurated with respect to the generic character, because with respect to it they are the same. Nor with respect to specific characters, because with respect to these they are of different character. But measure and measured must be of the same character, from *10 Metaph., tex. 4*.

Confirmation: equal and unequal are said according to more and less — namely because one participates more in some same character than another, or equally with it. But the essences of things consist in an indivisible, like numbers, from *8 Metaph., tex. 10*. Therefore equal and unequal truly cannot belong to them, but only "same" and "diverse."

I respond from what was said above: if this author intends that equal and unequal cannot properly belong to the essences of things (but belong in this way only to quantities), we concede the whole. But if he intends that they cannot even metaphorically and translatively apply to essences — as he seems to wish — we disagree with him. For if quantity is transferred to the signification of the perfection of essences (as he concedes himself), then the same must be conceded for equality and inequality in the same way. For there is no greater reason for one than for the other. To the argument the response is clear from what was said in nn. 229 and 230 in the examination of Vásquez's argument for our conclusion: just as quantities alone are properly mutually commensurable, and thus equality and inequality properly belong to them alone, so also the essences of things are metaphorically commensurable by the approach or recession of one from another in perfection, according to that saying of Aristotle in *10 Metaph., tex. 2*: that in every genus there is one that is the meter and measure of all the others. In this sense they can also be called metaphorically equal and unequal. In what sense the measure and the measured must be of the same character has already been explained in n. 230.

To the confirmation: one must admit that equality and inequality are not derived from the natures of things insofar as they constitute this or that species — because the greater perfection in this species or difference, just as the lesser in another, denotes a certain indivisible perfection that does not consist of degrees of perfection. But since we lack words to explain that simple and indivisible perfection exceeding another also simple one, we speak of it in order to explain this excess as if it had a latitude of degrees, like two, like three, and so on. And so the equality or inequality of essences is measured in them according as they are apprehended with as many degrees of perfection — which proves only that equality and inequality, properly and in strict terms, do not belong to the essences of things, not however that they do not even metaphorically belong to them.

As to why genus is not predicated of species according to more and less — so that one would say "whiteness is more a color than blackness" — and yet it can still be said that whiteness is a nobler color than blackness: the reason, as Aureolus in *loc. cit.* says, is that no thing is in any mode its essence, however perfect it may be, in a more diminished way than any other participates the genus more perfectly.

Second, Aversa argues from the divine relations to prove that two essences can be of equal perfection. For the relations of origin are of a different character and are distinguished, as it were, in species; and yet one is not more perfect than another, but perfectly equal — as is stated in the Athanasian Creed: "in this Trinity nothing is greater or lesser, but all three Persons are coequal to each other." Therefore a specific or essential diversity stands well alongside an equality of perfection. He also argues from created things: for a local presence constitutive in this space and another constitutive in another space are specifically diverse and yet of equal perfection.

I respond: this argument rests on a doubtful foundation. For there is controversy among theologians as to whether the relations of origin in God, as they are contradistinct from the essence, express any perfection. The Scotists deny it; the Thomists affirm it. And in either view the argument does not press. For if they are held to import infinite perfection with the Thomists, the argument immediately collapses — since being infinite, they are incapable of equality and inequality. For equality and inequality are properties only of quantity and finite essence, as the Doctor notes in 2, *dist. 1, q. 2, K.* Hence the reason for divine relations and attributes is diverse from that of the species of created things, of which the discussion here concerns. And in this matter of equality and inequality of specific perfection, an argument is poorly drawn from divine things to created things.

But the argument is even less pressing in the other view, which holds that divine relations import neither perfection nor imperfection. For since they are not quantitative beings, they are capable neither of equality nor of inequality — since these are properties only of a quantitative being. I therefore wonder that Poncius says this argument concludes efficaciously from the presupposition of our view that divine relations express no perfection.

Poncius presses against both responses: against the response given in the Thomist view, he says that from a specific diversity as such, inequality is not well inferred; and insofar as they cannot show the opposite, there is no reason why a specific diversity among created things, as such, should necessarily bring about that inequality. Against the response given in the Scotist view, he presses in roughly the same way: if a specific diversity does not bring about an inequality of perfection in some case, there is no reason why it should bring it about of itself precisely in every case. Furthermore, just as there can be specific constitutive and essential differences that are diverse entitatively and yet agree in not having perfection, so similarly there can be constitutive differences that are diverse entitatively and yet agree in so great or so great a perfection — and consequently are equal in perfection.

I respond: from a specific diversity, as such, in created things, an inequality of perfection is well inferred, because created things are finite beings and consequently capable of equality and inequality. Not so in divine things, where everything is infinite. So the Thomists would respond. Nor does this objection press even the Scotists. For in the case of the argument, the specific diversity does not bring about inequality because it is found in non-quantitative things (such as divine relations); but in other cases it universally brings about inequality, because it is found in quantitative things. Hence a specific diversity as such — as far as it is concerned, unless some obstacle is encountered from the outside — always brings about an inequality of perfection. When it does not bring it about, this does not come from its side but from outside, because it is found in non-quantitative things or in infinite things, which are incapable of inequality.

To the other argument about local presences: I concede that all are of equal perfection, but deny that they are specifically diverse. For as I said in *disp. 15 Phys., q. 7, art. 1*, all "where" (ubi) are of the same essential character and species, differing only accidentally by reason of the diversity of positions in the universe — as the Doctor teaches in *1, dist. 2, q. 7, T*. If it were also conceded that they were of diverse species, then one would have to deny that they were of equal perfection, since no compelling reasons are at hand to establish the contrary. Furthermore, many deny that a local presence is something superadded to the located thing, so this second argument also rests on a doubtful foundation.

Third, Poncius argues to the same point: if there were some reason from which one could certainly gather that all diverse species must be of unequal perfection, it would be at most from their being of diverse species. But this reason does not prove the point. For someone can well have a concept of whiteness and sweetness (for example) as being of different characters by reason of their great dissimilarity, and yet not know which of the two is more perfect. And indeed in practice one does not infer from the fact that the human being is of a diverse species from the horse that the human being is more perfect than the horse — for this principle would not prove more that the human being is more perfect than the horse, since

one is equally of a diverse species from the other. Therefore from a specific diversity, an inequality of perfection is not inferred. Nor should one say that it can at least be inferred indeterminately, even if one cannot determine which of them is more perfect. For someone can well have a concept of the specific diversity of things without in any way considering anything about their perfection.

Furthermore: a visual perception of one whiteness numerically distinct from another is not of greater or lesser perfection than a visual perception of the same eye terminating at another whiteness of altogether the same character, as is clear. But it is probable that those perceptions are of diverse species, because they are more intrinsically and per se dissimilar to each other than two perceptions of the same eye terminating at the same numerical whiteness. And since the latter two agree in everything in which the two perceptions of diverse whitenesses agree, and moreover agree in the fact of being perceptions of the same numerical whiteness — in which those perceptions of diverse whitenesses do not agree (since through one perception one cannot see that very object that is seen through the other) — nor can one say that this diversity arises from Petreity (haecceity), since by reason of that diversity those two perceptions differ more than numerically, and because in Petreity (haecceity) all those whitenesses agree proportionally without any difference at all.

I respond: first by denying the minor, with the major conceded. Just as those two whitenesses are distinguished from each other only numerically, so too are both those perceptions. When it is said that they differ in species because they differ more than two perceptions of the same eye terminating at the same numerical whiteness — since those differ numerically — then those perceptions would have to differ in species because every difference greater than numerical is specific. The assumption is again denied along with its proof, since this greater difference is only accidental, not essential; and therefore it does not exceed the sphere of numerical distinction. Just as a line of ten palms differs more from a line of two palms than another line of two palms that differs from it only numerically; and yet that difference is not specific but still numerical, since it differs more from the two-palm line than two two-palm lines differ from each other — only accidentally. This can be shown by many other examples as well.

If anyone were willing to concede that those perceptions are of diverse species, one would then have to deny the major — namely that one perception is not more perfect than another. For there is no appropriate reason proving the opposite, as Poncius himself admits.

But he presses again against this solution: if some dissimilarity can exist between two numerically distinct things by reason of their Petreities (haecceities) without any inequality of perfection, why cannot there be a dissimilarity between things by reason of their essential differences without any inequality of perfection? But if that dissimilarity between those two perceptions of two whitenesses came from

their Petreities (haecceities) — since it has no inequality of perfection — then some dissimilarity can arise from Petreities (haecceities) without inequality of perfection. Therefore also from essential differences.

I respond by denying the parity. For there can be some dissimilarity between two individuals by reason of their Petreities (haecceities) without any inequality of essential perfection — because that dissimilarity is accidental, not essential or in quidditative predicates. But every dissimilarity between things that occurs by reason of essential differences is essential and quidditative; and therefore it is not compatible with an equality of perfection between them, but necessarily requires an inequality of perfection. For since these two — essence and perfection — are altogether the same, it is contradictory for things that disagree in one of them not to disagree also in the other.

Fourth, Oviedo argues: it is not repugnant that there be two animals whose operations differ as notably as those of a horse and a lion, and that are equal among themselves both in the principles of operations and in the operations themselves. Concerning these I ask: would they be specifically distinct or not? If they are specifically distinct, then inequality is not required for specific distinction. If they are not distinct, then there could be individuals whose operations differ notably and yet are not specifically different, and there will be no argument for asserting that the horse and the bull differ in species — because even though they have notably different operations, we cannot be certain that those operations are unequal in perfection. If one says that specific distinction requires inequality of perfection, and therefore the case posited is repugnant — because those individuals would be specifically distinct because of notably different operations, and would not be distinct because of the equality of perfection — then one presses: from the sole notable difference of operations, species are sufficiently distinguished, and therefore inequality is not necessary to constitute this distinction. The antecedent is proved by the common sense of all who, speaking of the equality or inequality of things, say those individuals differ in species that have notably different operations — moved by no other reason.

I respond by denying the assumption. Since some individuals are found to differ in species — especially from operations that follow the entire species and that differ notably among themselves — it is simply repugnant that there be two animals with notably different operations (as do the horse and the lion) and that are nonetheless equal among themselves in perfection, by reason so often pressed: since the entitative perfection is altogether the same as the essence of the thing, it is altogether repugnant that what agrees in one of them does not agree also in the other. Nor do we say that for a specific distinction, inequality of essential perfection is required essentially as what formally constitutes that distinction. Rather, inequality follows upon and accompanies specific distinction. For just as each essence is followed by a peculiar perfection commensurate with it, so two diverse essences are also followed by diverse and unequal essential

perfections. And although from a notable diversity of operations a specific difference is sufficiently gathered, yet one can also gather it from the inequality of perfection. Since, however, operations are more known to us than the entitative perfection of things, we infer their specific distinction more from the diversity of operations than from the variety and inequality of essential perfection. Whether a specific distinction must always be inferred from a notable difference will appear below in *disp. 10, q. 11*.

Fifth, Arriaga argues: two cognitions equally intense and clear, one of Peter and the other of Paul, are somehow dissimilar, and yet in no way unequal. For the perfection that one says it has as representing Peter, the other has as representing Paul. Therefore dissimilarity does not formally denote inequality. Therefore two diverse species can be equal among themselves. This seems manifest from the very terms of the case.

Confirmation: it is one thing to be diverse and another to be unequal, so that in moral matters — however much we see things specifically diverse — we often value one as much as another. Likewise in physical things, two goods that are specifically diverse usually provide equal pleasure. Therefore specific diversity does not necessarily argue inequality.

Final confirmation: we see with our own eyes that green and red color are notably diverse; but that they are unequal and one more perfect than the other, we do not see. For where do you see the excess and in what does it consist? Experience shows us none, nor is any convincing reason at hand. Why, then, are we compelled to say that they must necessarily be unequal? If that notable diversity were formally inequality, then to see those colors as diverse and to see them as unequal would be the same thing — which is most false.

I respond: as is clear from these last words, this author suspects that we assert that a specific diversity is formally the same as inequality, or indeed that the specific diversity is constituted essentially, formally, and intrinsically through the inequality of essential perfection. But we assert nothing of the sort. For with Scotus in *Quol. 6* we rightly distinguish in the essences of things the relation of identity from the relation of equality, and the relation of diversity from the relation of inequality. We say that, just as in individuals the specific identity and the equality of essential perfection are not the same relation (but the latter follows upon the former), so also in species the specific diversity and the inequality of essential perfection do not import the same relation (but the latter follows from the former). And while identity and diversity are immediately grounded upon the essences of things, equality and inequality are grounded upon their intrinsic modes, or upon those essences as essentially modified. By this the argument is answered on this point. As to the rest, it must be answered as to the second argument of Poncius about several perceptions, with which it entirely coincides.

To the confirmation: the consequence is denied — it does not well follow from the antecedent. For just as this consequence does not hold: "in the human being formality of rationality is one thing and risibility another; therefore rationality does not necessarily argue risibility," because even though these are distinct in their concepts — and even really distinct, according to the Thomists — there is still a necessary connection between them, such that one necessarily argues the other: so likewise in the present case. Even though diversity and inequality do not formally import the same relation, since diversity is immediately grounded in essences and inequality in their modes — and since the modes are altogether identified with the essences on the part of the thing — it follows that inequality necessarily follows from the diversity of essences, and equality from their identity. For when some things are really and formally identified, what agree in one of them agree also in the other, and what disagree in one disagree also in the other, as has often been said. The examples adduced from moral and physical matters are not to the point, because the equality or inequality of estimation there is not grounded in any essential perfection identified with those things, but rather in a certain accidental perfection.

To the other confirmation: the assumption is conceded, and the consequence is denied. For we also do not attain the essential differences of red and green color but only their notably diverse operations and affects. Yet from these we infer those differences. So likewise in the present case: even though we do not attain the determinate degree of perfection of those colors — since this, being an intrinsic mode of essences, is nearly as hidden from us as the intrinsic differences themselves — nonetheless, just as from the notable diversity of operations and affects of those colors we may rightly infer a specific diversity among them, so we may also rightly infer such an essential inequality, which accompanies that diversity.

Sixth, Pasqualigo argues: it is not repugnant that as great a perfection should be in one essence as in another, with proportion maintained. For then diversity does not stand in the way — since this is not an equality of commensuration but only of proportion, and proportion is not according to the same character but a diverse one. Therefore it can well stand alongside the very diversity of essences, since proportion is not according to the same character but a diverse one.

Confirmation: by the example of two quantities that have a diverse figure — one circular and the other square. In that case those quantities cannot be commensurated with one another while preserving such a figure; yet with proportion maintained, they can be equal in mass, such that as great a mass is included in the circular quantity as in the square or triangular one. So likewise it can happen in essences: that as great a perfection is included in one essence (with the diversity of essence maintained) as in another, and they are therefore proportionally equal in perfection, even though they are not mutually commensurable because of their essential diversity.

Furthermore: the divine essence is infinitely imitable by a creature in various ways. Suppose some essence is already produced; then let God begin to produce other and other essences, beginning from one more imperfect and progressing to more perfect ones, continuing this production until some creature is produced more perfect than the one we suppose to be found before this continued production. Then necessarily some creature must be conceded as equal in perfection with that one — because before the creature of greater perfection is produced, it must first pass through that inferior degree in which that creature was already produced from the beginning.

Finally: if God could not communicate to some creature as great a perfection below his own being as he communicated to another, he would not be infinitely imitable.

I respond by distinguishing two kinds of proportion: geometric and arithmetic, from Aristotle, *5 Eth.*, *cap.* 7. I concede the assumption for the first kind of proportion — which obtains when one thing in its genus (say, some donkey) is as perfect as some horse in its genus. In this sense it is true that the perfection of one thing in its genus can be as great as that of another in its genus, with proportion maintained. And diversity of essences does not impede this proportion. But the assumption is denied for arithmetic proportion, which others call equality by weight. This obtains when, with no account taken of the perfection that this or that thing requires in its own order, as great a perfection is in one essence as in another, simply and absolutely speaking. Against this equality by weight (or arithmetic proportion), the diversity of essences tells — for the reasons already assigned.

To the confirmation: it is answered by the same distinction of proportion, that if Pasqualigo intends to induce a greater proportion and equality between two species by that example, the parity must be denied.

To the other argument: it is clear from what was said above in n. 232 that the argument drawn from divine Ideas bears more heavily against the opposing view than against ours. For if two essences were created as exactly equal in perfection — imitating the divine essence in the same degree — they would have one and the same idea, especially according to the opponents (namely, the divine essence insofar as imitable in such and such a degree). Thus those essences would not be essentially diverse, since to diverse essences correspond diverse Ideas and the divine essence under diverse aspects of imitability. Hence that case of continued production must not be admitted in the way it is posited in the argument — as if another creature could be produced equal in perfection to the one supposed from the beginning to have been produced before the others. For then both would correspond to a single idea — namely the divine essence under one and the same aspect of imitability.

As to the final argument — that if God could not communicate to some creature as great a perfection as he communicated to another, he would not be infinitely imitable — the consequence is denied. For God is shown to be infinitely imitable by the very fact that he can produce diverse species of beings to infinity, always unequal — one more perfect than another — and under the same species infinite individuals always equal in the same essential perfection.

Finally, the following argument is made: just as those that are of the same specific character stand in relation to the graduality of that character, so those that are of a different character stand in relation to the graduality of the common character. But two whitenesses participate the character of whiteness sometimes in one degree and sometimes in another, as is clear. Therefore forms of different characters will also be able to participate an entity and nobility in the same degree.

Furthermore: whenever things are distinguished, there is no inconvenience if diversity occurs in one thing without a corresponding diversity in another. But in a specific form, its quidditative character is one thing and its degree of perfection another. Otherwise everything that is of the same species would be equally perfect — which is false, since one intellectual soul is nobler than another. Therefore some things can be specifically distinct and yet have the same degree of nobility.

I respond: both of these arguments were proposed in the very same terms by Aureolus and Soncinas, but since they are not solved according to our principles, I respond differently.

To the first argument: I deny the parity of the major. For genus is contracted to species and species to individuals in different ways. Specific differences pertain to the quiddity constituted and are opposed and contrary to one another, adding perfection to the contracted character — which is not the case with individual differences, since they do not pertain to the quiddity of their constituted thing. For they do not explain what the individual is — say what Peter is — but rather who he is. Nor are they opposed and contrary to one another, but disparate. Nor do they add perfection to the species contracted by them, since they are not quantitative beings, as will be more fully established in *disp. 10, on the principle of individuation*.

It follows from this that all individuals are of the same essential character and always participate essential perfection in the same degree, since one is not essentially more perfect than another. Whatever may be the case with individual degrees: regarding those, some concede that one individual is more perfect than another. In accidents admitting more and less, this clearly cannot be denied — for one heat is more intense than another, and whiteness at six is more perfect than whiteness at three. With respect to those individual degrees, yet the specific and essential degree of whiteness is not more perfect in one than in another —

since it consists in an indivisible and is equally participated by all. From this doctrine it is also clear what must be said to the minor: it is verified only of participation according to individual degrees. The specific degree is indeed participated equally and indivisibly by all individuals.

There is also another most noteworthy distinction to be made between individual and specific degrees, as Trombeta notes in *1 Metaph.*, *q. 1, art. 2*: the specific degree is identified really and formally with the essence, but not so the individual degrees. Hence whiteness can be separated from those latter, and is sometimes found with one and sometimes with another. But it can never be separated from the essential and specific degree. From this it is clear that the parity assumed in the major does not hold. This doctrine is also taught by Scotus in *1, dist. 17, q. 3*.

To the other argument: the minor is denied. For the essence and its essential perfection are altogether the same really and formally, and at most can be said to be distinguished modally — which distinction, being the least of all, does not suffice to verify that two species differ in essence and yet agree in essential perfection. Since this is so commensurate with the essence that whatever the essence does not agree with, the essential perfection cannot agree with either. The minor is denied, I say; and it is freely conceded that whatever are of the same species are also of the same essential perfection. Hence it is false that one intellectual soul is essentially nobler than another. Whether one can be said to be more perfect with respect to individual degrees will be explained below in *disp. 10, q. 11*.

Disputation IX. On the Common or Universal Nature

After treating in the preceding disputations of the essence and existence of finite being as such, and since being is divided into substance and accident — as was said in *disp.* 7, *q.* 1 — one would next have to treat of these subjective parts. However, since substance and accident are distributed across various categories, and since the predicamental line is woven together from the various grades of beings — namely universals, which, as founding various logical intentions, are called genera and species, and singulars, which are called individuals — it seemed useful to treat first of these grades, which belong to both substance and accident alike, before taking up substance and accident themselves. For genera, species, and singulars are found in the categories of accidents just as they are found in the category of substance. Hence, by "common and universal natures" in this context we must understand not the transcendent grades common to God and creatures, as *Bassolis* rightly notes in 2, *dist.* 12, *q.* 4, *art.* 2, since concepts of this kind are not grounded in any nature or reality that is truly common to God and creatures, as is clear from what was said in *disp.* 2 on the nature of being — but only predicamental and limited natures, both generic and specific. For since these latter natures import a reality common to several things on the side of the thing itself, as will be established below, they rightly claim the name of common natures. And because universals customarily precede singulars in the order of nature, we shall first treat of the common and universal nature, and afterwards of the singular; hence the present disputation concerns the common nature, and the following one concerns the individual and the singular.

Question I. Whether common or universal natures exist in reality beyond individual things.

I set out the several meanings of "universal" in logic, in the preface to *disp.* 4. To pass over those that are not immediately relevant here: one thing is called universal in signifying, and it is a name signifying many things, such as the name "man" or "animal," which signify all men and all animals; another is called universal in representing, such as the cognition which the intellect has of man or of animal, since this cognition represents men in some way, and all animals at least with respect to that in which they agree; another is called universal in being, namely that which is in many things, such as the nature of animal, which is found in all animals, and the nature of man, which is in all men — and this is also commonly called the metaphysical universal; and finally something is called universal in predication, or the logical universal, which is predicated of many things by virtue of a certain second intention applied to that common nature by the intellect — the nature which is called universal in being — as when "animal" is predicated of all animals as a genus, and "man" is predicated of many men as a species. From this it is evident that the universal in being is the foundation of the universal in predication, for it is because human nature is in Peter and in Paul

that it is predicated of them by a predication saying "this is this" — Peter is a man, Paul is a man.

The universal that pertains to the present inquiry, therefore, is the universal in being, which, absolutely speaking, is understood under the name of "universal" as distinct from the singular and the individual, which cannot be communicated to several things, as Peter and this horse. For enough has been said about the universal in predication in *logic, disp. 4, q. 1*, and we touched on the universal in being only incidentally, insofar as it was necessary for understanding the foundation of the logical universal, reserving its full treatment for the present place. I have entitled this disputation and the present question "On the Common Nature" rather than "On the Universal in Being" — as is customary — because universality properly speaking cannot belong to a nature and essence on the side of the thing itself, whereas commonness can. The Doctor says in *2, dist. 3, q. 1*, at the passage beginning *ad quaestionem*, that nature is of itself neither universal nor particular, but indifferent to both; and at the end of that question he says that commonness belongs to nature of itself, but universality does not. Therefore, when it is asked whether common or universal natures exist on the side of the thing, or equivalently, whether universals in being are real natures or mere words and concepts, "universal" is not taken in the strict sense but broadly, as extending to everything that is not of itself singular and is in some way common to many. Hence nature, as distinct from singularity, is more properly called a common nature than a universal, although the dispute might be said to be about a name.

Although this question was already proposed and resolved from the beginning of *disp. 4* in *logic*, it seemed fitting to propose it here again: first, because this is its proper place, having been treated there only incidentally; and second, because in recent times the opinion of the Nominalists, who deny common natures or universals in being, has gained considerable force among the moderns, and so the present matter requires still more extended discussion.

There are accordingly two positions on this matter: that of the Realists and that of the Nominalists. The Realists assert that certain predicates which are intrinsic to singular things and in which the singulars essentially agree possess, on the side of the thing itself, a certain community and universality, as well as a certain unity intrinsic to them and distinct from the unity which belongs to the cognition that bears on those natures or predicates — and that accordingly those natures, for instance of man and of animal, are immediately conceived and signified by universal concepts and names. This is the common position of the whole school of the Realists, who also borrowed their name from this doctrine, asserting that universals in being are real natures and not mere words and concepts, as the Nominalists assert — from which assertion the Nominalists likewise derived their name. It is true, however, that even the Realists do not subsequently agree among themselves about how to explain the community and unity of the real nature that is communicable to several things. The Thomists do not want such community

to belong to nature except through the work of the intellect; the Scotists contend that it belongs to nature in some way even apart from the work of the intellect, as will be explained more fully below where questions specific to this unity and community of nature will be proposed.

The Nominalists, for their part, deny that universality or community truly belongs to any predicate that is intrinsic to singular things, asserting that no thing can be found in the nature of things that is universal in being — whether existing in singulars or separated from them, as Plato held — because every thing that exists or can exist is singular. They hold that only the universal in signifying or in representing exists, which is not distinguished in a singular thing in being but only in the manner of a sign. Consequently they assert that, on the part of the object, no unity corresponds to the concept of the universal, but that everything on the side of the thing is singular, and they conclude that the unity of the universal must be derived from the act of the intellect, by which all singulars are confusedly conceived as similar — not with a formally relative similarity, but with a fundamental one — so that on the part of the object there is no unity other than that of similarity. But similarity necessarily implies plurality, and yet those many things are not conceived distinctly but confusedly; in this the Nominalists agree with certain ancient thinkers, mentioned and refuted by *Aristotle in 4 Metaph. 22*, who denied universals altogether and acknowledged nothing in the nature of things beyond singulars. Such are *Ockham, 1 Log., from ch. 14*, and *1, dist. 2, q. 4*, and *Quodl. 12 and 13*; *Adam, 1, dist. 33, q. 8*; *Gabriel, 1, dist. 2, q. 8*; *Gregory, 1, dist. 3*; *Rubion, ibid., q. 7*; and more recently certain authors of the Society of Jesus follow them: *Hurtado, disp. 9, Meta., sec. 4. 10*; *Arriaga, disp. 6, Log., sec. 4*; *Oviedo, controuv. 2, Log., punct. 4 and 5*; and others.

It appears false to me — as many hold, including *Suárez, disp. 6, Metaph., sect. 2*; *Morisanus, disp. 1, Log., q. 3*; and *Pontius, disp. 3, Log., q. 5* — that the Nominalists in this matter differ from the position of the Realists only in words and manner of speaking. That, I say, is false, as is clear from the account already given of both opinions; for the Realists attribute to nature a greater unity and community on the side of the thing than the Nominalists do. The Nominalists want the very singulars to be immediately signified by universal words and concepts, as sharing in a nature common to inferiors, but those inferiors themselves only mediately — partly because, in the matter of the universality of things, the Nominalists abstract only on the part of the act in the manner already explained, whereas the Realists abstract also on the part of the object. And it is certain that those who prescind objectively are really distant in position from those who prescind only formally, especially when speaking of the objective precisions admitted by the Scotists, from what was said in *disp. 6, q. 16*. And partly because the Nominalists acknowledge no intrinsic unity or community in nature that could take on the denomination of universal, whereas the Realists do — either formally and actually from the nature of the thing apart from any work of the intellect, or at least virtually and as a foundation.

It is true, however, that some Thomists attribute such a thin and slender unity to nature prior to the work of the intellect, and explain their position in such a way, that they differ from the Nominalists only in words. This is why Cajetan, the most distinguished disciple of St. Thomas, lest he appear to slide into Nominalism along with the rest of the Thomists, explains the unity and community of nature in accordance with the phrasing of Scotus, as can be seen in *De Ente et Essentia*, *cap. 4, q. 6*, and will be further confirmed below.

Still less satisfactory is the claim of *Pontius, loc. cit.*, that the Nominalists denied that any universal nature exists in being only insofar as they understood by "universal nature in being" some one positive nature that could truly and positively inhere in many things formally and according to itself in a positive sense — and he concludes that their position is not as absurd as is commonly thought, and that their dispute with other doctors is merely a verbal one. This, I say, is very incautiously stated. For the Nominalists deny to nature not only positive unity but also negative unity; and they deny not only that it is common to several things prior to the work of the intellect by way of inexistence, but also by way of indifference, as can be seen in *Arriaga, Oviedo*, and *Hurtado, loc. cit.*, who among the moderns especially have understood and held the Nominalist position in its genuine sense. I could bring forward many testimonies from *Ockham* and *Rubion, loc. cit.*, to confirm this, but the words of *Hurtado* suffice, who explains the Nominalist opinion in *sec. 10, § 97* and following. He says that according to the Nominalists the community of nature is such that to the universal concept there corresponds no one object with a unity holding on its own part, but only a unity of similarity, which is not unity simply but only in a qualified sense, since it implies a plurality of similar things. Hence those many things have unity from the act of the intellect, from which they also have universality formally; and just as the unity arising from the act is extrinsic to the object, so too is universality. The Nominalists therefore attribute no intrinsic and real unity to nature on the side of the object, but only an extrinsic unity of reason arising from the act. They acknowledge no immediate significate of a universal word or concept other than singular things as similar. The Realists, by contrast, attribute to nature an intrinsic and real unity on the part of the object that precedes the work of the intellect either actually or at least virtually, and declare this one nature common to singulars to be the immediate significate of the universal word and concept. Therefore the Nominalists differ from the Realists not merely in name or manner of speaking, but also in substance, as will become still more evident from what follows.

Article I. Common natures exist in reality beyond singular things.

The position to be held is that beyond singulars there exist in reality real natures common to them, in which they are really assimilated to one another, and accordingly that universals in being are not mere words or concepts but certain real natures that truly exist in things themselves. This conclusion is beyond doubt

in the school of the Realists. By it we intend only to destroy the fiction of the Nominalists and to vindicate the reality of common natures in the universe, setting aside for now the question of the manner in which they are to be admitted: whether outside singulars or only in them, whether really distinct from them or only formally or by reason, and what this unity and community is — whether it is positive or only negative unity, whether community by inexistence or only by indifference. From these and similar questions I now abstract, and assert only that in the nature of things, beyond singulars, there must be common natures in which the singulars themselves agree on the part of the thing, however this may come about.

This is without doubt the position of *Aristotle, loc. cit., 4 Metaph. 22*, where he censures those philosophers who acknowledged only singulars in the nature of things; and in *2 Metaph. 51* he says that the account of animal is the same in all species; and in *7 Metaph.* he teaches that definition is not of singulars but of universals, which he had also said of science in *1 Post., cap. 5, 1, and 11*, and in *7 Metaph. from text 51*, where he disputes expressly against Plato about universals and common natures, and concedes outright that these are true things, and does not reproach Plato on this point but only on the point of his having supposed that they subsist per se outside singulars — which makes it very clear that Aristotle is on our side.

Pontius, loc. cit., proves this conclusion by this single argument: by a nature that can truly be called universal we understand nothing other than a per se unified nature that can be in several individuals along with multiplication of itself, inasmuch as individuals can have several natures similar to it in essential predicates. But it is certain that such a nature does not imply a contradiction, and that in each created individual — at least material ones — such a nature in fact exists, as in Peter, Paul, Bucephalus, and so forth. Therefore common natures exist, which can be called universal. This argument is sound, but it cannot compel the Nominalists unless the minor premise is proved, and its proof depends on what is to be said below in this disputation concerning the unity and community of nature. For what the Nominalists deny is precisely that such a nature — one in itself and yet multiplied in its singulars — can exist without contradiction; since multiplicity and unity are mutually opposed. And so we cannot press this argument against them without first explaining what sort of unity nature possesses and how its multiplication in singulars is compatible with that unity. On this ground, therefore, we must bring arguments against the Nominalists that absolutely prove that beyond singulars there exist in the universe certain common and real natures — not mere words and concepts — while abstracting for now from the manner in which they exist in the universe: whether in singulars or outside them, whether really or only formally or by reason distinct from them.

The conclusion is proved first from the signification of universal words and concepts, because the word "animal" does not immediately signify man and lion,

and the word "man" does not immediately signify Peter and John, but rather some common nature in which, on the side of the thing and apart from any work of the intellect, those many inferiors and singulars agree and are assimilated to one another. Likewise, the cognition of a universal — say of animal or of man — is not immediately terminated at all the particulars contained under it, as the Nominalists hold. Therefore the immediate object of such a formal universal concept will be some one nature so common to those particulars that the many of them agree in it on the side of the thing. Therefore common natures must also be conceded on the side of the thing beyond singulars. The assumption is proved: both universal words and universal concepts immediately signify things only according to the reason under which they are conceived; but through such universal words and concepts, inferiors and singulars are not conceived according to the reason of their singularities or differential determinations; therefore they immediately signify some real nature common to those things. I used this argument to prove this in *disp. 4, Log., art. 1*, where I also rejected the solutions of *Hurtado* and *Arriaga*, and also in *1 tom. Metaph., disp. 6, q. 16, n. 296*, in proving objective precisions, where I further reject the solutions of *Oviedo*.

The common solution of the Nominalists consists in this: that universal words and concepts immediately signify all the singulars themselves confusedly and without any distinction. But this is refuted by the very proof of the assumption. First: if from the force of a universal concept or word those many things are signified confusedly — that is, as they are merged into one — one must ask what this one ratio is in which they are said to be merged and to communicate, and this can only be some common nature that is the immediate significate of the universal word and the immediate object of that act by which many things are merged confusedly into one. The Nominalists respond that those many things are merged into a unity of similarity, and that the immediate object represented through universal cognition is not something one but those many things, not as many and dissimilar but as one and similar. Against this: according to *5 Metaph.*, the proximate foundation of similarity does not imply plurality but unity — namely that in which many things are one — and therefore it implies something one; and this is what universality is immediately attributed to, as I pursue at length below with the Doctor in *2, dist. 3, q. 1*. Second: to be the object of some cognition is to be expressed through it and represented to the intellect. Since through the cognition of the universal the singulars are not represented to the intellect according to their proper haecceities or other individual determinations — for then they would be grasped not as similar but as diverse and dissimilar — it must be admitted that through the intellection of the universal one common ratio is expressed and represented to all, and that this alone is grasped and conceived by the intellect. Third: through the cognition of the universal the singulars themselves are not grasped; therefore only the common nature in which universality is grounded is grasped. The assumption is proved: a singular cannot be cognized without singularity or some individual determination, just as

a white thing cannot be cognized without whiteness. But through the cognition of the universal the haecceities of singulars are not expressed or represented; therefore neither are the singulars themselves. You will say: they are represented at least confusedly and indistinctly, and implicitly. Against this: this means they are represented in some predicate common to both; that common predicate will therefore be the immediate object of that act — partly because this cognition has not only an implicit significate but also an explicit one, for there cannot be cognition unless some object is presented to the intellect explicitly to be known under some ratio, and that will be the immediate significate by reason of which the singulars are confusedly and implicitly signified. You will say again, with others, that singulars are indeed cognized through the cognition of the universal, not formally but materially, inasmuch as their similarity is cognized, which is identified with the singulars. Against this: to be cognized materially is not to be cognized immediately but mediately, since it is to be cognized by reason of something else immediately cognized, with which it is identified. Moreover, this does not suffice for something to be properly said to be cognized; otherwise sight could be said to reach qualities identified with whiteness that lie outside the sphere of its object — say sweetness in milk — because they are materially cognized insofar as that with which they are identified or united is cognized.

Furthermore this solution can be rejected, and it can be proved with respect to the unity of the universal concept of which we here speak, that the unity of similarity which the adversaries always invoke does not suffice. For the concepts of predicamental natures — of which alone this disputation speaks, as was stated at its beginning — are univocal, as even the adversaries concede. Therefore some one ratio beyond the singulars must correspond to them, in which those many things are univocated; and the unity of similarity does not suffice — that is, it does not suffice that they have several similar rationes — since such unity is indeed enough to constitute an analogical concept of proportionality, but not a univocal concept, according to their own doctrine.

Moreover: if through the cognition of the universal many things were cognized as similar, the act would already be formally terminated in some way to plurality; but it is evident that through that act no plurality is explicitly cognized or represented. Therefore many things as similar cannot be immediately signified. The major is proved: if the individuals are cognized as similar, they are cognized as distinct extremes, since the relation of similarity can only be between similar extremes. The minor is also proved: that act, by reason of its confusion, does not reach the singularities of all the individuals, and therefore neither does it reach their plurality, which can only arise from those singularities.

Oviedo, controuv. 3, Log., punct. 5, at the end, responds that in the universal the individuals are not signified as formally and positively similar, but materially and negatively, because they are signified only as not differing from one another on account of the fundamental similarity they have, which appears as a kind of

identity, since by reason of it the intellect cannot discern one individual from another. Against this: if similarity is not cognized formally but only materially, or only its foundation, then the intention is already achieved, because this is precisely to cognize one nature in which all individuals are assimilated, since unity is the foundation of similarity just as plurality is the foundation of dissimilarity, from 5 *Metaph.*

The conclusion is proved secondly from the truth of predication, in which the common nature is enunciated of some particular, as when we say "Peter is a man." For the proper and immediate significate of "man" is predicated of Peter, and yet the entire collection of individuals cannot be verified of him — otherwise Peter would be not only Peter but also Paul and John and so on. Therefore what is predicated is one nature in some way common to all. *Oviedo, loc. cit., n. 14*, says that the argument proceeds equally against the position of those who prescind objectively, according to which the universal also contains several abstractly distinct rationes, whose collection cannot be predicated of any inferior. He then responds that the universal is predicated of all individuals not according to the whole of itself but according to some part of itself that appears as though the whole, because the intellect does not distinguish between part and whole due to the confusion of the parts of the universal — that is, of the several individuals with the whole of the universal, that is, with the entire collection of individuals — and concludes that the collection is predicable of any individual taken separately according to the abstract ratio derived from that individual, which is included in that collection; he employs this same response again for the same argument and expounds it still more clearly in *controv. 4, Metaph., punct. 8, n. 32*, where he says that if the object signified by the word "man," which is predicated of Peter and John, is not verified of Peter insofar as it is verified of John, because it is verified of Peter insofar as in that object — which contains the collection of individuals — Peter is contained, and the whole predicate is contracted to him as its subject of verification when we say "Peter is a man"; and the same is to be said proportionally when it is predicated of John.

I also used this argument in the places cited above in logic and metaphysics, where I also refuted the various solutions of *Hurtado* and *Arriaga*; and from what was said there the response of *Oviedo* is also easily rejected, which scarcely differs from theirs and diverges from them only in words. For *Arriaga, disp. 7, Log., n. 31*, says that human nature confusedly conceived is predicable of any individual inadequately, that is, one nature of one and another of another — and the response of *Oviedo* plainly coincides with this.

This response must therefore be refuted, as was done in *disp. 4, Log., q. 1, art. 1*: because in that case the predication would be nugatory, that is, of the same thing of itself, as *Lichetus* rightly presses against *Ockham* in 2, *dist. 3, q. 2, § Ad responsionem*. For the same thing conceived in the same way would be predicated of itself, since nothing is conceived under the term "man" that is not conceived

under the term "Peter," since no significate corresponds to it that would be more explicitly applied to Peter. And so there would be no predication of a superior of an inferior, or of a universal of a singular, because the predicate would have no greater extension than the subject. I pursue this further still against Oviedo in *disp. 6, Metaph., q. 16, art. 1, n. 296*.

And it is false, as the same author claimed, that the same argument equally proceeds against those who prescind objectively, because even on that view the universal contains several abstractly distinct rationes, whose collection cannot be predicated of any inferior. That, I say, is false; for on our view the universal contains only one abstract ratio, which is predicated of all and each of the inferiors individually, and it imports the immediate significate of the universal name — as "animal" imports the common nature of animal, and "man" the common nature of man — as will be clearer from what will be said below.

But *Oviedo, loc. cit., n. 15* in logic responds that in the predication of the universal nature of the inferior contained under it, the predicate does not retain the universality it previously had but is contracted to that inferior ratio by which the subject is circumscribed; and it is called a predication of a universal nature because it is the predication of a certain nature that was contained in that universal, which was constituted by the aggregation of inferiors, and because it is signified in the same way in the actual predication as it was signified in the aggregate in which it was contained — for in this predication "Peter is a man," the ratio of man identified with Peter, which holds only on the part of the subject, is signified in the same way as the whole collection of men was signified in this specific universal "man," and this is what the ancient Nominalists said in the predication of the universal nature of the inferior: that although the nature is not predicated of any inferior according to the full extent of its extension as regards the thing, it is nevertheless predicated according to the mode in the sense just explained. Against this: this solution concedes, perfectly and to the letter, everything the argument was aiming at — namely that this predication "Peter is a man" is not, strictly speaking, a predication of a superior of an inferior or of a universal of a particular, but rather of the same thing of itself. For it concedes that the predicate "man" does not retain universality but is contracted to the inferior ratio by which the subject is circumscribed, so that in the thing it has no greater extension than the subject itself, but only in the manner of speaking — inasmuch as even when contracted in actual predication it is still signified in the same way it was signified in the aggregate in which it was contained. Therefore in reality that predication is not of a universal of a particular or of a superior of an inferior, but only according to the word and manner of speaking, and in the thing it is a nugatory predication, a predication of the same of itself, because nothing is conceived under "man" that is not conceived under "Peter," and "man" extends no further than "Peter" except in words.

Moreover: if in this predication "Peter is a man" only the ratio of man identified with Peter holds on the part of the predicate — so that it has no significate broader and more common than Peter — then this predication is equivalent to "Peter is Peter," "Peter is a certain man," "Peter is this man," because each of these says exactly the same thing on the part of the predicate as that proposition "Peter is a man" does; and therefore, just as these are not predications of a universal nature or of a superior of an inferior, neither is that one — or else they too will be predications of a universal nature, which no one concedes.

Oviedo responds again that the aforesaid propositions are not predications of a universal nature because they do not express on the part of the predicate the nature identified with Peter — contained in the universal — signified in the same way as the whole universal "man" is signified, but affected by a particular or demonstrative sign by which the predicate of this proposition of a universal nature is not affected. Against this I press the same objection: this distinction is merely verbal and concerns only the manner of speaking, because in the thing "man" signifies the same when predicated of Peter in "Peter is a man" as it signifies when affected by a particular or demonstrative sign, according to their doctrine. Therefore in the thing all those propositions are equivalent, and hence either all and each of them are predications of a superior of an inferior, or none of them are — both of which alternatives are false.

Furthermore: when we say "Peter is a man," either that concept of "man" is apt to be verified of Peter alone, or also of Peter and John. If the first, then that predication will not be of a universal nature — which can, according to the same ratio, be predicated of many — but will be of the same thing of itself, entirely equivalent to "Peter is Peter," "Peter is this man," and so on. If the second, then that predicate "man" will extend further than the subject and will have some unity and community which Peter does not have, and according to which it abstracts from Peter's individuality — which *Oviedo* in the end concedes under compulsion of truth in some way, *loc. cit.*, when he says that in this proposition "Peter is a man," the predicate "man," precisely insofar as it is signified on the part of the predicate, abstracts from the difference of Peter, though in the other propositions it does not abstract, because the particular and demonstrative signs import those differences. See further in *Lichetus*, *loc. cit.*, 2, *dist. 1, q. 1*, against this Nominalist doctrine, resolving the arguments of Ockham.

You will say: this difficulty about the predication of the common nature of the individual equally presses our position and that of the Nominalists, because even on our view the nature is predicated of Peter only insofar as it is contracted to him and identified with him; indeed, the truth of this predication "Peter is a man" is founded precisely on such identity. For it is not the humanity of Paul or John that is predicated of Peter, but that which is identified with him. Therefore if it is predicated as contracted to him and identified with him, it is not predicated as indifferent and undetermined to others, and thus it is not predicated in the mode

of a universal nature, since the predicate does not extend further than the subject, and when contracted it loses universality.

The response is to deny the assumption: for as will be established from what will be said below, the nature when contracted retains a certain negative indifference — that is, a non-repugnance — so that it can be in another individual. Therefore just as in the state of contraction it still retains such indifference and community because it is only extrinsically singularized, so too can it found universality; because by reason of such indifference it holds that, although the predicate is really identified with the subject, still according to its formal ratio it extends further than the subject. Hence when we say "Peter is a man," the predicate "man" does not lose universality in this predication; for universality would be lost only if the common concept were converted into a singular one, on which see *disp. 4, Log., q. 2, art. 5*. This the Nominalists cannot assert, because they admit no such indifference or community — neither positive nor negative — in the common nature, and especially in the state of contraction.

The conclusion is proved thirdly, and further, from universality and community of nature itself: the universal is predicated of individual inferiors, but if it does not import one nature but immediately a collection and aggregate of all individuals, it cannot be predicated of each individually. Therefore the universal does not immediately refer to all individuals taken together, but to some one nature common to them. The minor is proved: that entire collection of individuals, in which the Nominalists locate universality — say, of human nature — is expressed by the complex "every man"; but this complex cannot be predicated of Peter, for it is false that Peter is every man. Confirming this: the universal must not only be superior to and predicated of each inferior singly, but also of all individuals taken collectively. But this could not be done if the universal were nothing other than all individuals taken collectively, because then the sense of this proposition "all men are a man" would be "all men are all men."

Oviedo, loc. cit., denies that the universal is well expressed by that complex "every man," because by the universal name all the singulars are signified confusedly, whereas in that complex they are signified as distinct from one another, since the complex by virtue of the sign "every" is formally resolved into "this man and this man and this man." Others, conceding that the universal is well expressed by that complex "every man," still deny the assumption used in the confirmation, because a divided thing is equaled by all its dividing members taken collectively, and therefore the universal cannot be superior to all its inferiors taken together but only to each singly. Against this: according to the adversaries the universal does not import some one nature but immediately all individuals taken together; but such a collection is well expressed by that complex "every man." Therefore if the universal consists precisely in such a collection, it will perfectly well be expressed by that complex — or rather it must be said that the universal does not consist precisely in such a collection. Indeed, from this alone they should admit that the

universal imports one nature as its immediate significate in which the individuals are merged; and to respond that the universal is not well expressed by that complex "every man" because in that complex the singulars are signified as distinct from one another is openly to deny that the universal is sufficiently expressed by that collection, since that collection is sufficiently expressed by that complex, and consequently so too is the universal, if the universal imports nothing beyond that collection.

Confirming this with the same objection: it is certainly true that the universal is not well expressed by that complex "every man," but the reason for this is that the universal does not immediately import all individuals taken together — for in such a collection they can still be signified as distinct from one another — but imports one nature common to all and abstracting from their differences, in which accordingly all individuals are wholly merged.

Confirming further: it belongs to the ratio of a predicate that it be verified of the subject according to everything it actually contains. But that collection actually contains all the inferiors even as distinct from one another. Therefore if the universal consists in that collection, it will be well expressed by that complex, and according to that complex expression it will be predicated of any inferior, which is false.

And the response of the others to the confirmation also fails. For the universal is defined as superior with respect to inferiors — otherwise it would not be a universal — and it is defined in relation to all its inferiors not disjunctively only but also collectively. Therefore it is superior not only to each singly but to all together. This is confirmed by the fact that the predication "all men are a man" is true, from the chapter on species, and it is a predication only of the species of individuals, as is clear from the sufficient enumeration of the modes of predication. Nor does the fact that all the members together equal the divided thing remove its superiority with respect to them, for this consists in a certain community with respect to them that still subsists even if it is equaled by them — just as a cause is said to be universal and common not only in relation to one or another effect produced by it but also with respect to all, to which its power is said to be adequate.

Finally, the conclusion is proved from the object of science, with *Bassolis*, 1, *dist.* 12, *q.* 4, *art.* 2. Science is of universals, from 1 *Post.* 11 and 2 *De Anima* 60, not of singulars — both because of their contingency and because of their infinity. Therefore beyond singulars there must be a common nature as the immediate object of science. Nor can it be answered that science is indeed of universals, but not of things — only of universal words and concepts in which singulars have their unity. For we define things, not names, and we demonstrate the properties of things from their real essences; therefore the sciences are about things, not about names or concepts. If you say that science is about names and concepts as suppositing for things: then either the things for which they supposit are the

many singulars themselves, or some one nature common to them. If the second, the intention is had; if the first, the same argument returns — that singulars do not fall under science. And the same argument can also be made about names and concepts themselves, for science is not of all and each of them because concepts and names are nearly infinite; therefore science is of those concepts insofar as they agree in something common — which is not their common nature as a sign, but as a thing, otherwise there would be an infinite regress. Therefore it will be of something intrinsic to them, and the same conclusion must be drawn regarding the science of things in themselves.

This is confirmed from the primary and adequate subject of a real property in any species: this cannot be the individual, since a specific property does not convert with any single individual under the same species — for if it converted with one, it could not be predicated of another, as *Aristotle* teaches in *1 Post., text 12*. Thus risibility is said to be the primary and immediate predicate of humanity, not of Peter or John, to whom it belongs only mediately and secondarily. Therefore in any species the common nature is the primary and immediate subject of the specific property, not the individuals themselves, whether taken together or disjunctively.

The same argument can be made regarding definition: a definition must be predicated primarily of its defined object — that is, with the primacy of adequation — but it cannot be so predicated of any individual, because then it could not belong to other individuals of the same species. Nor can it be so predicated of anything extrinsic to the individuals — for example, of the name or concept of man, as is sufficiently evident of itself. Therefore it is predicated per se and primarily of that which is neither an individual nor extrinsic to individuals, but something intrinsic and common to them — such as human nature as such.

Certain recent authors, following *Gregory, 1, dist. 3, q. 1, art. 2, § pro quarto dubio*, in order not to concede that the object of universal cognition and concepts immediately represented is something existing in individuals, have said that the object of such an act is a kind of idol or simulacrum constructed by the intellect, and therefore in no way existing per se in individuals, though it is representative of them. By reason of this representation it can supposit for individuals, and they claim that in this way necessary predications are made and science is had immediately of this simulacrum, and through it mediately of the individuals. For that simulacrum has in objective and apprehended being whatever the thing existing on the part of reality — of which it is the image — has. For example, when I conceive "man," my formal concept corresponds to a kind of fictitious man in which I consider predicates similar to those I really see in Peter and Paul, who are remotely cognized in that idol insofar as our intellect is led by the cognition of it to acknowledge Peter and Paul. And that fictitious man is equally in Peter as in Paul — not intrinsically and really, but extrinsically and intentionally, through the

similarity of prototype and copy, as the image of Caesar is found in Caesar extrinsically and in represented being.

And some others, to illustrate this conception further, say that the intellect produces certain spectres that are substituted in place of objects, and that things are cognized in these as in images — so that the intellect is said to cognize "animal" insofar as it contemplates a certain spectre substituted in place of animal, and is said to perceive "rational" insofar as it perceives another spectre produced by itself and substituted in place of the rational. Thus report *Hurtado, disp. 5, Metaph., sect. 11; Arriaga, disp. 6, Log., sect. 1; Oviedo, controuv. 3, Log., punct. 4; Amicus, tract. 4, Log., q. 2, dub. 1* — who there unanimously reject this conception at length.

This manner of speaking errs in several ways. First: as is established from what was said in the book on the soul, in our intellect there are only two images — a virtual and impressed one, which is the intelligible species, and a formal and expressed one, which is the cognition itself and the mental word, through which our intellect immediately cognizes real objects themselves without producing any idol that it immediately reaches or in which it cognizes the object as in its substitute. Therefore it is false that in the cognition of things our intellect produces spectres substituted in place of objects. Second: because then science would not be of real and necessary being, as *Aristotle* says in *1 Post., cap. 2*, but of being of reason and fiction, and the predications would be between a fictitious subject and fictitious predicate. For the "man" corresponding to the universal cognition of man is a fictitious man according to these authors, and equally the rationality enunciated immediately of it is fictitious. Third: because the universal must be identified with its inferiors and essentially predicated of them — which cannot be done without identity — but the idol of animal, for example, is not identified with its inferiors, namely horse and man, nor the idol of man with Peter and Paul, because a being of reason is not identified with a real being. Therefore universality is absurdly attributed to such idols. Fourth: because it is false that predicates similar to those that belong in reality to the object on the side of the thing belong to that simulacrum. For the rationality attributed to the fictitious man is only fictitious and chimerical, and it is not similar to true rationality. Nor does it suffice to say that the predicates are similar intentionally, not really; it does not suffice, I say, because the predicates of a superior and an inferior must not only be similar but entirely the same — for the same rationality that belongs to man in general belongs to man in particular. Therefore similarity — especially merely intentional similarity — does not suffice. Fifth and finally, from a prior reason: as *Lichetus* argues with the Doctor in *2, dist. 3, q. 1*, near the end, everything that is in the predicamental line consists of true things and not merely of beings of reason; and the common rationes of the category of substance — such as being an animal and a rational being — are essential to man and to Peter, because man is essentially a rational animal, since "animal" is the genus predicated in quid and "rational" is the difference predicated in quale quid. Therefore those rationes are not fictitious; and *Hurtado, loc. cit., § 194*, also adduces this reason, which *Arriaga*

considers ineffective without justification, saying that it can easily be answered that those rationes which are fundamentally universal are indeed essential to the inferiors, but that those which are formally universal are essential only through similarity — inasmuch as other rationes similar to those fictitious universals are in reality essential to Peter and Paul. But this solution is of little worth, because — as was argued above — it is false that the idol has predicates similar to those that belong to the object on the side of the thing. For the universal as such must be identified with its inferiors and essentially predicated of them, not merely through similarity. And finally, if it is said that this belongs to formally universal rationes by reason of those that are fundamentally universal, then from this we already have our intention: that there must be admitted on the side of the thing natures common to several by indifference, which by reason of such real community are fitted to found formal and logical universality.

Article II. The arguments of the Nominalists are resolved.

First, some raise certain authorities of Aristotle: in *7 Metaph.*, *text 45*, asking whether the universal is a substance, he concludes that it is impossible for a substance to be any of those things that are said universally; and in *10 Metaph.*, *text 6*, he says: "But if it is not possible for any of the universals to be a substance, nor for this itself, as one thing beyond the many, to be a substance (for it is common), but only a predication." Aristotle therefore seems to hold that universals are not things but only common names or common concepts, to which it belongs to be predicated.

The response is found with the Doctor in his commentary on that text. The Philosopher does not intend there simply to deny universal substances, since he would contradict himself — for he posits genera and species in the category of substance as secondary substances, as is clear in the *Categories*. Rather, he denies that there are universal substances in the manner in which the Platonists supposed: namely, that there were universals that were substances and the whatness of singulars and really separated from them. For that is impossible, since the whatness and substance of each thing is proper to it and really inherent in it, as the Philosopher's first argument there proves. And *our Alensis* expounds it in the same way. As to the second text, the Doctor says in his commentary that Aristotle's intention is that neither being nor one is a substance existing per se and subsisting, which he proves from the fact that no universal is a substance existing per se, as he said in *7 Metaph. 45*, and being and one are the most universal of all; therefore being or one is not a substance existing or subsisting per se. From this it is clear that Aristotle denies being and one to be a substance in the same sense in *10 Metaph.* as he denies in *7 Metaph. 45* — which he himself cites — that universals are substances, namely in the Platonist sense. Hence I do not see from what grounds the Scotist margin at that text should have said that this exposition is not consonant with the text, since Aristotle explains himself when he says that

being and one are not substances in the way universals are denied in 7 *Metaph.* to be substances, against Plato.

It is true, however, that *Alensis* draws from this text the conclusion that universals exist only in concept — which favors the Nominalists. But he perhaps said this about the formally taken universal, since under that denomination formally it exists only in the intellect, as was said at the beginning of this question; or rather he said it because being and one, being transcendent grades rather than predicamental ones, do not exhibit on the part of the thing a reality or common nature to which their objective concepts would adequately correspond, but only inadequate concepts abstracted from several realities — as was said in *disp.* 2 on the nature of being. Hence it is true that being and one do not import common natures of the kind discussed in this disputation.

Secondly: nature, as prescinded from individuating conditions, is incompatible with existence, because existence requires singularity; hence if singularity is prescinded, so too is the power to exist. Therefore the common or universal nature cannot be something real, and it will either be something fictitious or only names and concepts signifying singular things. Furthermore: whatever is in a singular — say in Peter — is so determined to Petreity that it cannot be in Paul and other individuals; but what is universal is so undetermined that it can be in Peter, Paul, and others. Nor does it help to say that repugnance to indetermination belongs to the humanity of Peter by reason of the singularity that determines the nature, not by reason of the nature itself — for wherever the repugnance to being in many comes from, it is already established that universality is prevented from belonging to the nature. Finally: to all predicates found in a singular, singularity belongs, since they are singular; therefore none of them can be assigned an intrinsic predicate that of itself is common and universal. The antecedent is evident; the consequent is proved, since universality and singularity cannot belong to the same thing, as they have opposed conditions: universality implies aptitude to be in many, singularity implies repugnance.

The response is: we do not assert that universality of nature exists on the side of the thing, but only the nature that can found such universality when the work of the intellect is added. Hence it is one thing to speak of universality formally, another of the substrate of universality. Absolutely speaking, being in reality is not universal; but the nature that is called universal is real. And although existence is repugnant to nature as it abstracts from individuating conditions, still, for it to be called a real being, it suffices that it can exist in singulars conjoined with singularities — for many things are real beings that cannot exist immediately by themselves but only together with another, as is clear in the case of accidents, especially relative ones.

As to the second objection, the response is as stated there. Hence, from the common doctrine of the Scotists with the Doctor in 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 1 and following, something can be singular in two ways: in one way intrinsically, by inclusion of

singularity, and in this way not everything in singulars is singular, since only the individual constituted through singularity is singular in this way; in another way something can be called singular extrinsically, by conjunction with singularity, and in this way it is indeed true that whatever is in a singular is singular. From this it follows that by the same token whatever is in a singular is determined either intrinsically or only extrinsically — in which way nature is said to be determined by singularity to that one with which it is conjoined. With this it is still consistent that nothing intrinsic repugns it to be communicated to many with division according to individuals, because extrinsic determination is compatible with negative indetermination from within — and that impediment is extrinsic and accidental. And from this the response to the instantiation made against the solution given during the objection is clear.

As to the last: the response is by the same argument. Everything that is in a singular is singular: either intrinsically, as the individual difference itself, or at least extrinsically, as nature itself. But from this the consequent is denied, because although what is intrinsically and of itself singular can in no way be made common and universal, nevertheless what is singular only extrinsically and accidentally, or merely by identity in a third, can be per se and intrinsically universal and common — and this is what we say happens with the common nature.

When it was said that universality and singularity cannot belong to the same thing because they are opposite predicates: the response is that, although opposite predicates cannot belong to the same thing with respect to the same and in the same way, they can indeed belong with respect to different things and in different ways. The same white thing is said to be similar to another white thing and dissimilar to a black one. So in the case at hand: the nature existing in an individual can be said to be both universal and singular — universal formally through the intellect and fundamentally from itself, but singular through haecceity; common and indeterminate intrinsically, particular and determined extrinsically.

But you will say: nature, abstracted and prescinded from inferiors, does not exist on the side of the thing but only through the intellect; but it has community only by virtue of such abstraction or precision; therefore on the side of the thing it is common only through the intellect. The response is to deny the major. For if the matter is carefully considered, we will see that abstraction does not remove the conjunction which nature has with singularities according to the thing. For nature can prescind from haecceities in two ways: either according to itself — insofar as nature on the part of the thing never intrinsically and essentially includes haecceity, though it is conjoined with it — or through the intellect, insofar as the intellect cognizes nature in itself without reaching haecceity. The first abstraction does not remove the conjunction of nature with haecceity; on the contrary, it always remains even when nature is conjoined with it, because it imports nothing

other than that nature does not have haecceity from itself — which is compatible with its having it from another. Similarly, neither does the second abstraction — through the intellect — really remove the real conjunction of nature with haecceities, because this mode of abstracting imports only that the intellect reaches nature through its act without reaching singularities. And this second abstraction has its origin in the first: because nature on the part of the thing does not include singularity in itself, when the foundation is found in the thing the intellect conceives nature without conceiving singularity. It is therefore clear how, with both abstractions, the real conjunction of nature with haecceities subsists — which is a point very much to be considered in this matter.

Thirdly, *Arriaga, disp. 6, Log., sect. 2*, argues that not only nature existing on the part of the thing, but not even nature objectively prescinded, can be predicated intrinsically of any individual. Therefore it is not universal. The consequent is evident. The assumption is proved: that nature is the real nature of all men; but the nature of all men cannot be predicated intrinsically as a whole of Peter alone. Therefore it cannot be predicated of any individual. The major is evident; the minor is proved: Peter is really and adequately distinct from the remaining men; therefore the nature of some of them cannot be predicated intrinsically of Peter with numerical identity, otherwise Peter would have the natures of all men identified with himself and would truly and really be all men. Confirming this: it implies a contradiction for the same thing to be predicated really and intrinsically of Peter and Paul, and yet for Peter and Paul not to agree really and identically with it. For what is really and intrinsically predicated of something is really identified with it. Therefore if the very same thing is predicated of Peter and of Paul, it is really identified, one and the same thing, with both Peter and Paul, and therefore they are really and intrinsically the same as each other — which is manifestly false.

Finally: it is repugnant for something to be one in itself really and to be divided really and intrinsically into several things that are adequately the same as it and yet distinct from one another. Therefore it is repugnant for that nature objectively to be intrinsically one and to be divided really into several things that are adequately the same as it. The consequent is evident, because it implies that each of the two parts dividing the whole is adequate to the whole, since the part would be equated to the whole.

The response is, as has often been said, that it is not our intention to hold that universals exist formally and completely on the part of the thing, as was said in *disp. 4, Log., q. 1, art. 2*, but only that common natures exist through indifference. This community, though sufficient to found universality properly so called, is not yet properly universality itself, since universality requires a greater unity of nature and a stricter community — one that demands unity and community by inexistence, as was explained in *loc. cit.* Hence, because these arguments speak of logical universality — which is properly explained through being predicated of

many — and not of metaphysical universality, of which this is the discussion, one could from that standpoint concede what they conclude: that a formally universal nature does not exist on the part of the thing. Nevertheless, since the logical universal as such — actually or at least in proximate potency — must be predicated of many, it requires as its foundation the metaphysical universal, which can at least remotely be predicated of many. And this at least can belong to the objectively prescinded nature.

The response to the first argument is therefore: although nature existing on the part of the thing and as prescinded from singularity — for as we said above in n. 16, nature abstracts from singularity not only through the intellect but also according to itself on the part of the thing, insofar as it does not include haecceity intrinsically and essentially — cannot be proximately predicated of any individual by a predication saying "this is this," it can nevertheless be so predicated remotely. It follows that although in such a state it cannot be called logically and completely universal — since this requires that it can be predicated of many either actually or at least in proximate potency — it can nonetheless be called metaphysically, remotely, or fundamentally universal. It can be predicated remotely because it is indifferent, as far as it goes of itself, such that it constitutes not less this individual — say Peter — than another, namely Paul — not indeed conjointly but disjunctively. When the assumption is proved — that the objectively prescinded nature is the real nature of all men, and the nature of all men cannot be predicated as a whole intrinsically of Peter alone — I say that this nature is on the part of the thing the real nature of all men not by inexistence, since it inheres in Peter alone, but by indifference in the manner already explained and to be further explained below; and in this sense the nature of all men by indifference can be predicated as a whole intrinsically of Peter alone. When it is proved that the opposite holds because Peter is adequately distinct from the remaining men, this proves only that it cannot be predicated of many with numerical identity by inexistence — which does not prevent it from being predicated of many with numerical identity through indifference. For it is still consistent with this that Peter is distinct from the rest, inasmuch as it is consistent with this that the humanity of Peter and the humanity of Paul are different.

You will say: the argument at least concludes against the objectively prescinded nature through the intellect, because under such precision it can through the work of the intellect become the same for all through inexistence, as was said in *loc. cit. in logic*. The assumption is denied, because then it is not conceived as one and the same nature of all individuals numerically, but with formal unity — which is a lesser unity than numerical — and therefore it is still consistent both that it is one and the same nature of all by inexistence, and that the whole is predicated of Peter, and that Peter is still distinct from the other individuals. For although the whole is predicated of Peter, it is not predicated of him totally and adequately — that is, the whole is predicated according to essential totality, but not according to potential totality, as will be explained presently.

As to the confirmation: *Pontius, disp. 3, Log., n. 47*, denies that for something to be predicated intrinsically of many it is necessary that it be identified with those many, and says it suffices that either the same thing or something similar and representable by the same concept is in those many. And so he says that the nature of Peter can be predicated intrinsically of Paul and John because something similar is found in them — and he wants the predication of the common nature of many to be founded not on the identity of that nature with them but on their similarity. But this doctrine is entirely false, because in every school the truth of predication — especially essential predication — is founded on the real identity of the predicate with the subject. For if the predicate is not the same as the subject, how can it be predicated of it intrinsically and essentially? Confirming this: when we predicate the nature of Peter of Paul by a predication saying "this is this" — namely "Paul is a man" — the sense is certainly not precisely that the nature of Peter is similar to the nature of Paul, but that it is the same nature of both. Therefore the mere similarity of one individual with another does not suffice for the nature of one to be predicated of the other — since then it would not be a predication saying "this is this" but rather "this is similar to that" or "has a nature similar to it." The falsity of this doctrine will become still more evident from what will be said below.

Therefore, to the confirmation: for the reason given, the assumption is conceded, and also the first consequent — in this sense: that Peter and Paul are identified in one and the same thing or nature, not indeed one numerically and through inexistence, but one formally or essentially and through indifference. In this same sense the second consequent must be conceded: that Peter and Paul are really and intrinsically the same as each other — not simply and absolutely speaking, but with the same identity by which they are the same as a third — namely essential and formal identity. For it is true that Peter and Paul do not differ specifically but are the same.

As to the last: I have already expressly explained in *disp. 5, Log., q. 3, art. 1*, how the unity of a superior is well consistent with the plurality of its inferiors, since generally speaking unity excludes only the division opposed to it. Hence we see that specific unity subsists with numerical multiplicity, and generic unity with specific multiplicity. And when animal, for example, is divided on the part of the thing through differences, even if this is a real division, it does not occur in the manner in which a continuum is divided into its parts as a certain actual whole — as if animal before the advent of differences were one real entity that was then by their advent split and torn apart into diverse parts. For animality on the part of the thing does not have the ratio of an actual whole with respect to species but rather of a material and contractable part — and in truth of a part determinable through differences. Hence it is said to be divided only inasmuch as, remaining one and the same, it is contracted through this difference — namely, rational — to the constitution of man in such a way that the very same animality, as far as it

goes of itself, can be contracted through the opposing difference to constitute a horse or a lion.

Hence, since this division of a superior into inferiors occurs not as of an actual whole into its parts — as *Arriaga* seems to speak — but as of a potential whole into its subjective parts, it is clearly evident how any inferior can be said to be adequately the same as it, and how the whole nature of animal, for example, can be predicated of horse and simultaneously of man, because it is divided only according to potential totality, not according to actual and essential totality; and thus the whole and adequately is in any inferior with respect to essential totality — inasmuch as it belongs to all and each according to all its intrinsic and essential predicates — but it is not whole and adequate in singulars with respect to potential totality, because no inferior adequates its totality or potential extension.

Fourthly, to the same end *Oviedo, contro. 3, Log., punct. 5, n. 3*, argues: nothing is in Peter that really is in Paul. Therefore it implies a contradiction that some objective concept, according to everything it imports, can be predicated of Peter and also of Paul. The antecedent is evident because everything in Peter is identified with the individual differences of Peter. The consequent is proved: an objective concept capable of being predicated of Peter and Paul must be in Peter and in Paul; but no concept that is in Peter is in Paul; therefore no concept that is predicated of Peter and is in Peter is in Paul or can be predicated of Paul. You will say: with abstraction given, the result is a ratio entirely the same and common to Peter and Paul. Against this he insists: with abstraction given, no real identity results in the object, because abstraction does not change the object really. Therefore only an intentional or rational identity results; but this cannot serve for the verification of what — when this rational unity is removed — did not have physical identity in common, to be verified of the same subject. Therefore rational unity cannot serve to make rationes that — apart from it — are not really identified with the subject be identified with it for purposes of predication.

Confirming this: nothing is in Peter or in Paul when the ratio of man is abstracted from them that was not there when abstraction was absent. But when abstraction is absent, nothing is in Peter that is common to Paul or really identified with Paul. Therefore even when abstraction is present, nothing is found that can be predicated of distinct individuals according to one and the same indivisible ratio.

Finally: if the same nature that is in Peter is also in Paul, each individual would recognize its own nature in any other, and could demand it back from it, and would not have to yield it to the other, since by the same right it belonged to him. And so that nature would be proper to each individual insofar as "proper" is opposed to "alien," and would be said to be proper to neither insofar as "proper" is opposed to "common" — and that nature would be common to both individuals.

The response is that these arguments coincide with those brought from *Arriaga* and therefore admit the same solution. As to the first: granting the assumption,

the consequent is denied with its proof. For although nothing is in Peter in a way that is really in Paul, Peter still has something that of itself is indifferent to be identified with Paul just as with Peter, and this suffices for a concept abstracted from such a reality to be predicated, according to everything it imports, of Peter just as of Paul. For predication follows identification. Therefore just as the nature of Peter, as far as it goes of itself, can be identified with Paul, so too can it be predicated of Paul by a predication saying "this is this" — even though it is not in fact identified with him. For that only prevents the actuality of the predication, not its proximate or at least remote possibility; and such aptitudinal identity — or community through indifference — I freely grant does not result from the abstraction made by the intellect but precedes it; and from it results, or rather follows upon it, the identity and community through inexistence, as was said in *loc. cit. in Logic*, which identity is indeed of reason or intentional and — though it does not serve precisely, considered in itself, for the truth of propositions — it nevertheless serves to complete the universality of nature.

To the confirmation: the major might be denied, because with the abstraction of nature through the intellect it becomes common positively and through inexistence, whereas before abstraction it was common only negatively and through indifference. But since in the major the arguer seems to speak of inexistence on the part of the thing, the major is conceded and the minor is distinguished: when abstraction is absent, nothing is in Peter that is common to Paul through inexistence — this I concede; through indifference — this I deny. And this suffices for the nature of Peter to be predicable of other individuals at least remotely. As to the last: the argument proceeds against those who posit common natures through inexistence, not against those who posit them only through indifference, as we do. For we admit — as will be further explained below — that the humanity of Peter is other than the humanity of Paul; but because as far as it goes of itself it could equally well have constituted Paul as it now constitutes Peter, it is said to be common to both and proper to each: common through indifference, proper through inexistence.

Fifthly, *Hurtado, disp. 5, Metaph., sect. 10, subsect. 3* and following, presses many objections, proving that the cognition of the universal is immediately terminated at all singulars as similar in some ratio, and the principal reason is that "man" cannot be prescinded from Peter, since there are no objective precisions but only formal ones, as he shows below in *disp. 6, Metaph., sect. 4*. And having proved that on the part of the object one formality is not abstracted from another, it evidently follows that the object called universal cannot be one objective ratio prescinded from singulars. Second: because the act of the universal is unity through which man is constituted undivided in himself in reason, and thus *Aristotle* seems to teach in *10 Metaph., cap. 1*, when he says: "And those things are one of which the account is one — but things of which the intellection is one"; but this act immediately reaches all singulars, for example under the human species. Therefore the minor is proved, because man, for example, since he is constituted

formally undivided per se through that act, is nothing other than Peter and Paul and the other singulars; therefore Peter and Paul and the other singulars are constituted in the ratio of one universal through that act. Third: because the foundation of universality as such is cognized immediately through the universal act; but that foundation is formally the singulars themselves as similar — for everyone says that universality is immediately founded in the similarity of many — therefore the many singulars as similar are cognized immediately through the universal act. Fourth: division and indivision bear immediately on the same thing because they are related as habit and privation; but the division of man bears immediately on Peter and Paul; therefore also indivision. The minor is proved: the division of the universal is nothing other than clear cognition of the inferiors or dividing members, and so indivision will be confused cognition of the inferiors. Fifth: the divided and the dividing members taken together are wholly equal, differing only in the clarity and confusion of the act; but the dividing act immediately affects the dividing members and denominates them as divided; therefore the divided is immediately reached by the confused act, because the object of the explicitly dividing cognition and that of the cognition confusedly reaching the divided is the same — just as the act cognizing what is defined immediately reaches the same object confusedly as the definition reaches clearly. Sixth: the immediate object of the universal act, namely "man," is truly predicated of Peter and Paul, because to be something common and to be predicable are the same; but of those things there is nothing that is immediately and directly predicable except the inferiors themselves. Therefore the minor is proved: for everything that is immediately and truly predicable of Peter and Paul is necessarily Peter and Paul, with whom nothing is identical except themselves. And again: to the immediate object as immediate, adequate predication with Peter is repugnant; therefore as immediate it includes something by which that repugnance belongs to it; but what it includes for that repugnance is Paul; therefore what it includes is Paul, and hence Paul is a part of the object as it is the immediate object of the universal act. Finally: universal cognition is immediately terminated at many as similar; therefore their immediate object is many as similar. The assumption is proved: either what immediately corresponds on the part of the object is only singular as such — and this is not so, because it would repugn being the object of the universal act — or many as dissimilar, and this is not so because as such they do not have the unity required for the universal; or nature as prescinded from singulars, and not this either, because since precision is the cognition itself, the prescinded nature is the same as the nature cognized without singularity, and we are asking here for the ratio of the object that corresponds to the cognition on the part of the object, not the ratio that corresponds to the object as denominated by the cognition. What remains therefore is that singular things as similar correspond.

The response to the first is to deny the assumption, for I showed at length in *disp. 6, Metaph., q. 16, art. 1* that beyond formal precisions, objective precisions are also

necessary — especially those of universal rationes from singulars. As to the second: the major is denied, if it is taken to mean that the common nature has no other proper intrinsic unity than that which comes to it from the universal cognition. Nor did *Aristotle* in *10 Metaph.*, *cap. 1* intend this; rather he said the opposite: he says those things are essentially one of which the account is one — that is, one definition or objective concept — and when he adds that those things of which the intellection is one are such, he gives a posterior sign by which we can recognize which things have one ratio; he says they are those that can be represented by a single formal concept, and from this it is argued a posteriori that all such things have one ratio. Then the minor is denied with its proof, for what is immediately reached is that one ratio in which those many singulars are cognized as similar and in which they are said to be mediately and remotely united.

As to the third: the foundation of universality, which precedes in individuals on the side of the thing, is not the individuals themselves as such, but formally the natures that are found in them — as *Hurtado* himself admits when he says they are singulars as similar, for these are similar only in the common ratio of the nature. As to the fourth: the minor is denied, for what is immediately divided is the common ratio itself, when it is contracted through various differences to constitute diverse species or diverse individuals. For the division of the common nature on the part of the thing must be explained in this way, as I said in n. 18, and explained expressly in *disp. 5, Log., q. 3, art. 1*. Hence it is false — as was assumed in the proof of the minor — that the division of the common nature on the part of the thing is well explained through the clear cognition of the inferiors, and indivision through confused cognition. For it comes about formally on the part of the thing through the proper formalities of the contracting and contracted grades; through the intellect, however, it can be granted to come about through clear cognition of the inferiors.

As to the fifth: the major is denied. For in a potential whole — as the superior is with respect to its inferiors — the divided common thing and its dividing parts do not differ only in the clarity and confusion of the act, but also in the diversity of objective concepts, inasmuch as something more is included in the concept of the inferiors than in the concept of the superior. Hence although it is true that the superior or common divided thing is equal in convertibility to all the inferiors taken together, it does not have equality in actual predicates — which is to say that a superior as a potential whole equals its inferiors taken together because it converts with them, but not as an actual whole, because the inferior includes a difference not included in the common divided thing. As to the minor, I say that division can denominate both the whole and the parts, but in different ways: passively it denominates the whole, actively the parts or dividing members. But if it also denominates the parts passively, this still occurs differently than in the whole — for the whole is denominated as divided as something containing parts and is therefore said to be divided into parts, but the parts are denominated as

divided as members, to which division from other things properly belongs, not division into other things, which is proper to the whole.

As to the sixth, which *Hurtado* thinks most effective, as *Avicenna* rightly noted, this also creates a difficulty in the Nominalist opinion. For since the predicable universal according to them is the whole aggregate of all and each individual, it cannot be predicated vaguely, because it is of the ratio of the predicate that it be verified of the subject according to all the parts it actually contains; otherwise "man" could be predicated of horse, because it would be verified by reason of the part — namely animality — which is in man. If therefore Paul is actually included in the immediate significate of "man" even when predicated of Peter, as *Hurtado* says, then it must also be admitted that Paul and John are predicated of Peter, since according to him the immediate significate of "man" actually consists of all singulars, as an army consists of many men. For, as I said, it is of the ratio of the predicate to be verified of the subject according to all the parts it actually contains.

Therefore, to the argument in itself: the minor is denied. For what is immediately predicated of the inferiors is not the inferiors themselves but some ratio common to them — otherwise the predication would be identical and nugatory, not of a superior of inferiors. As to the first proof: I concede that what is predicable of Peter and Paul in the ratio of superior must be something identified with them, but it is false that nothing is identical to them except themselves — for then all universal predication would be identical, not of a superior of an inferior. As to the other proof of the minor: I concede that the immediate significate of "man" includes something by which adequate predication of Peter is repugnant to it, but I deny that this is Paul or John, as *Hurtado* inferred. I say it is the community of indifference, which human nature has in itself according to which it is indifferent to constituting Paul and John just as it now constitutes Peter, and by reason of this it cannot, according to itself, be adequately predicated of Peter or any other individual — because although now it is identified with him alone, still as far as it goes of itself it could be identified with others and is common to others through indifference.

As to the last: the assumption is denied, and to its proof I say that the cognition of the universal is terminated at the nature as prescinded from singularities, to which nature its own formal unity corresponds as such. When the objection is raised that precision is the very cognition prescinding nature from singularity, and the prescinded nature is the nature cognized without singularity — so we are asking for the ratio of the object corresponding to the cognition from the part of the object, not the one corresponding to the object as denominated by the cognition — I respond from what was said in n. 16: nature can prescind from haecceity in two ways — either from the nature of the thing, insofar as on the part of the thing it does not include singularity in its formal ratio; or through the intellect, insofar as the intellect through its act acknowledges and contemplates such a precision of nature from haecceity. Although therefore it can be granted

that the precision of nature made through the intellect is the cognition itself, it is entirely false to say the same of the precision of nature from singularity found in the thing.

And indeed that the cognition of the universal is immediately terminated at the prescinded nature is admitted by *Hurtado* himself along with the other Nominalists — precisely in that they say it is terminated at many singulars as similar. For they themselves declare they are not speaking of formal and relative similarity, because this formally includes plurality and requires distinct extremes, and the universal cognition does not reach many as many and as distinct; they say rather that they are speaking of fundamental similarity, which they call a certain unity and identity on which formal similarity is afterwards founded, and by reason of which the intellect cannot discern one individual from another. But this is the unity of the common nature, which we say is given from the nature of the thing — as will be further evident in what follows.

Question II. How the common nature has being on the part of the thing: whether it is included in and really identified with singularities, or not.

Having established that there is a common nature on the part of the thing beyond singulars, we must now dispute about the manner in which it is to be admitted: whether it is involved and intertwined in the singulars themselves, or whether it is rather separated and discrete from them. Now there is a sufficiently famous and widely known opinion attributed by Aristotle in several places to Plato, that universals are the natures of things separated from singulars, subsisting per se, free from matter, common to all individuals and bestowing their being on them — either in the genus of efficient cause or of exemplar. Hence Plato held — if Aristotle's report is to be believed — that the essence of man, for example, exists in common outside particular men, and called it the very man himself, while saying that particular men are not absolutely men but these men; and he added that the essences of these things, which he called Ideas, are altogether ingenerable, incorruptible, immutable, and eternal — so that even if singulars were destroyed the Ideas would not for that reason cease to exist. Just as when a seal is pressed into many pieces of wax many imprints are produced but the seal itself remains separate if those imprints are destroyed, and just as from one fire many candles are lit that, if extinguished, do not thereby extinguish that fire — in this sense Aristotle very frequently refers to and most sharply criticizes the Platonic Ideas in *1 Metaph.* and in books *7, 13*, and in *1 Ethics, cap. 6*, and in *1 Post., text 149*, where he calls them species; and others call them Plato's universals, separated from singulars. They also report that Plato placed them in a certain sublime and remote place above the spheres of the elements in the concave of the Moon. And *Scotus* in *2, dist. 3, q. 6*, § *ista positio* reports this opinion of Plato as recounted by Aristotle.

Whether this was the true and genuine opinion of Plato and was faithfully reported by Aristotle, many deny — asserting that Plato posited the ideas of all things only in the divine mind and erred in nothing in this positing of ideas. A long catalogue of those who share and follow this view is given by *Pasqualigo*, *tom. 2, Metaph., disp. 11, sect. 3*, where he also adduces many passages from Plato himself in confirmation. But as a witness of this truth beyond all exception *Scotus* adduces *1, dist. 35, q. unica, § ad ista*, St. Augustine, *lib. 83, q. 45*, where he says: "In the divine mind there are the reasons of all things to be created and already created; nor in the divine mind can there be anything except what is eternal and immutable; and Plato called these the principal reasons of things, by participation in which whatever exists is, and in whatever manner it is." And in *lib. 1, Retract., cap. 4*, speaking again about Ideas and the intelligible world, he says: "Nor did Plato indeed err in this, that he said there is an intelligible world." And therefore *Scotus*, *loc. cit.*, says that Plato, when he posited Ideas as separated from sensible things, posited them in the divine mind, and spoke of the intelligible world, and that Augustine took the name "Idea" from Plato, who posited the Ideas as the quiddities of things — not indeed existing per se, as Aristotle wrongly attributes to him, but in the divine mind, as Augustine rightly interprets him. Thus the Doctor there; and in like manner *our Alensis* speaks for Plato in *7 Metaph., text 52, q. 2*, where, asking whether separated Ideas can be given by the Platonists, he resolves the question as follows: it must be said that to give a separated Idea outside the mind of the First Intellect — so as to posit a man per se who is outside this particular man — is impossible, because human nature has it that it exists in this man. But if it is understood that Ideas of things are given in the mind of the First, this is necessary. The reason is that all things below the nature and below created essences proceed from God, not however after the manner of nature, so that what remains is that they proceed after the manner of art; and everything that proceeds from something after the manner of art proceeds after the manner of an artifact; and everything that proceeds from God after the manner of an artifact has its exemplar in the mind of the craftsman. If therefore everything proceeds from God after the manner of artifacts, Alensis concludes that everything has an exemplar in the intellect of the First, and such an exemplar he calls an Idea. And these Ideas, he says, Plato posited according to external reasons in the intellect of the First, and not as subsisting per se outside of it, as the Philosopher attributes to him. In confirmation of this Alensis also cites the commentator *Eustratius*, *1 Ethics*, saying that the Ideas were not posited by Plato as Aristotle attributes to him — outside the mind of the First craftsman — but in the divine mind. Whatever therefore the followers of Aristotle may say, since Scotus and Alexander stand for Plato, we too must subscribe to such great doctors in this matter. Whoever wishes more can consult *Aversa*, *q. 8, Log., sect. 2*, and *Contarini junior*, *tom. 3, q. peripath., q. 1, from cap. 8* and following.

Others, commonly in the Peripatetic school, teach that there is not, and indeed that through divine power there cannot be, a universal nature separated from

individuals on the part of the thing, but that it is always and indispensably immersed in singulars and essentially included in them. But some among these, although they do not posit universal natures separated and distinct from singulars, still really distinguish them from singulars at least as the included from the including, because the inferior grade includes the superior but not the superior the inferior. So *Jandun, 2, Metaph., q. 9* seems to indicate; and so those authors must reason if they are to speak consistently who in the preceding disputation, q. 6, said that the superior and inferior grades are taken from forms really diverse — for example, "body" from the form of body, "living" from the vegetative soul, "sentient" from the sentient soul, and "intelligent" from the intellectual — forms which those authors take to be really diverse existing in the same singular.

The position to be held is that the common nature can only be given immersed perpetually in singulars, and is indeed really and essentially identified with them, so that universals in being as separated from singulars — as Aristotle reports Plato to have posited them — are entirely fabulous. And that this is impossible and implies a contradiction is proved by the most evident reasons drawn from Aristotle himself in *7 Metaph.*: nothing is more contradictory than that the essence, or a part of the essence, should be outside the thing whose essence it is, since nothing is more intrinsic to a thing than its proper essence. But the common nature or universals in being are of the essence of singulars — as "animal" is of the essence of man, and "man" is of the essence of Peter. Therefore it is impossible for such universals to be outside singulars or separated from them.

Bonetus, lib. 7 of his Metaphysics, cap. 2 and 3, attempts to resolve this argument drawn from *Aristotle, 7 Metaph.*, because he also tries to defend the Platonic opinion about Ideas in part, as it is attributed to him by Aristotle. Hence in cap. 2 he sets out ten theses according to the mind of Plato, the first of which is that universals simply exist outside the intellect and subsist per se; in the third thesis he asserts that a man existing simply excludes the reality of all singular men and yet is the same as them and is predicated of them. He then explains in cap. 3 how this is possible — that the universal is separated from singulars and yet is the same as them and is predicated of them — saying that the simple man is every man eminently and equivalently but not every man quiddatively and formally, like an exemplar of all men; just as we say the First Intelligence is an eminent exemplar of all things and representative Idea of all; hence the stone is not formally but representatively and exemplarily every stone, and the simple man is every man eminently, and the simple rose is every rose eminently and exemplarily. Therefore it is not predicated of particular roses with an essential predication saying "this is this," just as an exemplar is not so predicated of its copy, nor is the First Intelligence — which is the eminent exemplar of all — so predicated of those of which it is the exemplar.

And if you say that Plato also posited some predication of the simple man of singular men, then what kind of predication is this, and what kind of identity or consubstantiality is there between the simple man and particular men — since it seems to imply a contradiction that what is the same as all singulars exists outside them and is separated from them? For then the same thing would both be and not be. Bonetus responds, according to the mind of Plato, that this predication is not essential but is the predication of the representative of the represented, and of the eminent exemplar of its copy — as we said that the house in the mind and the house outside are the same house, which is true representatively and exemplarily. For the same name can be imposed on a thing and its likeness, and such a predication can be made — just as it is said that the First Intelligence is a lion, a stone, and so on, which is true representatively and eminently; and Plato did not intend any other predication or identity, and whoever attributes another to him is not speaking Platonically, as Bonetus says.

This exposition of the Platonic opinion partly coincides with the explanation given of St. Augustine, for such an Idea considered precisely will be something singular in itself as regards its being and can only be universal in representing — it will not be universal in being and separated from singulars, which is the only sense in which it is impugned here. But even this exposition, as *Bonetus* propounds it, seems deficient in many respects. For if he wants, according to the mind of Plato, the simple man not to be anything other than an exemplar and Idea of all men, he should have placed it in the divine mind and not as some being separated from singulars and subsisting per se. For if it exists per se in the universe outside all intellect, a place would have to be assigned to it, and there would be no more reason for assigning one rather than another.

Furthermore: if the Platonic universal is explained in this way, it will not only not be universal in being but not even in representing. For Bonetus says that the universal of man excludes the realities of all singular men and represents only human nature with individuation excluded. Therefore it would only represent human nature, not the individuals of that nature — and therefore it would not be universal even in representing. And so there would not be a true predication of the universal of the particular, as of an eminent exemplar of its copy. For such a predication to be true the exemplar must express in itself everything found in the copy and vice versa, and the truth of such predication is founded in such conformity. And since the universal on this account would be a diminished exemplar of singulars because it does not express haecceities, it could not be truly predicated of them exemplarily and representatively.

Furthermore: Plato's Ideas explained as Bonetus explains them — which explanation *Aversa, loc. cit.*, admits to be true and genuine to Plato's mind — are still useless and can serve no agent. Not the uncreated agent, because God has the Ideas of all things in his own mind and is by himself the Idea of things and needs no external exemplar to imitate; nor the created agent, because it too forms in its

own mind the Idea of the things it is to make, and since it operates only in an artificial manner, it has no need of the Ideas of natural things.

Finally: the argument drawn from Aristotle to refute the Platonic Ideas is valid, because we impugn them as if they were universals in being separated from singulars, as Aristotle attributes to Plato — not as though they were only universals in representing. Moreover, even in this sense the position faces the difficulties just adduced, unless the opinion of Plato is explained of Ideas in the divine mind, as *Scotus* and *Alensis* interpret him with St. Augustine, loc. cit.

The conclusion is then principally proved and the Platonic universal — as reported by Aristotle — is impugned, because every thing that exists solitarily and subsists per se immediately in the universe is singular and individual, according to Boethius: "Everything that is, is because it is numerically one." Therefore a universal in being that exists per se and subsists separately from singulars implies a contradiction in terms.

If again with *Bonetus* you say that such a universal imports only the nature of particulars and not their individuation, and therefore since it imports only the essentials of the nature it exists per se without singularity — just as nature in the intellect, if considered as abstracted from individuation, is universal: against this, existence presupposes the singularity of the thing to which it belongs, as was demonstrated above in *disp.* 8. Therefore it implies a contradiction for something to exist per se — especially immediately and solitarily — without singularity; for by the very fact that something exists in itself and per se separated from everything else, it is in itself numerically one and singular. For the singular is what does not imply division in itself into many singulars.

Furthermore: either that separated universal existing per se is produced or unproduced. Not unproduced — for then it would be God. If produced: then it is no longer universal but singular, or simultaneously universal and singular, because actions are terminated at singulars, and everything that a production immediately and in itself terminates is singular. Nor is the assumed parity with nature objectively prescinded by the intellect valid; for it is one thing to speak of nature prescinded in this way through the intellect, and another of some thing existing in the nature of things outside the intellect. When nature is universalized through the intellect and taken in objective being, it is plainly not considered according to the whole of its being as it has it on the part of the thing — since on the part of the thing it is found identified with singularity from which it abstracts through the intellect. But if a universal separated from singulars were given in the nature of things, it would certainly have its full actual entity, by which it would be in itself undivided and divided from everything else according to real physical and entitative being — and therefore would be an individual and singular.

Finally, the conclusion is proved for this part by going through the individual headings on account of which Plato is reported to have introduced Ideas and

separated universals, showing the uselessness of all of them. In the first place, they are not to be posited on account of the sciences, because — as *Aristotle* argues in *7 Metaph. 20 and 21* — a thing is perfectly known when its whatness or proper substance is known, and there is no need to have recourse to a substance wholly extrinsic to it, as the Platonic universal is posited to be. Furthermore, when we define man as a rational animal and demonstrate that he is risible, we certainly do so not about some separated and unknown man or about some Idea, but about the man we know. And science exists also of accidents, whose Ideas Plato did not posit — only those of substances — and therefore they are not absolutely necessary for the science of things. And finally, even without the Platonic universal it holds good that science is of an immutable, incorruptible, and eternal object, because the necessity and immutability required for the object of science does not concern existence but only the connection of predicate with subject. For as *Scotus* teaches in *1, dist. 3, q. 4, § and K*, for science it suffices that complex and propositional necessity hold, and the necessity of incomplex terms is not required — on which see what was said above in *disp. 8, q. 1, art. 4, n. 58*, where I also explained in what way, even if no particular man existed, there would still be science of man in general, and it would be true to say that he is a rational animal, a risible being, and so on. And in what sense the essences of things are called eternal without any need for the Platonic universal.

Nor are Plato's Ideas necessary in order for every generation to be from something univocal and every like to be generated from a like. For since we see many things generated from dissimilar particular causes — as fire from iron and stone, a frog from rain and dust — Plato inferred that there must be some universal cause imprinting its likeness on generated things. But the Platonic Ideas are not to be introduced on this account. First: because they would be superfluous at least in univocal effects; second: because absolutely speaking, formal and univocal similarity between cause and effect is not always necessary — virtual similarity often suffices, as is clear in equivocal effects; third and finally: because even if such similarity were necessary, the Platonic universal would still be irrelevant, since Plato posited it as entirely devoid of matter, ingenerable, and incorruptible, whereas sensible effects are composed of matter and form, are generable and corruptible — and therefore the Platonic universal cannot be posited as being of the same ratio and species with these.

Nor again are they necessary for the preservation of inferior things, because since those things are corruptible and transient they have no need of a perpetual conserving cause — and for the entire time they endure, even setting aside the Ideas, they have natural causes sufficient for their conservation; and at no time is the influx of universal causes — namely of God and the heavens — lacking, as was said in its place. Nor are they to be posited in order for inferior things to be able to exercise their operations, since inferior things have of themselves sufficient principles for those operations: their proper forms are the primary and radical

principles, accidents the proximate and instrumental ones, and on God's side as first and universal cause the general concurrence is always available.

Nor finally are they to be posited in order for the intellect to be able to cognize the universal without falsity and without cognizing the singulars. For this it suffices, as the Doctor notes in 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 1, that there be a common nature immersed in singulars through real identity, which yet does not include singularity in its formal ratio — and which, as far as it goes of itself, is indifferent such that it constitutes not more this singular than another. For such indifference and formal distinction of nature from singularity is a sufficient foundation for nature to be thought of as universal while thinking of nothing about the singularity through which it has been contracted on the part of the thing and determined to this individual. And no falsity is involved here: first because the foundation in the thing precedes, and second because when the intellect thus contemplates nature it does not separate or divide it from individuals but only abstracts and prescribes — considering one thing without considering another — which from 2 *Physics* 12 is called precisian abstraction, not divisive abstraction.

The other part of the conclusion — namely that the common nature is not only always conjoined with singulars and immersed in them, but is also really identified with them — is the common sense of all and is most widely received in every school. And this is what *Aristotle* taught in 7 *Metaph.* 31 and frequently elsewhere, when he says that universals are nothing beyond singulars and that the genus is nothing beyond the species that belong to the genus. For according to the exposition of serious interpreters, by these words he intended to indicate not only that universals are not given as separated from singulars, but also that they are not given as things really distinct from them. This can be proved first by all the arguments by which in the preceding disputation, *q.* 6, art. 1, it was proved that the diverse metaphysical grades of the same essence do not admit a real distinction among themselves but are all really identified in the same essence and entity. Furthermore: essential universals — of which the discussion here is — such as genera and species, are essentially and quiddatively predicated of their inferiors, either as the whole of their essence or as a part of their essence. Therefore they presuppose that the common natures in which their intentions are grounded are really identified with their inferiors, for the truth of such essential predications is founded in such real identity, as was said in *disp.* 4, *Log.*

Further, this is proved from the rules of real distinction already assigned in *disp.* 6, *q.* 8. Real distinction is measured by diversity of existences, especially in created things, from what was said there in n. 182, and properly concerns thing and thing. But to the common nature, as prescinded from singularity, existence does not belong — only insofar as it is conjoined and identified with the singular. Therefore since it has no existence distinct from the existence of the singular but exists by the very same existence of the individual, it cannot be really distinct

from it. The minor is clear from the preceding disputation, n. 176, and will be further proved presently.

Confirming this: when things are distinguished as two things — which is the condition required between things that are really distinct — each of them must have its own real entity existing through which the one is separated from the other. But every entity existing by its own existence is singular, because by it the entity is constituted as the immediate and per se terminus of the action of the agent, which is terminated at singulars. Therefore the universal and the singular, as two real distinctions, can in no way be distinct. Confirming further, from the rules of real identity: just as real distinction is grounded in the plurality of existing things or in diversity of existences, so real identity is grounded in unity of essence and existence, as was said in *loc. cit.*, *disp. 6, n. 189*. Hence things that are realized or constituted by a single essence and that likewise exist by a single existence must be said to be really the same. But all metaphysical grades are so related in the common constituted whole. Therefore they cannot be really distinct among themselves. The minor is proved: because essence, from its own proper signification, expresses the integral nature ordered to existence, whereas formalities — as metaphysical grades — are only constitutive of essence and are not of themselves immediately capable of existence, but exist adequately through the existence of the whole entity composed of them.

But this is proved further specifically of the common nature in its relation to singularity: existence only comes to a singular thing, for it is communicated to the thing through action, since it is the terminus of real production, which is terminated only at singulars, from *1 Metaph., cap. 1* and *lib. 7, cap. 15*. But in each individual on the part of the thing there is only one individual difference, through which the specific nature existing in it is singular — and with good reason, since by that same individual difference Peter becomes this substance, this body, this living thing, this animal, and this man, as will be clearer in the following disputation. Therefore likewise there will be only one existence — namely that of the individual — through which all the predicamental grades exist; and therefore none of them can be really distinct from the common constituted.

Moreover: if human nature in John were really distinct from John himself, it would equally have to be distinct from John's individual difference; but this cannot be said. The sequel of the major is clear: since from humanity and John's singularity one composite — which is John — is constituted, humanity cannot be really distinct from John without being equally distinct from the other part, namely the singularity of the same. The minor is proved from what was said: for real distinction requires a proper entity and existence in each extreme; but before singularity in John, humanity does not possess any actual existence but only after it is singularized — for it is understood to exist toward the existence of the singular, since it cannot exist outside its causes except through production, and it cannot be produced except with singularity, because every production — being

singular — is also necessarily terminated at a singular and individual thing, from *Aristotle* just cited.

Furthermore, this can be proved from the path of generation and corruption, which, though not an adequate sign as diversity of existences is, is nevertheless a sufficient sign of real distinction or its opposite, from what was said in *disp.* 6, q. 8, n. 185. For a sufficient sign for recognizing real identity between two things is when at the generation of one the other is also generated by the same action, and at its perishing the other likewise perishes. And this is how singular and common nature are related: for the common nature is generated at the generation of the singular and is corrupted at its corruption secondarily and remotely, as *Scotus* teaches in 3, *dist.* 22, q. un., H.

Finally, this can be proved by a posterior argument used by *Aureolus* as cited in *Canon.* 1, *Physics*, q. 6 and 7: if the common nature were really distinct from singulars and their haecceities, then it could be transmuted from one difference into another. For when a potential and prior thing has several opposed actualities as really distinct from itself, God can at least transmute it from one to another — and can even strip it of all simultaneously, as is clear in the case of matter with respect to forms. For because matter is potency with respect to forms and is really distinct from them, it can be transmuted from one to another, and God can even strip it of all of them, as the Doctor argues in 2, *dist.* 12, q. 2: every absolute reality that is prior to another and really distinct from it can be separated from it, since it does not depend on it. And so the animality of man could be made the animality of a lion; indeed, an animal could be given in the nature of things that was neither rational nor irrational and stripped of all differences — which is plainly more monstrous than the separated Platonic universal. I pursue this argument still further above in *the preceding disp.*, n. 190.

Objections Resolved.

It is argued in opposition. First: the common nature is really distinct from singulars and their haecceities, since contradictory predicates are verified of them on the part of the thing: nature on the part of the thing is said to be communicable to many, whereas the individual is incommunicable; nature on the part of the thing is said to be common and contractable, while the individual difference is said to be proper and contracting. But those things of which contradictory predicates are verified on the part of the thing are judged to be really distinct, for in created things at least opposites cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied of the same thing. Therefore nature is really distinct from singulars and their haecceities.

The response is: contradiction from the nature of the thing is indeed a sufficient sign for detecting a distinction from the nature of the thing — as a genus for all distinctions that precede the work of the intellect — but not for detecting a simply real distinction, as was said in *disp.* 6, n. 168 and 181. For there are certain

contradictories that belong to the whole thing absolutely and not precisely by reason of some included formality, and that pertain to the identical and entitative, or physical, being of the thing — such as to exist and not to exist, to be produced and not to be produced — and the contradiction founded in them certainly infers a true and proper real distinction, especially in created things, because these are the extremes of the primary contradiction, of each of which it is true to say either that it is or that it is not. But there are other contradictories of lesser moment, that bear on the formal being of the thing and belong not absolutely and simply to the whole thing but by reason of some formality and with the reduplication of that formality. As "sensitive" and "discursive" are in man: he is called sensitive insofar as he is an animal, and discursive insofar as he is a man and not insofar as he is an animal. Hence for composing these contradictories the mere diversity of formalities in the same thing suffices — a doctrine more fully expounded above in *disp.* 6, *n.* 227, 299, and 310. This is how things stand in the case at hand: the contradictories verified of nature and haecceity are not contradictories of the first kind but of the second, and therefore they infer only a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, not a real one. And *Lichetus* also responds thus to this argument, which *Ockham* and *Rubion* make in 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 3, against the Doctor in 2, *dist.* 2, *q.* 1; and the Doctor himself employs this doctrine frequently to preserve the formal distinction from coinciding with the real, in 1, *dist.* 2, *q.* 1 and 2, in 2, *dist.* 1, *q.* 5, and often elsewhere.

You will say: between contradictories there is equal repugnance, inasmuch as they can never be verified of the same thing and in the same respect; therefore they always infer equal distinction. The response from *loc. cit.*: all contradictories — whether real or of reason — are indeed equally repugnant as regards truth, since they import affirmation and pure negation and plainly cannot be verified of the same thing with respect to the same and in the same way. However, they are not equally repugnant as regards the distinction they infer, for some infer a simply real distinction — such as primary contradictories — others a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, and others finally only a distinction of reason, according to the character of the contradiction. For distinction is always commensurate with the contradiction.

Secondly: nothing can identify with itself that which it could exist without — indeed which it absolutely can be without. But according to the doctrine of *Scotus*, 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 1, the humanity in Peter could be without that individual difference; for just as it was contracted through Petreity, so it could have been contracted through Paulinity. Indeed, intrinsically considered it still retains that privative indifference in which *Scotus* places the whole community of nature, by reason of which in a divided sense it can be determined by another singularity.

Confirming this: the specific nature stands to the individual as the generic to the specific; but the generic is really distinct from the specific, because animality can be found, and in fact is found, where humanity is not. Therefore similarly here.

Finally: the humanity that is in Peter is really distinct from the singularity of Paul; therefore also from the singularity of Peter, because what is distinct from several things of the same ratio is distinct from any one of the same ratio, since there is no greater reason for one than for another.

The Scotists respond in general that the argument with its confirmation does not conclude except that nature and the contracting difference are not absolutely identified with each other, but only by reason of a third in which they are united through identity. And if they are abstracted from that third, no sufficient cause of their identity remains among themselves. Hence although the humanity of Peter is the animality of Peter in Peter, yet outside Peter, absolutely speaking, humanity is not animality. This doctrine was expressly delivered by the Doctor in *1, dist. 8, q. 4, ad 1 princ.* and is embraced by all the Scotists. Indeed, the Doctor himself responds in just these terms to this difficulty in *7 Metaph., q. 13, n. 20*, where he says that if the common nature is considered as naturally prior to the contracting difference, nothing is found in it by which it is repugnant to it to be under another; but if it is considered as conjoined with the difference in a third, it implies that it can be separated because of the real identity acquired from the combination of both in the third, with which they are identified. He concludes that some things are not repugnant to nature in itself but are repugnant to nature posited in being or made.

Lichetus, 2, dist. 3, q. 1, § Respondeo ad hanc rationem, explains this doctrine further for the solution of the present difficulty, saying what the Doctor has in that citation — namely that nature, insofar as it goes of itself and is prior to singularity, is indifferent to all haecceities and does not repugn being without the difference under which it is — can be understood in two ways. Either it means that it does not repugn to nature, as far as it goes of itself and as prior to this singularity, to be without this singularity — because it can be with another and does not necessarily determine this one for itself — and in this sense it is true, because nature has a determinate regard for no difference but regards all disjunctively and equally. Or it is understood as meaning that nature can be without this singularity while it is under this singularity, and in this sense it is false, because while it is under this singularity it identifies it with itself, nor can it in the composite sense be under another. And this does not arise from the part of nature — for as far as it goes of itself it would identify all with itself, since it regards all equally and all are suited to arise from the principles of that nature — but arises from the part of the contracting difference; because as it is actually under one, it is repugnant to it to be under another, and while one arises another cannot arise as long as the first remains. For while it actually has one singularity, having another is repugnant to it.

This is the principal difficulty in this matter, because that negative indifference which Scotus assigns to the common nature in relation to the contracting differences, and in which he places the whole community of nature, seems plainly

to introduce a real distinction between nature and singularity. For nature can, as far as it goes of itself, or at least could have been, without the singularity under which it is in fact found. And the common Scotist solution does not seem to satisfy — even though indicated by the Doctor — unless it is better explained. For if nature and the difference are not really the same outside the third, it is not evident how they can become really the same through conjunction of both in the third. Nor does union — however substantial it may be — have such force as to be able to identify in a third what before were really distinct, as is clear in the case of matter and form in the composite: even united in it, they are still really distinct from each other, because they were so distinct before.

Nor does the doctrine that *Lichetus* adds satisfy either: for even prime matter, while under this form, cannot be under another in the composite sense, and from this it is not rightly argued to real identity between them, because absolutely speaking and according to itself it can be without that form and is equally indifferent to all — and therefore just as from such indifference of matter to forms we correctly deduce real distinction of matter from them, so in the present case from such indifference of nature to all haecceities it seems possible and necessary to deduce real distinction of nature from those haecceities. Nor is the response of *Lichetus* valid when he denies the parity because there matter is compared to forms that are really distinct, whereas here nature is compared to haecceities that are not really distinct. This response is invalid because on the part of both matter and common nature the indifference and indetermination toward forms and haecceities is similar. Therefore just as from such indifference real distinction of matter from forms is argued, so it seems possible to conclude the same about common nature with respect to the differences to which it is indifferent. And to deny the parity — because matter is really distinct from forms but nature is not so distinct from haecceities — is a manifest begging of the question, for this is precisely what the argument now tries to prove. Or else it means that nature is not indifferent to haecceities as matter is to forms — but if it is indifferent to them just as matter is to forms, it must equally be distinct from them as matter is from forms by reason of such indifference.

For the exact solution of this difficulty it must be noted that the indifference of matter to forms and of common nature to haecceities are not alike, nor is the mode of union of matter with form in the physical composite alike with the mode of union of common nature and contracting difference in the metaphysical one. For the indifference of matter to forms is the indifference of a pre-existing subject toward things that are wholly extrinsic perfections of it, which it does not therefore have by natural emanation or flowing from itself, but which are imprinted on it from without by an external agent by means of preceding dispositions — so that if the agent did not induce forms in matter, matter would always remain in those forms. But the common nature is not related to haecceities in this way. For before haecceity, nature itself is not supposed to be existing, and haecceity necessarily and by emanation flows from it without any concurrence of

an external agent — and with such an indispensable necessity that not even through divine power could it be posited in the nature of things without some haecceity immediately flowing from it as its ultimate and last reality, from which it is said to be determined so as to be rendered incommunicable as a "what." And from this necessary and indispensable connection we argue for their real identity, since when some things are related such that one cannot be without the other and such impossibility is from within, those things are really identified, as was said in *disp. 6, q. 8, n. 189* from the Doctor in *2, dist. 1, q. 5, N.*

In the case at hand, the impossibility of separation of nature from singularity is not from without and accidentally, but from within — inasmuch as haecceity arises of necessity from the nature of the thing and flows from the intrinsic principles of the common nature, as *Lichetus, loc. cit.* rightly explains. Yet with this necessary flowing of haecceity from nature it is still consistent that nature does not include singularity in its essential ratio, and that no one haecceity is more suited to arise from its principles than another, because all are in this respect of the same ratio. By this reason, I say, nature is said to be intrinsically indifferent to all and each, such that, as far as it goes of itself, it can identify one with itself just as well as another.

Lichetus illustrates this with a sufficiently apt example, positing that all dependencies of a creature on God are of the same ratio, because they are toward the same terminus. In that case it would be rightly said that to the nature of stone as such it is not repugnant to be without the dependence it has, yet it is repugnant concomitantly, because that dependence of the stone arises of necessity from the intrinsic nature of the stone. And if the stone were actually under the dependence which man has, that dependence would arise in the same way from the nature of the stone, and it would not be repugnant to the stone to be under man's dependence — supposing that such dependencies are of the same ratio. So in the case at hand: given nature in actual real being, of necessity and in that nature there sprouts and flows only one haecceity, which is really identified with it; and if that haecceity were not the one under which nature exists, it would not be really identified with it but with another that would flow from it. From all this it is clear how very diverse is the indifference of the common nature to differences from the indifference which matter has to forms, and how from the indifference of matter to forms real distinction between them can be well deduced — but not so from the indifference of nature to haecceities. And in this sense the doctrine of *Lichetus*, understood as explained, suffices for the resolution of the proposed difficulty derived from the indifference of nature.

The indifference of nature could also be explained in another way, by saying that nature is indifferent in the sense that it can be contracted through this or that haecceity — not indeed in the state of existence, but in the state of essence, in that prior in which it is indifferent to being produced or not produced. In that prior — in which God is indifferent to producing this individual or that one — just as

God is actively indifferent, so human nature is passively indifferent: it is indifferent to being contracted through this individuation or through that one. And it is thus clear how this indifference of nature to various individuations is not physical and subjective, as the indifference of matter to forms is, but only objective — and therefore it cannot by any means be inferred that there is real distinction between nature and the haecceity under which it is afterwards produced.

Yet because the same essential predicates that belong to nature in the state of essence — whether in the first or the second mode — are retained by nature also in the state of actual existence, it follows that even in the state of existence, when nature is found under this individuation, we still say that nature is in some way indifferent to individuations, insofar as it includes none of them in its formal ratio, and as far as it goes of itself it does not seek to be determined by this one — under which it is in fact found — more than by another.

Finally, this passive indifference of nature can be illustrated by a theological example — just as, namely, the active indifference of the divine will toward free acts is ordinarily explained. For those free acts are really identified with the necessary entity of the divine volition, as everyone admits, and yet according to their formal ratio they can cease without the entity of the divine volition ceasing, as is the case with the free decree about the existence of the world. Just as therefore the divine will so willed from eternity that this world would be, that it could have not willed it — by reason of its indifference to opposites freely — and yet notwithstanding such indifference, this decree about the existence of the world is really identified with the entity of the divine will or volition: so in like manner and with due proportion, in created things the common nature can be admitted as so passively indifferent to individuations that, when produced under this which it in fact has, it could equally well in that prior have been produced with another — without from such indifference real distinction between nature and the individuation under which it is in fact found being deducible. Hence the proposition assumed in the argument under n. 34 — "nothing can identify with itself that which it could exist without" — has a manifest instantiation in the free acts of the divine will. And this explanation of the indifference of the common nature to individuations is well worth noting, because in this indifference Scotus places the whole community of nature on the one hand, and on the other it seems very difficult to reconcile with this indifference the real identity of nature with singularity — nor have I yet found any Scotist who satisfactorily unravels this knot.

Just as the indifference of nature to individuations is not alike with the indifference of matter to forms, so too the mode in which matter and form are united in the physical composite is not alike with the mode in which nature and the contracting difference are united in the metaphysical one. For as the Doctor notes in 2, *dist. 12, q. 2, ad 1 princ.*, matter and form in the physical composite are

united by unity of union alone, which certainly does not remove real distinction between the united things; but nature and the difference in the metaphysical composite are united by unity of identity, passing namely into real identity, which then redounds between them insofar as things that are the same as one third are also the same as each other as united in that third.

The reason for this difference is that between physical and metaphysical composition there is this difference: the physical parts, being things and things and true and proper causes with respect to the physical composite, constitute it through true causality — and therefore they cannot really identify themselves with it, but nature and the difference, since they are not truly things but realities existing by a single existence in the same thing, and not true and proper causes, do not constitute the metaphysical whole through true and proper causality but through simple metaphysical influx — really identifying themselves with it. And so they are united in it not only by unity of union, as the physical parts do, but also by unity of identity, as the Doctor says, *loc. cit.* This difference between the union of physical and metaphysical parts in the common constituted is also rightly signified by *Tataretus*, 2, *dist. 3*, *q. 6*, *ad 1 princ.*

In this sense, then, the common Scotist doctrine derived from the Doctor in many places, and explained in this sense, greatly assists in the resolution of the present difficulty.

To the argument put in n. 34, it can first be instantiated against the major: "nothing can identify with itself that which it could exist without." As I said in the preceding number, this has a manifest instantiation in the free acts of the divine will toward the outside. Then the major can be distinguished: "nothing can identify with itself that which it could exist without" — after its production, this is conceded, for such separation of something from a thing already produced and existing without its destruction manifestly indicates real distinction between them; before its production, this is denied, because it is consistent with this that in actual production the thing identifies that with itself, having previously been indifferent to identifying it with itself or not. And then to the minor it must be said that humanity in Peter could have been without that difference before its production in the manner explained in n. 37 — but by no means after its production. Hence the nature already existing is said to retain that indifference only in the negative mode, insofar as as far as it goes of itself it can be without that singularity — not indeed with a natural potency that can be reduced to act, but with a logical potency, insofar as if it is considered as naturally prior to the contracting difference, nothing is found in it by which it is repugnant to be under another. Or else the indifference of nature is explained in the manner drawn from *Lichetus*, n. 36 — for even from such indifference real distinction between nature and individuation cannot be deduced, as was said there. Or finally the indifference of nature to individuations is explained as theologians explain the indifference of

the divine will toward free acts, without which it could sometimes exist and yet those acts are still identified with it.

To the confirmation of the same argument: the minor is denied. For animality is so identified with rationality in man as humanity is with Petreity in Peter. And when it is said that animal is really distinct from rational, and indeed separated, because animal is found in the brute in which rationality is not: first it must be noted here that when we say the common nature is really identified with the contracting difference, we are speaking of the grades of the same essence — that is, those found in the same constituted, whether species or individual. For when comparing the animality of the brute to the grade of rationality that is in man, it is certain for everyone that they are not really identified with each other, because such identity accrues to them only because they are joined together in the same common constituted and are identified with a third.

Furthermore — and this is even more worthy of attention — from the fact that the grade of animality is found in the brute where the grade of rationality is not, it does not rightly follow, strictly speaking, that there is real distinction or separation of animality from rationality or humanity. Rather, all that can be deduced is that animal on the part of the thing is not the same as man alone or as the brute alone by reason of its extension; because since it is a grade common to man and brute exceeding the extension of both, it is as much suited to be in man and not to be really distinct from man as it is suited in the same way to be in the brute with similar identity. Therefore from the fact that it is in man it is not separated from the brute, nor conversely, since it persists in both by reason of its extension and inadequate identity. Hence nature identifies with itself, as far as it goes, all the differences by which it is contracted — but inadequately, for just as it identifies one with itself in this individual it also identifies another with itself in that one — so that its unity and identity is unlimited and inadequate with respect to each singular.

This can be illustrated by an example: the soul, by reason of its unlimited nature and virtual divisibility, so is in the foot that it is also one and the same in the head, and yet from the fact that it is in the foot one cannot infer that it is separated from the head — for from the fact that it is in the foot it does not cease to be in the head. So in the case at hand: from the fact that animality is not found in man alone but also in the lion, it does not follow that it is separated from man as it is in the lion or conversely — because from the fact that it is in one it does not cease to be in the other. This doctrine in turn can help to clarify the indifference of the common nature to haecceities, and how from the fact that it is so under one singularity that it could have been under another, it does not at all follow that it can be separated or really distinct from the one it has. For from the fact that it is under one difference it does not cease to be under another — but only it can be inferred that it is not identified only with this difference in this individual but also with any other in any other individual by reason of its indifference to all. But it is

true that this doctrine rather favors community of nature through inexistence than through indifference, as will be clear from what will be said below in q. 5, though it can also serve us, as will appear below in n. 121.

To the last: it is responded with *Lichetus, loc. cit.*, that nature, as prior to singularity, is not really distinct from any singularity but only formally, because it is suited to be under one as well as under another; but as it is actually under one singularity, by reason of that singularity it is really distinct from any other. And so nature, as it is actually in Socrates, is really distinct from any other singularity — but this is not precisely from the ratio of nature but by reason of the singularity it actually has, which it really identifies with itself since that singularity arises of necessity from the principles of that nature. If it is said that it also really identifies every other with itself, because since all are of the same ratio one is as suited to arise from the principles of nature as another — I say that as far as it goes of itself it really identifies all with itself, and if it does not really identify them, this is not by reason of nature but because as it is actually under one singularity, being under another there is repugnant to it. And I concede that all are suited to arise from the principles of that nature, but while one arises another cannot arise while the first remains, because while nature actually has one singularity having another is repugnant to it. So *Lichetus, loc. cit.*

But note here that in the present case individual differences are all said to be of the same ratio only insofar as all are suited to arise from the same nature, and no one is more suited to flow from it than another; otherwise properly speaking individual differences are mutually *primo diversa*, as the Doctor teaches in *1, dist. 3, q. 3, § ad questionem istam*. Hence the Doctor himself in *7 Metaph., q. 13, § contra predicta*, asking whether all individual differences are of the same species or ratio among themselves or of another, responds in n. 21: if it is understood of species in the sense of being contained under a species, neither member is to be given, just as "rational" is neither of the same genus nor of another as "irrational" as contained per se under the genus. For opposed differences are mutually *primo diversa* to avoid infinite regress. But if it is understood that they are of the same species in the sense of being divisive and constitutive of things of the same species, then they are the same — just as the differences of a species in this sense are of the same genus.

Thirdly, the main objection is to prove that nature is not only really distinct from singulars but can also be separated from singularity: for nature precedes individuation with a priority of nature. Therefore it is not repugnant to it to be able to be separated from the singularity it has, at least through the absolute power of God, because what is naturally prior is not repugnant to being without what is posterior, as Scotus himself often holds, and as *Aristotle* teaches in *5 Metaph. 16*, where he says that those things are called naturally prior that can be without others but not others without them.

Furthermore: if nature cannot be without singularity it already depends on it, and thus would be posterior to it — but what does not depend is prior; therefore it can be without it.

Again: whatever is in something at some instant in which another is not can be conserved by God without that other for any other instant; but nature is at some prior sign in which singularity is not; therefore, and so on.

Finally: cause and effect are really distinct, since nothing causes itself; but nature is the cause from which individuation is produced, because — as was said — it arises from the intrinsic principles of nature. Therefore they are really distinct; and if they are such, nothing prevents their being able to be separated, because if nature causes it, it does so only in the genus of efficient cause, which God can impede.

The response to the first is from *Lichetus, loc. cit.*: to nature as such — that is, as prior — it is not repugnant to be without singularity; it is however repugnant from something concomitant, because nature itself as such — as an intrinsic cause — of necessity as it were originates the haecceity it actually has, and from this it is impossible for it to be without such haecceity. Just as we say that to man considered in his quidditative being precisely there is no repugnance to being without risibility — there is however repugnance from something concomitant, because he produces it of necessity in himself. More briefly and clearly: to the form of the argument the consequent is denied; to the proof I say that proposition is true when the prior is really distinct from the posterior, as the Doctor notes in 2, *dist. 12, q. 2, A.*, and also taken reduplicatively, because the prior as prior does not depend on the posterior, and so as prior it can be without the other. But an impediment can come from another source — namely from real identity — and this is the case here: that to nature there is no repugnance to being without singularity from the aspect by which it is prior, but because it is really the same as singularity.

This can be illustrated by the example of a property and its subject. For the explanation of *Aristotle's* saying: from what was said in *disp. 9, Log., q. 2*, there is a double priority of nature — one of being, which is explained through the ability to be prior without what comes after, and another of understanding, which is not rightly explained in this way even though it has a foundation in the thing, but only through the ability to be understood apart from another or prior to another without including it in its concept, as *Scotus* explains in 3, *dist. 3, q. 1, G.* Aristotle therefore speaks of priority of nature in being; but nature precedes singularity with priority of nature in understanding — especially if it is considered as contracted through singularity. For if it is considered as indifferent to singularity, one could still say it is prior to it even in being, insofar as as far as it goes of itself it could have been without it.

To the second: it can be conceded that nature depends on singularity with the dependence called "from the posterior" — which is more rightly called co-requirement — and this can exist without dependence, as the Doctor notes in *Quodl.* 8, § *sic videmus*: for we see that the formal cause cannot be without its formal effect, and yet from this we do not infer that it depends on it, but only that it necessarily co-requires it.

To the third: the minor is denied. For only priority of duration is rightly explained through the verb "is" and "in which," but priority of nature is explained only through "can be" and "in which" — if it is priority of nature in being — or through "is understood" and "in which" — if it is priority of understanding — as was said in *disp.* 9, *Log.*, q. 2 cited.

To the last: the major is valid for a physical cause by true and real influx, but not for a metaphysical one — as nature is in the case at hand with respect to the singularity arising from it. Hence properly speaking it should not be said that haecceity is produced or caused by nature, but only that it flows and emanates from it — which mode of speaking we also use to express the causality of a subject toward its proper properties. For these terms suggest a metaphysical action by simple emanation, while those suggest a physical and real one. What this metaphysical action and simple emanation is, as distinct from physical action, was already explained in *disp.* 2, n. 14 and 61.

Fourthly and finally, one could argue for the Platonists, proving that the common nature is not only really distinct from its singulars but also separated in the manner in which Aristotle attributes to Plato — the arguments for which were reported and resolved in *disp.* 4, *Log.*, q. 1, art. 1, § *Tertio arguitur*, where they can be seen.

Question III. Whether the common nature is at least formally distinguished from the real nature of the thing from singulars or from contracting differences.

Having established in the preceding question that the common or universal nature is not only not separated from singulars but is not even really distinct from them, but rather is perpetually immersed in them and really identified with them, we must now see whether it can and must at least be formally distinguished from them by a distinction from the nature of the thing — that distinction which is intermediate between simple real distinction and rational distinction, whether of the reasoning reason or of the reasoned reason, and which is so widely celebrated and familiar in the Scotist school. I declared it at length and showed its necessity expressly in *disp.* 6, *Metaph.*, q. 11, and incidentally in *Logic*, *disp.* 1, q. 1, art. 2.

The Thomists commonly deny this, as do all the moderns, asserting that the common nature has real being in singulars but is in no way distinguished on the part of the thing from the being of singulars or from the contracting difference,

but only by reason and through the intellect conceiving with a foundation in the thing the common nature as abstracted from individual differences. So that at most there can be posited between the common nature and singularities a distinction of the reasoned reason or a virtual or foundational distinction from the nature of the thing — but not a formal and actual one. So hold *Cajetan, De Ente et Essentia*, q. 5 and p. 1, q. 5, art. 6; *Soncinas*, 7 *Metaph.*, q. 3; *Suárez*, disp. 5, *Metaph.*, sect. 2, n. 9; *Aversa*, q. 9, *Phil.*, sect. 10 and following; *Rubius*, *Log.*, q. 8 *univers.*; *Sanchez*, *ibid.*, q. 32; *Morisanus*, disp. 1, *Log.*, q. 5, art. 2; *Blancanus*, disp. 2, *Log.*, sect. 4; *Oviedo*, *controv.* 4, *Metaph.*, punct. 3; *Hurtado*, disp. 5, *Metaph.*, sect. 2 and 3; *Arriaga*, disp. 5, *Log.*, sect. 1, subsect. 2; *Complutenses*, disp. 3, *Log.*, q. 4; *John of St. Thomas*, q. 3, *univers.*, art. 6; *Contarini junior*, tom. 3, q. *perip.*, q. 1; *Pasqualigo*, tom. 2, *Metaph.*, disp. 40, sect. 3; and others *passim*.

The opposing position is that of *Scotus*, 2, *dist.* 3, q. 1 and following, *Quodl.* 2, and 7 *Metaph.*, q. 16, where he teaches that the common nature on the part of the thing formally and actually differs both from the singular and from the individual difference through which it is contracted. All the Scotists follow him: *Tataretus*, q. 1 *praedicam.*, *dub.* 2 and 3, and 2, *dist.* 3, q. 1 with *Lichetus* and other commentators; *Canon.*, 1 *Phys.*, q. 6; *Bassolis*, 2, *dist.* 12, q. 4; *Antonius Andreae*, 7 *Metaph.*, q. 16; *Trombetta*, *ibid.*, q. 8 and 9; *Zerbus*, lib. 7, *Metaph.*, q. 17; *Bonetus*, 1 *Metaph.*, cap. 2; *Pontius*, disp. 3, *Log.*, q. 5; *Rada*, p. 2, *controv.* 3, art. 1; *Meurisse*, lib. 2, *Metaph.*, p. 1, cap. 1, q. 3; *Fonseca*, 5 *Metaph.*, cap. 6, q. 2, and sect. 2, q. 5, throughout; *Ragullus*, disp. *ult. perip.*; *Amicus*, tract. 4, *Log.*, q. 5, *dub.* 3, art. 2; *Piccolomini*, lib. 1, *De Anima*, comm. 8; *Monsorus*, *opusc. de univers.*, cap. 6; *Saxius*, tom. 2, *Catastrophis*, disp. 3, q. 2; *Faber*, 4 *Metaph.*, disp. 9, and in *Philos. theor.* 93; *Maironus*, 2, *dist.* 3, q. 4; *Venerandus*, q. 4 *de univers.*; and all the Formalists in the Tract on Formalities.

Article I. The affirmative part is asserted.

The position to be held is that the common nature is formally distinguished from singularity by a distinction from the nature of the thing. This is the common position in the Scotist school and with all who acknowledge any distinction between metaphysical grades that precedes the work of the intellect. Hence this conclusion can be proved in the first place by all those arguments by which in the preceding disputation, q. 7, art. 2, it was shown that between predicamental metaphysical grades there is a formal and actual distinction from the nature of the thing. For the predicamental metaphysical grades are especially the generic reality and the specific difference, and likewise the specific nature and the individual difference. Indeed the third argument drawn there in n. 200 from the path of contradiction directly proves this conclusion, because the ratio according to which several things agree and differ cannot be entirely the same on the part of the thing — for it is impossible for contradictories to be verified of the same thing and in the same respect on the part of the thing. But it is the case that the common nature — say animality or humanity — is the ratio according to which its several inferiors agree and are assimilated on the part of the thing, while

according to the differential reality — whether specific or individual — they are dissimilar. Therefore the common nature — whether generic or specific — differs on the part of the thing formally from the specific or individual difference. I pursue this argument at length in the passage cited and defend it against the various objections of the adversaries.

But the adversaries commonly respond that two things can agree and differ through the same simple entity on the part of the thing — that is, be assimilated inasmuch as they are similar and essences of the same ratio, and differ from each other inasmuch as those essences are in fact diverse. Hence to agree and to differ, as these are the same as to be assimilated and to be dissimilar, certainly do contradict; but to agree and to differ insofar as the same is to be assimilated and to be distinct or divided do not contradict, because similarity does not exclude distinction and division — on the contrary, in terms it involves the distinction of those things that are similar. This is the common doctrine of the Nominalists — Ockham, Aureolus, and Rubion in 2, *dist. 2, q. 1 and 3*.

Against this I prove that to agree and to be distinguished, as this belongs to individuals of the same species, do contradict — and therefore they cannot belong to those individuals through the same simple entity. Peter and Paul are said to agree substantially because the nature of each is of the same ratio, so that the nature of Peter just as it now constitutes Peter could as far as it goes have constituted Paul and vice versa; whereas Peter and Bucephalus disagree substantially, because the nature in Bucephalus cannot constitute Peter or belong to Peter, and vice versa. But from another point of view, Peter and Paul are also said to disagree substantially in some way, because there is something substantial in the one that is repugnant to being in the other. But it implies a contradiction that the very same entity or reality of Peter can be in Paul and cannot, and that it is intrinsically and of itself indifferent and not indifferent. Therefore it implies that Peter and Paul agree and disagree substantially through entirely the same entity.

Confirming this: to agree in this sense and to be distinct or divided is the same as to be similar and dissimilar; therefore these contradict. And this is especially clear in diverse species or in individuals of diverse species — as Peter and Bucephalus. For these individuals agree in the same generic predicate of animal, and by this reason are said to be assimilated; but because they have diverse specific and essential predicates, from this side they are said to be essentially dissimilar, since division in essential predicates implies essential dissimilarity. Therefore the argument at least concludes with respect to generic nature, that it must from the nature of the thing be distinguished from its contracting differences — because such differences among their constituted instances introduce not only entitative division but also essential dissimilarity.

The adversaries respond, denying the major, because neither agreement nor similarity signifies unity but only the commensuration of two things in that in

which they are similar — which also must be divided in those two things, because nothing there is similar. But in this sense two things can agree with each other as wholes, because they are entirely commensurate in entity, and be distinguished from each other as wholes, because they are two total entities, not one. Against this: *Aristotle, 5 Metaph. 20*, says that the essential agreement and similarity of two things is grounded in some unity of nature which is of the same ratio in them and greater than numerical unity. It is false what the adversaries commonly say — that Aristotle there takes unity for similarity and agreement — for he says that these are grounded in it; therefore he does not confuse these two things or take one for the other, as will be still more evident in the following question.

Furthermore: the major has evident truth in things that are under diverse species, since in that case entitative division is also essential. Therefore at least those things cannot through entirely the same reality agree and differ among themselves, or be distinguished, because these contradict. And again: although it is true that agreement and similarity between two individuals of the same species does not presuppose in them one and the same really identical nature — because what is really in one is not really the same in the other — it does presuppose in them two entities so entirely of the same ratio that what now constitutes one could as far as it goes of itself constitute the other in the same specific being. In this is grounded the essential agreement between Peter and Paul. But if in Peter there is no such entity that as the very same thing could in reality constitute Paul in the same being of man, why does Peter agree more with Paul than with Bucephalus? And if it is equally repugnant for the nature of Peter to constitute Paul and Bucephalus — as the adversaries say — why does Peter agree more with Paul than with Bucephalus? And why are the natures of the former said to be of the same ratio more than those of the latter?

They say that Peter agrees more with Paul because there is something in Peter to which something similar and commensurate is in Paul. But let them explain what this commensuration of natures says and shows, and in what it is grounded: we say it is grounded in the difference and unity of nature, insofar as the nature constituting Peter is indifferent of itself to constituting Paul — nor can it be explained in any other way. They say they are commensurate because they participate in the same essential predicates; but again I ask in what does this identity of the essential predicates of Peter and Paul consist? If you say it consists in some unity of the common nature of both individuals, the intention is had; if you say it consists in similarity and uniformity of essential predicates, this is a vicious circle — for you just said they are similar because they participate in the same essential predicates, and now you say they participate in the same essential predicates because they are then similar and essentially uniform. Hence from first to last the greater agreement and similarity between Peter and Paul than between Peter and Bucephalus can only be explained through the unity and indifference of nature in each.

Moreover, given the opinion of the adversaries that Peter and Paul differ from each other as wholes, it follows that there is as great a distinction and difference between Peter and Paul as between Peter and the Sun, since Sun and Peter cannot be more distinguished than as wholes. But they respond denying the consequent: for although Peter and Paul are two singulars mutually distinct and mutually totally independent — just as Peter and the Sun — Peter and Paul are similar entities and more numerous essences, while Peter and the Sun are dissimilar essences — not only more numerous essences but also diverse ones. Against this: from the fact that there is not as great a distinction between Peter and Paul as between Peter and the Sun — because those two are more mutually similar than these — it follows that Peter and Paul do not differ as wholes, but agree in something in which Peter and the Sun do not agree. The consequent is proved: two things cannot differ from each other more than as wholes; therefore if Peter and Paul differ less from each other than Peter and the Sun, then they can no longer differ as wholes but only in some part. Furthermore: if Peter and Paul are assimilated in something in which Peter and the Sun are not similar, this one thing can only be a nature of one and the same ratio in both — which will be the foundation of such similarity.

Some accordingly respond that, although several things cannot agree and disagree through the same simple entity adequately conceived, as if they were to agree and disagree as wholes simultaneously, they can nevertheless agree and disagree through it inadequately conceived. In confirmation of this response they adduce several instantiations: the individual differences among themselves also agree and disagree — for Petreity and Paulinity are distinguished as two realities and yet also agree, since they are more similar among themselves than the individual differences of Peter and Bucephalus; and all individual differences agree univocally in the common ratio of individual difference no less than Peter and Paul agree in the common ratio of man; yet in these differences no diverse grades of realities are distinguished, one founding similarity and another dissimilarity — for then there would be infinite regress — but through the same simple entity inadequately conceived they agree and disagree. Hence they conclude that a mere distinction of reason suffices between the rationes of agreement and of disagreement.

Others adduce another instantiation about God and creature, which likewise agree and disagree with each other — and yet in God no more realities are distinguished from the nature of the thing, one being the ratio of agreement and another of disagreement, since the transcendent grades in God, through which he agrees with creatures — such as the grades of being and substance — are not on the part of the thing prescinded from the particularities in which God and creature differ.

Fonseca, followed by *Amicus, loc. cit.*, rejects this solution on the grounds that the adduced instantiations are not to the point, since it is one thing to speak of

univocal agreement and another of analogical agreement. Where there is univocal agreement, rationes of agreement and disagreement must plainly be distinguished — for it is impossible on the part of the thing for several things to agree univocally and equally disagree through the same ratio. Not so in analogical agreement, because since that is imperfect it can be derived from the same ratio or reality from which disagreement is derived. But in our present case the discussion is of univocal agreement, for such is the agreement that belongs to predicamental common grades of which this disputation is concerned; whereas between ultimate differences and between God and creature there is only analogical agreement. And therefore those instantiations are not to the point.

I grant that this solution is the best according to the principles of the adversaries — indeed from this a valid argument *ad hominem* can be drawn. For if they want univocal agreement to be possible from the same ratio from which disagreement is attended — so that through the same simple entity several things agree and disagree univocally — it follows according to their doctrine that univocation cannot be distinguished from analogy of proportion, since in both cases a simple entity would correspond in the thing, and in the thing the individuals would agree and be distinguished through the same thing.

However, this solution is not in accord with our principles, for we do not give an analogy of proportion so distinct from univocation that an analogous term genuinely mediates between univocal and equivocal, as is clear from what was said in *disp. 2, Log., q. 5, art....* Nor do we say that God and creature agree with each other only analogically — on the contrary, along with analogy we also admit univocal agreement, as is clear from what was said in *disp. 2*. This some also admit about the ultimate differences themselves with respect to the common ratio of haecceity, as cited in *disp. 5, Log., q. 2, art. 4*.

The Scotists commonly deny what is affirmed in the adduced instantiations, for they deny that ultimate differences agree with each other in any way, since they are altogether mutually *primo diversa*. Hence they say that haecceities of the same species — as Petreity and Paulinety — agree more with each other than haecceities of diverse species — as Petreity and Bucephal-haecceity — not indeed quiddatively, *per se*, and directly, but only concomitantly and through real identity alone. The sense being that there is greater agreement between Petreity and Paulinety on the one hand than between Petreity and Bucephal-haecceity on the other, because Peter and Paul constituted by them agree more among themselves than Peter does with Bucephalus. Otherwise, speaking directly and formally, Petreity and Paulinety are just as mutually *primo diversa* as Petreity and Bucephal-haecceity, since none of them quiddatively includes anything in which it agrees with another. From this they conclude that the ratio of agreement is not the same between individuals mutually compared and the individuating principles themselves — for two individuals of the same species agree among themselves directly, *per se*, and quiddatively more than one individual of one

species with an individual of another; not so the individuating principles, except concomitantly.

Likewise they deny what is assumed in the second instantiation — that haecceities agree univocally in the common ratio of individual difference — and say this agreement in that common ratio is only analogical and proportional, insofar as just as one makes its constituted ultimately different, so proportionally does another. And finally they deny the assumption in the last instantiation about the concept of being — that it is not on the part of the thing prescinded from the modes or differences by which it is contracted to God and creature — for they want it to be so prescinded, just as other predicamental grades are.

But although the first instantiation is well met by this common Scotist saying, it is nonetheless gratuitously denied — what was assumed in the second and third instantiations by the adversaries. For as is clear from what was said in *disp. 5, Log., q. 2, art. 4*, and will be even more evident from what will be said in the following disputation, it is true that haecceities all agree per se and quiddatively in the common ratio of individual difference — not only proportionally but also univocally. Furthermore it is true that the concept of being is not on the part of the thing so prescinded from its contracting principles as other predicamental grades are, as is clear from what was said in *disp. 2* on the nature of being throughout.

More aptly therefore the adduced solution is rejected along with its instantiations: because the agreement and disagreement between Peter and Paul by reason of humanity, and of their haecceities, and likewise the difference of man and horse through rationality and agreement through animality, are certainly not through the intellect or only virtual on the part of the thing, but are fully actual prior to any work of the intellect. For on the part of the thing man and brute actually differ through the grade of reasoning, and in the same way they agree in the grade of sensing — and so the reasoning must proceed for any difference and agreement found in things by reason of predicamental grades. For all of these are suited to ground actual difference and agreement in things, preceding all work of the intellect. And therefore a mere distinction of reason between the rationes of such agreement and disagreement does not suffice. And by this are excluded the instantiations made about ultimate differences and about the agreement of God and creature with respect to the concept of being. For it is absolutely false that God and creature actually agree on the part of the thing in the grade of being in the manner in which man and brute agree in the grade of sensing — since by reason of the great transcendence of that grade they do not agree in it on the part of the thing actually but only virtually and fundamentally, as is clear from what was said in *disp. 2, from n. 87*. Likewise all haecceities are mutually *primo diversa* on the part of the thing, and do not actually agree except through the intellect conceiving them inadequately — from what was said in *Logic, disp. cit.* and from what will be said in the following disputation.

From this it is clear how even the instantiations adduced against our position cannot conclude anything, nor weaken our argument drawn from agreement or disagreement between two individuals of the same species — even granting the univocal agreement of haecceities in the common ratio of individual difference. For there is not such and so great an agreement or similarity between Petreity and Paulinity as there is between Peter and Paul, since the agreement between Peter and Paul is in a common reality — being positive and actual on the part of the thing — whereas the agreement between the ultimate differences is not except in concept; which concept aside, such agreement is not actual but virtual and fundamental, not positive but negative, being rather a certain negation of dissimilarity found between them in the mode of making differ.

But something can differ actually on the part of the thing from another and agree virtually with the same through the same entity, because this is not a contradiction — which must be of the same thing with respect to the same and in the same way, which is not what happens here. But something cannot actually differ from another and actually agree with the same through entirely the same entity, because this is a manifest contradiction. And such is the distinction and agreement found on the part of the thing between two individuals of the same species, or between two species under the same genus — for the same reason. Nor does the instantiation so often pressed by the adversaries hold — the agreement and disagreement of God and creature in the ratio of being. For although God and creature agree and differ in the same respect on the part of the thing, they do not do so in the same way: for through their proper rationes they differ actually on the part of the thing, and through the same they agree not actually but only virtually and fundamentally — which is not a contradiction. For a contradiction is of the same thing with respect to the same and in the same way. But in the case at hand, two individuals of the same species agree actually and also actually differ on the part of the thing; therefore if this is with respect to the same, a manifest contradiction already follows. But why predicamental grades ground actual agreement on the part of the thing between species under the same genus and between individuals under the same species, while transcendent grades ground only virtual or fundamental agreement — this was explained in *disp. 2, n. 88*: because species and individuals from *5 Metaph.* and *10 Metaph.* are not mutually *primo diversa* but are something identical — that is, agreeing in some generic or specific reality. Not so God and creature. And the prior reason is that the more things are mutually distant the less they agree, and the less they are distant the more they agree. Hence *Averroes*, *Themistius*, and *Boethius* as cited by *Scotus, q. 4 univers.*, explain Aristotle's dictum to our purpose — that univocation is only in the infima species and in the genus equivocations are latent — saying that the genus is a kind of tenuous similarity of singulars, so that inferiors and singulars are assimilated the more in common rationes the less common those rationes are, and the less they are assimilated the more common the rationes are. Hence remaining within the predicamental line, the agreement of inferiors in common

rationes is grounded in realities; but when we go outside it to transcendent rationes and grades, then agreement is grounded only in inadequate concepts, as was explained at length in *disp. 2* cited.

Aureolus furthermore responds to this second argument in 2, *dist. 9, q. 2, art. 1* at the end: when it is said that one and the same thing cannot on the part of the thing agree and disagree through the same entity, the discussion is either of agreement and disagreement formally — and in this sense it is true, because formally they agree through the relation of agreement and disagree through the relation of disagreement, which are certainly diverse relations — or if we speak not formally but fundamentally, it is thus false, because whiteness through the very same reality of whiteness agrees with another whiteness and differs from blackness. This solution rather opens up the force of our argument drawn from contradiction — for contradiction is only of the same thing with respect to the same and in the same way. Hence if any of these conditions is lacking, the contradiction is dissolved. In the instantiation adduced by *Aureolus*, the agreement and disagreement are certainly both grounded in entirely the same reality, but the comparison is not with respect to the same terminus but diverse ones — namely with respect to whiteness and blackness — and so the contradiction is dissolved, since affirmation and negation is not of the same thing with respect to the same. But in the case of our argument, affirmation is of the same thing and with respect to the same: for man agrees with horse through animality and differs from it through rationality. Since therefore in this case affirmation and negation is of the same thing and with respect to the same, to dissolve the contradiction it is necessary to say that agreement and disagreement are not through the same thing or through the same formality on the part of the thing — otherwise manifest contradiction follows, since it will be of the same thing, with respect to the same, and through the same.

Finally, some following *Ockham* respond: conceding that the same thing cannot be the cause of agreement and of disagreement opposed to that agreement, but in the present case there is no opposition between specific agreement and numerical difference — and so it is not inconvenient that what agrees specifically and differs numerically does so through the same formality. And that this is possible, *Ockham* shows by an example drawn from our doctrine: for it is certain that the contracted nature agrees really with the individual difference because it is really the same thing as the difference, and yet the nature formally differs in some way from the contracting principle. He then asks whether it agrees and differs through the same or through different things; if through the same, the proposition is had — that the same undivided thing in the same way agrees really and is distinguished formally — and with the same ease it will be said that Socrates agrees specifically with Plato through the same entity and is distinguished numerically. If through different things, the question recurs for those, because those agree and disagree in some way, and so either infinite regress follows or we must arrive at something that agrees and differs through itself.

But even this solution does not weaken the force of the argument. For although specific agreement and numerical diversity are not immediately opposed to each other as if they could not belong to the same thing in the same respect, they are nevertheless opposed in their foundations, inasmuch as they require formally distinct and opposed foundations: for that through which things agree specifically must be something communicable, and that in which they differ numerically must be incommunicable. Otherwise, if the argument were valid, we could prove that in the Trinity the Father through the sole formality of the divine essence agrees essentially with the Son and through the very same thing differs personally from him — because such agreement and disagreement are not opposed, since they are of diverse ratio. Nor does the example adduced by *Ockham* bring anything of weight against us: for although formal distinction is compatible with real identity, just as numerical diversity is with specific identity, the conditions they require of their foundations are not opposed as those of specific identity and numerical diversity are. Hence the same formality of nature is said to agree really with its contracting difference insofar as they share the same existence and the existence of each is one, and is said to be formally distinguished from it on the part of the thing insofar as the objective concept of one is diverse from the objective concept of the other. From this it is clear how a nature can in the thing really be identified with its difference and formally be distinguished from it through itself — but Socrates cannot through himself agree specifically with Plato and through himself be numerically distinguished from him.

For further treatment and attacks on this ineluctable argument see the preceding disputation from n. 200 and following.

The conclusion is proved secondly and principally: no created nature is of itself this thing and singular; therefore it becomes such through some reality superadded to it and formally distinct from it on the part of the thing. And consequently it is necessarily formally distinguished from the individual difference through which it is singularized. The assumption is proved: for if nature were of itself this thing, then it could not with truth be understood under the ratio of a universal — which is false, because then all sciences would be abolished, since science is of universals. The sequel is proved: for then the intellect errs when it conceives a thing otherwise than it is in itself and in a mode repugnant to it. And this indeed occurs in that case; for if every created nature is singular of itself, to every one it is repugnant to be communicated. Hence when it is understood as communicable and as indifferent — which is necessarily required for it to be understood under the ratio of the universal — it would be understood under an opposed and repugnant mode, and therefore with falsity.

This is confirmed: for no other reason do we say that the divine nature is understood as common and indifferent to several Gods with falsity, other than that it is of itself this and singular. Thus the Doctor argues in 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 1, § *Contra istud*, and in *q.* 7, *sub A*. And against this further: if on the part of the thing

humanity were essentially singular like Deity, humanity could not be multiplied without becoming another essence of a diverse ratio — just as because God is essentially singular another God cannot be given according to the ultimate grade of essence similar to that one.

The Nominalists respond — denying objective precisions — that the mode of universality does not belong to the singular or to any common nature distinct from the singular on the part of the thing, but only to some concept which is called universal. This solution remains sufficiently refuted from what was said against the Nominalists in q. 1 of this disputation, and is further rejected because — as *Lichetus* argues at the beginning of 2, *dist. 3, q. 1* and following, confuting the responses of Ockham in § *Nunc restat* — that concept to which the intention of universality is attributed is either the intellection by which the singular nature itself is reached, or the nature so conceived, or some idol fabricated by the intellect. Not the first: both because since that intellection is terminated at the singular nature, the intention of singular rather than universal should be attributed to it; and because this very intellection is either of its formal ratio this thing and singular or not. If the second, the intention is had; if the first, the main argument recurs from the beginning — that the intention of the universal could not be attributed to it, because then it would be understood under a mode repugnant to it. Nor can it be said that the subject of universality can be the nature so conceived, because that nature according to them is singular, and so then the singular would be universal through the intention of universality applied to it — which is impossible. And finally it cannot be said that the subject of universality is that idol which some fictitiously construct, because that idol is not predicated quiddatively of inferiors, as is evident — both because just as an idol is fabricated common to Peter and Paul, called the infima species, so an idol could be fabricated that would be called infima species with respect to Peter and Bucephalus. If therefore something is understood under a universal mode precisely and adequately, and something else under a singular mode precisely — since these modes are altogether repugnant — it follows that when human nature is understood under the universal mode, from the nature of Francis as of Francis under the singular mode, it as such considered in itself does not include singularity. And *Lichetus, loc. cit.*, somewhat further pursues this reason against Ockham while rejecting the responses of Ockham to the arguments of the Doctor. See what was said in q. 1 of this disputation for a fuller and clearer refutation of this solution.

The Thomists, however, who admit objective precisions, deny the consequent of the argument: for although every nature is in itself singular and none is common to many in one thing, still because they have a real similarity among themselves, the intellect will be able to abstract from those many a common ratio which — just as it does not include the individuating differences but prescinding thus from all of them is indeterminate with respect to them — is made indeterminate with respect to them. For the real similarity of many can well be the reason why a

common ratio is abstracted from them in which they are confusedly understood, just as by reason of a certain similarity which God and creatures have in being we abstract from them the common ratio of being — even though no reality in the thing corresponds to this ratio as distinct from the realities of God and creature — as even the more careful Scotists hold, with whom I subscribed in *disp. 2* on the nature of being.

This solution is rejected from what was said in the response to the preceding argument: for either the discussion is of real actual and positive similarity — such as that which is had by reason of predicamental grades and bears either on several individuals of the same species or on several species of the same genus — or of a certain virtual and negative similarity such as that found between God and creature insofar as in the ratio of being they are not dissimilar. If the discussion is of the first kind: this certainly cannot be preserved between any two things without a foundation of a common unity in the thing, as will be evident in the following question from *Aristotle, 5 Metaph., text 20*. But if it is of the second kind: although this may be a sufficient foundation for the intellect inadequately conceiving to abstract that common ratio in which those things are thus similar inadequately and confusedly represented — as we say of the ratio of being in God and creature — it is nevertheless not a sufficient reason for abstracting clearly and adequately conceiving. Therefore if every created nature is of itself singular and not through something added from the nature of the thing, it will be repugnant to the intellect clearly and adequately conceiving to conceive a nature common to several individuals — which however is false, for God understands not only Francis and Peter but also the nature of man common to them.

As to the confirmation of the argument about the non-multiplication of God — because he is essentially singular — *Suárez, loc. cit.* says the non-multiplication of God does not arise from the identity of haecceity with the divine essence, but from his infinite perfection, to which multiplication is repugnant. Against this: the infinity of God prevents multiplication of God precisely insofar as it makes haecceity to be nothing outside the essence of God, since by reason of his infinity God contains in himself every entitative perfection. Therefore the non-multiplicability of God arises from the identity of haecceity with the essence proximately and formally, and from infinity only remotely and radically. Confirming this: suppose per impossible that God were infinite but not essentially singular — then multiplication would not be repugnant to him. And conversely: if in some things there were finitude and individuation through a principle that is essentially so, then there could be no multiplication there except according to essence, as the Thomists in fact hold about angels. Therefore the proximate and immediate reason of multiplicability or non-multiplicability is not finitude or infinity, but the formal identity or diversity of haecceity with essence. Hence it is finally concluded: if created nature were essentially singular, it would be non-multiplicable, nor could it be conceived without falsity under the ratio of the universal.

But the adversaries respond again that although created nature is of itself singular, it can still be conceived without falsity under the ratio of the universal, because by reason of its eminence it can correspond to several inadequate concepts of our intellect conceiving it imperfectly. Against this: it follows from this that still more without falsity a distinct nature could be conceived under the ratio of the universal applicable to the three divine persons, since the divine nature is infinitely more eminent than created nature. The consequent is false; therefore so is the antecedent. It must therefore be said that the divine nature cannot be conceived under the ratio of the universal because it is of itself this thing, while created nature can be so conceived without falsity — not by reason of some eminence of its own but because it is of itself common and indifferent to several individuals.

Pasqualigo, tom. 2, Metaph., disp. 40, sect. 4, n. 6, concedes that nature independently of the intellect is not of itself singular, but has of itself communicability so that it can be in several things, and that through individuation it has incommunicability. But he says that the mode of this communicability is not after the manner of something that of itself alone has complete being, but after the manner of a superior grade that is so communicated to another that it simultaneously receives completion from that other. And therefore this is a communicability through identification and co-unification in the same being of what is communicated and that to which it is communicated; and consequently, with such a mode of communicability remaining, what is communicable must not be distinguished on the part of the thing from that to which it is communicated — otherwise such a mode of communicability would be destroyed.

Against this: although simply real and properly so-called distinction cannot subsist with this mode of communicability of nature with singulars — because nature is communicated to them through real identification, as *Scotus* holds in *Quodl. 19* — it is nonetheless false that this mode of communicability is not compatible with formal distinction between the contracting ratio and the contracted one. On the contrary, such distinction is necessary between those grades, since communicable and incommunicable contradict on the part of the thing. If therefore nature is of itself communicable on the part of the thing, and the principle of individuation is incommunicable — as this author concedes — it plainly must admit formal distinction from the nature of the thing between them. Nor does any absurdity follow from this, for just as formal distinction is compatible with real identity, so it can also be compatible with the mode of communicability through identification in some third — in the manner already explained above in n. 34 and following. For other solutions of the Thomists and their attacks on this argument, see *disp. 4, Log., q. 4*.

The conclusion is proved thirdly from the path of metaphysical composition, which is made from nature and the contracting difference. For although this composition is not real from thing to thing as the physical composition of matter

and form is, it is nevertheless from the nature of the thing from reality and reality — not only of reason from diverse objective concepts. Therefore between nature and the contracting difference there is necessarily a greater distinction than reason alone, and since this cannot be real, as is clear from what was said in the preceding question, it follows that it is the formal distinction intermediate between simple real distinction and distinction of reason.

The consequent is evident: because composition follows the tenor of the distinction of the composing parts. Hence if the composing parts are really distinct, a real and physical composition results from them; if they are only formally distinct from the nature of the thing, a formal and metaphysical composition results; if finally they are distinguished only by reason, only a rational composition coalesces. The assumption — that the metaphysical composition from nature and contracting difference is not of reason alone — was proved at length expressly in *disp. 5, Log., q. 3, art. 2* and in the preceding *disp., q. 6, art. 2, n. 197* and following, where the various solutions of the adversaries are also rejected.

The conclusion is proved fourthly from the immediacy of the subject of common and proper accidents. For the immediate subject of the properties that inhere in things per se is the very essence of things, and through it they belong to singulars — as is clear from this causal expression: "Peter is risible because man is risible." And conversely, the immediate subject of common accidents is the singulars themselves, through which they also belong to common natures — as is clear from this causal expression: "therefore man runs because Peter runs." But this mediation and immediacy indicates some distinction from the nature of the thing, at least formal, between the common nature and the individual.

Suárez, disp. 5, sect. 2, n. 29, responds that from this mediation or immediacy of the subject of accidents — both proper and common — only a virtual distinction or of the reasoned reason between nature and individuation can be induced; and this distinction is sufficient for those causal expressions "man is risible," "Peter is risible" — since in them no real and physical causality between Peter and risibility is signified, but the adequate ratio and origin of that property is explained. For the same reason God is said to be immense because infinite, even though between divine infinity and immensity no distinction from the nature of the thing intervenes.

But this solution is easily overturned: for distinction follows the tenor of that mediation and immediacy; since therefore that mediation and immediacy is given on the part of the thing and not only through the intellect, the distinction will also be from the nature of the thing. True, it is not a simply real distinction from the nature of the thing — just as through those causal expressions no real and physical causality is in truth signified, but only formal and metaphysical causality from the nature of the thing. And that that mediation and immediacy is given on the part of the thing is proved: for on the part of the thing, running or

whiteness belongs to nature by a different reason than a property does. For the property, with the essence removed even while individuals remain (by hypothesis), cannot belong to those individuals according to individuation; and conversely: with individuation removed, running or whiteness does not belong to essence, yet the property belongs to it. Therefore this mediation and immediacy is given from the nature of the thing and not only through the intellect.

As to the point about immensity which is said to belong to God because he is infinite: if these two attributes in God are formally distinguished from the nature of the thing, or at least as two intrinsic modes of the divine nature, the parity can be conceded. But if no such distinction is posited between them but only virtual or of the reasoned reason as the Thomists hold, then the parity must be denied and it must be said that causal expression is not true actually on the part of the thing but only according to our mode of understanding with a foundation in the thing — insofar as if immensity in God were caused on the part of the thing, it would plainly arise only from infinity.

You will say: this argument equally proves the precision of being and of any other transcendent grade from the nature of the thing from its inferiors and contracting principles — the opposite of which was determined in *disp.* 2 on the nature of being, *q.* 4. The assumption is proved: because also in transcendents this mediation or immediacy of subject is given in relation to proper and common accidents, and similar causal expressions are verified — for example: "Peter is one because a being"; "a being moves because Peter moves." And yet it is certain from what was said that between being and its inferiors or contracting principles no actual distinction from the nature of the thing intervenes, but only virtual or of the reasoned reason.

I grant this argument is not valid, as the preceding ones are, for proving our conclusion. For reasons to prove it must be derived precisely from those that must distinguish predicamental grades from the nature of the thing from their inferiors and contracting principles — not transcendent ones. Still, it can be said that the mediation or immediacy of subject in relation to proper or common accidents is not entirely alike in transcendent grades as in predicamental ones, nor are those causal expressions verified in entirely the same way here and there. For predicamental grades import proper realities grounding concepts adequate to themselves, which transcendents do not. And therefore in predicamental grades those causal expressions, although they do not indicate real and physical causality, do indicate formal and metaphysical causality; but in transcendents they import only the simple ratio on account of which something belongs to another, and do not express any origin of one from another in which some distinction from the nature of the thing between what flows and that from which it flows could be founded. And therefore that mediation or immediacy of subject is not entirely actual before the work of the intellect in those transcendents, but

only virtual and fundamental; whereas in predicamental grades bearing realities it is given on the part of the thing with no intellect operating.

The conclusion is proved fifthly, from the priority according to the consequence of subsisting, which is proper to universals as they are distinguished from singulars. For it holds to say: "Peter is; therefore man is" — this priority therefore comes from the nature of the thing and not only through reason. Consequently, between the common nature and the particular reasons of beings a distinction greater than reason is introduced. But this reason suffers the same inconvenience as the preceding one, since it equally proves for transcendent grades as for predicamental ones. For even in being there is such a priority with respect to God and creature — it holds to say: "God is; therefore a being is," not conversely: "a being is; therefore God is" — and yet being imports no reality on the part of the thing prescinded from the particular reasons of beings. Hence in resolving this argument in *disp.* 2 on the nature of being, n. 76, it was said that this priority of non-conversion is not a real priority in being, as far as it goes of itself, but only a logical one in predication.

But since I also said in the preceding disputation, n. 199, that this same priority of non-conversion in predicamental grades is real or actually from the nature of the thing — because with respect to their contracting principles, with which they make a true metaphysical composition, they have the ratio of a potential whole in the proper sense and from the nature of the thing and not only through our mode of conceiving, and potency from the nature of the thing precedes act — it must be said that this argument holds in the present case, not indeed by force of form — since absolutely speaking such priority of non-conversion is not real and in being — but by force of matter, insofar as within the coordination of predicamental grades this priority is not of reason alone but also from the nature of the thing: inasmuch as between superior and inferior metaphysical grades there is an order of prior and posterior from the nature of the thing and not only through the intellect. From this heading too the formal distinction from the nature of the thing between them was derived in the preceding disputation, q. 6, art. 2, n. 198. See what was said there, for from that the fifth argument derived from the priority of non-conversion draws its strength.

Sixthly, some are accustomed to prove the conclusion from the univocation of species with respect to individuals, because the univocation of the common nature seems to be destroyed if it is not so unified on the part of the thing as to be distinguished from differences. For by this, univocal things are separated from analogous ones, since in analogous things too a common nature that has only a distinction of reason from its contracting differences can be found. This argument is promoted by *Amicus, loc. cit., n. 6*. This reason, however, is not suited to our purpose. For although it can hold as an argument *ad hominem* against some of the adversaries who also grant a certain rational objective unity to analogues — as was said above — yet it does not absolutely conclude, and

especially not according to our principles, by which we also attribute univocation to transcendent grades, yet not a distinction or precision from the nature of the thing from the particular reasons of being. Hence it is false that univocation is destroyed by the opposing opinion, because for univocation the unity of reason suffices in the common nature — especially when this unity is abstracted from inferiors with a foundation in the thing. Nor is it necessary that the univocal concept always be grounded in a reality that on the part of the thing prescribes from inferiors, as was said in *disp. 2, Log., q. 4, art. 2, § Secundo dubitatur*. And it is false that univocal things are by this set apart from analogous things, since analogous things participate in no unity of concept from the force of analogy but only insofar as they can coincide with univocal things, as was said in *disp. 2, Log., q. 5, art. 2*. This reason drawn from univocation is therefore to be dismissed as entirely useless, as is any other that equally militates against transcendent grades — and only those are to be employed that prove precisely concerning predicamental grades.

Finally, the conclusion can be proved by uncovering the error and equivocation in which the opposing position is caught — as *Amicus, loc. cit.*, rightly noted: it confuses abstraction of one thing from another through identity and through conjunction, and precisian abstraction with negative and divisive abstraction. For when they say that an existing man does not abstract from haecceity, this can have two senses. Either they understand divisive abstraction and abstraction through conjunction — and thus it is true, because nothing can exist unless it has haecceity either intrinsic to it, as Peter, or at least extrinsically conjoined with it, as humanity which is in Peter with respect to Petreity. Or they understand precisian abstraction and abstraction through identity — and in this sense it is plainly false that an existing man does not abstract from haecceity, since humanity — whether existing or not — always abstracts from haecceity through identity, insofar as it is never formally the same as haecceity nor includes it in its formal ratio. But it does not rightly follow from this that what cannot abstract from haecceity through conjunction cannot abstract from it through identity either. For as was said above in this disputation in n. 16, abstraction through formal identity does not remove the conjunction which nature has with singularities according to the thing. Hence it is well consistent that an existing nature abstracts through identity from haecceity but not through conjunction. And so according to the adversaries themselves, figure cannot abstract from quantity through conjunction since it is always immersed in quantity, yet it rightly abstracts through identity, insofar as it is distinguished from it.

Article II. The arguments of the Thomists and Nominalists are resolved.

In opposition, *Suárez, loc. cit., disp. 5, Metaph., sect. 2, n. 10*, argues first: if the nature that is in Peter on the part of the thing formally differs from Peter's singular being, then either as such it is communicable to many or incommunicable. If the second, it will still be of itself singular, and it will not be distinct from Peter. If the first, it

will be actually universal — taking the universal properly, as what is actually common to many and exists in them — which even Scotus himself does not want to admit, as was said in *disp. 4, Log., q. 1, art. 2*.

The response is: the nature is communicable insofar as it prescribes from singularity — but it cannot therefore be said to be actually universal. For as is clear from what was said in *disp. 4, Log., q. 2, art. 1*, the unity and indifference required for logical universality — for this is what properly constitutes the universal in the proper sense — is greater than the unity and indifference which nature has on the part of the thing. For the unity nature has on the part of the thing is only unity through indifference, which is not consistent with actual numerical plurality — because it is multiplied in individuals according to the proper nature of each. But the unity it has through the intellect when universalized is through inexistence, and is consistent with the numerical plurality of individuals, insofar as it is conceived as one through inexistence in all and each of them, as was explained at length in that passage. Likewise the indifference or aptitude for being in many is greater when the universal is given, for on the part of the thing its indifference is negative and a remote aptitude for being in many disjunctively — as will be further explained below. But under universality it is conceived as indifferent positively and proximately apt for being in many — not only disjunctively but also conjunctively. Hence both the unity and the aptitude required for universality are not real but of reason, and therefore nature can never be said to be universal as it is on the part of the thing.

Furthermore: although universality is not repugnant to nature according to itself, still as long as it exists under singularity, it is judged to have an impediment preventing universality from being able to belong to it in such a state — universality that refuses all determination in nature both intrinsic and extrinsic. Nor from its being formally distinct from haecceity on the part of the thing does it rightly follow that it is not singularized on the part of the thing but universal. For with the fact that it is formally distinct from singularity it is still consistent that it can be conjoined with it really — which is the formal cause of determination, as is clear from the doctrine given above in n. 16. This can be illustrated by the example of quantity: it is of itself indifferent to a straight and a curved figure, yet while under a straight figure it is not indifferent to the curved one, since those figures cannot simultaneously exist in the same line.

Suárez argues secondly in the same passage: the nature that is in Peter, as distinct from the individual difference of Peter, is either the same really as the nature that is in Paul as also severed from the individual difference of Paul, or different and different really. If the first, then the same nature will be actually communicated on the part of the thing to Peter and Paul, and thus universal on the part of the thing. If the second, then those natures will be singular, because things that are really distinguished in the same species are individuals of that species. If therefore those real natures are distinguished, and are of the same species and

ratio, then they will be individuals. Nor can you say they are distinguished from each other by real differences superadded; for we are speaking of those natures as prescinding from their proper haecceities, and it implies that something is distinguished from another except through an entity intrinsic to it, since a thing is distinguished through that by which it is formally constituted.

The response is that this is a sufficiently troublesome argument, which however most of our people make little of, thinking they have fully satisfied it when they say that the nature of Peter and Paul do not differ except extrinsically and are not other and other except by reason of the individual differences. Indeed, if you ask them whether when Peter perishes the common nature also ceases in him, they say it ceases and is corrupted only extrinsically. Which response, though given by Scotists of no small reputation, has always seemed irrational to me. For truly the nature which is in Peter is not really the same nature which is in Paul, because the nature of Paul is corrupted at the corruption of Paul and Peter with his nature remains. Nor is it valid to say that it is corrupted only extrinsically — because intrinsically and in itself it does not remain; for not only the difference ceases but also the nature with which it was identified. Therefore it is also corrupted intrinsically. Therefore the nature of Peter is really other than the nature of Paul — not only extrinsically but also intrinsically and in itself. For what is really distinguished from another is certainly distinguished from it either through itself or through something intrinsically belonging to it and not only through something extrinsic — for, as I said, a thing is distinguished through what intrinsically constitutes it.

Furthermore: this solution plainly concedes the other member of the argument — that there is an actually universal nature on the part of the thing — because according to this mode of speaking, the nature not only would be one in all through indifference but also through inexistence, since they say the nature of Peter considered in itself, as prescinding from the difference, is not really distinguished from the nature of Paul but is the same entity with it. Therefore one and the same entity on the part of the thing is already admitted in many, the unity of which is consistent with numerical plurality. Therefore according to this mode of speaking there is a universal in act with all the conditions required. But this opinion about the unity of nature in many through inexistence will be expressly refuted in q. 5 below.

Pontius, a recent Scotist, in *disp. 3, Log., q. 2, n. 35*, says that the nature of Peter, as formally distinct from its haecceity, is neither positively one with another nature nor positively distinct from it, since as such it has precisely its essential predicates, among which there is neither that unity nor that distinction. This he proves from the saying of Avicenna cited by the Doctor in 2, *dist. 1, q. 1* — that horseness according to itself formally is only horseness, and as such is neither one nor many. This solution does not satisfy and contains false doctrine. For to the common nature in the state of essence considered as distinct from the state of existence,

not only the predicates of the first mode belong, but also those of the second mode — that is, either predicates belonging to its quiddity or its necessary properties. As man in the state of essence is a rational animal, is sensitive and discursive, is risible. Since therefore in the present case unity and distinction are properties of nature — as they are of any being — even if it abstracts from singularity, that is, from the state of existence, they can still belong to it even under such precision, and it can be asked whether it is positively distinct from another nature or rather one with it — speaking especially of that formal unity which is customarily posited as a property of nature and is less than numerical unity.

Nor does the saying of Avicenna — which he cites from Scotus — make to the point, because when Scotus and Avicenna so speak they understand that nature considered in itself and in the state of essence is neither one nor many with numerical unity or multiplicity — since just as from itself it has no individuation, so from itself it has no numerical unity or multiplicity. Thus the Doctor explains it in *loc. cit.*, 2, *dist. q. 1, § ad quaestionem*, when he says that horseness is only horseness, neither one nor many — understand, not from itself with numerical unity or the plurality opposed to that unity.

Lichetus responds otherwise in *loc. cit.*, 2, *dist. 3, q. 1 and 6*, followed by *Rada*, *tom. 2, controuv. 3, art. 4, concl. 9*: those two natures, as prescinded from singularities, are really distinct from each other. But it is denied that it follows from this that they are individuals, singular, and numerically different. And when this is proved, the minor is denied — because those two natures are not said to be of the same ratio from the fact that they are of the same species and there is a specific nature common to them on the part of the thing, since each is common and suited by nature, if compared to the inferiors to which it is indifferent, to ground the second intention of species; but they are said to be of the same ratio because the nature of Peter, as prior to Peter's haecceity, is suited to be contracted by the haecceity of Francis and to identify it with itself — just as when contracted to Peter it identifies with itself the haecceity of Peter. And as such they are the rationes by which Peter and Francis agree quiddatively in man.

You will say: they are really distinct; therefore they differ either by genus, species, or number. Not by species or genus; therefore by number. The consequent is denied, nor does it follow from a sufficient division — as *Lichetus* says — since in many things there are instantiations. For animal and rational, nature and haecceity, are distinguished yet neither by species nor by number nor by genus. So I say that those two natures are really distinguished because one can be without the other, and yet they differ neither by number nor by species, but as it were as two absolute natures of the same ratio. Nor does it follow: "they do not differ by species or number; therefore they are numerically or specifically the same" — the instantiation of animal and rational holds: those are neither numerically the same nor do they differ by number, and neither are they the same by species nor do

they differ by species. Therefore those two natures, though really distinguished, are not numerically distinct except reductively and accidentally, insofar as they are identified with their singular entities — that is, haecceities — which are the immediate principles of numerical distinction.

I confess this solution is better than the preceding ones, insofar as it admits that — prescinding from the individual differences of Peter and Paul — the humanity of Peter is still another entity than the humanity of Paul, though of the same ratio. For this must necessarily be admitted: both because of the pressing reason that the nature of Peter can perish while the nature of Paul still surviving with its haecceity; and because the Doctor manifestly signifies this in *7 Metaph.*, *q. 12*, § *contra predicta*, in the response to the second argument, where he proposes this difficulty in terms: whether the nature of Peter differs from the nature of Paul with haecceities set aside. And he responds with these words: "If we speak with haecceities set aside really, the humanity that is in Socrates is not the humanity that is in Plato." He adds however that this real difference comes from the individual differences unitively contained, inseparably on either side; and if we circumscribe on either side, just as neither is the nature understood as maximally one in itself, but only with that lesser unity which is common, so neither is it diverse from the humanity of Plato by numerical division, nor by any other since not by specific. He gives the analogy: just as not positing one form of genus and another of species, it would be said of the nature of the genus in one species and another with differences circumscribed on either side — so the Doctor proceeds in *loc. cit.*, where, as one can see, he grants that the humanity which is in Socrates is not the humanity in Plato, but adds that it cannot be said to be positively different and really distinct from it with haecceities set aside. And the reason can be: because real distinction is not measured by formalities but by entities as capable of existence — since real distinction presupposes diversity of existences in what is thus distinguished, as was said in *disp. 6*, *q. 8*. From which it follows that real distinction does not belong to natures except as they include singularities, because an entity is capable of existence only if it is singular, as is clear from the preceding disputation, n. 176. But formal distinction from the nature of the thing is measured only by formalities, which although together they constitute the integral entity of the thing, yet individually and per se: although the nature is formally distinguished from the nature of the thing from haecceity, yet as nature it does not found real distinction from another nature — for it speaks not precisely of nature but of the whole and integral entity, since only according to the whole entity is it capable of existence. And this is what the Doctor said in *loc. cit.* — that such a distinction proceeds from individual differences unitively contained, when circumscribed it cannot be properly said that those two natures are really distinct, because as such they are not conceived under existence, which is necessarily required in the foundation of real distinction.

It is therefore clear where the response of *Lichetus* to the argument is deficient: because he concedes those natures with haecceities set aside are still really distinct

— which the Doctor perhaps concedes because he also admits there that nature is capable of existence antecedently to singularity, even though on the part of the thing it can only possess its proper existence in singulars.

And when it was said in the argument that no thing is really severed from another through what is extrinsic to it but only through what is intrinsic — and therefore those natures cannot be really severed from each other through superadded differences: the response is that this real distinction of those natures is still made through what is intrinsic to them — but proportionate to the distinction they found. For they are distinguished through intrinsic existences and those really identified with themselves, from which real distinction cannot prescind since it is founded above their diversity. You will say: the nature that is in Peter, as distinct from Petreity, is either the same nature as the one in Paul as distinct from Paulinity, or not. If it is not the same really as that, then it is really distinct even as prescinding from singularity. The consequent is denied — because as was said in *disp. 6, q. 7, n. 146*: although every distinction is a non-identity, not conversely, since non-identity is wider than distinction, since it also belongs to non-being and non-identity can belong to many things to which distinction cannot belong. So therefore in the present case: the nature in Peter, as it prescribes from singularity, although not the same really as the nature of Paul, cannot nevertheless under such precision be said to be really distinct, because as prescinded from singularity it is not capable of existence — and so it cannot found real distinction, which only bears on extremes having diverse existences. In like manner *Scotus* says in *1, dist. 2, q. 7, sub Hh*: it does not follow that "A and B are not really the same; therefore they are really distinct," because in the antecedent reality is denied, in the consequent it is affirmed. See *disp. 8, n. 221*.

But against these solutions *Aversa, q. 19, sect. 10*, insists, proving that those natures with haecceities set aside are really and numerically distinguished, as individuals under the same species. For first: it cannot be denied that they are really distinguished, because they are really separate and one can exist without the other — and from actual or potential separation real distinction is well deduced. Second: if they are really distinguished it cannot be denied that they are also distinguished numerically, for it holds to say "this and that nature"; therefore they are singular and individual. Finally: the distinction, whatever name it is called by, between those two natures is not had from the force of human nature taken specifically but divided into many and contracted. Therefore those natures by the very fact that they are distinct and divided are singular and individual. And in Peter no other entity is to be posited from which they are distinguished — since through that entity, prescinded also from Paul, Peter is distinguished from Paul, who is supposed to have not that same but another nature of the same ratio.

The response to the first is: those natures are really separate and one can exist without the other — not indeed immediately through themselves but by reason of the haecceities with which they are conjoined and identified. Hence the nature

of Peter can exist without the nature of Paul because Peter can be destroyed while Paul survives — not because the nature of Peter can exist by itself alone immediately. Hence the consequent is denied — that real distinction between them is well deduced with haecceities set aside — because without those haecceities they are judged incapable of existence, and consequently also of real distinction, which only bears on things having diverse existences.

To the second: it is only abusively said of those natures "this and that nature" — in the sense in which we customarily say "humanity and horseness are two specific natures" — applying number to common things. Hence some rightly say that the number by which essences and grades are counted is not predicamental but transcendental: for when four humanities or six are spoken of, that number consists of formal unities of those grades, each of which has its own formal unity, and this, insofar as it affects one of those grades, although it may be called numerically one, this is abusively so called, because it does not render that grade incommunicable and distinct in species or number from another.

To the third: the supposition of the antecedent — that the nature of Peter is really distinct from the nature of Paul as they abstract from haecceities — is denied, as is clear from what was said.

Thirdly: this same argument about the nature of Peter and Paul as prescinded from haecceities can be pressed further from another angle — for those natures are really distinct from each other and really agree; hence it is asked how they agree and differ among themselves. Either they agree and differ as wholes, or in some part. Not the second, because then another common nature would have to be posited for those common natures, and so there would be infinite regress, and those two natures of Peter and Paul would truly be two individuals of the same species — because beyond the individual difference by which they differ, they would still have a common reality in which they agree. If the first: then two things agree and differ through entirely the same entity, and so Scotus's principal foundation for the formal distinction of common nature from singularity collapses.

The same argument is constructed by *Suárez* from the part of individual differences which are in Peter and Paul, which are really distinguished from each other — as is evident — and yet have similarity and agreement among themselves, since they are more similar among themselves than the individual difference of Peter with that of a horse or a lion. Nor on that account must we distinguish in them something in which they are similar and something in which they differ — otherwise we would proceed to infinity. Therefore the same can be said of Peter and Paul: that although they are distinguished from each other and are similar, there is no need to distinguish on the part of the thing that in which they agree and that in which they differ.

The Scotists are accustomed to respond: just as those two natures, as prescinded from the singularities of Peter and Paul, cannot be said to be really distinct from each other, so neither can they be said to agree — because in that state they are considered only according to their essential predicates, among which, just as distinction is not numbered — since this is a property of nature — so neither is agreement. This solution would be good were it not for the instantiation made above against *Pontius* in n. 58.

Hence I think the argument can be better satisfied from the general rule which the Doctor delivers about constitutives — in *q. 4, § contra illud, lit. L.* — where he says that generally speaking the constitutive is the ratio through which the constituted differs or agrees, but not itself as agreeing or differing, but according to itself. Just as "rational" according to itself — not as agreeing or as differing — constitutes man, though the man constituted through "rational" is distinguished formally or agrees through it. He concludes that distinction or agreement belongs to the constituted through the formal constitutive ratio, but is not included in the constitutive ratio itself. Hence properly and strictly speaking the two humanities cannot be said to agree or differ specifically and essentially in the direct sense but only in the oblique sense, because they are not things agreeing in one specific common nature — rather they are the means by which many individuals agree essentially and quiddatively among themselves. And the general rule in every school is that when something is for something else the reason of being such, it in the direct sense cannot be called such at all, but is rather that through which something is such, not what it is. Thus we do not say whiteness is white or similarity is similar, but that it is that through which something is white or similar. So therefore in the present case: the two humanities with singularities prescinded cannot be called similar, except as that-through-which, insofar as they are the rationes of assimilating individuals under the same species.

You will say: they are entities of the same ratio; therefore they can be called similar. The consequent is denied, for they are not said to be of the same ratio because they agree in some specific nature — as *Lichetus* notes — but because the nature of Peter, as prior to haecceity, is suited to be contracted by the haecceity of Paul and to identify it with itself, just as now it identifies with itself that of Peter under which it is. You will say: why then, without multiplying entities, do we not say the same about the natures of Peter and Paul as wholes — that they differ as wholes and agree as wholes? The response is from the rule just given by Scotus: it is one thing to speak of the constituted and another of the constitutive. For distinction or agreement properly belongs to the constituted through the formal constitutive rationes, but is not included in those constitutive rationes themselves.

As to the same argument made about individual differences: *Amicus, tract. 4, Log., q. 3, dub. 4, art. 2*, responds that all haecceities — since they necessarily have a most simple concept, lest there be infinite regress — do not agree univocally but only

analogically in the ratio of haecceity. But not so Peter and Paul in the ratio of man, since they agree univocally and without ratio.

Suárez with *Cajetan*, *De Ente et Essentia*, q. 5, thinks it hard to believe that haecceities do not agree univocally. But in truth it must be conceded that all haecceities agree essentially in the common ratio of haecceity — not only analogically but also univocally, as is clear from what was said in *disp. 5, Log.*, q. 2, art. 4 and will be said again in the following disputation. And it must be conceded that such a concept can be abstracted from ultimate differences and said of them in quid, as the Doctor expressly holds in 1, *dist. 26, q. un.*, §, and *Lichetus* there, and *Smising*, *tract. 1, De Deo uno, disp. 2, n. 64*. Nor from this does it follow that they are not ultimate differences and that they would need to differ through other differences and so there would be infinite regress — because that common abstract concept will be inadequate, and no higher reality will correspond to it that is potential with respect to another, but only the ultimate realities of Peter and Paul inadequately conceived.

And thus must be understood the proposition of *Aristotle in 5 Metaph. and 10*: that every difference of differents must be reduced to something mutually primo diversa, and that the concept of what is the ratio of differing precisely is simpliciter simple — that is, not resolvable into further concepts to which realities properly correspond, for then that reality would not be the ratio of differing precisely, nor would it be primo diversa from another in the thing, nor would it truly have a simpliciter simple concept. And in this sense Scotus often denies that a concept said of them in quid can be abstracted from ultimate constitutives. But how even with such univocal agreement of haecceity in the common ratio of individual difference — as it were in a common inadequate concept — the argument already made does not press, was said above in n. 48, where the same instantiation was adduced about the agreement and disagreement of haecceities among themselves.

Fourthly, *Suárez* argues: the common nature is not distinguished from the individual difference either as thing from thing or as thing from mode. Therefore it is in no way distinguished from it on the part of the thing. The consequent is evident, since beyond these no other distinction from the nature of the thing is given. The antecedent for the first part is also conceded by the Scotists; it is proved for the second part: for such a distinction requires that the entity from which another is distinguished as mode should — with that mode set aside and prescinded — have in itself a true and real entity. Otherwise it cannot be understood in what way it is distinguished from the nature of the thing, since for such distinction each extreme must be actual and actually in the nature of things — otherwise such distinction would not be actually from the nature of the thing but rather virtual. But if with the mode of the individual difference prescinded, nature has a real and actual entity, therefore it has existence — for nothing has real and actual being unless it exists. Therefore it also has singularity. This second

consequent is proved: because everything that exists in the nature of things has a determinate entity through which it terminates a singular action; but every such determinate entity has conjoined to it the negation of division or communicability into several others like itself — which is singularity itself. Therefore it also has singularity.

The response is first to note that it is falsely assumed in the argument that there are only those two genera of distinction from the nature of the thing — and especially in the sense in which the distinction of mode from thing is explained by the adversary. For there is also a formal distinction from the nature of the thing intermediate between simply real and rational distinction, as is clear from what was said in *disp.* 6, *q.* 11. And although this distinction presupposes each entity between which it bears to be constituted in the ratio of entity, it does not presuppose each to be existing with its own proper existence — but rather presupposes them to be something of what exists and something of something that has its own proper and true existence in the direct sense. And therefore that distinction never bears on several existences. Hence although every distinction from the nature of the thing presupposes extremes constituted in themselves, it does not always presuppose them according to every perfection they can have — but each presupposes its extremes constituted in themselves as such a genus of distinction requires and according to the proper ratio according to which they are distinguished. Hence formal distinction presupposes extremes constituted in their essential ratio alone, with existence prescinded; but real distinction, because it is greater, presupposes them constituted also in their proper existence.

Nor is it true that nature is prior to existence before singularity belongs to it, because existence is not understood to belong to it except as it stands under singularity. For it belongs to nature through singularity and only in that state does it terminate the action of the agent, as was said in the preceding disputation, n. 176.

You will say: nature is prior on the part of the thing to singularity according to us, and as far as it goes of itself it can be without it; therefore it exists per se with singularity prescinded, and hence is of itself singular without another formality superadded from the nature of the thing. The response: the priority of nature with respect to singularity is not a priority of being but rather of understanding, insofar as nature is preunderstood with respect to singularity and does not include it in its essential concept, as was said above in n. 41. It is also a priority of non-convertibility according to the consequence of subsisting, which is a logical priority with respect to predication, as was said in *disp.* 9, *Log.*, *q.* 2. Or if it is understood that it is also a priority in being — that is, with respect to existence — this must not be understood of the same individual entity with respect to its own singularity, but of nature taken absolutely with respect to any determinate individual, as *Amicus*, *loc. cit.*, rightly noted: because it does not hold to infer from the existence of nature the existence of a determinate individual — since the

argument from superior to inferior affirmatively does not hold, as the logicians say — not because nature can exist by itself alone outside any singular, but because since it is indifferent to all and can equally well exist through the existence of one as of another, from its being posited one cannot gather the existence of any particular individual taken determinately, but only vaguely.

I know that some Scotists — such as *Lichetus* and *Faber, theor. 93, cap. 3* — attribute to nature its own existence which also belongs to it in some prior sign of nature before singularity. And therefore they want this priority of nature to be entirely real and of being, not of understanding. But these persons have difficulty evading the force of the argument, and it is hard for them to preserve the distinction from the nature of the thing between nature and the individual being only formal and not real — because if these two have diverse existences and not rather one and the same existence which primarily and directly belongs to the individual alone, then that distinction will already be real and not merely formal. For the diversity of existences infers real distinction. Nor can it be said that the existence of nature is only formally distinct from the existence of the singular — on the contrary this is a contradiction in terms, since the formal constitutive of real distinction in the proper sense is precisely the diversity of existences, from *disp. 6, q. 11, n. 3*. If therefore the existence of nature is other and the existence of the singular is other, from this real distinction of nature from singulars is immediately inferred by intrinsic reason.

You will say: nature as distinct and prior to singularity is a real being independently of singularity because it is prior; therefore it is one, since unity follows being; and this is numerical unity, because even under such precision from singularity it is undivided in itself and divided from any other nature, and cannot be divided into several things such as itself is — otherwise it would be simultaneously one and many entitatively, which is altogether repugnant.

Some respond that nature as distinct from singularity does not have complete singular unity but incomplete numerical unity which is altogether independent of superadded singularity — as is clear in prime matter, which has in itself the unity of an incomplete potential being even with form prescinded, yet does not have complete unity unless conjoined with form which gives matter its specific and complete being. Hence matter does not need form in order to be this matter, but in order to be this man or this horse. So *Albertinus, tom. 2, Princip. 1, Philos., disp. 1, q. 10, dub. 2*, responds; *Arriaga, disp. 5, Log., sect. 1, subsect. 2*, partly approves of this solution too.

But this solution is not to be approved: for nature with singularity prescinded is communicable and indifferent to any individual to be constituted disjunctively; therefore under such precision it has no numerical unity — either complete or incomplete — because such unity renders nature incommunicable to many. Furthermore: the arguments adduced above for the distinction of nature from complete singularities would equally apply against incomplete singularities if

those were given, as a person going through each one will see. Nor is the example of matter to the point, since just as matter is really distinct from the entity of form, so too it possesses its own existence and singularity even with form prescinded; and just as through form it is completed in its predicamental specific ratio, so too in its individual ratio in that species. But in the present case nature is not really distinct from singularity, nor is its existence diverse from the existence of the singular — but entirely the same — and therefore it has of itself no numerical unity distinct from the unity of the singular, neither complete nor incomplete.

The response therefore is: nature, as prescinded from singularity, is not really distinct from it but only formally. Hence on the part of the thing it is always conjoined with singularity through real identity, which is consistent with formal distinction. And so as formally distinct from the haecceity with which it is conjoined, it has its formal unity — which is communicable unity; and as really identified with it, it also has numerical unity. And so it is one formally intrinsically and per se by reason of its intrinsic community which it has of itself — because as far as it goes of itself it can be communicated to many disjunctively — and it is one individually extrinsically and accidentally by reason of real identity with singularity.

You will say: according to Scotus nature not only through the intellect but also on the part of the thing and under real existence prescribes from singularity, insofar as singularity is not of its essence and quiddity. Therefore of itself it is singular and existing. The response: this precision of nature from singularity on the part of the thing is formal — because without any considering intellect the formality of nature is diverse from the formality of singularity — but not real, because each formality coalesces in one and the same thing. And so nature under real existence is always singular by reason of real identity with singularity, however much it is formally distinct from it. Considered however as formally distinct from singularity, it has only formal unity.

Fifthly, *Arriaga, disp. 11, Log., n. 7*, proves that the same parity runs for transcendent grades and predicamental grades with respect to objective precision from their inferiors and contracting principles on the part of the thing, and therefore either it must be denied in all or conceded in all. He proves this as follows: just as it is certain that in a creature no formality is given that is not created really — and from this it is inferred that from a creature no ratio of being prescinding from created and uncreated can be abstracted, as we ourselves argued in *disp. 2* on the nature of being, *q. 4, art. 2, from n. 77* — so it is certain that in the rational soul no formality is given that is not spiritual and immortal. Therefore by like reason it must be inferred that from it no ratio of animal prescinding from mortal and immortal, from spiritual and material, can be abstracted — as "animal" prescribes which of itself is indifferent to being contracted either to horse, altogether material and corruptible even as to soul, or to man, spiritual and

immortal as to soul. Therefore that argument equally proves that animal cannot be prescinded from man and horse as being from God and creatures.

The response: although those Scotists who hold that even transcendent concepts common to God and creatures are grounded in proper and adequate realities existing in them on the part of the thing — which we do not concede except of predicamental grades — should concede the parity; to us holding the opposite the parity of predicamental and transcendent grades must be altogether denied. For since these latter are common to God and creatures, it would follow that there is something in the nature of things that according to itself formally is neither created nor uncreated, neither dependent nor independent — as we pressed in *disp. 2, loc. cit., from n. 77* and following. This inconvenience does not follow for predicamental grades, as we demonstrate there. For predicamental differences are not supreme and most universal — as the modes of being: dependent and independent, participated and unparticipated, and so on. Therefore there can be some common reality which formally from itself abstracts and prescribes from those modes on the part of the thing. And such will be animality common to man and horse — so that according to its formal ratio on the part of the thing it is neither mortal nor immortal, neither spiritual nor material, except materially and identically according to what it is found in man and brute. But it is not so that a formality can be assigned on the part of the thing in God and creature which would be neither created nor uncreated, neither dependent nor from itself nor from another. For whatever is on the part of the thing in a creature is entirely participated from God and has it from another, and conversely whatever is in God he has entirely from himself and not from another. Since those are the supreme and most universal modes of being, no reality can be assigned in the nature of things and the whole order of beings that does not fall directly and formally under them — a necessity that does not hold for predicamental grades with respect to their contracting principles.

The other arguments of *Arriaga* by which he proves in *disp. 5, Log., sect. 1, subsect. 2* generally that there is no formal distinction from the nature of the thing between metaphysical grades have been resolved in *disp. 2, q. 6, art. 3, n. 215*.

Sixthly, *Pasqualigo, tom. 2, disp. 40, sect. 3*, says our position can have a double sense. The first is that the individual ratio is only a certain grade of being by which nature is ultimately completed — but such that it is really identified with nature, and only one simple physical entity coalesces from both, and therefore it is only a metaphysical reality distinguished by metaphysical distinction alone, which sense he says Scotus intends more. The other sense — which is more to the mind of the Scotists — is that individuation is something distinguished on the part of the thing from the individual thing, and is not a mere formality or metaphysical reality, but something physical or at least approaching physical being — since it has its own being on the part of the thing contradistinguished from the being of the individual thing, and really superadded to it.

Having premised this, he attacks our opinion in the second sense — which sense was never intended either by Scotus or even by the Scotists, and therefore his arguments need no resolution. Both because they prove only the real non-distinction of nature from individuation, which we freely concede; and because almost all of them coincide with what has already been adduced.

One or the other argument should however be adduced, since it seems to prove not only real identity but also formal identity. He argues as follows: if nature on the part of the thing in any individual is distinguished from its proper individuation, it would certainly have to appropriate that individuation to itself, and then it is asked through what it appropriates it to itself. Since nature as such cannot appropriate it to itself — being by its being indifferent to any individuation — some determinative would have to be conceded, through which nature would be determined to appropriate this haecceity to itself; through which it would consequently be divided and multiplied, and so before individuation it would already be individual. Therefore nature must be held to be in no way distinguished on the part of the thing from individuation, since then no such appropriation is necessary — but through the individuation identified with itself it would be in such a way of this individual that it could not be of another.

Confirming this: the nature of Peter is of itself incommunicable to another individual as a superior; therefore it is of itself individual without anything superadded from the nature of the thing. The consequent is evident; and the assumption is proved, because nature from the force of its production is determined to be of that individual alone and not of another, and is not separable from its proper individuation. But if it were communicable to many individuals, it would be separable from its proper individuation.

Finally: nature is multiplied in individuals even according to its intrinsic being — which is posited as contradistinguished from haecceity — since it is another nature that with its haecceity is produced in Paul, and another that is produced in Peter. From such multiplication it follows that nature is of itself individual and not through something superadded on the part of the thing distinct from it. For since it has multiplication also according to that being which is posited as distinct from individuation, this multiplication will be outside the multiplication of those distinct individuations. Therefore and so on.

The response is: these arguments also attack our position only in the second sense understood — namely that nature is not really distinct from individuation, which we freely concede. But they do not attack the formal distinction — or if they do attack it, they equally attack the distinction of reason, which even the adversaries do not deny between nature and haecceity. For they well concede that nature is individuated through something of reason or of reason alone contradistinguished from it. This conceded, I take nature as rationally contradistinguished from haecceity, and ask why the nature so considered appropriates to itself Petreity rather than Paulineity — for some determinative will have to be conceded,

rationally yet still contradistinguished from nature, about which the same argument can be made again. And so either there will be infinite regress, or we must say that nature through itself is altogether singular and not through something superadded to it even by reason. And whatever will be said to resolve the argument made against rational contradistinction can equally be said to resolve the argument made against formal distinction from the nature of the thing between nature and individuation. Similarly the other two arguments can be retorted against rational distinction — and especially the last: for granting rational distinction between nature and individuation, it can still be proved that nature is multiplied in individuals even according to its being which is posited as rationally severed from singularity. And with such multiplication being outside the multiplication of haecceities, nature would be concluded to be multiplied through itself altogether without anything superadded — either from the nature of the thing or by reason distinct from it. And whatever will be said to resolve the argument as it proceeds against rational distinction will be said equally as it proceeds against formal distinction from the nature of the thing.

As to the first then: it proceeds only against real and entitative distinction of nature from haecceity — for then such appropriation through some extrinsic determinative would be necessary, as is clear from the example of matter which *Pasqualigo* himself adduces. For since matter is really distinct from form and its indifference to forms is properly real and physical, it would need an extrinsic determinative — namely dispositions — in order to appropriate this form more to itself than that. But it is not so in the case at hand, because neither is nature really distinct from individuation, nor is the indifference of nature to haecceities physical and real but only metaphysical and objective, as was explained above in this disputation, n. 36 and 37. And therefore it does not need an extrinsic determinative but is determined by the agent and from the force of such production to be in Peter and not in another in the genus of efficient cause, and through the individuation identified with itself in the genus of formal cause.

As to the confirmation: the assumption is denied, because nature as far as it goes of itself is as communicable to this individual as to that one — though in the composite sense, that is, as it stands under such haecceity, it is incommunicable to another. As to the proof: I say that nature from the force of its production is determined to be in Peter rather than in Paul extrinsically and accidentally — not intrinsically and per se. For intrinsically and per se it is indifferent to both. Nor from such indifference or communicability does it follow that nature is separable from the individuation under which it has in fact been produced — because as was said above in n. 26 and following, this is not a real and physical community and indifference, as that of matter to forms, but metaphysical and objective in the manner there explained.

Furthermore: through such indifference and communicability of nature we do not intend that it can pass from this haecceity — under which it is — to another,

as matter passes from one form to another; but only that it does not include haecceity in its essence, and that the repugnance to being under another singularity does not come from its formal ratio but from elsewhere. And this mode of communicability can well belong to nature without its being separable from its individual difference.

As to the last: it must be met as in n. 59 above — nature is not multiplied in individuals except through haecceities; with those abstracted from nature, it can be said to be neither one nor many, since in such abstraction it is considered only according to its essential predicates. And in such abstraction if it can take on any of those attributes, it must rather be called one than many — one, I say, with formal unity which is less than numerical — as will be evident in the following question. For unity, although not its quidditative predicate, is at least its property; but plurality and numerical multiplication is wholly extrinsic and adventitious to it, and does not proceed from its intrinsic and formal principles but from extrinsic and individual ones. Hence it absolutely implies that nature is multiplied without individuations. Although it may be conceded that it is also intrinsic and entitative for nature to be multiplied, still it must never be conceded that such multiplication occurs without haecceities. The other arguments that *Pasqualigo, loc. cit.*, accumulates to attack our position are easily resolved from what has been said, because in truth they prove nothing except the real non-distinction of nature and haecceity — and to prove this alone they are adduced by him as he declares at the beginning of that third section. The other arguments by which the same author generally proves in *tom. 1, disp. 79, sect. 2* that no distinction from the nature of the thing is found between metaphysical grades have already been resolved in the preceding disp., q. 6, art. 3, from n. 218.

Finally, against our position *Hurtado, disp. 5, Metaph., sect. 3* and *Oviedo, contrrov. 4, Metaph., punct. 3* argue — whose arguments were also resolved in *loc. cit.*, q. 6 of the preceding disputation: those of the former in n. 212 and following, those of the latter in n. 216 and following. And others pertaining to this will be resolved in the following disputation, q. 2. Note also that all the arguments adduced above from the recent authors against our conclusion are not new difficulties raised by them but are arguments of the Nominalists — especially Ockham, Aureolus, and Rubion in *dist. 3, q. 3* — a thousand times chanted in the schools, though not yet fully deflated on account of their great apparent force. They can be seen in *Lichetus, loc. cit.* Indeed the second argument, which seems most difficult of all — namely how the two humanities of Peter and Paul are distinguished with haecceities prescinded — is very pressingly urged by *Rubion, loc. cit.*, 2, *dist. 3, q. 3, art. 1* and with more evidence than *Suárez, Pasqualigo, Aversa*, and the other recent authors manage. And in art. 2 he presses the instantiation of the agreement and disagreement of the two haecceities, which he says if they are posited must be admitted to agree and disagree through themselves — and the same must be said of Peter and Paul.

Aureolus, 2, *dist.* 9, *q.* 2, *art.* 1, argues that if the nature of man as such is formally distinguished from the nature of this man on the part of the thing, then Peter would be two men — since he would have humanity in general and also another humanity particular to himself. And in Peter there would be two intellective souls, one corresponding to humanity in general, the other to this humanity in particular. But these and the other arguments of *Aureolus* there impugn the opinion of Scotus as if the Scotist common nature coincided with the Platonic universal — as *Aureolus* himself protests at the beginning of that article. But this is false, because although the Doctor formally distinguishes the common nature from singulars or haecceities, he does not really distinguish it — and therefore the inconvenience drawn in the argument does not follow against Scotus as it does against Plato. For this soul, this humanity, add over and above soul and humanity in general only the individual difference, by reason of which they are said to be severed from each other not really but only formally. And furthermore: the common together with singulars are not multiplied into a count, because all and each are individuated through the same haecceity — and therefore all taken together constitute only one individual. The other arguments of *Aureolus* will be resolved below. See meanwhile for this argument *Trombetta*, 7 *Metaph.*, *q.* 8, *ad 1 princ.*

QUESTION IV: On the commonality, or aptitude of a nature to exist in many things, whether this belongs to it on the part of the thing itself, or only through the operation of the intellect.

That community does not belong to nature on the part of the thing but only through the work of the intellect is the common Thomist position with St. Thomas, *Opusc.* 55, and *De Ente et Essentia*, *cap.* 4, where Cajetan, *q.* 6 and 7; Capreolus, 3, *dist.* 5, *q.* 3, *art.* 3; Soncinas, 7 *Metaph.*, *q.* 40; Suárez, *disp.* 6, *Metaph.*, *sect.* 4; Aversa, *q.* 8, *Log.*, *sect.* 9; Morisani, *disp.* 1, *Log.*, *q.* 7, *art.* 2; Hurtado, *disp.* 5, *Metaph.*, *sect.* 2; Oviedo, *controv.* 3, *Log.*, *punct.* 3; Arriaga, *ibid.*; Complutenses, *disp.* 3, *Log.*, *q.* 5; John of St. Thomas, *p.* 2, *Log.*, *q.* 3, *art.* 4; and others *passim*.

Authors usually treat the unity of nature before its community, because the aptitude follows from unity, and from the condition of unity the condition of aptitude is also recognized. I however, for this same reason, inverting the order, treat first of the community of nature and afterward of its unity. For when it has been established what the community of nature in individuals is and of what kind — whether it is real or of reason, and if real, whether it is through inexistence of the same nature in many or rather through indifference alone — it will easily be possible from this to recognize what and of what kind the formal unity of nature is which is said to be less than numerical unity: whether it is real or of reason, whether through inexistence or through indifference.

The opposite is held by Scotus, 1, *dist.* 3, *q.* 1 and 7 *Metaph.*, *q.* 18, whom all his disciples follow, cited at the beginning of the preceding question — with the

single exception of *Pontius*. For on this matter of the common nature he abandoned his teacher Scotus and adhered to the Thomists in *disp. 3, Log.* — and therefore, as in *q. 2, concl. 4*, he posits no true unity in the common nature but acknowledges only the unity of similarity of one individual with another under the same species, so consistently speaking in *q. 3* with the Thomists and *Suárez, disp. 6, Metaph., sect. 4*, he says the common nature on the part of the thing has no other aptitude for being in many than that another nature similar to it can be given, representable through the same species through which it itself is represented — and thus denies all community and properly speaking aptitude in nature for being in many on the part of the thing. We will deal with Pontius and other recent authors below in *q. 7*.

Meanwhile Scotus is followed not only by his disciples but also by other very serious authors outside our school: namely *Ragullus, disp. ult. perip.*; *Pasqualigo, tom. 2, Metaph., disp. 16, sect. 3*; *Amicus, tract. 4, Log., q. 3, dub. 7*; and others cited at the beginning of the preceding question.

Article I. That nature has a certain community on the part of the thing.

For the resolution of the question and understanding of the conclusion to be noted is the distinction of a double community or indifference or indetermination of nature for being in many, which is very familiar to all Scotists in this matter and is gathered from the Doctor in *loc. cit., 2, dist. 3, q. 1* and *7 Metaph., q. 18*, and was already indicated in *disp. 4, Log., q. 1, art. 2* at the beginning. For one is positive and another privative or negative. The positive is that according to which nature is conceived in itself as undivided and abstracted equally from all individual differences, regarding all and each of them — by reason of which it is also customarily called indifference or contrary indetermination, insofar as it positively is contrary to actual determination through a difference; and if it were to admit that determination, it would no longer regard all equally, nor would it be separated and abstracted from all. And in this way positive indifference and community of nature is explained by all Scotists.

The negative or privative indifference or indetermination is not explained by all in the same way. The more frequent manner of explaining it — as can be seen in *Trombetta, 7 Metaph., q. 8, art. 1, notab. 3*; *Lichetus, 2, dist. 3, q. 1, § ibi sed contra*; *Rada, tom. 2, controuv. 5, art. 1, notab. 2*; and others — is that it is that according to which nature is not determined but is suited to be determined through differences, and is of itself indifferent to inferiors. This explanation does not sufficiently please me, because it posits no opposition of this negative community with the positive one — since also nature in the prior state or under positive indifference and when it is abstracted from differences is not determined through those differences, but suited to be determined. Since therefore this whole explanation also fits the positively indifferent nature, it is not sufficiently apt — for it must be such as to somehow distinguish one indetermination from the other, so that nature has

something under indifference of the second mode which it does not have under indifference of the first mode. Furthermore: this explanation does not suggest the reason why the indetermination of the second genus is called privative or negative.

Hence other Scotists explain it otherwise: namely the privative or negative indifference is that which nature still retains in itself when contracted, because since even under the state of contraction it is formally distinguished from the difference through which it is contracted, it still retains a certain non-repugnance proceeding from its formal ratio to be able to be — as far as it goes of itself — under another singularity than that under which it is. And it is called privative or negative because with such similar indifference of nature the extrinsic determination of it through some individual difference is consistent — which explanation I also employed in *disp. 4, Log., loc. cit.*, and it is sufficiently apt, because through it it is suggested that nature in the second state is conjoined with a difference — which conjunction it does not have in the first state — and it is also explained why the second community or indifference is called negative or privative: namely because in this second state nature is deprived of the complete indetermination it enjoyed in the first state, since this second state is a state of contraction.

But more briefly both indifferences of nature and community can be explained: the positive may be called that which nature has when so indeterminate with respect to many individuals through abstraction from individual differences that it itself is proximately able to be predicated of those individuals. But the negative community is called that which nature has even when it is on the part of the thing contracted through a difference — for in such state, though it cannot be said absolutely and positively common and indifferent, since it is applied and appropriated to one individual, it can still be called such negatively, insofar as although it is this and singular, it has this not from itself or from its intrinsic principles but from the contracting difference. And so even in that state it is not of itself this thing, not of itself singular — which is to be negatively common.

This distinction can even more conveniently and aptly be given under the name of aptitude, such that there be a twofold aptitude of nature for being in many: one proximate, another remote. The proximate is the capacity of nature to conjoin or identify with itself this or that difference without any impediment, and it belongs to nature in the state of abstraction. The remote is the same capacity of nature but impeded through the contraction of one difference, so that it is not free and unhindered for another, on account of which impediment such a potency cannot be reduced to act. Just as matter according to itself expresses proximate potency for receiving all forms disjunctively — so that it has simultaneity of potency, not potency of simultaneity — but affected by some form is in remote potency for receiving others, as was said in physics. So in the case at hand: the humanity of Peter, as long as it is under Petreity, has a remote aptitude for being in many; but

when conjoined with no haecceity it has a proximate aptitude for many. These aptitudes are not diverse but one and the same differently — impeded in the state of contraction, unimpeded in the state of abstraction.

Lest you be deceived by this example of prime matter — as the adversaries have been deceived by examples — it must still be remembered that the indifference of prime matter to forms and of the common nature to individual differences is still far diverse. For the indifference of prime matter to forms is that of a pre-existing subject to things really distinct from itself — which it therefore does not have by natural emanation or flowing from themselves in it, but because they are imprinted on it from without by an external agent through preceding dispositions. But the indifference of nature to haecceities is only metaphysical and objective, as I explained above in n. 36 and 37. Hence it is that matter by reason of its indifference can well pass naturally even from one form to another — not so the common nature from one difference to another. And this is why neither *Aureolus*, 2, *dist.* 9, *q.* 2, *art.* 1 and 2, nor *Rubion*, 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 2, nor *Ockham*, nor any of the Nominalists understood rightly, to the intention of the Doctor, the indifference of the Scotist common nature.

And because the whole doctrine of the Doctor about the community of nature consists in rightly understanding this indifference of nature, it is to be noted beyond what was said above in n. 36 and 37: this aptitude of nature to be in many is not to be thought of in nature after the manner of a potency belonging to nature as potency belongs to matter for receiving forms — as the Nominalists attribute to Scotus. For whether nature — say humanity — is considered in causes, or in potential being as outside causes, or in being of actual existence, in no state can this aptitude belong to it after the manner of a potency. Not in the first state, because then it imports no entitative character according to which it could ground such a potency, since it is not contained in its causes in a formal mode but only virtual — and therefore has no real being beyond the being of the cause. Not in the second state can it ground such a potency, because then it is really identified with its haecceity, and therefore through no potency can it relinquish it and receive another. But neither on the other hand is it to be posited as a mere negation of repugnance, as *Cajetan* wanted in *De Ente et Essentia*, *cap.* 4. For since this aptitude and communicability is posited as a property of nature and flowing from its principles as distinct from singularity, it is better grounded in a positive than a negative. Furthermore: such communicability in creatures is exercised through contractibility, insofar as nature from its essence is contractible through differences with which it makes one per se through metaphysical composition — which is real composition in its order. Therefore it cannot consist in a simple negation.

Nor does it impede that nature is determined by haecceity to this individual, because from this its positive aptitude which it has from itself is not removed but only impeded extrinsically — so that its aptitude cannot exit into act so as to be

afterwards in another. Just as it is said of the potency of matter when it is informed by an act. Nor does it impede that such aptitude is often expressed through the negation of repugnance, for we often indicate a positive ratio through negation — as when the positive differential of the brute is expressed through the negation of "rational." Furthermore any negation is customarily grounded in a positive — especially when it is necessarily in a subject and not contingently, as the Doctor notes in 3, *dist. 1, q. 1* from 1 *Post.*, *text 40* and 2 *Caeli*, *text 8*. Hence if it is asked why it is not repugnant to human nature to be in many with its own division and multiplication, whereas to the divine nature it is repugnant, the reason must be given from some positive that is in human nature and another positive that is in divine nature.

You will say: repugnance and inaptitude for being in many is something positive — namely the difference that positively determines nature — so that the aptitude opposed to it is something negative, since the positive is opposed to the negative. I respond by denying the assumption, since more properly formally speaking repugnance consists in negation — for it expresses impossibility of being in many, and impossibility is something negative. Furthermore: even if the assumption were conceded — that repugnance is formally positive, constituted by singularity — the consequent is still not well deduced from this. For not only contradictory and privative opposition is given but also contrary opposition and disparate repugnance, which is found between disparate forms.

Having premised these things, I say that this remote aptitude and negative indifference belongs to nature even in the state of real existence — not indeed reduplicatively but specificatively. For existing nature has two things: its essentials and singularity with existence. Hence although by reason of singularity and existence it is determined to one thing and thus as such cannot be in many, nevertheless according to its essentials it has no determination. And therefore the nature which is existing is determined — not as existing but as nature — because such precision of nature from singularity is not made only through the intellect but is given on the part of the thing, since it does not include haecceity in its essence.

The conclusion thus declared can be proved first from what will be said below about the formal unity of nature that is less than numerical unity. For individuals from essential principles of nature are not distinguished from one another but rather are united and communicate in it. Therefore nature has real community in individuals at least through indifference. The antecedent is evident and will be proved at length below. The consequent holds, since nothing else is meant by nature having community in individuals than that individuals are not divided in nature but only through haecceities, and thus communicate in it on the part of the thing and not only through the intellect — as *Aristotle* taught in 5 *Metaph.* 11 and 10 *Metaph.* from the beginning, where he says individuals are one in essence, because one in account and definition. Where by "account" he does not

understand precisely the mental concept — as the adversaries explain — but the objective definition, which has its unity on the part of the thing derived from the unity of the defined, as the Doctor expounds in those places. And if *Aristotle* also explained that community and unity in essence in relation to our intellect, it must not be said he did so because such community and unity is not given on the part of the thing, but because through the act of the intellect prescinding nature from individuals that community and unity is customarily perceived. And this argument drawn from the unity of nature will be pursued more at length in question six.

Secondly, principally: nature which is found in some individual on the part of the thing, as far as it goes of itself and from within, is either communicable to another from that one in which it is, or not; either suited to be in another through identity, or not. If the first, the intention is had. If the second, then when it is conceived under the ratio of the communicable — which happens as often as it is conceived under the ratio of the universal — it is conceived under a mode repugnant to its essence, since of itself it is not communicable nor has any aptitude or indifference on the part of the thing to be in many.

They respond by conceding the second member and denying what is deduced from it, because although nature from itself and from within is not communicable, it is therefore not of itself incommunicable in such a way that communicability would intrinsically repugn it. For then the argument would conclude. But nature as nature includes neither in its quidditative concept — so that of itself it is neither communicable nor incommunicable, but either can extrinsically belong to it: incommunicability through the individual difference, and communicability through the intellect prescinding it from the difference.

But against this common solution of the adversaries I argue: we also concede that neither is included in the quidditative concept of nature; we also concede the positive indifference — and especially that by which it can be in many simultaneously and not vaguely in this or that — belongs to nature only through the intellect. For through such positive indifference nature is constituted in the being of actual and complete universal. But we ask whether to such positive indifference there corresponds some community of nature on the part of the thing, inchoate and remote, which belongs to it in the second mode of saying per se as its innate property. And we say yes, because the fact that nature can be conceived under non-repugnance to be multiplied and communicated in many arises from real principles of nature itself. Therefore some negative and inchoate community precedes in it.

The antecedent is proved: partly from the contrary, because the fact that the divine nature cannot be conceived under such non-repugnance is grounded in its being of itself essentially singular; and partly because if such community does not arise in created nature from its intrinsic principles, it will not be fitting to it but repugnant. They respond that it arises from the limitation and finite perfection

of created nature, by reason of which it is not repugnant that there be several individuals of such nature and several similar natures coexist — but such non-repugnance is not some communicability of nature preceding the intellect. Conversely, the divine nature has repugnance to such communicability by reason of its infinite perfection, which prevents several similar natures from coexisting.

Against this: the divine nature cannot be conceived under non-repugnance to be communicated in this way to many by reason of its infinite perfection — which requires that it be of itself singular, as was said above in n. 50. Therefore the fact that created nature can be conceived under such non-repugnance will be because by reason of its finite and limited perfection it is not of itself singular. Therefore such non-repugnance is grounded in some community of nature.

Furthermore: it is impossible to understand how a similar nature can be in another individual unless nature intrinsically has it that it is not intrinsically determined to any but is of itself compatible — at least disjunctively — with any, since this similarity is grounded in the formal unity of nature, which argues in it negative community. Hence it is clear that the community of nature and its aptitude for being in many is not well explained by the adversaries through the fact that several similar natures can coexist simultaneously in creatures — for it always remains to be asked what is the foundation of such similarity and whence it arises that there can be several similar natures in creatures but not in divinity.

Confirming this: that the divine nature is not numerically multiplicable and that there cannot be several similar natures depends on some intrinsic property of the divine nature itself. Therefore conversely that created nature is numerically multiplicable and that there can be several similar ones will not be something merely thought up by reason, but will depend on some intrinsic property of created nature — which will be nothing other than the negative indifference of nature, just as the root of the multiplicity of the divine nature is its supreme singularity.

Furthermore: according to the adversaries any nature is of itself singular on the part of the thing and not through a superadded reality, as is clear from the preceding question. Therefore according to itself, and not only accidentally, it will be non-multiplicable and will not be able to be conceived under the ratio of the universal — just as we say of the divine nature that because it is of itself singular it cannot be universally conceived. And this was the intention of the principal argument.

They respond by denying the parity, because the divine nature includes singularity in its concept, not so created nature. Against this: the divine nature includes singularity in its concept precisely because it is not made singular through a superadded reality toward which it is in potency, but is of itself singular in its most simple entity. Therefore likewise: since created nature according to them is not made singular through a superadded reality but through itself, it will

include singularity in its concept. They respond: it does not include it, because singularity is distinguished at least virtually or by reason from created nature, by reason of which distinction created nature can be conceived inadequately and thus conceived take on the ratio of universal — which does not belong to the divine nature.

Against this: the adversaries must assign the reason why singularity is distinguished virtually or by reason from created nature but not from the divine nature. And if they concede it is also virtually distinguished from the divine nature, they must again assign the disparity — why by reason of this distinction created nature can be prescinded from the difference but not the divine nature. Finally: existing nature on the part of the thing still retains its essence and quiddity and includes predicates of both the first and the second mode. Existence also does not destroy the essence and quiddity of the thing. Therefore a real property of nature according to itself must be assigned — and nothing can be assigned other than the aforesaid negative community.

Oviedo, controuv. 3, Log., punct. 3, n. 8, responds differently — and first retorts the argument: because in the Scotist opinion nature does not have positive communicability on the part of the thing but only negative, yet the intellect apprehends in nature a positive communicability contradictorily opposed to the negation of positive communicability which nature has on the part of the thing. Therefore even if nature has positive incommunicability, the intellect can apprehend positive communicability in nature — for no greater repugnance can be found in nature being apprehended with some predicate contrary than with one contradictory to what is in nature.

Then to the argument he responds: nature is of itself incommunicable, and the intellect through the force of abstraction can apprehend it without incommunicability — with incommunicability prescinded on the part of the object if objective precisions are possible, or only from the part of the act if only formal precisions are to be admitted. And in this apprehension no falsity is involved, because from the force of that cognition the intellect does not say that nature is not positively incommunicable, but precisely omits incommunicability and does nothing with it.

But this solution is worse than the preceding one, because it concedes that nature is of itself incommunicable — which the preceding one did not admit — and with this concedes that through the force of abstraction it can be apprehended by the intellect without incommunicability: which plainly implies a manifest contradiction and cannot be done without falsity. For something cannot be conceived quiddatively and distinctly without a predicate that is of its formal ratio, since because man is of himself rational, it implies conceiving him with a quidditative and distinct concept without rationality. If therefore nature is of itself incommunicable — so that singularity is of its ratio — the intellect plainly cannot conceive nature quiddatively without incommunicability. Furthermore: a

thing cannot be conceived, with its nature preserved, stripped of what is of its formal ratio. Therefore neither will nature be conceivable with its essence preserved without singularity, if singularity is of its quidditative concept. And for this precise reason we say the divine nature cannot be conceived without singularity and under the ratio of the universal — because it is of itself singular. Therefore the same must equally be said of created nature if it is of itself singular. Therefore such abstraction cannot be made without falsehood. Nor does it hold what *Oviedo* says — that such abstraction is made without falsehood, because from the force of it the intellect does not say that nature is not positively incommunicable, but precisely omits incommunicability. For it does not hold, I say, because to construct a universal it does not suffice to conceive nature without incommunicability, but it must be conceived as positively communicable to many — for such communicability constitutes the ratio of the universal. And consequently, conceiving nature under the ratio of the universal, when it says it is positively communicable, it also says it is not positively incommunicable — since positive communicability directly excludes positive incommunicability. And consequently it is a false and mendacious conception.

Furthermore: if nature is of itself incommunicable and singular, it conceives without any preceding foundation in the thing the communicability in nature — indeed with repugnance on the part of the thing. Nor does what he says there in n. 7 hold again: that singularity and incommunicability are of the quidditative concept of nature taking it physically, as it exists on the part of the thing — since Peter is one simple entity on the part of the thing; yet they are not of the concept of nature if taken metaphysically in relation to our concepts, through which the intellect divides that simple entity of Peter existing on the part of the thing into two formalities, calling one nature and conceiving it as something common to many, and calling the other the individual difference, attributing incommunicability to it.

This response, I say, does not hold — since it is entirely grounded in the false Nominalist doctrine that metaphysical formalities are not given on the part of the thing immersed through real identity in physical entities, the opposite of which I showed in *disp. 6, Metaph., q. 16*. And the doctrine that those formalities admit no formal distinction among themselves from the nature of the thing, the opposite of which was determined in the preceding disputation, q. 6, art. 2. And that metaphysical composition is altogether of reason — as if the essence of an angel, for example, were equivalent in simplicity at least with respect to essential composition to divine simplicity, and differed from it only in accidental composition, the opposite of which I hold in *disp. 5, Log., q. 3, art. 2*, where I teach that metaphysical composition is a composition from the nature of the thing in its own genus. And the doctrine that the definition does not express the nature of things as they are on the part of the thing, but as apprehended by us — the opposite of which I taught in the preceding disputation, n. 204.

Furthermore: metaphysical precisions of one formality from another, in order not to be false and mendacious, must be made with some formal foundation or non-repugnance on the part of the thing, or at least virtual. Therefore if singularity belongs on the part of the thing to the quiddity of nature, the intellect will not be able without falsity to conceive nature without singularity — because the intellect has not merely a foundation or occasion for such a concept on the part of the thing, but rather total repugnance.

Finally: if on the part of the thing such repugnance belongs to nature — to be in many — plainly from the cognition of the intellect alone nature cannot be divested of such repugnance and invested with the opposite aptitude without fiction. Otherwise the intention of the universal could also be applied to the individual and to the divine nature, as the Doctor argues in 2, *disp. 1, q. 7, A.*, where he concludes that such conception is false and implying a contradiction, because the ratio of understanding is altogether repugnant to its understood object. Nor does the instantiation that *Oviedo* makes hold — of positive communicability belonging to nature through the intellect without fiction, notwithstanding the negation of such positive communicability which we attribute to nature on the part of the thing. For our argument presses that nature cannot without falsity be conceived by the intellect under the opposite of a predicate that is essential and intrinsic to it on the part of the thing — because then it would be conceived under the opposite of its essence. But the negation of positive communicability — although we attribute it to existing nature on the part of the thing under the difference — is not posited by us as its intrinsic and essential predicate but rather as contingent and adventitious, because such negation belongs to it by reason of the haecceity impeding its intrinsic indifference which it has equally to all individuals. Hence nature can well without fiction be conceived without such negation by the very fact that it prescribes from singularity — because on that account it is not conceived in a mode repugnant to its nature intrinsically and essentially. But it would be so conceived if singularity belonged on the part of the thing to it intrinsically and essentially, as *Oviedo* contends.

Thirdly, principally: nature as existing on the part of the thing is not intrinsically incommunicable and singular from itself or from its essence, but has this from the individual difference — which therefore from itself will be indifferent and communicable at least negatively, that is, not of itself and not from itself singular. *Oviedo, loc. cit.*, responds that singularity is of the quidditative concept of nature if taken physically — as it exists on the part of the thing — but not of its concept taken metaphysically — as it exists in the intellect prescinded from the difference. But this response was overturned a little above, as containing false doctrine. Furthermore: existence does not pertain to the quiddity of created thing — hence the quiddities of things are said to prescind from existence. Therefore it is vain for this author to invent quidditative concepts belonging to things as involving existence, when they do not belong to things except insofar as they prescind from existence. And so in order for nature not to be said of itself singular, it suffices that

singularity does not enter the metaphysically considered concept of nature — since such concept prescribes from whatever lies beyond the pure quiddity of the thing even with material conditions underlying it. For even in such a state it prescribes from those on the part of the thing, since nature does not include them in its essence. And this exists even when nature exists on the part of the thing. For existing nature expresses both essential principles and singularity, and even so it is true to say that according to its essential principles it is not determined — and this is what is expressed by its concept which explains it quiddatively. Therefore it is true that the concept which explains it quiddatively on the part of the thing does not include singularity.

Confirming this: even of nature existing in individuals it is truly said that it is not determined and made proper to someone from the principles of essence but from elsewhere. Therefore even existing nature is negatively indeterminate — not indeed as existing reduplicatively but as nature, which precision is given also on the part of the thing. Therefore the singular on the part of the thing is not of the concept of nature — not only in relation to our concepts, as *Oviedo* claimed.

Morisanus, loc. cit., granting the antecedent, still denies the consequent — because although essence does not from its intrinsic force become incommunicable, it is nonetheless altogether necessarily such, and this by virtue of numerical unity with which it is identified, so that absolutely and simply it is unfit to be participated by many, and positive repugnance to being in many in such a state belongs to it. And this repugnance can only be removed by the intellect — namely when, separating essence from numerical difference, it conceives it without repugnance.

Against this: although it is repugnant to nature to be communicated to another — as it is under this difference and in the composite sense — this is not repugnant to it from itself and from its principles, as the arguer himself admits. Therefore from itself and intrinsically it will not be unfit for being in many.

Furthermore: this intrinsic indifference is not removed by the conjoined singularity — for with such conjunction and real identity the precision from the nature of the thing and formal distinction between nature and singularity still hold. Furthermore: as *Amicus, loc. cit.*, rightly notes, singularity can only remove the concept to which it is opposed — for this is done through formal repugnance. But determination through singularity is not opposed to indetermination through essential principles, since opposition is of the same with respect to the same — and these are not the same: not to be determined through essentials includes a different terminus than to be determined through singularity.

Finally: if singularity removes all indetermination of nature and renders it absolutely and simply unfit for being in many, then such inaptitude and repugnance could not be removed by mere precision of the intellect without falsity — since no foundation on the part of the thing would remain for such

precision. You will say: community removes all determination — for it expresses the negation of determination, and negation distributes the term it affects. But existing nature — though not determined from essential principles nor appropriated to any from the force of those — is nevertheless appropriated and determined through an extrinsic principle. Therefore from this alone all community of nature is removed, since one suffices to destroy it.

Confirming this: just as for a field that was common not to be such, it suffices that it becomes proper to Peter — whether Peter appropriates it to himself or another does so — so likewise in the present case: nature having been made proper to Peter completely loses all community, even if it is not appropriated from itself but through singularity. Since community expresses the negation of determination — whether from principles of essence or from elsewhere — wherever determination comes from, community is removed.

On account of this objection, *Amicus, loc. cit.*, considers the opposing opinion probable — though he admits that on account of this reason one ought not depart from ours, which he himself does not resolve. But it must be said: community, even in ordinary speech, does not absolutely exclude all determination — for prime matter in natural things, though affected by some particular form, is still judged to be the common subject of all forms and indifferent to all — because the form that comes does not entirely pull it outside its connaturally indifferent state. And also some opinion is called common not because it is held by all but by the greater part. Therefore just because nature contracted through some difference is not to be judged thereby as having lost altogether the name and ratio of its community. And when it is said that negation distributes the term it affects, this is certainly true in logical strictness — and therefore when nature is contracted through some difference it would not be well said that it is not determined simply and absolutely, since by such a manner of speaking it is signified that it has no determination either intrinsic or extrinsic. But it must be said it is not determined — with an addition — namely not determined essentially and intrinsically, not of itself this and singular. And the Doctor always so speaks.

From this however it is not well deduced that nature under singularity can in no way be called common, because community from the force of the term does not express negation but rather indifference and positive aptitude for being in many — by which it is also clear to the confirmation.

Cajetan, De Ente et Essentia, loc. cit., says the antecedent of our argument contains a contradiction in terms: for "nature from itself" expresses nature taken solitarily and prescinded from singularity; whereas "nature existing on the part of the thing" expresses nature conjoined with singularity — since there is no nature on the part of the thing without singularity. Although therefore nature as far as it goes of itself — that is, solitarily — is negatively common, yet existing outside it is not common, since such community belongs to it by reason of solitariness and

precision, which it has only through the intellect, and it loses it by the very fact that it is in another.

But this response proceeds from a false imagination: for it is false that this negative community does not belong to nature by reason of its essence but precisely by reason of solitariness which it does not have except through the intellect. As is clear from what was said: the root of such community is the essence of nature itself and not something extrinsic. Therefore not precisely from that solitariness does such community belong to it, but from its own intrinsic principles. Because also *Cajetan, loc. cit.*, concedes that existing nature on the part of the thing is not incommunicable by reason of itself but by reason of the difference. Therefore by its own ratio even existing in a singular, it is not intrinsically and essentially singular — which is to be negatively common.

Furthermore: existing nature on the part of the thing does not lose its ratio and quiddity. Therefore existing on the part of the thing it also includes predicates of both the first and second mode — and we say this community is a predicate of the second mode flowing from its ratio and quiddity.

Furthermore: nature is still said to retain its ratio even existing in individuals because it does not include haecceity essentially. The Doctor does not take "from itself" negatively to mean the same as "solitarily and not with others" — as *Faber, theor. 93, c. 2, ad 1 Cajet.*, incorrectly concedes. For then indeed there would be a contradiction in terms and community would belong to it not only in the negative but also in the positive state. Rather the Doctor takes "from itself" positively, as expressing all the essential ratio of both the first and second mode which nature includes even existing on the part of the thing. And when we say existing nature on the part of the thing is not of itself incommunicable, this is not a locution reduplicating existence — as if the sense were that existing nature together with individual difference, as such, is not incommunicable — but is specificative. And therefore there is no contradiction in terms, because the discussion is of existing nature with individual difference not in the composite but in the divided sense, as was said in the declaration of the conclusion itself.

Fourthly: nature according to itself is not proper to anyone. Therefore from itself it is common and negatively indifferent. The consequent holds by the rule of *Aristotle, 2 Periherm.*: from a negative of a finite predicate the consequent holds to an affirmative of an infinite predicate by virtue of that first principle: of whatever one contradictory is removed, the other is said of it. Just therefore as it validly follows by virtue of this rule — "matter according to itself is not determined to form; therefore according to itself it is indeterminate to form" — so it will be valid to infer: "nature according to itself is not determined and of itself singular; therefore of itself it is indeterminate with respect to any singularity."

Cajetan responds that the process from a negative proposition to an affirmative of an infinite predicate does not hold with reduplication — as in saying: "man insofar

as man is not white; therefore man insofar as man is not-white" — for then it produces the sense that the negation of the conjunction of whiteness with man is of the essence of man, which is plainly false, because then man could not be conjoined with whiteness. And a similar consequent is what Scotus makes in the aforesaid terms: "nature as nature is not of itself singular; therefore nature as nature is common and not proper."

Faber, theor. 93, c. 3, rejects this solution of *Cajetan*: because the Doctor does not argue from a negative proposition to an affirmative of an infinite predicate, but from the negation of one contrary to the affirmation of the other — which consequence from *Aristotle, cap. On Opposites*, is most valid when contraries have no middle. As it is said: "the number two is not odd; therefore it is even" — this is a good consequence, because between these contraries there is no middle. So likewise if it is said: "nature is not of itself singular and particular; therefore it is common" — this is a good consequence because between the particular and the universal there is no middle. And in this way he says the consequence of Scotus holds.

This refutation does not please me. Whatever may be the case with the consequence of the Doctor — about which presently — *Faber* badly confuses the community of nature with universality, because — as the Doctor teaches in *loc. cit.*, 2, *dist. 3, q. 1* — especially at the end, community belongs to nature on the part of the thing and from itself, while universality does so only through the intellect. And in the body of the question he says that although nature is of itself common, nevertheless of itself it is neither universal nor particular, since both belong to it extrinsically: universality through the intellect, particularity through the contracting difference. If therefore between the particular and the universal in this sense there is a middle, the Doctor's consequence would not hold well through the locus of opposites, as *Faber* contends.

But whatever the objection of *Faber* to *Cajetan*, the argument adduced — to which *Cajetan* responds — does not seem to be found in terms at the Doctor's text, especially in that question of the second. For only at the beginning of the question there is an argument to the opposite as follows: "To that which of itself belongs one opposite, the other opposite repugnates from itself. Therefore if nature is of itself numerically one, numerical plurality is repugnant to it from itself." And so the consequence impugned by *Cajetan* is found only implicitly at the Doctor's text, but explicitly in other Scotists — who plainly from the force of it did not want to affirm that the negation of haecceity positively belongs to nature and that it therefore has repugnance to haecceities from itself, as *Cajetan* argues — because then the argument would rather conclude the opposite of their intention. But they only wanted to conclude that there is no repugnance in nature to being separated from haecceity, since as it is not of itself singular — that is, not essentially singular — nothing in it from itself repugns being not-singular — that

is, not conjoined with this haecceity, since as far as it goes of itself it can be with another haecceity. And this also is what the Doctor tries to prove in *loc. cit.*

But as regards the argument itself, it is not well resolved by *Cajetan*. For although it may be conceded that that rule does not hold with reduplication in accidental predicates — as the Doctor notes in 3, *dist.* 3, *q.* 1, *G.*, "universally" — it nevertheless seems to hold universally in essential predicates of the first and second mode. Hence it validly follows: "God insofar as God is not visible; therefore God insofar as God is invisible"; "God insofar as God is not finite; therefore God insofar as God is infinite"; "matter insofar as matter is not determined; therefore matter insofar as matter is indeterminate." Since therefore this predicate of community belongs to nature in the second mode of saying per se as its proper property — while universality and singularity are only accidental predicates — the consequence in the argument most soundly holds.

It is added that properly speaking in accidental predicates "insofar as" is not taken reduplicatively — for reduplication, as was said in the second part of *Institutiones Logicae*, denotes that what immediately follows is the precise and formal cause of the inherence of the predicate to the subject in the first or second mode, or of its division from it. But when we say "man insofar as man is not white," the sense is not that humanity is the formal and precise cause why man is not white — for then man could never be white. Yet when we say "man insofar as man is not-rational," this is so.

Finally: it is one thing to speak of the negation of singularity and another to speak of the negation of conjunction with singularity. Through that argument from a negative of a finite predicate to an affirmative of the infinite — "nature is not of itself singular; therefore of itself it is not-singular" — what is certainly concluded is that the negation of singularity belongs to nature according to its essence — just as the negation of stone according to essence follows from humanity — but it is not concluded that there is a negation of conjunction of singularity with nature. And therefore it is false what *Cajetan* claimed: that the consequent produces the sense that the negation of conjunction with singularity is of the essence of nature. For it only produces this sense: that the negation of being formally and essentially singular belongs to nature essentially — just as it is also true that the negations of predicates simply repugnant to something, although they do not constitutively belong to the essence of the thing, nevertheless consecutively pertain to it, insofar as they necessarily follow from the proper essential predicates — as the negation of brutality follows in man from rationality, as was explained in *Part 2, Inst., tract.* 1, *cap.* 3.

Fifthly and finally: that human nature is not from itself intrinsically determined to the haecceity of Peter but is altogether indifferent — yet determined only extrinsically — belongs to nature on the part of the thing and not through the operation of the intellect, and is clear from what has been said — and the adversaries concede it. Therefore truly the human nature existing in singulars has

from itself at least negative community. The consequent is proved: for nothing else is meant by existing nature being negatively common from itself than that it even under existence is not intrinsically determined to any individual difference but only extrinsically and accidentally. And nature being negatively indeterminate for the Scotists is nothing other than nature not having from itself the principle that determines it — through which it becomes proper to one.

The adversaries respond that this belongs indeed to nature according to itself — but "according to itself" expresses precision and solitariness. Hence this indetermination does not belong to it in individuals in the state of existence, because this is not a state of precision and solitariness. Against this: as was said in n. 85, it is false that "from itself" is taken negatively so as to signify the state of solitariness. Furthermore: it is false that nature only through the intellect prescribes from haecceity, for it prescribes also from the nature of the thing — as is clear from the preceding question — since it does not include haecceity in its essence. This precision is well consistent with the conjunction of nature with haecceity — nor does it remove it, since it imports nothing other than that nature does not have haecceity from itself but from another, as was said above in n. 16.

Furthermore: this negative indetermination of nature is not removed by supervening singularity — as was often stated, because singularity cannot remove except the concept to which it is opposed through formal repugnance. But determination through singularity is not opposed to indetermination through essential principles.

Furthermore: there is no repugnance that the same thing be extrinsically determined and intrinsically indeterminate. For thus we say that matter under this form, a surface under this color, is extrinsically determined — yet still intrinsically indeterminate from man. Thus the contingent future is said to be extrinsically determined to one part and yet intrinsically indeterminate to either.

Finally: even of nature existing in individuals it is true to say it is not determined from itself but from elsewhere. Therefore even in those individuals it retains its indetermination.

Article II. Arguments against the community of nature are resolved.

Aureolus, 2, *dist.* 9, *q.* 2, *art.* 1, thinking that the Scotist opinion about the community of nature coincides with Plato's opinion, attacks it as follows: given such unity of the common nature in individuals, God could not create or annihilate one individual under one species without creating or destroying all. The consequent is proved: for if he annihilated the entire individual, either he removes the entire specific reality — and then since that specific reality is in the other individuals to which it is common, it must be annihilated in them too; or if not, then the entire entity of the individual has not been annihilated. And in proportion this is proved of creation.

Second: from this it follows that one man would be two men — since he would have humanity in common and also another humanity peculiar to himself. But if you say the common nature is not distinct from the particular but becomes proper to Peter through Petreity, which draws it into being an individual without adding to it another humanity but only that contracting propriety — *Aureolus* insists: because either after that appropriation it is true to say that some thing is common to Socrates and Plato, or not. If so: since that appropriated humanity is common, it still follows that individuals do not differ substantially from one another but only hypostatically, as the divine persons are distinguished. If not: then it follows that no reality will be common; or if some is common — other than that proper humanity — then your man will be two men, as before.

Third: for the same reason that the specific common nature is posited, so also must the generic one be posited, as is evident. But this is false, because then there would be many discrete substances in one substance — and it is impossible for one substance to be constituted per se from several substances.

Fourth: either that common reality — say humanity — is predicated identically and formally of the inferiors Socrates and Plato, so that it is true to say "this humanity is Socrateity" and conversely — or not. If the first: then one thing would be predicated identically of many really distinct things, and there would be as it were one thing common to many in reality, as in the Trinity. If the second: then knowing humanity nothing would be known about Socrates, since it is altogether another thing.

Finally: if nature from itself is common, then when Socrates generates Plato, either he does not generate the whole Plato, or he generates himself — unless it is said that generation is nothing other than the communication of essence through transmutation in another, as we say of essence in the Trinity.

Then in the body of the article he proves that the opinion of Scotus is the opinion of Plato, because he says it was not the opinion of Plato — as is commonly attributed to him — that Ideas were separated from singulars in place and subject. But they were separated by real separation, because they were really other than the individuals to which they were common, and were altogether ingenerable and incorruptible. And both those Ideas and those individuals were men, and so for individuals of the other species. And this is the intent that Aristotle touches in 7 *Metaph.*, who says that among those generation was made by entry and exit — so that the mind of the Platonists was that the Idea was a reality inside the individual, yet outside through not local separation but entitative separation, since it was really distinct from the individual. And the reality of this common Idea became this and that particular through contracting matter — and in this sense Callias and Socrates differ only through matter. And in this sense Aristotle argues against that opinion in 2 *Metaph.*

The response is: these arguments militate against the community of nature through inexistence, as will be evident in the following question — as if one and the same entity were adequately in many with some unity that is less than numerical. But not against the community of nature through indifference: for those who hold this way multiply nature in individuals with its formal unity, as we will say below. And even *Aureolus himself, loc. cit., art. 2*, acknowledges this, since therefore we too hold that nature is common to many only through indifference — insofar as the nature in Peter, as far as it goes of itself, could also have been in Paul — the first argument in no way presses us. For with Peter destroyed, every reality of his — both common and particular — is destroyed, nor does any of his entity remain surviving in Paul, because his nature was common to Paul only through indifference, not through inexistence — as if the nature of Peter and the nature of Paul were one and the same entity.

As to the second: the response is as there. From what was said in n. 70: to the objection I say that after the appropriation of nature already made extrinsically, it still remains intrinsically common — not indeed through inexistence, as if one and the same nature were in many individuals, but through indifference: insofar as although the nature of Peter is other than the nature of Paul, yet what constitutes Peter could as well have constituted Paul and vice versa. And therefore it does not follow that Peter and Paul are distinguished only hypostatically as persons in the Trinity, since there is not one nature in Peter and Paul but other and other. Yet it is still true that those individuals are not distinguished per se taken and with haecceities prescinded — partly because as such they prescind from existence, and hence cannot found the real diversity of individuals, since this requires each extreme to have its own proper existence; partly because since they are common realities through indifference, they are rather rationes of assimilating individuals under the same species, not of discerning one from another. But that is the function of haecceities, as was said above in n. 59 and following.

As to the third: the whole is conceded. For since both generic and specific concepts are predicamental, each is grounded in one common reality having its proper formal unity. The only difference is that the formal unity of generic nature will be still less than the specific — since it recedes further from the maximum unity of all which is numerical. Nor is it inconvenient that in one individual substance several superiors included among themselves are also distinct — not numerically, since all are individuated through the same haecceity, but by formal distinction, which is suited to bear only on formalities. And one substance per se can well be constituted from several of which one is per se act and another per se potency metaphysically, just as physically one per se composite is constituted from matter and form, since one is per se act and the other per se potency.

You will say: this seems contrary to the Doctor in 2, *dist. 3, q. 1, § contra istud*, where in the second reason the formal unity which is less than numerical and in which

nature's community is founded seems to be attributed to species alone and not to genus. The response: not only in that second reason but also in almost all the others the Doctor speaks of the formal unity of specific nature — because this is more manifest and closer to numerical unity — not because generic nature does not also have its proportionate formal unity and community from the nature of the thing, since the same reason holds in both cases and for all predicamental grades.

As to the fourth: humanity as contracted to Socrates can be formally and essentially predicated only of Socrates — since it is quiddatively included in him — and of Socrity only identically, insofar as it is really identified with it, though it is not quiddatively included in it, since the contractible is never thus included in the contracting principle but in the common constituted from both. Yet since the humanity of Socrates is still extrinsically common through indifference, it has a certain remote potency of being predicated also of other individuals if prescinded from Socrity through the intellect and positive indifference attributed to it — by reason of which it can be predicated of all and each by the mode of a universal by a predication saying "this is this," as was said in *disp. 4, Log., q. 2, art. 3*, explaining the nature of the universal. And so it is clear how from this no one common thing is admitted to many as it is in the Trinity.

As to the fifth: it proceeds similarly against community of nature through inexistence — not against community through indifference. For according to this position it is well consistent and understood how Socrates generates the whole Plato and not himself — because it is not one and the same really and entitatively nature in Socrates and Plato, but only through indifference, insofar as the constitutive nature of one could as far as it goes of itself also constitute the other disjunctively.

As to Plato's opinion: enough has been said of his mind in q. 2 and what his position is as commonly attributed to him by the Peripatetics. But if even it were such as *Aureolus* reports, still it is false that our position on the community of nature coincides with it — as can be shown from many points of view. For Plato as reported by *Aureolus* posited nature as really distinct from individuals, while Scotus posits it as really identified, as was said in q. 2 and it is evident from q. 3. Plato posited it as ingenerable and incorruptible, while Scotus posits it as generable and corruptible at least mediately and remotely, as he expressly teaches in *3, dist. 22, q. un., H.* Finally Plato posited the common nature as common through inexistence, while Scotus posits it as common only through indifference, as will be established in the following question. From which it is clear there is still a great difference between the opinion of Scotus and Plato, even if Plato's was such as *Aureolus* reports it — nor did *Aureolus* sufficiently perceive the mind of our Doctor in this matter.

Secondly, the same *Aureolus, loc. cit., art. 2*, though he honestly admits that this way of defending the real community of nature is very beautiful and subtle and

superior to others, still proves that nature is not common even through indifference. First: even if it is posited as common only through indifference, it still follows that Socrates and Plato do not differ quiddatively and really but only through hypostatic properties — as the divine persons. He proves the consequence: because on this path there is still one nature in Socrates and Plato. Therefore they do not differ in nature but only in persons, as in the Trinity.

Second: every indifferent reality God can transfer from one of those things to another, as is clear in prime matter with respect to forms. If therefore nature is of itself indifferent to many haecceities, God could at least transfer it from one to another. If you say this cannot be done because nature is identified with the haecceity under which it has already been produced, and it is for this reason that it is said to be indifferent to it — insofar as it does not include it in its formal ratio — *Aureolus* insists: through what does the humanity of Socrates appropriate Socrity to itself, not from itself since it is posited as indifferent? Therefore through something added that takes from it indifference, and so through that added thing before the advent of Socrity nature will be individual.

Furthermore: in the same genus are act and potency; therefore in the same genus must be posited the potential unity for receiving the act in which it is in potency for that act. But the potency for being multiplied — by which humanity is said to be possible to be conceived as universal — is not in the thing but only in the intellect. Therefore humanity as indifferent — that is, as possible to be multiplied — is not in the thing but only in the intellect.

Finally: everything that is numerically one is — from Boethius — everything that exists outside the intellect is therefore of itself singular; no other cause of its singularity need be sought.

The response: I deny the consequent with its proof. For according to this path there is indeed one nature in Socrates and Plato — not through inexistence but only through indifference. Hence absolutely speaking other is the nature in Socrates and other in Plato. And therefore the community of created nature to individuals is far diverse from the community of the divine nature to the three divine supposits, since that is communicated to them through its own division and multiplication — not so the divine nature which is numerically the same in three.

As to the second: *Canonicus*, 1 *Phys.*, q. 6, art. 1 at the end, and *Trombetta*, 7 *Metaph.*, q. 8 at the end, say that assumption is not universally and absolutely true, but only with certain conditions preserved. The first is that what is mutable is singular, since motion and operation are said to be of singulars from 1 *Metaph.* The second is that what is transmuted are not simultaneously compatible — for matter is indeterminate to whiteness and sweetness and yet is not really transmuted from one to the other, since both are simultaneously compatible with it. The third is that what is indifferent and transmutable does not necessarily determine some

one of those things for itself — for if it necessarily determines some one, it will not be transmuted from one to the other. The final condition is that from the indifferent and that to which it is indifferent some one thing is not made identically and really. From which it follows that since the indifferent nature to singulars is not some singular existing thing — though it exists in singulars — and since the singulars themselves are simultaneously compatible in the same nature, and finally since from nature and singularity some one thing is made identically and really, it does not follow that nature itself, namely nature, can be really transmuted from one to the other.

But this solution does not please me: for all the conditions adduced for the truth of that proposition seem to beg the question and to adduce the case at hand as an instantiation — or at least not to be lacking in nature. For when it is said the first condition is lacking in nature because it is not singular of itself but universal and common, this begs the question — since this is precisely what the argument controverts and tries to conclude. The second condition does not seem lacking in nature, since several singularities do not affect one nature — for nature is indifferent to all disjunctively, not conjunctively, and therefore they are not simultaneously compatible with it. The third either belongs to nature or in no way impedes the truth of the proposition — for if nature necessarily determines some difference for itself in a designated way, it is already not indifferent of itself; but if it determines none in a designated way, this does not prevent nature from being transmutable from one to another. For matter too necessarily determines some form vaguely for itself, but because none in a designated way, it can be transmuted from one to another. The final condition openly begs the question — for from the fact that nature is indifferent to singularity the argument tries to prove that there cannot be made from it and the difference some one thing identically and really; otherwise it would not be indifferent to it.

More appropriately therefore the assumption of *Aureolus* is shown to not be universally true from other instantiations outside the present case. For contingent futures are intrinsically indifferent to each part of the contradiction and are only extrinsically determined to one part by the divine will — and yet by reason of this extrinsic determination they cannot pass to the other part. Indeed in the probable opinion of many the truth of futures is really identified with the futures themselves, even though they are intrinsically indifferent to each part. Likewise divine will — as the Doctor notes in *1, dist. 39, G. and 1* — is indifferent to opposite objects for any definite moment of time, and yet it cannot now pass to one and now to another by reason of its immutability. Indeed after it is understood to have passed to one part of the contradiction — for example that the world is to be — notwithstanding its intrinsic indifference to the opposite, according to all theologians the decree about the existence of the world is really identified with the necessary entity of the divine will or volition.

So therefore in the present case it can and must be admitted that the common nature is so passively indifferent to individuations that, when produced under this one which it in fact has, it could equally well in that prior have been produced with another — and from such indifference it is not permitted to deduce real distinction of nature from the difference and free transition from one to another. Both because such transition is altogether impeded by their union which is made through real identity, and because such indifference of nature to individuations is not physical and subjective as the indifference of matter to forms, but metaphysical and objective in the manner already explained in n. 36 and 37 and again in n. 74 and 75.

When *Aureolus* replies against this solution asking through what the humanity of Socrates appropriates Socrity to itself — this has already been answered sufficiently above in n. 69.

As to the second assumption: it is denied by *Scotus*, 2, *dist.* 16, *q. un.*, § *rationes ite*, and elsewhere frequently — because an accident is immediately received in substance. But whatever may be of that assumption, the minor is denied in the present case — that the potency of nature for being multiplied is only in the intellect, if the discussion is of remote potency. It is conceded however for proximate potency — and so it only follows that nature does not have in the thing the positive indifference through which it is called universal but only in the intellect, which however does not prevent it from still having in the thing the negative indifference.

As to the fourth: from *Scotus*, 2, *dist.* 3, *q. 6, lit. E.*: everything that exists in the nature of things is numerically one and singular — either intrinsically and essentially, as all individuals, or extrinsically and denominatively, as the common natures included in them, which are denominated singular because they are contracted through singularity — in the manner in which a body for one part of the composite is called ensouled: not indeed intrinsically and essentially, since only man is said to be ensouled because he essentially includes soul, but extrinsically and denominatively, because it is conjoined with soul and informed by it. On this see what was said in *disp.* 4, *Log.*, *q. 1, art. 1, ad 1 princ.*, resolving the arguments for Heraclitus and Cratylus.

Thirdly, *Rubion*, 2, *dist.* 3, *q. 3*, argues: if humanity is something existing in Socrates and Plato in which they agree on the part of the thing, either it is numerically one in each or one in one and other in the other. Not the first, since this belongs only to the divine essence. If the second: then individuals do not agree more in some humanity existing in reality than they agree in some proper difference of any of them.

Second: Socrates and Plato are many men; therefore they have many really different humanities. But many really distinct humanities cannot be one common humanity.

Third: the humanity of Socrates is numerically one; therefore not of itself common. Nor say it is numerically one only extrinsically through the conjoined haecceity — because nothing is numerically one through that by which it is numerically distinguished. But the humanity of Socrates is numerically distinguished from its individual difference if they are two distinct things in reality outside, for each of two distinct things is numerically distinguished from the other.

Fourth: everything really produced is numerically one and distinct from any other thing. But if Socrates is something constituted from haecceity and nature, both Socrity and humanity itself are something produced in reality outside — for no product, such as is an individual, is constituted except from really produced things. Therefore and so on.

Fifth: the divine nature is one thing common to several supposits really distinct among themselves by reason of its infinity. Therefore created nature by reason of its finitude cannot be so common to many.

Finally: Socrates does not differ more from Plato through individual difference than through humanity, since anything distinct from another is equally distinguished from it through things that are equally proper to itself and repugnant to the other from which it is distinguished. But Socrates' humanity is equally proper to him as his individual difference, nor does the humanity of Plato belong more to Plato or be able to belong to him than his individual difference. Therefore and so on.

The response: conceding the second member and denying the consequent deduced from it — because Socrity, for example, is so of itself proper to Socrates that it can in no way belong to Plato, and therefore it is the ratio of distinguishing one individually from another per se. But humanity is not so, because as far as it goes of itself it is indifferent to constituting Socrates just as Plato — and therefore it cannot be the ratio of distinguishing one from the other but only of assimilating them. Hence the similarity found between Socrates and Plato is grounded in such unity of nature that is not unity through inexistence but through indifference.

As to the second: I concede that Socrates and Plato have many really different humanities. Yet it is true that those do not found a real distinction among themselves except as conjoined with their haecceities. And because the humanity of Socrates so constitutes Socrates that as far as it goes of itself it could equally have constituted Plato — this is the way they are said to have a common humanity, that is one of the same ratio, common through indifference and not through inexistence. And in the same sense it is said there is one common humanity of both — with which it is still consistent that the nature of Socrates is really and entitatively other than the nature of Plato.

As to the third: it is responded as there. As to the attack: the humanity of Socrates is denied to be numerically distinguished from haecceity, since the superior ratio

together with the inferior does not produce a number, since all and each are individuated through the same haecceity, and they cannot properly be called two or two things but one, and at most they will be called two formalities — which number is transcendental, not predicamental.

As to the fourth: everything really produced is numerically one in the way it terminates the production. If it terminates it immediately formally and in itself, it is singular and numerically one intrinsically and essentially — as Socrates. But if it terminates it only mediately and concomitantly and through identity with what terminates it primarily and per se, it is singular and numerically one only extrinsically and denominatively. And since all the metaphysical grades in Socrates are produced in this second manner — as the Doctor teaches in 3, *dist.* 22, *q. un.*, *G.* — they are called singular only in this second way. You will say: what is said to be produced concomitantly — insofar as it is the same as what is primarily and immediately produced or intimately reached by the action of the producer — is either truly a singular thing in itself formally, because through itself it is the terminus of a singular action; or not. If the first: therefore it is in truth a singular thing formally in itself. If the second: therefore it is nothing or something unproduced. The response: conceding that it is intimately reached and denying the consequent drawn from this. As to the proof: if through "through itself" you understand immediately and by itself alone, then no metaphysical grade or formality is thus produced through itself, because it does not by itself alone and formally terminate the action of the agent — since it has no proper existence, but only concomitantly and insofar as it is identified with that whose existence it exists in.

As to the fifth: it only proves that in creatures nature cannot be common to many through inexistence — especially with numerical unity, since this is the special privilege of the divine nature.

As to the last: the assumption is denied. To the proof: the major is conceded; the minor is denied — because Socrity is more proper to Socrates than humanity is. For Socrity is proper to him of itself and essentially, so that it is intrinsically repugnant to it to be able to be of another. But humanity is proper to him only extrinsically and by reason of real identity with Socrity — otherwise according to itself and from essential principles, it can belong to Plato as it now belongs to Socrates. And therefore it cannot be the ratio of distinction of those individuals but only of assimilation.

Fourthly: *Cajetan* argues — no particular can be common, since to be particular expresses to be proper, while common expresses to be not proper. But everything existing outside the soul is particular. Therefore it cannot be common.

Second: for something to be common in creatures it must be denuded of individual principles. But no such thing can be given outside the soul, but only in the intellect when it prescribes nature from differences. Therefore and so on.

Third: each nature is so determined to this individual that it has no aptitude for being in another. Therefore and so on. The assumption is proved: for no potency or aptitude is given to what is repugnant. But it is repugnant that what is really and essentially in me can also be in another — whether conjointly or disjunctively. Therefore and so on.

Finally: everything that is predicated essentially of a nature is also predicated and belongs to the individuals of that nature by the first ante-predicamental rule. If therefore indifference, indetermination, and community belong essentially to nature, they will belong also to individuals and be predicated of them.

The response: it can be simultaneously particular and common according to diverse rationes. And so it is with nature: it is common extrinsically from itself and from its principles, but extrinsically and through the added difference it becomes particular. And for it to exist in the nature of things and outside causes, it suffices that it is particular in one or another way.

You will say: to that to which one of the opposites belongs, the other cannot belong. Therefore nature cannot simultaneously on the part of the thing be common and particular, since these are opposed. The response: these are opposed if taken in the same way, not in a diverse way — for opposition must be attended around the same, with respect to the same, and in the same way. And this does not occur in the present case about nature, since it is common intrinsically and per se, but singular extrinsically and accidentally.

You will insist further: when one opposite belongs to something per se and essentially, the other opposite can belong to it neither per se nor accidentally — for because man is rational and risible per se, he cannot accidentally be irrational and irrisible. Therefore if nature is per se common, it cannot be singular accidentally and extrinsically. The response from *Scotus, q. 4 Prolog., 10*: conceding the assumption about opposites truly and absolutely, and not about opposites only in a qualified sense. Just as to someone simply black and according to the whole, simply and according to the whole white is opposed — while white according to the teeth is opposed in a qualified sense. And although the first opposite is repugnant to him, the second is not but can belong to him accidentally. So in the present case: common per se and intrinsically is opposed to singular taken in the same way — not so to singular only extrinsically. And therefore since nature is per se and intrinsically common, for the same reason it cannot be singular — neither per se nor accidentally — in the same way. But this does not prevent it from being at least able accidentally to be singular extrinsically and denominatively, since this is opposed to it not simply but in a qualified sense.

As to the second: the denudation of nature from haecceities can be taken in two ways. Either as expressing separation from them and positing solitariness in nature — and thus the minor is true but the major is verified only of positive community which belongs to nature through the work of the intellect, not of

negative community, since this does not belong to nature by reason of solitariness — as I said above — but by reason of its essence and essential condition. Hence since even existing nature does not lose its ratio, neither does it lose the negative community. Or denudation is taken in the second way — as expressing the exclusion of differences from the essence of nature — and then the major is absolutely true, but the minor is false, since between nature and singularity there is a precision from the nature of the thing, insofar as it in truth is not involved in the essence of the other — and not only through the intellect.

As to the third: the assumption is denied if the discussion is of remote aptitude, though it is conceded for proximate aptitude. As to its proof: the major is conceded when repugnance comes from within; denied when it comes from without, as in the present case — for such repugnance comes from the individual difference, not from the formal ratio of nature. You will say: therefore at least through the absolute power of God nature can be without individual difference — since he can supply all repugnance coming from without. The response: he can supply it — not however in this sense, that once it has had the individual difference it can afterwards through God's power relinquish it and acquire another. Just as he cannot make a contingent proposition already determined to one part cross over to the other — even if the repugnance of such transition comes only from without. But just as one is said able to supply that the Antichrist will not be future — insofar as just as from eternity he decreed him to be future, so he could have decreed the opposite — so God can supply this extrinsic repugnance of nature, since at the same instant in which it was produced by the generator and conjoined with this individual difference, it could equally well as far as it goes of itself be produced under another and conjoined with another — in the manner explained in n. 74 and 75.

As to the last: *Faber, theor. 93, cap. 3*, says the argument errs through a fallacy of passing from predicates of the first intention to predicates of the second intention — for he thinks that the community of nature is a predicate of the second intention, and the assumed proposition is verified only of predicates of the first intention. But the error of this solution comes from this — that this author often confuses universality with community and vice versa, *loc. cit.*, which must not be done. For universality is indeed a predicate of the second intention, belonging to nature on the part of the thing but only through the intellect. But not so community — as the Doctor notes in 2, *dist. 3, q. 1*, especially at the end. For this belongs to nature beyond any work of the intellect, as also does the less than numerical formal unity on which it is founded. For the common nature just as it is on the part of the thing has its proper unity and community with no intellect considering — and for this reason unity and community of which we speak here are predicates of the first intention.

Otherwise it must be said from what was said in *disp. 6, Log., q. 4*, in the declaration of that ante-predicamental rule — from *Scotus, 1, dist. 4, q. 2* — that the predicates

or attributes of some nature are of two genera: some belong to it as it supposes simply for its own, namely the immediate significate taken precisely; and others belong to it as it supposes absolutely or personally. And those predicates do not place a difference between nature and supposit. That proposition and antepredicamental rule therefore is true of predicates that belong to nature suppositing absolutely or personally, not suppositing simply. But community is a predicate of the first genus, not the second.

You will say: the formal unity proper to nature is also said of individuals — for it is true to say that Peter is formally one. Therefore also community. The parity is denied, since community is an attribute of the first genus while formal unity is an attribute of the second genus. You will insist: if the formal unity of nature can be enunciated of a supposit, therefore also community. The response: formal unity can be considered in two ways — either as a certain undividedness through essential differences, or as it is common and less than numerical unity. In the first way it can also be said of a supposit, since as this predicate it does not place a difference between nature and supposit. But in the second way by no means — since as this it is a predicate placing such difference. And therefore the consequent is denied.

Fifthly, *Oviedo, controuv. 3, Log., punct. 2 and 3*, argues: where there is no distinction on the part of the thing, neither can there be contraction or indifference — for nothing is contracted to itself nor is it indifferent to itself. But nature in no way on the part of the thing is distinguished from the individual difference with which it is conjoined. Therefore and so on.

Second: even granting formal distinction between them, they are nevertheless really identified. But thus identified they cannot even through divine power be separated. Therefore no state can be assigned in which the nature of Peter has such indifference to Petreity that it can be separated from it — and consequently no state in which it can be contracted.

Third: because even with such a difference granted, nature still could not be contracted to many individuals conjointly but only disjunctively. Therefore that entity that is contractible through many haecceities under disjunction on the part of the thing would not yet be universal.

Fourth: this community does not belong to the individual difference of Peter. Therefore neither does it belong to nature identified with it. The consequent is evident, since it implies that some predicate belongs to some formality and not to another really identified with it — otherwise contradictories are verified of the same thing.

Fifth: before the operation of the intellect there is no nature that is not singular — either negatively or precisively. Therefore neither is there one that is negatively common. The assumption is proved — that there can be no nature not singular negatively or privately — because nothing can be understood as lacking what it is

identified with. And that neither precisively: because in things that are really identified, precision can only be found through the benefit of the intellect.

Finally: a contradiction is found in these terms: "nature before the operation of the intellect is not singular of itself, but by reason of the differences with which it is identified" — for before the operation of the intellect nothing can belong to a thing more from itself than what belongs to it by reason of the formality with which it is identified, or which is the same as itself. For what can more really and physically belong to an entity than what physically and really belongs to it through itself?

The response: the minor is denied, as is sufficiently clear from the preceding question. As to the second: I admit no state is given in which nature can be separated from the difference with which it has once been produced. But since in the state of possibility it does not regard any singularity determinately but one vaguely — as even the *Complutenses* admit in *disp.* 3, *Log.*, q. 5, n. 46 — in that state its indifference is especially evident in the manner explained above in n. 36 and 37 and again in n. 74 and 75, where I also exclude a certain objection of *Oviedo* against this solution. Furthermore: since this indifference of nature to singularities is not physical and subjective but only objective and metaphysical, it need not be explained through the possibility of separation of nature from the difference — but it suffices if it is explained through the exclusion of the difference from the quidditative concept of nature, so that nature is said to be indifferent even to the haecceity with which it is produced insofar as it does not include it in its formal ratio. In this sense it is still more evident how even in the state of contraction it retains its indifference at least negatively. And against similar argumentation — which the adversaries are accustomed to press in this matter with great force — the instantiations adduced above in n. 94 must be brought: about the indifference of contingent futures which they still retain even after the determination of the divine will, and likewise about the indifference of the divine will which it retains together with the identity of divine decrees.

As to the third: the whole is conceded — for Scotus does not say that a universal is given on the part of the thing, but that something is negatively common, since for this the negative indifference and remote aptitude for being in many disjunctively suffices. But for universality the positive indifference of nature is required — and the proximate aptitude for being in many not only disjunctively but also conjunctively — which indifference nature certainly cannot have except through the work of the intellect.

As to the fourth: the consequent is denied with its proof. For of the same thing on account of the mere diversity of formalities on the part of the thing, contradictory predicates can be enunciated without contradiction. How this is possible and what such contradictory predicates are was explained above in *disp.* 6, n. 227 and 240 and 310 and again in this disputation in n. 33, where this argument about the contradictory was resolved — which *Rubion*, *loc. cit.*, also adduces. You will say:

therefore from contradiction we could never infer real distinction between two things — since it would suffice to say that formal distinction from the nature of the thing suffices to avoid contradiction. The consequent is denied: for contradiction infers also real distinction in the proper sense when something is verified simply of one thing that cannot be really verified of another in any way — as existence is really verified of Paul, but is not verified in any way of Peter already dead. Such contradiction infers real distinction between those of which it is verified. But when one contradictory is verified of one extreme as formally distinguished on the part of the thing from another with which it is really the same, then it is not repugnant to the other extreme really but only formally — just as it is really true to say that the intellect wills, the will understands, and sense is the same thing that understands and wills — but this is not formally true, because it does not happen through the same formality. See *disp. 8, n. 221*.

As to the fifth: the assumption is denied with both its proofs. For although before the operation of the intellect there is no nature that is simply and absolutely not singular — neither negatively nor precisively — there is nevertheless given one that is not of itself singular, not of itself this thing, which is to be negatively common, insofar as it does not include singularity in its formal ratio. Hence as to the first proof: for there to be a nature thus common on the part of the thing, it is by no means necessary that it be understood as lacking singularity — for this would be dividing, not prescinding. But it suffices that, though it is known to be singular on the part of the thing, it is nonetheless understood not to be of itself singular and from its intrinsic principles but extrinsically by reason of the superadded difference. As to the other proof: it is denied that in things that are really identified there is only precision through the work of the intellect — since according to our principles, since things that are really identified can still be formally distinguished from the nature of the thing by reason of the plurality of formalities embedded in that thing, there can be objective precisions from the nature of the thing between those formalities, from what was said in *disp. 6, q. 16*.

As to the last: the contradiction is denied to be found in these terms — "nature before the operation of the intellect is not singular of itself, but by reason of differences with which it is identified." For — as *Oviedo* himself rightly foresaw in response according to our principles — more from itself it belongs to a formality what belongs to it by reason of its very own formality than what belongs to it by reason of another formality with which it is really identified. As for example: it belongs more to the intellect to be a principle of intellection — which belongs to it by reason of its very own formality — than to be a principle of willing, which belongs to it by reason of the will that is a formality really identified with the intellect. Likewise it belongs more to animal identified with rational to be a principle of sensing — which belongs to it by reason of the formality of animal — than to be a principle of reasoning, which belongs to it not by reason of the formality of animal but by reason of the formality of rational which is identified with the formality of animal.

Oviedo foresaw this solution and says that this doctrine has deceived us and is the cause of our deception: for in the physically same thing before the operation of the intellect there is this and that formality, since these are only divided by the gaze of the intellect in an object physically and really indivisible and altogether simple. Therefore before the operation of the intellect nothing can belong to some entity by reason of one formality and not by reason of another identified with it — since before the operation of the intellect there is not one formality and another but a certain simple and indivisible entity, by reason of which everything belongs that belongs intrinsically to the entity through itself.

The response: rather the adversaries themselves deceive in this point, because created things are not such simple entities as they imagine — metaphysically speaking. For in the essences of things various formalities are embedded on the part of the thing, which are the various grades of the essence of the same thing, which possess neither their own existence nor can terminate physical causality, but all and each exist through the existence of the same entire essence which they constitute and of which they are the grades of being, and their production is understood as following in a certain flowing or metaphysical emanation — as was expressly declared in *disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1* and *disp. 8, q. 6, art. 3*. And this is especially necessary for preserving the reality of metaphysical composition. And in the present case before the operation of the intellect there are found in Peter nature and individual difference, which are indeed one simple thing and physical entity, but are several metaphysical realities, one of which is by its own nature communicable and the other of itself incommunicable. From which it follows that there is no contradiction in these terms — as the arguer claimed — "nature before the operation of the intellect is not singular of itself, but by reason of the difference with which it is identified."

Sixthly, *Suárez, disp. 6, Metaph., sect. 4*, at length attacks this community of nature and aptitude for being in many on the part of the thing. But his reasons coincide with the arguments of *Cajetan* and others, and they can all be reduced to this one: either this indifference of nature belongs to it in the state of existence — when namely it is produced with this singularity — or in the state of possibility — namely because in that prior, before it was produced to the outside, it did not of itself regard one haecceity more than another, and therefore it could equally well be produced under one as under another as far as its formal ratio goes.

But the first cannot be said. First: because by the very fact that nature is contracted it becomes this and individual. But in a real individual there is no such aptitude or non-repugnance for being in many even disjunctively, but rather the opposite repugnance. Second: because it cannot be made that once contracted it loses the individuation it acquires and passes to another, since such contraction is made through real identity. And therefore as existing in reality it has neither proximate nor remote aptitude for being in others. Third: because to be determined to one

and to be indeterminate to many contradict. But as existing on the part of the thing it is determined to one.

Nor does the Scotist response hold — that it is not contradictory for nature to be of itself indifferent and yet determined through individual difference. For from this — says *Suárez* — it only follows that nature does not have determination without individual difference, which though it is so, still after such individual difference has been joined to nature, nature thus contracted cannot remain actually indifferent. At most it can be said that if it did not have that contraction it would be indifferent — but since in fact it never exists without such contraction, in fact it never exists as indifferent.

But if the second is asserted — that such indifference or aptitude for being in many belongs to nature in the state of possibility — from this it follows that it does not retain it in the state of actuality, since actuality excludes objective possibility. Hence the intention is still had: that nature in the state of existence or on the part of the thing has no community or aptitude for being in many, but complete determination and repugnance.

The response: the negative indifference belongs to nature both in the state of possibility and actual existence. Since it arises from its essence and since it retains this also in the state of existence, it consequently retains its property too. The only difference that seems to intervene in these states is that under the state of possibility nature seems to regard one singularity vaguely — that is, not this one more than that — whereas in the state of existence it regards one designately. But since in neither state does it include any in its formal ratio, in both states it is in this sense said to remain indifferent.

Therefore the consequent of the argument is denied in form — that nature does not retain its negative indifference even in the state of existence. And to the first attack: I say that nature in the state of existence becomes individual only extrinsically and accidentally from the advent of the difference which it does not include in its formal ratio. And therefore intrinsically it remains communicable to others.

As to the second: it has already been often said that with its formal ratio — by reason of which it remains intrinsically indifferent even under the actual haecceity — this is consistent.

As to the third: as has been said, it does not contradict that nature is extrinsically determined through a difference and yet retains its intrinsic community. For as has been often stated, this indetermination is not removed by singularity — since singularity cannot remove except the concept to which it is opposed, for this is done through formal repugnance. But determination through singularity is not opposed to indetermination through essential principles, since opposition is of the same and according to the same — and these are not the same.

Nor does it help what *Suárez* says: that from this it is only gathered that nature does not have determination without individual difference, but not that it retains indifference after having it. For as I said — since singularity is not opposed to indetermination through essential principles — it does not take it away. And therefore nature retains such indetermination even together with determination to singularity. Otherwise it would equally have to be said about the contingent future that, once determined by the divine will to one part, it no longer retains its intrinsic indifference to either — but at most it can be said that if it did not have that determination it would be indifferent. But this must not be conceded, because then the future would not have true contingency — which properly consists in that indifference to either part and is not removed through the extrinsic determination of the divine will to one part. For as the logicians say, determination of inherence is consistent with indetermination of the possible by reason of the intrinsic indifference of the contingent future. And this doctrine is received in every school by all theologians, and admirably serves our purpose to show that these two things are not contradictory: that nature — say the humanity of Peter — is determined through Petreity extrinsically, and yet as far as it goes of itself it can be in others by reason of its intrinsic indifference. For also here in its own way determination of inherence is consistent with indetermination of the possible.

And indeed *Suárez* himself clearly concedes the whole matter in the same passage, *disp. 6, sect. 4, n. 10*, where he says: taking indifference negatively, it can be conceded that nature even on the part of the thing is indifferent — insofar as nature from the force of its formal unity taken precisely does not have repugnance to being in many. For such repugnance so explained is grounded in the formal unity of nature, which is not of itself individual. And in this way it can be said that nature even existing in reality has this non-repugnance, since even in the thing itself it is not incommunicable from the force of formal unity, but from the force of individual unity — for though the whole nature and formal unity in the individual is incommunicable and it is repugnant for it to be in many, it nonetheless does not have this from the force of formal unity of nature but from individuation. So *Suárez, loc. cit.* — with these words, willingly or not, he subscribes to the Scotist position on the indifference of nature. For such indifference, and no greater, is what Scotus seeks to establish in nature on the part of the thing — which *Suárez* approves in that argument.

Seventhly, *Morisanus, disp. 1, Log., q. 7, art. 2*, objects: nature according to itself exists on the part of the thing and not only its haecceity, whatever that may be. Therefore nature also according to itself has a certain determinate entity. But such entity includes in itself the negations of division into many things such as itself is. Therefore intrinsically through itself, with nothing superadded, it has singularity and incommunicable unity, and has no need of any extrinsic mode. The assumed minor is proved: because by this very fact that nature according to itself exists and is a determinate entity, it cannot be divided from itself —

therefore it cannot be divided into many that are such as itself is. Otherwise it would simultaneously be one and many entitatively, which is repugnant.

The response: it is indeed true that nature exists on the part of the thing — but not through existence proper to it, only through the existence of the individual which is constituted from it and haecceity. And when it is said that according to itself it has a certain determinate entity: if the discussion is of determination to singularity, this is denied. If of determination with respect to a certain grade of being, this is conceded in some way. And in the same sense the assumed minor is conceded: because just as it holds a certain grade of being in the whole order of beings, so too it holds a formal unity proportionate to itself — which is always less than numerical unity. But when it is inferred: therefore according to itself it is incommunicable, I distinguish: as excluding positive communicability, conceded — because such it has from the intellect. As excluding negative communicability, denied. And the reason for the denial is: for an entity to be called negatively common alone, it is not required that it be divisible into many such as itself is — for this is required only for positive or universal community. But it suffices if that entity is of such a condition that as far as it goes of itself it does not seek to be terminated more by this singularity than by another, since it is equally contractible by all disjunctively. For this suffices for such entity not to be of itself this and singular, since such indifference and indetermination directly repugns singularity — which is so determined of itself to constituting this individual that it can constitute no other even disjunctively.

You will say: such community as we attribute to nature on the part of the thing does not exclude intrinsic singularity from it. For the divine nature is also common in this way — it is communicated to many subsistences by which it is terminated — and yet it is intrinsically singular. Therefore if created nature is not in another way common on the part of the thing — so as to be divisible into many such as itself is — it is not well concluded from this that it is not intrinsically singular. Furthermore: the singular is what is indivisible into many such as itself is. Therefore the common — which is opposed to the singular — must be of such a kind that it is divisible into many in the same way. If therefore nature is not common in this way, it is not avoided that it is singular.

The response: the assumption is denied and its proof. For created nature is potential and contractible through singularity, and therefore it is singularized extrinsically through it and rendered incommunicable as a "what." But the divine nature is in no way contracted and actuated through personality — whence we argue that it has of itself the ultimate unity and actuality, as the Doctor notes in *1, dist. 2, q. 2, 1*.

As to the confirmation: I say that the singular is what excludes all community and indifference — both positive and negative. Hence it is not only indivisible into many such as itself is — by which it excludes positive community — but also indivisible, that is, incontractible, insofar as it is not indifferent to be able to be

numerically another or to constitute another numerically. By this it excludes also negative community, which is a property of nature on the part of the thing. And therefore the last consequent is denied. And at least in creatures this is true: that singularity intrinsically belonging to that to which it belongs excludes all communicability and indifference — as *Trombetta, 7 Metaph., q. 8, art. 1, not. 1*, rightly notes, where he says the singular is what is incommunicable to many and indivisible into them. And above all he says this is true in creatures. For the common ratio of both the created and uncreated individual is that it is non-multiplicable and indivisible into many. The ratio of incommunicability belongs only to the created individual. From which it follows that the created individual both is incommunicable and is indivisible into many — and because such individual is incommunicable, it must be constituted in such being through some incommunicable and simply indivisible reality — which we call haecceity.

You will say: the same prime matter in natural things is indifferent and common in this way to many forms disjunctively. Therefore such community and indifference does not exclude singularity from what is thus common. The response: the parity is denied. For the indifference of matter is to this and that form — not however to this and that singularity, since it is already supposed singular before receiving this or that form. But the indifference of nature is to this and that singularity — and it implies that something is indifferent to what intrinsically and essentially belongs to it. And therefore this indifference excludes singularity from the concept of that which is thus said to be indifferent — and the supervening singularity does not destroy it but only impedes and extrinsically determines it.

You will say again: nature is of itself neither universal nor singular, but both belong to it extrinsically — universality through the intellect, singularity through the individual difference. But if on the part of the thing it were singular of itself — the Doctor says — it could not be made universal through the intellect, because it would be conceived in a mode repugnant to it from the nature of the thing. Therefore by the same reason, if on the part of the thing it is according to itself common, it cannot be rendered singular and incommunicable through the added difference either.

The parity is denied. For it well follows: if nature is singular on the part of the thing, it cannot be conceived as universal without conceiving it in a mode repugnant to it from the nature of the thing. But it does not follow: if it is on the part of the thing per se common, it cannot even accidentally be made singular through the added difference. Just as matter is of itself indifferent to all forms, yet it can accidentally be determined to this or that. And so as not to use a suspect example — which carries some disparity with it — the example of contingent futures can be adduced: these intrinsically and per se are indifferent to either part without injury to such indifference and can be extrinsically determined to one

part — since determination of inherence is consistent with indetermination of the possible by reason of the intrinsic indifference of the contingent future.

Another argument that *Morisanus, loc. cit.*, presses is derived from various absurdities that follow upon our position. But in that argument he supposes several false things, and especially: first, that nature and haecceity are so distinguished according to us that they can be separated; second, that nature is common to many through inexistence and not through indifference. The falsity of the first is clear from what has been said; the falsity of the second will also be evident immediately from what will be said in the following question.

Question V. Whether nature is common on the part of the thing through inexistence, or rather through indifference alone.

Those attributing some community to nature differ in explaining this community — as *Trombetta, 7 Metaph., q. 8, art. 1* at the end, and *Tataretus, q. 1 praedicam., dub. 3; Canonicus, 1 Phys., q. 6; and Aureolus, 2, dist. 9, q. 1, art. 2* report. Some posit that created natures are common to individuals through inexistence — so that one and the same humanity, for example, is found in all and each men simultaneously and at once, and the humanity of one does not differ from the humanity of another except extrinsically and by reason of the joined differences. And lest by this manner of speaking they seem to concede in natural things what only occurs in the ineffable mystery of the Trinity — where one and the same numerical nature is found in three — they add that when they say one common nature is in singulars, this must by no means be understood as numerical unity — as if one and the same numerical nature were in all and each — since this belongs only to the mystery of the Trinity; but it must be understood as that unity proper to natures which imports indivision through essential principles. Hence this unity is also called formal and essential unity, by reason of which it is also called lesser than numerical unity. In this sense therefore they say one and the same nature is common to its inferiors through inexistence. This position is followed by many Scotists — and indeed of no small reputation: *Bonetus, lib. 1, Metaph., cap. 2; Canonicus, 1 Phys., q. 6; and so also Meurisse, lib. 2, Metaph., cap. 3, q. 4; Faber, Philos., theor. 93, and 4 Metaph., disp. 9; and it is extensively defended by Pasqualigo, tom. 2, Metaph., disp. 15.*

But other Scotists commonly admit common natures not through inexistence but through pure and simple indifference for being in many disjunctively in the manner already explained in the preceding question — so that nature is in truth multiplied in individuals, so that with truth it can be said that the humanity in Peter is other than the humanity in Paul. Yet each of those natures is said to be common because however much it is extrinsically determined through a difference to this or that individual, it still always remains intrinsically indifferent to being in this or that one. For just as it now constitutes one, so it could equally well as far as it goes have constituted another — if it had been communicated to

that other by the generating cause. And in this sense nature is called common through indifference.

This position is followed by the more careful Scotists: *Tataretus* and *Trombetta*, *loc. cit.*; *Lichetus*, 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 1, with *Tataretus* and other commentators there; *Saxius*, *tom.* 2, *Catastrophis*, *disp.* 3, *q.* 1, *art.* 1; *Merinerus*, *cap.* 1, *De Univers.*, *disp.* 2, *q.* 1; the Formalists generally in the *Tract. Formalitatum* — and especially *Vallonus* in the *explanation of the division of beings of reason*; *Rada*, *part.* 2, *controv.* 3, *art.* 1. Indeed *Canonicus*, though he follows the former opinion, admits that this second is more subtle and consonant with the Scotist doctrine. And *Aureolus*, *loc. cit.*, though holding neither of these, says this second mode of defending the real community of nature is very beautiful and subtle, and that the arguments customarily made against the community of nature proceed especially against the community of nature through inexistence and not against community through indifference.

Article I. Resolution of the question.

The position to be held is that created and predicamental nature — of which alone this disputation speaks — is common to many through indifference and not through inexistence. This is the conclusion of the Doctor nearly wherever he speaks of the community of nature. And indeed in 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 1, where he expressly speaks of the community of nature, he explains it through indifference and not through inexistence — and so he teaches expressly especially in § *Sed contra*, when in *lit. H* he says to existing nature in the thing: it is not repugnant to be in another singularity than that in which it is — which is to acknowledge it as common through indifference and not through inexistence.

Likewise in the same passage in *lit. K* he says: in creatures there is something common with real unity lesser than numerical unity, and that common thing is not so common that it is predicable of many — though it is so common that it is not repugnant to itself to be in another than in that in which it is. But if the common nature were through inexistence, it would also be proximately predicable of all those in whom it exists, since to be actually in many it immediately follows to be said of many. Therefore he posits it as common only through indifference.

You will say: to the instantiation made there from Damascene about the divine nature alone being common to many on the part of the thing, the Doctor responds: it is by this that the community of created nature is distinguished from the community of the divine nature — that there the common thing is one singular and individual, not so in creatures. Therefore he does not deny that created nature is common through inexistence, but only that it is not communicated to many as numerically one. The response: the Doctor indeed says there doubly that the authority of Damascene is not against him — partly because only the universal which is not created is not one in singulars but neither is anything common in creatures; and partly because the authority speaks of the

common predicable — not precisely of the common which is determined in fact, though it is not repugnant to itself to be in another, as such a common thing can precisely be posited in creatures in reality. So the Doctor. He therefore distinguishes the community of created nature from the divine one not only on the first count — that this one is communicated numerically one to many, not the other — but also on the other count: that the divine one is proximate to being predicable of many in whom it is actually determined — while the created one is not.

Furthermore: in the same *dist. 3, q. 6*, in the body of the question, § *Ad questionem*, he proposes in terms this doubt we have in hand — whether the unity of the common nature is that of some entity existing in only one individual or rather of something that is simultaneously in two. And he responds with these words: "I therefore concede that the real unity is not of some entity existing in two individuals but in one" — with which words he indicates, as *Lichetus* there expounds, that created nature is common not through inexistence but through pure indifference which it retains even when determined to one — in the manner explained above.

Nor does what *Meurisse, loc. cit.*, says to this satisfy — that by this the Doctor only indicates that the unity of nature is not of some entity existing in two individuals with a heterogeneous division, but well with a homogeneous division. For once it is admitted that nature is on the part of the thing divided into singulars as a homogeneous whole into its parts through differences of the same ratio, it follows that the humanity of Peter and the humanity of Paul are not one and the same entity — but other is the humanity of Peter and other is that of Paul, though all are homogeneous. This does not therefore infer that there is one nature through inexistence in all, but only through indifference: insofar as what constitutes Peter could equally well have constituted Paul. Furthermore: even where the Doctor exemplifies the specific nature, still the doctrine which he there delivers about the unity and community of nature must be understood generally of specific nature as well as generic — about which the Doctor speaks indiscriminately in those questions.

Moreover: in the same *dist. 3, q. 7* at the first reason in the opposite, he says it is not the same for some two things to differ in form and to differ formally. For several men differ in form — or rather there is diversity of forms between them — since other is the humanity of Peter and other of Francis. Yet there is no formal or essential diversity between them, nor do they differ in humanity, since this is the ratio of assimilating many individuals under the same species, not the ratio of distinguishing them or a distinct ratio.

From which it is deduced that according to the Doctor there is not one really and entitatively common nature in individuals, but other and other, and it is called one common nature of all only through indifference.

And finally in 3, *dist.* 8, *q. un.* at the end he teaches that in each individual the common nature is multiplied to the plurality of individuals together with the multiplication of the formal unity of nature — hence he says other is the formal unity of the humanity of Christ and other is the humanity of Mary. Which is an evident sign that he does not intend one and the same nature common through inexistence, but only through indifference. For those who posit nature as common through inexistence do not multiply its formal unity in each individual, but say that this unity corresponds to it as it is adequately in all individuals together, but only partially and inadequately in each.

The same can be gathered from 7 *Metaph.*, *q. 18*, where he also explains the community of nature through negative indifference — insofar as it is not of itself this thing — and elsewhere frequently. This therefore is the true and genuine opinion of the Doctor about the community of nature — as *Rada, loc. cit., controuv.* 3, *art.* 1 at the end, rightly notes, where after an exact weighing of the Doctor's words in 2, *dist.* 3, *q. 1*, § *Sed contra*, in explaining the community on the part of the thing, he concludes with these words: "Therefore Scotus considers it inconvenient for there to be some one and the same real entity in many. And therefore according to him there is not given any real thing that is actually one in many, but only is given something common in such a way that it is not repugnant to it from its own ratio to be in another than that in which it is. And understand this not as though some unique entity on the part of the thing can be non-repugnant to be simultaneously in two supposits — since this is altogether repugnant to any created nature existing on the part of the thing — but so that disjunctively it is not repugnant to be in another. That is: just as it is determined through this singularity to be of Peter, so it will not be repugnant to it — as prior to the singularity of Peter — to be determined through the singularity of Paul or any other. From which it can in no way be non-repugnant to be simultaneously in two singulars. Therefore whatever is in creatures a real common thing is de facto determined and in one according to Scotus — not however in many simultaneously and conjointly, as those who explain the community of nature through inexistence in many must say."

The first and principal foundation for attacking community of nature through inexistence is: if in all individuals there is one and the same common humanity, then the same nature will be in Christ the Lord and in Judas the traitor. And so the same humanity will be simultaneously in Heaven and in Hell — and will be simultaneously miserable and blessed. Furthermore: on this view the mystery of the Trinity is introduced in creatures, since the same altogether common nature is really identified with many singularities that are really distinct from each other, without the singularities being really identical among themselves — just as the same divine nature is in three persons with the persons not being really identical among themselves.

But unless something more is added, the authors of the first opinion easily evade these and similar arguments by saying they proceed from the hypothesis that this unity of nature in many is numerical — which they do not assert. For this unity is formal — proper to nature and lesser than numerical unity — and of itself common to many just as nature itself is, and is inadequately preserved in this or that individual, adequately in all individuals together. Since therefore the nature of Christ is numerically diverse from the nature of Judas and only the same in species, no inconvenience follows. For it is not inconvenient that some nature of the same species as the nature of Christ is miserable and tormented in hell.

Nor does the mystery of the Trinity follow, since in the Trinity the same numerical nature is in three — not so in creatures where it is only the same in species or genus. And *Pasqualigo, tom. 2, Metaph., disp. 15, sect. 3*, responds especially in this way, stubbornly defending the opposing position which had been obsolete for innumerable years from this point.

In order to completely overturn this solution which is given rather than refuted, the reason must be sought why in the Trinity the divine nature is not said to be divided or numerically multiplied — even though it is terminated by the divine persons — whereas human nature in Peter and Paul, by the very fact that it is understood contracted by their individual differences, is so divided that with truth it can be said there are two men, but not so that the Father and Son are two Gods.

Either this is so because the individual differences are multiplied in created nature and are really identified with it — and by reason of this identity nature also receives division in itself — and this cannot be: since also in divinity the personalities are multiplied in nature and are supremely identified with it, and yet nature is not thereby multiplied so that the divine persons could be called several Gods.

Or it is so because nature in creatures is contracted and actuated through haecceities — not so divine nature through personalities, since it is in ultimate actuality. And this cannot be said either, because it is impossible to understand how something is divided and multiplied through the advent of another if it remains in itself one as before. But human nature according to the adversaries remains in itself one formally and positively after the advent of singularities just as before. Therefore through them it is in no way divided or multiplied — even if it is contracted or actuated through them.

Furthermore: through what precisely the divine nature is not said to be multiplied through the divine personalities is that it is terminated by them in such a way that through the force of such termination nature does not become multiple in the ratio of nature, but only personally. Similarly according to the adversaries, nature is contracted through haecceities, and yet through the force of such contraction it does not become multiple in the ratio of nature, but only

individually — since according to them nature formally and positively remains one in itself after the advent of singularities just as before.

You will say: numerical division redounds in human nature from those various haecceities through which it is contracted to those individuals — because through them it is rendered incommunicable, whereas before it was communicable. Against this: only extrinsically and accidentally does it become incommunicable by reason of conjunction with haecceity; intrinsically however and in itself it remains one and communicable as before — since it still retains its intrinsic indifference even under singularity. Therefore in itself it is neither divided nor multiplied.

You will say: insofar as it is under singularity it cannot be communicated, and therefore insofar as it becomes numerically one — and everything such in creatures is incommunicable. Against this: this is the same as saying that nature together with singularity cannot be communicated — which is certainly true. But this does not posit proper multiplication or individual unity in nature, but in the constituted from nature and individuation. And so the same could equally be said of the divine nature: that taken with paternity or filiation it is incommunicable.

From these considerations stated above, therefore, no reason can be gathered why nature in divinity is not said to be divided and multiplied through the plurality of personalities in it — while human nature is divided through the plurality of haecceities. For the same parity runs in both cases. Hence it remains to say that the one and adequate reason for this is: in divinity the personalities are identified with the divine nature in such a way that through the force of such identity nature does not become multiple in the ratio of nature — but only personally. Whereas in creatures nature is identified with haecceities in such a way that through them it is multiplied also in the ratio of nature. Hence because in Peter and Paul there are found on the part of the thing not only diverse haecceities but also several humanities, they are said to be several men — not so the Father and Son as several Gods, for the opposite reason.

The confirmation of this reason: as was said in *disp. 2, Log., q. 6, art. 2*: a substantial concrete cannot be multiplied without multiplication of the form. And this is the precise reason why the three divine persons are not three Gods — because only one divinity is found in them. Since therefore Peter and Paul will well be able to be called two human persons, they cannot however be called two men except because they have two humanities.

Furthermore: the action of any individual productive of the common communicates to it a being distinct entitatively from the being of another individual. And through it is produced not only individuation alone but also the very intrinsic being of nature — though under individuation. And so nature itself is placed as the formal terminus of univocal generation. Since therefore production is terminated at the real being of nature — which is posited formally

as distinct from individuation, though not except as conjoined with it — it must be admitted that created nature in individuals is multiplied also in the ratio of nature. Not indeed according to essential being — which of itself abstracts from existence — but according to real, physical, and entitative being, which concerns existence.

Confirming this: since nature according to its intrinsic being distinct from individuation is the formal terminus of univocal generation — I ask: when Peter is produced by the generator, is the very same humanity that is in Paul produced in him — or not? If the second, the intention is had: that nature is multiplied in individuals also according to the ratio of nature. If the first, then the same thing is produced twice — indeed a thousand times — for the same humanity will be reproduced as many times as individuals of human nature are produced. You will say: that the humanity produced in the production of Peter is numerically diverse from the humanity of Paul and the same in species. Against this: I ask about the formal terminus of univocal generation, which is nature alone — to which haecceity concurs as simple and pure condition of terminating generation, not as the ratio of terminating it, since this is precisely nature under the ratio of nature. If this formal terminus of the production of Peter is diverse from the formal terminus of the production of Paul, then nature is multiplied in them also according to the being of nature — not indeed essential being which abstracts from existence, but physical and entitative being which concerns existence. If however it is the same terminus, then the same thing is produced twice.

Furthermore: little matters that it is said to be the same terminus in species — for as long as this unity and community of nature is real, the same inconvenience follows. It is equally absurd for the same common entity to be reproduced several times as it is for a singular one. Furthermore: in the case where nature is not multiplied in individuals even according to the being of nature, then to be numerically the same in species would mean that the very same entity — say humanity — is affected by several haecceities as Petreity and Paulinety, and each haecceity cannot be affected by others. This does not prevent such unity of nature from being numerical. For just as the same rational soul is not thereby numerically multiplied by being affected by several unions in a body in different parts — nor is the same divine nature multiplied through being affected by several personalities — on the contrary it is still preserved that the same numerical nature is in three persons and the same numerical rational soul is in several parts of the body.

From this doctrine therefore it is clear the force of this first argument proposed in n. 111: since if in no way nature created is multiplied in individuals according to the being of nature, then it will be communicated to them in the complete unity of nature — which is numerical — and so the mystery of the Trinity is introduced in creatures. Furthermore: even granting that it follows that not the same numerical nature is commonly in many in creatures but one of lesser unity

called formal — still we will have a miracle in creatures very similar to the mystery of the Trinity. For the miracle of the Trinity consists especially in this: that several personalities really distinct from each other are really identified in a third — namely in the divine essence — and yet are not identified among themselves. For this directly repugns that universal natural principle: "things that are the same as one third are the same as each other." And this in divinity is said to arise from the privilege of the divine nature's infinity. But from the opposing position all this would happen in creatures — for haecceities really distinct from each other would be really identified in a third without being said to be identified with each other. And little matters that in creatures this third in which really distinct things are identified is something common rather than particular as in divinity — since even if the divine nature is singular, it is also common to three, since there neither singularity excludes community nor vice versa — as happens in creatures. Furthermore: this privilege is conceded to the divine nature — that really distinct things are identified in it — not because of its singularity or community but precisely because of its infinity. Therefore even if the unity of the common nature is not numerical unity but of a greater kind, this does not suffice for haecceities really distinct from each other to be identified in nature, unless it is also posited as infinite like the divine nature.

And from this same doctrine is rejected the solution to the argument for the other part: that hence it follows that the same humanity is simultaneously miserable and blessed. For it is not sufficient to say that it is not the same numerically but in species — since from what was said it is compelled that it would be the same numerically if nature is not multiplied in individuals even according to that being which is physical and entitative and concerns existence. Furthermore: even granting it would not be the same numerically but in species, they must still render the reason why these are absurd of the same numerical nature but not of the same specific one. If they say the reason is that nature is multiplied in individuals — so that of it it is verified that it is miserable and blessed but according to diverse portions — against this: either such division of nature into many portions posits multiplication in the ratio of nature according to its intrinsic being, or only the multiplication of haecceity in it. If the first: therefore it is not one and the same nature in all through inexistence. If the second: therefore the entire entity of the humanity of Christ — beyond its singularity — is damned, and the integral humanity of Judas — beyond haecceity — is blessed. How authors will be able to stomach this I do not know.

Secondly, the conclusion is principally proved: from the opposing position it follows that God cannot truly create one man — say Peter — nor truly annihilate him. The consequent is proved: because creation is the production of the whole being and according to its every formality from nothing, and annihilation is likewise the reduction of the whole being to nothing. But in the opposing position the same nature of Peter would always have pre-existed in other individuals

before his creation, and would always remain after his destruction. Therefore he could neither truly be created nor truly be annihilated.

Canonicus, *loc. cit.*, responds: for creation it suffices that nothing singular pre-exists, and for annihilation likewise that nothing singular remains. For singulars are what terminate any production or destruction. He also adds: for annihilation it suffices that the whole entity is destroyed categorically with respect to that third entity which results from the parts. For it is certain that when a thing is corrupted its matter remains, since it is incorruptible.

Against this: for true creation as distinguished from generation it is required that nothing pre-exists of the entity intrinsically composing the created thing. And likewise for annihilation properly so called as distinguished from corruption, it is required that nothing remains in the nature of things of the actual entity that intrinsically composed the annihilated thing. Therefore the solution of *Canonicus* does not suffice.

Furthermore: when something is created, it is produced not only according to the ultimate individual grade — as *Bonetus* seems to assert — but also according to every reality existing in it on the part of the thing, up to the highest one placed in the category. Otherwise some reality would be given in it as unproduced. And likewise when annihilated, every such reality is destroyed. Therefore for creation it does not suffice that nothing singular pre-exists, and for annihilation that nothing singular remains. But in creation no common thing must precede and in annihilation nothing must remain. Or certainly if something common altogether the same pre-existed before the creation of Peter, it must be admitted that the same thing is produced twice.

Pasqualigo, *loc. cit.*, responds: creation tends to placing the actuality of the thing and annihilation to removing it — and they remove or place actuality according to the inadequate being of nature, which nature can have in such an individual, because according to its full extension it is not adequately in any one. But this inadequate being of nature is the adequate being of that individual. And therefore with it placed or removed, the individual is placed or removed in nothing. And for something to be made from nothing it suffices that nothing previously existed of this inadequate being, and if all this inadequate being is removed it will cease into nothing.

But if this solution is carefully considered it is no better than others. For I ask of this inadequate being of nature in Peter — whether it is altogether the same as the inadequate being of the same nature in Paul, or not. If the first: the argument proceeds as before — Peter cannot be created since the same being pre-exists in Paul, nor annihilated since after his destruction it remains in Paul. If the second: therefore it is not one and the same nature in all singulars through inexistence but only through indifference.

Others respond: Peter is annihilated because although the very same reality of humanity remains in Paul, it does not remain as the humanity of Peter but of Paul. Against this: the argument returns from the beginning — since for annihilation the thing must simply and totally cease to be, not merely to be of this or that one, which is a secondary and qualified cessation. Furthermore: with this solution standing, if God transferred the whiteness of Peter to Paul, it could be said it is annihilated — since although in itself it does not cease, it ceases to be of him of whom it was before said, which suffices for annihilation by the solution just given. Furthermore: with the first substances corrupted it is impossible for anything of the others to remain from *Aristotle, cap. On Substance*. Therefore with Peter destroyed, every reality — both particular and common — that was in him is destroyed. Therefore the positive humanity of Peter and Paul is not one and the same entity in some way — and consequently its community is not through inexistence but through pure indifference. Or it must be admitted that at the corruption of the humanity of Peter, the humanity of the other individuals must also be corrupted — which is sensibly known to be false.

Thirdly: from this is derived another ineluctable argument for our position. For we see sensibly that nature begins or ceases according to its formal and entitative being in Peter — but not in Paul. Therefore it is not one and the same nature positively in Peter and Paul through inexistence. The consequent is evident: since the evident sign of real distinction between two things is real separation as regards existence — and it implies for things that are identified on the part of the thing for one to be able to exist without the other, as was said in *disp. 6, q. 8, n. 186 and 187*. Indeed by reason of this difficulty I said there that the opinion about community of nature through inexistence cannot be sustained but only community through indifference must be admitted — since with such unity and community of indifference the real and entitative distinction of the nature of Peter and Paul is consistent.

Pasqualigo responds: nature from its intrinsic ratio demands to be in individuals through identification — and it is possible only with entitative distinction. Hence the fact that it has such entitative or material distinction of the nature of Peter and Paul allows it to be well produced in one or corrupted — without thereby being so in another — by reason of this entitative distinction which it has in diverse individuals by reason of individual being. And then it begins and ceases inadequately and not adequately — since according to its full extension it has regard to the whole collection of individuals.

Against this: either such material and entitative distinction of the nature of Peter and Paul bears only between their haecceities, or also between the natures themselves — so that the humanity of one and the other are not some common physical entity in both but multiple and diverse. If the second, the intention is had: that there is not one and the same nature through inexistence but only through indifference. If the first: the whole argument returns — how the very

same entity of the common nature of Peter is the same as the common nature of Paul, and how one is corrupted but not the other, and how it is on the part of the thing with Petreity but not with Paulinety — even though it identifies both with itself.

Pasqualigo responds: the formal or essential unity of nature must not be conceived after the mode of indivision of entity, but of essence. For nature is not one entity in all entitatively, but only according to essential being, which it expresses in absolute state. And because it is only inadequately preserved in this or that individual, by reason of this illimitedness it can be corrupted in one and not in another, and to be without Petreity and not without Paulinety.

Against this: if the discussion is of actual essence — in which way since it concerns existence, the essence of a created thing is nothing other than its physical entity existing on the part of the thing — just as there cannot be given on the part of the thing an essence which is not existing, so neither unity which is not entitative. Therefore for nature to be on the part of the thing one according to essential being, it is also required to be one in entity. And so it implies that there is given in creatures a nature that is positively one in all and each according to essence but is not likewise one according to entity. Therefore if *Pasqualigo* concedes that the natures of Peter and Paul are really and entitatively divided, then he already comes to our position — that the common nature is not given through inexistence, that is, one common entity in many, but only through indifference. Insofar as the nature which is one entity physically and really other than the nature of Paul — yet since they are homogeneous, and the nature constituting Peter in the being of man could equally well have constituted Paul and vice versa — for this reason the nature of one is said of itself common to the other through indifference.

And mark this point well, since on it depends the whole resolution of the question. For we do concede that there is one nature of all individuals — not that the same physical entity of common nature is in all and each through inexistence, but through indifference. For the nature of one could have been of the other. And we say that real and positive unity of nature in individuals together with entitative division of one nature from another cannot be consistent unless it is explained through indifference. For thus it is well conceived how there is one common nature of all individuals and yet how it is divided and multiplied in them — not only according to individual being but also in some way according to real and intrinsic being in the ratio of nature.

Furthermore, what *Pasqualigo* said is further attacked: that nature can cease in Peter — or be without Petreity — and yet remain conjoined with Paulinety by reason of its extension and breadth which it has in individuals. For the adversaries, in order to defend their position about community of nature through inexistence, deny two first principles. For first they deny: "what is really the same as one third are the same as each other" — since through them Petreity and

Paulinity are really identified in humanity, though they are really distinguished among themselves. And then they deny another: "what is really identified cannot be without the other" — since they say humanity by reason of its illimitedness and extension can be without Petreity and not without Paulinity. But neither inconvenience follows from our position explaining the community of nature through indifference. For thus humanity is only posited as actually identifying with itself Petreity — with which it actually constitutes Peter — and not Paulinity, except in aptitude: insofar as it could in the beginning equally well have identified Paulinity with itself as it now identifies Petreity. But actually and de facto it is really distinct from it. And therefore it can well be destroyed and cease with Petreity without ceasing with Paulinity without any inconvenience.

And this point alone makes the position on community of nature through indifference far more probable to me than the opposing one on community through inexistence — even if the other reasons were lacking.

Pasqualigo responds: this argument must be resolved in the same way proportionally as similar arguments are customarily resolved in the matter of the Trinity. For when it is said that if persons are identified in essence they must also be identified among themselves — since "what is the same as one third are the same as each other" — the customary response is that essence is identified with each person not adequately but inadequately. And therefore it does not follow that they must be identified among themselves. So therefore we must say in the present case that common nature is not identified adequately with Petreity — and therefore from the fact that Petreity is identified with essence it does not follow that Petreity is likewise identified with Paulinity.

This response plainly drives the adversaries into the absurdity they try to avoid in the present matter. For we rebuke them that without necessity they introduce the mystery of the Trinity in creatures — they firmly deny this follows from their position. But when they cannot resolve arguments otherwise than as the mystery of the Trinity is customarily resolved, they already admit by deed what they deny in words — that they introduce in creatures the mystery of the Trinity.

Moreover: the doctrine delivered in the matter of the Trinity to resolve that argument is not rightly adduced to the present case. For the inadequate identification of the divine essence with persons — which are really distinct among themselves — derives from the infinity of the divine nature. But no created nature is infinite. Therefore however much it is posited as common, it cannot identify with itself things really distinct among themselves — unless it is also posited as infinite like the divine nature.

Furthermore: even if divine infinity is sufficient for the divine essence to be able to identify with itself things really distinct from each other, it is by no means sufficient for the divine essence to be able to exist without any of those things which it actually and positively identifies with itself. Therefore all the less can

created nature exist without any haecceity if it actually and positively identifies with itself a single nature of all through inexistence. Or if it can thus exist, it is at least more marvelous from this standpoint than the very divine nature.

Others respond: that proposition — "of those that are really identified, one cannot on the part of the thing exist without the other" — is true speaking of singular things, but not speaking of something common and universal in relation to a singular thing. Against this: this is a manifest begging of the question. For from this most universal principle — "what is really identified cannot be without the other on the part of the thing" — I infer: therefore a common nature on the part of the thing through inexistence cannot be given. When therefore you say that proposition is true in all things except the present case about common nature, you already adduce an instantiation in the present case and about the matter of the question, which is plainly to beg the question.

Furthermore: of two evils the lesser must be chosen when neither can be avoided. But in the case the lesser evil is to deny nature to be so common — namely through inexistence — than to deny that principle — namely "what is the same cannot be separated" — since this principle is most accepted in every school, while real community of nature through inexistence is driven away from every school and is not even willingly received in the Scotist school.

Fourthly: it can be proved that from the opposing position it follows that on the part of the thing a universal exists in act — which especially in the Peripatetic school is a monstrosity. The consequent is proved: for the universal in act from *Scotus*, 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 1, § *Sed contra*, is what has an indifferent unity according to which it itself is in proximate potency to be said of any supposit. For from the *Posterior Analytics* the universal is said to be what is one in many and of many — since from being in them it follows to be said of them. If therefore nature on the part of the thing is one formally and positively in all individuals, it already has such indifference toward them that it can be predicated of all and each by a predication saying "this is this" — and consequently it is actually universal.

Many among the adversaries respond, freely conceding what they in fact cannot deny: that according to their opinion there must be given a universal in act. And they do not take this as an absurdity since it does not thereby admit the Platonic universal. Against this I prove that from this it follows that the Platonic — or quasi-Platonic — universal follows: one namely that though not separated from singulars is nevertheless really distinct from them. And that this must be admitted in this opinion I show: because human nature is so one and the same positively on the part of the thing in Peter and Paul that it can exist on the part of the thing both without Petreity and without Paulinity. Therefore it would be a kind of Platonic universal really distinct from its singulars.

The consequent is evident: since it has often been said that separation in the thing is the most evident sign of real distinction between two things. You will say: the

nature is not really distinct from singularities since it must necessarily be identified with some individual vaguely — and since there is no greater reason for one than another, consequently it must be posited as identified with all. Against this: even if something cannot be without many indeterminately, still if it can be without any determinate one of those, this is a sufficient sign of real distinction from all and each. A thousand examples can be adduced about matter — which cannot exist stripped, and perhaps through the divine power of all privation — and yet because it can be without this and that one determinately, it is posited by all as really distinct from each. Quantity cannot be without any figure — yet because it can be without this and that one determinate, it is in fact distinct from it. Likewise about quality with respect to the degrees of intensity, about a continuum with respect to indivisibles, and so on. So therefore in the present case about nature: if it can be without this and that singularity, from this it is sufficiently gathered that it is really distinguished from every one.

You will say: this same argument militates against the community of nature through indifference — by the force of which nature is posited as indeterminately regarding all singularities, so that it does not belong more of itself to one than to another. Against this: adducing an inconvenience is not solving it. And through the fact that this argument militates against community through indifference, it is not thereby removed that it militates more against community through inexistence. Furthermore: it is false that the argument militates against community through indifference. For on that path each humanity — for example — is posited as identified with its haecceity and really begins with it and ceases with it. And the humanity of Peter is not posited as actually identified and one with the humanity of Paul — as the opposing position asserts — but only in aptitude: insofar as from the beginning it could in the same way have identified with itself the haecceity of Paul — if contracted through it — as it now identifies with itself Petreity. Furthermore: the indifference of nature to singularities — since it is metaphysical and objective and not physical — need not be explained through separability in singulars, but rather through exclusion of each singularity from its formal concept, by reason of which it remains intrinsically indifferent even under the actual haecceity, as was said above in n. 100.

Finally: it is remarkable how *Pasqualigo* — especially among the recent — defends the opposing position of real community of nature through inexistence with such alacrity and in such rigor, while in other principles on this matter he agrees himself with the Thomists — especially in the complete non-distinction of nature on the part of the thing from singularities. For Scotus and the Scotists assign a community of nature from the nature of the thing especially because they acknowledge a formal distinction from the nature of the thing between nature and singularity — and therefore say that nature is not of itself singular, but negatively common. Since therefore *Pasqualigo* stubbornly denies this formal distinction — and especially between nature and singularity — how he speaks consistently with his own principles I do not see. For if they are altogether the

same on the part of the thing both really and formally, how can it be verified of nature that it is of itself common and indifferent, while the difference is of itself singular and incommunicable? Furthermore: even if the Thomists attribute proper formal unity to nature distinct from numerical unity, they deny this unity is common and less than numerical on the part of the thing — since it is in no way actually distinguished on the part of the thing from the individual unity, but only through the intellect. Since therefore *Pasqualigo* also distinguishes the nature from singularity and its formal unity from individual unity in no other way than by reason — as the Thomists do — it is plain that in order to speak consistently he cannot defend such real community of nature and with such rigor as not even the Scotists admitting formal distinction from the nature of the thing between nature and singularity dare to assert it so.

Article II. Objections are met.

In opposition they first object: whoever holds that specific nature — say human nature — as distinguished from singularity is positively formally one in all individuals: unity is the absence of division, from *5 Metaph. 11*. But the human nature which is in Peter and Paul on the part of the thing lacks formal and essential division. Therefore on the part of the thing, as it is in many, it is formally one and common through inexistence. The minor is proved in several ways. First: Peter and Paul do not differ in nature and essence, and the nature of one is not formally distinct from the nature of the other. Second: if Peter is not essentially one with Paul on the part of the thing, he would not differ more from Brunellus than from Paul himself. Third: Peter and Paul in the ratio of man are not many on the part of the thing. Fourth: they have the same account and definition. Therefore they are formally and essentially one. Fifth: if they did not have one common account belonging to all, univocation would be given neither in genus nor in species. And this is the principal foundation of *Bonetus, 1 Metaph., cap. 2*.

The recent authors respond: individuals of the same species are not formally and essentially distinguished from each other, but are of the same essence and nature by reason of the maximum similarity they have in their essences — just as also it is customarily said of two individuals of men, if they have very great similarity, that they do not seem to be distinct but to be one and the same man. But this solution does not satisfy — as will be more evident in the following question. For the mere unity of similarity between many individuals does not suffice to constitute a real community of nature unless some unity of nature on the part of the thing is conceded in which such similarity is grounded — as the *Philosopher* wants in *5 Metaph.* For if some things are similar they must certainly be similar in something and agree.

Therefore it must be responded from what will be said in the following question: everything in the argument is verified by reason of the formal unity of nature in Peter and Paul — not through inexistence but through indifference. For since the same nature which is in Peter could be in Paul and vice versa — so that those

natures are altogether of the same ratio — Peter and Paul are said to have the same nature, are said to be one in nature. Not because one and the same nature is simultaneously really and entitatively in both. As *Lichetus*, 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 6, § *Ad quaestionem*, rightly explains.

As to the first proof of that minor: Peter and Paul do not differ in nature — that is, they do not have natures entitatively divided and according to the thing, is denied. They do not differ in nature — that is, they do not have essentially diverse natures, which are of another and another ratio — in this sense it is conceded. But from such essential non-division of natures it is not well argued that there is one and the same nature in both entitatively and according to the thing.

As to the second: although the nature of Peter is distinct and divided from the nature of Paul — so that both do not have the same nature really and entitatively — still Peter differs more from Brunellus than from Paul. For the nature of Peter and Brunellus are not only many but also of diverse ratio — since the nature of one, namely Peter, cannot of itself constitute Brunellus — nor vice versa.

As to the third: on the contrary I say that on the part of the thing Peter and Paul cannot be called one man but necessarily are several men — which is an argument that there is not one and the same humanity really and entitatively in both, but several of the same ratio however.

As to the fourth: insofar as individuals of the same species have the same account and definition — because they have natures altogether of the same ratio from which also essential predicates of altogether the same ratio are derived — the intellect afterwards constructs one definition common to all individuals of the same species.

As to the last: the consequent is denied. For predicamental generic or specific univocation by no means requires that one and the same nature physically and really be found in the univocated things. It suffices if there is one and the same nature through indifference — for such unity suffices that from those things there can be abstracted one and the same common ratio belonging to all and each, as far as predicamental univocation goes. As is clear from what was said in *disp.* 2, *Log.*, *q.* 4, *art.* 2. On the contrary, for transcendental univocation still less is required — as is clear from what was said there and in *disp.* 1, *Metaph.*, *q.* 5, *art.* 2.

Pasqualigo, *loc. cit.*, *disp.* 15, *sect.* 2, *n.* 12, tries to overturn this solution. For when it is said that nature is not one in all according to the thing, "according to the thing" can be understood either as according to physical entity or according to that being which is called nature. If it is understood in the first way — it is certain, he says, that nature is not the same according to physical entity in all. If it is understood in the second way — the argument made effectively concludes that nature is one in all according to the thing — that is according to its being, which it expresses in absolute state. Hence it follows that nature, its unity remaining, can have entitative division — and this in no way damages the unity of community, since

this unity is of itself apt to be in many and hence together with the division of entity.

But from this solution it is clear that this is only a contest of names — especially with *Pasqualigo*. For he concedes the whole of what we intend — namely that nature is not one and the same according to the thing, that is according to physical entity — but only according to the being of essence which nature expresses in absolute state. But this is what we teach. We call such community through pure indifference in the manner already explained. But so that this may be further declared, it must be recalled what was said in *disp. 4, Log., q. 1, art. 2*: "being" can be taken in two ways: first formally or nominally — in which sense it signifies pure essence abstracting from every difference, from individually existing, from place and time. Second materially or participially — and it signifies existence, that is a determined entity not only as regards singularity but also place and time, since a thing cannot exist unless in some place and time.

When therefore it is said that one and the same common nature or entity is in all individuals of the same species, this must not be understood of entity in the second sense — for in this sense it is true that nothing of the entity that is in Peter is found simultaneously in Paul — whether adequately or inadequately — since everything is really and entitatively divided. But in the first sense the same common entity that is in Peter is also found in Paul — since the entity as expressing essence says no determination either of individuation or of time or place. Hence if *Pasqualigo* concedes only in this sense that one and the same nature of all individuals exists, we plainly do not differ from him except in words. But certainly the authors of the opposing position — which he professes — when they say nature is common through inexistence, seem to want it to be one and the same common entity in all and each even in the first sense: in each individually and inadequately, but in all totally and adequately.

And their error seems to have had its origin from the fact that they considered that no indivision can be given on the part of the thing that is not entitative — because we conceive all unities through the species of numerical unity since we have no proper ones. But this is false, since since there is some grade in the order of beings diverse from the individual one, and unity and indivision is a property of it, consequently there must be given another unity and indivision that is not entitative and through inexistence but through indifference alone.

Secondly, *Pasqualigo, loc. cit., n. 17*, argues: the essential being of nature found in one individual is also found in another, and predicates attributed to one are attributed not as similar but as the same to the other — so that the very same predicate predicated of one is also predicated of another. Therefore not a similar nature or of the same ratio is in many individuals but the very same, and consequently having the same formal unity of community. The consequent is evident, and the assumption is proved: for if of Peter it is stated that he is a rational animal, this very predicate can be applied to each individual of human nature.

If it is said: the predication is not made without the work of the intellect, and therefore when the same predicates are attributed to many individuals, then nature is predicated of them insofar as it has unity through the intellect abstracting nature from individuals. Against this, *Pasqualigo* insists: when nature is predicated of an inferior, it is not predicated according to something it acquires anew through abstraction, but only according to what it expresses as it is in individuals — because if it were predicated according to something else which it does not express as it is in individuals, from the force of predication something would be attributed to individuals which is not in them, and consequently the predication would be false.

Confirming this: the predication of a superior of an inferior is grounded in identity with its inferior — for insofar as it is identified it is predicated. Since therefore the same being of nature predicated of one is also predicated of another, nature on the part of the thing will be one in all through inexistence — not only through indifference.

The response: *Pontius, disp. 3, n. 45*, responds that the unity of similarity in nature suffices for the same nature to be predicated of many by a predication saying "this is this" — which solution was excluded above in n. 18. Hence it is better met from the doctrine of *Lichetus, 2, dist. 3, q. 1*, in responding to the arguments of *Ockham*, where he teaches that when Francis is called man, it is not understood of a humanity distinct from Francis but precisely of that which is found in him, which therefore is predicated in quid of Francis because de facto it constitutes him and furnishes him all quidditative being. And as contracted in Francis it is not actually suited to be predicated in quid of another, but as contractible from any haecceity it is suited to per se make another individual with another and another haecceity. And in this sense it is said suited by nature to be predicated in quid of those — so that the actual predication is grounded in actual identity of nature with the individual of which it is predicated, while the aptitudinal predication of others is grounded in aptitudinal identity — insofar as it can be contracted to them from its nature on the part of the thing disjunctively, or through the intellect conjunctively, in which way it becomes universal.

Therefore from this doctrine the argument must be met: the same nature through indifference can be predicated of many by an aptitudinal predication on the part of the thing, and in remote potency — insofar as the nature in Peter could equally well of itself have constituted Paul. And such aptitudinal predication is grounded in aptitudinal identity. But the same nature through inexistence can be predicated of many proximately only through the intellect when it conceives it in the mode of the universal — which actual predication or proximate aptitudinal predication nature acquires through the operation of the intellect, as was declared in *disp. 4, Log., q. 1*. And this predication is still said to be true by reason of the foundation which precedes in the thing — namely by reason of community of nature through indifference which it possesses without any fiction of the intellect,

from which occasion the intellect afterwards establishes in nature also community through inexistence and makes it actually universal, as was said in *loc. cit.* and will be further established below.

You will say: from this it follows that a thousand natures could be predicated in quid of Francis — since each of them as prior to its individuation is common and as far as it goes could have constituted Francis. The response from *Lichetus, loc. cit.*: only that nature which is actually in Francis expresses the quiddity of him and of no other. But as contractible and suited by itself to make one per se with the haecceity of Francis it is said to be predicated in quid. And so he concedes that each of them as such is suited by nature to be predicated in quid of Francis — but as contracted in Francis it expresses the whole quiddity of him. Then no other nature is predicated in quid of that constituted — since to be predicated in quid is nothing other than the nature suited to per se make with the contracting haecceity that individual of which it is predicated. Therefore of the same individual constituted from nature and haecceity, another and another nature is not predicated — rather as such no nature is predicated of it except considered in the contractible being and suited to per se make one with such haecceity.

You will say: explaining the community of nature through indifference and not through inexistence, we seem to coincide with the Thomist opinion — since they too say two individuals of the same species are essentially undivided and one: not because one and the same common nature is in both, but because — even if there are several natures and essences — since they are however similar, they can be conceived as one.

The response: the assumption is denied. For the reason why the nature of Peter and the nature of Paul according to us are similar and of the same ratio is: the nature of one as far as it goes could be constitutive of the other — and for this reason they are truly said to be similar in species, because one includes a certain entity that absolutely could be in the other and is common to both through indifference. But the Thomists say Peter is similar to Paul as a whole — even though whatever is in Peter is as repugnant to being in Paul as in Bucephalus. Which is impossible since they cannot explain in what such similarity is grounded and why Peter is more similar to Paul than to Bucephalus.

You will say: we are compelled to say the same as the Thomists when we compare the nature of Peter with the nature of Paul — since either those natures are similar or dissimilar. And we cannot say they are similar except through themselves and not because they include some common entity — for then infinite regress would follow. The response: even here the assumption is denied. For Peter and Paul are properly speaking similar in nature — but their natures cannot be called similar except insofar as they are rationes of assimilating those in which they are, as *Lichetus, loc. cit.*, and the Doctor in *Quodl. 4, L.* teach. And the reason is: universally speaking — as was said above in n. 32 — "that which cannot be a what" cannot be "such."

Thirdly: if in the singulars there were nothing other than nature, it certainly could not be distinct — since the function of distinguishing pertains to individual differences. But they would be one and altogether the same on the part of the thing — since individuals agree through nature, they are not distinguished through it — as the Doctor says in 2, *dist. 3, q. 6*. Therefore de facto one and the same nature is really in all entitatively undivided in itself — only divided through the differences from without.

Confirming this: if the nature of Peter and the nature of Paul as prior to their haecceities are not one and the same nature positively and through inexistence, but really and entitatively diverse, there would be no necessity of superadding singularities — since through the natures themselves the individuals would be sufficiently distinguished.

Confirming further: if the nature of Peter, as prior to its haecceity, is really distinct from the nature of Paul also so considered, it must have some principle of that distinction. But this is false, since the nature of Peter as distinct from Petreity has only its essential predicates and properties following from them — in which it altogether agrees with the nature of Paul.

This argument with its confirmations is touched by *Bonetus, loc. cit., 1 Metaph., cap. 2*, and is extensively developed by *Pasqualigo, loc. cit., sect. 2*, throughout, with other confirmations that come to the same thing.

The response: *Pontius, disp. 3, Log., q. 2, n. 35*, says that the nature of Peter as formally distinct from Petreity is neither positively one with another nature nor positively distinct from it — since as such it has only its essential predicates, among which there is neither that unity nor that distinction. And this solution was rejected above in n. 58.

Lichetus, 2, dist. 3, q. 6, § Ad quaestionem, concedes that two individuals de facto are really distinct from each other not only through haecceities but also through natures — though not numerically and individually. For nature as prior to singularity is not one numerically. When the Doctor said that individuals do not differ really through nature but through haecceity, he was speaking either only of numerical real distinction and not of real distinction absolutely — as *Lichetus* explains. Or if he was also speaking of real distinction absolutely, he said this only insofar as through nature per se individuals of the same species are not distinguished really, since per se the nature of one could be the nature of the other; and it is accidental that the nature of Peter is constitutive of Peter and not of Paul — since per se it is indifferent to constituting both disjunctively. But through haecceities they are distinguished per se really, since it is altogether repugnant to the haecceity of Peter to be the haecceity of Paul. Hence it is absolutely said that individuals agree through nature and differ through haecceities — since though they have other and other natures and entitatively divided ones, yet since they are of the same ratio, those are not rationes through

which individuals are distinguished from each other but rather through which they agree.

But adhering to the doctrine delivered in n. 59 from *Scotus*, 7 *Metaph.*, q. 13, § *contra predicta*, it must be said that although the nature of Peter as preceding haecceity is not one and the same positive entity as the nature of Paul, yet they cannot be said to be really distinct from each other with haecceities set aside — for the reason there adduced: since real distinction is founded in entities capable of existence, and since nature cannot found existence unless as standing under singularity, it consequently cannot found real distinction from another nature unless as singular, as was declared there. Hence at most those natures as singularities precede can be said to be not the same among themselves, but not really and positively distinct from each other — from what was said there in n. 60. By which is clear the response to the argument with its confirmations. For although the nature in Peter is not the same as the one in Paul even before singularity, it still cannot really distinguish Peter from Paul. Both because a communicable entity and as far as it goes of itself so constitutes Peter that it could equally well have constituted Paul; and because antecedently to singularity it is not capable of existence and consequently cannot found real distinction.

Fourthly: if nature in many individuals is in itself and entitatively divided — and is not rather actually one in all and only divided extrinsically — it follows that the singular of any species is imperfect in that species, since Peter — for example — would not have completely the whole common nature but only a part of it. The response: the consequent is denied. For by the very fact that the singular — say Peter — has the common nature with its formal unity, he is said to have the whole common nature — that is, everything that is of the ratio of common nature. Yet this totality of nature does not express the negation of a similar or of the same ratio of human nature in another individual — for this is essential totality and not entitative totality. Since there is no repugnance why beyond the nature of Peter another entity of the same ratio is found in Paul. On the contrary, the argument concludes rather against the opposing position: which asserts the same nature is in all and each individuals and has its formal unity adequately in all taken together, but in each only partially and inadequately. Hence from this it seems to follow that not the whole nature is found in each individual with its formal unity, but only a part of nature with a part of formal unity. And so rather in the opposing position it follows that Peter does not have completely the whole common nature but only a part of it.

Fifthly: the nature of Peter and the nature of Paul are formally identical antecedently to singularities. Therefore they are also the same really — since greater identity infers lesser. The assumption is proved: since the humanity of Peter and the humanity of Paul are formally undivided — that is through formal and essential principles.

Confirming this: since as *Bonetus* argues — if the humanity of Peter and the humanity of Paul are really distinct, the prior predicates will not be common but proper — speaking of community outside the soul — and consequently Peter and Paul will not have the same definition, since this is given through common and prior predicates.

The response: from what was said in n. 121 it is clear in what sense the nature of Peter and Paul are said to be formally undivided — namely that they do not make the same thing distinct formally through formal and essential principles. And so they are said to be formally the same — as formal identity is consistent with essential identity. But with this conceded antecedent the consequent is denied. For formal identity in this sense is well consistent with real distinction, since two individuals of the same species are really distinguished and are essentially the same. Hence in this sense a greater identity is not inferred. As to the confirmation: the humanity of Peter as contracted to Socrates can only be formally and essentially predicated of Socrates — since it is quiddatively included in him. Yet although two humanities are formally undivided, they are not really identical. And the fact that two individuals are said to have the same definition and common predicates arises not from there being one and the same entity of humanity in both but from there being entities of the same ratio in both — as explained above in n. 121.

Hence it must be said to the argument: just as individuals of the same species have prior predicates common and not proper to them, so also they have the same definition common to all and each, as was explained above in n. 121.

As to the confirmation: the *Scotist margin at the margins of Bonetus* says for Scotus that predicates are common through the intellect and not outside the intellect — and so also that individuals have one common concept in the mind. But this is an inept solution entirely alien to the mind of Scotus. For the Doctor in predicamental grades acknowledges community not only in the intellect but also outside the intellect — as is clear from 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 1, where he expressly proves this. And he wants the definition, especially when given through adequate concepts, to express the essences of things as they are on the part of the thing — not according to the being they have in the intellect. For the being in the intellect does not give the thing its quidditative ratio, as he says in *Quodl.* 1, *Q.*

Pontius, disp. 3, *Log.*, *q.* 2, *n.* 32, speaking of objective definition, concedes another is the definition of Peter and another of Paul — just as other is the essence of one from the essence of the other — though by reason of the supreme similarity they have, they are judged to have as it were one essence and therefore also one definition. But it is already clear from what was said in *disp.* 1, *Log.*, *q.* 4, *art.* 3 at the end: that individuals have no proper definition except of the species, as the Doctor also notes in 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 6, *lit.* M. And therefore it is false that another is the definition of Peter and another of Paul. Just as it is also false that other is the essence of one from the essence of the other — although it can be said that the

humanity of Peter is other than the humanity of Paul, yet with truth it cannot be said that the essence of Peter is other than the essence of Paul and that they differ essentially from each other. For since those humanities are entities altogether of the same ratio, they can indeed be called many entities and also distinct or diverse entities — but not diverse essences, since they have the same formal and essential constitutive principles.

Hence it must be said to the argument: just as individuals of the same species have prior predicates common and not proper to them, so likewise they have the same definition common to all and each, as was explained above in n. 121.

Sixthly, they argue from authority: *Aristotle*, 7 *Metaph.* 51, says that animal is one and the same in man and horse — as you are to yourself. And *Porphry*, in the chapter on species, says that many men by participation in species are one man. Which manner of speaking of both Aristotle and Porphyry suggests that nature is one and the same in all individuals not only through indifference but also through inexistence or through entitative indivision.

The response: the first authority proves more than the adversaries want, who certainly want one and the same nature to be of all individuals — not however one with individual and numerical unity but with a lesser one which they call formal. But the cited authority signifies that one and the same animal numerically is in man and horse — saying it is the same as you are to yourself. And therefore it must be said — as the Doctor there and *Alensis* expound — that Aristotle is proving against Plato that genus and species cannot be posited as substances existing per se, since if man and horse are defined as animals, the same definition will be given in both — hence the same thing numerically is in several things existing separately, which is impossible. Aristotle therefore wants animal to be one and the same in man and in horse: either with unity of reason — as is commonly said — or with real unity and identity not through inexistence — since that is impossible — but through indifference alone.

As to Porphyry: it must be said he is speaking there of specific nature for the second intention and under the ratio of universal. And therefore he is not speaking of real unity which nature has on the part of the thing, but of rational unity which it has through the intellect under the ratio of universal — which unity I of course concede is not through indifference alone but also through inexistence, as was said in *disp.* 4, *Log.*, q. 2, art. 3, explaining the unity of universal nature. For when nature is universalized it is conceived as one through inexistence in all and each — as will be further explained below.

Finally *Hurtado*, *disp.* 5, *Metaph.*, sect. 2, insists: the specific concept of man is quiddatively predicated of many men. But humanity existing in Peter alone is not quiddatively predicated of many men since it is not in them. Therefore that nature is not the universal concept.

If you say it can be so disjunctively. Against this he insists: this only means being able to be in one, but not necessarily in this one rather than that one — but this is not sufficient for universality, to which it belongs to be able to be predicated simultaneously and to be in many.

Second: although soul disjunctively can animate many bodies, still it cannot be predicated in the concrete of those — since actually it exists only in one. And of my body alone can my soul be predicated in the concrete.

Third: likewise Petreity could be called universal — since as according to you the nature of Peter could be contracted by the haecceity of Paul, so Petreity could be contracted by the nature of Paul.

Fourth: there would be as many specific universals of man as there are natures contracted through singularities — since according to you the nature of any man is universal.

Fifth: in God there would be some common ratio indifferent to the singularity of God and the human one — which is false. The consequent is proved: since in God there are given common rationes in which creatures agree with him, and in the opinion of Scotus they agree univocally with him. The falsity of the consequent is clear: since whatever is in God is necessarily God. Therefore it implies on the part of the thing that it can be a creature.

Finally he brings an a priori reason: since the humanity of Peter, for example, is of itself singular — since it does not have from Petreity or anything extrinsic that it cannot be divided into several humanities which are the same as itself in reality. But it has this from itself — even if it lacked every haecceity, it still could not thus be divided.

The response: these arguments — if they prove anything — prove only that nature is not formally and completely universal on the part of the thing — so that actually or at least in proximate potency it can be predicated of many — which we freely concede. But not that it is not common through indifference in the manner explained. For in order for nature to be said to be common in that way, it is not required that actually or in proximate potency it can be predicated of many conjunctively — but it suffices that it can be predicated of those many in remote potency and disjunctively. And this we freely concede to be insufficient for universality. By which the response to the first with its instantiation is clear.

As to the second: although the example of soul with respect to body is not sufficiently to the point — since soul is communicable to body only as a "through which," whereas nature is communicable to inferiors both as "through which" and as "what" — the response is: just as soul cannot denominatively be predicated except of the body it actually informs, and not of others which it can inform disjunctively except in remote potency — so also humanity cannot actually quiddatively be predicated except of the individual it actually constitutes. Of

others which it does not actually constitute but can only constitute, it is predicated only in remote potency. Which though it does not suffice for universality properly so called, it suffices however for constituting community of nature through indifference.

As to the third: the consequent is denied. For by that it is only proved that Petreity is indifferent to contract — not to be contracted and communicated. Since from itself and from intrinsic principles it is determined together with nature to constitute Peter — so that it cannot constitute Paul. Indeed this is intrinsically repugnant to it. What cannot be asserted of the nature of Peter.

As to the fourth: the consequent is denied. Since although there are as many humanities as men, still there is only one human species — since each is suited to ground only the second intention of that species, being entities of the same ratio. And it is false that according to Scotus the nature of any man is formally universal — though it is common through indifference. For universality requires community through inexistence from what was said in *disp. 5, Log., q. 1, art. 2*.

As to the fifth: the argument concludes against Scotists who hold that transcendent concepts common to God and creatures are grounded in proper and adequate realities existing in them on the part of the thing — which we do not concede except of predicamental grades, as is clear from what was said in *disp. 2, Metaph., from n. 77*. And therefore the parity must be denied, as I also denied above in this disputation in n. 66.

As to the last: it is clear from what was said to a similar argument above in n. 104.

Question VI. Whether Nature in the State of Essence Possesses a Certain Unity Less than Singular Unity, Which Is Called Formal Unity

Various authors assign different states of nature and various degrees of unity for the correct understanding of this question, so that it may be clear what unity belongs to nature in any given state. Nature, then, can be considered in three states, as Scotus teaches following Avicenna, 6. *Met. q. 18 & dist. 3. qu. 1. & 6.*, and as St. Thomas teaches, *quol. 8. q. 1. art. 1. & de ente & essentia cap. 4*. First, it is considered in itself and absolutely, according to its own proper account, and this is called the state of essence, in which the essential predicates belong to nature — those which necessarily follow upon the essence, that is, predicates both of the first and second mode. Second, it is considered insofar as it exists in singulars on the side of reality, and this is called the state of real existence, in which nature is necessarily contracted through haecceities, because it cannot exist on the side of reality except as singular and individual. Third and finally, it is considered insofar as it exists objectively in the intellect, and this is called the state of objective existence, in which those predicates belong to nature that are attributed to it through the prescinding or comparative power of the intellect. The first state

precedes the second at least in the order of nature, for nature is first understood in itself and only then conjoined with haecceities. The state of objective existence follows last, insofar as nature can be prescinded and compared in various ways by the intellect.

Furthermore, these states are related to one another in such a way that the predicates which belong to nature in the first state — since that is the quidditative state and the predicates are likewise quidditative — belong to nature in every other state as well, for a human being or humanity, whether in singulars or in the intellect, is essentially rational and is capable of laughter. On the other hand, what belongs to nature by reason of the other states cannot be said of nature in the state of essence, because the other two states happen to nature and it is constituted in them through something superadded: in the state of real existence through the superadded haecceity, and in the state of objective existence through the operation of the intellect and some second intention. Hence we cannot say that nature in its essence is either singular or universal, because both predicates are accidental to nature. Accordingly, if these and similar predicates are compared to nature taken absolutely, they stand in a denominative relation to it, for they merely denominate nature rather than constitute it. In this question, therefore, we consider nature in the first state; it will be considered under the other states in what follows.

With regard to the degrees of unity, setting aside for now transcendental unity — partly because enough has been said of it above, partly because it does not pertain to this disputation, which concerns only the predicamental degrees and their unity — Aristotle, 5. *Metaph. cap. 6*, assigns three kinds of unity: numerical, specific, and generic. The reason for this assignment is that one thing can be distinguished from another either through its formal and essential principles, and this in two ways — either through more proximate or through more remote principles — or through its individual principles. In the first way, Peter and Paul are distinguished, because they are distinguished precisely through their haecceities, which is also called material distinction because it is taken from the individual difference, which is usually called the matter of the whole, as will be evident in the following disputation. In the second way, Peter is distinguished from Brunellus, because they differ not only through individual differences but also through the proximate specific differences, namely rationality and irrationality. In the third way, Peter and a stone are distinguished, because they are separated not only through individual or proximate specific differences, but also through remote ones, which are generic. This distinction through proximate or remote specific differences is commonly called formal distinction, because it is taken from the essential difference, which is usually called the form of the thing. Therefore, since multiplicity of division gives rise to multiplicity of unity — for unity is usually explained through the negation of division, and those things which lack division are, insofar as they lack it, said to be one, as Aristotle teaches, 5. *Met. 11* — just as a threefold diversity or distinction is assigned (numerical,

specific, and generic), so a threefold unity must also be assigned. Peter is said to be numerically one in himself, because he is undivided in himself through individual principles and divided from everything else. Peter is said to be specifically one with Paul, because in their specific principles they are undivided. Finally, Peter and Bucephalus are said to be generically one, because they are undivided in generic principles. The unity that belongs to things by reason of individual difference is called material unity, just as the opposing distinction was called material. The unity that belongs to things by reason of essence is called formal unity, just as the opposing distinction or diversity was called formal.

These unities are compared among themselves in such a way — as Lychet and Meyronnes especially note — that one is called greater than another, and that unity is called greater which tolerates less division alongside itself. For since the account of unity consists in, or at least connotes, the negation of division, the greater the unity, the further it recedes from its opposite. From this it follows that numerical unity is the greatest of all, because it tolerates no division alongside itself; for what is numerically one is so undivided in itself that it cannot further be divided into other similar parts. Formal specific unity is said to be less than numerical, because it admits alongside itself division through haecceities — hence what is specifically one can be numerically multiplied. Nevertheless, this unity is said to be greater than generic formal unity, because the latter admits alongside itself not only division through haecceities or material principles, but also through formal and essential ones. For this reason, generic formal unity is considered, within the predicamental order, the least of all, because it admits division through essential differences. With these preliminaries established as commonly conceded, the opinions of others must be presented first, for the understanding of the title of the question to be proposed.

The first opinion denies that this formal unity less than numerical belongs to nature on the side of reality in any way — neither in the state of essence nor in the state of existence — and holds that it belongs to it only through the intellect. This is the view of the Nominalists, who say that nature is individual through itself and through its own essence: as Ockham, *1. p. 2. Log. cap. 16. in fine & cap. 17. & 1. dist. 2. quaest. 6*, where Gabriel and Adam, *1. dist. 33. quaest. 8. art. 1*; Auriol, *2. dist. 9. quaest. 2. art. 1. 2. & 3*; Toledo, *1. de anim. quaest. 17. art. 1*; and Hurtado follows this view, *disp. 5. Met. sect. 9*, where he argues at length that there is no formal unity midway between singular and universal unity, just as there is no nature occupying a state midway between singular and universal.

The second opinion, usually attributed to Fonseca, *5. Met. cap. 28. quaest. 3*, holds that nature, considered in the state of essence or according to its absolute state, has a certain unity that is, as it were, mixed from formal and numerical unity, and it says that nature does not descend to inferiors according to this unity, nor communicate it to inferiors, because from the fact that nature is multiplied in inferiors, this kind of unity is removed. It concludes at last that this unity is not

the one they call formal, because according to formal unity nature descends to inferiors, nor is it properly numerical, because numerical unity belongs only to individuals as such. Therefore, Fonseca says it ought rather to be called quasi-numerical, or numerical of the common nature, insofar as common natures are numbered through it.

The third opinion denies to nature in the state of essence any positive unity — whether formal, numerical, or mixed — and says it can be called one only negatively, insofar as it is not divided; for nature considered in itself is neither positively one nor multiple, since according to Avicenna, horseness is merely horseness, neither one nor multiple. This is the view of Aversa, *q. 8. Log. sect. 7*; Serna, *disp. 1. Log. sect. 4. q. 6. art. 2*; John of St. Thomas, *p. 2. Log. quaest. 3. art. 3*; and some other Thomists, as Suárez reports, *disp. 6. Met. sect. 1*.

The fourth and final opinion — which is the common teaching — holds that nature, considered in the state of essence or absolutely, has formal unity, which is formally and positively a unity. Hence in that state it is positively one with formal unity, which is less than numerical. This is the view of Scotus, *loc. cit.*, with all the Scotists; St. Thomas, *de ente & essentia c. 4. quaest. 2*, where Cajetan and Ripa, *art. 4*; the Complutenses, *disp. 1. Log. q. 2*; Amicus, *tract. 4. Log. q. 3. dub. 5. art. 3*; Suárez, *cit.*; Pasqualigo, *to. 2. Met. disp. 14. sect. 3*; and others *passim*.

Article I. Resolution of the Question

I say first that nature, taken absolutely or in the state of essence, has a certain real and positive unity — one less than numerical unity — which follows upon it as a proper property. This is the teaching of the Doctor, *cit. 2. d. 3. qu. 1. § Ad quaestionem, in fine lit. G*, where he speaks as follows: "nature according to that entity has true being outside the soul, and according to that entity it has a unity proportioned to itself, which is indifferent to singularity, such that it is not repugnant to that unity, of itself, to be posited together with any unity of singularity. This, then, is how I understand nature to have a real unity less than numerical unity. And although it does not have this of itself in such a way that it falls within the account of nature — for according to Avicenna, *5. Met.*, horseness is merely horseness — nevertheless that unity is a proper property of nature according to its primary entity, and consequently it is not of itself this unity intrinsically, nor is it necessarily included in nature itself according to its primary entity." So Scotus, *ibid.* And a little before he had explained in what sense Avicenna's saying is to be understood — that horseness is merely horseness, neither one nor many, neither universal nor particular — for this was said not because nature according to its essence is not positively one, but, as the Doctor says, because when Avicenna and other authors speak thus, they mean that it is not of itself one with numerical unity, nor many with the plurality opposed to that unity. For just as it has no individuation of itself, so it has no singular unity or multiplicity of itself.

This is proved first by the argument drawn from the Doctor: unity is the adequate property of being, such that whatever being there is, at whatever degree it is taken, is of its essence one and has a unity proportioned to itself. But nature has a proper essence and entity distinct from singularity on the side of reality, as was said above. Therefore it has its own proper unity as well.

Aversa, *loc. cit.*, responds that the unity which is a property of being can be preserved merely negatively — that is, because division does not belong to the essence of nature — and can also be preserved through reason with a foundation in reality, in which way nature is one in the intellect. Furthermore, transcendent unity, which is the property of being, can be taken for numerical and individual unity, not indeed taken determinately but indeterminately, as it abstracts from this or that individual unity; and in this way individual unity taken in common will belong to nature taken absolutely.

This solution is refuted both absolutely and *ad hominem*. Absolutely, because the properties of being are true, real, and positive properties, as was said in *disp. 4. q. 1.*, and in particular transcendent unity renders its subject truly and positively one, as was said in *disp. 5.*; therefore unity cannot be preserved merely negatively and through reason. It is also refuted *ad hominem*, because according to the opponents, unity formally consists in the negation of division; therefore, by their account, nothing can be formally and positively one, but only negatively. If, then, nature has the negation of formal division through its formal and essential principles, it will be one in its own order, just as any other being, because on their account nothing can be formally constituted as one except through the negation of division. Furthermore, according to them, nothing can be positively one except by reason of a foundation to which the negation of division belongs of itself and intrinsically. But in nature considered in itself, as distinct from individuation, there is found a positive entity, and there is found the negation of formal division with respect to formal principles. Therefore, full and perfect unity is found there, which on their account consists in entity together with the negation of division; and consequently nature will be positively one, to the extent that this can belong to it by reason of its foundation.

John of St. Thomas responds that the negation of division is not found in nature absolutely and in every respect, but only under the reduplication "insofar as it is from formal principles," and because it leaves room for indifference — having plurality or unity absolutely and through material principles — therefore it does not remain perfectly and simply one, but only negatively and under that stated reduplication. Against this: this proves only that nature is not simply, absolutely, or maximally one — that is, numerically — because it admits alongside itself some division in singulars through material and individual principles. But it does not prove that it is not positively one in its own order, that is, with some unity less than individual unity. Furthermore, unity is not destroyed by just any plurality, but only by the plurality opposed to it; for example, formal unity is not destroyed

by numerical plurality, but only by formal plurality. Therefore, from the fact that nature is one under that reduplication — insofar as it is from formal principles — even though it is indifferent to unity or plurality through individual principles, its formal unity is in no way injured. Hence this does not prevent it from being positively one in its own order, and so the response offered is without force.

Finally, the other response that Aversa adds regarding individual unity — that it can be assigned as the property of being, not taken determinately, but as it abstracts from this individual unity and that — is entirely false, as was shown in *disp. 7. q. 3. ex professo*. Furthermore, just as this individual unity follows this individual thing as designated, so individual unity taken in common — as it determinately abstracts from this one and that — follows being as individual in common, as its property, and not being in common or nature considered in the state of essence. Moreover, individual unity, whether taken determinately or in common, is always incommunicable according to its formal account, and it renders the subject it affects incommunicable. But nature in the state of essence, considered precisely as such, is incommunicable of itself. Therefore, the unity which follows upon nature as its property cannot be individual, whether taken determinately or in common.

Second, the Doctor proves this because nature, considered in the state of essence and as it precedes singularity — being the whatness of the thing, the per se object of the intellect, considered per se as such by the metaphysician, and expressed through definition — cannot truly and properly be defined unless it is per se one, as Aristotle teaches, 4. *Met.* 10. & 1. 7. *tex.* 13. & 1. 8. *tex.* 15. Therefore nature is in itself and essentially truly and positively one.

Aversa responds again that for nature to be signified by one name and explained by one definition, it suffices that it be negatively one — that is, that it not essentially entail division — and that it can also be conceived by the intellect as one. This is the solution of Auriol, 2. *d.* 9. *q.* 2. *art.* 1. Against this: what has one name and one definition can be univocal, such that univocation is taken from the unity of name and definition. But univocation is founded on the positive unity of the same name and account, as is clear from the definition of univocals. Therefore what is definable must be positively, not merely negatively, one. Furthermore, the other response is also false — that for nature to be definable it suffices that it can be conceived as one by the intellect — because, as the Doctor says, *quol.* 1. *Q.*, nature does not have its definability from the intellect but from itself, and definition expresses the essence of the thing as it is in the thing, not as it is in the intellect. Therefore what is truly and properly defined must have that unity of itself and on the side of reality, and not merely through the work of the intellect. Furthermore, if it were the case that unity granted by the intellect sufficed for definition, then even per accidens beings could be defined, because they could be apprehended by the intellect as one.

Third, a per se property belongs first and per se to nature, not to singulars; but the subject of one property must be per se and positively one. Therefore nature, considered in itself and as it precedes singularity, is truly and positively one. The major is from Aristotle, *1. Post. tex. 12*, where the capacity to laugh is said to be the first and immediate predicate of humanity, not of Socrates or Plato. The minor is proved because the unity of the property depends on the unity of the subject.

The Nominalists respond that the subject of the property is a concept of the mind, as is the property itself, if it is taken as a true property; but if the property is taken improperly, as a true thing which is the accident of another, then the major is denied, because the subject of such a property is the singulars.

Against this: if the adequate subject of the property — for example, risibility — is the concept common to this and that human being, and the adequate property is the common concept of this and that risibility, then when the property is predicated of the subject, it is not a predication of thing of thing, but of concept of concept, and the predication will be false, because neither the formal nor the objective concept of the property is the formal or objective concept of the subject. Furthermore, if the singulars taken together are the adequate subject of the property, then either they are so according to the proper singularity of each — and this is not the case, because they share in such a property — or they are so according to nature; and in the latter case the intended conclusion is obtained, for just as the property is of one account, so too the adequate subject must have one account; otherwise it would be one only collectively and by aggregation, which is entirely insufficient for the unity of the subject of a science, about which properties are demonstrated in science.

Fourth: unity consists in undividedness, but human nature, for example, has formal undividedness of itself — that is, through formal principles. Therefore it has formal unity of itself.

You will say that from this it follows only that nature is negatively and undividedly one of itself, because it is not divided of itself — but not that it is positively one of itself.

Against this: since unity formally consists in negation, or at least is explained through it, if nature has of itself the negation of formal division, it thereby already has formal unity. Furthermore, as was said above, the opponents wrongly distinguish between being positively one and being negatively one, because on their account unity formally consists in negation and is only fundamentally a positive being. Since, therefore, in the present case nature, as distinct from individuation, has its own entity together with the negation of formal division, why would it not be said to be formally one also positively, to the extent that this can belong to it by reason of its foundation?

Aversa responds that the proposition "nature has formal undividedness of itself" or "in the state of essence nature is not formally divided" — if it conveys an

affirmative sense, namely that it belongs to its essence that it not be divided, is false; but if it conveys a negative sense in this way — that it is not from its own essence that nature is divided — then it is true; from which it does not follow, speaking positively, that unity or undividedness belongs to nature in the state of essence.

Against this: even in the first sense that proposition is true, since nature so has the negation of formal division of itself that formal division is altogether repugnant to it; for to be formally divided is nothing other than to be divided essentially or through essential differences, but a human being cannot be divided in this way — only materially and through individual differences. From this it also follows that it can be said to be positively one in the state of essence, because in that state it has nothing through which it would be positively plurified. Therefore it is positively one. The consequence is proved: one and many are immediately opposed in being, and mutually exclude each other, such that in every being one of them must be present — namely, either it is positively one or positively many. Therefore if positive plurality is removed from nature in virtue of its own essence, this will certainly be through the positive unity it has of itself. Finally, this can be proved from the parallel with individual unity: formal division is not as repugnant to nature as material division is to an individual; yet individual unity is positive. Therefore formal unity is positive as well.

Serna, *loc. cit.*, responds that nature taken in itself or in the state of essence abstracts from unity and multitude, with which the response of others coincides — that neither formal division nor formal undividedness belongs to nature of itself, but that it is indifferent to both, just as a surface is of itself indifferent to being white or not white, and can therefore in this sense be called negatively not-white.

Against the first response: if nature abstracts from unity, it would also have to abstract from being, to which unity is consequent; hence it is indeed true that nature in the state of essence abstracts from singular unity, but not from any unity whatsoever, otherwise it would abstract from the very account of being. Furthermore, the other response is rejected for the reasons already given, because the negation of formal division belongs to nature of itself in such a way that formal division is altogether repugnant to it. Therefore it is false that it is indifferent to formal division and undividedness in the way a surface is indifferent to being white or not white. It is certainly indifferent to individual unity or multiplicity, insofar as it can be contracted through one or more singularities at least disjunctively; but it is not indifferent to formal unity and multiplicity, because it is repugnant to it to be formally divided.

I say second that the unity which follows upon nature in the state of essence is not numerical, nor a mixture in any way of formal and numerical, but is precisely formal unity, which is proper to natures. This conclusion is Scotus's, *loc. cit.*, and is directed against the first and second opinions. Regarding the first part — that

the unity of nature in the state of essence is not numerical — this is clear from the fact that numerical unity permits no division into other subjective parts, whereas the unity of nature does permit this. Numerical unity is altogether incommunicable, whereas the unity of nature is not. Finally, no created nature is of itself this individual nature — only the divine nature is, as was shown above. Therefore the unity of created nature considered in itself is not numerical or singular unity. Furthermore, the principle of singular unity is singularity; but nature according to its own essence prescends from singularity and acquires it only in the state of existence. Therefore the unity of nature in the state of essence is not numerical.

Next, it is proved that it is not a unity mixed from formal and numerical, because such a mixture is altogether repugnant; for singular unity is proper to individuals, and formal unity is proper to natures, and for this reason the latter is communicable and the former incommunicable, the one tolerates some division alongside itself while the other tolerates none at all — therefore such a mixture is altogether repugnant. If you say with Fonseca that this unity of nature is in some way mixed from formal and numerical unity — because insofar as it belongs to natures alone, it participates in the account of formal unity, while insofar as it forms a number of common natures themselves (since humanity and horseness are two specific natures), it has the account of numerical unity, and he therefore wishes it to be called numerical unity, not the numerical unity proper to singulars but to universals — against this: numerical unity is placed by everyone as proper to singulars, and therefore it is wrongly attributed to common natures. Nor does the fact that metaphysical degrees and common natures are commonly counted properly attribute numerical unity to them, since the number of quiddities is not a predicamental number but a transcendental one, which can be composed even of formal unities, for each degree has its own formal unity. Furthermore, this mode of speaking is refuted by its own explanation: Fonseca says that nature does not descend to inferiors according to this unity, because by the very fact that nature is multiplied in inferiors, this unity is removed. This plainly conflicts with the rule already given above at the beginning of the question, n. 130: that whatever predicates belong to nature in the state of essence belong to it also in the other states, since they are predicates of the first or second mode; therefore if such unity belongs to nature in the state of essence, it must belong to it also in the state of existence, that is, as it descends to inferiors. Furthermore, this unity belongs to nature in the first or second mode of per se predication, since it belongs to it in the state of essence; therefore it is a predicate really identified with it, and so it is contradictory for nature, when it descends to inferiors and is multiplied in them, to lose such unity. Other objections against this way of speaking may be seen in Suárez, *disp. 6. Met. sect. 3.*, and Pasqualigo, *disp. 14. sect. 3. n. 4. & seq.* Finally, from these considerations the last part of the conclusion stands proved: since some unity must belong to nature in the state of essence, and this unity is neither

numerical nor mixed from formal and numerical, it remains that it is pure formal unity, which is proper to natures.

I say third that the formal unity of nature is real unity, that is, it belongs to nature on the side of reality, and it is less than numerical unity. This conclusion is the Doctor's, *loc. cit.*, and is also held by the leading Thomists along with Cajetan, *de ente & essentia c. 4. q. 6*, where he asserts that this conclusion is so manifest that no sane person can deny it; the Complutenses, *d. 3. log. q. 2.*; Suárez, *disp. 6. Met. sect. 1.*; Blanco, *disp. 2. log. sect. 5*, where they assert that formal unity is found on the side of reality and prior to every operation of the intellect; and others among the more recent authors likewise speak in this way. This point is well worth noting, because many of our own authors — as can be seen in Fabro in *Philos. theor. q. 3. & in Met. lib. 4. disp. 9* — regularly cite the Thomists in support of the opposing position, as if they denied that the formal unity of nature less than numerical unity is a true and real unity, and asserted that it is only a unity of reason. But this is false: even they acknowledge a true unity found on the side of reality in nature as distinguished from individuation, and therefore Rada rightly observed, *2. p. controuv. 3*, that on this point St. Thomas agrees with Scotus. On this point, then, there is no disagreement between Scotists and Thomists; the disagreement concerns only the commonality of such formal unity and its distinction from singular unity, for the Thomists deny that it is formally distinguished from singular unity on the side of reality, and say that its commonality is one of reason, not real — the opposite of which the Scotists teach. All of this was well noted by Suárez, *loc. cit.* The more learned Thomists, and especially the Cajetanists, agree with us in this conclusion. To support it, the Doctor, *2. d. 3. qu. 1*, adduces several arguments, which simultaneously prove that the formal unity of nature is real unity and less than numerical unity — against the Nominalists — and that its commonality is real — against the Thomists — not by inexistence but through difference alone, as was said in the preceding question, and will be further explained in the following one. And indeed that this formal unity is less than numerical is freely conceded by the Thomists themselves who admit it, and is demonstrated evidently from the fact that numerical unity permits no division into other subjective parts, whereas formal unity does permit this. But beyond this, the Doctor proves that this unity less than numerical is real and belongs to nature on the side of reality against the Nominalists, who deny this, and he proves it by several arguments, which are also adduced by Cano, *1. Phys. qu. 6.*, Trombetta, *7. Met. qu. 8. art. 2.*, and other Scotists passim. I will therefore here set forth and defend the more forceful ones.

First: relations of the first mode — identity, similarity, and equality — being relations of equiparance (that is, mutual relations), are founded upon unity or upon the one. Therefore, since they are real, the unity in which they are founded and which is the proximate reason for founding them will be real, for a relation is not real unless it has a real foundation and a real proximate reason for its founding. I then argue in a subsidiary way with Scotus: this unity cannot be

numerical, because nothing one and identical is similar to itself; therefore it will be a unity less than numerical. Although this argument does not strongly conclude against Nominalists who deny that such relations are real, it is nonetheless valid against certain older Thomists of the Hervaeus school, who along with Hervaeus admit a real relation of similarity or essential identity among several individuals of the same species, yet deny that such a relation is founded on any unity of nature less than numerical. Instead, they want it to be founded on the singular unity of one individual and terminated at the unity of the other, and they say there is no need to posit unity of nature in both similar extremes, because those extremes are similar through themselves and through their own entity. This argument, I say, remarkably refutes them, because two individuals are in their singularities altogether dissimilar, and so singular unities are reasons for founding dissimilarity rather than similarity, as Lychet and Trombetta rightly urge. Furthermore, on their account similarity would not be founded on one, but on two — contrary to the text of Aristotle. Furthermore, in the divine there is the most perfect similarity by reason of the most perfect unity of nature, which is not only formal but also numerical; since in creatures such numerical unity of nature cannot be posited in many, at least a formal unity of nature less than numerical should be posited. This argument can also in some measure press the Nominalists; for although they say these are relations of reason, they do not say they are wantonly fabricated by the intellect but have a foundation in reality, and clearly no other sufficient foundation for this can be assigned except a unity of nature less than numerical — for as has been proved, singular unity is rather the foundation of dissimilarity than of similarity.

The more recent authors, especially Morisanus and Aversa following Suárez, respond that it is false that such relations are founded on some unity existing in things, because similarity does not express unity but rather in its very terms involves distinction of those things that are similar, as well as of the entity in which they are made similar, since what is identical is not similar to itself. They add that even in grammar, the names of agreement, similarity, and equality do not signify unity but rather the commensuration of two things with each other, insofar as something is in one individual — say, in Peter — to which something similar and commensurate is found in Paul. And they say that Aristotle, *5. Met. 20*, took unity fundamentally — that is, for that agreement which is found on the side of reality among individuals of the same species — for this is the foundation from which the intellect afterward fabricates the formal unity of several natures that are similar to one another, by representing them to itself under a single concept. And when Peter and Paul are said to be of the same nature, they say that this mode of speaking is taken from our way of conceiving, whereby we represent to ourselves two distinct but similar essences through one formal concept, not as if on the side of reality there were some real unity or identity between them — for by similar reasoning we call numerically distinct things the same in number, from which it does not follow that they are truly numerically the same. For example,

when standing in a printer's shop I say "I have this book in my study" or "I have this flower in my garden," I mean: I have one similar to it, though numerically distinct. And to correct the error of the imagination founded on this common way of speaking, they show by clear examples that similarity and real agreement can exist without real unity. First: two singularities — for example, of human nature — are similar, for according to Scotus each is a mode extrinsically determining common nature and rendering it incommunicable, yet there is no real unity between them, since they are altogether simple modes. Second: God agrees with a creature in some account of real being — that of being something beyond nothing — yet there is no real unity between God and creature, for they are distinguished as wholes. Third: the three divine Persons are similar in the account of person or suppositum of a rational nature, yet they are really distinguished as wholes through their most simple entity.

This is the doctrine by which the more recent authors claim to resolve all the arguments of the Doctor, through which he intends, *loc. cit.*, to prove that there is a real unity of nature less than numerical. They say those arguments prove only this pure unity of similarity and conformity found on the side of reality among several individuals of the same species, and not any preceding common unity of nature that would be the foundation of such similarity and conformity, as Scotus seems to contend. This doctrine and solution is wholly approved and received by Poncius the Scotist, *disp. 3. Log. quaest. 2. concl. 4*, where he says that human nature found in Paul has no other unity on the side of reality with the nature found in Peter and other individuals of the same nature than the unity of similarity and conformity, or of representability through the same formal concept; and at n. 42 in fine he concludes that this is how the formal unity less than numerical is to be understood, which the Doctor asserts in *2. dist. 3. quaest. 1*, and that the Doctor's arguments prove no other unity. But this is to depart from the common position of Scotus and the Scotists — both older and more recent — and to go over with both feet to the position of the Nominalists or Thomists of the Hervaeus school, who acknowledge no other unity of common nature in individuals than the pure unity of similarity and conformity. And certainly the Doctor, *loc. cit.*, intended to prove something more than the mere unity of similarity and conformity, because his adversaries freely admitted this; and from this similarity and conformity found on the side of reality among several individuals of the same species, he undertook to derive a certain unity in nature less than numerical unity, in which it is founded. Therefore this unity less than numerical is not the pure unity of similarity, but another unity preceding it. Moreover, Poncius, by agreeing with the more recent authors on this point, not only departs from his teacher and fellow disciples, but also from himself, since in *part. 3* of his own course, *disp. 18. num. 11*, he maintains not only predicamental degrees but also transcendent ones as possessing a reality common to inferiors on the side of reality; therefore, to speak consistently with himself, he should have asserted that the unity of nature is not a pure unity of similarity among individuals but something more; or if he

wished, along with the more recent authors outside the Scotist school, to place it precisely in such unity of similarity, he should not thereafter, together with the Scotist school, have admitted real common natures and common natures, which the more recent authors consistently deny. Thus in his position he speaks neither consistently within the Scotist school nor within the school of the more recent authors.

But this common doctrine and solution of the more recent authors has already been rejected above in this disputation, n. 45, and is again rejected here. For in the first place, it directly conflicts with the intent of the text, where Aristotle assigns the proximate foundation of relations of the first mode and says they are founded on unity; if, therefore, this unity is nothing but agreement and similarity, as they maintain, it is as if one said that similars are founded on similarity, and equals on equality. Furthermore, if in truth the similarity and agreement of two things are the foundation of the formal unity which can be conceived on their occasion when they are taken together, then rather unity will be founded on similarity and agreement — the opposite of which Aristotle teaches. Furthermore, comparison presupposes some similarity between the extremes being compared, because comparison takes place within the infima species, from 7. *Phys.* 29; but comparison truly presupposes some real unity of form in which the extremes are compared. Therefore similarity does too. The minor is proved: if we say A is whiter than B, it is certain that A and B participate in whiteness and agree in it. The question then arises: in what whiteness do they agree? Not in singular whiteness, because then two singulars would participate in one and the same accident more and less — therefore in whiteness common to both, having specific unity less than numerical. This is confirmed by grammarians, who teach that for a proper comparison three things are required: the thing compared, the thing to which it is compared, and that in which they are compared; and for lack of this last condition, they say that the following is not a proper comparison: snow is whiter than the crow — because the extremes do not participate in the same specific form. Therefore agreement among grammarians, and the similarity presupposed for comparison, signifies unity. Furthermore, when A and B are said to be similar, the question arises: in what are they similar? For beyond a remote foundation, relations also require a proximate one, or a proximate reason for founding; but no other such reason can be assigned except this specific unity of whiteness in which these two white things really agree.

The reply is that A is similar to B through itself, and conversely. But then the argument returns from the beginning, because similarity would then be founded not on one but on two, and the singular unity of A — which is the reason for distinguishing it from B — would be the reason for assimilating them and for their agreement, which is contradictory. Furthermore, the question arises: why does one white thing assimilate itself more readily to another white thing than to something green? If the answer is that this white thing is of such a nature and the green thing is of another, the objection is that the reason why one white is more

similar to another white than to something green is that both participate in whiteness in common, and white participates more than green — as Aristotle teaches, 7. *Met.* 29 — that comparison takes place within the infima species, and not because this thing is such and that thing is such. Furthermore, two things cannot be compared as more and less unless some real common thing is presupposed in which they participate more and less on the side of reality. Furthermore, if similarity and agreement do not imply any real unity in the similars but rather imply total distinction, it follows that the more similar two things are and are known to be, the more distinct they are known to be — which is contrary to sense experience. For we find that the more similar things are, the less we discern and distinguish them from one another, and therefore their similarity implies some real — though not numerical — unity among them, and hence a unity less than numerical. Furthermore, if A and B are similar through their own entities, then the more they are known as similar, the more they would be known according to their proper entities, and therefore the more they would be known as distinct and different — not as one.

Furthermore, when they say that names of agreement and similarity do not signify unity but rather the commensuration of two things with each other, etc., I ask what they mean by the commensuration of two things with each other, and what it means for the entity of one to be commensurate with the entity of the other. Either they mean the very same agreement and similarity of two things — and this is begging the question — or they mean the fundamental reason for similarity, in which case they must explain what this fundamental reason is. If they say it is the entity of Peter, for example, I ask why the entity of Peter is the reason for founding similarity with Paul rather than with Brunellus; and they will never be able to assign the difference unless there is in Peter some entity that can be in Paul and in no way in Brunellus.

Further, I prove absolutely that the agreement of two individuals must be founded in some real unity, and I explain what kind that real unity must be. If Peter and Paul are distinguished as wholes in such a way that not only is whatever is in the one not what is in the other, but it is altogether repugnant that anything of the one be in the other and constitute it in being of the same account, then in truth they do not specifically agree with each other, and the intellect could no more abstract a concept that is more one from Peter and Paul than from Peter and Brunellus. The consequence is proved by parallel: a piece of wood two spans long is said to be equal to another piece two spans long, and to agree with it in quantity, because if God were to remove the quantity of one and place it in the other and vice versa, they would still be equal in quantity. White A is said to be similar to white B because if God were to place the whiteness of A in B, or vice versa, they would still truly be similar. Therefore likewise two individuals of the same species are said to be substantially similar to each other, because there is some entity in the one that, of itself, could be in the other and constitute it in being of the same account, and vice versa. But if no such entity is found in the

one and in the other, there is clearly no reason to see from what angle the agreement of one with the other should be reckoned, any more than with another altogether disparate thing. Therefore agreement and similarity necessarily presuppose some real unity in which they are founded — not such that one real entity is the very same in two individuals, for this is false and impossible in creatures (because what is really in one is not really that same thing in another), but such that in those two individuals there are entities that are really distinct and divided from each other, and yet altogether of the same account, such that what now constitutes one could, of itself, constitute the other in the same specific being. And this is that unity of indifference and formal unity which Scotus says accompanies nature as its proper property. In this sense, Peter and Paul can be said to be one — not because there is one and the same nature really in both through inexistence, but the same through indifference — insofar as what is now in one could, as far as its formal account goes, be in the other, though it is presently prevented by real identity with this singularity or that.

Moreover, this same point can be shown in some way from the very example that the opponents adduce. When, pointing to a book in a printer's shop, I say "I have this book in my study" or "I have this flower in my garden," the meaning is, as they themselves say, that I have a similar book or flower; but such similarity is founded on some unity — namely, the similarity of the book upon the unity of the author, and the similarity of the flower upon the specific unity of accidental properties such as shape, color, scent, and so forth. Therefore likewise, in the present case, the substantial similarity of two individuals must be founded on some real unity of nature, which is at least a unity of indifference. Nor do those instances they give affect the point — to which responses have already been given above, n. 48. For here we are speaking of real, actual, and positive similarity, such as that which obtains between two individuals of the same species. Such is not the similarity found between God and creature in the account of being, between the Father and the Son in the divine relations in the account of person, or between two singularities in the account of determining nature; for that is only a fundamental and virtual similarity, by reason of which an inadequate concept can be abstracted from them, confusedly representing them — and actually on the side of reality there is found only the negation of the negation of real dissimilarity between God and creature in the account of being, between haecceities in the account of determining nature, and so forth.

You will ask: why is the similarity between God and creature in the account of being not actual and positive, whereas the similarity between an ox and a human being in the account of sensing is actual and positive — even though God and creature seem to agree in the account of being in the same way as an ox and a human being agree in the account of sensing? The answer is ready at hand: species and individuals are not primarily diverse but are in some way the same things — that is, they agree in something real — and therefore they found among themselves a positive similarity. But God and creature, two haecceities, and divine

personalities are, as ultimately constitutive, primarily diverse in reality, and therefore they cannot found real and positive similarity but at most the pure negation of dissimilarity.

You will ask again: why are God and creature, and also two haecceities, primarily diverse among themselves, but not an ox and a human being, or Peter and Paul? The answer is that God is most simple, entirely lacking any composition, and therefore cannot agree with a creature in any real common reality. Haecceities are the ultimate modes determining nature and therefore no longer resolvable into further modes and realities. Every difference of differing things must ultimately be reduced to certain primarily diverse things, from 5. *Met.* 10. But an ox and a human being, and Peter and Paul, are not in this situation — since they properly differ from one another, they must consequently agree in some reality, because things that differ are the same as something else, from 5. *Met. loc. cit.* I have elaborated at more length on this argument drawn from the similarity and conformity of individuals than on the others, in order to show that the formal unity of nature is not well explained by the more recent authors through the pure unity of similarity, but consists in a preceding unity which is the foundation of similarity.

Second principal argument: a univocal generator really agrees in nature with what it generates, as is clear from fire generating fire; and it is certain that they do not agree in something numerically one. Therefore they agree really in some common form which is the real reason for agreement in each, and therefore there is a unity of nature less than numerical. The response is offered in the same way, that when generator and generated are said to have a unity of nature univocally, this is to be understood as a unity of conformity — that is, their natures are similar — and not as a unity of undividedness, as if the same nature were really in both.

But this response requires what was just said. It is added that neither do we say that generator and generated agree in nature as if the very same real entity were in both, nor does the Doctor by the formal unity of nature mean such a unity of undividedness. Rather, he wants the nature of generator and generated to be really and entitatively distinct in themselves; but because each, formally undivided in itself, can according to itself be in several individuals disjunctively — constituting this one or that one indifferently in the same specific being — he therefore calls nature in itself one with a certain unity less than numerical. By this same reasoning, two individuals of the same species are said to be one in nature, because the nature of the one, as far as it is of itself, could constitute the other, and vice versa — not because the nature of each is one and the same undivided entity. And this is genuinely the formal unity that Scotus intends to attribute to nature according to its essence, as Auriol rightly noted, 2. *d.* 9. *ar.* 2, where under the following words he reports the position of Scotus: "A certain modern Doctor distinguishes three kinds of unity: one is singular unity, to which it is contradictorily repugnant to be plurified and conceived universally; another is

universal unity, because the universal is said to be one in many — but this unity is not of any thing, because according to Damascenus no thing is the same in several except the divine essence, and the opinion of Plato would return; and therefore this universal unity is not primary, nor does it rest immediately on the unity of singularity, because it is repugnant to universal unity to be conceived universally. Therefore another unity is required in the thing beyond singular unity, and that is the unity called indifference — that is, of nature indifferent to this numerical unity and to that — and upon this the intellect founds the unity of universality when it conceives one in many. And for this reason the unity of this is also called the unity of indifference, because it can be universal in concept and can be this signate through the intellect, but neither of these does it have through its own essence: universality it has through the act of the intellect; that it is this signate, it has through the individual difference which makes it this. And this, according to them, is the unity less than numerical and greater than the unity of reason." So Auriol. From all this it is clear that the more recent authors have not sufficiently grasped Scotus's meaning regarding the formal unity of nature.

Third: one real opposition has two real extremes. Contrariety is a real opposition, as is clear, because one really destroys and corrupts the other, with every operation of the intellect set aside — and only because they are contraries. Therefore each first extreme of this real opposition, as extreme, is one by some real unity — but not by numerical unity, because then this white would be the first contrary precisely of this black, or precisely of another white, which is inappropriate, because then there would be as many primary contrarieties as there are undivided contraries.

The Nominalists respond with Ockham that, speaking of real opposition in reality, there are not just two extremes of real opposition but many: this whiteness and this blackness are really opposed, and likewise that whiteness and that blackness are really opposed; and it is precisely true of these that one contrary corrupts the other, and each of them is numerically one.

Against this: the difficulty is not resolved by this, since it concerns primary extremes. It is certainly true that this whiteness and that whiteness are opposed to this and that blackness respectively and mutually corrupt each other; but it is false that these are the primary extremes of the opposition, for whiteness is not contrary to blackness because this whiteness is contrary to that blackness, but rather the reverse. Therefore whiteness as such is contrary to blackness as such, and not this whiteness to that blackness. Consequentially: it is certain that all and each of the heats are opposed to all and each of the colds; the question then is what the reason for this opposition is in the things themselves. Either it is the singularity in the heat, or the nature of heat as such. Not the first: for either the singularities are of the same account — and then they could not be contrary — or of different accounts — and then the contrariety that belongs to this heat in relation to this cold would not belong to another heat in relation to another cold.

If the first is conceded, the intended conclusion follows, because the very nature of heat which is included in every heat will be one on the side of reality with specific unity. Finally: any heat whatsoever is opposed to any cold whatsoever, and vice versa; either this belongs to them per se or per accidens. Not the latter, because then no contrary would be per se opposed to another. If the former, then what belongs per se to several singulars on the side of reality belongs to them through the account of something common on the side of reality, from *1. Post. c. 5*.

Fourth: a single act of sensitive knowledge — for example, vision — has one object according to some real unity, but not according to numerical unity. Therefore there is some unity less than numerical. The major is evident because the act of sense is terminated at something one existing on the side of reality. The minor is proved: a knowing power that cognizes an object as one with numerical unity cognizes it insofar as it is distinct from everything that is not numerically one with it; because if two quanta were posited that were altogether similar and equal in whiteness and quantity — like two eggs — sight would not be able to distinguish them. Therefore sight cognizes that object as one with another unity less than numerical.

Meurisset, *lib. 2. suae Met. cap. 3. q. 4*, thinks that this argument does not effectively prove the formal unity of nature, but only the unity of similarity and confusion; for although sense does not distinguish the two objects, it does not follow that they are not distinct, and therefore even if they also have that real unity less than numerical, such unity does not seem sufficiently proved from that single act of sense, since sense confusedly perceives those two objects as if they were one on account of their total similarity.

But Meurisset wrongly criticizes this argument as inept for proving the unity of nature less than numerical. For those two objects which sense perceives as indistinct are certainly distinct on the side of reality as regards individual conditions, which sense does not attain — but not as regards the specific nature, which is the motive reason for sense itself. Therefore it follows well that if sense does not distinguish those two objects, they are not distinct on the side of reality according to the specific account by which they move, even though they are distinct according to individual accounts; and so the argument well proves the unity of nature less than numerical. Furthermore, if it proves a unity of similarity and confusion among those two objects, it consequently proves the formal unity of nature, because the similarity of two individuals is founded precisely in such unity, as is established from the development of the first argument; for things that are made similar must be made similar in something common, and things that are confused must be confused in some third thing communicated to all. For if they do not communicate in something, it is unclear how they could appear confused.

The Nominalists respond with Ockham, denying the minor; and to the proof they deny the major, because for a discriminative cognition of one thing from another, more is required than for the apprehensive cognition of them, and sense apprehends its object well under the account of singularity in such a way that the account of singularity terminates the apprehension, even though sense does not have the capacity to discern between those two objects.

But Lychet rightly rejects this: for it is certain that if I cognize A distinctly and under its proper account as A, I cognize it as actually distinct from everything else, because just as A, taken under its formal account, is distinguished from whatever else is not it, so one who cognizes A under such a distinct account distinguishes it from whatever else is not it. Indeed, it seems to be a contradiction in terms to cognize A distinctly and under its proper unity, and yet not cognize it as distinct from everything else that is not it — for to cognize something as one is nothing other than to cognize it as undivided from itself and distinct from everything else that is not it.

Fifth: if every real unity is numerical, then every real diversity is numerical. The consequent is false; therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence is proved: first, because one and many, the same and diverse, are opposites, and whatever modes are said of one of the opposites, the same number of modes is said of the other, from *1. Top.* Second, because the one is that which is undistinct from itself and distinct from everything else; therefore in the same way in which something is one, it will be diverse from another. The falsity of the consequent is evident, because then all things would be equally distinct, since every numerical diversity, as numerical, is equal.

You will not say that just as generic or specific unity is not found on the side of reality formally but only fundamentally, so also distinction is only fundamental. For the distinction between diverse species is formal and actual, no less than it is between things numerically distinct — not merely virtual and fundamental.

The more recent authors respond by conceding the consequence and denying its falsity, if diversity is taken for distinction and division; for in that sense Peter is no more distinct from Paul than from a horse or the sun, since there are as many distinct entities in the nature of Peter and Paul as in the nature of Peter and Bucephalus. But if diversity is taken for disagreement and dissimilarity in nature, they deny the consequence, for in that way the diversity between Peter and Bucephalus is greater than between Peter and Paul, because where Peter and Paul have only plural essences, Peter and Bucephalus not only have plural essences but also diverse and dissimilar ones.

Against this I argue as follows: the real disagreement of natures found in Peter and Bucephalus indicates that these are diverse not only really but also essentially — or, as others say, indicates in them not only a distinction of forms but also a formal distinction. Therefore if such essential and formal division and distinction

is found on the side of reality, there will also be found on the side of reality a similar unity and undividedness, because whatever modes are said of one of the opposites, the same number of modes is said of the other. Consequently: on the side of reality, Peter and Bucephalus are said to be divided not only materially and really but also formally and essentially, by reason of the disagreement of natures that they found; therefore on the side of reality Peter and Paul will be — not really and materially, but formally and essentially — undivided, by reason of the agreement they have in nature. Nor is the response valid that Peter and Paul are more one on the side of reality than Peter and Bucephalus, taking unity as agreement rather than undividedness, because Peter and Paul are equally divided from Peter and Bucephalus in entity. This response is not valid, I say, because although it is true that they are equally divided really and materially, they are not equally divided formally and essentially. Therefore, in the same way, Peter and Paul are essentially undivided on the side of reality, just as Peter and Bucephalus are essentially divided on the side of reality.

Finally: in every individual thing, beyond the entity of singularity, the entity of nature is found, which is not of itself this individual. Therefore, just as singular unity follows upon it as a proper property — a unity we explain through undividedness into several singulars — so likewise formal unity — called formal because the very entity of nature according to itself can be in several individuals — follows as a proper real unity upon the entity of nature; for nature is in itself formally undivided and indivisible through essential differences. The consequence is proved: every entity is followed by a unity proportioned to it, since unity is an affection of being. So the Doctor reasons, 2. d. 3. qu. 6. § *Ad quaestionem*. For other arguments of the Doctor to the same effect, see Lychet, 2. d. 3. q. 1, where he well defends them against the solutions of Ockham, and also Bassolis, 4. d. 12. qu. 4.

I say finally that the formal unity of nature is formally and actually distinguished from numerical unity not only by reason but on the side of reality. On this conclusion the more recent Thomists differ from us; for although they agree with us on the preceding conclusion, and grant a formal unity of nature on the side of reality less than numerical, they deny that it is formally distinguished from numerical unity on the side of reality, and hold that it is distinguished at most only by reasoned reason, as can be seen in Suárez, *disp.* 6. *Met. sect.* 1. n. 10, and the Complutenses, *disp.* 3. *log.* q. 4. However, it follows from what was said in q. 3, where it was proved that nature in Peter, for example, is formally distinguished on the side of reality from Petreity, though it is really identified with it; in the present case it must be consequently asserted that the formal unity which follows upon nature as its proper property is formally distinguished from the numerical unity that follows upon haecceity. Therefore all the arguments proving the formal and actual distinction on the side of reality of nature from haecceity can be applied in the present case to prove the same distinction of formal unity from numerical.

Moreover, from the very fact that the Thomists acknowledge the unity of nature to be real and less than numerical, they must also acknowledge it to be formally and actually distinguished from numerical unity on the side of reality. For if it is not formally distinguished from numerical unity on the side of reality, then in its formal character it is not less than numerical unity on the side of reality — since if it is placed as altogether the same as numerical unity on the side of reality, it cannot on the side of reality participate in a predicate altogether repugnant to numerical unity. Either, then, it must be denied that this formal unity is less than numerical on the side of reality; or if this is asserted, it must consequently be asserted that it is distinct from numerical unity on the side of reality — not by real and entitative distinction, but by formal distinction midway between real and rational distinction, which I presuppose as given, from what was said in *disp. 6. de distinctionibus*.

You will say that Suárez and other more recent authors freely concede that formal unity is not less than numerical unity on the side of reality, but only as it is subject to our concept. But from the preceding conclusion it is clear that this is false, and also from q. 4, where it is proved that commonality belongs to nature on the side of reality, from which it follows that the unity following upon it must be posited as less than numerical on the side of reality.

Furthermore, this is proved from what was said, especially in proving the preceding conclusion: nothing altogether the same on the side of reality can be the proximate reason for founding opposite relations — namely, of identity and diversity. Since, therefore, the proximate reason for founding identity between Peter and Paul is the formal unity of nature, and the reason for founding diversity is singular unity, it plainly follows that they are at least formally distinguished from each other on the side of reality. Furthermore, it is altogether contradictory to understand that Peter and Paul are the same and yet diverse without any distinction on the side of reality, at least in the proximate foundations. Furthermore, the unity according to which univocal generation is considered is distinguished on the side of reality from that according to which it is not considered; but the former is the formal unity of nature and the latter is singular unity. Therefore they are distinct. Furthermore, in the unity of nature comparison can take place, from 7. *Met.* 29; but in numerical unity no comparison can take place, because one and the same thing cannot be compared to itself. Therefore these unities are formally distinct. Furthermore, when two unities are so related that one of them on the side of reality stands together with the multitude opposed to the other unity, those two unities must be at least formally distinguished on the side of reality. But formal and numerical unity are so related, because two things multiplied numerically — such as Peter and Paul — are said to be one among themselves, or one is said to be the same as the other with respect to the formal unity of nature. Therefore they are distinct. Finally, the kind of numerical undividedness is on the side of reality other than formal undividedness, because one is undividedness in formal principles and the other

only in individual principles; therefore numerical unity will also be distinct on the side of reality from formal unity, since unity either consists in undividedness or at least necessarily connotes it.

The solutions that the opponents are accustomed to apply to these arguments should be rejected in the same way as those rejected in the preceding conclusion in response to similar arguments, from which these are derived.

Article II. Objections to the Contrary Are Resolved

Against the 1st conclusion of the preceding article, Aversa, *qu. 8. sect. 7*, objects, proving that nature in its essence is not formally one positively: first, nature in the state of essence has only predicates of the first or second mode, but this unity is not found among the essential predicates of nature, nor does it necessarily accompany them — indeed, nature is multiplied and divided in its individuals. Second, it is repugnant to nature that the opposite of what belongs to it in its essence should ever belong to it; but division, which is opposed to unity, belongs to it in singulars. Third, the divine nature, because it is of itself and essentially one, cannot be divided, and is unique in all persons; since, therefore, unity does not belong to nature in every state — since division belongs to it in the state of existence — it follows that unity does not belong to it of itself. Fourth, whatever belongs to nature in the state of essence descends with it to inferiors and is communicated to them; it is therefore contradictory in terms to say that unity belongs to nature in the state of essence and yet does not descend with it to inferiors. Finally, John of St. Thomas argues that a positive unity is absolutely and simply unity only when it not only negates division from one side, but leaves the subject or entity wholly undivided and determinately reduced to unity on every side; for if from some side it still leaves room for division or plurality, it will be one only in some respect, not simply. But nature considered in itself does not have division removed from it on every side, nor does it remove all principles of plurality, because of itself it is indifferent to plurality or unity and determinately claims neither for itself.

The response to all of these easily follows from what was said above, n. 132: just as there are diverse degrees of being, so also there are diverse degrees of real proportionate unity, and not just any unity is opposed to just any multitude or division, but only what corresponds at the same level of being — namely, individual unity to individual plurality, and formal unity to formal plurality, but not formal unity to individual plurality. For the less a unity is, the more division it admits alongside itself. From this doctrine, all of Aversa's arguments are resolved, because it is true that nature descends to individuals and is divided in them while retaining its own formal unity, since this unity is perfectly compatible with individual plurality. Therefore formal unity belongs to nature also in the state of existence, and is not destroyed by individual plurality, as will be more fully established in the following article. To the last argument, it is clear from what was said at n. 134 that it only proves that nature is not simply, absolutely, or

maximally one — that is, numerically — because it admits alongside itself some division in singulars through material principles; but it does not prove that it is not positively one in its own order, namely with some unity less than individual unity.

Second, against the 2nd conclusion, Fonseca, *cit.*, presses, proving that the unity of nature can be called numerical: the unity that belongs to the common nature is incommunicable to many, because it remains in the nature itself; therefore it should be called numerical, for numerical unity is constituted by incommunicability, in contrast to formal unity which is communicable. He confirms: wherever number is granted, numerical unity must be granted, since number arises from such unities; but in common natures there is number — for there are so many species, ten genera — therefore the unity of common nature should be called numerical.

Aversa, *cit.*, responds that no unity belonging to nature in the state of essence fails to be communicated to singulars, because it is plainly repugnant to say that some predicate belongs to nature in the state of essence and is not communicated to singulars. Nevertheless, even granted that formal unity of nature is in some way communicated to individuals — for Peter, for example, is said to be not only individually one in himself, but also formally and essentially one, insofar as he is undivided in himself through essential principles — still, the doctrine that it is repugnant for some predicate to belong to nature in the state of essence and not be communicated to singulars is not universally true; for there are predicates that mark a difference between nature and singulars and belong precisely to nature as it is simply presupposed — such as, for example, the real commonality of nature. This predicate, along with similar ones, is not communicated to singulars; Peter, for example, is not said to be common to many. Hence formal unity itself, even if communicated to singulars insofar as it is a certain undividedness through essential principles, is not communicated to them insofar as it is common and less than numerical unity, as was said above, n. 98. But whatever may be said of this, for the resolution of the argument it suffices to deny the assumption, because formal unity of nature is in some way communicated to singulars. To the confirmation: it was already said above, n. 138, that the number of natures is not predicamental — which properly arises from numerical unities — but transcendental, which can arise from formal unities as well.

Third, against the 3rd conclusion, the Nominalists customarily raise many objections against the formal unity of nature; but since these bear more against the formal unity of nature in the state of existence — as found in singulars that are divided — than against it in the state of essence, they belong to the following question, where it is asked whether nature retains its formal unity even in inferiors that are divided. Hence we shall adduce here only those arguments that seem to overthrow its formal unity absolutely, both in the state of essence and in the state of existence. Every entity outside the intellect is singular, because the

universal is found only in the intellect; therefore no formal unity less than numerical is found on the side of reality. The consequence is evident, because just as a thing stands with respect to entity, so also with respect to unity.

Second: if specific nature has its own formal unity less than numerical, then so also does generic nature, for the same reason — but this is false, because equivocations lurk in genus, from 7. *Phys.* 29, and the Doctor himself expressly denies this, 2. *d.* 3. *q.* 1. *lit.* B, where he says that genus does not have such unity.

Third: such unity would be common to many, and so nature according to this unity could be communicated to many — which is impossible in created nature, since this is proper only to the divine nature, which is one and the same in several supposita.

Fourth: if there is some real unity less than numerical, either it belongs to something in the same numerically one, or to something else; not the first, because whatever is in the same number is numerically one; not the second, because in them nothing is numerically one really, since this is proper to the divine supposita.

Finally, Hurtado presses, *d.* 5. *Met. sect.* 9, that there cannot be a formal unity midway between singular and universal unity, just as there is no nature occupying a state midway between singular and universal; for either it is considered as singular — and then it is given on the side of reality, but with singular unity alone — or it is conceived confusedly and as universal — and then it surely has universal unity, but only in the intellect.

The response is from Scotus, 2. *d.* 3. *q.* 6. § *Ad quaestionem, lit.* E: something can be said to be singular and numerically one in three ways — first and per se, as the individual difference; per se but not primarily, as the individual itself; and finally per accidens and denominatively, as the common nature existing in the individual, which considered in itself and according to its proper essence, as distinct from individuation, is not of itself this individual but is common through indifference, insofar as it has no repugnance of itself to being under another singularity. In this way it has a unity less than numerical unity, because what is per se numerically one has an altogether repugnant relationship to being under another singularity.

But the objection is pressed: the phrase "according to itself," either refers to nature considered in isolation — and then it is not on the side of reality but only through the intellect, and so it has unity through the intellect — or the phrase "according to itself" does not negate association with individuals, and so does not denote isolation; and in that case it will be singular.

The response, from what was said above n. 85, is that the phrase "according to itself" certainly is not to be taken negatively, as if meaning in isolation and not with others — for in that sense nature certainly does not exist on the side of reality

but only in the intellect. Rather, it is to be taken positively, as denoting essential predicates of both the first and second mode, which predicates nature still includes even when existing on the side of reality and conjoined with singularity. Hence, since it also exists under these predicates on the side of reality and is formally distinguished from individuation on the side of reality according to them, in this state it is still a real being; for although under these predicates it is formally distinguished from individuation, it is nevertheless really conjoined and identified with it on the side of reality. Furthermore, as has been said repeatedly: for those of us who admit the formal distinction from the side of reality between nature and haecceity, the prescission of nature from haecceity is not given only in the intellect's prescinding nature from haecceity, but also on the side of reality — for it signifies nothing other than the formal non-intermixture of the concept of one with the concept of the other, even though they are really and identically intermixed. Hence when the intellect considers nature prescinded from singularity, it does not itself perform the prescission but rather finds and understands a prescission already made on the side of reality. And this state of prescission can be called the state of the real essence of nature, because under such a state it is offered to the intellect for consideration only with respect to its essential predicates. But if by the state of the real essence of nature is meant not the state of actuality but only of potentiality for existence, even in this state it can be called a real being, because — as is established from what was said, *disp. 8. n. 45* — for real being it suffices that the essence can be individuated and exist through contraction, without it being necessary that it actually be under existence and in fact conjoined and identified with individuation.

To the second objection, the consequence is conceded; for as is clear from what was said above, n. 91, generic nature, being predicamental, has its own formal unity proportioned to itself, just as specific nature does. And when Aristotle says that equivocations lurk in genus, he did not speak absolutely — as if he wished to banish all unity altogether from the concept of genus — but comparatively in relation to species, which, being divided only through ultimate differences, has far greater unity than genus. And the Doctor likewise speaks, *loc. cit.*, when he says genus does not have such unity — not such formal unity absolutely, but such formal unity as species has, namely of the infima species.

You will say: the Doctor seems there to concede that the formal unity in genus is not real but one of reason, and that it is real only in species. The response: the Doctor is arguing there only from what is conceded by the opponents regarding the unity of reason of the concept of genus, in order to demonstrate from this that formal unity is real at least in the infima species, in which it was easier to demonstrate that such unity is real than in generic nature, where formal unity is far less — as Meurisset rightly noted, *lib. 2. suae Met. 3. c. 3. q. 3.*

To the third: it must be said from the preceding question that just as it is not inconvenient for there to be in creatures a nature common to many through

indifference and disjunctively on the side of reality — but only through inexistence and conjunctively, since this is reserved for the divine nature alone — so likewise a common unity is to be conceded to it as its proper property, common not through inexistence but through indifference alone to many disjunctively.

To the fourth, Rada responds, *2. p. contr. 3. art. 1 ad 2*, that nature has one unity in several individuals without thereby being assimilated to the divine nature, because the divine nature is numerically and singularly one in several supposita, whereas created nature is not; and this unity in all is less than numerical. The same response is given by Saxius, *t. 2. catast. disp. 3. q. 2. ar. 3. ad 2*. But these Scotists speak less consistently with what they said in the same question, for above in the body of the question they concede that nature in creatures is not said to be common through inexistence but only through simple indifference in the manner explained in the preceding question; but once this is conceded — namely, that nature is not common to many through inexistence — it must consequently be conceded that it does not have one unity in all individuals, but is multiplied in each along with its unity, as will be established in the following question.

The response, therefore, is to be given with Scotus, *2. dist. 3. qu. 9. sub lit. D*, where he adduces the argument in its very terms — that nature is naturally prior to this nature, and the proper unity consequent upon nature as nature is naturally prior to the unity of this nature as this nature; and under this account metaphysical consideration concerns it, and its definition is assigned, and there are per se propositions of the first mode. In the same individual, therefore, there is some entity which is followed by a lesser unity than numerical unity, and this is real, and that whose unity it formally is is not of itself numerically one. He accordingly concedes that this real formal unity does not belong to some entity existing in two individuals, but only in one; and in *3. d. 8. qu. unic. in fine* he teaches expressly that in individual things the common nature is plurified along with their plurality, along with the plurification of the formal unity of nature, saying that the formal unity of the humanity of Christ is one thing and the formal unity of the humanity of Mary is another. Furthermore, as is clear from what was said in q. 5, the Doctor does not admit a nature common on the side of reality with the commonality of inexistence but only with that of indifference; therefore he cannot hold that the formal unity of nature is one and the same in all individuals, but rather is multiplied in each, just as nature is multiplied in each in the manner explained there. The consequence is evident, because the formal unity of nature must be proportioned to its commonality, so that if nature is one and the same in all individuals through inexistence, it has also one single unity adequately in all; and if it is the same in all only through indifference, it is multiplied in each along with its unity through indifference — such that what is now in one with its unity could, of itself, be in another. And that this is the Doctor's genuine opinion, see the other passages cited for this, q. 5. art. 1. nn. 109 & 110.

Question VII. Whether Formal Unity Belongs to Nature Also in the State of Existence, and How

The first opinion is negative. This is held not only by those authors who in the preceding question denied any unity to nature in the state of essence, but also by a number of those who granted some unity to nature in that state. For since nature cannot exist unless individuated, nor can it exist in several individuals without being divided through haecceities, they say it loses in that state the formal unity it enjoyed in the prior state. This is the view of Aversa, *q. 8. Log. sect. 6.*; John of St. Thomas, *2. par. Log. q. 3. art. 3.*; Capreolus, *3. d. 5. qu. 3. art. 3.*; and certain other Thomists of the Hervaeus school, who nonetheless — even though they deny that nature on the side of reality is formally one in individuals (taking unity properly for undividedness) — concede to it a unity taken improperly, namely for the agreement that excludes dissimilarity among things, insofar as every created nature is similar and conformed to itself in its individuals on the side of reality. This was the common opinion of the older Thomists, as the Complutenses attest, *disp. 3. Log. q. 3. nu. 27*, and Zerbus, *7. Met. q. 17. § Propter secundum*. Poncius among our own follows this view, *disp. 3. Log. qu. 2. concl. 4*, where he grants to nature in individuals only the unity of similarity and conformity, and explains in this sense the formal unity less than numerical which the Doctor attributes to the common nature, *2. dist. 3. qu. 1*. Suárez, *cit. disp. 6. sect. 1*, is not far from this opinion; for although he admits in each individual a formal unity of nature on the side of reality somehow distinct from numerical unity, he does not admit it as a unity of undividedness of nature in many, but as a unity of a kind of similarity and conformity, as he explains at n. 12 — so that by virtue of such formal unity, each individual can be said to be formally one and undivided in itself, though not formally one with another, but only agreeing with or similar to it.

To this opinion also belongs the position of certain Scotists, which Canon follows with Francis of Marchia, *t. Phys. q. 6. art. 3. § Quantum ad 2.*; Trombetta considers it probable, *9. Met. q. 8. art. 1. in fine*; and Rada, *controv. 3. cit. art. 1. ab initio*. They assert that nature has its formal unity in all individuals not positively but privatively. They call positive unity that by which something is positively one in itself; and privative unity that by which something lacks the unity that would belong to it if certain extrinsic dividing factors were removed — by which removal it would remain with its proper unity. In this way, prime matter, *1. Phys. & 1. de Gener.*, is said to be numerically one of all generable and corruptible things — not positively one in number, but privatively, because if the distinguishing forms were set aside, matter would have the unity proper to itself. Thus in the present case, nature has in individuals this privative unity, because by reason of the individuating conditions it does not have the unity proper to itself; but if those conditions were prescinded, it would have the positive unity proper to it. This Scotist opinion, I say, tends toward the first view, insofar as it also denies that full and perfect unity — such as nature had in the state of essence and of prescission — is found in nature on the side of reality in individuals; and it holds it to be only

imperfect and diminished, namely privative, on account of the contracting differences under which it is found in the state of contraction and existence.

The opposing opinion affirms that nature in the state of existence retains its own formal unity even in individuals — the same unity it had in the state of essence. This is taught by Scotus and the Scotists, and by St. Thomas, *de ente & essentia* c. 4. q. 2, and with him Cajetan and Ripa, *ibid.*, where speaking about the mind of each they say: it is not the case that from the fact that the unity of singularity accrues to nature from the singulars in which it is found, it loses the other unity it claims for itself as such, in its own nature; for even existing in a singular, that belongs to it which belongs to it absolutely from its intelligibility, since what belongs to something in respect of what belongs to it is present to it wherever it is placed.

But there are two ways of explaining this second opinion. The first asserts that this unity less than numerical is one and the same positively in all individuals, because it is not inconvenient for this unity to coexist with individual plurification, since such plurification is not opposed to this unity. According to this view, the formal unity of nature is not multiplied in inferiors but is the same in all; and it is for this reason called less than numerical — because numerical unity is found in only one, whereas formal unity is found in several, and is a kind of common unity. This is cited as the common way of speaking among Scotus and the Scotists, as can be seen in Suárez, Aversa, the Complutenses, *loc. cit.*, and Pasqualigo, *t. 2. Met. disp. 15. sect. 1*, where he adopts and strenuously defends it.

The other way of speaking denies that there is one simple unity common to all individuals — that is, one that is the same by reason of some entity which is one and the same in all individuals. Instead, it teaches that in every singular there is its own formal unity by reason of its own proper nature, distinct from the numerical unity of that same individual, and similarly distinct from the formal unity of another individual. This is cited as the common way of speaking among Thomists, and is accordingly taught by Cajetan and Ripa, *loc. cit. de ente & essentia*, and the Complutenses, *cit.*, as representing the mind of St. Thomas; and Suárez himself professes this, *loc. cit.*, along with other more recent authors. From this it follows that each individual has a twofold unity: one formal and the other individual — formal unity follows upon nature, and individual unity follows upon being individual. Cajetan, however, says that formal unity does not import anything positive, but only the negation of division through essential principles — which negation, he says, is not one and the same in all individuals, but as many as there are individuals.

Before proceeding to the resolution of the question, however, it must be noted that the first way of explaining this second opinion is wrongly cited by the more recent authors as Scotus's genuine position. For Scotus expressly teaches the opposite, *loc. cit.*, and especially 2. *dist. 3. quaest. 6. § Ad quaestionem, lit. E*, where he proposes this very doubt in its own terms — namely, whether this unity belongs to something existing in only one individual, or rather to something that

simultaneously exists in two — and responds, saying: "I concede that this formal unity does not belong to any entity existing in two individuals, but only in one." And in *3. d. 8. qu. unic. in fine*, he expressly teaches that in individual things the common nature is plurified along with their plurality, along with the plurification of the formal unity of nature, saying that the formal unity of the humanity of Christ is one thing and the formal unity of the humanity of Mary is another. Furthermore, as is clear from what was said in q. 5, the Doctor does not admit a nature common on the side of reality with the commonality of inexistence but only with that of indifference; therefore he cannot hold that the formal unity of nature is one and the same in all individuals, but rather multiplied in each, just as nature is multiplied in each in the manner explained there. The consequence is clear: the formal unity of nature must be proportioned to its commonality, so that if nature is one and the same in all individuals through inexistence it also has one sole unity adequately in all; and if it is the same in all only through indifference, it is multiplied in each along with its unity with indifference — such that what is now in one with its unity could, of itself, be in another. That this is the Doctor's genuine opinion, see the other passages cited for this purpose, q. 5. art. 1. nn. 109 & 110.

This is also the common opinion of the Scotists, with only a few exceptions. So teach Lychet, *2. dist. 3. qu. 1*, and likewise Taretus; and *quaest. 1. praedicab. dub. 3*; Trombetta, *7. Met. qu. 8*; and Rada, *loc. cit.*, where, after recounting the two mentioned ways of speaking, they approve only this second one as more in keeping with the mind of Scotus — though Rada, in the same controversy, *art. 1. in sol. ad 2*, not quite consistently with his own stated position, concedes that nature has only one unity in all individuals. Into this same error fell Saxius, who imitated him, seeing that in *t. 2. catast. disp. 3. quaest. 1. art. 1* he teaches that the commonality of nature in creatures is through indifference alone and not through inexistence, and afterward in *art. 3. in sol. ad 2* concedes, himself likewise, that it has one unity in all individuals. Meurisset also holds this view, *lib. 2. suae Met. cap. 3. quaest. 3*, where he rightly reprehends Suárez, who says that Scotus differs from the Thomists in this — that Scotus does not consider this unity to be multiplied numerically in the individuals themselves, whereas the Thomists think it is multiplied — even though Meurisset himself afterward does not speak consistently, since in q. 4 he admits that nature is common to many not only through indifference but also through inexistence; these two, as I said, do not cohere with each other. For one who explains the commonality of nature through indifference multiplies the formal unity in each individual along with nature itself; and one who explains it through inexistence — since he posits one and the same nature in all — must consequently ascribe to it only one unity adequately corresponding to all.

Thus the second of those two ways of explaining the second opinion is common to Thomists and Scotists, who differ only in explaining the commonality of this formal unity and its distinction from individual unity; for the Thomists attribute

both of these to it only through the work of the intellect, whereas the Scotists attribute them on the side of reality and apart from any work of the intellect, as is clear from the preceding question, where the commonality of such unity and its distinction from numerical unity were treated.

Article I. Resolution of the Question

I say first that nature, even in the state of existence or contracted to individuals, still retains the formal unity it had in the state of essence. This conclusion is that of Scotus and the Scotists, *loc. cit.*, and is proved first by an a priori argument derived from the compatibility of formal unity with numerical unity: formal unity is not removed by numerical unity, since it is not opposed to it; therefore it remains even in nature in the state of existence. The consequence is evident. Trombetta proves the antecedent in several ways: no real unity is removed from some things unless those things include a diversity opposed to that unity; but individuals of the same species do not include any diversity outside the intellect that is opposed to the specific unity of nature, because their diversity is only numerical; therefore, etc. Furthermore: what is not distinct or divided outside the intellect is necessarily undistinct and undivided in that way; but individuals of the same species are undivided and undistinct outside the intellect in the same species, because with every work of the intellect set aside, Socrates is not distinguished specifically from Plato; therefore, etc. Furthermore: things that are really distinguished from each other but not according to every account included in them have some real unity — namely, in the account in which they do not differ; but individuals of the same species are really distinguished and not according to the specific account but only the individual one; therefore, etc.

Aversa responds that if difference is taken for division of nature, it is false that two individuals of the same species do not differ in nature — for in that way the nature of one is truly divided from the nature of the other; but if difference is taken for disagreement, it is true that two individuals do not differ in nature, because they are not dissimilar in nature, and so the argument concludes only that there is among them a unity of nature taken not properly for undividedness, but for the agreement that excludes dissimilarity of natures.

But this solution — familiar and common to the opponents in this matter — has been effectively refuted above, nn. 45 & 142, because even if it is true, as was said there, that the agreement and similarity between two individuals of the same species do not presuppose in them one and the same nature with the unity of inexistence and entity (since what is really in one is not really that same thing in another), they do presuppose in them one nature with the unity of indifference — that is, several natures indeed, but of so entirely the same account that what now constitutes one could, of itself, constitute the other in the same specific being. And in this the essential agreement between Socrates and Plato is founded, as was proved there. Hence when we say that Peter and Paul are one in humanity, humanity is not to be taken as some third thing existing in which the singulars

agree, but precisely as something one with the unity of indifference — by virtue of which unity it is true to say that the humanity of Peter is of itself indifferent to constituting Paul in the being of human, and vice versa, and that they are not distinguished essentially but in the principle of essence there is one humanity of both — one, I say, with the unity of indifference, not of inexistence.

The Nominalists respond differently, with Ockham: although formal and numerical unity have no formal repugnance with each other, they have virtual repugnance, since they are really identified with each other; and by virtue of such identity, whatever belongs to one belongs to the other, and what is repugnant to one is repugnant to the other. Therefore if nature can be numerically multiplied or communicated to another, so too can the individual difference; or if something is repugnant to the individual difference, it will be repugnant to nature as well, which is really the same as the immultipliable and incommunicable difference.

Amicus, *tract. 4. cit. quaest. 3. dub. 5*, refutes this solution: Peter, for example, is immultipliable because he is an adequate singular; but nature according to itself is not adequately identified with singularity, and therefore according to that account which is inadequately identified with one singular it can be multiplied without the singular being multiplied. Hence the proposition that "when some things are really identical, if one is multiplied the other is also multiplied" is true when they are adequately identified, as is evident in the divine, where for this reason the persons are multiplied without the essence being multiplied, because the essence is identified with each only inadequately.

However, this refutation does not please me, because it proceeds according to the principles of those who defend the unity and commonality of nature in individuals through inexistence, not through simple indifference; hence I rejected that way of meeting Ockham's objection above, n. 118. Nevertheless, in what way even on that view the refutation can proceed will be clear below, n. 121.

Lychet, *loc. cit. ad 3. Ockham*, says more; he first denies that individual difference cannot be among several numerically distinct things; then he concedes that just as natures are really multiplied, so too are singularities, for there are as many really distinct singularities as there are really distinct contracted natures. But in the first place it is altogether false that individual difference can be communicated to several really distinct things — for this is the property of nature, not of haecceity. Petreity is necessarily so bound to this individual that it cannot belong to another. Nor is Ockham's objection answered by conceding that natures are really multiplied just as singularities are; for the force of the objection lies in this: that nature is of itself multipliable, that is, indifferent to constituting several things disjunctively in the same specific being, whereas haecceity is not indifferent to constituting several things in individual being. Ockham's response must therefore be attacked and his objection overcome from what was said above, nn. 33 & 100, because to reconcile the apparent contradictories of being communicable and not communicable, the formal distinction on the side of

reality suffices — as is evident in the divine, where by virtue of that formal distinction the essence is said to be communicable and the personality incommunicable, though they are altogether really identified. And it is universally false that all contradictories verified on the side of reality entail a real distinction between the things of which they are verified; for many of them entail only a formal distinction — one that is verified of the same thing by reason of diverse formalities precisely. What these are has been explained in *disp.* 6. *Met. nn.* 227, 290, & 310.

Next, it is proved by an a posteriori argument: individuals of the same species agree more among themselves on the side of reality than with individuals of another species; therefore they have some unity that those others do not have, and this is the formal unity of specific nature. You will not say that individuals of the same species agree more not formally but fundamentally; for this rather corroborates our argument, since the foundation of this agreement, as has often been said, can be nothing other than unity in human nature.

The Nominalists and Hervaeans respond that there is indeed agreement among individuals of the same species, but that there is no unity on the side of reality, because they agree and differ more and less through themselves as wholes. But this solution has been thoroughly refuted above, nn. 45 & 142: if the agreement is real, a real unity of nature must precede it as its foundation. Furthermore, it is contradictory to say that Peter and Paul and likewise Peter and Bucephalus differ more and less as wholes, because two things cannot differ more than as wholes — for in that case they agree in nothing. Furthermore, individuals of the same species are really distinguished but not according to every account included in them; therefore it is false that they are distinguished as wholes. The assumption is proved because Peter, insofar as he is a human being, is not distinguished from Paul; for if he were, then every human being would be distinguished from Paul, since the reduplicative "insofar as" entails a universal conclusion. Furthermore, no account is distinctive of one thing from another unless it falls under the contradictory of the latter; just as whiteness does not distinguish the white thing except from what falls under "not white" — therefore humanity in Peter does not distinguish him from something unless that something falls under the contradictory of "human being," namely "not a human being." But Paul does not fall under "not a human being," for it is not true to say that he is not a human being; therefore humanity in Peter does not distinguish him from Paul, and hence they are essentially the same in humanity.

Suárez responds that there is indeed found in each individual a formal unity of nature somehow distinct from numerical unity, but that by virtue of this unity one cannot say that Peter, for example, is formally one with Paul — only that he is formally one and undivided in himself, insofar as he lacks on the side of reality not only numerical division but also essential division.

Against this: this solution is also rejected from what was just said, because by the same reasoning by which Suárez says Peter is formally one in himself — namely, because he is undivided in himself through essential principles — he can also be said to be formally one with Paul, insofar as he is not divided or distinguished from him through essential principles but only individual ones.

Finally, it is proved from the rule already given, q. 6, at the beginning, n. 130: that predicates which belong to nature in the state of essence belong to it also in the state of existence, because those predicates are essential to it in the first or second mode of per se predication, and are therefore really identified with it. Since, therefore, formal unity is the property following upon nature in the state of essence as its proper property, it will consequently retain it also in the state of existence, nor can it lose it in any way since it is really identified with it. Furthermore: what belongs to something in respect of what belongs to it, is present to it wherever it is placed; since, therefore, formal unity belongs to nature according to what it is, even if it is placed in individuals, it will belong to it there as well. Furthermore: just as existence does not destroy essence but rather perfects and modifies it, so neither does it destroy the essential predicates of the first or second mode; since, therefore, formal unity is the property of nature considered according to its essence, just as nature in the state of existence retains its essence, so it retains its own proper property.

I say second that the formal unity of nature is not privative in the state of contraction and existence, but positive. This conclusion is against those Scotists who say that the formal unity of nature in individuals is merely privative, and it is clearly deduced from Scotus, *loc. cit.*, where he teaches that this formal unity is the property of nature itself, is real unity in the thing apart from any work of the intellect, and that nature according to this unity is the formal principle of acting and terminating real acts, is the proximate reason for founding real relations of similarity and equality, and so forth — all of which cannot be verified of a merely privative unity, by which the response of Cano, *loc. cit.*, is also disposed of, when he says that the arguments of the Doctor by which he proves there is a real unity less than numerical on the side of reality prove only a privative unity. For as is clear from the said functions that belong to nature according to its unity, it is plainly deduced through them that such unity must be positive, because those functions are positive. Furthermore, from Scotus's own way of speaking: he says not only that nature is not one with numerical unity, nor many with the plurality opposed to that unity, but further adds that it is formally one because according to its own account it does not admit division through essential principles. Therefore according to him nature is not only privatively one but also positively one — for to be one privatively it would suffice for it not to be numerically one, nor many with the plurality opposed to that unity. Furthermore, from the parallel with individual unity: there is no more reason why a singular thing should be positively undivided numerically in itself than for nature to be positively formally

undivided in itself. Therefore, just as numerical unity is a true and positive unity, so likewise formal unity is.

Certain Scotists who defend this way of speaking respond that when they say nature in the state of existence has only privative unity, they do not wish to exclude all positive account from such unity, but only intend that in the state of contraction it is deprived through singularities of some unity it would have if singularities were absent — because division removes some unity, and what is divided after division does not remain undivided as before. In this sense, therefore, nature is said to have its privative unity in the state of existence — that is, diminished and imperfect.

Against this: by the unity that nature is said to have before the advent of differences, either is meant the formal unity that is posited as its property — and it is false that this is lost at the advent of differences or diminished in any way, both because numerical multitude is not opposed to such unity, and because since such unity is a property really identified with nature, it cannot be removed by anything subsequently accruing — or is meant a certain numerical unity of reason, which nature is conceived to acquire precisely from the fact that it is abstracted from individual differences; and this is indeed lost when it is understood in the state of contraction. But this is not the formal unity that is posited as the proper property of nature, nor is it the case that because nature loses such unity through the contraction of differences, formal unity is in any way diminished, so as to be called privative.

For the same reasons, the way of speaking of Cajetan must be rejected, *cap. 4. de ente & essentia qu. 2*, where he says that the unity of nature in individuals does not import anything positive common to them, but only the negation of formal division of one from another — which negation is also not one common to all, but multiplied in each. It is rejected, I say, for the same reasons, because by reason of such unity there belong to individuals certain common properties and operations of the whole species, and such unity is the foundation of the real agreement and similarity among them — which, even according to the Thomists, is a real and positive relation. Therefore it cannot be a simple and pure negation, since what is founded cannot be of greater entity than its foundation. Furthermore, negation is universally posterior to affirmation and is founded upon it; and negations of the same account, especially when they are negations in a genus, follow upon affirmations of the same account. Therefore if in each individual negations of the same account are multiplied, it will be because affirmations of the same account are multiplied — namely, nature, which is of the same account in all and is therefore called by us common through indifference. For this reason, Ruvijs, *quaest. 3. universalium*, who follows the Thomist position on the formal unity of nature, does not want the foundation of the real agreement found among several individuals of the same species to be a pure negation, but a positive virtual unity. But this does not suffice, because if the relation of

agreement is actual, its foundation must also be actual — not merely virtual — since, as I said, the founded cannot be of greater entity than its foundation. Therefore the unity that is the foundation of agreement among individuals of the same species must be real, actual, and positive, just as that agreement is.

I say third that when nature is multiplied in individuals, the formal unity does not remain one undivided in all but is itself multiplied along with nature. This conclusion is Scotus's, *loc. cit.* n. 171, and is also held by the more refined Scotists and Thomists, though neither all of them prove it correctly nor from the same principles.

Suárez, *cit.*; the Complutenses; Blanco; Ruvijs; and other more recent authors are accustomed to prove it thus: formal unity is in no way distinguished on the side of reality from individual unity, just as nature is not distinguished from this haecceity; but in diverse singulars there is not one real individual difference nor the same numerical unity, since they are diverse individuals by reason of diverse numerical unities; therefore neither in diverse singulars will there be the same formal unity common to them. This is confirmed because, although formal unity of nature is given on the side of reality, it does not have real commonality with respect to many except through the intellect; for if it had it on the side of reality, then just as Peter on the side of reality is said to be formally one, so too he would be said to be common to many — since all real properties predicated of some nature are also predicated of its individuals.

This argument with its confirmation does not prove absolutely, because it proceeds from two principles that are false according to us. The first is that formal unity in no way differs on the side of reality from numerical unity; for although it is not really and entitatively distinguished, it is still formally distinguished on the side of reality. Therefore, if that argument relies on the real identity of formal unity with numerical — by virtue of which, if one is really multiplied on the side of reality, the other must likewise be multiplied — it can be admitted. But if it relies on the formal identity of one with the other, it must not be admitted, because it is false that such unities are formally identified with each other, as is clear from what was said, n. 149.

The other false principle on which the confirmation relies is that neither nature nor its unity have any commonality on the side of reality — which is false. For although they have no positive commonality, as it were through inexistence, they do have a certain negative commonality through indifference, insofar as the nature of Peter, together with its whole formal unity, is not of itself this individual or bound to this individual, but of itself is indifferent to constituting another individual; and this cannot be said of Petreity, as is clear from what was said in q. 4. art. 1 and the preceding conclusion. Therefore, if the confirmation relies on the denial of positive commonality through inexistence, it can be admitted — because in truth neither nature nor unity is common on the side of reality in that way; but if it relies on the denial of any commonality whatsoever, even through

indifference, it does not proceed correctly, since nature has such commonality on the side of reality from what was said in q. 5. Furthermore, even with such commonality admitted, it is still well defended that nature in each individual is multiplied with its formal unity, because such unity does not argue that one and the same nature is in all entitatively — so that apart from haecceities the nature of Peter and Paul would be positively the very same thing, the same entirely physical entity — but only argues that those several natures are of the same account.

Suárez, n. 11, further proves this because formal unity accompanies nature according to itself; but in reality there is no nature that is common, since natures and essences are multiplied as many as there are individuals; therefore the same must be said about formal unity, which is the intrinsic property of nature, and they mutually follow one another. But this argument assumes a dubious minor and encounters the same difficulty as the preceding one, because either the discussion is about the commonality of nature through inexistence — and then the argument can be admitted — or about any real commonality whatsoever, even through indifference — and then the argument does not proceed correctly, because in this sense the minor is false; and even with such commonality admitted in nature, it is still defended that common nature is multiplied with its unity in each individual, because such commonality is not actual — as if the same nature were actually communicated to many — but aptitudinal, insofar as nature is of itself indifferent to several things disjunctively.

Ripa, *de ente & essentia cap. 4. qu. 2. art. 4. in fine*, proves with Cajetan: things that are convertibly really the same — if one is multiplied, the other is multiplied, because their existence is one, just as their entity is. But nature and its unity are convertibly really the same; therefore when nature is multiplied through haecceities, its unity will also be multiplied.

This argument is not very pressing either, because Scotists who hold the opposing way of speaking immediately deny that nature is intrinsically and per se multiplied through haecceities, and maintain that nature has its adequate unity in all individuals and in them taken together only extrinsically and as it were per accidens.

And if you press again for Cajetan that nature is really identified with singularity, and therefore when singularities are multiplied, nature must also be multiplied, the Scotists will immediately respond from Cajetan's own doctrine used in the argument: that proposition — "when two things are really the same, if one is multiplied the other must be multiplied too" — is true when they are adequately and convertibly identified with each other. In this sense, common nature is not identified with this or that singular, but only inadequately and non-convertibly; and by this same response the first argument familiar to the more recent authors could be evaded — drawn above, n. 178, from the real identity of formal unity

with numerical, by which they argue that the former must be plurified at the latter's plurification.

The right and fundamental proof of this conclusion must therefore be drawn from what was said in q. 5 about the commonality of nature; for the commonality of nature's unity will be of the same kind as that of nature itself. And since it was proved there that nature is not common through inexistence — as if it were one and the same nature in all, that is, the same physical entity under diverse individual differences — but is truly multiplied in itself in each singular, such that it is said to be common only through indifference (insofar as what constitutes one individual in specific being could equally, of itself, constitute another), so consequently it must be said that the formal unity, when nature is multiplied in individuals, does not remain one in all and undivided, but is itself also multiplied along with nature. For if the formal unity of nature were posited as one in all adequately and not multiplied in each, this would be the case because of one and the same entity of nature that is one and the same in all individuals; and this is the reason why Scotists of the opposing position maintain that the unity of nature is one in all and each individual. Since, therefore, nature is not so one and the same in all, but rather multiplied in each, the same must be said about its unity — that it is multiplied in individuals along with nature itself, such that the formal unity of Peter's nature is one thing and the formal unity of Paul's nature is another, just as each is entitatively and physically a different humanity from the other's. I said "physically," because when the metaphysician considers the essence of nature prescinding from existence, Peter's nature is not different from Paul's nature in a metaphysical sense, since those natures are of the same essence and account, as they in no way differ in their constitutive principles.

Nor does it suffice to say with Scotists of the opposing position that the formal unity of Peter's humanity and the formal unity of Paul's humanity are distinct only extrinsically and materially, but intrinsically and formally are one and the same unity — just as the entity of nature is one and the same intrinsically and formally speaking. This common evasion of theirs does not help, I say, because the unity of nature must be multiplied in the same way as nature itself, with which it is identified as its proper property. Since, therefore, nature is multiplied in individuals not only materially and merely extrinsically by reason of haecceities, but also in some way intrinsically and in the account of nature — as was proved in the cited passage, from n. 112 — it follows consequently that the formal unity of nature is also multiplied in individuals in the same way, and not merely extrinsically and materially — that is, precisely by reason of the numerical multiplication of unity; for in that case only numerical unity would be said to be multiplied, not formal unity in itself considered as such.

But here it must again be noted that even in explaining the real commonality of nature and its unity through simple indifference and not through inexistence, the argument that the Thomists commonly use for this conclusion — that formal

unity must be multiplied because it is the same as numerical unity which is multiplied — does not conclude correctly. The reason is that nature, by reason of such commonality, is not limited of itself so as to be in only one individual, but regards several individuals and extends to several — not indeed actually and conjunctively, but only in aptitude and disjunctively. From this it follows that when it is contracted to one individual, it does not have its adequate act, but can still be in others; and from this latitude it follows that even though it is not actually identified with several singularities, it can be so identified with them disjunctively. From this it follows finally that it is not adequately identified with any one of them, for it is identified with one in such a way that it can also be identified with another. Once this is admitted, the said argument — founded on the identity of formal unity with numerical — is immediately weakened; for the proposition that "what are really identified, if one is multiplied, the other is also multiplied" is valid, as I said, when they are really and adequately and convertibly identified — which is not how nature is identified with singularity, nor formal unity with numerical. Hence that argument does not press, from the very fact that nature is asserted to be common on the side of reality — whether this is through inexistence or through simple indifference. The conclusion with the Thomists about the multiplication of formal unity therefore stands, but their arguments should be set aside.

You will say: either the formal unity of humanity in Peter is common or it is individual and singular; if the first, then it is not multiplied in Peter and Paul, but is one and the same common to both and not divided among them; if the second, then the Thomist argument holds — that it must be multiplied along with the singular unity from which it is in no way distinguished on the side of reality.

The response is that it is common and individual simultaneously, but in different ways: common intrinsically and essentially, but individual extrinsically and accidentally. Or, as others put it, it is singular and individual as the *Quod* — that is, as the thing itself — but formal and common as the *Quo* — that is, as that by which; for nature in the singular, as affecting it, makes it formally one. But it is common not through inexistence — for then the consequence would follow that it would be one in all and not divided — but through simple indifference alone. Hence it is also called the unity of indifference, with which the multiplication of nature and its unity in all and each individual is fully compatible, because such indifference does not require that one and the same nature be in all individuals really and physically undivided, but only metaphysically — such that there are several physical entities of the nature of Peter and Paul, but of entirely the same account, such that what constitutes Peter is of itself indifferent to constituting Paul, and vice versa — which cannot be said of their haecceities.

I say fourth that the formal unity of nature in individuals does not import mere bare similarity found among them on the side of reality, but the preceding unity of indifference which is the proximate foundation of such similarity and

conformity. This conclusion is against Aversa, *qu. 8. sect. 6*, and against other more recent authors who acknowledge no other unity of nature in individuals, and especially against Poncius, *disp. 3. Log. q. 2*, where at n. 42 he further asserts that this was Scotus's meaning, and that the arguments Scotus makes in *2. dist. 3. q. 1* conclude no greater unity — which no Scotist or Thomist has ever asserted, since all Scotists unanimously intend through those arguments to conclude that nature in individuals has a greater unity on the side of reality than mere similarity and conformity; and all Thomists also understand Scotus in this sense, and dispute against him, for if Scotus posited no other unity in nature than similarity and conformity, there would be no disagreement between Scotus and St. Thomas, since the Thomists freely concede this unity — it is so obvious that Scotus would have labored in vain to prove it by so many means in that passage.

And indeed the chief argument the Doctor adduces about similarity and agreement evidently shows that the unity of nature in individuals is greater than the unity of similarity and conformity, as I showed in the preceding question, n. 140. This is also confirmed because similarity rather involves the distinction of those that are similar, and nature with respect to its essential predicates is constituted in what is indivisible, as Aristotle teaches, *8. Met. tex. 10*; furthermore, from the same *5. Met. 20*, the relations of equiparance are founded on the unity of nature, called the unity of indifference, as I deduced there — and at n. 141 and following, I closed off various evasions of the opponents.

Hence it remains not only to reject the response of Poncius, *loc. cit. n. 41*, where after giving the common solution of the more recent authors and its extension to the text of Aristotle, *5. Met. cap. ad aliquid*, he responds secondly that if some unity antecedent to similarity is required between the nature of Peter and the nature of Paul, this is nothing other than representability through the same species or formal concept — such that whatever two things are representable through the same species, concept, or cognition, must be said to be one and consequently similar — and this unity, he says, can optimally be called formal and essential unity, because it is the unity corresponding to things by reason of essence; it is also less than numerical unity, because things that are numerically one are really identified and one cannot be without the other, whereas things that are one in this way are not really identified and one of them can exist without the other; and this very unity is well called a property of nature, for it is a property of nature that it can be represented through such a concept — which concept can formally represent another nature.

But this solution does not evacuate the force of the argument either, because as was said in *disp. 2. de Anim. quaest. 4*, the object does not receive its unity from the concept but rather the concept from the object, since powers are specified through acts and acts through objects, from *2. de Anim. 33*. It is therefore wrongly said that Peter and Paul are essentially one because they are representable through the same formal concept, as if they received unity from that confused

act and from the unity of that act — since the reverse is rather the case, and the unity of that concept depends on the unity of nature found in them. Furthermore, as Poncius himself admits, the reason why the formal concept explicating the essence of Peter and Paul is one is that they themselves are representable through the same concept. I then ask: why does this same representability belong to them? Either because they have one and the same essence in some way on the side of reality — and the intended conclusion follows — or because they have similar and conformed essences, and then this unity of representability will not be antecedent to the similarity between the nature of Peter and the nature of Paul, as was said in the response, but will rather be subsequent — or a vicious circle is committed, since the unity of similarity is explained through the unity of representability, and vice versa. Furthermore, the formal concept that essentially represents Peter and Paul is univocal; therefore, corresponding to it in Peter and Paul there must be one account of nature at least through indifference, or one objective concept, upon which the univocation of the formal concept is founded — for to found univocation, the mere unity of similarity does not suffice, that is, having several similar accounts; for such unity usually produces only analogy, not proper univocation.

I further prove with Zerbus, 7. *Met. q. 17. § propter secundum*, that the formal unity of nature in individuals does not import pure and bare unity of similarity and conformity. The question is: what is that in which all singulars of some species are essentially conformed? Either it is a real being or a being of reason. The second cannot be said, because similarity is real. If it is something real, it cannot be some singular nature communicable to many, because this is found only in the divine. Therefore it will be some one nature common through indifference.

You will say with the Hervaeans and the older Thomists that the foundation of such similarity is all the singulars as conformed. Against this: all singulars as conformed either say something beyond what they are when considered absolutely, or they do not. If not, then since all singulars taken absolutely are many, as many, therefore all singulars as conformed will be many, as many; and since, on the offered response, this is the very thing in which they are conformed, the account of plurality as such would be the formal account of conformity and unity — which is impossible. But if all singulars as conformed say or import something beyond what they are when considered absolutely, it is either something accidental — and this is not the case, because then it would follow that all human beings are essentially conformed through some accident, which is contradictory — or something substantial; and since this is real (since we are now prescinding from all operation of the intellect), and since according to this position nothing one is real except the singular, it follows that all human beings as essentially conformed include some singular or some numerically one thing beyond themselves taken absolutely — which is absurd, because then some singular in creatures would be communicable to several, which is reserved to the divine Persons alone. It remains, therefore, that that in which all human beings

agree really and essentially is nature one in all with the unity of indifference and common to all with the commonality of the same account — that is, of indifference.

Furthermore, the Nominalists and Thomists who concede only this unity of similarity to nature in individuals do not agree sufficiently among themselves in explaining it. The Nominalists deny that it is a relation added to the extremes, and hold it imports only the coexistence or combination of two individuals in the same species; the Thomists concede that it is a true and proper relation really added to the extremes from the fourth predicament. And each group faces difficulties: from the Nominalists it must be demanded what that coexistence of two individuals in the same species signifies — either it adds something to the absolute entities of the extremes (and this is what they could have said about similarity itself, which will accordingly be some relation), or it precisely says the absolute entities of Peter and Paul themselves; and then it follows that those individuals are similar to each other even according to their proper individual differences — which is utterly false. But if with the Thomists similarity is said to add to the extremes a real relation from the fourth predicament, since this is an accident, it follows that Peter and Paul agree essentially with each other through some accident, and that this accident is a property of nature — which is the opposite in terms. It is therefore better to say that that in which they agree is one nature common to both through indifference, in which similarity is founded.

Some Thomists, in order not to concede this commonality on the side of reality through indifference, respond from Cajetan, *cap. 4. de ente & essentia*, that the agreement and similarity found among individuals of the same species is founded on the negation of formal division which is found in them — not as one common to all, but multiplied in each. But this was refuted above, n. 167, because since the agreement and similarity of individuals of the same species is real and positive, its foundation must also be real and positive. Therefore it cannot be founded on a pure and simple negation; and I added other reasons there destroying this solution.

Article II. Arguments to the Contrary Are Resolved

First: against the first conclusion, Aversa, *q. 8. cit. sect. 6*, argues, proving that nature is not formally one or undivided on the side of reality in individuals. There cannot be a unity that is undividedness unless by reason of an entity that is undivided and one; but the entity of nature is not undivided in individuals — on the contrary, it is truly multiple and divided. Therefore such formal unity of nature is not found on the side of reality in several individuals. Nor can it be said that individuals or nature in individuals are distinguished materially and really but not formally. For with real division standing, it is unclear what this formal undividedness and unity on the side of reality could be, and it does not appear how in one way nature could be divided and in another way undivided even on

the side of reality; with real division can stand at most only agreement and similarity.

He confirms: for some things to be formally or essentially one is to have one form and one essence; but in fact the form itself and the essence, which is nature, is not one but multiple and divided; therefore individuals among themselves cannot be attributed formal and essential unity, taking unity for undividedness, given real division.

He confirms finally: whatever is in one individual is really divided and separated from what is in another individual, and even the superior essential predicates are divided in them — humanity, animality, corporeity, etc. — therefore what is thus adequately really divided and separated cannot have among themselves any unity and undividedness on the side of reality, as if in some account they were divided and in some undivided, and the same thing on the side of reality.

The response is that these and similar arguments proceed against those who posit one and the same nature in several individuals through inexistence, not against those who posit it as one in individuals only through indifference, because — as was declared in conclusion 3 — with such unity and commonality of nature through simple indifference, the multiplication of the same in each individual is perfectly compatible. The unity of indifference is the unity of metaphysical nature, which regards the real essence of nature as it abstracts from individuating conditions; whereas the unity of inexistence, or entitative unity, is physical unity, which regards essence as existing and determined to singularity. Hence this entitative unity properly imports undividedness in an entity existing on the side of reality, whereas the other imports only undividedness in essence as it abstracts from existence, from which it follows that it is false that there can be no undividedness on the side of reality that is not entitative; for there can be essential undividedness, which concerns essence as it prescends from existence.

You will say: if it concerns essence as prescinding from existence, then it is not undividedness or unity belonging to nature on the side of reality or as existing — in which sense the question about the unity of nature is being treated here. The response is that by essence prescinding from existence is to be understood not only the essence of nature in the state of potentiality, before it is produced or in its objective being with the abstracting intellect, but also in the state of actuality — insofar as while remaining under existence it is still formally, or at least modally, distinguished from it on the side of reality, and in this way it is called by the name of essence. For under the name of entity it is signified as, as it were, enveloped with existence. In this sense, therefore, the essential undividedness of individuals is said to concern essence as it prescends from existence — insofar, namely, as it belongs to essence whether it exists or not. In this same sense, science is said to abstract from existence — not because it cannot be had about existing things, but because it is had indifferently whether they exist or not. Thus in the present case, such unity and undividedness can still be said to be real and to really

belong to nature even as existing — not indeed reduplicatively as such, but specifically — by which the proposed argument along with its confirmations is easily met, despite its great apparent force at first sight.

To the first it is denied that there can be no undividedness on the side of reality that is not entitative and physical; for since there is some degree of being diverse from the individual, a corresponding degree of unity must also be admitted, called essential unity, which — since it follows precisely upon essence as distinguished from existence — is not founded on the undividedness of some entity, but can coexist with entitative division — that is, with several entities of entirely the same account in diverse individuals, such that what now constitutes one in specific being is of itself indifferent to constituting any other in the same being. Hence it is called the unity of indifference, by which it is also clear how the humanity of Peter is really individually divided from the humanity of Paul and yet essentially undivided — which unity is only of indifference, not of inexistence, and therefore coexists perfectly with the multiplication and entitative division of nature.

To the confirmation: I distinguish the major — that for some things to be formally and essentially one is to have one form, one essence, with entitative unity and that of inexistence, I deny; with the unity of indifference, I concede — and I distinguish the minor and deny the consequence in the same way, if essential unity is taken for undividedness of essence; it is conceded if taken for entitative and physical undividedness, because in that sense it is true that one and the same nature is not in all individuals.

To the last: the assumption is true physically and entitatively, not metaphysically; for those predicates physically separated and divided are still of the same account, and so the consequent is to be distinguished: they cannot have any unity and undividedness — physical and entitative, I concede, or through inexistence; metaphysical and through indifference, I deny. Therefore what is divided on the side of reality physically can be metaphysically undivided; and what is plural through inexistence can be one through indifference.

Second, it is argued that Scotus founded this formal unity on the distinction from the side of reality which he established between nature and singularity; but this distinction between them is not given, and even if it were given, it would be wrongly inferred from it that the nature of Peter is not distinguished from the nature of Paul — on the contrary, the opposite would have to be inferred: that in the same way as nature of Peter is distinguished from Petreity, it is also distinguished from the nature in Paul. And if it then seems impossible to distinguish nature from nature except through singularity, from this it would rather have to be inferred that nature cannot be distinguished from singularity on the side of reality.

Furthermore, if such formal unity is given on the side of reality, it is either one in all and each individual — which even we do not concede — or there are individual unities in each individual; and then it cannot be said that on account of such unity this individual is one with that one, that is, undivided and undistinct from it. On the contrary, if they are distinct unities, then the things themselves are truly divided and distinct through them — for this is the way things are distinguished from each other, each through its own peculiar and proper unity. And it is contradictory in terms to say that a thing has in itself a unity distinct from another thing and its unity, and is through that unity one and the same with that thing.

He confirms further: one is said to be undivided in itself and divided from any other, and unity is undividedness in itself and division from any other; therefore through unity itself the thing is formally divided from any other thing. It is therefore contradictory to say that a thing through its unity is one and the same with another thing having another distinct unity.

The response is to deny the minor as regards the first part, as is sufficiently clear from what was said in q. 3. As for the other part: it is false that the Doctor infers from the formal distinction found between nature and haecceity that the nature of one individual is not distinguished from the nature of another — or that one individual is not distinguished from another by reason of nature. This he rather infers from the commonality through indifference which each of those natures possesses of itself: because the nature of the one is of itself indifferent to constituting the other in the same specific being, and vice versa, therefore those individuals cannot be distinguished from each other through their natures, nor can natures be distinguished from each other — because since they are of entirely the same account, they are not reasons for distinguishing but for assimilating. Nor is it well inferred from the fact that the nature of Peter is distinguished from Petreity, that it must also be so distinguished from the nature in Paul — for nature and Petreity in Peter are entities of an altogether different account: one is communicable and the other incommunicable, one contracting and the other contractible, one is the reason for assimilating and the other the reason for distinguishing. Whereas the nature of Peter and the nature of Paul, compared to each other, are so entirely of the same account that they cannot be discerned from each other except when taken as conjoined with singularities; and this is especially because real distinction is founded on diversity of existences, and existence belongs to nature only through the mediation of singularity — from which it follows that one nature cannot found a real distinction from another with singularities set aside, as was said above.

To the second point: I say that in each individual the formal unities are multiplied along with nature; and those unities do not essentially distinguish those individuals from each other, but from individuals of another species. For example, Peter is not distinguished from Paul through the unity of his humanity, because it is a common unity through indifference; but he is distinguished from

Bucephalus and from whatever else is not constituted through the same essential principles. Hence the argument carries its solution with itself when it says that this is the way things are distinguished from each other — each through its own peculiar and proper unity; because since the formal unity of Peter's humanity is not proper to Peter but is common to him with Paul through indifference, just as humanity itself is, it is therefore not a reason for distinguishing Peter from Paul, but rather for assimilating them; whereas the reason for distinguishing Peter from Paul is his individual unity, which is proper and peculiar to him.

To the last: the response is the same — otherwise through transcendental unity as such one thing would be distinguished from another. Therefore common unity does not divide inferiors contained under the same common generic or specific nature from each other, but from other inferiors contained under a diverse nature to which it is not common. Through proper and peculiar unity it is true that a thing is distinguished from any other; but through common unity — such as the unity of nature — it is distinguished only from inferiors contained under a diverse nature to which it is not common, as was explained. Thus Peter is divided from Paul through his individual unity, but through the formal unity of his humanity he is not divided from Paul — since it is common to both through indifference — but from Bucephalus.

Third: other more recent authors urge the following — the one is said to be undivided in itself and divided from everything else; but nature has this kind of undividedness only when conceived as prescinded from the dividing differences; yet from the very fact that it exists on the side of reality in individuals, it is conceived — indeed it truly is — divided in itself, that is, into several things of the same account. Therefore as it is in individuals it does not have any unity — otherwise it could be simultaneously one and many entitatively, which is so contradictory that it cannot be done even in the divine, for although the divine nature is communicated to several supposita, it is in them neither divided from them nor from itself, because it is whole in each and in all simultaneously, and therefore is individual and singular.

The response is that the major is true in the order in which something is said to be one and undivided; for not only individual but also formal and transcendent unity is given. Therefore the minor is denied if in it the discussion is about formal unity — it is denied, I say, that nature has such unity only when conceived as prescinded from the differences, and that it loses it from the very fact that it is divided through them, for this belongs to it in the state of essence as its proper property, and therefore it retains it also in the state of existence since it is a predicate really identified with it. Nor do haecceities remove such unity, because numerical multitude is not opposed to formal unity but only to individual unity. And so it is not inconvenient for nature to be simultaneously one and many, taking unity and plurality in different senses — one with formal and specific unity, and many with numerical plurality.

You will say: even if individual division is not directly repugnant to formal undividedness, it is still repugnant indirectly, because every division removes some unity; and no other unity besides the formal can be removed from nature — the one it had in the state of essence.

The response is that nature in the state of essence denotes the negation of division through formal principles, and the negation of division through material or individual principles. Therefore when haecceities accrue in the state of existence, they do not remove from nature the first undividedness — since this is not removed except by division through formal principles — but only the second, because it no longer remains undivided as before through individual principles. Hence before, in the state of essence, it had — besides the positive formal unity — a certain negative individual unity, insofar as it was not individually multiplied; and this it loses in the state of existence through the advent of haecceities, as will be more fully explained in resolving the arguments of Cano against the second conclusion.

Fourth: John of St. Thomas argues to the same conclusion — from the very fact that nature is posited outside the intellect, it acquires the state of singularity, since nature cannot be found existing without singularity. But once singularity is posited, not only is the positive commonality that nature had in the intellect removed, but also the negative commonality. This is so: first, because there does not remain one negation in those singularized natures; for just as the specific nature itself is multiplied, so too is the negation of formal division that accompanies nature. Second, because to be common negatively is not to be divided in many; but once singularity is posited, it remains divided in many — since truly and positively nature is multiplied — which is to have the opposite of that negation by which it is negatively common, that is, not divided. Therefore in the state of existence it neither remains one nor negatively common.

The response is to deny the minor — that once nature is in the state of singularity, negative commonality is removed from it — as was proved in q. 4. art. 1. Since singularity happens to it and belongs to it from without, it still remains negatively common under singularity, insofar as it is still true to say of it that it is not of itself this individual nor determined by its essential principles. To the first proof I say that even though nature does not have in individuals one negation of formal division common to all — but each individual has its own negation imported through formal unity — nevertheless, by virtue of such negation or unity, individuals of the same species are said to agree and be similar to each other on the side of reality; and such negation or unity, though multiplied in each, can and should be called common through indifference, since this commonality through indifference does not exclude a multiplicity of unity in each individual. To the other proof the major is denied or rather explained: to be negatively common is not to be of itself this individual, nor to have from within numerical unity or multiplicity, but entirely from without. And therefore even in the state of

singularity nature remains negatively common, and formal unity belongs to it in the same way — negatively common, namely — because the state of singularity is accidental to it, and what comes later does not alter the account of what is prior, as was fully explained in q. 4, cit.

But John of St. Thomas insists that it does not suffice for something not to have some form or accidental predicate of itself, in order to be said simply not to have it — when in reality it belongs to it absolutely, even if not from its proper and intrinsic principles. Just as it is not from its proper principles that a human being is white, or that air is luminous; yet when a human being is actually white and air is illuminated, we cannot say that it absolutely is not such, because it does not have this intrinsically. So nature, even though of itself it is not plurified and divided, and consequently is negatively common — that is, not singular — if it is in fact singularized and multiplied, it no longer remains negatively common, even though from its own principles it is neither common nor singular. And so it should never be conceded absolutely that nature according to itself is negatively common in reality.

The response is that Scotus never calls singularized nature simply and absolutely common or not singular or not individual, but always with an addition — namely, negatively common, not of itself this, not of itself singular — by which way of speaking, it is not absolutely implied that nature lacks singularity (as the arguer urges), but that it does not have it from its own proper and intrinsically principles. This could also be said with truth of a human being who is white on the side of reality: even though one cannot say simply and absolutely that it is not white (because simple negation distributes the term it affects), it can nonetheless be said that it is not of itself white, nor has whiteness from its intrinsic principles. Hence when singularized nature is said to be not of itself this and not of itself singular, the phrase "of itself" does not negate the conjunction of singularity with nature, but indicates the mode of having it — namely, from without — as was explained in q. 4. cit. n. 84.

Fifth: Cano argues against the second conclusion, proving that the unity of nature in individuals is privative. No thing divided into several things according to some unity of it remains, after the division is completed, one by that very unity according to which it was divided, for every division removes some unity from the divided things. But specific nature is divided into individuals according to specific unity; therefore specific nature itself, divided in individuals, does not remain one species in them. The minor is proved because it has no other unity of species according to which it is divided except the specific one.

He confirms: it is impossible for generic nature to be divided except through specific differences, or for specific nature to be divided except through individual ones; but through division the divided thing is cut, and does not remain one as before the division. Therefore division through individual differences removes specific unity, nor can it be removed in any other way, since the species is not

indivisible through essential differences. By this argument the common Scotist solution is attacked — that numerical multitude coexists with specific unity, because numerical multitude is opposed only to numerical unity and not to specific unity — for the argument directly proves that through numerical division specific unity is also removed, and indeed that it is impossible for it to be removed in any other way. Or it must be said that such unities can never be split apart — which seems false, because genus is split through essential differences and species through individual ones.

Finally: a unity that regards its supposita indifferently according to any distance from them — whether finite or infinite — is infinite; but specific unity regards its individuals according to any distance, for specific nature is always necessarily in its individuals however infinitely distant they may be. Therefore if this kind of unity is real, it will be actually infinite.

The response is to concede the major and deny the minor with its proof. For as was said just now: when specific nature is divided through haecceities, it is divided according to the numerical undividedness it had previously — for nature of itself has two things: not to be divided or divisible through formal principles, and not to be divided but to be divisible through individual principles. Therefore division through haecceities removes from nature the second undividedness but not the first, which cannot be removed except by division through essential principles — to which the infima species cannot be subject. And therefore in individuals it still remains formally one, though individually divided.

To the confirmation: the response is that nature, through conjunction with specific or individuating differences, is certainly determined and divided, and as such does not have the unity to which that division is opposed. But since divisions of this kind accrue from without, they are not repugnant to the formal unity that belongs to nature of itself and from within — as all Scotists say unanimously, following whom Amicus, *tract. 4. Log. q. 3. dub. 6. art. 2*, also rightly notes that the assumption of the argument is false — namely, that essential differences split generic unity and individual ones split specific unity — because these divisions accrue from without, and occur through differences that are posterior to the divided thing, and therefore do not remove the unity of the prior thing from every side, but only from the side where they are opposed to it, as was declared. From which he concludes that this argument proves only that division through differences falls upon the formal unity of nature insofar as it multiplies it along with nature in individuals — not because it totally destroys that unity. Hence after the division is completed, nature remains formally one in individuals only through indifference — with which unity I have often said the numerical multiplication of it in each individual is compatible. Therefore that common Scotist response is excellent and unshaken.

To the last: it proves only that this unity is not positively common through inexistence — as if the same real and formal unity belonged to nature as

simultaneously existing in all individuals, which would seem to make it of quasi-infinite perfection and altogether similar to the divine nature which is numerically one in three. But we do not attribute such infinity or illimitateness to nature, because we do not posit it as one in all through inexistence, but through simple indifference — which it also has to constituting several things in the same specific being, not conjunctively but disjunctively. That is, it has the simultaneity of potency, not the potency of simultaneity — in which limitation is recognized.

Sixth: it is argued against the third conclusion, proving that the formal unity of nature is not at all multiplied in individuals but is found adequately one in all. Nature in individuals, considered according to itself or according to its essence, truly has on the side of reality the absence of essential division; therefore it also has in all adequately its own proper real unity. The consequence is evident, and the assumption is proved in several ways. First: nature considered according to itself is not divided into several diverse essences, and is distinguished from every other essence. Second: common nature considered according to itself is a real being; therefore it has a real unity proportioned to itself, since unity is the property of being. Third: human nature and equine nature considered according to themselves are several and really and essentially distinct; therefore each of them is of itself formally one, for plurality or multitude presupposes unities. Finally: common nature considered according to itself is either one or many; not the latter, since it becomes many only through individual differences; therefore of itself it is formally one with that lesser unity.

The response is that these and similar arguments prove only that nature in individuals retains formal unity through indifference — but not that this unity is one in all and not rather multiplied in each individually along with nature itself. Therefore to the argument I distinguish the antecedent: if by absence of essential division you mean the physical and entitative undividedness of nature, which pertains more to existence than to essence, the assumption is denied — because then it would be one and the same nature in all through inexistence, which is impossible in creatures; for we see with our own eyes that the nature of one individual is separated in place and subject from the nature of another. In the second sense, the assumption is conceded, but the consequence is denied — because with that metaphysical and essential undividedness of nature, its physical and entitative division is compatible, and consequently the individual multiplication of formal unity along with nature.

To the first proof of the assumption in the denied sense: essence under that name is signified as prescinded from existence by the side of reality, or at least through the intellect, and as denoting the connection of the essential predicates of the thing; and therefore in that sense it denotes undividedness into several essences. But when it is considered as enveloped with existence under the name of entity, then it is plainly divided into several essences individually, and the formal unity identified with it is multiplied in each individual in the same way.

To the second: common nature considered according to itself and under the name of essence is a real being nominally, and has an essential unity corresponding to it without any physical and entitative division, because this accompanies nature only in the state of existence by reason of individual differences. And therefore in the state of existence the unity of nature is only through indifference, not through inexistence, because it is in each individual simultaneously with nature, multiplied individually.

To the third: it proves only that each nature — human or equine — considered according to itself has its own essential and metaphysical unity; but it does not prove that when contracted to existence it is also physically and entitatively one in all, because by reason of individual differences it is multiplied in each individually along with the very formal unity.

To the last: the response is the same — that nature considered according to itself is formally one; but when it becomes numerically many through the adjoined singularities, this formal unity is multiplied along with it. Since it is the unity of indifference, it is perfectly compatible with numerical multiplicity. Hence the whole argument with all its confirmations proves only that nature — as it precedes any singularity on the side of reality — is formally and essentially one, and through such unity is distinguished from other diverse natures; but it by no means proves that human nature is really and entitatively one in all, because the entitative and physical plurality of humanities is not repugnant to the essential unity of human nature considered according to itself.

Seventh: Pasqualigo argues in several ways, *tom. 2. Met. disput. 15. sect. 2.* Individuation is outside nature considered according to itself, such that the individuation of Peter is outside the nature in Peter and the individuation of Paul outside the nature in Paul; therefore it cannot posit multitude in nature itself, because nothing posits multitude in what is extrinsic to it. Consequently, since there is no other multitude in individuals than what comes from individual being, this division will not remove the unity that belongs of itself to nature, even if nature is posited in several things, but it will still remain one in all with its formal unity.

He confirms: nature in individuals is altogether the same in itself as it is when individuation is prescinded, and says only superadded individual being; but this individual being only posits material division of nature and does not alter the intrinsic being of nature. Therefore nature with this individual being retains its own formal unity of commonality entirely one in all.

Finally: either nature is one and the same in all individuals with singularities set aside, and one sole adequate unity corresponds to it in all — if so, the intended conclusion follows — or not; if not, it will be divided before singularities, and the first division of it will not be through differences; indeed, there will be no need to superadd singularities, because the natures themselves would suffice to

distinguish individuals. Other arguments Pasqualigo assembles at *loc. cit.* — but they all reduce to these three.

The response is, as has been often said: one must not confuse the essential and metaphysical unity of nature with its physical and entitative unity. The former regards essence as such, whether it exists or not; the latter regards essence as enveloped with existence. Individuation certainly does not posit essential multitude in nature — since it is outside its essence — and therefore in individuals nature still retains it, since it imports only the connection of essential predicates in which individuals do not differ. But it does posit entitative multitude, since haecceity is really identified with nature, and therefore at its plurification nature must also really and entitatively be plurified; and in the same way the unity identified with nature is plurified. Nor is the conclusion of physical and entitative unity of nature in several individuals well drawn from its essential and metaphysical unity, because such unity of nature cannot be given in creatures in several individuals — as we see nature persevere in one singular while another perishes. Therefore nature in creatures cannot be said to be one in several on the side of reality except through indifference.

To the confirmation: the response likewise is that it proves only that haecceities do not alter the essential unity of nature, which consists in the connection of predicates and belongs to essence insofar as it abstracts from existence — since it belongs to it whether it exists or not. But it does not prove that they do not posit real and entitative multitude in it, since they are really identified with it; hence nature must be so multiplied at their multiplication, and the formal unity must be multiplied in the same way along with nature — entitatively and really, though not formally and essentially.

To the last: with singularities set aside, nature is one in all with essential unity and through indifference; and with singularities adjoined, this is not altered intrinsically and formally, yet it is altered really and extrinsically — because it is multiplied extrinsically at the multiplication of singularities with which it is really identified. And therefore before the advent of differences, nature is not understood as divided, nor are haecceities superfluous; rather, they are necessary for distinguishing one nature from another, or one individual from another, materially and entitatively. But for a more exact understanding of this difficulty, see what was said in q. 5, n. 125, where in art. 2 other arguments were resolved that are directed against this third conclusion set out in the preceding article.

Finally, against the fourth conclusion, neither the Nominalists nor the Hervaeans have any solid argument by which to prove that the formal unity which nature has in individuals imports only the similarity and conformity of individuals with each other. However, Aversa tries to prove it first by argument: such similarity exists on the side of reality between Peter and Paul because each is called a human being, each an animal, and so forth. Since, therefore, these predicates are common to them on the side of reality by reason of such similarity, formal unity

of nature can rightly be called this — for through it things are said to agree, that is, to come together as it were into one proportion and similarity.

He confirms from the authority of Aristotle, who, 5. *Metaph. cap. 5*, calls such a relation of equiparance by the name of unity, saying: "the same are those whose substance is one; similar are those whose quality is one; equal are those whose quantity is one." Therefore the similarity and conformity of several individuals under the same species is rightly called formal unity of nature, and such unity is rightly explained through such conformity.

The response is in the first place from their own doctrine that similarity does not express unity but rather in its very terms involves distinction of those that are similar; and though through similarity and proportion several things are said to agree — that is, to come together as it were into one — nonetheless this kind of similarity does not always lead us to the unity of univocation, but sometimes only to the unity of proportion and analogy, as they themselves admit. Therefore the formal unity of nature, in which especially the univocation of the infima species is founded, is not well explained through the pure unity of similarity and conformity, unless the unity of indifference precedes — upon which the essential agreement of several individuals under the same species is founded.

To the confirmation from Aristotle: it was already shown above, nn. 45 & 142, that that passage about relations of equiparance is on our side — for the Philosopher says that such relatives are said to be according to one and that such relations are founded on the unity of substance, quantity, or quality. Hence Aristotle calls not similarity or equality itself unity, but their proximate foundation.

Question VIII. What the Unity of Prescission Is and in What State of Nature It Belongs

The unity of prescission is said to be that according to which nature abstracts from any individuation whatsoever, and under which abstraction it is said to be positively common and positively indeterminate with respect to several things. This is also called contrary indetermination, insofar as it positively contrasts with actual determination through a difference and entirely excludes it — for if it admitted any such determination, it would not be said to be equally prescinded from all. Therefore the unity of prescission, of which we speak here, entirely coincides with the unity of positive indetermination which I explained above, q. 4. art. 1. nn. 72 & 73.

Since it is established from what has been said up to now that nature existing in things has on account of itself a certain formal unity — because it is divided in itself and in individuals neither through essential principles — and that this is less than numerical unity, because it admits the aptitude for being in many disjunctively, and has a certain negative commonality intrinsic to itself; and since it is also established from what was said in *disp. 4. Log. quaest. 1 & 2* that nature

having such characteristics — when abstracted from individuals or rendered indeterminate with positive indetermination — is either actually universal or at least the proximate foundation of universality, inasmuch as remaining thus it is in proximate potency to be said of any suppositum by the predication that says "this is this," as the Doctor teaches, *2. dist. 3. qu. 1*: in the present context, before declaring in the following question the universal unity of nature, we must examine whether common nature claims for itself such unity of prescission or positive indetermination before any operation of the intellect, or only in the state of objective existence.

The first opinion affirms that this unity is real and belongs to nature in the real state, though not all explain this in the same way. Fonseca, *5. Met. cap. 28. quaest. 3. sect. 4*, says this unity belongs to nature in the state of essence and considered according to itself, as nature precedes all individual differences — which state is called antecession with respect to contraction through differences. And since such antecession and priority of nature over differences is real, he holds that such unity of prescission is real and belongs to nature in the real state; he adds, however, that this unity is separable from nature, because it belongs to nature according to itself — that is, taken absolutely, as it does not descend to individuals — since when it is contracted to inferiors, the state of antecession is lost and consequently the unity that accompanied it in that state.

Amicus, *tract. 4. Log. quaest. 4. dub. 2. art. 2*, says that given the distinction of degrees on the side of reality (as he holds with the Scotists), the unity of prescission can belong to nature before any operation of the intellect — not only in the state of essence and antecession, as Fonseca said, but also in the state of existence and contraction, though not reduplicatively. The reason is that prescission is either the same as distinction or at least is founded on distinction; if therefore even in the state of existence and contraction, nature is still formally distinguished on the side of reality from individuation, then by reason of such distinction nature can be said to be prescinded from the contracting difference — not indeed prescinded really and separated, but formally, insofar as it does not include it in its formal concept. Therefore even in the state of existence, nature can enjoy the unity of prescission in this sense, because under such prescission only those predicates belong to nature that are essential to it or necessarily flow from its essence; whereas conjunction with haecceities is not essential to nature nor does it flow from its essence, since it can lack either.

Trombetta, finally, holding the same opinion, explains in a different way in what sense nature, according to some real being existing outside the soul, can truly obtain such unity of prescission. For this he premisses two propositions, *7. Met. quaest. 8. art. 2. concl. 2*. The first is that something has being in two ways: one way entirely outside the intellect, and another way in the intellect; and in the intellect in two ways — subjectively and objectively. Subjectively, as the act of understanding, habits, the intelligible species; objectively, and this again in two

ways — habitually and primarily, or actually and secondarily. In the first way, as the object in the species by which it is not actually moving the intellect but is in proximate potency to do so; in the second way, when the species itself is actually moving the intellect — and the object in the species is said to have being objectively and actually in the intellect. But this second mode is further subdivided, since something has objective being actually in the intellect before the act of understanding at least in the order of nature, and something has being after the act of understanding, receiving being through the act itself or through some comparative act of the intellect. In the first way, universal nature in act and positively indeterminate has being in the intellect through the species representing it. In the second way, second intentions have being in the intellect, which second intentions are caused through the collative act of the intellect and remain in the intellect as long as the act of understanding remains. The second proposition he accepts is that Aristotle, in distinguishing being in the soul from being outside the soul, does not take being in the soul subjectively, nor even objectively in the soul — whether habitually or actually before the act of understanding — because the intelligible species, habits, and the act of understanding are beings in the soul subjectively, and are still beings outside the soul since they are true and real qualities; likewise genera and species according to Aristotle — if they are taken as first intentions — are objectively in the soul and are still beings outside the soul, because they exist per se in a genus. From this it follows that being in the soul, as distinguished from being outside the soul, is precisely being objectively in the soul actually after the act of understanding, or receiving being through some collative act of the intellect. From this he finally proves his conclusion: whether nature is taken as having objective being in the soul habitually or actually before the act of understanding, nature so accepted is being from the side of reality; therefore a unity from the side of reality corresponds to it, since to every being its own proper unity corresponds; and such unity can only be the unity of prescission and positive indetermination. So Trombetta argues, *loc. cit.*

The opposing opinion — common among Scotists and Thomists — asserts that no other unity belongs to nature existing outside the soul except the formal one with real negative commonality (especially according to the Scotists), whereas the unity of prescission from individuals, or of positive indetermination, does not belong to nature except when it has been abstracted from individuals through the intellect and rendered positively indeterminate with respect to them. This is expressly taught by the Doctor, *loc. saepe cit. 2. dist. 2. q. 1*, for there he attributes to nature outside the soul only formal unity and negative commonality, and the rest only in the soul. This is so because the unity of prescission, as was said at the beginning of the question, coincides with the unity of positive indetermination, according to which nature is constituted in proximate potency so that it can be said of any suppositum by the predication that says "this is this." But this unity does not belong to nature outside the intellect, as the Doctor notes, §. *Sed contra*,

litt. H, in these words: "for nothing according to any unity in reality is such that according to that precise unity it is in proximate potency to be said of any suppositum." Note those two words: "precise unity" — that is, the unity of prescission — which he says does not belong to nature in reality and outside the intellect. Furthermore, that the unity of abstraction is not real unity he expressly teaches in the same question, §. *Contra istud*, in the fifth argument for real unity less than numerical — for there he assumes that the primary object of sense is one with some real unity, and adds under *litt. D*: "if that argument were to assume that the primary object of sense must be one with real unity, it would not prove as the preceding one, because some primary object could be posited — as adequate to the power — that is something common abstracted from all particular objects, and therefore not having real unity, but only the unity of commonality and abstraction." Therefore he did not think this unity to be real in nature.

But although this common opinion belongs to both Scotists and Thomists, they do not prove it from the same principles. The Thomists are accustomed to prove it from the total identity found on the side of reality between nature and the contracting difference, because where there is no distinction there is no negation of conjunction of two things; but between the degrees of nature and individuation there is no distinction on the side of reality; therefore neither is there a negation of conjunction, in which the unity of prescission is founded — which consists in the negation of division of nature through the contracting differences.

But this proof rests on a false foundation, for it has been proved above that a formal distinction from the side of reality exists between predicamental degrees, and especially between nature and the contracting difference. Hence, from the opposite foundation, the opposite conclusion could rather be deduced, as *Amicus, loc. cit.*, was deducing. Furthermore, the assertors of the opposing opinion would say that the unity of prescission is not founded on the negation of just any conjunction of nature with individual difference, but precisely on the negation of conjunction through formal identity — with which the conjunction through real identity can coexist — and therefore even on the side of reality and under the state of contraction, such unity can belong to nature, though not reduplicatively under that state.

Suárez, *disp. 6. Met. sect. 3. nu. 9*, proves the same from the name and account of this unity, which they call unity of prescission: if, therefore, prescission is not in reality and does not belong to nature of itself but only through the intellect, then neither can the unity belong to nature of itself, setting aside the intellect. Indeed, from the very phrase "according to itself," the operation of the intellect is already involved, because nature is not prescinded or separated from all individual differences except through the work of the intellect; hence whatever belongs to nature "according to itself," taken properly and peculiarly by reason of that condition or state which is explained through the phrase "according to itself,"

belongs to it through the intellect. But such is the said unity; therefore, etc. But this argument too is weakened, like the preceding one, once the formal distinction of nature from haecceity apart from any work of the intellect is admitted with the Scotists. For then one would say that prescission is given in reality — and not only through the intellect — from any individual difference; for even though on the side of reality it is conjoined with Petreity, for example, it is still said to prescind from it on the side of reality, insofar as it excludes it from its formal account just as it does any other whatsoever from which it is not really conjoined.

And to the confirmation it would be said, according to the doctrine given above, nn. 85 & 162, that the phrase "according to itself" is not to be taken negatively — as meaning in isolation and not with others, in which way it imports the per se character of the third mode of per se predication — but is to be taken positively, as signifying the necessary connection of predicate with subject as belonging to its essence and flowing intrinsically from it, in which way it imports the per se character of the first and second mode.

Third, Suárez, *cit. n. 3*, proves the same thus: if it is said that this unity belongs to nature not indeed in the state of existing but of possible essence (for the state of essence is sometimes taken for the state of possibility, as is clear from what was said in *disp. 8*), this does not seem intelligible, because possible essence cannot be conceived as real except at least in aptitude through order to existence; therefore if this unity cannot belong to essence as existing, it does not belong to it as apt for existence either, because just as it does not exist as individual, neither is it apt to exist except as individual. Therefore it does not really belong to it in any way.

He confirms: no essential predicate belongs to nature which cannot belong to individuals by the second ante-predicamental rule. But nature with this unity cannot descend to individuals without contradiction; therefore it does not belong to nature really and essentially.

But neither this argument with its confirmation convinces; to it Amicus, *cit.*, responds well that from eternity both nature and haecceity have had a real concept, though there is not between them from eternity an actual union — because this does not necessarily belong — but a possible union; and so they can constitute an individual according to the concept of essence, in which way nature is not said to be contracted but to be contractible. And for this reason individuals are said to be from eternity possible, because from eternity nature and haecceity have the possibility of union, which doctrine I approved above in this disputation, n. 75.

To the confirmation it can be met from what was said above, n. 98, in a parallel case about the negative commonality of nature, where it was explained in what way certain essential predicates can belong on the side of reality to nature and not to individuals.

Fourth, it can be proved more forcefully, excluding all solutions that might be offered even with the formal distinction between nature and haecceity admitted — because even in Scotus's opinion, even if they are thus distinguished, they are nonetheless not really distinguished. Therefore on the side of reality, nature cannot obtain the unity of prescission from haecceity even with the formal distinction admitted. The consequence is proved: real identity is still sufficient to impede this prescission, since prescission is a kind of negation, and negation is of a malignant nature — it must distributively negate any conjunction of nature with the difference, not only through formal identity but also through real identity.

Amicus, *loc. cit.*, while admitting this argument is difficult to resolve, responds however that here we are not considering what belongs to things as they have real identity, but as they have formal distinction, prescinding from identity or real distinction. And thus we say that nature in the state of essence or solitude — as it is distinct from the differences — has the unity of prescission, insofar as, as such, it does not have conjunction with them. This he says must necessarily also be conceded in the view that grants unity of prescission to nature only from the force of the intellect, for just as cognition does not remove from the object real identity on the side of reality, so neither does it remove the contraction it has on the side of reality, and yet along with that contraction on the side of reality, prescission through the intellect can stand, because along with real identity, a distinction of reason can stand.

Against this: the unity of prescission differs from formal unity in this — that formal unity certainly belongs to nature considered according to itself, where the phrase "according to itself" denotes per se character of the first and second mode, and therefore can also belong to nature in the state of existence, especially as it is formally distinguished from the difference, because under such distinction it includes only what belongs to it in the first and second mode. But the unity of prescission belongs to it "according to itself" as denoting per se character of the third mode and the state of solitude, as Amicus himself also admits, *loc. cit.* But the state of solitude denotes the stripping of nature from every difference whatsoever, and its separation from it — not only through the negation of formal identity, but also of real identity. Therefore the offered response does not suffice.

He confirms: because nature under the unity of prescission has positive indetermination contrary to the determination of singularity — according to which nature is not only not determined through singularity, but has being abstracted from all singularity, according to which it bears itself indifferently to any singular and regards all equally, as Scotus teaches, *loc. cit.* This determination is called positive and contrary because it does not denote negation of singularity in just any way — since nature has this negation also insofar as it is formally distinct from haecceity — but it denotes such a mode of negation of conjunction with singularity that it negates all-encompassing conjunction, such that it would

be repugnant to that state, without its destruction, to have singularity conjoined in any way.

He confirms further: because nature under the unity of prescission is said not only to be not this but positively common and indifferent to many at least in aptitude; but by virtue only of formal distinction it can be said to be not of itself this, not of itself singular. Therefore the formal distinction from haecceity does not suffice for it to be said to have on the side of reality the unity of prescission.

As for the objection that Amicus raises — that we too must accept his solution, since just as abstractive cognition of nature from the differences does not remove the real identity of nature with them on the side of reality, so neither does it remove the contraction it has on the side of reality, and yet with that real identity on the side of reality, prescission through the intellect can stand (since along with real identity both formal distinction and rational distinction can stand) — I confess this presses; nevertheless it can still be parried by showing the disparity: from the force of formal distinction, abstraction of nature from the difference can be made that is only prescissive, not divisive — because by virtue of such distinction it is only understood that it is not of itself this. But when the intellect conceives nature under the unity of prescission, in order to make it universal, it not only makes prescissive abstraction — understanding nature without conceiving singularity — but also divisive abstraction, because it understands it without singularity, indeed under the opposite of singularity — namely, under commonality and positive indifference. Hence for the intellect that nature stands exactly as if it were on the side of reality stripped of all individuation.

You will say: therefore this prescission of nature from the difference made through the intellect will be rather a division than a prescission, and so the intellect will be deceived through such an understanding — since it not only understands the thing thus not as it is on the side of reality, but also under the opposite, because on the side of reality it is with singularity, and the intellect understands it not only without singularity but with a positive commonality opposed to singularity.

The response is that this knot must also be untied by the opponents, because they too concede that nature can be conceived under universality, which is repugnant to the singularity it has on the side of reality. And although such conception has rather the mode of division and intentional separation than of prescission and simple abstraction, it is still made without fallacy and deception. First, because it has a foundation in reality, and finds in nature no repugnance — indeed an aptitude from the side of reality — for being thus conceived; for even though it is singular on the side of reality, this does not belong to its essence either in the first or the second mode, and indeed of itself it is common and indifferent. Second, because when the intellect says that nature is universal and positively common, it does not affirm this of nature according to the real being it has on the side of reality, but according to the intentional being it would have in the intellect.

You will ask: how then does the unity of the common axiom derived from 2. *Phys.* 18 stand — "of those that abstract, there is no falsehood" — which is commonly interpreted of prescissive, not divisive abstraction? For divisive abstraction, they say, cannot occur without falsehood.

The response is that this must be understood of predicates that belong to the thing in the first or second mode of per se predication; for although we can conceive a human being without conceiving risibility, without any falsehood, we cannot conceive a human being without risibility or under the opposite of risibility without prejudice to the essence of the human being. But it is not to be understood of merely accidental predicates, even if inseparable from the thing on the side of reality — for as Porphyry said in *cap. de accidente*: although blackness is inseparable from the crow or the Ethiopian on the side of reality, yet because this is a common accident, not only can the crow or Ethiopian be understood prescissively without conceiving blackness, but also without any falsehood or prejudice to its essence, the crow can be understood divisively — even under the opposite of blackness, namely under whiteness — because this predicate does not belong to its essence either in the first or second mode. Likewise in the present case: although nature is really conjoined with singularity on the side of reality, yet since singularity does not belong to the essence of nature either in the first or second mode but merely happens to nature, therefore nature can without any falsehood be conceived without it — even divisively, indeed under its opposite.

Fifth: it can be further proved by excluding each of the ways in which the opponents try to defend the opposite of our conclusion. And indeed, the way Amicus proposed — that the unity of prescission can belong to nature on the side of reality by virtue of the formal distinction from haecceity — remains sufficiently refuted from what was just said, because from the force of formal distinction nature is only said to be not of itself this, not of itself singular; whereas from the force of the unity of prescission it is said to be positively common, which commonality demands that under that concept nature is neither from within nor from without singular, but excludes all singularity entirely and in every way. Therefore in the state of existence, such unity of prescission cannot belong to nature.

But that it cannot belong to nature in the state of essence either, as Fonseca wished, is proved: by that state of priority and antecession of nature to contraction through differences, either is meant only the priority of nature insofar as it is presupposed to them, or the antecedence of duration in eternity in which it was precisely under the state of possibility. But the priority of nature does not suffice, because such priority does not denote a priority of time in which nature exists and is not yet contracted, but only denotes the independence of essence from differences — for it is not considered with respect to the duration of existence, but with respect to the independence of one from another, whether this is through the causality of one from another or through simple

presupposition. Hence it cannot be explained through the fact that it is prior in some instant in which what is posterior does not exist, but only through the fact that it can be understood prior in some instant in which what is posterior is not understood, as was said in *disp. 9. Log. quaest. 2. art. 1*. But for the unity of prescission it is required that nature precede its contraction in duration, because negation and form cannot be in the same subject in the same instant of duration, even if the instant of duration is divided into diverse instants of nature, as was said in *disp. 4. Phys. quaest. 2*.

Nor is the priority of eternity to time sufficient for this — in which eternity nature was precisely under the state of possibility — since in the same way possible humanity is distinguished from possible Peter as existing humanity is from existing Peter; for a thing does not become a different thing by existing, as was said in the preceding disputation. Therefore, in its own proportionate mode, the unity of prescission is repugnant to nature in the state of possibility just as in the state of existence; for as Lychet notes, *2. dist. 3. qu. 1. §. Respondeo*: "in their own mode, possible nature is identified with possible haecceity in the same way as existing nature with existing haecceity."

Furthermore: even when we refuse to say that nature is contracted in eternity, but only that it can be contracted by individual difference — and that for this reason individuals are said to be from eternity possible, as was said above, n. 138, in resolving the argument of Suárez — still in that state it is not free from the contracting differences as it is in the state of objective existence, because it concerns them at least in aptitude. From this argumentation it is gathered that this unity of prescission cannot be real in nature, because it is not well accommodated to nature either in the state of actuality or in the state of possibility, but only in the state of objective existence.

Finally, it is proved by refuting also the way of speaking of Trombetta, *cit. n. 135*: from what he himself concedes, the unity of prescission or abstraction does not belong to nature as it exists on the side of reality, but only insofar as through the agent or possible intellect it receives that abstracted being from individuals — and this either in the intelligible species of the universal, insofar as it receives that being represented as universal and sequestered from all individual difference, or in the cognition itself of the common nature, insofar as it receives that being expressed as universal and sequestered from all individual difference. But common nature thus — either represented universally or expressed universally — has no real being of real existence or of essence, but only the being of extrinsic denomination, which is being in some respect and of reason, as the Doctor teaches, *1. d. 3. qu. 6. § Dicitur, quod terminus actionis intellectus agentis &c.*, and with him Lychet, Bargius, and other interpreters, *ibid.* Therefore the unity of prescission that belongs to nature thus understood cannot be a real unity belonging to nature as having being outside the soul.

He confirms: because nature does not abstract from individuation except through the work of the agent or possible intellect, as Trombetta himself admits. Therefore it has from the intellect that it is one with this unity of prescission, and so does not claim it for itself insofar as it is outside the soul.

He confirms further: because nature, insofar as it is abstracted, has no being outside the soul — for outside the soul it is not abstracted. Therefore the unity of prescission which belongs to it as abstracted cannot be accommodated to it outside the soul.

The response for Trombetta is that this argument proves only that abstracted nature does not have altogether real subjective being outside the soul, but not that it does not have real objective being in the soul and also outside the soul, insofar as the phrase "outside the soul" is opposed to being of reason.

Against this: objective being of things is not some true real being that is their formal being — as if produced anew in the soul, as he presupposes — but is either the being of extrinsic denomination that things outside have from the fact that the intelligible species or the cognition produced bears a certain relation to them, or it is the being of the intelligible species or cognition in which the things themselves are represented and expressed. Hence in no way can it be maintained that nature, insofar as it has formally abstracted being, has real being. Furthermore: it is not necessary that if nature — which is offered to the soul as an object — is real and has real being outside the soul, the mode and condition under which it is offered to us is also real and outside the soul; but it can arise through the work of the soul itself, as is clear from the very name of abstraction and prescission.

Objections Are Resolved

First: against the above, you will object for Fonseca — common nature precedes at least in nature the individual difference; therefore in that prior moment nature will exist while the difference does not yet exist, or at least is not yet understood, and so in that prior moment it will have the unity of prescission from all difference.

He confirms: if common nature were to exist on the side of reality without contraction to individuals, it would have this unity; therefore since common nature before any operation of the intellect precedes all individuals, in that state of antecedence it will have this unity.

The response is to deny both consequences, because — as was said above — the priority of nature is not the antecedence of duration as if in some moment nature exists or at least can exist without individual difference (for the existence of a thing is not measured by instants of nature but of duration), but is only the priority of independence, or of natural presupposition, or of preunderstanding with a foundation in reality. And therefore just as in reality it never is, nor can be,

without such differences, so it can never claim for itself on the side of reality this real unity of prescission. To the confirmation: the assumption being conceded, the consequence is denied, because if nature were to exist on the side of reality without contraction, then it would precede the differences not only in the priority of nature but also in duration; but now it precedes them only in the priority of nature or natural understanding.

Second: you will object with the foundation of Amicus reported above from the beginning of the question. For with the distinction of degrees between themselves admitted, as the Scotists admit — actually on the side of reality — it does not seem possible to deny the unity of prescission to nature on the side of reality: nature prescends from the contracting difference in the same way as it is distinguished; but it is distinguished on the side of reality formally and not only through the intellect; therefore the unity of prescission belongs to it on the side of reality and not only through the intellect.

The response is that although for this reason the opposing opinion seems to the Scotists capable of being probably defended, it is better to say that nature, insofar as it is formally distinguished from individuation on the side of reality and precedes it in the order of nature, claims for itself no other unity than the formal one with negative commonality — since formal unity and negative commonality follow upon it as properties. Therefore the unity that belongs to nature by reason of distinction is pure formal unity, not the unity of prescission, because for the latter it does not suffice that nature be distinct from haecceity — there is also required the negation of conjunction with it. Since this cannot be had on the side of reality but only through the intellect that separates and divides nature from the difference, consequently the unity of prescission resulting from such negation can be had only through the work of the intellect. And Meurisset, *lib. 2. Met. c. 3. q. 5. concl. 1*, also holds this view, saying that prescission from the difference belonging to nature on the side of reality by virtue of formal distinction is only negative, and consists in this — that nature does not include the difference; but positive prescission adds an act of the intellect carrying away and casting off the contracting conditions, and as it were extracting and separating nature from them. From which he concludes that the unity consisting in this is only of reason.

Third: you will object with the foundation of Trombetta from n. 135: abstracted nature — whether through the work of the agent or possible intellect — truly precedes in time and in nature the act of understanding and is in the intellect objectively not only actually before the act of understanding, but also habitually; therefore it truly has existence that is real and not intentional, accepted through the act of understanding; therefore it has also real unity proportioned to it in that state — which cannot be other than the unity of prescission, as was argued above, *loc. cit.*

The response is that this argument proves only that nature itself which is abstracted truly has real being outside the soul — which we concede — but that

nature itself, as having abstracted being, claims some formal real being for itself: this is not sufficiently proved. For even though nature having abstracted being precedes the act by which it is extrinsically denominated abstracted and understood, it does not precede every act of the agent or possible intellect through whose work it is abstracted and extrinsically denominated abstracted; hence just as it does not follow that "a wall is said to be seen before the intellect considers it, therefore the being-seen of the wall is the real being of the wall" — since it is only the being of extrinsic denomination — so neither in the present case. Furthermore, when Trombetta, *cit. n. 135*, said that genera and species are placed in the right line of predication, this is true regarding the natures of genera and species that are in things outside, but not regarding that condition of abstraction and the mode by which they are precisely represented by us universally in that line; for as Scotus teaches, that mode of universality is the mode of understanding real things, and is not a mode of the intellect or part of their primary concept, because it is not of metaphysical concepts.

Supposing, therefore, that this unity of prescission does not shine forth in nature except through the work of the intellect prescinding it from individuation, the question is usually raised: whether to have this unity — which afterward serves for the universality of nature — it suffices to abstract nature from one individual, or whether it is necessary to abstract it from several compared to each other as similar. That abstraction from one is sufficient is held by Hurtado, *disp. 5. Met. sect. 9.*; Smiglecius, *disp. 4. qu. 4.*; Amicus, *tr. 4. Log. q. 2. dub. 5. in fine*; Aversa, *q. 8. Phil. sect. 11.*; and Pasqualigo, *to. 2. Metaph. disp. 29*. That it does not suffice, but that abstraction from several is necessary, is asserted by Oviedo, *controv. 5. Log. punct. 7*.

Two arguments are usually offered for the first opinion, which Oviedo, *cit.*, adduces and resolves. The first is: nature abstracted from one individual is cognized without singularity; but nature cognized without all singularity is abstracted from all, because to abstract is to cognize one without another; therefore nature abstracted from one individual stands in the same relation as if it were prescinded from all, and can in the same way serve for the universality of nature, whether constituting it formally or at least proximately founding it.

Oviedo responds that these authors have not attentively considered what it is for the intellect to abstract one predicate from another. For abstraction does not merely mean cognizing one without another — when I cognize an animal without cognizing a stone, I am not said to abstract animal from stone. Therefore to abstract is to cognize one without another that is identified with it, from which the abstracted predicate is said to be abstracted since it is cognized without what it is identified with and with which it stands. From this doctrine he not only resolves but also retorts the argument: he resolves it by conceding that nature abstracted from one individual is cognized without all difference, and denying that it is abstracted through the intellect from all — but only from those with

which it is identified. It would be abstracted from all, though, if it were identified with all. He then retorts the argument: nature that is cognized without individual differences can only be predicated of what it is really and physically identified with; but nature in Peter — however it is cognized without individual differences — is really and physically identified only with Peter, because abstraction through the intellect does not give to it a real identity it does not have of itself. Therefore nature in Peter, however cognized without all differences, can only be predicated of Peter, and consequently cannot serve for the universality of nature, which must be predicated of all and each.

But although the stated argument for the first opinion could be more correctly constructed than Hurtado does it, it can still be defended from the solution and refutation of Oviedo. For when the authors of the first opinion say that nature abstracted from one individual is also abstracted from all, they do not assert this absolutely but with a certain qualification — namely, that it stands in the same relation as if it were prescinded from all. As Pasqualigo, *cit. sect. 2. nu. 11*, explains: from the very fact that nature is explicitly abstracted from one individual, it is also implicitly abstracted from the rest, by reason of the unity of nature in all inferiors — since nature with respect to essential predicates is one and indivisible essence with respect to all; hence when the whole essence of nature is abstracted from one individual, there is also abstracted all that the other individuals say in the account of such essence, the individualizations being left behind. In this sense, therefore, nature abstracted from only one individual is said to also be abstracted from the others implicitly, because it is one and the same nature of all at least through indifference. This can be further declared thus: nature, when abstracted from only one individual, says the whole formal being of nature according to itself and involves all of it — just as if it were abstracted from all simultaneously, because given that it were abstracted from all simultaneously, nothing more would be abstracted pertaining to the essential being of nature than what was abstracted from one alone. Therefore abstraction of nature from one alone is equivalent to abstraction of the same from all simultaneously; and in this sense the argument offered for the first opinion proceeds.

From this same doctrine, a response can also be given to the retorted argument: nature prescinded from one individual — after abstraction has been made — has not only the aptitude to be through identification in that individual from which it was abstracted, but also to be in others at least disjunctively; and this aptitude is not remote as it was in the state of contraction, where the impediment of the contracting difference was present, but proximate — because the impediment of individuation has been removed through abstraction. And therefore nature thus abstracted can be predicated at least aptitudinally not only of the individual from which it was abstracted, but also of others.

He confirms the solution: because nature abstracted from one individual lacks all individuation and consequently stands in the mode of a metaphysical potency

proximately contractible; and since it does not have any determination, it will stand as something proximately indifferent — no more determined to one individual than to that one. Therefore just as it can be proximately contracted through identity to this and that, so it will also be able to be predicated of them at least aptitudinally.

Another argument for the first opinion: nature abstracted from one individual is predicable of that individual from which it was abstracted; therefore of the remaining individuals similar to it as well; and thus it is no more predicable of one than of all; therefore prescission of nature from one individual is sufficient to constitute or at least proximately found the universality of nature.

The first consequence is proved: because nature thus abstracted is positively indifferent to all individuals, and applicable to them; for after abstraction from this individual it belongs no more to it than to any other similar ones — otherwise it would not have been abstracted.

Oviedo responds that the cognition prescinding nature from one individual only attains that one individual, from whose difference nature is said to be abstracted, and regards all the rest in no way per se, and therefore cannot be predicated of them but only of the individual from which it was abstracted. But this solution is rejected from the refutation of the solution to the first argument — indeed from the second argument itself — because nature once abstracted from one individual is afterward positively indifferent to all the others and proximately contractible through identification with them; therefore of all of them it is proximately predicable, since aptitudinal predication is founded on such aptitudinal identification.

He confirms: if nature abstracted only from Peter is predicable only of Peter, then nature abstracted only from Peter and John can only be predicated of Peter and John; therefore for nature to be predicable of all individuals, it must be abstracted from all. Oviedo responds that all these consequences are legitimate and all the consequences are true and must be admitted without fear. But if Oviedo does not fear this absurdity, I do not know what other absurdity he could fear — for in order for the intellect to abstract one thing from another, it must cognize not only the abstracted formality, but also that from which it abstracts, as the *a quo* term. Therefore in order to abstract nature from all individuals, it must cognize not only all individuals existing under some species, but also all possible ones — which is altogether impossible for the created intellect.

To clarify what I think about this dispute, however, I judge that this contention can only be about a mere name, since both parts can be asserted — namely, that nature which is to become universal can be abstracted from one individual alone and from several — if the matter is stated without confusion. For if the discussion is about actually existing individuals, it is certain that a plurality of individuals is not necessary for nature to be abstracted from them, and it can be equally well

abstracted from one alone as from several, as I said in *disp. 4. Log. q. 2. art. 1*, in the solution of the first argument to the last confirmation — otherwise solar nature could not found universality, since only one individual exists under that nature. But if the discussion is about individuals not only existing but also possible, then indeed a plurality of individuals is necessary for abstraction of nature — as is shown by an evident argument: for the intellect to abstract nature from individuation, it must first know the formal or at least virtual distinction of nature from individuation; but the intellect perceives such distinction between nature and individuation because it knows that the same nature found in one individual is also found — or at least can be found — in another, and that the same individual being is not. Since, therefore, the intellect cannot perceive such a distinction except by making a comparison of several individuals with each other — whether actually existing or at least possible — and without knowledge of the similarity obtaining among them, it follows a fortiori that in this sense, for the abstraction of nature in which several individuals agree, a plurality of individuals is necessary, since similarity — whether actual or possible — can only obtain among several, for nothing is similar to itself.

He confirms: because our intellect, at least in this state, cannot gather the communicability of nature and discern this from individual being by reason of this communicability, except by making a comparison between individuals with respect to their similarity and conformity. Therefore the plurality of individuals in this sense must precede the abstraction of nature as its foundation.

Finally, once a comparison of several individuals with each other has been made — following the similarity of nature, by which the intellect perceives the distinction obtaining on the side of reality formally or at least fundamentally between nature and individuation — the intellect can at will abstract nature from those several individuals or from only one of them, not conceiving its individuation. And nature thus abstracted will be able to be universalized, because as such it has the unity of prescission, and in that state enjoys positive indifference to being in several things, and consequently is of a nature apt to be predicated of several. Hence in that state it either is actually universal or is at least the proximate foundation of universality, according to the variety of opinions about the universality of nature — of which, in the following question.

It is therefore clear how this contention among the more recent authors is to a great extent about a name, and how in one or another sense each part of the problem can be maintained. And since Pasqualigo, *loc. cit. sect. 2*, also concedes all of this and freely admits that in no way can nature be abstracted — neither from one nor from several individuals — unless there has first been a comparison by which the individuals were collated with each other; and where he also rightly reprehends Suárez, who says the opposite, *disp. 6. sect. 6. num. 11* — I do not see why, given this premised doctrine, he then assertively holds the other part of the problem, namely that it is not necessary for nature to be abstracted from several

individuals, but that it suffices to be abstracted from one alone; for in order to speak consistently, he ought rather to have said that each part of the problem can be defended in one sense or another, as we have established.

Question IX. What Universal Unity Is, and in What State of Nature It Belongs

In order to see what universal unity truly is, and whether it is a real or a rational unity, we must first examine what the universal is in act and formally — for it is the universal so understood that is considered the universal properly and strictly speaking by everyone. Indeed, the definition that the Doctor indicated at *1 Met. q. 6 n. 5* and *lib. 7 q. 13 n. 9*, and expressed most clearly at *2 dist. 3 q. 1 § Sed contra lit. H*, appears to be accepted by all and in every school: the universal in act is that which has an indifferent unity, by virtue of which it is the same, and is in proximate potency to be predicated of any suppositum whatsoever by a predication that says "this is this." He derives this from Aristotle, *1 Post. 25*, where Aristotle says that the universal is what is one in many and of many — which commentators universally interpret as meaning "being in" and "being said of," either in act or at least in proximate aptitude and near potency. For a remote potency to be in many and to be said of many does not suffice to constitute the universal in act and formally, as we are speaking of it here; it constitutes the universal only in potency and fundamentally. Since this has been treated at length at *disp. 4 Log. q. 1 art. 2*, there is no need to add anything further on this point here.

Furthermore, the universal is commonly distinguished by all into the physical, metaphysical, and logical. By the physical universal is understood the nature existing in singulars with its formal unity, which is less than numerical; by the metaphysical universal is understood the nature as it is abstracted by the work of the intellect, stripped of differences and clothed with the unity of precision; and by the logical universal is understood the same nature as affected by the second intention of universality, by which it is related to its inferiors as their superior and as predicable of them. It is true, however, that the older authors omitted the first member and distinguished only the logical and the metaphysical universal, calling the former the formal universal and the latter the fundamental universal — which they in turn divided into the proximate and remote foundation of universality. They called the remote foundation the nature in the state of contraction by the difference on the part of the thing, and the proximate foundation the same nature in the state of abstraction by the intellect from individuating conditions. This can be seen in our Parisians, *tract. univerf. qu. 1* — Barg. and Viger., *1 d. 3 q. 6*; Ant. And., *7 Met. qu. 18*; Scotus himself, *ibid.*; Tromb., *qu. 8 and 9*; Zerb., *qu. 17*. Hence the physical universal was included under the remote metaphysical universal, and quite reasonably so, as I noted at *disp. 4 Log. cit. qu. 2 art. 2 in fin.* — for among the ancients, matter was commonly understood as the physical universal and genus. Hence the more recent authors err, and err notably, when in the aforementioned division of the universal they omit the third

and most principal member, namely the logical, and assign only the physical and metaphysical universal, as can be seen in Pasqualig., *tom. 2 Metaph. disput. 18 sect. 3*.

Article I. What the Universal Properly So Called Is

The difficulty is this: to which of the universals does the assigned definition of the universal properly and formally so called apply? Pasqual., at the cited place, affirms that it applies to the metaphysical universal, and thus applies the definition of the universal in act brought forward by Scotus to the metaphysical universal, claiming this to be the mind of the Doctor. Others — and this is the common opinion — affirm that it applies only to the logical universal, and that it is of the logical universal that the Doctor speaks at the cited place. This is the view I myself defended at *disp. 4 Log. cit. q. 1 art. 2*. Meurisse, *lib. 2 suae Met. cap. 3 qu. 5*, says that the definition applies neither to the metaphysical nor to the logical universal, but to a certain universal mixed from both, which he calls the "metaphysicological," which involves both the material and the formal aspect of universality — namely, the nature as it has been abstracted by the intellect from individuating conditions and as it has been affected by the second intention of universality, by which it is related to its inferiors as their superior and predicable of them. This, he says, is the universal properly and formally so called, of which the Doctor speaks. He adds that no one should imagine that the actual universal which arises through the comparative act of the intellect is simply universal for its formal part in the mind of Scotus, because on his doctrine, that actual universal has being in many and being said of many in such a way that each one is it — as each individual of human nature is a human being — whereas the universal for its formal part does not stand thus with respect to the many, such that each is it; for it is not each individual of human nature that is the species, but rather the human being. Other Scotists, finally, concede that only the logical universal is the universal properly and formally so called, but distinguish a twofold logical universal: one per se and another per accidens. The logical universal per se is only the second intention founded in the common nature, while the common nature itself, as the substrate underlying it, is only the logical universal per accidens. Their reason is that only the second intention is considered per se by the logician, and the thing underlying the intention only per accidens. And since they see that the definition of the universal in act brought forward by Scotus applies more appropriately to the nature as it underlies the second intention of universality than to the intention itself — for the reason given by Meurisse — they say that the Doctor there does not define the logical universal per se, since that is only the second intention, but rather the logical universal per accidens, namely the nature that underlies universality.

What must be said, however, is that only the logical universal is the universal truly and properly so called, that the aforesaid definition applies to it and not to the metaphysical universal, that it is of the logical universal that the Doctor speaks at

the cited place, and that under the name of the logical universal per se there is comprehended not only the second intention of universality taken concretely — that is, as it denominates the nature taken in the first intention — but also the nature itself underlying it as denominated by it. These points are proved and explained individually.

First, that the logical universal is the universal truly and properly so called is proved as follows. Among philosophers, an analogous term — such as "universal" as such, said of the logical, physical, and metaphysical — always stands for the principal analogate. But in the common manner of speaking, when the name "universal" is uttered, the logical universal comes to mind — the one that is related to its inferiors as their superior and proximately predicable of them. Furthermore, the universal truly and properly so called is that which is universal in predication; and by this is understood the logical universal, whose property it is to be predicated — not the metaphysical, which is said to be universal only in being, and which does not have the character of a potential whole in relation to its inferiors, but rather the character of a part contractible by the difference in order to form a metaphysical composition. Furthermore, the universal properly so called is by everyone considered to be that which is universal in act and not merely in potency, that which is complete and not incomplete and inchoate, and which therefore has its perfect being only through the operation of the intellect, as the Doctor notes at 7 *Met. q. 13 n. 19* and at the cited place 2 *dist. 3 qu. 1 H*. But only the logical universal enjoys all these conditions among all the universals; for the metaphysical universal is incomplete and not complete, because its universality can be completed by the further supervening logical intention. Moreover, it has its being in some way on the part of the thing and not precisely through the operation of the intellect. Therefore, only the logical universal is the universal truly and properly so called.

Second, that only the logical universal is the one to which the given definition applies can be proved by the same arguments. For in every school, the universal in predication is understood to be the logical universal and not the metaphysical, since predication is proper to second intentions and not to first. Furthermore, the metaphysical universal — even if considered under the unity of precision, that is, when the nature has been abstracted by the intellect from singularity — does not yet have the character of the universal in act, or of what is proximately predicable of its inferiors. For either in that state it is conceived only in the manner of a potential and contractible part — and then it does not have the character of a universal, because it does not regard the difference as an inferior of which it can be predicated, but rather as another component by which it can be determined — or, if in that state it is conceived as a kind of whole, it is not at all conceived as a potential whole divisible into many subjective parts of which it is predicable, but rather as a kind of actual whole, that is, in relation only to those attributes which it actually contains and regarding its essential predicates, and so it is conceived more as a nature that can be subjectified than as one that can be

predicated. Furthermore, all of this is conceded by Pasqual. at the cited place, n. 4 — namely that the nature, even abstracted from individuation, then has the character of a contractible part and of metaphysical potency actuable by the difference. Therefore in such a state it does not have the character of the universal in act, nor of the superior in relation to its inferiors, as he himself contends in the same place. Furthermore, in questions pertaining to modes of speaking, the more common and received manner of speaking is to be maintained, lest the question become merely verbal, as the Doctor notes at 9 *Met. q. 6 § contra hanc opinionem*, and at 3 *d. 1 qu. 1 M*, and at 4 *d. 2 qu. 1*, and frequently elsewhere. But by the universal in act, formal, and complete — which is predicable of many either actually or in proximate potency — every school understands the logical universal and not the metaphysical, as the Complutenses testify at *disp. 3 log. q. 6 in fine*. Furthermore, even if the metaphysical universal — insofar as it signifies the nature abstracted from singulars and considered under the unity of precision — has its being only through the act of the intellect, as Pasqualig. contends, it nevertheless has this through the abstractive act of the intellect and not through the collative act. But the universal in act and complete, which is actually or in proximate potency predicable of its inferiors, received its being through the collative and not the abstractive act, as has been proved at *disp. 4 cit. log. qu. 3*. Therefore such a universal is not the metaphysical but the logical.

Third, that the Doctor at the cited place is speaking of the logical and not the metaphysical universal when he says that the universal in act is that which has an indifferent unity by virtue of which it is the same, and is in proximate potency to be said of any suppositum — this is proved from Scotus's own course of argument in that question. For at § *ad quaestionem lit. E* he speaks of the metaphysical universal when he says that the nature is neither actually universal nor particular of itself, and that although it never really exists without one or the other, it is nonetheless not of itself either of these; rather it is naturally prior to all of them, and according to that natural priority it is what it is and is the object per se of the intellect and is considered per se as such by the metaphysician. By these words he expressly teaches that the metaphysical universal is the nature considered in itself, as it abstracts from singularity and actual universality. Therefore, in the mind of the Doctor, the metaphysical universal is not the universal in act, but only in potency. When therefore he later, at § *sed contra lit. H*, defines the universal in act and complete, he is not speaking of the metaphysical universal — for he had spoken of that above and said it was not the universal in act — but rather he is speaking of the logical universal, deriving its definition from the logical books of the *Posteriores*.

One might object that Scotus there calls the universal in act and in proximate potency — i.e., what can be said of many — that which has been abstracted from singulars and has the unity of precision. But this is the metaphysical universal, which is distinguished from the physical precisely by the fact that the physical universal says the nature with the difference as concrete on the part of the thing,

while the metaphysical says the nature abstracted and stripped from any difference whatsoever by the work of the intellect — whether the agent or the possible intellect, depending on the variety of opinions. Therefore he there speaks of the metaphysical universal and defines it there.

The response is that Scotus there calls the nature abstracted from singulars the universal in act, but as the proximate foundation of universality in act — not in the sense that the nature so considered, precisely under such abstraction and the unity of precision, is the universal in act, complete, and formal. For he there explicitly teaches that the nature attains its complement and is formally and actually universalized not through abstraction from singulars, but rather through regarding them in the manner of a superior and predicable — which relation of predicability, since it belongs to logic and not to metaphysics, is precisely what makes the universal in act and in proximate potency, predicable of many, to be the logical and not the metaphysical universal. And since on the other hand it belongs to the metaphysician only to consider the nature either negatively prescinded from singularity — in which state it exists on the part of the thing, insofar as in that state the nature does not include singularity in its formal account — or positively, as it receives positive indifference through the abstracting intellect and is positively stripped of individuating conditions, the nature under either of these states can only be said to be universal metaphysically and only universal in potency: in remote potency under the state of negative precision on the part of the thing, and in proximate potency under the state of positive precision in the intellect. And this is what the Doctor means when he says at § *lit. I* that even if we were to grant that the abstraction of the nature from individuating conditions is performed by the agent intellect and not the possible intellect, as most hold, it would still not be true that the agent intellect produces universality in things — because the nature is never universal in act and in proximate potency, so as to be said of any suppositum whatsoever, except as it is in the possible intellect, which compares it to its inferiors in the manner of a superior and predicable. By this the Doctor manifestly indicates that the nature considered precisely as abstracted from singulars and under the unity of precision is universal only metaphysically and in potency, and not in act and completely.

It is indeed quite true that the nature considered under such abstraction from individuating conditions and under the unity of precision is in proximate potency to receive the relation of formal and actual universality, because in that state it is understood to have positive indifference, insofar as it is understood to be determined to no individual — whereas in the state of contraction it was said to be only in remote potency to found the relation of universality, because in that state it has only privative indifference. On this point some have erred, and especially Pasqual. at the cited place. For it is one thing for the nature in the state of objective precision to be in proximate potency to be predicated of many by a predication that says "this is this," and another thing for it to be in proximate

potency to receive and found formal and actual universality. The second is indeed true and we readily concede it, but not the first. And this is what deceived Pasqual., because he did not distinguish these two from each other, and thought it was the same thing for the nature to be in proximate potency to be predicated of many and for it to be in proximate potency to found the relation of formal and actual universality — two things that must not at all be confused, since the first makes the nature actually universal, whereas the second only makes it be or be capable of being the proximate foundation of formal and actual universality.

Fourth, it is further proved that not only the second intention of universality as founded in the common nature, but also the nature itself as underlying that intention, can and should be called the logical universal per se and not merely per accidens, as those Scotists said, moved by the authority of the Doctor at *qu. 3 univerf. in fine*, where he calls the nature underlying the intention a being per accidens, insofar as it is an aggregate of diverse natures. This is clarified from *Lichet. 2 dist. 3 quaest. 1 § ibi sed contra*, where he says that the nature, under the relation of being related to its inferiors, is predicated per se of them — not insofar as it is a being per accidens constituted from the nature and the relation, but only through the account of the nature, which is one being per se, which nevertheless cannot be predicated unless it is actually under such a relation of reason. The nature itself is therefore predicated as underlying the intention — not as the formal reason of predication, but as the condition that places it in the state of universality. In accordance with this teaching, I later said at *disp. 5 log. qu. 1 art. 1* that in the definition of genus given by Porphyry, what is defined is not the aggregate of both — the thing and the intention — but either the thing as it underlies the intention, or the intention as applied to the thing, such that one of these is what is directly and principally defined, while the other enters the definition by way of connotation. This was explained at length there, by distinguishing the twofold predication — exercised and signate. For although in signate predication it is properly not the nature that is predicated but universality itself taken concretely, that is, as applied to the nature predicating of many — because this kind of predication is made through terms of the second intention as applied to those of the first — nevertheless, speaking of exercised predication, which is made through terms of the first intention, it is the nature that is properly predicated, not the intention. For what is predicated exercitively of the subject is what is in it, and the nature is properly in the things subject to the universal, not the intention. Therefore it is the nature that will be properly predicated of them, while universality will be only the condition that places the nature in proximate potency to be predicated of them. And that this teaching is in the mind of Scotus is attested by Lichet. at the cited place.

From this teaching it follows that the common nature, as it founds the intention of the universal — conceived, that is, with positive indetermination and proximate aptitude to be in many — even if it can be called the logical universal per accidens with regard to signate predication, since that belongs only to second

intentions, it is nonetheless the logical universal per se with regard to exercised predication, and is considered per se by the logician. The reason is that everything that is universal in predication is considered per se by the logician; but the universal in predication is not only the signate but also the exercised — therefore this too must belong to the logician. Hence the logician considers the nature as exercitively predicable of many not per accidens but per se, and the nature as such is the logical universal per se. Furthermore, every per accidens is reduced to a per se. I therefore ask regarding the nature in that state — namely as underlying the relation of actual universality — which universality belongs to it per se: is it metaphysical or logical? Not the first, because metaphysical universality is not constituted by predicability in relation to inferiors, but by orderability to act in the manner of metaphysical potency. Therefore it will be logical universality. One might say the nature in that state is per se the metaphysical universal and per accidens the logical, insofar as logical universality accrues to it per accidens. Against this: although when the nature is considered on the part of the thing — as formally one and formally distinct from the difference on the part of the thing, or as one through the abstraction performed by the intellect — one might say that logical universality accrues to it per accidens, yet when it is conceived as one in all through inexistence actually or by aptitude, and as indifferent to all individuals proximately and conjointly, and so founds the relation of the universal to its inferiors, then logical universality does not accrue to it per accidens — because such unity and commonness do not found but essentially constitute logical universality itself.

One might object: although the nature, conceived through its relation of logical universality, is predicated per se exercitively of its inferiors, it does not follow that it is called the logical universal per se and considered per se by the logician, because such predication occurs through terms of the first intentions, which per se do not belong to the logician but only per accidens. Against this: it does not follow that such predication does not still belong per se to the logician. For it remains true that such predication does not belong to the nature taken nakedly and in the real state, but as contained under the second intention of universality as a condition placing it in proximate potency to be predicated of many, and so it belongs to logic — to which it belongs per se to consider second intentions applied to first intentions, as much as first intentions conceived under second intentions, as was said at *disp. 5 log. q. 1 art. 1 in sol. ad 1* — but disposed in such a way between themselves that they do not constitute an aggregate per accidens, for in that manner they would be excluded not only from the consideration of the logician but also from that of any craftsman, as the Doctor teaches at *cit. q. 3 univerf. in fine*, since a being per accidens, as such, is neither knowable nor definable. Furthermore, when the common nature is considered under such a relation of universality and as such is predicated of many in quid, it is not taken as a being per accidens constituted from the nature and a rational relation, nor reduplicatively, but rather specifically, so that the sense is that what is

predicated of many is the nature which underlies the intention of universality as the condition placing it in the state of universality, as Lichet. said at the cited place. Indeed, Meurisse at the cited place, n. 152, adhered so tenaciously to this teaching of Lichet. that he acknowledges only the nature considered under the relation of universality as the logical universal truly and properly so called, and not the relation of universality itself — because the universal so taken, that is entirely for its formal part, does not stand with respect to the many such that each one is it. For it is not each individual of human nature, for example, that is the species, but the human being. But I already showed at *d. 4 log. q. 2 art. 1 in fine* how in signate predication it is not the nature properly speaking, nor the aggregate of nature and universality, but universality itself taken concretely that is predicated of many — so that in signate predication universality is predicated of many, and in exercised predication the nature underlying universality in the way explained. And in both senses the logical universal per se must be spoken of. Nor is Meurisse's above-mentioned manner of speaking to be approved — namely, that the universal in act truly and properly so called is that mixed universal composed of the logical and metaphysical, which he invents and accordingly calls the metaphysicological, as if coalescing from both — for the universal so taken properly signifies an aggregate per accidens, namely of the nature and the second intention, because in that way both are signified equally, and not one principally and the other by connotation. It is only in this latter way that an accidental concrete can be defined by a quidditative definition given by way of connotation — because what concerns the principal signification does not enter into the understanding of it as a part, but as terminating its relation, and therefore does not destroy its unity, as the Doctor notes at *4 dist. 1 qu. 2* and *qu. 8 univerf. prope finem*, and as was explained at length at *disp. 5 Log. q. 1 art. 1*.

Article II. On the Community of the Universal

With these matters already established, as virtually everyone acknowledges regarding this question, what remains is to declare what the unity and community constitutive of the universal in act, formal, and complete actually is and what sort of thing it is. For, as is clear from the Aristotelian definition — that it is one in many — two things concur in its adequate conception: unity and community. And concerning community, doctors do not differ much; for with a few exceptions who contend that there is a universal in act on the part of the thing — and these are abundantly refuted by us at *disp. 4 Log. q. 1* — the rest, Scotists and Thomists alike, unanimously acknowledge that the community constitutive of the universal in act is not real but rational. The reason is ready at hand. As the Doctor says at the cited place, the community and indifference required in the nature so that it may be said to be universal in act and completely must be such that it is in proximate potency to be predicated of any suppositum whatsoever by a predication saying "this is this." But nothing is found to be common to many in this way on the part of the thing; for although it is not repugnant to something existing in a thing to be in another singularity than the one in which it is, one still

cannot truly say of any inferior whatsoever that it is that thing, at least in proximate potency — since the truth of a predication is founded on the identity of the nature with the subject of which it is predicated, whereas the humanity of Peter, for instance, is on the part of the thing identified only with Peter and not with Paul and John. Therefore the nature on the part of the thing cannot be predicated of all and each by a predication saying "this is this." Hence the Doctor concludes that this is only possible of the same object as it is indifferently considered in act by the intellect, which, as understood, has even a numerical unity of the object, by virtue of which it is itself the same thing predicable of every singular, saying "this is this."

A further confirmation: in order for a nature to be able to be proximately predicated of many in this way, it must be the same nature found in those many through inexistence; but there is no nature common to many on the part of the thing through inexistence — only through indifference, as is sufficiently clear from what was said at q. 5. Therefore the community that constitutes the nature in the state of universality is not a real community but a rational one.

A further confirmation: even if community through mere indifference sufficed to constitute the universal in act, negative or privative indifference would not suffice — it would have to be positive, unimpeded, and free from any impediment of contracting difference; otherwise the nature would not be in proximate potency to be predicated of many. But the nature on the part of the thing is not indifferent in this way toward many, but only negatively and privatively, on account of the impediment of the haecceity annexed to it. Therefore the community required for universality is of reason, not real.

A final confirmation: even if we were to posit the nature as positively indifferent on the part of the thing to being in many — which is impossible given the impediment of the annexed difference — successively and disjunctively, such indifference would still not suffice to constitute it as universal in act. For the indifference of the universal nature must be toward many simultaneously and conjointly, since it is of the nature of the universal to be predicable of its inferiors in this way as well, as the Doctor teaches at *4 dist. 43 qu. 2 F*. Besides, otherwise, if the same form were placed by God successively through replication in many subjects, it could be called universal. Therefore for all these reasons the community of the universal nature in act cannot be real but only rational, fabricated by the operation of the intellect with a foundation in the thing. All of this has been explained at length at *disp. 4 Log. qu. 1 Sed et 2*, and although it need not be repeated here with its confirmations — since it is expressly Scotus's view at *cit. 2 d. 3 q. 1* and is received by the common reckoning of Scotists and even of Thomists — Poncius at *disp. 3 Log. q. 6 concl. 2* does not approve it absolutely but attacks it, on the grounds that the description of the universal through the aptitude for predication gratuitously supposes that proximate aptitude or proximate predicability must be understood. For just as when whiteness is

described as dispersive of sight, it is not understood that it disperses sight proximately — since otherwise it would not of itself be dispersive, but would only be formally dispersive upon application to a visual power capable of dispersion, since it could not disperse proximately without such application — so too when the logical nature is said to be predicable of many, this should not be understood of proximate predicability. A further confirmation: the divine nature too, considered by the intellect in many, has proximate predicability of many, for it could not be predicated of many by the intellect unless it were considered in many — no more than the universal nature — and yet it is certain that the universal receives a different predicability from the intellect than the divine essence does. If you say that the predicability of the universal must be proximate, because remote predicability does not suffice — since the nature already has that on the part of the thing, whereas the logical universal is not found on the part of the thing but is made by the intellect — the reply is: this too gratuitously assumes that no logical universal is found on the part of the thing. For if remote predicability is found on the part of the thing, it follows that there is also a logical universal on the part of the thing, which is no more absurd than the former.

The response is to deny the assumption — that it is gratuitously assumed in the description of the universal that it must be predicable proximately of many. This is taken from the common authority of the metaphysicians, since they speak of the universal in this way and interpret Aristotle's definition of the logical and complete universal in this sense, to distinguish it from the metaphysical universal, which is predicable of many only in remote potency. It is also proved by a clear argument: actual, complete, and simply-speaking universality excludes all singularity, because it implies positive and contrary indifference, and therefore remote predicability does not suffice for it, since remote predicability is compatible with singularity on the part of the thing. The predicability must be proximate — proximate but impeded — and the nature joined to singularity should not be called simply and absolutely universal, but rather particular. And although such proximity does not per se belong to whiteness as dispersive of sight — since this is argued from the special account of whiteness — from this it should not be concluded that such proximity cannot per se belong to other things as a special condition of things. For a free cause, for instance, is essentially distinguished from a natural cause precisely in that the latter, once applied to the patient and with all necessary prerequisites in place, necessarily acts, whereas the former does not necessarily act even when these are in place, but can operate or not, as it chooses. Hence that proximity and the placement of all prerequisites for acting belongs essentially to the distinction between the two types of cause; for if the necessary prerequisites for acting are lacking, even the free cause necessarily does not act, just as the natural cause. So likewise in the present case: the universal from its intrinsic account and constitution demands such proximate predicability.

Nor is the instance he adduces valid, concerning the proximate predicability of the divine essence of the three divine persons. For it is false that this proximate predication depends on the apprehension of the divine nature in the three, as the proximate predication of the universal depends on its apprehension in many. For the divine nature on the part of the thing is one and the same numerically, existing in those three, and the intellect does not make it one in the three by its apprehension, as it does in the universal. Hence it is proximately predicable of the three on the part of the thing, and the intellect is not said to append such proximity to it through its operation. Yet even so it is not predicated in the manner of a universal, because it is not in the three with division and multiplication of itself. The case is different in creatures, where since no nature is one and the same through inexistence in many, but only through indifference, the intellect cannot predicate it proximately of those many unless it considers it as one and the same through inexistence in them, actually or at least possibly.

Some other Scotists deny that the community of the universal nature in act must be or can even be such that it is or can be one and the same through inexistence in many simultaneously — because this is altogether repugnant even through the work of the intellect, since in that case the intellect would understand the thing otherwise than it is, and the thing would simultaneously have aptitude and repugnance for being in many. They say it is false that the Doctor ever asserted this. However, the Doctor not obscurely signified this at the cited place *lit. H* when he says that although the nature has on the part of the thing a certain community and indifference to be in many, this nevertheless does not constitute it such that it is proximately predicable of many by a predication saying "this is this." For although it is not repugnant to something existing in a thing to be in another singularity than the one in which it is, one still cannot truly say of any inferior that it is that thing. For this is only possible regarding the same object as it is indifferently considered in act by the intellect. Therefore the indifference the nature has on the part of the thing is one thing, and the indifference it has through the intellect is another, and the latter is greater than the former. This superiority consists especially in the fact that the nature in the intellect is apt to be in many simultaneously and conjointly. For to be able to be in many disjunctively also belongs to it on the part of the thing, if considered according to its formal account and according to its formal unity which it has on the part of the thing, less than numerical; therefore it has greater indifference in the intellect than on the part of the thing, because through the work of the intellect it can, according to the unity of universality, be one in many simultaneously and conjointly.

A further confirmation: of the nature of the universal it is that it be sayable of many by a predication saying "this is this," not only disjunctively and successively, but also simultaneously and conjointly — according to that saying of Porphyry: by participation in the species, many human beings are one human being. The Doctor also noted this again at *4 d. 43 q. 2 lit. F*, in these words: the universal in act is cognized under so great an indifference, under which it is cognized as

simultaneously sayable, and it is simultaneously sayable of all singulars in which it is realized — therefore it must also be able through the intellect to be in many, because in the universal "being in" and "being said of" are adequately commensurate, and neither extends further than the other. From this it follows that when the universal nature in act is conceived in its inferiors, it is conceived in them as one through inexistence. For although such unity is repugnant when it exists on the part of the thing in singulars, it is not repugnant to it as it is conceived in them by the intellect in the manner of a universal.

Nor does it follow from this, as those Scotists urged, that the intellect conceives the thing otherwise than it is, to the point of being deceived, or that the nature would simultaneously have both aptitude and repugnance for being in many. For this would only follow if we were to posit that the nature is of itself this, and then conceived it under the account of a universal — for in that case it would indeed be conceived under an account opposed to its own account, and the intellect would be deceived, since it would be understood under the account of a universal while being in itself this and singular, as the Doctor teaches at *2 d. 3 q. 1 § Sed contra istud*, and *q. 7 lit. H*, in the way Thomists speak about angelic natures. But in the present case the argument does not tell against us, because we do not posit the nature as of itself this, but as of itself common and negatively indifferent. Furthermore, otherwise we could equally say that the intellect is deceived when, in prescinding the nature from differences, it thinks it is common and positively and proximately apt to be in many — for it is not so on the part of the thing. Thus, in order not to say that the intellect is deceived in its conception of the universal, it suffices that there precede in the thing the community and negative and remote indifference of the nature. And finally, I see no repugnance in the nature having, through the intellect, a proximate aptitude even for being conjointly in many, while not having this on the part of the thing — indeed there is rather a repugnance only in this sense: that the aptitude and repugnance for being in many do not contradict each other, since they are not of the same order — the repugnance being real and the aptitude rational. Other difficulties against this doctrine have been resolved at *disput. 4 Log. quaest. 2 and following*, where this matter is treated formally.

Against the community of the universal — that it is not rational but real — those arguments can be raised by which it is commonly shown that there is a universal in act on the part of the thing. These have already been resolved at *disp. 4 Log. q. 1 art. 1*. And indeed the ones that press most urgently prove only the negative community on the part of the thing already declared at *q. 1 and 3*. It is also argued that the universal falls under the senses, since often a thing is apprehended from a distance without cognition of its contracting difference — as when something is seen to be an animal without knowing its species, or to be a human being without knowing which individual it is. To this the Doctor replies at *4 d. 8 q. 2 O* that when from a distance a body is seen before an animal, and an animal before a human being, this is not to be understood of the universal, since sight does not see the

universal but the singular of the more universal; thus in that case what is seen is some singular, but indeterminately and vaguely — for it is certain that an animal or a walking human being is being seen, with a difference of place and time.

Article III. On the Unity of the Universal

Concerning the unity of the universal, the difficulty is greater than concerning the community. For some among the authors who deny the universal in act on the part of the thing — while readily admitting that its community is only rational, as was said in the preceding article — still wish its unity to be real and not to have its being from reason, except insofar as it underlies the community. So Blancus, *disp. 2 Log. lect. 5 and 7*, where he says that the unity the universal nature has is real unity, whereas the community is a community of reason, and that this unity has its being through the intellect only insofar as it stands under community — yet the unity in itself is on the part of the thing. And so he does not think that the unity the abstract nature has as related to many is a unity of reason, while the unity it has on the part of the thing is real — as is commonly said — but rather thinks that the same unity the nature has on the part of the thing has its being through the intellect, only with the accidents varied. For community toward many and singularity are accidents of that unity; and so on the part of the thing that unity stands under singularity, whereas in the intellect conceiving it in relation to many it stands under community.

Poncius, however, at *disp. 3 Log. q. 2*, holds in *concl. 1* that the nature does not receive from the intellect any unity sufficient for universality or by virtue of which the nature can truly be predicated of many, and later in *concl. 4* says that the nature denominated as universal — for example, the nature of Paul — has no other unity with the nature in Peter than similarity and conformity, adding that no other unity is required for it to be formally one with that unity which is required for it to be formally universal. Pasqualig., also, at *disp. 19 sect. 9*, holds that universal unity is not rational but real, and wants it to be the same formal unity that adequately corresponds to the nature in all individuals.

Others want the unity that formally constitutes the universal to be not formal unity but the unity of precision explained in the preceding question — and this is universally taught by all who hold that the universal in act is produced by the abstractive act of the intellect on the nature from its inferiors, and indeed also by some who teach that it is produced by the collative act, insofar as the nature made one through abstraction and stripped of individuating conditions is afterwards through the collative act thought to be in many with such unity, or at least apt to be so — so that it has unity from the abstractive act and community from the collative act. On the variety of these opinions we have treated at *disput. 4 Log. qu. 3*. So Amicus, *tr. 4 Log. quaest. 4 dub. 1 art. 3*; Aversa, *quaest. 8 sect. 8*; and among our own, Meurisse, *lib. 2 suae Met. cap. 3 qu. 5 concl. 1 and 2*, where, explaining this further, he says that universal unity is not yet complete and actual unless after the intellect has compared the common nature with its inferiors — because in so

comparing it, the intellect apprehends it according to that unity or single account which it has, as apt to be in many and to be predicated of many — so that even if unity can be understood in the very act of precision and abstraction, it is still not understood as universal unity, because the respect toward many is not yet conceived, by virtue of which unity that thing is universal, and this is perfectly completed in the account of universal unity. Suarez, *disp. 6 Met. sect. 2*, also acknowledges that universal unity is not real but rational, and to clarify it further says at n. 11 that it is a unity distinct from both formal and numerical unity, having its own proper name and proper account — for this unity is called universal unity, and its account consists in the non-division of a nature into many similar natures under the same name and account, with the aptitude to be so divided. For this reason he says it is not real unity but rational unity, because such non-division does not belong to the nature in the state of real existence — where it remains divided by its various individual differences — but only in the state of objective precision, and as it underlies the concept of the mind. For in this way all human beings in the account of the species are said to be one human being. And so he also seems to agree that universal unity is the very unity of objective precision.

First Conclusion: Universal unity in act is not real unity but rational unity, produced by the operation of the intellect with a foundation in the thing, however. This is drawn from Scotus at the cited place *lit. H*, and is stated explicitly by Tromb. at *7 Met. q. 8 art. 2 concl. 3*, and is nearly common in every school. It is taught by Thomas, *de ente et essentia cap. 4*, where see Cajetan and Ripa; Compl., *disp. 3 Log. qu. 5*; Soto, *q. 2 univ. q. 3*; Toledo, *ibid.*, *q. 2 and 3*; Coimbra, *qu. 3*; Maius, *qu. 2 de univ. q. 3*; Suarez; Amicus; Aversa, cited; Alensis our own, *5 Met. 10 and lib. 7 tex. 52 and 5*; and also almost all interpreters of Aristotle, when they explain his saying at *1 Post. tex. 149* that the universal is posterior to singulars, insofar as it is abstracted from them by the intellect, as also at *5 Met. tex. 11 and lib. 10 tex. 1*, where among the various modes of unity he counts one by reason and intelligence, attributing this kind of unity to the universal. And it is explicitly St. Damascene, *lib. 1 Fidei c. 11*, where he says the natures of two singulars in creatures are one by reason alone — whom the Doctor cites at the same place. The proof is as follows. The unity required for the universality of the nature must belong to it in some state — namely, the state in which the nature itself is universal. But there are two states of the existence of the nature: real and objective; and likewise two real unities — as has been said — namely numerical and formal, since every division is either formal or material. Since, therefore, universal unity does not belong to it in the state of real existence — for the nature is not formally universal in act on the part of the thing — it belongs to it only in the state of objective existence. And since such unity cannot be numerical or formal, it follows that it is not real unity but rational unity, which is properly proportionate to the state of objective existence.

That universal unity cannot be numerical unity is clear enough of itself, since numerical unity is proper to singular things and is wholly incompatible with

numerical multiplicity, both in act and by aptitude, since it renders the thing altogether indivisible into inferiors. And although the Doctor at the cited place *sub litt. H* seems to attribute a certain numerical unity to the universal nature, it is certain that he is not speaking there of real numerical unity but of objective numerical unity — that is, in the account of an object understood. For just as the formal concept of human nature, for example, is numerically one, so its object in the account of an object can be called numerically one by extrinsic denomination from the concept of the mind, since human nature, as such, with all its community, is one of the number of intelligibles — as Lichet. most learnedly explains there.

That universal unity is not itself the formal unity of the nature which is less than numerical is proved as follows. Although this formal unity is certainly required as the precise foundation of actual universality, it does not suffice to constitute it formally — something greater is needed. Suarez proves this at *disp. 6 cit. sect. 2 n. 10* by three arguments. The first is that universal unity cannot in any way belong to and be communicated to singulars, whereas formal unity can. For Peter is said to be a human being not only individually but also formally — yet he is not said to be so universally. Therefore formal unity is not universal unity. But Blanc. could easily evade this argument by saying that formal unity is indeed communicated to individuals under the account of unity as such, but not as it underlies the community of reason — just as we too said above that it is not communicated to them as it is in some way common on the part of the thing. The second argument is that formal unity is multiplied in inferiors, as was said at *qu. 7 art. 1 concl. 3*; but universal unity cannot be multiplied in inferiors, because then there would be as many genera as species, and as many species as individuals, which is absurd. But this argument too, even if I admitted it in some way at *disp. 4 Log. q. 2 art. 1*, can receive the same solution I applied above at n. 130 when it was raised against the multiplicity of formal unity in individuals. The third argument which he adduces coincides with the first and can therefore admit of the same solution. It can therefore be better proved from our Scotist principles, which we have laid down in the preceding material.

For the nature to be universal in act, it does not suffice for it to be negatively indeterminate — it must also be so positively and contrarily, because the universal is opposed to the singular not merely negatively or privatively but contrarily. Hence these states require opposing conditions in the nature: the singular says a unity to which positive multiplication is repugnant, while the universal says a unity to which the aptitude to be in many positively belongs. Given this major premise, I add the minor: it is the case that the nature, as it stands under formal unity, is not positively and contrarily indeterminate, but only negatively so, even if by virtue of formal unity it does not have determination — it nevertheless has it from without, from the conjunction with the individual difference on the part of the thing. Therefore formal unity is not universal unity and is not apt to constitute the universal in act.

A further confirmation: formal unity is compatible with singularity in the same nature, as is clear in the humanity of Peter, which is simultaneously and at once both formally one and singular. But the same nature cannot simultaneously be singular and universal in act, because this universality excludes all determination whatsoever, both intrinsic and extrinsic — otherwise it could not be in many proximately, as the universal in act requires. Therefore, etc.

And by this teaching there is refuted the response that Blanc. at the cited place n. 162 suggested — namely, that the nature has the same real unity on the part of the thing that it has also through the intellect, only with the accidents varied, because community toward many and singularity are accidents of that unity. And so on the part of the thing that unity can be found with singularity, and in the intellect with community. This is refuted, I say, because this response preserves only that just as the same nature can from without receive now universality from the intellect and now singularity from the difference — since either state accrues to it — so too the unity that is posited as its proper passion; and so it preserves that formal unity can be the foundation of universal unity, but it does not preserve that it is formally universal unity itself, and that it formally constitutes the universal — for formal unity as such can stand joined with singularity, whereas universal unity in no way can.

One might say: the conjunction of singularity is not repugnant to universal unity as formal unity is, but only insofar as it has universality annexed to it in the intellect. For in both cases it is one and the same real unity, with only the accidents varied. Against this: I prove that this is repugnant even from the account of the unity itself that is called universal. For the formal unity less than numerical, which belongs to the nature on the part of the thing, is divided on the part of the thing in the several inferiors and multiplied in each — and therefore is called formal unity through indifference. But the formal unity — if we may call it that — which belongs to the nature in the intellect, when made universal, is not divided and multiplied in the several individuals, but is conceived as one and undivided in all, since in the account of the species all human beings are said to be one human being. Hence it is called formal unity of the nature through inexistence. Therefore these two formal unities are distinguished from each other even in the account of unity, and one unity is greater than the other — namely, the formal unity belonging to the nature through the intellect is greater than the formal unity belonging to the nature on the part of the thing outside the intellect. The reason is that the formal unity the nature has on the part of the thing is unity through indifference, which does not stand with actual numerical multiplicity, because it is multiplied in individuals according to the proper nature of each; whereas the formal unity it has through the intellect, when made universal, is through inexistence, such that its unity stands with the numerical multiplicity of individuals — because it is conceived as one and the same in all and each through inexistence.

A further confirmation of this and proof of the conclusion: the universal in act is something per se one in its own order and has a per se one concept, which, as Blanc. himself admits, is adequately integrated by unity and community. Therefore the unity that essentially constitutes it together with community cannot be real unity but must be rational, just as the community itself is rational. The consequence is proved because just as from things of diverse predicaments there is no coalescence of something per se one, so much less from things altogether diverse, such as a real being and a rational being. Therefore, just as an essentially real being cannot be constituted per se from a rational being, so conversely a rational being, such as the universal, cannot be essentially constituted by a real being. Therefore the unity constituting it is a unity of reason, not a real unity.

A further confirmation: the same nature can indeed be one on the part of the thing in many through indifference, but not through inexistence — as has been said. But for the nature to become universal in act and formally, it must be conceived as one in all through inexistence and not merely through indifference — from what was said at *disp. 4 Log. q. 2*. Therefore universal unity cannot be real unity but must be rational even in the account of unity itself, since in creatures one and the same entity cannot be found in many on the part of the thing.

Second Conclusion: Universal unity is not itself the unity of precision, even if this is held to be a rational unity. This conclusion is against the authors of the second opinion, and seems to be against the common view; yet it agrees with what we said about universal unity at *disp. 4 log. q. 2*, and with what the Doctor teaches at 7 *Met. qu. 17 § circa hujus quaestionis*, where he says that the universal can be taken in three ways: first, for the second intention, which is a certain rational relation in the predicable to its inferiors of which it is predicated, and this respect is signified by the name "universal" in the concrete, as universality is signified in the abstract; another way, the universal is taken for that which is denominated by that intention, which is some thing of the first intention — for second intentions are applied to first intentions, and in this way it can be taken in two ways: one way, for that which is denominated by that intention as a remote subject; the other way, for the proximate subject. In the first way, the nature taken absolutely is called universal, because it is not of itself this, and thus having said of many is not repugnant to it of itself — and in this way it is not the complete universal, because although it has indetermination privatively or contradictorily, it does not have positive and contrary indetermination as is required for the universal. In the second way, the nature is called universal when it has contrary indetermination — that is, when the nature is intelligibly one numerically and led of any suppositum whatsoever. And the Doctor adds that not even in this way is it the altogether complete universal, because the contrary indetermination by which a human being is so indeterminate that it is quidditatively present in every singular through a single act of understanding naturally precedes the second intention which is logical universality or the disposition of being said of many. So the

Doctor at the cited place. From which I first argue as follows: the unity of precision is had before that relation of the nature as predicable to its inferiors — for the nature is first considered as abstractable from or abstracted from singulars, and afterwards as predicable of them, and it is precisely in the latter state that the Doctor says the universal is complete and in act. Therefore the unity of precision is not itself universal unity but rather its proximate foundation.

Second, from the same teaching: the unity constitutive of the universal in act is not that by which the nature is one in itself, but that by which it is one in relation to others, or one in many — as is clear from the very definition of the universal. But the unity of precision constitutes the nature as precisely one in itself, and not in relation to many. By this argument there is precluded the tacit response of Meurisse at the cited place n. 212 — that the unity of precision is not complete and actual except after the intellect has compared the nature with its inferiors, since by virtue of this comparison the unity of precision is completed in the account of universal unity. This response is precluded, I say, because from the argument given above it is evident that the unity of precision and universal unity differ from each other not only by reason of the universality added or not, but also by reason of the unities themselves, which are of a different character in themselves. For the unity of precision is an absolute unity by which the nature is said to be one in itself, whereas universal unity is essentially a relative unity — just as similarity, the similar, and the equal have unity not by which they are one in relation to themselves or in themselves, but by which they are one in relation to another.

Third, the unity of precision places a repugnance in the nature to being in many, because it places it in the state of solitude, to which the company of contracting differences is repugnant. But universal unity, on the contrary, places the nature in many actually or at least by aptitude, and removes the state of solitude. Therefore the unity of precision is not formally universal unity and is not sufficient for universality.

A further confirmation: when the nature abstracted from singulars is afterwards by a simple collative act compared with its inferiors, so as to be said to be in them and of them in the manner of a superior and universal, it relinquishes the unity of precision and solitude which it had previously acquired through the abstractive act — and it still remains universally one. Therefore universal unity is not itself the unity of precision.

The response is made that the unity of precision is repugnant to the act of being in many, but not to the aptitude for it — since it does not imply that the nature is precise from many and simultaneously retains the aptitude to be in them. And the argument touches us as well, because even if we do not want the unity of precision to be universal unity, we still admit it to be at least its proximate foundation — and therefore it must remain at least in the manner of a foundation and substrate with universal unity itself. Against this: universal unity not only

stands with the aptitude for being in many, but also with the very act of being in many — not in the real act, but through reason. This is entirely repugnant to the unity of precision. Therefore this unity is not the other. I proved this extensively at *disp. 4 log. q. 2 art. 2*, and prove it again: "being said of" presupposes "being in" — for this is predicated of that because it is inexistent in it or is conceived as inexistent in it, and they are commensurate so that actual predication presupposes actual inexistence of the predicate in the subject, and aptitudinal predication presupposes aptitudinal inexistence. Since therefore the universal is predicated of many not only aptitudinally but also actually, it must also be preconceived as being in them not only by aptitude but also in act, while its formal unity still remains — a unity that adequately corresponds to it in all of them. Therefore universal unity remains with actual communication of the nature to many.

Furthermore, when the universal nature is divided by the intellect into many of the same name and account, it is divided only according to material and numerical being, not according to its proper formal being — since with such division there still corresponds to it one and the same formal unity adequate in all inferiors. And therefore it is called unity through inexistence and not merely through simple indifference, by which it is said to be one in many on the part of the thing. Therefore universal unity not only stands with aptitude for being in many but also with the act, at least through the intellect. This is altogether repugnant to the unity of precision. Therefore it is not the same unity as that one, but they also differ in the account of unity itself.

As for the objection that on this doctrine the unity of precision could not be the proximate foundation of universal unity — because once the division and contraction through the intellect has been made, it is destroyed — the response is what the Doctor replies at *quol. 13 circa finem*, and *4 d. 6 q. 10 l.* and *d. 13 qu. 1 V*, and *quol. 12 C*, with respect to what is commonly said from Metaphysics about second-mode relations, that they are founded through action and passion — which seems difficult, since the relations remain even when the generative action has passed, as in paternity and filiation. The Doctor responds, I say, that this should not be understood in the strict sense, as if action and passion were properly the foundation of those relations, but only as necessary conditions or dispositions required beforehand — the true foundation being the potency reduced to act. So likewise in the present case, the unity of precision is said to be the proximate foundation of universality because abstraction is as it were a prerequisite disposition in the nature for founding universality — since singularity, which the nature has on the part of the thing, must be shed before universality can be induced, and this cannot happen except through and by the prior abstractive action of the intellect.

One might ask: if therefore universal unity is neither numerical nor formal nor that of precision, what will it be and of what kind? The response is that it is a unity

distinct from all of these, having its own proper name and proper account, but more similar to formal unity than to the others. Hence, since a rational being is in general formed by the intellect after the manner of a real being which it imitates, so likewise universal unity, being rational, is formed by the intellect after the manner of formal unity, upon which it is founded — namely, after the manner of a unity communicable to many and able to stand with numerical multiplicity. And what the intellect adds beyond formal unity through its discourse is this: whereas formal unity on the part of the thing is unity common to many through indifference, the intellect makes it common through inexistence; and whereas formal unity on the part of the thing is multiplied in individuals in proportion to the multiplication of individual unity — as was said at n. 168 — the intellect conceives it as one and undivided in all, conceiving one nature as adequate in all. Hence this universal unity must be explained in exactly the same way those authors at q. 5 explained it when they acknowledged one and the same nature in all individuals through inexistence on the part of the thing — not one by numerical unity, since that is repugnant in creatures, but by formal and essential unity, which is less than numerical. And the only difference between us and those authors is that they consider that unity of the nature through inexistence to be real, whereas we say it is rational — and we say it is precisely this that is properly called universal unity. And if they can without implication admit such a unity of the nature in the common nature on the part of the thing, we may all the more without any repugnance conceive it in the nature through the work of the intellect, when it becomes universal.

This unity of the universal nature can further be explained by the example of the divine nature. For the divine nature is said to be actually and positively common to several persons — yet it cannot be called universal, not because it is not predicated of them by a predication saying "this is this," but solely because it is numerically one in them without any division, contraction, or multiplication of itself. But if it were at least numerically divided in them, there would be nothing preventing it from being truly called universal with all propriety. Therefore, in order for the human nature, for example, to be conceived with the unity that renders it universal in act, it does not suffice to understand it as formally one in all through indifference, as it is — because then it would not be conceived as one and the same common nature inadequately identified with each singular, as is required for universality in act and proximate predicability of each singular by a predication saying "this is this." It must rather be conceived as one in all through inexistence — that is, as one and the same entity of the nature communicated to and identified with all — yet in such a way that its unity is not numerical (for then it would stand altogether as the divine nature does, and would not be numerically divided in individuals) but a unity somewhat less than numerical yet greater than the formal unity the nature has on the part of the thing. For the formal unity of the nature on the part of the thing is multiplied in individuals together with the

nature itself; but when made universal, its formal unity is not understood as multiplied but as one and the same in all and each.

But one might say: even when the nature is understood as made universal, if it is understood with the act of being in many, it is understood as divided and multiplied numerically from without by the individual differences joined to it through the intellect. But the same is the case on the part of the thing, since its real formal unity is not multiplied in individuals except extrinsically and denominatively, remaining intrinsically one and the same, just as the nature itself does. The response is that the nature on the part of the thing is also in some way plurified intrinsically and in the account of the nature in individuals — as is clear from what was said at *q. 5 art. 1* — so that on the part of the thing there should be said to be as many human beings as there are individuals of human nature, and they cannot truly be said to be one human being, as in the divine case the three persons are said to be one God. But when the nature becomes universal through the intellect and is intentionally contracted to many individuals, it is only multiplied purely intrinsically and individually, and in no way in the account of the nature. Hence it follows that in that state of universality many human individuals can be said to be one human being in the account of the nature, as Porphyry said. And hence it is that the formal unity the nature has through the intellect, when made universal, is greater than the formal unity it has on the part of the thing. I confess the matter is not easy to explain, because this universal unity is a kind of middle unity between the singular unity that the divine nature has in the three persons and the formal unity that the created nature has on the part of the thing in singulars.

Resolution of Objections

Against the first conclusion, Poncius at the cited place argues first, proving that universal unity is not rational but real. For this universal unity must be such that by virtue of it the nature can be truly predicated of many by a predication saying "this is this." Therefore it is not something rational and fabricated by the intellect, which — on account of a fictive unity the human nature would have in Peter and in Paul — could not truly predicate, nor truly be inexistent in Peter and Paul in the manner of one thing. A further confirmation: that objective concept which the intellect predicates as one of Peter and Paul is either truly and really in those individuals or it is not. If it is not, it cannot be predicated of them by a predication saying "this is this." If it is, then the nature predicated does not receive such unity from the intellect. A further confirmation: that same nature, which is considered in many, is either one in many on the part of the thing, or at least apt to be in many, or it is not one or apt in this way. If it is one and apt on the part of the thing, then it receives no unity or community from the intellect. If it is not, then certainly through being thus understood it cannot become such. A final confirmation: it is either understood as it is — and then unless it is one, it cannot be understood as such — or as it is not — and then beyond the fact that the

concept would be false, the nature would not on that account become one, any more than a human being would become a horse by being understood as a horse. Poncius heaps up other arguments to the same effect, all of the same texture.

The response is that this manner of arguing destroys not only universality in natures, but absolutely all distinctions of reason and rational beings that are said to be produced by the intellect with a foundation in the thing. And so, to the first: granting the antecedent, I also grant the consequence — that the unity of the universal is not fictively made by the intellect. For things are said to be fictively made by the intellect when they are manufactured by it without a foundation in the thing. But universal unity is made by the intellect with a foundation in the thing — as was explained at n. 218 — and it is by virtue of such a foundation that the universal predications of inferiors are said to be true and founded in the truth of the thing, not rashly and arbitrarily contrived. To the second: that objective concept is one on the part of the thing fundamentally and incompletely, not formally and completely — for the complement of universal unity is received from the intellect. Or rather: it is one on the part of the thing as common to Peter and Paul through indifference, and becomes one through the intellect through inexistence. And although it is not one in this way on the part of the thing, this unity should not be called fictive, because it has a foundation in the thing and is occasioned by the real unity found in the nature. To the third: the same applies — that nature is one on the part of the thing through indifference and remotely apt to be in many, which foundation the intellect uses to attribute to it unity through inexistence and proximate aptitude. To the last: the nature is understood as it is fundamentally on the part of the thing, not formally — or as others prefer to say, it is understood as it is not, or otherwise than it is on the part of the thing, prescisively and not divisively, and therefore the concept is not false. For the nature is not conceived under an account intrinsically repugnant to it on the part of the thing, since universality is repugnant to the nature existing on the part of the thing only extrinsically and by reason of an adjunct — namely the individual difference — which when separated by the intellect renders the nature proximately capable of universality.

Second, Pasqual. at *disput. 19 cit. sect. 9* argues to the same effect: when the nature is conceived as abstracted from individuals, it is conceived as one by reason of being undivided in its being, and therefore it is one according to its being. Since unity is not distinct from the being of each thing that is one, the nature so abstracted will be one by virtue of its own formal being in itself undivided. Furthermore, each thing is capable only of that unity which follows upon it as its proper passion — since formal unity follows upon the nature as its proper passion, the nature will not be capable of any other unity, and this will suffice for universality. Furthermore, this formal unity which belongs to the nature on the part of the thing is not incommunicable, since it is not individual — and therefore it can stand with aptitude for being in many. Why then should it not suffice for the universal? Finally, the nature according to its intrinsic being is communicated

to many and enters into composition with many individuations to constitute individuals. Therefore according to its real metaphysical being it ought to participate in the account of the universal.

The response is that Pasqualig. does not seem sufficiently consistent on this point — for here at *disp. 19 sect. 9* he wants the actual and complete universality, which he himself calls metaphysical, to be real; yet at *disput. 18 sect. 3* he holds that the metaphysical universal is had only through the work of the intellect, and that there is only a universal fundamentally and physically on the part of the thing. But whatever his sense may be: to the first, I grant that the concept of universal unity is founded in the formal unity the nature has on the part of the thing, and that by virtue of such real unity the nature is so conceived as one intentionally by the intellect. From this, however, it does not follow that universal unity is altogether the same as the formal unity the nature has on the part of the thing, with nothing rational added to it. To the second: the assumption is true intrinsically and essentially, and so the nature is intrinsically capable only of formal unity — but compatible with this is that it is also capable intrinsically and per accidens of both singular unity on the part of the thing and universal unity through the intellect, which even Pasqualig. himself cannot deny. To the third: those who constitute the universal nature through the mere proximate aptitude of being in many, and who deny that universality coexists with the exercise of that aptitude — that is, with the actual being in many — can easily respond that formal unity is indeed compatible with the aptitude for being in many, but with division of itself. And what is proper to the logical universal is to stand with that aptitude without self-division. But admitting also that universality can consist with the actual being in many, it must be said that the formal unity the nature has on the part of the thing is communicable only negatively and apt to be in many only remotely, not positively and proximately — as is required for the universal. To the last: the same response is given by negating the assumption if understood of actual or aptitudinal and proximate communication, because on the part of the thing the nature is communicable to many only negatively and remotely, under the impediment of the annexed difference — and it is only through the intellect, with a foundation in the thing, that it becomes communicable positively and proximately.

Third, Blanc. argues to the same effect: when the intellect conceives human nature without considering the individual differences of Peter and Paul, the entity of the nature is not varied — the same is conceived as on the part of the thing, only in a different way than it is on the part of the thing. Therefore neither is its formal unity varied, which it had on the part of the thing, but community is only superadded to it. A further confirmation: the formal unity the nature has of itself and according to itself is not incommunicable and ultimately contracted, but has this only from the individual difference with which it is really identified. And so, precisely by the fact that it is conceived by the intellect without the individual difference, that same unity — which by reason of the individual difference was

contracted — is rendered free and communicable to many without any addition of new unity. And so from real formal unity and rational community the universal is adequately constituted.

The response is that just as in the state of objective existence the entity of the nature is not really and essentially varied — since the operation of the intellect does not really alter its object — so neither is the unity of the nature really varied. And just as the nature is intentionally varied — since it is conceived as universal when previously it was not so conceived — so too the unity, and not only in the account of being more or less common, but also in the very account of unity. For the formal unity itself has in individuals on the part of the thing a certain division and multiplication which it does not have in the intellect — as was said at n. 221. And therefore the formal unity is greater in the intellect than on the part of the thing, and is thus intentionally varied even in the account of unity. To the confirmation: the same applies — it proves only that the unity of the nature on the part of the thing and through the intellect is fundamentally the same, not formally the same. Indeed from the argument itself it is deduced that at least intentionally that unity is varied. For the formal unity of the nature is multiplied and divided in individuals on the part of the thing in the account of unity — which division it loses by the very fact that it is abstracted from them. Since therefore it acquires some non-division it did not have on the part of the thing, it follows that even in the account of unity it is in some way varied and is greater through the intellect than on the part of the thing. And so a new rational unity is added. And finally, it has already been said that the universal cannot be adequately constituted from real unity and rational community, because its concept is *per se* one — and such a concept cannot coalesce from a real being and a rational being.

Fourth, Suarez, Amicus, and other recent authors argue against the second conclusion, proving that universal unity is itself the unity of precision. For the proper unity of the universal is the negation of division into many of the same name and account, conjoined with the aptitude for such division. For by the negation of division it has unity simply — which formal unity does not achieve, since even though it affects a thing as one in essence and account, it absolutely leaves the nature as multiple in the thing. And insofar as it says aptitude, this unity is repugnant to singulars — because singulars, even if they have unity by which they are not divided into similars, that unity is negative and not privative, since it does not say division. But universal unity says this aptitude, and hence is said to be privative. A further confirmation: the proper unity of the universal is that which says the negation of numerical unity, not only negatively but also contrarily. But this belongs to it only through precision, since through precision the nature is separated from singulars. The response is that this doctrine of Suarez has already been refuted at *disp. 4 Log. q. 2 art. 1 § haec doctrina*, where I show that universal unity stands not only with aptitude but also with the act of being in many, and therefore does not essentially say non-division into many of the same name and account. For the universal divided into its subjective parts retains its

essential integrity and totality, according to which it is predicated of each — though not totally and adequately — and even though the real formal unity is multiplied on the part of the thing with the nature in individuals, the intentional formal unity is conceived as undivided in all, just as one nature is conceived in each through inexistence.

To the confirmation: universal unity certainly excludes the state of contraction on the part of the thing, because through such contraction the nature loses its positive indifference and thus becomes proper to one individual such that it cannot simultaneously be the constitutive nature of another. But it does not exclude the state of contraction through the intellect, because through such contraction the nature's positive indifference and proximate aptitude for being in many are not destroyed — rather, this proximate potency is exercised and placed in second act. In each individual taken separately it is contracted inadequately, and in all together adequately. Its positive indifference is not destroyed by intentional contraction, I say, because the nature is thought of as one through inexistence contracted to all simultaneously — so that as it is conceived in Peter, it is not so appropriated to him that the same is not also in Paul, and formally one in all. For although it is repugnant on the part of the thing for there to be one and the same entity of the nature (even speaking of unity less than numerical) in all individuals in creatures, it is not repugnant for it to be so conceived as one in all by the intellect. Hence it is one thing to speak of the state of contraction on the part of the thing, and another of the state of contraction through the intellect. The first is certainly repugnant to universality, since it destroys positive indifference — but not the second, as was explained at the cited place in the *Logic*.

One might say: universal unity, as such, since it is a kind of potential whole, properly consists in non-division into many subjective parts, and once this division is made, such unity is destroyed, as we ourselves said at *disp. 5 Met. num. 112*. Therefore it properly consists in the unity of precision, and in no way can be preserved in the state of contraction, whether real or through the intellect. It matters little that once intentional contraction has been made, the nature is still thought to remain one and the same in all through the formal unity of inexistence, insofar as each individual includes the same essential predicates — for that pertains to essential and actual totality, not potential totality; and the universal as such is not an actual whole but a potential whole.

I concede this is a good objection, and whoever wanted to speak in strict logical terms would have to yield to the argument, since the universal in the account of a potential whole truly consists in its non-division into subjective parts with aptitude for such division. But it must be noted that the universal has a twofold predication of its inferiors: one signate, the other exercised. With this difference: in signate predication it is predicated under the account of a potential whole — as, for example, the genus of many species differing specifically; in exercised predication, however, in the manner of an essential and actual whole — as, for

example, "a human being is an animal," "a horse is an animal." For the fact that something common is conceived as a potential whole does not cause it to lose the account of an actual and essential whole, since it still includes under that potentiality its quidditative predicates, according to which it can be enunciated of its inferiors by exercised predication saying "this is this." And since the universal in act is especially defined and considered by the metaphysician as predicable of inferiors by exercised predication — for it is said to be that which is in proximate potency to be said of many by a predication saying "this is this" — therefore in relation to such predication we say its universal unity is better explained through the unity of inexistence and the non-division of essential predicates than through non-division into subjective parts. This teaching on this point is very worthy of note, and for a better understanding of universal unity as explained by us, what we said at *disp. 4 Log. qu. 2* about the logical universal, and at *disp. 5 qu. 3 art. 1* about the division of genus by differences and how it is exercised both in the state of real and of objective existence, should be recalled.

Disputation X. On the Individuation of Nature, or the Principle of Individuation

We have treated of the common nature in the preceding disputation; now in the present one we must treat of its individuation — or rather of the principle of its individuation — by virtue of which it is constituted as this, singular, and individual, that is, undivided into other subjective parts and incapable of being so divided, so that it cannot be communicated to them in the manner of a common nature and superior. Hence in this disputation "singular" or "individual" is not taken logically — that is, for the second intention, insofar as it is the correlative of species, as the Doctor rightly notes at *2 d. 3 q. 2 § Contra isto primo* — for in that sense its individuation consists in a relation of subjectability to the species, which is a certain second intention produced by the work of the intellect. Rather, it is taken metaphysically for that which is indivisible into subjective parts — that is, to which it is formally repugnant to be divided into many, each of which would be it. Nor is the efficient principle asked about here, since that is the efficient cause; what is sought is the formal principle. Nor, as the Doctor adds at the same place, is there inquiry here about the formal principle of individuation in the sense of the formal principle of denomination — that is, the principle by which the nature is formally denominated as individual, and the individual itself as formally numerically one and singular. For in that sense it would be easy to answer that it is formally individual through individuation and numerically one through its numerical unity. Rather, what is asked is what is the foundation and root of such individuation and unity, and what is the thing upon which numerical unity immediately follows. Finally, there is no question here of a vague or indeterminate individual, but of a determinate and designated one — for it is this that is properly and simply said to be undivided and indivisible into subjective parts, simply incommunicable in creatures — about whose individuation the present disputation is entirely instituted. This was noted by the Doctor at *2 d. 3 q. 4 § Contra istam*, who treats this matter extensively at the cited distinction and at *7 Met. q. 13* on the same subject.

Question I. Whether Every Thing Is Singular and Whether a Principle of Individuation Must Be Assigned for It, So That It Is Not Singular of Itself

This question contains two parts, and since both present difficulty, I shall resolve both in this question. Regarding the first part, some Thomists say that although every material thing that exists must be singular, a spiritual nature — and generally any that is perfect — exists abstracted in its specifically essential perfection alone, without proper individual contraction. This is because in such perfect natures the specific essence is not only the nature but also what has the nature — which cannot be verified in material natures. Suarez, *disp. 5 Met. sect. 1*, together with all the rest, says that whatever per se and immediately exists, is in

itself and per se — not in another — individual and singular. This "per se" is added to exclude the common accounts of beings, which as such cannot immediately exist, nor have actual entity except in singular and individual beings. Remove the singulars and it is impossible for any real thing to remain — as Aristotle said of first substances in the *Predicaments* chapter on substance. This is the most common and widely received opinion in every school, even among those who admit the universal in act on the part of the thing — for they do not admit it as separated but as immersed and existing in singulars, and thus they want it to be singular as what it is.

What must be said is that whatever exists on the part of the thing and in the nature of things is singular and individual. This conclusion is Aristotle's at *1 Met. cap. 6* and *lib. 7 tex. 26 and 27*, where against Plato he shows that nothing exists except the individual, and in the cited chapter of the *Predicaments* on substance, where he says that with the destruction of the prior substances it is impossible for anything else to remain. It is proved by induction: God is most singular; so too is every existing angel, every human being, every stone, etc. — for neither Gabriel, for instance, can be divided into many angels, nor Peter into many human beings, nor a stone into many stones. Although a stone can be divided into many similar parts, of each of which "this is a stone" can be said — as the Doctor notes at *2 d. 2 qu. 4 G* — this is a division of an integral whole into its integral parts, not of a universal into singulars. Therefore no fragment of stone will be that stone which was divided, but only an integral part of it. Therefore whatever exists in the nature of things is singular and individual.

It is also proved by clear argument: everything that exists in the nature of things is either created or uncreated, either from itself or from another. If from itself, this is God, most singular. If from another, it plainly cannot exist unless it is produced — for in creatures this is what it means to exist, namely to stand outside causes. And every production, since it is singular, necessarily tends toward a singular thing, as Aristotle says at *1 Met. cap. 1* and *7 Met. cap. 15*. Furthermore, any created nature is either of itself singular, as some hold, who will be cited below, or of itself common, as was said in the preceding disputation and is held by nearly all. But whichever is said, the conclusion follows — for although common natures exist in the nature of things and universals that say "being in," they are nonetheless not found separated from singulars but entirely included and immersed in them at least by real identity, as was said at the preceding disputation, qu. 2. Hence although such common natures are not singular and individual intrinsically — that is, through inclusion of singularity in their quiddity, in the way God is said to be singular — they are nonetheless singular extrinsically, through conjunction with singularity with which they are identified, as the Doctor teaches at *2 d. 3 q. 6 E*. So whatever is in the nature of things is singular, either immediately or mediately, or per se and formally, as the individuals themselves, or identically and concomitantly and denominatively, as common natures individuated and contracted.

From this reasoning it also follows that this conclusion must be understood not only of things actually existing, but also of possibles and things that will exist at some time. For these are possible and future only through a possible or future production — and since every production is singular and must be terminated in a singular thing, it follows that no thing is possible and no essence exists except in relation to singularity. And again it follows that the conclusion is to be understood not only of ordinary power and according to the order of nature as it is established, but also of God's absolute power — because not even God can make a common nature exist without singularity. The reason is that the common nature is not really distinguished from the singular, or from singularity, but is really identified with it. Therefore it cannot be separated from the singular even by absolute power, since God cannot separate what is really identified, as is universally conceded. But why dwell on a matter most well known and disputed by no one?

One might object on behalf of the Thomists cited at the beginning of the question: individual unity is understood to add something beyond the formal or essential account, by reason of which the essential account itself can be divided into many individuals. But in a spiritual nature, such as the angel, there is no such addition; the entire essence is there as if precise and abstracted, for which reason it cannot be multiplied according to number — just as if a human being as abstractly conceived were to so exist, it could not be multiplied. A further confirmation: a human being actually exists in Peter and in Paul, and as such is not something individual and singular. Therefore not every existing thing in the universe is individual and singular.

The response is to deny the minor in all its parts. For the Doctor holds that common nature is found even in angels, which is of itself indifferently indifferent — by privative indifference — to many singulars. Hence on account of the individual difference superadded, even the angelic nature itself is individuated. But even if this opinion were not admitted by Thomists, and even if the multiplication of individuals were held to be repugnant to such a nature, it would not follow that the angels themselves are not singular — since the account of singular as explained applies to them and the account of common nature is repugnant to them. Indeed they should be said to be most singular, because they would be singular of themselves and by virtue of their proper account, just as we say the divine essence is most singular, even though it is not singularized by the addition of any positive individual difference. To the confirmation: it is clear from the proof of the conclusion that humanity in Peter and Paul, although it is not singular intrinsically and formally through inclusion of singularity in its quiddity, is nonetheless singular extrinsically through conjunction with singularity and identity with the individual, which is constituted with singularity.

Concerning the second part of the question — namely, whether it should be asked and admitted that there is a principle of individuation of things — it is reported

as the common opinion of the Nominalists that they assert singularity to be nothing beyond the essence of the nature itself. For just as the nature is of itself formally a nature, so of itself it is singular, and it is not universal and common except through the intellect. Hence they infer that one should rather ask what the principle of commonness and universality of the nature is, than what the principle of its singularity is. For this opinion are cited: Adam, *1 dist. 13 q. 8 art. 1*; Ockham, *1 dist. 2 q. 4 and 6*; Gabriel, *quaest. 6 and 7*; Durand., *2 dist. 3 q. 2*; Aureolus, *2 dist. 9 q. 3 artic. 3*. The Thomists also seem to follow this opinion with respect to spiritual substances, in which, just as they deny matter — which they acknowledge as the unique cause and root of individuation — so too they deny every principle of individuation. Pasqualig., however, at *tom. 2 Met. disput. 42 sect. 1*, denies this to have been the sense of the Nominalists — for they do not want the nature, as nature, to be of itself individual, as some attribute to them (he says) — indeed almost commonly — but rather that each thing which is on the part of the thing is individual, and that it has its individuation from nowhere else than from its own physical being which it participates, such that that physical being is of itself individual and not through something superadded. And he says this is their legitimate opinion, as will be clear to anyone who reads them.

Certainly if this is the Nominalists' opinion on this matter, it does not differ from the common view, nor indeed from the opinion of the Scotists — for they too concede that every thing is in this sense individuated of itself, that is, not through something physically superadded to it and really distinct from it, but only formally and metaphysically from the nature of the thing, as is clear from what was said at the preceding disputation, qu. 2 and 3. I think however that the Nominalists wanted something more, as is clear from the preceding disputation, q. 1 — where they deny all community of the nature on the part of the thing, and acknowledge in the intellect only the community of the formal mental concept, not of the objective concept. But especially our Aureolus cannot receive this sense, for at the cited place *2 disput. 9 q. 3 art. 3* he proposes this question — what is the principle of individuation — and immediately from the beginning responds in these words: that speaking really, the question is empty, since when it is asked what the individual adds to the account of the species, since every thing insofar as it is singular, and insofar as it is indifferent and common it is a conceived account, to ask for something by which the thing, outside the intellect, is singular, is to ask nothing. For to ask this is to ask whether the thing outside the intellect is universal and something comes to it making it particular — which is nothing, because every thing insofar as it is a thing, not including the concept, is by that very fact singular. Then when one asks through what is the thing singular, I say that every thing is singular of itself and through nothing else, but through it. Yet the difficulty is whether it adds anything to the concept — for example, I conceive a human being, and I do not conceive this human being; what does that add to the concept by which I contract a human being to this human being? Thus Aureolus. From which it is gathered that he so strictly wants every thing to be

singular of itself that he does not even want singularity to be something added to the nature through the intellect, and therefore I think the commonly attributed opinion of the Nominalists is that which is commonly ascribed to them. Add that in almost the same words Scotus himself recounts this opinion at *2 d. 3 q. 1 ab initio* § *Hic dicitur*, where the margin refers to Adam, Ockham, and other Nominalists. Therefore there is no doubt that this was the Nominalists' opinion.

What must be said is that, although every created existing thing is singular — as has been said — nonetheless no created nature is of itself individual and singular, that is, from its intrinsic principles. Hence it is rightly asked what the principle of its individuation is. This is the common view of the Realists against the Nominalists, posited by the Doctor at the cited place and proved by all the arguments by which at the preceding disputation, q. 3 and 4, the real community of the nature was proved, and at q. 6 its formal unity less than numerical. But since those arguments prove not only a distinction of reasoned reason between nature and individuation — as recent authors commonly posit — but also a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, I will here, prescind from that distinction — since there will be further discussion of it below — adduce only that argument which convinces of so much distinction as suffices to show, against the Nominalists, that no created nature is of itself singular and individual by its formal account. And consequently the question about finding the principle of individuation of things is not empty and irrational.

The proof is first from the indetermination and indifference of the nature in its essence: although when considered in itself it is determined to its essential predicates and principles — for example, humanity to animality and rationality — it is not determined to individual principles. For of itself humanity is no more the nature of Peter than of John, but is indifferently related to either. Since therefore it is on the part of the thing the nature of Peter or John, it cannot have this from its formal account, and it is necessary to concede some determinative by which it is determined to be of this or that. The Doctor proves the consequence at *2 d. 3 q. 5* from the parity of genus: because we see the generic nature is of itself undetermined to many species, we attribute a specific difference to it by which it is determined to one species rather than another — for example, rationality to the animal, so that it is determined to the human species. Therefore the same must be said of the species with respect to individuals.

Furthermore: if in the essential concept of a nature — for example, human nature — the individuating principles, such as Peterheid and Paulhood, were essentially included, since the concept of such a nature is common to all individuals of human nature, it would follow that of John and Francis there would be predicated essentially not only rational animal but also Peterheid and Paulhood and whatever other individual differences of humanity, so that the several individuals would include each other essentially. The Doctor proves the consequence at *2 d. 3 quaest. 1 ab initio*: whatever belongs to something from its nature belongs to it

per se in whatever it is placed. Hence if the nature of stone is of itself this, in whatever the nature of stone is, that nature would be this stone. Therefore it is false that the nature in its essence includes individuation, and individual differences must be assigned that are not part of the essential concept of the nature.

Furthermore: we experience having an essential concept of any nature while prescinding entirely from individual differences. For once humanity and rationality are conceived, and Peterheid and Paulhood are prescinded from, the adequate essential concept of a human being is had. Therefore every individual grade is outside the essence of the nature and superadded to it.

Then it is proved no less evidently from the distinction and numerical difference that obtains on the part of the thing among individuals. We see that they agree in one concept — namely the concept of the nature — and differ in another — that of this individual and that individual. Therefore at least through the intellect, with some foundation in the thing, we must assign the concept in which they agree and something in which they differ. This latter is the concept of the singularities by which the individuals are constituted in their ultimate and determinate being, superadded to the concept of the nature in which they agree — one of which has the character of what is determinable and the other of what is determinative. And indeed Aureolus at the cited place wrongly denies this, saying these are not subordinated concepts, one including the other, but entirely disparate concepts, one standing in the manner of similarity (that is, the specific concept) and the other in the manner of dissimilarity. This is plainly unintelligible. For unless we are willing to admit Plato's separated universals — as Aversa rightly urges at *qu. 9 sect. 2* — it is evident that the specific concept is essentially included in the concept of individuals and is in no way disparate and alien to it; and in the direct predicamental line we see one subordinated to the other in the order of superior and inferior. Furthermore, if the specific and individual concepts are disparate in Aureolus's sense — in the manner of similarity and dissimilarity — then by that very fact he admits that the individual difference is not included in the essential concept of the nature, and thus the nature will not be of itself singular and individual by its formal account. Note also that these arguments press equally for material and spiritual natures, as will be apparent to anyone who works through them — for even angels agree in some common essential concept and differ by their proper concepts.

From these considerations, Canon., *1 Phys. q. 6 art. 1 I*, proves that the question raised about the principle of individuation is a good and rational one: every question that supposes something true and seeks something doubtful is good and rational. This question about the principle of individuation is of this kind. Therefore, etc. He proves the major from Aristotle, *7 Met.*, where the Philosopher says that to ask why a human being is a human being is to ask nothing, since it seeks no doubt. And to ask why a human being is a donkey is to ask nothing, since

it supposes something false. He proves the minor: when I ask what the cause of individuation is, I suppose that some thing is undivided, and this is true — as is clear from the preceding disputation. But beyond this I ask what the cause of this individuation is, and this is what is doubtful. For how would so many capable doctors (he says) have inquired into this unless they had doubted? See Soncin., *in 7 Met. q. 31*, where he proves at length that a principle of individuation must be assigned in things, especially material ones — and Bannes follows him, *1 de Gener. et Cor. q. de principio individuationis art. 1*.

Against this, Aureolus argues — as reported by Canon. at the cited place — as follows: the question that asks through what a thing is a thing is empty. But to ask through what a thing is singular is to ask through what a thing is a thing. Therefore it is empty. For in its very being a thing is singular — since nothing, as such, is universal; because everything outside the soul exists because it is numerically one, as Boethius says, *lib. de Unitate et Uno*. A confirmation: every question that supposes something false is empty. This one is of that kind, because it supposes that in the nature of things there is something indifferent to this and that, which needs to be contracted by individual differences — which is false, since every thing existing on the part of the thing is determined. Canon. responds by denying the minor. When it is proved — "because everything that is, etc." — he says from Scotus that something can be numerically one or singular in two ways: either of itself intrinsically and essentially, or extrinsically and denominatively. And by one or the other of these two modes, whatever is on the part of the thing is numerically one and singular. The individual is numerically one in the first way; the common nature constituting it is numerically one in the second way — through conjunction with singularity, which although it does not include in its formal account, it is nevertheless really identified with, and therefore identically and denominatively is said to be singular — much as the body, as one part of the composite, is said to be animated, not intrinsically and essentially, but extrinsically through conjunction with the soul by which it is informed. To the confirmation: the minor is denied, since there truly is in singulars a nature that of itself and intrinsically has privative indifference to all and each disjunctively — even if it is extrinsically determined through individuation. And it is true that whatever exists on the part of the thing must be determined in its entity with respect to certain essential principles — but not with respect to individual ones, except extrinsically and per accidens.

Second, Aureolus argues again in two ways — as reported by Ragusejus, *disput. 24 perip. cap. 3* — though I do not find these arguments in Aureolus himself. The first: numerical unity is real unity; for what is numerically one is one in reality and not through the intellect. But the nature is per se one by real unity. Therefore it is per se numerically one. The second: the principles of unity and of individuation are the same — for that is individual which is one. But the nature by its own entity is one, since per se it is a being formally speaking, and unity is a passion of being. Therefore by its own entity it is individual and not through something added.

Ragusejus responds to the first by saying some Scotists deny the major — that numerical unity is real — because real unity is the unity of the nature. He rightly rejects this response, since for everyone numerical unity is real unity and no one dares to say that what is numerically one is so through the operation of the intellect. He responds therefore that the argument concludes nothing, since it proceeds from indefinite propositions in the second figure. But I have never seen or heard any Scotist deny that numerical unity is real unity. I believe rather that those Scotists denied only that numerical unity alone is real unity — since the formal unity of the nature, which is less than numerical, is also real — and did not absolutely deny that numerical unity is real. And this is the true solution to the subject matter of the argument, in which there is also a formal error noted by Ragusejus. To the second, he rightly responds that the major is not to be understood of unity simply and absolutely taken, but of numerical unity — so that the sense is: the same are the principles of numerical unity and of individuation. And then for the minor it must be said that the nature is indeed one by its own entity, but not by numerical unity — rather by formal unity, which is less than numerical and is proper to the nature.

Third, Scotus at 2 d. 3 q. 1 *ab initio* § *hic dicitur* reports the foundation of the Nominalists, which is as follows: just as the nature has from itself true being outside the soul, and does not have being in the soul except from another — that is, from the soul itself — since being truly belongs to it simply, while being in the soul is its being in a certain respect, so universality belongs to the thing only insofar as it has being in a certain respect, that is, in the soul, while singularity belongs to the thing according to its true being, and thus of itself and simply. The Doctor responds at the end of the question that community and singularity do not stand to the nature in the same way as being in the intellect and true being outside the soul. For community belongs to the nature outside the intellect, and so does singularity; and community belongs to the nature from itself, whereas singularity belongs to the nature through something contracting it in the thing. But universality does not belong to the nature from itself. And therefore, says the Doctor, I concede that the cause of universality must be asked, but not that a cause of community other than the nature itself must be asked. And once community is posited in the nature itself according to its proper entity and unity, it is necessarily required to ask for the cause of singularity, which superadds something to that nature whose it is.

Fourth, Aureolus at 2 d. 9 *cit. qu. 3 art. 1* brings other arguments by which he directly tries to show that the specific nature individuates itself and not through something added to the pure nature, either really or by reason. For either what is added is essential or accidental. If essential, it follows that the species can be divided by essential differences — contrary to Porphyry, *cap. de specie* — and furthermore it would follow that individuals differ essentially; and also that the species does not express the whole essence of the individuals. If it is accidental, then the individual is a being per accidens, and thus the species cannot be

predicated per se of it, and an accident would constitute the individual subject rather than belong to it — which is impossible.

The response is: if by "essential" is understood a quidditative entity, and by "accidental" is understood everything that does not present a quidditative entity, then what is added to the common nature is accidental — for as Scotus teaches at *2 d. 2 q. 6 littera O*, and it is the common teaching of others, the individual does not add a quidditative entity to the nature; rather the common nature itself is the whole quiddity of the individuals. And if accidental is taken in this sense, it does not follow that the individual is one per accidens — for the quidditative entity of the nature, truly contractible and numerically divisible, together with the non-quidditative but per se contracting entity, can constitute per se one individual of some single predicament, of which the species is predicated per se. If however "essential" is taken for every intrinsic entity of something, and "accidental" for every extrinsic entity, then the individual difference which the individual adds beyond the nature is not called accidental but essential, since as Scotus teaches, the individual difference constitutes the individual intrinsically. Yet it does not follow from this that the common specific nature is contractible by essential differences — for then "essential" is taken as denoting some essential difference expressing quiddity.

But one might say: the species is called the whole essence of the individuals because it is not further divisible — for if it were further divisible and contractible by other differences called individual, it would not express the whole essence of the individuals but only part of the essence. For the individual difference would be an intrinsic grade of the individual, pertaining to its entity and proper concept, no less than the specific difference pertains to the concept of the species. Indeed such an individual difference would also have to be called essential, since the specific difference dividing the genus is called essential to the species because it enters into its intrinsic concept. Since therefore the individual difference would also be part of the intrinsic concept of the individual, this too in its own order would have to be called an essential difference.

The response is that the species is said to be the whole essence of the individuals because it is not further divisible by other differences that would be called essential. For as the Doctor says at the cited place, although the individual grade pertains to the integrity of the entity of the individual, it is not said to pertain to its quiddity. The reason I assigned at *disp. 4 Log. qu. 5* is that essence and quiddity is that by which one responds to the question "what is it?" — and this question, when raised concerning individuals, is answered through the specific nature. For if one asks "what is Peter?" one responds: he is a human being. But through the individual difference one responds only to the question "who is it?" — for if one asks "who is that?" one responds: it is Peter. For this reason the species expresses the whole essence of the individual, though not the whole substance and entity. And for this reason also the specific differences are called essential and the

individual ones are not — because if one asks "what is Peter?" one responds that he is a rational animal. One can also say, from Scotus at *quodl. 19 art. 2 D and K*, that the species is said to be the whole essence of the individuals because essence is distinguished by philosophers from hypostatic entity, as the communicable entity from the incommunicable — and so even though individual differences pertain to the integrity of the entity of the individual, they are not said to be essential, because they are no longer communicable.

Fifth, he argues to the same effect: if the specific nature is not of itself individual, but through further superadded differences, then the most special species would not be atomic, since then its account would be possible with respect to differences. Furthermore, as Porphyry reports, when descending through division from the most general to the most special, Plato bids us stop — but if further division were possible, one should not stop. Moreover, that difference contracting the species would be something communicable; therefore through it the specific nature cannot be individuated. The assumption is proved: first, because God can produce two whitenesses in the same degree; second, because it is of the nature of quiddity to be communicable, but that difference would truly have the character of quiddity; third, because the difference of Peter would be individuation, as would the difference of Paul; therefore they would agree in the common concept of individuation, and then one must ask whether individuation in common is individuated of itself or by another. Finally, no reality contracting something can give itself to that something what it is, because that contracting element, when it finds the prior reality to be outside the intellect, finds it singular and this.

The Doctor responds at *2 d. 3 q. 6 § ad argumenta*: the species is called atomic — that is, indivisible into many species — but it is not purely atomic, that is, simply indivisible. For indivisibility into many species is compatible with divisibility into many of the same species. And to the saying of Porphyry, he says Plato bade us stop because artificial division reaches its term at the most special species, since proceeding further goes to infinity, which must be left aside by the art. See the Doctor there also explaining a certain authority of Boethius in *lib. divisionis*, who does not assign the division of species into individuals. To the second, the assumption is denied. To the first proof, it is denied that the same degree of intensity in whiteness is the individual difference constituting this whiteness. And even if this were conceded, it would still not follow that the same degree was communicated to both whitenesses, but only that those whitenesses are similar in their degrees. To the second, it is denied that the individual difference has the character of quiddity, since it is a hypostatic entity and has rather the character of "who" than "what." To the third, it will be seen below whether from the particular haecceities a concept of individuation in common can be abstracted. To the last: the same argument could be made about the specific difference in relation to the genus, proving that it does not determine it in any way but finds it already determined. I say, therefore, that it is false that the individual difference

finds the nature already existing in some prior instant of nature or time — for in the same instant that the nature is singularized, it exists and is placed outside causes.

Finally, he argues: since Aristotle at *10 Metaph. 26 toward the end* says that the ultimate division that is per se and essential is by specific differences, there is no further division. A further confirmation: no per se division can proceed to infinity, since per se and essential accounts do not proceed to infinity. But if the species were divided by individuations, it would proceed to infinity. Therefore etc.

Trombeta at *5 Metaph. q. 5 art. 4* responds: Aristotle there inquires what the ultimate differences are that are essential and make specific contrariety, and says they are specific differences. And if there is some further division, that one is as it were per accidens and pertaining in no way to specific contrariety. Hence he does not deny that a species is divided into individuals — since in the predicamental line the individual is below the species — but he only wants such division to be per accidens, in the sense that what divides is outside the formal account of what is divided, and does not pertain to the quidditative constitution of what is constituted by such a divider — and also in the sense in which per accidens division is distinguished from quidditative and essential division in those things that have an essential order between them, which is not the case here. For the species is not divided by quidditative division, that is, into things constituted in quidditative being by the dividers themselves, nor into things having essential order, as individuals do according to *3 Met.* To the confirmation: the same applies, since the division of the species is not per se in the aforesaid sense, because it is into individuals, among which there is no essential order — about which division Aristotle was not concerned, but only about those dividers which, together with what is divided, make an essential predication of the things into which they divide and express the cause "on account of which" with respect to the knowable and demonstrable passion of the subject, for the sake of science according to the *Posterior* books. Some other arguments are brought by Trombeta at the cited question that bear on this purpose, from the beginning of the question, and he resolves them at the end. Let them be seen there.

Question II. In What Way the Principle of Individuation Is Superadded to the Nature and Distinct from It

Whoever wants to properly conduct this disputation about the principle of individuation of things concedes, against the Nominalists cited in the preceding question, that this principle is something superadded to the pure nature and distinct from it in some way, either really or by reason. For if they did not concede this, they would be yielding to the Nominalists, that all things are individual of themselves and not through something superadded. But concerning the mode of distinction they do not agree. Some want it to be something physically and really superadded to the nature and really distinct from it in the strict sense — so all those who assert that things are individuated by certain accidents, who will be

cited below in the following question. Others want it to be something indeed actually distinct from the nature on the part of the thing, but not really in the strict sense or as thing from thing, but formally, as one formality or reality from another. So the Doctor at the cited place, together with the entire family of Scotists, and following them Fonseca, *7 Met. cap. 12 q. un. sect. 11 and seq.*; Amicus, *tract. 4 Log. quaest. 3 dub. 3*; Ragus., *disput. 24 perip.*; Piccol., *1 de anim. com. 8*. Others, not admitting the formal distinction from the nature of the thing, say the principle of individuation is distinguished from the nature by a distinction of reasoned reason with a foundation in the thing, and indeed with perfect precision of reason, so that through the intellect the nature can be conceived without the individuation being in any way conceived, either explicitly or implicitly, and conversely individuation without the nature. So Suarez, *disp. 5 Met. sect. 2*; Pasqualig., *tom. 2 Met. disput. 43 sect. 1 and 3*, and other recent authors commonly follow this. Others finally do not want it to be distinguished even in this way, but only through imperfect precision of reason, such that the nature cannot be conceived without at least implicitly conceiving individuation, and conversely. So Aversa, *q. 9 Log. sect. 12*. For the resolution of the question, the following conclusions are to be set out.

Article I. Resolution of the Question

First Conclusion: The principle of individuation is not something really or physically superadded to the nature and distinct from it in the same way. This conclusion is common in every school and has been sufficiently proved at the preceding disputation, q. 2 from n. 30, and by the many absurdities that would follow from the opposite. The principal a priori reason is that real and entitative distinction properly so called obtains between thing and thing and is measured by distinct existences of things. Hence if nature and haecceity were distinguished in this way, it would be necessary for the nature to have its own existence prior to its principle of individuation — and since everything existing outside the intellect is singular, because existence follows singularity, then the nature would be singular before singularity, or would not need a superadded principle of individuation.

Nor can this distinction be posited as a real distinction of a mode, as Amicus at the cited place *concl. 4* seems to suggest. For the modal distinction which recent authors posit between a thing and its extrinsic mode is such that although the mode cannot exist without the thing of which it is the mode, even by God's absolute power, the thing can exist without the mode. But it is the case that God cannot separate the nature from singularity, since then it would be singular and existing without singularity — which implies a contradiction. Therefore the nature cannot be distinguished from the principle of individuation either by the reality of a thing or by the reality of a mode.

And in this sense it can be said that all things are individual of themselves, insofar as they are not individuated by something really distinct from them. And indeed

this has always been the constant and firm opinion of Scotus and the Scotists — hence Pasqualig. at *tom. 2 Metaph. disput. 40* wrongly imputes the opposite to the Scotists. For at *sect. 4*, after having recounted the Doctor's opinion from *2 dist. 3 quaest. 6* and said that by the entity by which the nature is individuated the Doctor understands only a certain reality that is not properly a thing nor really distinct from the nature, but only formally so — and therefore that through this haecceity he cannot understand some physical entity but only a certain grade of being by which the nature is completed — Pasqualig., I say, after recounting the Doctor's opinion in this way, adds that Scotists for the most part interpret it otherwise, in that they want individuation to import something superadded to the individual thing, which they call haecceity, positing it as distinct from the individual thing from the nature of the thing — and for them this formal distinction from the nature of the thing precedes every operation of the intellect, is found in things arising from their own nature, just as the entitative distinction is found between entity and entity, and is real, just like the entitative. For this opinion so explained he cites almost all Scotists — Ant. And., Bassol., Lich., Tat., Rad., Meuriff., Raguf. But let those authors be read, please, and everyone will see that they do not depart from the Doctor's opinion by so much as a fingernail, and defend it in precisely the same way as Pasqual. himself recites and understands it. And it is altogether false that when they say haecceity is formally distinct from the nature from the nature of the thing, they understand this to be an entitative and real distinction, such as that found between entity and entity, or thing and thing. For they understand nothing other than that distinction which they themselves acknowledge as intermediate between simply real and simply rational distinction — and which I explained at length at *disp. 6 Met. q. 9*.

Second Conclusion: Individuation adds at least something of reason superadded to the nature and distinct from it in the same way. This conclusion too is common, conceded even by Durand. at the cited place, and can be proved from what was said at the preceding question, n. 6 — for those arguments at minimum prove such a distinction of reason.

It is further proved: the nature of itself is indifferent to many, while individuation is of itself determined to one — and therefore the former is conceived as determinable and the latter as determinative. Therefore the latter superadds something to the former at least through the intellect, since the determinative cannot be included in the determinable — otherwise the determinable would not be determinable but already determined.

Furthermore: the nature is an account communicable of itself, while individuation is incommunicable, and the nature is drawn through individuation to incommunicable being. Therefore individuation necessarily superadds something at least rationally distinct and a special grade of being to the nature — otherwise there would be no reason why after contraction it could not be said to be communicable, as before, if nothing is understood as superadded.

Furthermore: when we compare individuals and simultaneously conceive in them precisely the nature, we perceive them as agreeing and being similar; if we additionally conceive their singularity, we perceive their difference and dissimilarity. Therefore individuation superadds a certain special grade beyond the nature. For if it added nothing, there would be no reason why the individuals would first be recognized as similar and not also afterwards.

Furthermore: when we say "Socrates is a human being," the subject in this predication says something more than the predicate — because what is imported by the predicate can also be enunciated of Plato and of other individuals, but not what is imported by the subject, except for Sorteshood, which is the individuation. Therefore this adds something beyond the nature, at least rationally distinct.

Furthermore: in any individual — for example Peter — there is found not only formal unity by which he is said to be one human being and one essentially with Paul, but also numerical unity by which this human being is numerically distinct from Paul. Since unity is the adequate passion of being, a corresponding entity proportionate to each unity must be present from which it flows. But such an entity is not the entity of the nature with respect to numerical unity, since just as the nature is of itself communicable, so too is the unity emanating from it. Therefore there will be another grade of being superadded to the nature.

Finally, because in the direct predicamental line, as one descends from the most general to the most special and the individual, one always descends through various grades from the more communicable to the less communicable until one reaches the utterly incommunicable. Therefore the singular — which is the first subject in the predicamental line and is therefore called the first substance — imports a special grade of being superadded to the nature, in which incommunicability is founded.

Third Conclusion: The distinction of the nature from individuation is not only a distinction of rationalizing reason with imperfect precision of one from the other, but one of reasoned reason and with mutual perfect precision, such that the nature can be conceived without individuation or without it being conceived, and conversely. This conclusion is against Aversa and is proved as follows. A perfect distinction and adequate precision of reason occurs when the intellect distinguishes several formalities in the same object and conceives one in no way conceiving the other, as was said at *disput. 2 de natura entis q. 3 n. 47* when declaring what the difference is between the perfect precision of reason; but such is the case in the present matter — the intellect can conceive the nature without individuation being found in such a concept, and conversely can conceive individuation without the nature being found in it. Therefore one perfectly and adequately prescends from the other.

The major is clear; the minor is proved: by conceiving precisely the predicates in which individuals agree, one obtains the adequate concept of the nature — for example, by conceiving only animality and rationality one obtains the adequate concept of a human being as such; and by conceiving precisely the predicates in which they differ — as Peterheid and Paulhood — one obtains the adequate concept of individuation. And in this latter concept the nature is in no way involved, nor in the former is the concept of individuation — because if so, then Peter and Paul would neither agree precisely in their essential predicates without also differing, nor would they differ so exactly in individual predicates without also agreeing. Aversa responds that this proves only that neither the nature is explicitly included in the objective concept of individuation, nor individuation explicitly in the concept of the nature — but that implicitly they include each other, and therefore do not perfectly prescend from each other.

Against this: the argument directly refutes this response, because if it were so, then individuals would not perfectly agree in essential predicates, nor perfectly differ in individual ones — which cannot be said of the most special species in particular, since in it there are no equivocations lurking, and individuals are perfectly univocated in it according to 7 *Phys.* 29. Hence, although Aversa can offer this response regarding transcendental predicates — that they do not perfectly prescend, since in them inferiors partly agree and partly differ — this response has no place in the present case, since we are speaking of the atomic and most special species, in which perfect univocation is found and all analogy is absent.

A further confirmation of our argument from Aversa himself at the same *q. 9 art. 2*, where he proves from the following that the concept of the nature prescends from the concept of individuation: because the concept of human nature, for example, is essentially predicated of Peter and Paul and each individual human being. Therefore it does not essentially include individuation — for if it essentially included it, it would carry it wherever it is essentially found, and of each individual there would be predicated according to all the proper concepts of the other individuals, and so all individuals would be included in the several ones and would not be distinct from each other. By the same argument it is proved that individuation on the contrary perfectly prescends from the nature — for if it essentially included the latter in its concept, then Peterheid could also be predicated of Paul, and Paulhood of Peter.

The response is again made that these and similar things prove only perfect precision, and that the stated absurdities do not follow — namely that individuals in the concept of a human being as such partly agree and partly differ, and that one individual can be predicated of another — because what is explicitly known is alone predicated and causes agreement, not what is implicit. And because in the concept of nature I know only animality and rationality explicitly, and not individuation which is only implicit in it, it follows that individuals agree only in the nature and do not differ, and only the nature and not individuation is

predicated of many. And conversely, because in the concept of individuation — for example Peterheid — I know only what is explicitly represented to me and not what is implicit, I therefore know only the formality by which individuals differ, not that by which they agree. Against this: only what is attained by the intellect has objective being in it, and only what is understood is represented to the intellect. If therefore when it understands individuals as agreeing it has only the concept of the nature and not of individuation, and when it understands them as differing it has only the concept of individuation and not of nature, the sign is that in the concept of the nature individuation is involved in no way — neither explicitly nor implicitly. Furthermore, as I proved extensively at *disput. 2 Met. quaest. 3*, this implicit conception of one formality along with another is so implicit that it can in no way be declared. For either when I precisely conceive the humanity of Peter, does the formal concept express Peterheid for me, or not? If it expresses it, the conception of Peterheid in humanity is already not implicit but explicit and expressed. If it does not express it, therefore it is neither explicit nor implicit. And if you contend that it is implicitly expressed — beyond the fact that this seems a contradiction in terms, since implicit conception is not compatible with expression with respect to the same object — I again argue: when individuation is implicitly expressed to me in the concept of humanity, do I conceive and attain it simultaneously with humanity or not? Not the first — as even the Adversary concedes, since then the conception would be explicit and not merely implicit. If the second: this suffices for humanity to be said to perfectly prescend from Peterheid, and conversely. For then there is perfect precision when one formality is attained in the same real object while the other is not attained. Finally, because this implicit conception or containment of individuation in the nature, or conversely, either draws necessity from the real identity of one with the other, or also from essential identity, since one is part of the concept of the other. Not the first, because the physical and entitative identity of many formalities does not prevent the intellect from intentionally and metaphysically separating them by conceiving one without the other. Nor the second, because it is false — even for the Adversaries themselves — that the nature is of the essential concept of individuation, or conversely. Furthermore, if this were conceded, then when conceiving the nature one should conceive individuation not only implicitly but also explicitly, and conversely; since in the quidditative concept of a thing all and each of its essential predicates must be attained explicitly, if it is conceived adequately.

Second, I argue principally: there is no question here of some transcendental concept, nor of a generic one, in which equivocations are wont to lurk inducing at least analogy, as Aristotle says at 7 *Phys.* 29, but of the concept of the most special species, in which perfect univocation is found, and individuals perfectly agree. Therefore such a concept perfectly prescends from the differences of its inferiors and involves them in no way — neither explicitly nor implicitly. For if it contained them even implicitly, then in the atomic species there would not be

perfect univocation, nor would individuals perfectly agree in it — since by reason of such implicit containment, with the containment being included in the specific nature, some diversity originating from the inferior accounts would also be included.

A further confirmation: it is for this reason that Aversa, with others, denies perfect unity and precision to the concept of being and other transcendentals from their inferiors and contracting modes — because on account of their transcendence they imbibe and are imbibed in them, and hence inferiors partly agree and partly differ in them. Since therefore the specific concept is not transcendental, and is perfectly one since perfectly univocal and mixed with no analogy, it follows that it contains in itself neither explicitly nor implicitly any individuation whatsoever, but perfectly prescends from all of it, and conversely.

Third, genus and specific difference perfectly prescend from each other, as I proved at *disp. 5 Log. qu. 3 art. 3*, and Aversa concedes this in many cases. Therefore much more so do species and individual difference. The consequence is proved because the species has greater and more perfect unity in its concept than the genus, and therefore also more perfect precision. This consequence is again proved: the imperfection of the unity of a concept arises from imperfect precision, as is clear in transcendentals, to which Adversaries deny perfect unity of concept insofar as they are asserted not to perfectly prescend from their inferiors. Furthermore, it is for this reason that Adversaries salvage in the species the metaphysical composition from genus and difference, through the distinction of reason with perfect precision between the nature of genus and difference. Therefore they must all the more admit such perfect precision in the individual between the specific nature and individuation. The consequence is proved: such metaphysical composition is also found in the individual — indeed, as the Doctor notes at *2 d. 3 qu. 6 L*, the individual is more composite than the specific nature itself, because that reality from which the specific difference is taken is in potency with respect to that reality from which the individual difference is taken.

Aversa responds: even if such composition and distinction are admitted in the species, it is still to be denied in individuals — for essential grades can be found, one of which does not formally include the other, which can be determinate and precise; but the account of singularity necessarily belongs to every grade and is in a certain sense transcendent throughout, and so is imbibed in all, such that the human singularity cannot be distinguished from humanity, the substantial from substance, and so on. Therefore this precision of the species is only imperfect, through a confused conception of individuals as one.

However, this response is directly refuted by the argument itself, which shows that the species has greater unity in its concept than the genus, and that the individual is more composite than the specific nature itself. If these are true, as the argument urges, there is no response. Furthermore, it is false that singularity is transcendent throughout all superior grades in the predicamental line and is

imbibed in all. For any superior predicamental grade of singularity has its own formal and essential unity, at least rationally distinct from the individual one. And none is said to be intrinsically singular and individual, but only extrinsically and denominatively, through conjunction with singularity in the same individual.

Fourth, I argue principally for the conclusion, and against the response just given: genus perfectly prescends from difference, and conversely — not precisely because they form a metaphysical composition, but especially because they stand to each other as determinable and determinative, contractible and contracting. Of these it is of the account that the contracting and determining is outside the account of the contractible and determinable, and conversely — otherwise the determinable would not be determinable but already determined. But such is the case that the specific nature and the individual difference stand no less as determinable and determinative with respect to each other than the generic nature and the specific difference. Therefore just as the latter perfectly prescend, so too do the former. The major is clear; the minor is proved: the generic nature is said to be contractible and determinable by the specific difference because the genus is of greater scope and latitude than the specific difference — since the genus is communicable to many species but the specific difference is found in only one species. But so too the specific nature and individuation stand in their order, such that the former is of greater extensive latitude insofar as it is communicable to many individuals, while individuation — for example, Peterheid — is proper to only that individual in which it is found. Therefore by equal proportion, *mutatis mutandis*, these too stand to each other as contracting and contractible in their order.

And from this is also gathered the reason why conversely the contractive must exclude the contractible from its formal account — because the contractive must have a narrower extension than the contractible, and must coarct it to a more determined being, which it could not do unless it entirely excluded it from its concept and superadded to it a more determinate grade of being.

Finally, this conclusion can be proved by the arguments adduced for the preceding conclusion — since those arguments, rightly considered, prove not only a distinction of rationalizing reason and imperfect precision of one from the other, but also a distinction of reasoned reason and perfect precision. For it is founded on the opposition of the formal accounts of nature and individuation: the nature from its formal account is communicable, while individuation is incommunicable; the nature is determinable and contractible, while individuation is contracting and determinative; the nature makes individuals on the part of the thing similar and agreeing, individuation makes them dissimilar and discordant; the nature is the root of formal unity, individuation of numerical unity; the nature is the principle of operations and passions common to the whole species, but not individuation. The opposition therefore that nature and individuation have in their formal accounts manifestly shows that they mutually

exclude each other in their objective concepts and that one is perfectly prescinded from the other. See *disput. 2 Metaphysicor. quaest. 3* on the perfect precision of the concept of being, where you will find much to this purpose.

Fourth and final Conclusion: The nature and individuation are distinguished from each other not only by reasoned reason and with perfect precision of one from the other, but also formally from the nature of the thing — which is our middle distinction between simply real distinction and distinction of reason. Hence in this sense it can be and must be said that created natures are not individuated of themselves, but through something formally superadded from the nature of the thing.

This conclusion is against all Thomists and recent authors, and is that of Scotus at *2 d. 3 quaest. 6*, and of the Scotists: Lichet.; Tatar.; Gratian., *ibid.*; Canon., *1 Physic. qu. 6*; Trombet., *5 Met. quaest. 5*; Bassol., *2 d. 12 quaest. 4*; Ant. And., *7 Met. qu. 16*; Rada, *2 part. controverf. 3 art. 4*; Faber, *theor. 90*; Meurisse, *2 Metaph. cap. 2 quaest. 6*; Poncius, *disput. 6 Log. quaest. 9*; Sarnan., at the end of the universals, in a special treatise on the principle of individuation; Raguf., *disput. 24 perip.* It is proved by all the same arguments by which at the preceding disputation, question 4, the formal distinction of the nature from singularity was proved — since they reciprocally prove the distinction of the nature from individuation, and conversely.

It can also be proved by the arguments by which at the preceding disputation, question 3, I showed that the nature has a certain negative community on the part of the thing. For since individuation on the other hand is an entity of itself entirely incommunicable and of itself bound and tied to this individual, it manifestly follows that the nature and individuation differ more than by reason alone — since they have this opposition on the part of the thing in their formal accounts, and not only through the intellect, as has been deduced in the preceding material. From which head also those arguments adduced for the second and third conclusion can serve for this conclusion, showing that the opposition they have in their formal accounts — detected from their diverse and opposite functions — is not an opposition of reason and produced by the intellect, but from the nature of the thing. For on the part of the thing, with no intellect thinking, the nature makes individuals similar and individuation makes them dissimilar — not only virtually and fundamentally, but also actually; the nature is communicable at least negatively, individuation incommunicable; the nature is determinable, individuation determinative; and so on.

Furthermore, the arguments adduced at question 6 for formal unity prove this conclusion — since if there is formal unity on the part of the thing, less than numerical, just as individual unity is separated on the part of the thing in some way from the formal unity of the nature, so too individuation — to which numerical unity follows — must in some way be separated on the part of the thing from the entity of the nature, to which formal unity follows.

Finally, it is proved by those arguments by which at *disput. 8 Metaph. quaest. 6 art. 2* the formal distinction from the nature of the thing was in general proved between all predicamental grades. And the a priori reason for all of them is touched upon by Bassol., *6 d. 12 quaest. 4 art. 2 § Dico igitur*, where he says that these accounts of communicable and incommunicable, determinable and determining, assimilating and discerning, etc., for this reason in predicamental grades infer a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, and not merely a virtual or reasoned one as they do in transcendentals — because the common and proper predicamental grades effect in creatures a metaphysical composition, which since it is in its own order real (namely from reality and reality, as the Doctor frequently teaches), they consequently import not only pure concepts, as transcendental grades do, but also true realities in the same physical entity, merged and imbibed by real identity, yet still formally differentiated from each other by their formal accounts.

It is also commonly proved by the Scotists from certain places in Aristotle: at *3 de Anim. 9* he says that magnitude and the being of magnitude are different things; and at *7 Met. 20, 21, and 41* he says that in things concrete with matter — that is, in the whole which is haecceity, as Scotus explains at *2 dist. 3 quaest. 6 in fine* — the quiddity is not the same as that of which it is the quiddity. By this he means to indicate a distinction more than of reason between nature and haecceity. These authorities I adduced at *disput. 6 Metaphys. quaest. 11 num. 219* to prove from Aristotle the existence of formal distinction.

Article II. Objections Resolved

Against the third conclusion, Aversa at the cited *quaest. 11* argues, proving that the individual difference does not even through the intellect, by perfect precision of reason, differ from the nature — as if neither explicitly nor implicitly does singularity include the nature, and the nature singularity. He proves this first from Aristotle, *4 Met. tex. 3*, saying: the same is one man and one being, and man and man and one man are not different according to the repeated expression — that is, "man" and "one man" — by which he plainly signifies (Aversa says) that nothing more is denoted, nor anything distinct added, by saying "man" and "singular man," "humanity" and "singular humanity." The response is that Aristotle there is not speaking of individuation and nature, nor asking whether singularity is something superadded to the nature, but is speaking of the one and being, and proves that the one does not express a nature diverse from being — as if the one were a thing diverse from being — because they are altogether the same really and convertible, as subject and passion. As Scotus and Alensis explain there, he is not therefore speaking of individuation in relation to the nature, but of unity in relation to being. And even if he affirmed these to be really identical with being, he still signifies that they are not the same formally or by reason — in those words: "if therefore being and one are the same, and one nature, because they follow upon each other as principle and cause, but are not signified by one account."

Hence even if Aristotle were speaking of individuation, Aversa does not conclude his intention from this.

Second, he argues: if the nature perfectly prescended from individuation... The response to this difficulty — since it is of no small importance — is that an entire question must be instituted below. But lest the argument be dismissed without sufficient solution in the present context, it must be responded to in the meantime from what was said at *disput. 9 log. qu. 2 art. 4*: granting the consequence, namely that a concept of individuation as such can be abstracted from the ultimate differences — in which all and each quiddidatively agree — as the argument well proves, and as the Doctor concedes at *1 dist. 23 quaest. unic. in fine*, and more clearly at *dist. 26 quaest. unic. litt. Y*, where also Lichet. and other Scotists agree. However, this concept would not be real and adequate — as if founded in some reality common to all haecceities in the way the real and adequate concept of humanity is common to the individuals of human nature, being founded in the nature real and common to all of them on the part of the thing. Rather, it would be a concept of reason and inadequate — somewhat in the way the concept of being and other transcendentals stands with respect to God and creature, to whom no common nature or reality corresponds on the part of the thing. Hence it is false that Peterheid and Paulhood agree in the common account of haecceity in the same way that Peter and Paul agree in the common concept of humanity. For the agreement of the latter is real and actual on the part of the thing, being founded in the real nature common to them, while the agreement of Peterheid and Paulhood in the common concept of haecceity is not real and actual on the part of the thing — because ultimate differences on the part of the thing are primarily diverse and agree in no reality or common nature, since every difference of the differing must finally be reduced to something primarily diverse, according to *5 Met. 10*.

Nor does the Doctor contradict himself when at the cited places in the argument and also at *1 d. quaest. 3*, he says the ultimate differences agree quiddidatively in nothing but are primarily diverse, and when at the cited places in the solution he says they can agree in something quiddidatively — for, as Lichet. explains at those places from the Doctor's own words at *1 d. 26 quaest. un. lit. Y*, he wants them to be primarily diverse in reality, but in those other places to be able to agree in some concept of reason and an inadequate one. And by this the infinite regress is also well avoided: for although they may agree in a concept before the intellect that conceives inadequately, yet since on the part of the thing they do not agree in any reality common to them — as individuals agree in the nature — there is a stopping-point in the ultimate differences, because they are the realities ultimately determining the nature in the predicamental line. And in this sense those arguments hold by which the Doctor proves at *d. 3 quaest. 3 § ad quaestionem* that the ultimate differences are primarily diverse — namely that in no real and adequate concept, or in some common reality, do they agree. How even in concepts of reason and inadequate ones an infinite regress cannot be given has

also been well declared at *disput. 5 log. cit. quaest. 2 art. 4*. This response will be further unfolded below in the proper question on this matter. In the meantime, see also what was said above at the preceding disputation, n. 48, and n. 144, and what will be said below at question 10.

Third, it is argued: since there would have to be conceded a distinct coordination of individuations, just as a coordination of grades of essence is conceded. For haecceities of one species agree not only in the account of individuation as such, but also in the root of individuation of such a nature — for example, of human nature — in that they are individuations of human nature, in which they differ from the individuations of the nature of brutes. Similarly, all individuations of things that agree in some genus have among themselves a generic agreement — hence all individuations of substances are substantial, of accidents are accidental, all individuations of material things are material, and all individuations of spiritual things are spiritual. Therefore by reason of these agreements there would have to be conceded a proper coordination of individuations, in which there would be superior, intermediate, and lowest grades — which does not seem admissible, because then an infinite regress would result. For just as any predicamental coordination, as it has genera, species, and individuals located in a direct line, so it has differences at the side that divide genera and constitute species.

The response — which is the common one of Scotists, and Lichet., *2 d. 3 quaest. 6* — is that the individuations of the same genus or species agree more with each other than the individuations of things of different genera or species, can be understood in two ways: one, per se, quiddidatively, and directly; the other, concomitantly only, indirectly, and through real identity with something that is per se, quiddidatively, and directly contained under some genus or species. In the first way, it is denied that the individual difference of Peter agrees more with the individual difference of Paul than with the individual difference of Bucephalus — since all are primarily diverse. In the second way they certainly agree more, but from this it is not permitted to infer that distinct coordinations of individuations must be given, as coordinations of grades of essence and natures are given. For a similar account of agreement is not found in individuals and individuants — since two individuals of the same species agree more per se, directly, and quiddidatively than an individual of one species with an individual of another, but individuants do not thus agree more, except concomitantly. For speaking directly and formally, Peterheid and Paulhood are just as primarily diverse among themselves as Peterheid and Bucephalushood — because quiddidatively and formally, humanity is as much excluded from Peterheid and Paulhood as from Bucephalushood.

Reductively therefore the individual differences of Peter and Paul are under the same species, just as the specific differences under diverse species are under the same genus — but not per se and quiddidatively. For neither is the genus

quiddidatively enunciated of its differences, nor is the species enunciated of the individual differences, as was said in the Logic. This common response of the Scotists very well dissolves this argument — though it is badly applied by them to dissolve also the preceding argument, for it is one thing to compare individuations to the nature which they contract, and another to compare them to the common account of individuation as such. For in the first mode of comparison they stand as contracting to contractible, and therefore do not include its account quiddidatively; in the other mode they stand as inferiors to their superior, and therefore must quiddidatively include it. So this solution works well for dissolving this argument, but not the preceding one, as I noted at the preceding disputation, n. 47. Note also that this argument can be made equally well about specific differences in relation to genus, as about individual ones in relation to species. For all specific differences of one genus agree more with each other than the specific differences of another genus — and so since Aversa in certain genera admits perfect precision from the differences, he is bound to dissolve the argument there as well.

Fourth, it is argued: just as a human being common to all individual human beings is considered and named, so too could a singular human being be considered and named — certainly agreeing in all singular human beings. For not only is Peter said to be a human being, but also a singular human being, and so too Paul. Therefore either by "singular" is understood that some formality rationally distinct from human nature is added, or rather "singular human being" says nothing more than "human being" absolutely. Not the first, because a really possible human being is none but a singular one, and there is no reason compelling us to say that a singular human being in common adds some formality to human nature as such. Moreover, a determinate individual would have to add another formality by which it determines the singular human being as such — which however cannot be done, since singularity cannot be added on top of singularity. Therefore it must be admitted that singularity does not add to the nature any formality perfectly precise.

Pasqual. at the cited place responds that by "singular human being in common" must be understood a human being as such with superadded singularity — but not taken in common, since that is not given, but with this or that singularity determinately, disjunctively. And therefore no other account of singularity is to be conceded as superadded to singularity, since it would only have to be conceded insofar as there were a singularity as such precisely taken. But the necessity of positing this or that singularity superadded to the nature is so that the nature, which is not of itself singular, may become singular. And even though the possible human being is singular, it is singular because it has a superadded singularity.

This response does not satisfy, however. For beyond the fact that it gratuitously denies the concept of singularity as such in common, it badly takes the singular human being as such for the vague individual — as if it meant the same as "some

human being" with disjunction. For "singular human being as such" means the same as the individual human being taken absolutely, abstracting from this one and that one; but the individual human being so taken does not mean the same as "a certain human being" or "some human being" under disjunction. For to the vague individual — as Summulists say — no sign of particularity or universality can be appended; for we do not say "every certain human being" or "some certain human being," which signs however are commonly appended to the individual human being and to the singular human being as such, as when we say: Peter is some individual human being, is some singular human being; likewise: every individual human being is risible, is incommunicable; every singular human being is incommunicable, etc. Therefore it is better responded — as to the similar argument about individuation at question 5, which I will discuss — that human nature conceived with that common individuation would not constitute any per se one composite in our intellect, because individuation is not conceived in that state in the manner of a contracting and determining, but rather in the manner of a contractible and determinable, since as such it is conceived in common. Furthermore, if it constitutes a per se one concept in the intellect, then "individual" is determined by "human," not conversely, so as to be distinguished from the brute individual and others — and human nature is not determined by individuation, unless this is taken determinately as Peterheid and Paulhood.

And finally, if you contend that singularity in that case still in some way determines humanity in the intellect and together with it constitutes a per se one concept, it could still well be further determined by certain and determinate singularity so that the singular human being in common becomes this human being and the designated individual. Nor would singularity on that account determine singularity as such — since then it is not taken as singular but as common through the abstracting intellect. This response will become still clearer below when it will be seen whether a common concept of individuation as such can be given.

Fifth, it is argued against the fourth conclusion: that individuation is not formally distinct from the nature from the nature of the thing before the operation of the intellect — because if it is so distinct from the common nature, it either comes to the common nature or constitutes it in the being of a common nature. The second cannot be said, as is clear. If the first, then it follows that the common nature is of itself singular — for what comes to something supposes it constituted in its proper being, and what is constituted and perfected in its own being is already singular. Therefore individuation cannot be formally distinct from the nature from the nature of the thing.

A confirmation from Cajetan, *lib. de ente et essentia cap. 2 quaest. 4*: if haecceity comes to the nature so that they truly compose the individual and singular in the thing, it is certain that one of them — namely the common nature — will have the character of potency, and the other — namely the difference — the character

of act, by reason of the formal distinction obtaining between them. But the singular act presupposes a singular potency, according to 2 *Physicor.* 38. Therefore the common nature will be singular of itself before the advent of the individual difference. If you say the minor is true where act and potency are really distinct, as happens in physical composition, since then the potency really receives the act — against this: according to Scotus at *quolib.* 1, when some two things are really united but still retain a formal distinction, they retain from the nature of the thing the same order that they would have if they were really distinct. But if haecceity were really distinct from the nature, it would presuppose the nature as a singular potency; therefore even now, though it is only formally distinct from the nature of the thing.

If again you say that the singular act presupposes a singular potency when it does not confer singularity upon that potency, but that individuation confers it, and therefore does not presuppose it — against this: here there appears to be a manifest *petitio principii*, for this is precisely what the argument directly proves — namely that haecceity cannot singularize the nature in the manner of act if it is formally distinct from it from the nature of the thing, because such an act presupposes a potency proportionate and commensurate to it. And since it itself is singular, the corresponding potency must also be singular — because only a particular act is proportionate to a particular potency, and not to a universal potency.

The response is to concede that the individual difference comes to the nature, and to deny what is deduced from this — namely that the nature before the advent of haecceity would be singular. For only that is singular which is so constituted and perfected in its being that it can no longer be further determined. Now the common nature, to which individuation comes, even though it is perfectly constituted in the being of the nature in its essential predicates, is not yet ultimately determined — and therefore it will not be singular but truly communicable and determinable by individuation to this individual.

To the confirmation: the same argument must be resolved by the Adversaries as well, who distinguish individuation from the nature by reason alone with a foundation in the thing. For by virtue of that rational distinction with a foundation in the thing, they also attempt to preserve the metaphysical composition in individuals from per se act and metaphysical potency. Hence they too are bound to explain how the difference conceived in the manner of a singular act determines the common and singularizable potency, and is still proportionate to such a potency.

I say, therefore, that this proposition — "a singular act presupposes a singular potency" — is not formally and absolutely true. For it does not formally follow that the same quantity of unity that is in the act is in the potency actuated by that act. Otherwise the genus would have as much unity as the difference dividing it — which is manifestly false, since the contractible and determinable is always of

greater latitude than the contracting and determining. Therefore this proposition is to be understood of a physical act which presupposes a pre-existing physical potency, but not of a metaphysical act and potency — since the metaphysical act does not presuppose a pre-existing potency, and therefore does not presuppose one that is singular. It is also understood of physical act and potency that are really distinct, not of metaphysical act and potency, which are really the same and only formally distinct.

Nor does the required proportion between such an act and potency require that if the act is singular, the potency too must be singular and particular — as the argument urges. For the proportion between act and potency must be such that it does not destroy the account of them: it would destroy it if in the potency the effect were required in advance that is expected from the act — since then the act could not actuate such a potency. Hence since individual unity is the effect of individuation, individual unity can be supposed before singularity, but is formally provided by singularity itself. The proportion required between the nature and individuation is therefore that of singularity and community — so that the act is singular, as that by which, while the nature is communicable to many. Nor should this seem marvelous, as the Doctor frequently notes, since proportion does not require similarity in what is proportionate, but rather dissimilarity. By this teaching satisfaction is also given to the objections made against the solutions given in the course of arguing, insofar as they pertain to this response.

Another solution to the same argument is also commonly applied by Scotists: that this proposition — "a singular act presupposes a singular potency" — holds of the singular act as what, as it is part of a material composite whether per se or per accidens. For this soul presupposes this body, this accident presupposes this subject — and in this sense the Philosopher utters it. But it does not hold of the singular act as that by which, which primarily constitutes the thing in singular being. For then there would be an infinite regress. This solution was given and extensively declared by Lichet., *2 d. 3 qu. 6*, and is followed word for word by Rada at the cited controversy — though he does not mention him, which you will find not infrequently in that author.

Sixth, Pasqual. argues at *disp. 40 sect. 3*: individuation does not distinguish only one individual from another, but also the nature of one from the nature of another — for it distinguishes one individual from another adequately according to its whole physical and real being, including its being of nature, since by virtue of such distinction we see one corrupted while the other remains. Therefore individuation cannot be formally distinct from the nature from the nature of the thing, such as to be outside the being of the nature formally. The consequence is proved because nothing is really distinguished according to its being from another through something altogether extrinsic to it and really distinct from it, since the principles of distinction and constitution are the same.

The response is: granting the antecedent — that both singularities and contracted natures in individuals are really distinguished from each other — to still deny the consequence. For although individuation in Peter is formally distinct from the nature, it is nevertheless really identified with it in Peter, and by virtue of this real identity it suffices to really distinguish the nature of Peter from the nature of Paul. For real distinction is measured not by formalities but by entities, as they are capable of existence. And since in Peter there is only one physical entity constituted from those two metaphysical formalities, and consequently only one existence, the whole of Peter — according to his whole physical being by reason of individuation identified with the nature — is distinguished from Paul. Nor on that account is the nature of Peter distinguished from the nature of Paul through something altogether extrinsic to it: for although individuation is formally distinguished from the nature, they are still really the same in the same place, and in this sense it is said to be distinguished through something intrinsic to it. Indeed, individuation must be said to pertain to the intrinsic being of the nature insofar as it is really distinct or distinguishable from another nature — because since they cannot be really distinguished except what have diverse existences, and since existence accompanies singularity, the nature of Peter cannot found a real distinction from the nature of Paul unless conjoined or conjoinable with Peterheid.

A confirmation of this response: the nature of Peter is not really distinguished from the nature of Paul according to its formal being — as if such distinction were founded in its formality, according to which it is distinguished from individuation. Rather, it is distinguished according to its real, physical, and entitative being, in which individuation is also really imbibed. Therefore the nature of Peter is really distinguished from the nature of Paul through individuation as intrinsic to it, insofar as it is really distinguishable; even if it is extrinsic insofar as it is formally distinguishable and considered according to its formal being.

But Pasqual. presses: if the nature and individuation are said to be really identified in the same entity, it follows that individuation is not something really superadded to the nature, nor is there any actual distinction between them on the part of the thing formally speaking. For real identification unites all metaphysical formalities in one and the same physical being, and hence in one single existence — from which it follows that they must be produced and corrupted by one and the same production and corruption. Therefore once the identification of the nature with individuation is posited, there can be no formal distinction on the part of the thing.

This consequence is proved: for given some formal distinction between nature and individuation, in the production by which the thing is produced it would be possible to understand a distinction, such that by virtue of the production there would be posited this being of the individual thing distinct from individuation —

which however is impossible, because it implies that by virtue of the production some being is posited that is not in itself certain, determined and designated, and therefore individual.

The response is: granting the whole antecedent, the consequence is denied. For just as real identity or distinction of things is measured by identity or diversity of existences, so likewise since production and corruption respect the existence of things as their immediate formal terminus, while formalities only mediately and concomitantly, the identity or diversity of the latter are only adequate signs of real identity or distinction, and not of formal distinction — as was said above at *disp. 6 q. 8 art. 2 n. 185*. From which it follows that it is impossible, precisely by virtue of a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, to be able to understand the nature as produced distinct from individuation — since the sufficient and suitable terminus of physical production is only a physical entity capable of its own existence, and such a terminus cannot be a pure and naked metaphysical formality, which cannot exist in the nature of things except as immersed through identity in a physical entity.

Pasqual. heaps up many more arguments at the cited place, which prove only a real distinction of individuation from the nature — which he wrongly thinks the Scotists deny, as I said at the preceding disputation, *q. 3 art. 2 n. 69*. And some other arguments, which seem to undermine even the formal distinction between them, were resolved there.

Seventh: the nature existing, prescinding from any other superadded formality, includes whatever perfection singularity would express if it were distinguished from the nature. Therefore no singularity distinct from the nature is to be posited. The consequence is clear: for if the nature of itself and intrinsically contains singularity, just as it is not distinct from itself, so neither is it distinct from the perfection of singularity which it contains in itself. The antecedent is proved: the nature is extrinsically determined not only in its specific account but also in its individual account — since existence presupposes singularity.

The response is that the argument presses those who attribute to the nature an existence distinct from the existence of the singular or singularity — which we do not concede, acknowledging only one existence in the singular, which is proper to the singular itself, through which all metaphysical formalities included in it through identity are said to exist formally. According to this manner of speaking, it implies to understand the nature as existing while prescinding from every superadded formality. For since actual existence is not a mode of any entity whatsoever however taken, but of an individually determinate entity, it follows that the nature cannot be understood as existing without singularity.

But if it were held that the nature and singularity have formally distinct existences, though really identified, then the antecedent would have to be denied. For existence as such only gives the essence to stand outside causes and to pass

from potency to act — it does not ultimately determine it in the nature of things, nor place it in the ultimate subjectable being, since this is the function of singularity and individuation. And to the proof of that antecedent, either the assumption would have to be denied, or it would have to be conceded of incommunicable existence but not of communicable existence — the kind that would be posited for the nature if it had existence formally distinct from the existence of the singular.

Eighth, it is pressed still more evidently concerning relative and modal entities of things, which Realists admit in their school even if they are denied by Nominalists. For the modes of things are of themselves singular — for the sitting posture of Peter can by no power be placed in Paul, because it essentially regards Peter determinately, and this not by reason of a haecceity distinct from the essence. For to regard the subject is essential to the sitting posture — and what is essential to a thing cannot belong to it through something distinct from it. The same holds for the causality by which Peter is produced, since it is essentially the production of Peter and is not determined to Peter through something distinct.

A confirmation: relative essences, especially those regarding actual termini, are of themselves singular — as is clear in the vision of white as such, which essentially regards such a terminus, so that it cannot regard another. The intuitive vision of this white cannot be of another white. But this does not come from a superadded singularity, but from its essence, which is specified in relation to such an object. For the essence of vision cannot regard the object through something distinct from itself, since then it would have an essence distinct from itself — whereas the essence of vision consists in regarding the object.

The response is: no greater difficulty arises in modal and relative entities than in absolute ones with respect to their individuations. For by equal proportion the same reasoning must apply to both. And just as in absolute beings we admit three predicamental grades — generic, specific, and individual — so too the same number must be admitted in relatives. And just as they are distinguished in absolute ones, so too must they be distinguished in relatives. Thus: union considered according to its generic grade regards parts as such; according to its specific grade, regards parts of such a species; according to its individual grade finally, regards parts individuated in such a way — as Amicus at the cited place rightly noted. And therefore this union between these parts cannot be except between these parts — not indeed by reason of its essence precisely taken, since as such it is indifferent to other parts, but by reason of haecceity, by virtue of which it so regards these parts that it cannot regard others. Likewise, the sitting posture of Peter so determinately regards Peter that it cannot be placed in Paul — not in the account of sitting posture as such, since as such it is indifferent to being also in Paul, but in the account of this sitting posture, under which account it essentially includes haecceity. And so by reason of haecceity, not by virtue of its specific quiddity, it is repugnant for it to be placed in Paul.

The same must be said of the production of effects — that this numerically individual production cannot be terminated to another numerically individual effect, not because it is determined to this one from essential principles, but from individual ones. To the confirmation: the same must be said in turn with Amicus, if acts of the will are held to be essentially relative beings — namely, that just as in the object there is a common account and a particular account, so in the cognition of that object there is a common account and a particular account. For just as there is whiteness and this whiteness, so in vision there are grades by which that vision is said to be terminated to white as such and to this white. Yet Scotus teaches at *quol. 13* that vital acts are per se essentially absolute entities, as those of the genus of quality, and only relatively speaking, insofar as they include predicamental or transcendental relations to their objects — and therefore he says they have their own intrinsic differences, both specific and individual, independent of the differences to objects, and that such differences are only manifested, not constituted, through objects. This was discussed in the book on the soul.

Finally, many more arguments — even more pressing than those recounted so far — are brought against the formal distinction of individuation from the nature by Suarez, *disp. 5 sect. 2*; Aversa, *quaest. 19 Philosoph. sect. 10*; Arriag., *disp. 11 log.*; Hurt., *disp. 5 Metaph. sect. 3*; Ovied., *controv. 4 Met. punct. 3*. These have already been resolved at the preceding disputation, *quaest. 3 art. 2* and *disp. 8 quaest. 6 art. 3* — for they are so numerous that it was necessary to distribute them across many questions in order to moderate the reader's tedium.

Question III. Whether the Principle of Individuation Superadded to the Nature Is Something Positive or Rather Something Negative

After the Doctor at 2 *dist. 3* has determined in the first question that no created nature is of itself formally individual, but through something superadded from the nature of the thing, he immediately at the second question of the same distinction asks what this superadded element is — what individuation formally imports — whether it is something positive or rather something negative.

The reason for doubting is this: in every opinion the individual is that which is undivided and indivisible into many of the same kind, each of which would be it, and incommunicable to them in the manner of a superior, such that it cannot be predicated of those many by an exercised predication saying "this is this." From this it is clear to all that the individual, beyond the nature, says a negation of division and divisibility into many similars — which is clear enough from the very force of the name: "individual" means the same as "not divided" or "divisible into many similars," like the universal, to which it is opposed. Since therefore it is certain that the individual implies such a negation beyond the nature, the question is whether individuation consists precisely in such a negation — so that beyond the nature it adds nothing except this pure negation — or rather whether prior to the negation it adds beyond the nature a certain positive formality that is

of itself incommunicable, to which that negation follows as to its proximate foundation.

Henry — as reported by the Doctor at the cited place — asserts at *quol. 5 quaest. 8* that the singular is formally individuated by negation, and that individuation adds only and precisely a negation beyond the specific nature in order to be determined in individual being. He says this negation is twofold: one is the negation of division in itself, or into many similars; the other is the negation of identity with any other being. Hence this opinion acknowledges no positive principle of individuation in the genus of formal cause, but only in the genus of efficient cause — namely the efficient cause by which the thing is produced in its entity.

For the resolution of the question, it must be said briefly: there is indeed such a negation in the individual, but the individual is not formally and precisely constituted in such being by it alone, as if it were superadded alone to the nature. Rather, individuation additionally adds a certain positive formality that is of itself incommunicable, to which as to its proximate foundation such negation follows.

This conclusion is Scotus's at the cited place, and that of all Scotists, and is commonly received by other authors: Suarez, *disp. 5 sect. 2*; Aversa, *quaest. 9 cit. sect. 3*; Pasqual., *disp. 40 sect. 1*; Mercen., *disput. speciali de hac re cap. 3*; Ragusejus, *disp. 24 perip. cap. 9*; Contar., *disp. de princ. individ. cap. 2*; Amicus, *tract. 4 log. q. 3 dub. 2 art. 2*. They prove it by the very same arguments the Doctor produced, and indeed as to the first part of the conclusion the matter is in itself clear. For it is most true that the individual is undivided and indivisible into many similars — into many subjective parts each of which is it. And although a cup of water can be divided into many portions of water, of each of which "this is water" can be said, taking water for the universal whole, none of them can be said to be that water which was divided. Hence that division was not of the universal whole into subjective parts, but of the integral whole into integral parts, as the Doctor says at *2 d. 3 quaest. 4 G*. Therefore it cannot be doubted that the individual involves such negation.

As to the other part, in which the difficulty consists, the Doctor proves with several arguments. First, as follows: nothing simply is repugnant to a being merely by a negation placed in it, but through something positive, to which that negation follows. This is the major proposition that the Doctor assumes. It can be proved by induction: the negation of corporeity belongs to the angel through some positive formality to which being corporeal is repugnant — which we call spirituality; the negation of brutality belongs to a human being through rationality, to which the opposed affirmation — brutality — is directly repugnant. And so on for others. Then I add this minor: but to the singular — for example a stone — it is repugnant to be divided into many singular stones each of which is what the divided stone was. Therefore something positive must be posited by reason of which this repugnance belongs to it radically.

One might say: even through a pure and bare negation existing in the subject, the opposed affirmation can be repugnant to it — for to the blind person, by reason of blindness which is a pure privation, sight is repugnant; and to a material substance, if deprived by God of quantity, division into many integral parts would be repugnant through the mere privation of quantity.

Against this the Doctor replies: because negation or privation — like blindness in a human being — certainly denies the proximate potency to the act of seeing, but does not place a simple repugnance to seeing; otherwise God could not illuminate the blind. Likewise, the stripping of quantity from a material substance certainly removes the proximate potency to being divided into those parts, since without quantity a material substance is not proximately divisible. But it does not place in it a simple repugnance to being divided — for God can give it quantity, and with it given the proximate potency to divisibility would be present. Although therefore to a subject by reason of negation there may be a repugnance *ex suppositione* and in a qualified sense to the opposed affirmation, yet it is not repugnant absolutely and simply — because through negation the proximate potency for acting and being acted upon is removed from the subject, but not the potency simply; since the same subject that is under the negation is of itself simply capable of the potency and act denied by the negation.

Since therefore the negation of division or divisibility into many similars is repugnant to the individual not in a qualified sense and *ex suppositione* but absolutely and simply, it follows that this negation or repugnance to being divided belongs to it by reason of some positive cause.

A confirmation from the parity of specific nature: it is repugnant to the species to be divided into many species, and since this repugnance belongs to it simply and absolutely — not merely in a qualified sense, as if separable from it — we say it belongs to it not through a simple negation but through something positive, namely through the ultimate essential difference by which it is constituted. Therefore likewise of the individual nature the same must be said — that since division into many similars is repugnant to it simply and absolutely, since such repugnance cannot be removed from it, such repugnance belongs to it not through a pure negation but through a certain altogether ultimate and incommunicable difference by which it is constituted, and to which that negation follows.

One might say again: even through a simple negation something can be simply and indispensably repugnant to something — for to a created person it is altogether repugnant to be communicated to another as that by which and as what, and this only through a double negation. For according to the Doctor at *3 d. quaest. 1 lit. E*, the created person is constituted in personal being through the negation of actual and aptitudinal communication. Therefore through a simple negation something can, according to Scotus, be simply repugnant to something.

But Rada at the cited *controv. 3 art. 2* very well excludes this objection by noting from the Doctor at *ibid. 3 d. 2 quaest. 1 G* that the negation of communicability is threefold: one is the negation precisely of actual communication, which the separated soul has; another which denies the aptitude to be communicated; and a third which includes repugnance to being communicated to another as that by which and as what. Then he says: the first and second negation can belong to something without any positive intrinsic principle — and through these something is not repugnant to something simply, but only in a qualified sense. But the third negation cannot belong to something except through a positive entity — and so it does not belong to the created person according to the Doctor at the same place, but only to the divine person, to whom through the hypostatic entity it has, being communicated to another as that by which and as what is simply and absolutely repugnant. But the created person is not so incommunicable — since it is not absolutely repugnant to it to be communicated to another, but only in a qualified sense, because such repugnance is separable from it by removing the double negation. Therefore the proposition assumed from the beginning remains altogether true: nothing is ever simply and absolutely repugnant to something through a simple negation, but through something absolute, to which that negation follows.

You might perhaps respond that this negation of division or divisibility into many similars belongs to the individual indeed through something positive, but that this positive is not something superadded to the nature but the nature itself — to which, as it is in Peter for example, it is repugnant to be communicated and to be in Paul. Against this: so far is the nature from demanding this negation that on the contrary it demands the opposed affirmation — namely to be communicated and multiplied in many similars. For even as it is in Peter, it is negatively indifferent of itself, or privatively so insofar as it is not of itself this. Therefore such negation cannot be founded on the very formal being of the nature; and therefore another formality of itself incommunicable must be added, upon which it is founded — and this will be the individual difference. And when it was said that it is repugnant to the nature as in Peter to be communicable, that is true taken reduplicatively — since in that way the real identification of the nature with Peterheid is considered. But taken specifically it is false — since in that way room is given to the formal distinction by which the nature is severed from haecceity.

Indeed, from this our principal argument can be confirmed as follows: the common nature of itself does not demand such negation, and yet to that nature as it exists in reality and has been made this, such negation belongs per se and intrinsically. Therefore something has been added to it by reason of which this negation now belongs to it, which previously did not. A further confirmation: there is no passage from one contradictory to another contradictory, whether in reality or in reason, except through some change made intrinsically or extrinsically in what passes. Since therefore after individuation has been made,

the nature is said to be incommunicable and non-multipliable, but not before, it is necessary to admit that through individuation something has been joined and superadded to it, from which that denomination derives into it — and this will be the individual difference. A final confirmation: if such negation were founded upon the very pure and bare being of the nature, then even before individuation it would have that negation, and not only afterwards — since even before individuation it has such being.

Second, the Doctor principally proves: through negation nothing is formally constituted in an entity more perfect than the entity presupposed to the negation, since negation as negation says no perfection. But the first substance, according to Aristotle in the predicament of substance, is substance most of all, and even more substance than the second. Therefore it is not formally constituted in the entity of the first substance, insofar as it is distinguished from the second, through negation. A confirmation of this reason from the functions attributed by Aristotle to first substance: the first substance is that of which the second is predicated per se. But it would not be so predicated if the first substance added beyond the second only a pure negation — for from a positive and a negative, no per se one thing is constituted, only an accidental one, and nothing is predicated per se of what is accidental. Nor does it avail to say that it receives the per se predication of the second substance not by reason of the negation but by reason of the nature included — for then it would only be predication of the same of itself.

Furthermore, it belongs per se primo to the first substance to be generated and to exist, according to 2 *Met. tex. 34 and 35*, and to operate per se primo, in the proem of the *Met.*, and the like. And it is clear that these are positive functions that cannot be exercised through a pure and simple negation.

Third, it is proved from Tromb., 5 *Met. q. 5 § impugnata opinione*: one individual differs positively from another under the same species, just as one species differs from another under the same genus. But one species does not differ from another through a simple negation, but through some difference constitutive of it. Therefore the same must be said of individuals. A further confirmation: Francis differs from John — not indeed through a simple negation, as if only some negation were in one that is not in the other, but they differ entirely by some positive entity, since there is a certain entity in one that is not in the other, and in this entity that negation is founded. A further confirmation: since not being able to be divided into many subjective parts is of the same account in Francis and in John, there still remains the question of where one of these negations gets its being the negation of Francis and the other the negation of John — and no satisfaction can be given except by assigning some positive reality that is of itself primarily this, and primarily diverse from another positive reality in John, as the Doctor says at the cited place, *lit. C*.

Fourth, the Doctor proves the same: that through which the species is atomic and indivisible is a positive being. Therefore much more is that through which the

individual is individual a positive being. The consequence is proved: numerical unity is greater and more perfect than specific unity. Therefore just as specific unity is positive and a passion of a positive being, so individual unity will be positive and follows upon something positive. A further confirmation: unity as such is a passion of being, whether it formally consists in something positive or negative. Therefore whenever a new unity is posited, a new grade of entity must also be superadded, to which such unity follows as its proper passion. For diverse grades of unity cannot emanate from the same grade of being, but each from its proportionate grade — transcendental unity from being as such, generic from the generic grade of being, and specific from the specific. Since therefore individual unity imports a new grade of unity — since the other unities are communicable, while this one is incommunicable — plainly a peculiar grade of being superadded to the nature must be conceded, to which individual unity follows — whether this formally consists in something positive or negative, on which there is no question here.

Finally, the Doctor proves that the opposing opinion does not answer the question but answers the same by the same — which is a manifest *petitio principii*. For granting that the individual is formally constituted in such being by the double negation, I ask: why does that negation belong to the individual, or why is it repugnant to it to be divided into many subjective parts? If you say: because of the double negation, you beg the question — assigning the cause as its own cause. For it is as if you said: it cannot be divided because it cannot be divided. This is further clarified by an example: if one asks why an animal is not a stone, and you respond: through the negation of stone, you do not satisfy the question but beg the question by assigning as cause its own cause. For to respond to that question through the negation of stone is as if you say: the animal is not a stone because it is not a stone. So likewise in the present case, the question is begged when the question — on account of which the individual is not divisible into many subjective parts — is answered by the negation assigned by Henry. See Mercen., *disput. de princ. individuationis*, where he also proves this by authorities from Aristotle.

Against this, Henry argued — as the Doctor reports — since transcendental unity adequately belongs to being and only adds beyond being the negation of division in itself and identity with another. Therefore proportionally, individual unity will be the negation of division into many individuals and identity with any other individual. Since therefore the individual formally says nothing other than individual unity, the consequence is that it is formally constituted by that double negation which individual unity imports.

Furthermore, a positive principle of individuation that would be positive cannot easily be assigned — for form, matter, or some accident are not well assigned. Therefore the stated negation is better and more easily assigned.

The Doctor responds: first, the assumption is false, since transcendental unity superadds something positive to being, as was said at *disp. 5 Met. qu. 4 art. 1*. Then, granting the assumption, the Doctor says it does not follow that the individual has no positive account by reason of which the double negation belongs to it. For specific unity likewise signifies a double negation in equal proportion, and yet no one denies that a positive entity is the account of specific unity, from which positive entity the specific difference is also taken. Indeed, from this an argument is drawn for our opinion: since in every unity less than numerical there is a positive entity that is the per se account of that unity and of the repugnance to the opposed multiplicity, this will be true to an equal or greater extent for the most perfect unity, which is numerical unity. Furthermore, the subsumed minor is also false — that the individual is formally constituted by individual unity; for this is not its formal constitutive but rather the passion following upon the grade of individual entity, through which the individual is formally constituted in the being of an individual — just as, by equal proportion, the specific nature is not formally constituted by the negation of division into many species, but by the specific difference, to which such unity follows as its passion. To the other point, satisfaction will be given in what follows by investigating the true and genuine principle of individuation.

Second, it is argued: nothing can be understood to have a real concept that is not understood to include singularity — for nothing can exist outside causes unless it is singular. Since therefore the nature has a real objective concept, it will be of itself singular through that double negation alone, without any other positive superadded. The response has been given many times: it is indeed true that whatever is found on the part of the thing is singular, but not in the same way. Some things are intrinsically and quidditatively so through the inclusion of haecceity in their intrinsic concept — and such are the individuals themselves. Others are singular only extrinsically through conjunction and identity with singularity — and thus stand the common natures immersed by real identity in singulars. Hence I freely concede that the objective concept of the common nature is real and in the thing and not only in the intellect, but with conjunction with singularity — which does not make it singular intrinsically but only extrinsically.

Third: the individual is formally such through non-division — as is clear from the very name. But non-division is formally nothing other than negation of division. Therefore etc. The response is that the individual can be considered in two ways: either as individual — that is, as a being constituted by the lowest predicamental grade in the direct line — or as one. In the second way it is indeed formally such through non-division — since unity is commonly explained through such negation. But in the first way it is formally such through the lowest grade of being ultimately determining the common nature, to which individual unity follows as its proper passion. And even if this unity, according to how it is conceived by us, is explained through negation, it still imports something

positive, as was said at *disp. 5 cit. q. 4 art. 1*. And even if it imported only negation, it would still have to be conceded that a positive grade of being is the root of such unity and the foundation of such negation, as has been proved.

Finally, if the nature is individuated by some positive superadded element, then in each individual there will be a double entity. But if it is said with Scotus that haecceity is not formally entity but rather the quality of being — since as the ultimate difference it does not formally and quiddidatively include being — then our intention is even more confirmed: that haecceity is not a positive entity but rather a kind of negation. The response is as before: the consequence deduced is denied. For although the Doctor says haecceity is not formally being, he does not say it is formally non-being. On the contrary, he wants it to be being really and identically — which suffices for it to be in itself a positive concept and not a mere negation.

Question IV. Whether Existence Is the Principle of Individuation

The Doctor at *2 d. 3 quaest. 3* reports the opinion of those ancients who held that actual existence (for this is the question — not possible existence) is the principle of individuation of things, and therefore that no other principle need be sought. For by the very fact that a thing has existence, it also has through that existence its formal individuation. Some of the Doctor's marginalists attribute this opinion to Bonetus, *lib. Met.*, and to Roger Bacon. Some recent authors tried to revive this long-collapsed opinion — as reported by Pasqual., *tom. 2 Met. disp. 39 sect. 1* — having first made a distinction: that existence being the principle of individuation can be understood in two ways. First, as the formal constitutive principle of the individual, such that it is the formal account by which the thing is individuated; second, as the radical principle, such that it is the proximate root from which individuation follows. In this second sense they defend this opinion, but not in the first, in which sense the ancients seem to have spoken.

For the resolution and correct understanding of the proposed question, it must be noted that existence is not here taken as some authors misuse the term — for the subsistence of a substantial nature, by which it is ultimately terminated and constituted in the account of a suppositum, which they call existence because it makes the nature exist in itself and not in another. (On that account it would better be called subsistence.) And they say existence so taken is the principle of individuation, taking the individual for the suppositum — that is, insofar as it says the first substance altogether complete and terminated in substantial being and in the being of the suppositum constituted, so as to be incommunicable to another both as that by which and as what — that is, both in the manner of form to a subject and of superior to an inferior.

Not in this sense, I say, is existence spoken of here, since we are speaking of the individual not as taken for the substantial suppositum, but as such, insofar as it imports a nature incommunicable to many as what and in the manner of a

superior — in which way the individual is also found in accidents, and it is the same as singular and numerically one. Rather, existence is taken here for that act by which each thing is placed outside causes and through which it formally terminates the action of what produces it — in which way existence belongs also to accidents. And of this we treated at *disput.* 8 throughout.

Furthermore, this question is treated supposing some distinction, either from the nature of the thing or at least of reason with a foundation in the thing, to obtain between essence and existence. For if any distinction whatsoever between them is denied and existence is asserted to be nothing other than the actual entity of any thing, then to say things are individuated by their existence would be the same as to say they are individual through their essence and of themselves, and to need no other principle of individuation beyond their entity. Such a manner of speaking would therefore belong to the opinion of question 1 of this disputation — already refuted — that every thing is individuated of itself and not through something superadded, and not to the present question, in which we suppose the principle of individuation to be something superadded to the nature, really or by reason, and ask whether this superadded element is existence. With this understood:

What must be said is that existence is not the principle of individuation of things, neither formal nor radical. This is common, taught by Scotus and all Scotists at the cited places; Suarez, *disp.* 5 *sect.* 5; Pasqual., *disp.* 39 *sect.* 2; Contar., *cit. cap.* 3; Raguf., *disp.* 24 *cap.* 11; and others throughout. They prove it by various arguments. First, some Scotists together with Bassol. prove it — and Suarez at the cited place concurs — as follows: nothing that is contingently predicated of an individual can constitute it in individual being. But existence is contingently predicated of every individual created thing. Therefore it cannot constitute the created individual thing in individual being. The minor is clear: all things other than God exist contingently and God alone exists necessarily. The major is clear: that which constitutes the individual intrinsically is included in the account of the individual, and therefore is necessarily said of it — indeed it implies an individual to be understood without it.

However, this argument does not seem sufficiently effective for convincing the proposed point, since as Pasqual. rightly notes: if actual existence — of which there is properly a question here — is compared with individuals as posited in act, it certainly belongs per se to them and is necessarily predicated of them. For granted their actuality, they necessarily exist — because as the Philosopher says at *1 Perih.*, everything that is, when it is, necessarily is. And if we speak of possible existence and compare it equally with possible individuals, it also belongs to them necessarily and is per se predicated of them. Hence existence does not seem to contingently belong to the individual except by comparing actual existence with a possible individual. And so someone could respond to the argument from the contingency of existence that actual existence is indeed not well posited as the

principle of individuation of a possible individual — and this alone the argument concludes — but through actual existence actual individuals can still be individuated, and possible individuals through possible existence. And therefore even Bassolius at the cited place, 2 d. 12 qu. 4, leaves this argument as doubtful.

Second, Suarez proves — and Pasqual. concurs — as follows: the singular act presupposes a singular potency. This principle is especially true in act and potency that are distinct from the nature of the thing, since then the potency is really presupposed to the act at least in the order of nature, and is something one distinct from its act — and one not by thought but in reality itself. Therefore it cannot formally and intrinsically have unity from its act. Since therefore in the opposing opinion essence and existence are compared as distinct from the nature of the thing, just as essence in the way it has, per se, the entity of essence distinct from existence and apt to be actuated through it — so too it will have its own unity and individuation antecedent to existence. However, this argument does not conclude absolutely, but only against Thomists who really distinguish essence from existence, not against Scotists who distinguish the one from the other only from the nature of the thing modally — as was said at *disp. 8 q. 2 art. 4* — and against others who distinguish only by reasoned reason with a foundation in the thing. For likewise that proposition — "a singular act presupposes a singular potency" — is only true of a physical act and physical potency really distinguished by a real distinction properly so called, which coincides with the entitative distinction of thing from thing — not of a metaphysical potency and metaphysical act, which are really and entitatively identified and only formally distinct from the nature of the thing, or at least by reasoned reason with a foundation in the thing — as was said above in this disputation at n. 27. This argument therefore does not conclude absolutely, but only from the supposition of a real distinction properly so called between essence and existence.

Third, Pasqual. at the cited place and Poncius at *disp. 6 Log. qu. 5* prove: the principle of individuation must narrow and determine the nature so that it holds itself incommunicably and is numerically designated as this. But existence provides neither of these functions. For it does not narrow the nature so that it is this numerically designated thing — since of itself it does not import a narrowing and limiting account, but only a certain account by which the thing is placed in act outside causes. Nor does it distinguish one individual from another — since to extract the thing outside causes is not formally to distinguish. And its whole formal effect consists in placing the thing in act.

A further confirmation: existence formally has no other concept than to make the thing existing. Therefore it formally does not constitute the thing as distinct numerically from other things. Therefore it is not the principle of individuation. However, this argument with its confirmation could easily be dissolved by the authors of the second opinion by saying it concludes only that existence is not the formal principle of individuation — since it does not exhibit such a formal effect

of individuating the thing and numerically distinguishing it from another. But it does not prove that it is not the proximate radical principle — since by placing the thing in act and extracting it outside causes, it places it in such a state that individuation must proximately follow upon it, and so it is the proximate root of individuation. And so this argument does not absolutely prove that existence is not the principle of individuation, but only that it is not the formal principle, and so proceeds against the first opinion, not against the second.

Fourth and decisively: the conclusion must therefore be proved absolutely with the Doctor at the cited place, by showing that individuation by its nature is prior to existence, so that existence presupposes individuation. For in this way it is proved absolutely that existence is not the formal principle of individuation and not even the radical one. Once this is proved of actual existence in relation to actual essence, it will easily also be proved of possible existence in relation to possible essence.

The Doctor proves this with the following argument, which I will cite word for word and change not the least — since as he arranges it, it is most clear and effective. What is not of itself distinct and determined cannot be what primarily distinguishes and determines another. But the being of existence, in the way it is distinguished from the being of essence, is not of itself distinct and determined — for the being of existence does not have its own differences other than the differences of the being of essence, since otherwise it would be necessary to posit a proper coordination of existences other than the coordination of essences. Rather, it is precisely determined by the determination of another. Therefore it does not determine anything else.

A further confirmation: what presupposes the coordination and distinction of another is not the primary account of distinguishing or determining it. But existence, as determined and distinct, presupposes the order and distinction of essences. Therefore etc.

And if it be said that it presupposes the distinction and determination of essences — a distinction other than that toward individuals — but that it causes the distinction which is as if through the individual: against this the Doctor presses, in the predicamental coordination there are all things that per se belong to that coordination, with whatever is not something of that coordination being set aside. For according to the Philosopher at *1 Post.* 33, there is a stopping-point in every predicament both upward and downward. Therefore just as the highest in the genus is found when considering it precisely under the account of essence, and intermediate genera and species and differences are found, so too the lowest is found — that is, the singular — without any actual existence. This is clearly the case: for this human being formally includes actual existence no more than does a human being. Thus the Doctor reasons at the cited place — by which reasoning he evidently proves that existence presupposes individuation in the nature, and that Peter is distinct numerically from Paul whether he exists or does not exist.

Hence the principle by which he is constituted as individually distinct from another is not existence.

But since someone might still respond that this argument proves only that the possible individual — as placed in the predicament — cannot be individuated by actual existence, but does not prove that the actual individual cannot be individuated by actual existence and the possible by possible existence — beyond the fact that it is false that things are disposed in the predicament precisely insofar as they are possible (for they are rather placed in the predicament according to the being of essence, which indifferently regards both the state of possibility and actuality, since in both states it remains unimpaired, retaining in both the connection of essential predicates in which it formally consists): although this sufficiently excludes the said response, it is worth adding yet another argument that universally proves this of both actual and possible existence.

Fifth, therefore, it is proved universally that the essence cannot be individuated through existence — neither the actual essence through actual existence nor the possible through the possible. And indeed that it cannot be individuated through it as through the very formal principle of individuation is sufficiently proved, as I said, by the third argument — since the formal effect of individuation is altogether diverse from the formal effect of existence. For the formal effect of individuation is to determine the nature to the lowest grade of being so that it holds itself incommunicably and is this numerically designated thing; while the whole formal account of existence — whether actual or possible — reduces to being the account that places outside causes the thing whose existence it is. The actual places in act, the potential can place. But it is further proved that it cannot even be posited as the proximate radical principle. The reason is that individuation in the essence universally precedes existence both in actual being and in possible being. Therefore so far from existence being the proximate root of individuation, the situation is rather the reverse — existence follows upon individuation, not the converse.

The assumption is proved: existence by its own nature is the ultimate act ordered to constitute the thing outside causes. Therefore it presupposes the thing to be so constituted as complete with respect to every predicamental grade of being, even the ultimate — which is individual. For it cannot happen that animality alone exists without rationality, or humanity alone without individuation. Therefore for the thing to be said to be possibly existing, it is understood first as individual or individualizable, since among other necessary grades for the complement of any entity, the individual grade is especially required.

It is true indeed that just as actual existence is identified with the actual essence as its intrinsic mode, so too possible existence with the possible — as was said at *disp. 8 q. 2 art.* — yet in both the state of actuality and possibility, individuation is understood to precede existence by nature, just as universally the difference in any constituted thing precedes the intrinsic mode. From this a new argument can

be drawn to convince the proposed point: singularity constitutes the individual as the difference ultimately contracting and determining the nature, while existence stands to it as its intrinsic mode. But from the entire genus of difference, the constituted precedes the intrinsic mode. Therefore from the entire genus, individuation in the essence precedes existence both in the being of actuality and possibility. And so it follows that existence cannot be posited as the principle of individuation — neither formal nor radical.

Finally, the Doctor proves that the opposing opinion does not satisfy the question about the principle of individuation of the nature. For the same question arises about existence — how it is contracted and made this — just as it does about the nature. The reason is that existence, as much as its own formal account goes, is something common to many — for it is found in each individual, and by virtue of its formal account is not the account of distinguishing individuals, since they all agree in having existence. And hence in existence itself there can be considered a common account of existence as such and the peculiar account of this or that existence. Therefore the same question still remains regarding existence — through what it is contracted and made this. And therefore the Doctor rightly concludes that the opposing opinion does not satisfy the question.

Against this, Bassol. at the cited place and Meurisse at the cited place — though he does not mention Bassolius — adduce some not contemptible arguments. That is the principle of individuation to which generation is primarily terminated, since generation is primarily terminated to the individual, as singular and this. But this is the actual existence — for generation is terminated to being in act. Therefore etc. Furthermore, the ultimate unity of a thing must belong to it through the ultimate act, as through its proximate and immediate foundation. But individual unity is the ultimate unity of the thing, and the being of existence is the ultimate act. Therefore etc. Furthermore, being in act — which is the being of existence — and being in the intellect are opposed, and the universal and singular or individual are opposed. But through being in the intellect the nature is universal. Therefore through existing in effect the thing and nature is particular. Furthermore, that is the principle of individuation by the existence of which united to the thing the thing is one, and by the multiplication of which the thing is multiplied. But the being of existence is of this kind, since one thing has one being. Therefore etc. Finally, because through the being of existence one individual is really and numerically distinguished from another. Therefore etc.

The response is from Bassolius himself: the individual in act indeed terminates generation primarily. But from this it does not follow necessarily that existence is the very principle of individuation; for the truth of that proposition suffices if existence concomitates the principle of individuation. Hence if existence is posited as the terminus of generation, then although generation is singular and of the existing, it is not as singular but as existing. But if the whole existing

individual — as is more truly the case — is the terminus of generation, then the minor must be denied.

To the second, the Doctor himself responds: existence is the ultimate act subsequent to the whole predicamental coordination, not per se belonging to such a series. But the ultimate act to which individual unity follows must belong to the predicamental series. Hence, the Doctor says, it is conceded that existence ultimately distinguishes — but by a distinction that is outside the whole per se predicamental coordination — which distinction is in some way accidental, not in the strict sense (since existence is not a pure physical accident of the individual, but its intrinsic mode). But Bassol. also responds, adding one thing that I cannot approve — namely that the thing is not in the metaphysical genus in act unless it actually exists. The opposite of this the Doctor expressly teaches in this question, and all Peripatetics, since things as they are in the predicament abstract from actual existence.

To the third, it is not necessary that because the thing is universal through being in the intellect, it must therefore be singular through being in reality. It suffices that actual existence concomitates singularity in reality. And in this sense it is verified that just as the thing is universal in the intellect, so it is singular in reality and in effect — whether existence constitutes it in such being or accompanies it in such being. Indeed, strictly speaking, it must be denied that the thing becomes universal precisely through being in the intellect, since other things are required — as was said at the preceding disputation, last question: namely precision from singulars, aptitude for being in them, etc. Therefore just as it does not avail to say: the nature is in the intellect, therefore by that very fact it is formally universal in act — since other things are still required — so too it does not avail to say: the nature is on the part of the thing or actually exists, therefore by that very fact — that is, through existence itself — it is singular. But the consequence holds only materially, on account of the necessary connection of singularity with existence.

To the fourth, that is the formal principle of individuation by the multiplication of which the thing is first multiplied — as the formal principle and not concomitating or consecutive — and through which the thing is first singularly one. But this is not actual existence, as has been proved, but something prior.

To the last, one individual is not primarily singularly distinguished from another through its actual existence, but through something prior. It is true however that for constituting the complete and total foundation of real distinction properly so called — which is called entitative and of thing from thing — singularity is required together with existence, according to what was said about such distinction at *disp. 6 Met. quaest. 8 n. 182*.

This solution is further verified in the common opinion which asserts the diversity of existences to be only a sign a posteriori of real distinction and not the formal constitutive — for in saying this it is implied that real distinction between

two things is made through their singularities, which are then manifested a posteriori through their diverse existences.

Furthermore, it is argued by proving further that existence is at least the radical principle of individuation: all existing things are individuals, and what is not an individual cannot exist. And a production that communicates actual being and makes something existing, by that very fact communicates individual being — for no other reason than that by the very fact that it determines the thing to existence, it is also determined to individual being. Therefore existence is the proximate root of individuation.

Furthermore, individual unity is founded in the being of the thing as in a root — so that from the very fact that the thing has being, it is also individual. But existence is the ultimate constitutive account of the thing in its being. Therefore it is founded proximately and immediately in existence itself.

Furthermore, if the nature is considered only according to its essentials with existence prescinded, it prescends from individuation and is communicable to many; but once existence is posited it becomes incommunicable and so undivided in itself that it is also divided from any other. Therefore existence is the proximate root of individuation, since from its force immediately follows that it is individual.

Finally, individuation does not enter into the being of the thing, but is outside it as something consequent. But existence enters into the being of the thing and ultimately completes it, and therefore each thing by reason of possible existence is subjectified to the power of the agent, and by reason of actual existence is constituted as the terminus of that power. Therefore existence is the immediate root of individuation — since possible individuation follows upon the thing that can exist, and actual individuation upon the actual thing. These arguments are reported by Pasqual. at the cited place for that second opinion stated at the beginning.

The response, from what has been said: every existing thing is individual and nothing can exist unless it is individual — not because existence is the formal individuation itself, or follows upon it, but rather because existence necessarily and indispensably follows upon individual being and is founded in individual being. Hence just as from the fact that a human being is risible, it is gathered a posteriori that he is rational — so from the fact that something is existing or capable of existing, it is gathered that it is individual actually or potentially. And therefore it is false that what was assumed in the argument — that determination is made first to existing being and then to individual being — since the situation is rather the converse, as was proved above.

To the second, as Pasqual. rightly noted, both the major and the minor are false. The major is false because individual unity is founded in individual being, not in the being of existence — since passions that per se belong to something belong to

it independently of existence. The minor is also false, because existence does not constitute the thing in its being as if conferring upon it a new intrinsic grade of being, but only modifies the same being — insofar as it makes it to be in act (if we speak of actual existence) or to be possible (if the question is about possible existence).

To the third: it is for this reason that the nature when considered with respect to its essentials is said to prescind from existence and individuation — not because these are formally the same, but because both are outside the essence of the thing. But speaking absolutely, as Pasqual. again rightly notes from Scotus's teaching, a precision can be made from existence alone without precision from individuation being made in the nature — especially speaking of actual existence. For such is the individual as placed in the predicament, and in this way Peter is called the possible individual. But the reason why with existence posited the nature is also said to be individual is not that existence is the individuation itself, or that individuation follows upon it — as the argument deduces — but rather because existence always presupposes individuation, and therefore the nature can never be existing without being individual.

To the last, the assumption is denied. For the situation is rather the converse — since individuation, even though it does not pertain to the quidditative being of the individual (which is said to consist in specific predicates alone), nevertheless pertains to its intrinsic and entitative being. For it is the difference constituting the individual with the specific nature in the ultimate determinable being within the predicamental series. But existence is not the difference constituting the individual, nor does it pertain to its intrinsic concept; it is only its intrinsic mode, pertaining to the being of the thing not because it confers a new grade of being but because it makes it in act. And therefore the consequence deduced from this is denied.

Question V. Whether Accidents Are the Principle of Individuation

The Doctor expressly and very fully treats this question at *2 d. 3 quaest. 4*, which can be debated in two ways, as he himself notes there. First, concerning the whole collection of accidents taken together — which is found in each substance, to which certain extrinsic ones are also annexed, such as place, time, etc. — namely whether the whole collection of accidents is the formal principle of individuation of that thing in which it is found. In this sense the question has a place not only in material substances but extends also to created spiritual ones, since even these have their own spiritual accidents. Indeed in this sense it can also extend to the individuals of accidents, since some cited below hold that all things universally — including accidents such as qualities, acts of intellect and will, etc. — are individuated through their relation to these numerically individual causes and circumstances of time and place in which they are first produced.

Second, the question can be treated specifically about some one accident — namely about quantity, which some have thought to be the principle of individuation of substance. In this second sense the question has a place only in material substances, since quantity is found only in these and not in others. And corresponding to this twofold sense of the question there is also a twofold affirmative opinion.

The first opinion asserts that the whole collection of accidents is the formal principle of individuation of the substances in which it is found. In favor of this opinion appear to be some of the holy Fathers — Boethius, Damascene, Basil — cited below. Also Avicenna and Porphyry, *cap. de specie*, when he described the individual through its relation to such a collection. Nor do some recent authors seem to subscribe to it, insofar as they assert that every thing is individuated through its relation to these numerically individual causes and circumstances of time and place in which it is first produced — Vasquez, *tom. 1 in tertiam partem disp. 94 c. 7*, and Suarez, *tom. 2 in 3 disp. 44 sect. 6* — though he later teaches the opposite at *disp. 5 Met. sect. 6* and *lib. 1 de concursu Dei c. 7 n. 4*.

The second opinion asserts specifically that quantity is the principle of individuation of material substance. For this, Gotifred is cited in the margin of Scotus — *quol. 6 qu. 16* and *quol. 7 qu. 5* — to whom the Thomists also partly assent, when they teach that matter signed by quantity is the principle of individuation of material substances — on which the next question.

Article I. Neither the Collection of Accidents nor the Relation to External Circumstances Is the Principle of Individuation

The conclusion of this article is posited by the Doctor at the cited place and commonly received in every school. It is held by Raguf. and Contar. at the cited places; Pasqual., *disp. 36 sect. 2*; Aversa, *q. 19 sect. 4*; Faber, Rada, Meurisse, Tromb., Lich., Tat., Bassol.; and finally all Scotists at the cited place. It is true however that these authors do not posit the conclusion explicitly except for the first part, and not for the second — about which there is greater controversy with recent authors in particular. And indeed through this alone the conclusion would be sufficiently proved: that God can make a substance without any accident, but not without singularity. But it also pleases to prove it by other arguments regarding both parts.

As to the first part, the Doctor proves the conclusion by three ways: first, from the identity of numerical account or individuation or singularity; second, from the order of substance to accidents; third, from the account of predicamental coordination. These I will present in reverse order, beginning from the last, for easier comprehension.

First therefore it is proved from the account of predicamental coordination: in whatever predicamental coordination there are all things pertaining to that coordination, with whatever does not essentially belong to that coordination set aside — since two coordinations are primarily diverse, or at least unmixed, and

thus nothing of one is such through something of the other's coordination. But just as there belongs to the series of substance upward and downward some first predicate of which nothing is predicated, so there belongs the lowest subject to which nothing is subjectified — from *1 Post. 34*. Therefore the singular or individual is in every coordination through nothing of another coordination.

A further confirmation: in every coordination, with whatever of another coordination set aside, the account of species is found — for no opinion imagines the species in any genus to be through the account of another genus, at least speaking of absolutes. But it is of the account of the species to be predicable of many differing numerically. Therefore in every coordination there can be found something intrinsically individual and singular, of which the species is predicated.

A further confirmation: the lowest subjectable and subject receives per se the predication of every predicable, just as the first predicate is predicated per se of everything in that coordination. But a being per accidens, insofar as it is a being per accidens, receives the predication of nothing per se. Therefore the lowest subjectable cannot be a being per accidens, and consequently the singular substance is not formally constituted in individual being through one or many accidents — since then it would be a being per accidens aggregated from things of diverse predicaments. Rather, it is intrinsically constituted through substantial individuation.

One might say the individual of substance is incomplete. Against this: to be complete it suffices to be further indivisible and incommunicable as what. And it is such without any accident whatsoever. Furthermore, such completion, being substantial, cannot be had from an accident. Therefore it has it in its own genus.

Cajetan at *de ente et essentia cap. 2* responds: it is one thing to speak of what is placed in the predicament and the account of placing it there, and another to speak of the condition without which it is not placed there. A thing placed in the predicament of substance and the account of placing it there is necessarily a substance. But the condition without which it is not placed there — such as individuation — does not inconveniently require some accident, such as quantity. And the account of placing the first substance in the predicament of substance is not singularity but substance.

However, this response is entirely gratuitous. For, as will be clear below, the individual difference of the first substance is not merely a condition for placing it in the genus of substance, but is the difference per se and primarily constitutive of it as first substance as such. And therefore it is a certain substantial reality belonging to the same genus as the substance of which it is the difference, as the Doctor teaches at *2 d. 3 qu. 6*. This can also be confirmed from the parity of species: the substantial specific difference stands toward the constitution of the species just as the individual difference stands toward the first substance and substantial individual. But the specific difference does not stand only as a

condition without which for the constitution of the species in its genus, but is a metaphysical part that together with the genus constitutes it and is the account of placing it in such a genus. Therefore the same must equally be said of the individual difference with respect to the first substance.

Furthermore, the first substance as such is neither in a subject nor said of a subject. Therefore its individuation is not some accident, nor does it in any way require an accident — for if it were an accident, then by reason of individuation it would require being in a subject.

Furthermore, the first substance as such is the foundation of the rest — since with the destruction of first substances it is impossible for anything else to remain. Therefore as such it does not include or require an accident, to which it is altogether repugnant to be the first foundation of the rest.

Second, it is proved from the priority of substance with respect to accidents: from 7 *Met. cap. 4*, substance is naturally prior to every accident throughout its entire genus. Hence between them the inference of subsisting does not convert: "it is an accident, therefore it is a substance" holds well, but not conversely — "it is a substance, therefore it is an accident." For substance does not depend in its being and coming-to-be on an accident, but the converse. If therefore substance according to its whole genus is prior to an accident, even with respect to the individual it precedes an accident — and as individual it will not need an accident.

If you say that substance in common is prior to every accident, but not the first substance — against this: substance, as was said, precedes accident throughout its entire genus, as the Doctor shows from Aristotle's intention at the cited place. Therefore if substance in common precedes accident in common, even the particular substance will precede every particular accident. For the individual substance maintains the same proportion of priority and posteriority to its individual accidents as substance as such maintains to accidents as such.

Furthermore, as the Doctor presses: whenever something is prior to another, the most primary of that thing is most prior to it. But the most primary of substance in common is the first substance. Therefore the first substance is simply prior to every accident.

If again you say that substance is prior to accidents in being but not in being divided and individuated — against this, the Doctor presses: for this response destroys itself. For if the first substance is naturally prior to every accident, and the first substance cannot be understood in its being except insofar as it is this, therefore it will not be this through any accident.

A further confirmation: substance is naturally prior to every accident in the same way that it is their subject and cause — insofar as it is subject, it is proved to be prior by definition to every accident, since it is placed in the definition of every accident by way of addition. But as it is their subject and cause, it is this substance

— since according to the Philosopher at *12 Met.*, singular effects have singular causes in every genus of cause. Therefore the singular accident has the singular substance as subject. And this is especially verified for per accidens accident, since that first belongs to the singular according to the Philosopher at *5 Met. cap. de eodem* — which is also proved by a clear argument, since as is clear from the Physics, a cause can only cause if it actually exists, and consequently unless it is individual. This is especially clear in the material cause from its mode of causing, since it causes by exhibiting itself as the receiving subject, and therefore must have its entitative substantial being determined in the individual.

Finally, by reason of such priority, accidents ought rather to be individuated through their relation to substance — as Thomists are accustomed to say — than the converse. But not even that is consistent with truth, as will be seen below. Therefore it is altogether wrongly posited that substance is individuated through accidents.

Cajetan at the cited place responds: although what is in the predicament of substance is simply prior in every other predicament and especially in the genus of material cause — since substance is the first subject of accidents — yet some condition without which the individual as such is not in the predicament can be prior to the substance as singularized in the genus of formal cause, even if it is of another predicament. For signed matter is the cause of quantity in the genus of material cause and of its individuation, and quantity is the cause of signed matter and of its individuation in the genus of formal cause. Nor is it inconvenient (he says) for a cause in causing to depend on what is caused, not as caused, but as it is a cause according to another genus of cause — nor does it imply that the caused is the cause of its own cause, as long as this happens in a diverse genus of cause.

But it has already been proved that singularity is not merely a condition, but the true and proper account of placing the first substance in the genus of substance — since it is the difference constitutive of it in the being of the first substance as such. Furthermore, even granting this, the response still does not hold: for what is the effect of something does not give that thing the condition necessarily required for causing itself — since then the same thing would depend on itself and would be both prior and posterior to itself. Since therefore an accident is the effect of substance in the genus of material cause, it cannot provide to substance the condition required for causing — which condition is singularity. And what Cajetan says about this not being inconvenient in a diverse genus of cause, I have long refuted extensively at *disput. 8 Physic. quaest. 1 art. 1 num. 6*. For then the same would be really and essentially both prior and posterior with respect to the same: if A is the material cause of B, A is really prior to it; and if B is the formal cause of A, B is really prior to A as caused — and so the same would be really and essentially both prior and posterior with respect to the same.

Third, it is proved from the identity of singularity and the separability of accidents: it is impossible that a substance, without substantial mutation, becomes

from being this substance not this, or conversely, from not this becomes this. But if some accident were the principle of individuation of substance, this would be possible. Therefore etc. The major seems evident from its terms: it implies that Peter should become not Peter, or become Paul, with nothing at all changed in his substance.

The minor is proved: substance can without contradiction become and be without any accident whatsoever — since it is naturally prior to it — and so, without substantial mutation, from being this it would become not this through mere variation of accidents. Similarly, what is not this substance could become this — since God can make one substance of bread to be under the accidents of another, as is clear.

Perhaps you will say this argument proceeds by miracle and therefore does not conclude against natural reason. Against this: it is true that a miracle does not hold with respect to contradictories — for then it would not be a miracle but simply impossible. But it implies a contradiction that what is not substantially mutated should from being this become that, or conversely. Hence the argument proceeds by miracle on the point where it supposes that God can strip substance of every accident — for this is above the course of nature and impossible by natural powers. But that some substance should from not this become this, or conversely, while being entirely unmutated substantially — this, I say, cannot be done even miraculously, because it implies a contradiction. And this can also be shown from a similar case about the specific nature: it implies that a human being, for example, while substantially unmutated in his specific principles, should become not a human being or a brute. Therefore likewise in the present case, it implies that this substance, while substantially unmutated, should become not this or another through mere variation of accidents.

A further confirmation: in fact accidents are changed in one and the same individual, and so there is a diverse collection of accidents — yet it is always considered the same individual substance. Nor should you say that all accidents can never be changed simultaneously, but some remain while others are changed, and hence it is considered the same individual. For if accidents have been changed for the greater part, there is plainly no longer the same collection of accidents — and consequently the individual difference is changed, if it was indivisibly constituted in such a collection of accidents. Or if it cannot naturally happen, it can happen through divine power — and yet even in such a case the same individual of substance remains, since no intrinsic change has been made in the substance of that individual.

Finally, every common accident — which is called accident per accidens — presupposes the thing to which it must be inexistant as singular. Therefore nothing can be individuated by what accrues to it per accidens. The consequence is clear; the assumption is proved: in this do proper and common accidents differ — that proper ones belong primarily to common natures, as risibility to

humanity, and through these things cannot be individuated since they are equally communicable as common natures are; while common accidents belong primarily to individuals and through individuals to natures. Hence we say a human being is white because this human being is white. Therefore accidents presuppose the things in which they are as singular.

You might say: when the collection of accidents is assigned as the principle of individuation, it should be understood not only of absolute accidents but especially of relative ones — such as form, shape, and the relation to time and place — for such a collection cannot be found either without that singular nature in which it once existed, or in many singular natures. Against this: even these accidents, even if necessarily bound to this singular nature, do not make it singular but presuppose it as such by virtue of the last argument. Furthermore, it is false that these accidents are necessarily bound to this particular nature — for accidental form and shape is separated from the bread in the Eucharist, and the same numerically could be placed in another bread newly produced under it. Furthermore, one substance can be produced simultaneously with another in the same time, and can successively naturally and simultaneously supernaturally exist in the same place. Therefore these accidents are not so bound to this singular nature that they could not be found in others.

You might say: the relation of this singular substance to this place and time cannot be found in another substance. This is nothing to the purpose, because it does not follow from this that this substance is individuated by such a relation — since absolutely speaking that substance could have been produced in another place and time, and another substance could also have been produced in the same place and time in which it was produced. This suffices to say that the substance is not individuated through its relation to this numerically individual place and time, as will now be even more apparent in proving the conclusion as to the other part.

The other part of the conclusion — that effects are not individuated through their relation to these numerically individual extrinsic circumstances of agent, subject, place, time, etc. — has been proved extensively at *disp. 8 Physic. qu. 2 art. 3* and is now shown again from what was said there. For the individuation of heat produced in my hand here in the cell cannot be traced to the agent, because the natural agent is indifferent to producing this or that individual — and so determination of such effect cannot be measured by it. Nor can it be measured by the subject, for the same reason: it too is passively indifferent to receiving this or that numerically individual heat. Nor by place — since the heat existing in my hand is indifferent to being here in the cell or in the classroom or in the church. For wherever I go I carry it with me as long as it is preserved in my hand. And conversely, diverse numerically individual heats are produced by fire in the same place. Nor can it be measured by time, for the same reason — since this heat is indifferent to being produced or lasting in my hand today or tomorrow. For it can coexist with many parts of time as the same numerically individual thing, and in

the same time a different numerically individual heat could have been produced. Therefore the effect cannot be individuated through its relation to these circumstances.

A further confirmation: if this heat proceeding from fire by its nature determinately regarded this fire, and the heat proceeding from the sun determinately regarded the sun, then it follows — against the common view — that these heats are specifically diverse, since they determinately would regard specifically diverse causes for their production. And the same argument can be made about the same heat in relation to the subject — since if the heat produced by fire in my hand so determinately regards my hand as its subject that it could not have been in water, it will be specifically diverse from the heat which fire produces in water, since they require subjects specifically diverse.

They respond that although the individuation of the effect cannot be measured by any of the stated circumstances taken separately — since each, taken individually, is indifferent to this or that effect — yet it can be measured by all taken together, since the whole collection of them requires a determinate effect.

Against this: I refute this response at *disp. 8 Phys. cit. num. 44* and now again refute it. For I ask about those circumstances from the collection of which the effect is individuated: are they singular by their own individual differences, or are they individuated precisely from that collection and combination with each other? The second cannot be said — since then before such combination neither the agent, nor the subject, nor the place, nor the time would have been singular, but common. For this reason, even when combining into one in the actual combination, no one could determine another — since no common element added to another common one can make that to which it is added singular. For no one gives what it does not have. If the first is admitted — that those circumstances are singular by their own individual differences — then the same can and must be said of the effects themselves: just as those circumstances of time, place, and causes are individuated by their own differences without relation to other circumstances, so too the effects are individuated by their own haecceities independently of circumstances.

A final confirmation of this second part of the conclusion is clear: for even if we were to grant that some effect is necessarily bound to this numerically individual cause — for example, this numerically individual mode to this numerically individual subject, like this sitting posture with Peter seated, and also to these circumstances of place and time — "here" and "now" — still the individuation of the effect would not well be posited as adequately measured through relation to this numerically individual subject and circumstances. The reason is: although it would essentially depend on this numerically individual subject and circumstances, there would still be possible many forms differing in number alone under the same numerically individual circumstances disjunctively. For example, in this same time, place, subject, etc., it is possible for this or that union,

heat, sitting posture, action, etc. to be present — which suffices for their numerical distinction not to be adequately measured by those circumstances. For within the same circumstances there can be numerically distinct individuals, as Arriag. very well notes at *disp. 1 Met. sect. 3 subf. sect. 9*. That this is possible is sufficiently and clearly deduced from the argument made above about the indifference of the agent to producing this or that numerically individual form or mode, the indifference of the subject to receiving this or that, and finally the indifference of place and time in which they occur.

Against this, objections are raised. First, by various authorities proving that individuals are distinguished from each other by their diverse collection of accidents. For Porphyry, *cap. de specie*, so suggests, when he says that individuals differ in their accidents, the multitude of which found in one is impossible to be found in another. Avicenna, *5 Met. cap. 3*, says: to natures requiring matter for their being come accidents and extrinsic dispositions through which they are individuated. Damascene in his *Dialectica cap. 30 and 42* says accidents are characteristic properties by which the hypostasis is expressed as by certain marks, and at *lib. 2 sentent. cap. 6* — as Bassol. reports — says hypostases do not differ according to substance but only per accidens. He has the same at *lib. primarum Instit. cap. 3 and 4* and in other places, as Pasqual. and Aversa report. Boethius, *de Trin. lib. 1 cap. 5*: variety of accidents makes numerical difference — for three men differ neither in species nor in genus, but in their accidents; if in the mind we separate all accidents from them, place still remains diverse for all of them, and we cannot imagine the same place for two. Finally, Basil has the same at *epist. de different. natur. et hypast.*, and Nyssen, *lib. de differentia essentiae et hypast.*

The response to these and similar authorities is from Scotus at the cited place: there is a twofold individual difference — one intrinsic and as-it-is-in-itself, which is primary; the other extrinsic and as-it-regards-us, which is secondary. When therefore the holy Fathers and other philosophers say individuals are distinguished from each other by their collection of accidents and through their accidents, they understand this of the extrinsic, secondary distinction as it regards us — since the ultimate differences being hidden from us, we regularly discern one individual from another through the difference of their accidents.

It can also be said with the Doctor at the cited place: when philosophers say individuals differ from each other through accidents and not through substance, by the name of accidents they do not mean common accidents belonging to other predicaments, but they mean the individual substantial differences themselves — which are called accidents, taking "accident" for what is extraneous, according to what was said above at n. 11, insofar as they are outside the concept of nature and quiddity and accrue to it, just as the specific difference is said to accrue to the genus. The first exposition is that of Porphyry, as commentators commonly explain him; the second is what Avicenna requires, as the Doctor explains at the cited place at the end of the question. In the same way, at the same place, the

Doctor explains Damascene: he says "accident" means the proper and intrinsic individual difference, which he calls accident because it is outside the per se account of the specific nature itself — for in this way whatever is posited as individuating is an accident.

To Boethius: the Doctor concedes that the variety of accidents makes numerical distinction in individuals, saying however that this is not primary and intrinsic but secondary and concomitant. Indeed, because every numerical distinction is concomitant by a distinction of accidents, therefore where no variety of accidents is possible, no numerical distinction or material difference is possible. And by this he says Boethius's argument holds — which he makes there — that since in the divine there can be no accident whatsoever nor variety of accidents, there can be no numerical distinction or material difference — not as from the denied precise cause to the denial of what it causes, but as from the denied necessary concomitant to the denial of what it necessarily concomitates. And when he says it is impossible to imagine the same place for two bodies, he is to be interpreted charitably as speaking in relation to natural power, and that even if supernaturally one and the same place can be that of both, it is not necessarily the same place for both — as it would be if they were the same body.

Or finally it must be said with others that the aforesaid Fathers so speaking spoke not of the individual precisely but of the hypostasis and suppositum — taking suppositum or individual of substance for the concrete from substance and accident, as importing a kind of incommunicable whole altogether subsisting. In this way it is well said that individuals differ individually through their accidents — just as Peter-white and Paul-dark, as such, would rightly be said to differ from each other through whiteness and darkness.

One might say: individuals of substance cannot be distinguished from each other by substantial differences — since then they would differ essentially from each other — and so they can only be distinguished through accidental ones. The response is clear from what was said above at n. 11 from Scotus, *2 dist. 3 qu. 6 M*: substance can be considered either according to its formal being alone, insofar as it imports the quiddity of substantial nature according to its generic and specific account; or also according to its material being, insofar as it also imbeds the individual difference, which though really identified with the nature is still outside its formal account. If therefore substantial difference is taken as said of substance taken in the first way, it is true that whatever differs by a substantial difference differs essentially, and in this sense the individual difference is not a substantial difference. But if substantial difference is taken as said of substance in the second way, then the individual difference is plainly substantial — and yet it is false in this sense that whatever differs by a substantial difference differs essentially. For in this sense the individual difference is substantial and of a diverse account from the essential and quidditative difference.

Second, it is argued, proving that every thing is individuated through its relation to these numerically individual causes and circumstances of time and place in which it is first produced. And because if in this instant and with these circumstances many acts of the will differing in number alone were possible — for example, many hatreds of God — it would follow that God is determined with respect to the individual of sin. It is added that unless this numerically individual effect — for example, this numerically individual form — is bound to this time, no reason can be assigned why it cannot naturally be reproduced. Therefore this form must be said to be bound to this numerically individual time, which since it cannot afterwards again exist, the form cannot be reproduced.

The response is that God determines that act of hatred in the individual with respect to entity, not with respect to malice — for in relation to the latter he stands permissively, as I said at *disp. 8 Phys. cit. quaest. 2 art. 3 nu. 47*. But why, even with such determination to the entity of the act in the individual, God is not said to be the cause of sin, I treated extensively at *disp. 5 Met. qu. ult. per totam*, which must necessarily be read for the resolution of this difficulty.

To the second: a past effect cannot be reproduced by a secondary cause — because God has decreed not to concur toward one and the same effect except once, so that the variety of individuals in the universe may be maintained. Hence the repugnance is not intrinsic, arising from the nature of causes and effects, but from God's extrinsic decree — as was said at the cited disputation of Physics, and is gathered from Scotus at *2 d. 43 § De secundo articulo*. And if it were also granted that this numerically individual effect is bound to this time, and if it were held with some that an identical permanent being once corrupted can indeed be reproduced by God, but not the same successive being, then it would follow that such an effect could not even be reproduced by God's absolute power — indeed absolutely no effect at all, since every effect in this opinion is posited as bound to a determinate time, which however cannot reasonably be denied to divine omnipotence.

Article II. Quantity Is Not the Principle of Individuation

The conclusion of this article is also nearly common in every school. Although Thomists want matter signed by quantity to be the principle of individuation — yet they do not assert this of quantity alone taken per se, as Gotifred at the cited place from the beginning of the question asserted, to whom Aureolus at *2 d. 9 qu. 3 art. 3* partly seems to adhere. And although it has been sufficiently proved from the preceding article — since once it has been proved there that no accident whatsoever is suited to be the subject of the individuation of substance, nor can any collection of them sufficiently individuate, the same follows consequently from those arguments about quantity, supposing against the Nominalists that it is a special accident having its own entity condistinct from substance, as was concluded in the Physics at the disputation on the continuum, qu. 2.

Nevertheless, not content with those general arguments, the Doctor still draws specific ones about quantity — both physical and theological. To which others also add some, both Scotists and Thomists who agree with us in this conclusion — such as Bannes, *p. de gener. et cor. qu. 20 art. 3*, where he heaps up many to prove this. Of these however some either do not conclude or conclude only according to their own principles — such as that quantity, like other accidents, is individuated through its subject, and therefore presupposes it as singular. For that assumption is true only in Thomist principles.

He also proves, because numerical unity is substantial, and therefore cannot be derived from quantity; but neither is this assumption universally true, since numerical unity is also found in accidents — since in other predicaments too proper individuals are given. Therefore only in the predicament of substance is it true that the numerical unity of the substantial individual is substantial, and of this it can well be argued that it cannot be had from quantity.

He proves finally that the individual difference of Peter is substantial, since the species of substance is not contracted to any individual through some accident — and therefore it cannot be quantity. This reason can be admitted. Let us prove more effectively from arguments drawn from the Doctor and from our own principles.

First therefore it is proved: the first substance as such does not have its individual entity from quantity. Therefore neither does it have the unity that accompanies it. The consequence is clear; the antecedent is proved: even the lowest grade of substance is substantial. Therefore it cannot be provided by quantity, which is a mere accident of inferior order.

The Thomists respond — who want quantity to concur in some way to the individuation of substance — that the account of the individual consists of two things: the first and principal is that it be incommunicable to many; the second is that it be numerically distinct from others. They therefore say that Capreol., *2 d. 3 qu. 1*; Soncin., *7 Met. 34*; and Ferrara, *1 contra Gentes*, hold that quantity is the principle of individuation with respect to this second effect: so that the individual has being actually distinct from others from quantity. And so when it is said that quantity is the principle of individuation of substance, this should not be understood as if it conferred upon it the intrinsic individual being — for that it has from the force of its proper being — but only because it distinguishes individuals that exist, since since they are all of the same account they cannot be distinguished except through quantity.

This response is entirely futile: for if substance the individual is constituted in such being — namely, individual being — through something peculiar to the genus of substance, then through that same thing it is also individually distinguished from every other individual substance. For the principles constitutive and distinctive of a thing are the same.

Furthermore: considering substance insofar as it is found under diverse quantities, the substantial entity of one according to its intrinsic being is truly not the substantial entity of another, nor does it communicate with the other according to its proper intrinsic substantial being. And with quantity removed through divine power, one substance would not on that account pass through identity into another — as Peter into Paul, or conversely. Therefore even without quantity there must be conceded intrinsic individual differences substantially distinguishing Peter from Paul — for nothing can be really distinguished from another through something altogether extrinsic to it and really distinct from it.

Furthermore: through quantity substance cannot differ substantially — since quantity cannot provide an effect more perfect than itself and beyond its species. But here the question is not of accidental difference but of substantial difference, by which one individual of substance differs from another without any accident whatsoever. Hence Bannes at the cited place neatly deduces that his fellow Thomists cited above do not answer the proposed question — for they concede that quantity does not cause difference except quantitative and accidental difference. Yet in this question we ask not only about this but also about the principle of substantial difference in the same species. Therefore they do not answer the proposed question — since they do not explain through what the individual of substance is one undivided in itself and substantially different from everything else as the same thing.

Second, the Doctor proves that quantity — not only in the genus of substance but even in its own genus of quantity — is altogether unsuited to making individual distinction among many under the same species. For "being divisible into many subjective parts" does not belong to the common nature through quantity. He proves this as follows: what is the account of divisibility belongs formally to what is divisible by such division. But quantity does not formally belong to the species or the universal whole, insofar as it is divisible into subjective parts. Therefore quantity itself is not the account of such divisibility of that whole into such parts.

The major is clear; the minor is proved: the universal whole divided into individuals and subjective parts is predicated of any of those subjective parts, so that each subjective part is it. But the quantitative parts into which the division of a continuous whole occurs never receive the predication of the divided whole.

One might say: water is a quantitative whole, and yet when divided, it is predicated of each of the dividing parts — for "this water is water" and likewise "that water is water." Therefore in this respect there is no difference between quantitative parts of at least homogeneous things and the subjective parts of a universal.

But the Doctor subtly meets this objection at the cited place *lit. H*: in the same division of a whole into its parts, a twofold division sometimes intervenes — one of the quantitative whole into its integral parts, and another of the common and

universal whole into its subjective parts. As in the division of any homogeneous thing. But in the first division, what is divided is the integral quantitative whole as such — and therefore it is not enunciated in the direct of the dividing parts. For the water is not the whole water that was divided — which is still clearer in the division of a heterogeneous whole, where the divided part does not receive the predication of the whole. But in the second division, what is divided is the universal whole, and the dividing members are the subjective parts in which the whole nature of the divided is contained. And hence it is enunciated of them in the direct — for animal is divided into human being and brute, each of which is animal.

From these it follows — the Doctor infers — that the division of the quantitative whole into its integral parts is of a different account from the division of the universal whole into its subjective parts. And consequently what is divided in the first division, as such, is of a different account from what is divided in the second division — and so also the dividing parts, even if they accidentally coincide when both divisions concur in the same thing.

Third, the Doctor proves: if quantity is the principle of individuation of substance, it would be either determinate or indeterminate quantity — on which distinction see the Physics, *disp. 2 qu. and art. ult.* Not the first, since that follows upon the form in matter and consequently the singularity of the substance — since just as substance is the cause of it as it is determinate, so this substance is the cause of it as it is this determinate. But if indeterminate quantity is the cause of why substance is this: against this, the Doctor says, because this is indistinct and confused in matter and therefore can bring no distinction. Furthermore, according to them it remains the same in what is generated and what is corrupted — therefore it is not the cause of any determinate singularity.

If it be said that it is not the cause of singularity except with the specific unity presupposed, while the generated and corrupted are not of the same species: against this, the Doctor again presses, supposing that from water fire is first generated, and secondly from fire water is generated — in the first corrupted and the second generated water there is the same quantity, not only indeterminate but also determinate, since it can have the same terminus from the form. Or at least the same indeterminate quantity suffices, and that per se is the cause of singularity with the specific unity presupposed. Therefore the first water and the second water are this same numerically individual water — which seems impossible, since the same numerically individual cannot return by natural action, according to *2 de Gener. and 5 Phys.*

Fourth: the generating agent, insofar as it is generating, is distinguished from what is generated with every other thing set aside — since it is not intelligible that the same should generate itself. Not even in the divine does the same person generate itself, but the generating generates another. But the generating, insofar as it is generating, does not include quantity as its proper generative principle —

nor does what is generated, as generated, include quantity as the per se formal terminus of generation. Therefore with both quantities set aside — both of the generator and of the generated — this substance is numerically distinct from that.

A further confirmation: a substantial generation is terminated to substance. But if quantity constituted the individual substance in such being, then generation would be terminated per se to quantity — which is absurd. A further confirmation: the terminus of substantial generation is per se one; but if quantity were the principle of individuation — this something and the individual substance, which is the per se terminus of generation — it would not be per se one, since from substance and quantity no per se one thing comes about. Therefore etc. This argument also applies to other accidents.

Fifth: the condition that is simply necessary in the terminating of a real dependence is not itself dependent upon what it terminates, but quantity is a real being really and essentially dependent upon material substance. And the condition in material substance for terminating such dependence is the account of singularity and haecceity. Therefore quantity cannot be the account of individuating such substance. The major is clear, since then the dependent itself would be the cause by which the terminating terminates its own dependence — and therefore would depend upon itself, and the terminating in the power of the dependent would terminate, which are implications. The minor is proved: nothing can terminate a real dependence unless it is real and singular. Therefore singularity is the condition in material substance for terminating the real dependence that every accident, and especially quantity, has upon substance.

Furthermore: the first substance as individual is said to be the foundation of the rest — since with the destruction of first substances it is impossible for anything else to remain. Therefore singularity is the account for terminating the dependence of accidents upon substance as their subject.

Sixth, the Doctor argues with a theological argument from the inconveniences that would follow from this opinion in the mystery of the Eucharist. If material substance were individuated by quantity, it would follow that no singular bread would be transubstantiated into the body of Christ in the Eucharist — which is heretical. He proves the consequence: it is certain that no singular is transubstantiated into another unless the singularity of one is transubstantiated into the singularity of the other. For just as substance is not transubstantiated into substance unless whose cessation the being of another succeeds, so the singular is not transubstantiated into the singular unless whose cessation of singularity another singularity succeeds. But it is the case that with the bread transubstantiated in the Eucharist, the singularity of this bread would remain — namely the account of singularity which is its quantity on this opinion. Therefore etc.

It would also follow that by virtue of the words of consecration the quantity of the body of Christ would be placed under the host — which is against the common teaching of theologians and the words of Councils. The consequence is clear, since by virtue of the words the body of Christ is placed under the host; therefore also its singularity, which is its quantity. It would likewise follow in the Eucharist that the singularity would be separated from the nature it individuates — which is impossible, since what is really identified cannot be separated even by God's power. But the nature and singularity are not really distinguished — as is clear from question 2 of this disputation, art. 1 n. 14.

Furthermore, just as God could preserve singularity without the nature of bread which it individuated, so conversely — and even with greater facility — he could preserve the nature of bread without its singularity, since it is easier to preserve what is prior without what is posterior than the posterior without the prior. And in that case there would be a common nature of bread existing in the universe without singularity — which is impossible by any power whatsoever. And this argument universally proves that the nature cannot be individuated through something really distinct from it, but must necessarily be individuated through something really identified with it and inseparable from it.

Finally, the Doctor argues: if quantity were the principle of individuation of substance, it must first of all be of itself this and individual, and of itself numerically distinct from another. For what is one in species cannot be the account of another's being numerically one. But it is false that quantity is of itself this and numerically one — since in quantity too, just as in other things, a common nature is considered. For the common account of a line is the line of the curve and the straight, and to understand a line under the common account of a line implies no more than to understand a human being or a lion under a common account. Therefore it is necessary to assign through what the common nature of quantity is individuated and contracted in this singular.

If it is said that quantity absolutely considered is not of itself this and numerically one, but insofar as it has some determinate position: against this, the Doctor says: I ask what position you speak of. Either of the position that is a predicate — and this is naturally posterior to quantity — or of the position that is the difference of quantity, insofar as quantity is said to consist of parts having position. And then the same question arises about this position as about quantity itself with respect to distinction — and so you beg the question, assigning the same as the account of itself. For it is no clearer that the permanent and continuous parts in this whole are of themselves distinct from the permanent and continuous parts in that whole — since continuity and permanence include the subsistence of quantity as the substance of quantity itself — than that this quantity differs from that position as the difference. It is also clear that if this response were good, why would a principle of individuation be assigned to quantity within its own coordination, if substance in its own genus need not have one? For surely if any genus suffices for

itself and has in itself all predicamental grades, supreme, intermediate, and lowest, this must especially be attributed to the genus of substance, which is the most perfect of all.

By the efficacy of these arguments the Doctor says at the cited place that Giles — cited in the margin at *quod. 1 qu. 5 art. 1* — to avoid these arguments, defended in another way that substance is individuated by quantity. For to avoid these arguments, they concede that substance is not immediately individuated by quantity, but through something caused by quantity in matter, which Giles himself calls the "signation" of substance. But the Doctor there proves that neither in this way is substance individuated by quantity mediately — that is, through a signation caused by quantity in substance and really identified with it, as Giles asserts (and Cajetan follows him at *lib. de ente et essentia cap. 2*). For if quantity itself, which is naturally prior to the thing caused, is not the same as the substance, the thing that would be thus caused by quantity would be even less the same as the substance. For when two things receive one third thing of which one is naturally prior to the other, if the prior is not really the same as that third thing, neither will the posterior caused by that prior thing be identified with it. Hence from beginning to end, the signation caused by quantity in substance is just as really distinct from substance as quantity itself is. Therefore, if substance on account of real distinction from quantity, and natural priority to it, can be without it, all the more can it be without what has been left behind or caused by it in itself — and so all the arguments that we have urged so far against quantity can be equally well urged against the signation caused by quantity in matter. But of this signation of matter we will treat formally in the following question.

Against this, the Doctor adduces three arguments for the opposite side. The first is: what per se and primarily belongs to some being belongs to every other being through the account of that being. But being divisible into parts of the same account per se and primarily belongs to quantity, from *5 Met.* Therefore since this division belongs to substance as a species divided into individuals, it will belong to it through the account of quantity, and so quantity will be the account of distinguishing many individuals under the same species — and consequently it will be the principle of individuation.

Furthermore: this fire does not differ from that fire except because the form differs from the form, and the form does not differ from the form except because it is received in another and another part of matter, and a part of matter is not other from another part unless it is under another and another part of quantity. Therefore the whole distinction of this fire from another, from beginning to end, reduces to quantity as to the primary distinctive. Therefore quantity is the principle of individuation of material substance.

Finally: the generating agent generates another by reason of the diversity of matter, *7 Met. tex. 28*. But the matter of the generating is not diverse from the

matter of the generated except because it has matter affected by another quantity. Therefore etc.

The response to the first: from the teaching brought from the Doctor above at n. 57, there is a twofold division: one is the division of the universal whole into its parts, each of which is it; another is the division of the integral or quantitative whole into its parts, each of which is this something, but is not the divided whole. Division into integral and quantitative parts certainly belongs to something by virtue of quantity, and it is of this division that Aristotle speaks at 3 *Met.* But not division into subjective parts — from which latter division, however, the multiplication and distinction of individuals arises through contracting differences. And just as this division belongs to the genus through specific differences, so it belongs to the species through altogether ultimate and individual ones.

To the second: the Doctor says both assumed propositions are false. For although another form is in another matter, the form is not other because of the otherness of matter — since form rather brings distinction to matter than receives it. But just as the entity of form is distinct from the entity of matter, so too is its otherness. Hence forms are multiplied by something intrinsic to them, prior by nature, before they are received in another and another part of matter. Similarly, the other premise — that a part of matter is other from another part because it is under another and another part of quantity — is false. For whether the distinction of parts of matter in themselves apart from quantity is the case (as it truly is, which is called entitative) or not, the distinction of parts of matter is prior to that of quantity — since the subject of this accident is this something. Hence although it is true that in another and another fire there is another and another form numerically, yet the precise and primary account of the distinction of this fire from another is taken from the numerical difference of this fire, another from the numerical difference of that fire.

To the last: that the matter of the generator and generated is distinguished through quantity can be understood in two ways — either intrinsically and primarily (and so it is false, since they are distinguished by their proper haecceities), or extrinsically and concomitantly (and so it is true, since to another and another matter there follows another and another quantity, and in material things from the quantitative distinction of substances we are accustomed to detect a posteriori the entitative distinction as well). And in which sense Aristotle said at 7 *Met.* that the generator generates another by reason of diversity of matter — this will be explained in the following question.

Second, others argue: a piece of wood is divided into ten parts. It is clear that these parts are individuals of its species — for they are ten pieces of wood. It is also clear that they are distinguished and divided from each other by nothing other than their proper quantities. Therefore in truth quantity is the principle of individuation and distinction in material substances.

A further confirmation: numerical and individual distinction coincide. But the principle of number or numerical multiplicity is the multiplication of quantity — since at 6 *Phys.* number is said to result from the division of continuous quantity. Therefore etc.

Finally, Aristotle at many places signifies that the individual is one through quantity: at 3 *Met.* 11 he says "one is what is indivisible — and everything indivisible either according to quantity or according to species." By "indivisible according to species" he understands the species itself; by "indivisible according to quantity" he understands the individual, which is not divided in its quantity. And at 5 *Met.* cap. 6, he seems to constitute individual unity in continuative unity through quantity, and distinction in the distinction of quantity.

The response to the first: from the teaching brought at n. 57, when wood is divided into ten parts, a twofold division concurs there — namely the division of the wood as an integral whole into its integral and quantitative parts, and the division of the universal whole into its subjective parts, each of which receives the predication of wood in common. The first division occurs through quantity; not however the second — but this occurs through the proper haecceities of each fragment of divided wood. And even if one fragment of wood is distinguished from another through quantity, it is not distinguished precisely through it, but through its own entity — since even with quantity removed, those two pieces of wood would not on that account become one entitative piece of wood, but one substance would still be diverse from another by its own haecceity. Hence quantitative and entitative substantial distinction of material things must not be confused — for even if these distinctions are connected in such substances, still one is not the other, and one is substantial while the other is merely accidental. Indeed sometimes these distinctions can fail to be connected, and one can be separated from the other. For if water is divided into ten parts, each water is distinct from another both entitatively and quantitatively. If they are reunited, then the quantitative distinction — which occurs through the discontinuation of one part from another — is destroyed, for the several waters become one water quantitatively, since they make one quantum by the unity of continuity. But they do not become one water entitatively — for they still retain their haecceities under the continuity, and are truly many real parts and portions of water, and again divisible and separable from each other.

To the confirmation: Bassol. at the cited place says that in material and quantified things, quantity in substance does not belong to the genus of quantity but to the genus of substance. Hence even in things separated from continuous quantity, numerical or individual multiplicity is found — which, just as it does not belong to the genus of discrete quantity, so neither does it belong to the genus of quantity simply. Hence he concludes that neither the unity nor the individual multiplicity of other genera from quantity belongs to quantity any more than quantity belongs to those genera or predicaments.

However, this response does not please. For although it is true that the multiplicity of many angels, for example, does not belong to the predicament of quantity, still the multiplicity arising from quantified things — even if these are substances — is said to belong to the predicament of quantity according to the common view, as was said at *disput. 7 Log. q. 2 art. 1*. Therefore, just as in the solution of the preceding argument we said that the entitative distinction must not be confused with the quantitative in material things, so now I say the entitative unity must not be confused with the quantitative. Entitative and substantial unity consists in the non-division of something into many themselves, and in the distinction of its entity from everything else. But quantitative unity consists in the non-division of a quantified thing into many parts, or in the continuation of all parts with each other — as the opposed multiplicity consists in their division and discontinuation. Of this unity Aristotle speaks at *5 Met. tex. 8 and 11*. Hence predicamental number, resulting from the division of a continuum, consists of many numerical unities of quantity, and transcendental number consists of many entitative ones. And it can be conceded that the singular of substance in its quantitative unity is individuated through quantity — since quantities are what constitute the unities from which predicamental number arises. But in its entitative unity it is by no means individuated through quantity — since this unity is substantial and intrinsic, obtained only from something intrinsic: namely its own haecceity.

Therefore to the argument it is said: the multiplication or division of quantity in material things causes predicamental and extrinsic numerical distinction — which is extrinsic to substance — but not intrinsic and entitative distinction. To the places of Aristotle, the same teaching can be used: he sometimes declared the entitative unity and distinction of material things through quantitative unity and distinction — since that is more known and familiar to us. Hence when the parts of water are divided and discontinued from each other, we very well detect from their quantitative distinction the entitative and substantial distinction — which we do not as well detect when they are joined and continued. And for this reason Aristotle did not intend in those material things to deny entitative unity and distinction beyond quantitative — nor did he say the numerical distinction between material substances is had precisely through the distinction of quantity.

Question VI: Whether Bare Matter, or at Least Designated Matter, Is the Principle of Individuation

As is clear from the title, this question has its place only among material and corporeal substances, in which quantity is found. Certain older Thomists held that matter considered in itself, apart from any determination by quantity, is the principle of individuation of material substances. This view is attributed by Flandria, *7. Metaph., q. 22, art. 1*, also to Albert. Scotus himself, *2. dist. 3, q. 5*, reports this as the Thomist position, making no mention of any determination by quantity — and not without reason, since St. Thomas, *p. 1, q. 3, art. 2, ad 3*, and *q.*

50, *art. 4, in corpore*, states absolutely that matter is the principle of individuation, without specifying whether it is designated or undesignated matter. But because it is extremely difficult to defend this view of matter taken in itself and absolutely, the Thomists generally say that it is not bare matter that is the principle of individuation, but designated matter — matter, that is, marked out by quantity. Yet what this designation and marking by quantity in matter actually means, and how it is to be explained, is a matter of great disagreement and divergence among the Thomists themselves.

Some wish it to mean matter affected by formal quantity, with the principle of individuation of material substances constituted from these two principles together, such that matter provides incommunicability and quantity provides distinction: so *Capreol.*, 2. d. 3, q. 1, art. 1; *Ferrar.*, *contra Gentes*, lib. 1, c. 21; *Soncin.*, 7. *Metaph.*, q. 34; *Nazar.*, 1. q. 3, art. 2. In this same sense it appears to have been received by *Mercenarius*, *disp. de hac re*, cap. 11, as is clear from the examples he adduces, and by *Bonamicus*, lib. 6, *de motu*, cap. 18.

Others, by "designated matter," mean matter that includes quantity, but only matter capable of receiving this and no other quantity — because, they say, although matter is in itself indifferent to all quantity, it is, through antecedent dispositions introduced by an agent, appropriated to this particular quantity in such a way that it is proximately capable of no other. Hence it must be supposed that in the first instant of the generation of a composite — which is the first moment of its existence — matter is so disposed toward that particular quantity that it is in no way capable of any other, for, as it is said in 2. *de Anima*, all things constituted by nature have a determined measure of magnitude and growth. Matter, then, insofar as it is capable of this and no other quantity, is called designated matter and is the principle of individuation: so *Cajet.*, lib. *de Ente et Essentia*, cap. 2, q. 5, who explains Thomistic designated matter and says that this capacity and designation add nothing real in the strict sense over and above matter — nothing that is really distinct from it — but only an order and relation to such-and-such a quantity, which order and relation is indeed something real, but distinct from matter by reason alone. This view has been embraced by *Javel.*, 5. q. 15; *Bannes*, *prima parte*, q. 3, art. 2; *Zumel*, *ibidem*; and many others among the Thomists.

Another position is offered by the same Cajetan, 1. *part.*, q. 29, art. 1, where he notes that matter can be related to quantity in two ways: either as its material and receptive cause, or as the principle and root that virtually contains quantity itself. In the first sense, he says, matter cannot be the principle of individuation, because that potency of matter toward quantity belongs to the genus of quantity rather than to the genus of substance — since act and potency belong to the same genus (12. *Met.* 26) — and therefore cannot be the principle of individuation of a substantial thing. But in the second sense it is the principle of individuation, insofar as it is the root and source of quantity; because the numerical distinction

by which one substantial individual is distinguished from another is not a quantitative distinction but the foundation of quantitative distinction. Hence the principle of distinction and individuation must itself be the foundation and root of quantity. And so Cajetan in his final judgment rejects his own earlier explanation of designated matter, which he had given in *lib. de Ente et Essentia*, and more approves of this second way of speaking. This second mode is preferred by Ripa, *de Ente et Essentia*, cap. 2, q. 4, art. 5, and by many other recent Thomists, including Gonzalez, 1. part., q. 11, disp. 23; the Salmanticenses, tract. de principio individuationis, disp. 1, dub. 3; Blasius a Concep., disp. 3, q. 4. Even Bannes, though in his *Summa*, at the place cited, he preferred the first Cajetanist explanation, nevertheless in *lib. 1, de Gen. et Cor.*, q. 20, art. 8, prefers this second one as being quite subtle and in keeping with St. Thomas's mind — because through it one can plainly and clearly understand how the category of substance, in its own proper account, includes no accident, which is where the whole difficulty of this question lies.

Jo. de S. Thom., q. 9, *de Gen. et Cor.*, art. 4, says that designated matter is matter that expresses an order — not actual but aptitudinal — toward quantity as dividing and separating; and he speaks so ambiguously that it is impossible to determine which of Cajetan's two positions he embraces, the first or rather the second. And although Suarez, *disp. 5, Met., sec. 3, n. 18*, and others say that this second Cajetanist mode of explanation coincides with the first — because matter is a foundation and root of quantity and virtually contains it only insofar as it is in passive potency toward quantity — the Thomists of the Dominican family maintain that the two are entirely different. On the second mode, they argue, matter is the principle of quantity in the way in which essence is the principle of its proper attributes and form is the principle of other accidents: it is not merely the subject receiving quantity, but the root in virtue of which quantity belongs and is owed to material things. So Bannes, *lib. 1, de Gen.*, q. 20, art. 8, explains the difference between the two modes offered by Cajetan for explaining designated matter.

Still others, finally, by "designated matter" understand matter that is determined and appropriated — as though stamped — to this particular substantial form. They argue that even if, in the instant of generation, all antecedent dispositions cease and vanish with the corruption of the preceding composite, matter nevertheless remains, in virtue of those dispositions, determined by itself to this particular form, which it receives immediately in that same instant. So hold certain recent authors commenting on 1. part. *D. Thomae*, q. 3, art. 2. Among these, some, in order to explain more fully this stamping of matter, say — as reported by Suarez, *disp. 5, Met., sec. 3, n. 22* — that in that instant a certain real mode is added to matter, distinct from it by the nature of the thing itself and prior to the introduction of the substantial form with its quantity and other dispositions, and that matter is stamped by this mode. Some call this mode substantial, others accidental.

These are the various positions by which the Thomists attempt to explain their highly involved doctrine of designated matter. From the variety and obscurity with which they explain it, it follows plainly — as *Rada* observes — that this doctrine contains little truth; for truth, shining of itself, would never allow the minds of so many highly learned men to grow blind before it. And it is indeed worthy of note that Cajetan — a man of the greatest learning and most resourceful in devising more probable ways to defend the views of St. Thomas — was nevertheless in this matter unable to satisfy even himself, let alone his opponents, since in his *Summa* he repudiated the very mode of explaining designated matter that he had set out in *lib. de Ente et Essentia*.

Article I: Bare, Undesignated Matter Is Not the Principle of Individuation

This is the conclusion of Scotus, 2. d. 3, q. 5, which all the Thomists also hold who posit matter as the principle of individuation only under designation, not taken in bare abstraction. Bannes, 1. de Gen., q. 20, art. 4, sets it out in so many words. The Doctor proves it first from explicit authorities of Aristotle: at 7. Met. 35 and 39, and 12. Met. 27, Aristotle teaches that matter is not of itself primarily individual, but that it is divided into universal and particular, just as in general form and composite are divided — for he speaks in this way at 7. Met. 36, near the end: "It is plain that soul is a certain substance, body is matter, and man or animal, which is composed of both, is universal; but Socrates or Coriscus is singular." Matter, then, is in itself a kind of common nature, contractible to this and that singular matter through individual differences, and therefore cannot be the principle of individuation, since that principle must be per se and primarily incommunicable, so as to constitute the individual in incommunicable being.

If it is objected that this only shows that matter taken universally is not the principle of individuation, without prejudice to the view that particular matter is such a principle — and that the Thomists do not say that matter taken in any and every way individuates the composite, but only matter as it is this and numerically one — this solution is frivolous. For since the Thomists say that matter individuates and confers incommunicable being insofar as it is primarily irreceivable — a character that does not belong to form, since matter includes such irreceivability in its very essence — it follows that, on their account, matter individuates by reason of its essence. Furthermore, not even this irreceivability establishes that matter can be the primary root of individuation, because matter taken in common includes this irreceivability along with communicability, since thus taken it is common to many things. Therefore, just as form, on their view, cannot be the principle of individuation because it is of itself communicable to many, so for the same reason neither can matter, even though it is primarily irreceivable. Again: if matter as this particular matter is the principle of individuation because it is thus communicable, then by the same reasoning form as this particular form can also be the principle of individuation — which they deny, and rightly so. Finally: if common matter is conceded to exist, as they are

compelled to admit by the authorities cited above, then some principle of individuation must be assigned to matter taken in common, by which it is singularized. But that principle cannot itself be matter, as is evident — therefore matter is not the principle of individuation, but rather it is that by which matter taken in common is itself individuated.

In a second proof, *Tromb.*, 5. *Met.*, q. 5, art. 3, appeals to the authority of the most celebrated University of Paris, which condemned this opinion in two articles. The first article states that it is an error to say that God cannot multiply forms without matter; the second, that it is an error to say that form does not admit division except through matter. Nor does it avail the Thomists to say that those articles were condemned at Paris but not everywhere. Trombet replies that a position condemned anywhere by a celebrated university is condemned or suspect of heresy everywhere — not only by the authority of the diocesan bishop but also of the Lord Pope, as is evident from *Extra ne haereticis, caput ad abolendam*. And among all the universities of the world, the University of Paris has always held and holds the first place, as one in which the leaders of learning have always flourished and so many schools have been founded.

Thirdly, the conclusion is proved by reason. Matter is a part of the quiddity of the composite — not only according to Scotus, 3. *dist.* 22, q. *un.*, but also according to St. Thomas in many places. But what belongs to the quiddity and essence of a specific nature cannot be the principle of individuation, because individuation lies outside the essence of nature, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore matter cannot be the principle of individuation.

Some, as reported by *Tromb.*, *loc. cit.*, respond that matter can be considered in its being in two ways: either in relation to the form from which it receives its being, or in relation to the generating agent from which the form is produced that gives being to matter. Accordingly, matter has two grades of being which, though one and the same in reality, are distinguished by reason. Thus the being of matter can be considered either according to the grade it receives from the form, or according to the grade it receives from the generating agent. According to the grade it receives from form, the being of matter is communicable; according to the grade it receives from the generating agent, it is incommunicable. According to the former grade it constitutes the species; according to the latter it constitutes the individual. *Tromb.*, *loc. cit.*, refutes this solution, but since it is not much used by the Thomists today, I will not linger over its refutation. I note only that it assumes something plainly false — namely, that matter receives its intrinsic and essential being, according to which it together with form constitutes the composite, from the generating agent, at least according to some grade. This is utterly foreign to all philosophy, which teaches that matter in respect of its intrinsic and essential being is ingenerable and incorruptible.

Fourthly, the conclusion is further proved as follows: what is of itself indistinct and undifferentiated cannot be the principle of individuation, which

distinguishes one individual from another. But matter is of this character, since in the foundation of nature — such as matter is — nothing is distinct, according to *1. Met., text 17*. Therefore, and so on.

The Thomists respond that there are two aspects to an individual: first, that it is undivided in itself by ultimate division, or that it is incommunicable in the mode by which a superior is communicated to an inferior; second, that it is divided from everything else that is not itself. The first, they say, comes from matter by reason of its irreceivability, for by reason of matter the individual cannot be received in another and communicated to it; the second comes from quantity. The Ferrariensis adds that the essential nature of an individual consists only in the first aspect, the second being merely a property of it. They therefore conclude that bare matter is not the principle of individuation with respect to every aspect of individuation, but only with respect to incommunicability, which is the primary and most important characteristic.

But this solution is refuted by what has already been said, through which it was proved that matter is of itself communicable, since it is a part of the specific quiddity, and that there is not only this matter but also matter in common, corresponding to form and composite in common. Moreover, matter's essence is not repugnant to being divided into several things numerically distinct, for there is not one numerically single matter for all, but one species of matter, as was established in the *Physics*. Therefore matter cannot be the principle of individuation with respect to incommunicability and undividedness in itself, as though the individual possessed these precisely by reason of matter.

Confirmation: individuation coexists with receivability in a subject, and the communicability opposed to individuation coexists with irreceivability. Therefore it is false that matter, by reason of the irreceivability that belongs to it primarily and essentially, is the root of the incommunicability of form and composite. The consequence is evident. As for the assumption, the first part is illustrated in the Eucharistic accidents, which exist outside a subject and yet can be communicated to and received in one, while still remaining individual. The second part is proved as follows: prime matter, considered precisely in its own essence, is primarily and essentially irreceivable — since it is constituted as the first subject — and yet it is still communicable to many inferiors even in respect of this very irreceivability, namely to this and that matter differing from each other numerically.

A further confirmation, drawing on a prior argument: the incommunicability by which something cannot be communicated to another as to a subject, or by union in any other way, in respect of its entitative being, is not the proper incommunicability of an individual that constitutes it in such being. That proper incommunicability is rather the one by which the individual cannot be communicated to another as a superior is communicated to an inferior; and it is for this reason that an individual is said to be incommunicable, not as that by

which (ut quo) — for in that sense it is communicable — but as that which (ut quod). And this is how it is distinguished from a supposit, which is incommunicable in both ways. Since, therefore, irreceivability does not render something incommunicable as that which (ut quod) — that is, as a superior to its inferior — but only as that by which (ut quo) and as a form to its subject, even if matter is the cause of irreceivability, it does not follow that it is the root of incommunicability, which is the proper characteristic of an individual. The consequence is plain. The assumption is proved as follows: individual incommunicability is that which is directly opposed to the communicability of a universal and common nature. But the communicability of a common nature looks to many things as its inferiors, not as subjects, and it is communicated to them through real and essential identification, not through any other more extrinsic union. Therefore individual incommunicability is precisely that by which an individual is rendered incommunicable to many things as its superiors, each of which would be identical with it.

Some Thomists respond that the incommunicability of the singular is not only incommunicability in the mode of a superior to its inferiors, but also in the mode of a form to its subject — and for this reason, which we have just indicated: because its incommunicability must adequately oppose the communicability of the universal, and the universal is communicable not only in the mode of a superior to its inferiors but also in the mode of an act to its subject. Hence the second substance is said to be in a subject and to be predicated of a subject.

But this response is proved false by what was just said. For individual accidents — such as this whiteness, this flavor — are truly and properly individual, and yet they are communicable to another as to a subject. Likewise, the humanity assumed by the Word was singular and yet was communicated to the divine supposit. Therefore the incommunicability of an individual excludes only communicability in the mode of a superior to its inferiors, which alone and precisely constitutes the universal. Nor is it true that universals — and especially secondary substances — exist in another as in a subject. The opposite is found in the *Categories*, cap. 2, on substance, where it is stated that the secondary substance is predicated of a subject — namely of an inferior — but is in no way in a subject, because although humanity is in Peter and Paul, it is not in them as a form in a subject through inherence, but as a nature in its inferiors through real and essential identification — which is why it can be predicated of them quidditatively. And although the universals of accidents are also said to be in a subject — such as color and flavor — this belongs to them not insofar as they are universals, but insofar as they are accidental universals. And if universals are indeed found to be in their inferiors as in a subject, this is to be understood of the subject of predication, not of inherence or reception.

Fifthly, to overturn this Thomist foundation — that bare matter gives the individual its incommunicability, though not its distinction from other

individuals — I prove that if matter provides the first, it must also provide the second; and since it does not provide the second, as they themselves admit, neither does it provide the first, which is what we intend. The proof is as follows: that which causes one individual not to communicate with another divides and distinguishes it from that other in respect of the being in which they do not communicate. But that which confers incommunicability on the individual thereby causes it not to communicate with another in individual being, and therefore distinguishes it individually from everything else. Hence that which confers incommunicability also confers individual distinction. If, therefore, matter confers incommunicability taken bare and apart from any designation by quantity, it must also provide individual distinction. Confirmation: the principles by which a thing is constituted and those by which it is distinguished are the same, and they constitute and distinguish in the same degree. If, therefore, through bare matter the individual is intrinsically constituted in incommunicable being, it is also individually distinguished from everything else through matter, and there would be no need to await that distinction from quantity. Further confirmation: if matter constitutes the individual in incommunicable being, then it also constitutes it in numerical unity — because nothing can be constituted in any being without being constituted in some unity consequent upon and proportionate to that being, since unity is the adequate attribute of being. But through unity each thing is undivided from itself and distinct from everything else. Therefore the individual, through the unity it has from matter, will be distinguished from everything else. Since, then, the Thomists do not wish to say that bare matter is the principle of individuation with respect to distinction — for they say this comes from quantity or from the designation of quantity — they should not consistently maintain that it is the principle of individuation with respect to incommunicability either. They ought either to affirm both or, better, to deny both. See *Tromb., loc. cit.*, where he pursues this middle path at length against the Thomists.

Lastly, the Doctor argues at *loc. cit.*, near the end of the question, that the principle of individuation must be most properly characteristic of a singular and individual thing — so peculiar to it that it is common to many individuals neither simultaneously nor successively. But matter is not of this kind, because one and the same matter, remaining numerically the same, is common successively to many individuals — namely to what is generated and to what is corrupted. Therefore matter itself is not the principle of individuation.

The Thomists respond that this proves only that bare matter is not the principle of individuation, since as such it can be common to many; but understood as designated — that is, as capable of this quantity rather than any other — it is so proper to one individual that it cannot be common to many, either simultaneously or successively.

This response concedes everything we are at present contending for. For in this article we intend to prove nothing other than that bare matter cannot be the principle of individuation; in the next article we will prove that even designated matter cannot serve as such. The Doctor, moreover, directly attacks this solution in the following manner: suppose fire is generated from water, and then water is generated again from fire. In such a case, although there is in the corrupted water and the generated fire the same matter with the same quantity or designation, it seems that in the first corrupted water and in the water subsequently generated from fire, not only is the same indeterminate quantity present but also the same terminated quantity — since it can have the same terminus from form. Therefore the same matter with the same designation can be in what is generated and in what is corrupted, and hence even with designation matter cannot be the principle of individuation. But this will be addressed in the following article.

Objections Resolved

In opposition to the foregoing, the Thomists press several authorities of Aristotle suggesting that matter is the principle of individuation. But since those authorities speak of matter in absolute terms, they seem rather to favor those who posit matter as the principle of individuation taken absolutely than those who posit designated matter — and therefore they must be addressed in this article. The first authority is from 6. *Met.* 12, where Aristotle says that things are one in number whose matter is one. The second is from 1. *Caeli* 92, where he says that the heavens as such are form, while this heaven, he says, is form in matter, and then at 93 and 94 he denies that there are several worlds, because they cannot be multiplied through matter, since all matter is contained in this world. The third is from 12. *Met.*, text 94, where he teaches that whatever things belong to the same species and are numerically many necessarily include matter, from which he concludes that several numerically distinct first movers cannot exist, since the first mover lacks matter. The fourth is from 7. *Met.* 28, which holds that the generator generates another by reason of matter: "Callias," he says, "and Socrates are different on account of matter." The fifth is from the same book, text 35: after teaching that the universal man is composed of common form and common matter, he adds: "But the singular — already from ultimate matter — is Socrates," at 7. *Met.* 41; and at *lib.* 8, text 8, he says that in immaterial things the quiddity is identical with the thing whose quiddity it is — that is, with the singular — while in material things it is distinct, which appears to be said because of singularity, which is drawn from matter. These authorities I have not listed in the order of Aristotle's books, but roughly in the order in which they are adduced and resolved by the Doctor, 2. *d.* 3, q. 6, §*ad quaestionem quintam*, so that those admitting the same explanation may be grouped together.

These authorities, I respond, do not well establish the Thomist position — first, because the Doctor opposes to them other authorities from 7. and 12. *Met.*, cited at the beginning of the article, by which it is plainly shown that it was not

Aristotle's intention that physical matter should be the principle of individuation; second, because when the Philosopher frequently bases the unity of things on the unity of matter, it is certain that he is not always speaking of the matter of the part — that is, physical matter — as is evident from 5. *Met.*, *text 10*, where he says that man, horse, and dog are one, as those things are one whose matter is one, and there he takes matter for genus; third, because according to the more correct principles of Aristotle and the Commentator, the heavens are a simple body lacking matter and form, as the Doctor shows at 2. *dist. 14, q. 1*, and therefore when Aristotle says the heavens as such are form, and this heaven is matter (1. *Caeli 92*), on that view he cannot be speaking of physical matter but in another sense; fourth, because if he were speaking of the matter of the part and physical matter, this would tell no less against us than against those Thomists who admit in the heavens a composition of matter and form — for he says that the heavens as such, taken absolutely, express form alone, whereas in common, according to their opinion, they should also include matter in common; fifth, because the last authority, which in concrete terms seems to exclude matter from the quiddity and essence of the composite, tells no less against us than against the Thomists, who agree with us that matter is a part of the quiddity of a material composite. To reconcile these passages of Aristotle so that they do not contradict each other or obscure the truth, the various commentators have devised different senses in which Aristotle uses the terms matter and form.

The Doctor, then, in order to reconcile these passages of Aristotle, says at *loc. cit.* and *quol. 2, art. 2, lit. M*, near the end, that Aristotle uses the term matter in different ways in different places. Sometimes he calls matter the receptive principle that composes with act or form — as when he says that matter and form are two principles, 1. *Physic.*, and in many other places. In another sense, form is called quiddity by Aristotle in many places; and correspondingly, matter is called whatever has the character of contracting or determining that quiddity — and in this way any individual difference whatsoever is called matter with respect to the specific quiddity. Matter, therefore, is sometimes that which receives the informing form, and sometimes that which contracts or determines the indifferent quiddity. So the Doctor, *loc. cit.*, *quol. 2*. And because he himself, at 3. *d. 2, q. 2*, and *dist. 22, q. un.*, calls form taken precisely as quiddity the "form of the whole" (*forma totius*) — to distinguish it from form in the other sense, namely the "form of the part" (*forma partis*) — the Scotists have accordingly called the individual difference, which is called "matter" as opposed to the form of the whole, the "matter of the whole" (*materia totius*), to distinguish it from the matter of the part, which corresponds to the form of the part.

This twofold sense of matter and form, observed by Scotus in Aristotle, has been approved by virtually all others after him, as may be seen in *Raguf.*, *disp. 24, cit.*, *cap. 25*, and *Pasqual.*, *disp. 37, sec. 3*, where, in explaining the various Aristotelian passages already cited, he notes that by "form" Aristotle sometimes means the quiddity of the thing taken precisely in common and considered in itself — in

which sense he takes form at 7. *Met.*, text 28, and more clearly at text 35, where he calls the parts of the definition parts of form, even though matter is also a part of the definition and essence, and therefore by "form" there he cannot mean the form of the part but the form of the whole, taken as quiddity, as the Doctor also explains at 3. *d.* 12, *q. un.* By "matter," on the other hand, he means the entity of the thing in which the quiddity is involved. The quiddity is called "form" both because it expresses the formal being of the thing, and because with respect to that entity in which it is involved it stands as form — for it confers formal being upon it and constitutes it in such-and-such being — while the entity is called "matter" both because it is, as it were, subjected to the formal being that is imbued in it, and because it expresses the material being of the thing. This same twofold sense of matter and form in Aristotle is also set out by Jo. Baccon., 3. *dist.* 12; Franciscus Piccol., *lib.* 3, *de materia*, cap. 18; and Zabarella, *lib.* *de natura caelesti*, c. 8, where he also applies it to the authority from 1. *de Caelo*, text 92, when Aristotle calls the heavens taken absolutely "form" and this heaven "matter" — for the heavens taken absolutely signifies the very quiddity of the heavens as it were in the abstract, while when we say "this heaven" we mean the sensible and demonstrable thing, and thus the quiddity in matter — that is, in what has the quiddity.

This, I say, is the twofold sense of matter and form noted by Scotus in Aristotle. The only difference lies in the explanation of matter as it corresponds to form taken as nature and quiddity. For Scotus and the Scotists say that it is the individual difference, while those other authors say that it is the whole concrete thing composed of nature and the contracting difference, which is said to have the nature.

This, however, is a verbal dispute, and either can be said to represent the mind of the Doctor. For at *quol.* 2, cited, and *d. q.* 6, *§ad quaestionem quintam*, he calls the individual difference matter in comparison with the quiddity as the form of the whole, because it constitutes it in its ultimate subjectable being and constitutes the thing in material rather than formal being — since that entity is not quidditatively formal, as quiddity is called form. And in the same *q.* 6, at *lit. H*, he calls the very whole that has the quiddity "matter" with respect to the quiddity as the form of the whole, in these words: "because with Aristotle quiddity is often called form, as is evident at 5. *Met.*, cap. *de causa*, and *lib.* 7, cap. *de partibus definitionis* — 'that in which there is no matter, quiddity and what it is are the same' — since he uses 'matter' to mean whatever has a contracted quiddity, and so on." The same position is held at 3. *d.*, *q.* 2, *art.* 3, where, having proved from Aristotle, 5. *Met.*, cap. *de causa*, that nature and quiddity can be called form, he then asks: with respect to what is it form? And he answers: with respect to the whole composite — not as an informing form, but as the form by which the composite is an entity quidditatively — and in this way the whole is formally an entity through the form of the whole, just as the white is called white through whiteness.

And through this the pointless dispute is set aside which *Faber* wages against the Scotists in *theor. 21, cap. 1*, and *theor. 90, cap. 4*, near the end, where he sharply rebukes all Scotists for saying that Scotus called the individual difference the "matter of the whole" — since, on *Faber's* reading, in the Doctor it is the whole having the quiddity that is called the matter of the whole — by which he thinks he can evade the argument pressed by *Mercenarius, disp. cit. de principio individuationis, cap. 5*, who says that this matter of the whole is a pure fiction of Scotus and the Scotists, since in Aristotle matter is always potential and passive, whereas for the Scotists the matter of the whole is an act contracting and determining the common nature. *Faber* evades this difficulty by saying it is false that for Scotus the matter of the whole is the individual difference, since it is the whole having the nature, which indeed behaves potentially and passively toward the nature. This dispute, I say, is pointless, because both positions are found in the Doctor: that the individual difference is matter with respect to the form of the whole, and that the whole having the nature — the concrete composed of difference and nature — is also called matter. Nor does *Mercenarius's* objection carry much force, because the Doctor explains well in what sense the individual difference is called matter — namely, insofar as it constitutes the thing in its ultimate subjectable and material being, not in formal being, because it does not pertain to the quiddity of the thing. Hence, although from the angle of its contracting and determining the nature it can be called act, this does not prevent it from also being called, in the sense declared, matter and potency.

This being established, the Doctor, at *loc. cit., §ad quaestionem quintam*, responds to the three first authorities: they do not speak of the matter of the part but of matter taken as the individual difference. He says this gloss fits well with the first text from *5. Metaph., text 12*, because after saying that those things are numerically one whose matter is one, Aristotle immediately adds: "and things are specifically one whose account is one" — that is, whose quiddity is one, since "account" (ratio) there is taken for quiddity, which is called form with respect to individual being. He similarly explains the other text from *1. de Caelo 92*: by "the heavens" simply and absolutely he understands the very quiddity and nature of the heavens, as it were in the abstract; by "this heaven" he understands the same nature, as it were in the concrete — contracted by the individual difference. And he especially says this must be the explanation given by those who deny to the heavens, in Aristotle's view, a composition of matter and form. Text 93 and 94 do seem to speak of the matter of the part, for Aristotle there proves that another world is impossible because he supposed — though incorrectly — that this world consists of all possible and actual matter; hence, just as a physical composite cannot fail to consist of its own matter, so neither can another world exist if no other matter is possible. From this argument of Aristotle's, however, it cannot be rightly deduced that matter is the principle of individuation, but only that it is required and necessary for the constitution of another world as an essential part of a physical composite — as the Doctor hints at *2. d. 3, q. 7*, near the end.

The text from *11. Met. 49* the Doctor likewise explains as speaking of matter not as the matter of the part and physical matter, but as matter taken for the individual difference — which others prefer to call metaphysical. Aristotle proves there that there cannot be several first movers, because in the first mover there is no matter — that is, nothing in it that contracts, as matter or anything else would, but it is of itself this thing without any contracting principle; for such contraction is incompatible with perfect simplicity, and therefore the quiddity of God is of itself this, without any contracting difference. This explanation is accepted by *Pasqual.*, *loc. cit.*, and *Ragusejus*, an excellent Peripatetic, derives it from the very text itself — despite the objections of Cajetan and the Thomists.

The fourth authority, drawn from *6. Met. 28*, is handled by some Scotists in the same way — taking Aristotle's "form" as quiddity and "matter" as individual difference — as *Pasq.*, *loc. cit.*, follows. But the Doctor, *2. d. 3, q. 6*, near the end, frankly admits that the passage there is about physical matter and form, as *Raguf.*, *loc. cit.*, also follows. He does not, however, allow that it can be concluded from this that matter is the formal and proximate principle of individuation — which is what is in question — but only that, speaking in terms of physical being, the generator and the generated are in some way more distinguished from each other through matter than through form. For the reason for distinction is attributed to matter rather than to form, since form is not only distinctive but also assimilating, whereas matter is in no way assimilating — since the generator does not assimilate the generated to itself by reason of matter. Aristotle is arguing there against Plato and proving that the Ideas are not necessary for generation, because both the distinction of the generator from the generated and the assimilation of the generated to the generator — both of which are required for univocal generation — can be had without them. For a particular agent from its form has that by which it assimilates the patient to itself, and the generator assimilates the generated to itself; and from matter it has that by which it is distinct from the generated, since when the generator proceeds to the act of generation it produces form and brings matter to completion — not its own matter, which is already perfected by its own form, but the matter of the other thing, namely of what is generated. And so Aristotle speaks of physical principles and explains which of them is assimilating and which distinctive in the generator with respect to the generated — but he does not speak of the metaphysical principle of individuation, by which one thing is ultimately distinguished from another in such a way that no further principle need be sought. For this cannot belong to physical principles: although in the physical order one can say that Peter is this particular man because he is constituted from this soul and this body, it still remains to ask by what principle this matter and this form were first singularized — and that will be the ultimate principle of individuation, which is what is under discussion here.

The fifth authority also speaks of the matter of the part, and carries its own solution within it. For Aristotle there does not speak of the distinction between the composite in common and in particular, saying that the composite in

common is composed of matter and form in common, while the singular is composed of this matter — and implicitly also of this form, for in the physical order a numerically singular composite necessarily requires this particular form just as much as this particular matter. But since it must still be asked regarding these very things by what they have been made this particular and singular, neither of them can be posited as the first per se principle of individuation, which is what we are here investigating.

The sixth and final authority, from 7. *Met.* 41 and *lib.* 8, *text* 8, is explained by Scotus in both senses — both of the matter of the part and of the matter of the whole — as he notes at 2. *d.* 3, *q.* 6, *lit.* R: if the Philosopher speaks of the matter of the whole, the sense is that in things abstracted from matter — that is, from the individual difference — quiddity is identical with the thing whose quiddity it is, for the thing of which it is the quiddity is itself that very quiddity. But in things conceived along with matter — that is, with the individual difference, which is outside the account of the quiddity — quiddity is not identical in the primary and adequate sense with the thing of which it is the quiddity, because that thing includes matter, namely the individual difference. For example, in man, humanity is called the quiddity of man, because it is his quiddity, and is primarily and per se identical with man, since man and humanity are entirely the same and differ only in mode of signification — as concrete and abstract. But humanity and Peter, who is the singular of man, are not identical in every way, because beyond the quiddity — that is, beyond humanity — there is something in Peter that does not belong to his quiddity, namely the individual difference. If, on the other hand, Aristotle is there speaking of the matter of the part, the Doctor explains it thus at 3. *dist.* 22, *q.* *un.*, *lit.* I: in things abstracted from matter — that is, not from matter in common, but from singular and contracted matter — quiddity is primarily and per se identical with the thing of which it is the quiddity. But in things conceived along with matter — that is, with singular matter — the quiddity of the superior is not primarily and per se identical with the inferior, but only in a secondary sense, as was said in *disp.* 5, *Physic.*, *q.* 12, *art.* 1, *n.* 142.

For a still fuller understanding of these authorities, see the Doctor in the *Metaphysics* in the exposition of the text; for he explains each of the cited texts in conformity with what he says in the *Sentences*, and *Anton. And.* in his annotations to those texts clarifies them further in relation to our topic. Other explanations of those texts are also given by *Poncius*, *disp.* 6, *Log.*, *q.* 6, but they appear entirely arbitrary and foreign to the Philosopher's intention.

After the explanation of this last authority, the Doctor, 2. *dist.* 3, *q.* 6, near the end, raises this doubt: whether, in Aristotle's view, the absence of matter — which is one part of the composite — entails the absence of that individual entity; from the resolution of this doubt it will become manifest in what sense Aristotle inferred, from the absence of physical matter in abstract substances, their numerical non-multiplicability within the same species. The Doctor resolves this

doubt not there but immediately in the following question, in the response to the first principal argument, and says: it is most true in Aristotle's view that everything not having matter as one of its parts is identical with its own quiddity in the primary sense, because every such thing's quiddity posits itself as formally necessary. The reason is that whatever can exist in a formally necessary nature does exist in it, since in such things potency does not differ from act, from 9. *Met.* 17. Therefore whatever can have that quiddity does have it, and thus whatever possibility was posited in that nature given the presupposition is posited in act. But if there were possibility there for several individuals, there would be possibility for infinitely many, and therefore there would be infinitely many in act. Since, however, infinity is impossible in any nature, in that nature there is also impossibility of infinity, and therefore every nature abstracted from the matter of the part Aristotle posited as of itself this, and consequently also free from matter taken as the individual difference. Aristotle therefore did not immediately and formally infer from this that abstract substances are numerically non-multiplicable because they lack matter — as though matter were the principle of individuation and the precise cause of plurality and numerical distinction — but because, owing to their lack of matter, they are formally necessary; and if they are necessary, they are of themselves this, and not numerically multiplied by contracting differences, for in that case there would be infinitely many individuals in each such species.

In a second set of arguments the Thomists press reasons founded on the authorities cited above. They argue that what is the principle of multiplication and distinction of individuals is the principle of individuation, since things are constituted and multiplied and distinguished by the same principles. But matter is such a principle of distinction and multiplication. Therefore, and so on. The major is evident. The minor is proved: matter is the principle of distinction, because the generator does not generate another except by reason of matter, from 7. *Met.*; and it is the principle of numerical multiplication, because things that have no matter cannot be multiplied by number alone, which is why Aristotle posited that abstract substances differ from each other in species, not in number. Confirmation: when the absence of a thing is the cause of a negation, its presence is also the cause of the corresponding affirmation. Therefore the presence of matter will be the cause of such distinction and multiplicity.

I respond that the major is to be understood not of just any principle of distinction and multiplication, but of the formal, proximate, and first principle — such that no prior principle need be sought — in which sense the minor is denied. For matter is neither the formal nor the proximately radical principle of numerical distinction and multiplicity. To the first proof, concerning distinction, it is clear from what was said in explaining the fourth authority that, speaking absolutely, the generator is distinguished from the generated as much through form as through matter — since each has different matter and different form — but comparatively and relatively speaking, the generator is said to be

distinguished from the generated more through matter than through form, because form is not only distinctive but also assimilating, whereas matter is only distinctive and not assimilating. From this, however, it does not follow — as we said above, and as *Bassol.*, *loc. cit.*, notes — that matter is simply and altogether the first principle of individuation in the sense we are here seeking. For it still remains to ask by what this matter is other and other, and by what it is this or that particular matter. Although matter may indeed concur in the individuation of a material substance as its intrinsic cause, it is still not the formal or proximately radical principle of individuation of that substance. To the proof about multiplication, it is clear from the explanation of the last authority how, in abstract substances, Aristotle does not immediately and precisely infer their numerical non-multiplicability from the mere absence of matter, but mediately and consequentially from many other considerations — because they are necessary owing to the absence of matter, and in no species can there be an infinite multitude of individuals, and in necessary things act does not differ from potency — from which he finally concludes that abstract substances must be posited as of themselves this and singular. From this it is also easy to meet the confirmation: the major holds for precise causes, in which sense it is denied that the absence of matter is the cause of distinction and numerical non-multiplicability — since many other things concur toward that end, as has been explained. Indeed, speaking outside the school of the Philosopher and absolutely, it is false that the absence of matter as one part is the cause of numerical non-multiplicability; for outside the school of St. Thomas, among other theologians, angels lacking matter are still numerically multiplied within the same species, as the Doctor teaches, 2. d. 3, q. 7.

Thirdly, they argue: the principle of individuation is that through which it belongs to an individual to be subject to all of its genus, and through which it is repugnant for it to be communicated as the universal is communicated to the particular. But this belongs to it precisely through matter: for matter is the first subject of all and the receiver of all forms, yet is not receivable in another — and therefore this kind of subjection to all superior predicates belongs to the individual through matter, and so does incommunicability, because through matter both form and composite are rendered irreceivable in another and consequently incommunicable.

I respond by denying the minor. To the first proof, concerning subjection, I say with *Bassol.* that it belongs to matter and to a substantial individual equivocally to be subject to all of their genus. For it belongs to an individual substance to be subject to all of its genus upward, as to predicables stated of it — whereas it belongs to matter to be subject to forms of its genus not as predicables but as actualizing and perfecting it, as a part, toward the constitution of composites of the same genus. Therefore it need not follow that this belongs to the individual through matter, nor that matter is the principle of individuation on this score. To the other proof, concerning incommunicability, it is clear from what was said at

n. 70 and 71: the incommunicability belonging to an individual by reason of its principle of individuation excludes communicability in the mode of a superior to its inferiors through real and essential identification — not communicability in the mode of a form to its subject through information or any other union. For form, even when individual, can still be communicated to a subject, and the humanity of Christ, though individual, was communicated to the Word. Hence, even if such incommunicability to another in the mode of a form to a subject were to belong to the individual, matter would not thereby need to be posited as the principle of individuation, because this is not the incommunicability proper to the individual as such — which is incommunicable only as that which (ut quod), not also as a supposit, which is incommunicable as that which and as that by which (ut quo). Yet it is further false that matter is simply the first irreceivable thing and thus the cause of why other things cannot be received in a subject, for separated substances cannot be received in a subject either, and yet this belongs to them not by reason of matter but because they subsist of themselves and are acts not further orderable toward anything to be perfected substantially — and hence it belongs to them by reason of their own proper subsistence, as the Doctor rightly noted, *quod. 9.*

Fourthly: opposites have opposite principles. Since, therefore, form is the principle of universal nature, matter — which is opposed to form — will be the principle of particular nature. Confirmation: numerical or individual distinction is material and not formal; therefore it derives from matter alone. Finally: the principle of individuation is that which removes from the individual the capacity for definition, since the individual as such is not definable. But it is matter that removes this capacity from the individual, since the material parts do not belong to the definition, from 7. *Met.* Therefore, and so on.

I respond that if we are speaking of physical matter and form, and each is considered according to its essence and in common, then each can be the physical principle of the universal composite or composite in common. And if each is considered as contracted, each can be the constitutive principle of the composite in particular. Hence in this sense it is false that it belongs more to form to be the principle of universal nature, and more to matter to be the constitutive principle of particular nature, as *Scot., 3. d. 22, q. un.,* teaches. Matter and form therefore cannot be opposed such that one is the principle of universal nature and the other of particular nature, except in another sense — taking form for the form of the whole and matter for the individual difference.

To the confirmation, I say with *Scot., 2. d. 3, q. 6, H:* when the distinction through individual differences is called material and the distinction through specific differences is called formal, "material" and "formal" are not taken physically — as though denominated from the matter and form of the part — but metaphysically, as denominated from the matter and form of the whole, or logically: on this usage, an entity is called material when it constitutes the thing in the being of the

subjectable, and formal when it constitutes it in the capacity for predication alone — for the formal predicate has the character of form, and what is subjectable has the character of matter.

To the last argument, the minor is denied if we are speaking of the matter of the part, because just as matter is a part of the quiddity, so also it is a part of the definition; and an immaterial individual is equally indefinable as a material one. Therefore the minor is only true of the matter of the whole — taken as the individual difference — or of the contracted and particularized matter of the part, and it is only in this sense that Aristotle said, 7. *Met.*, that the material parts do not belong to the definition. So *Doct.*, 3. d. 22, q. un., ad 3, *pro opinione*.

Article II: Designated Matter Is Not the Principle of Individuation

The conclusion of this article is that of Scotus, 2. d. 3, q. 4, §*contra, ia positio*. Apart from the Scotists, it is held by all others outside the school of St. Thomas: *Suarez*, disp. 5, *Met.*, sec. 3; *Pasqualig.*, disp. 37, sec. 2; *Zabarel.*, lib. de constitutione individui, cap. 4; *Raguf.*, disp. 24, cap. 20, and the following; *Contar.*, disp. de princip. ind., cap. 6, and the following; *Piccol.*, lib. 3, de materia prima, cap. 12, and the following; *Fonsec.*, 5. *Met.*, c. 6, q. 4, lib. 3, q. 4, sec. 2 and 3; *Pererius*, lib. 6, cap. 11; *Aversa*, q. 9, log., sec. 5 and 6; and many others. I will establish this conclusion in two ways: first, by individually refuting each of the modes of expression set out at the beginning of the question from the Thomists, by which they defended their designated matter; then by rejecting all of them together with a general argument.

First, then, it is proved that designated matter is not the principle of individuation of material substance when "designated matter" is understood to mean substance actually affected by quantity — which was the first mode of expression. For this mode is itself universally scorned even by the Thomists as altogether unreasonable, as may be seen in *Ripa*, *Bannes*, *Blasius a Concep.*, the *Salmaticenses*, and other recent Thomists cited above. And rightly so: for either they are speaking of the internal, per se, and principal principle of individuation of material substance — the one that substantially and entitatively separates one individual from another — or of some external and secondary principle that distinguishes them only accidentally and a posteriori. They cannot mean the second, since that is not the kind of principle under investigation here, but rather the internal, per se, and preeminent one. Nor can they mean the first, since the individual of a substance is, through all its grades contained in the category of substance, itself substance in the ultimate sense — and therefore cannot be constituted in such being by an accident. Moreover, as even those Thomists acknowledge, quantity can bring about only accidental and quantitative unity and distinction; but the unity and distinction brought about by the principle of individuation is substantial. Furthermore, substance precedes accident in the whole genus — that is, with respect to all its generic, specific, and individual grades — as was said above at n. 50. Therefore it has no need of quantity in order to be individuated — which excludes the response of *Mercenarius*, who says that substance precedes

accident as substance, not as individual, just as a wall precedes whiteness absolutely, while a white wall is posterior to whiteness as a formal effect is posterior to its formal cause. This is excluded, I say, because from what was said there, substance even as individual precedes every accident, since it precedes it as its subject — and it is not the first and ultimate subject of accidents except as primary and singular. Moreover, if substance as such is prior to accident, as Mercenarius concedes, then it is also prior to accident as this particular substance, because an added difference does not destroy the nature of the genus or species. Hence if as substance it is prior to accident, it will not be posterior as this particular substance. And the example of being white in a wall is entirely beside the point: for being white with respect to a wall is purely accidental being, whereas being individual with respect to Peter is not so — since whiteness does not presuppose a white wall, but accident presupposes an individual and singular substance as its proportionate subject, for it is grounded not in universal but in singular and particular substance, and it is primary substance that is said to underlie all others.

Some Thomists respond that this argument proves well that quantity together with matter is not the proper reason for individuating substance, but that quantity nevertheless concurs as a condition without which individuation is impossible. Bannes especially says this in support of these authors. Against this: it is plainly to retreat from that mode of expression, which maintains that quantity concurs with matter in individuating substance precisely because there are two things that belong to the essence and account of the individual — namely, incommunicability and distinction from everything else — and since the second cannot be had from matter alone, it asserts that quantity is necessary. Therefore on this mode of expression, quantity is not added to matter as a mere condition without which individuation is impossible, but as a reason that per se pertains to individuation. Furthermore, given this response, matter alone would be the per se root and principle of individuation, and quantity merely per accidens and as a kind of extrinsic condition — which is not to the point, since what is sought here is the internal and per se principle of individuation, not an extrinsic one that concurs only as a condition. Again: when they say that quantity concurs as a mere condition without which matter cannot individuate the composite, they must mean either that it is prior to the individuation of the composite — which they cannot say, since even on their view the immediate subject of quantity and other accidents is not prime matter but the composite — or they mean by "condition without which" a natural disposition accompanying the individual material substance, in the way we say heat and dryness in fire are conditions without which fire would not exist. But this is beside the point, since such conditions presuppose the subject in which they inhere to be singular and individual.

Further, on the main point: when they say that matter affected by formal quantity is the principle of individuation, being thereby stamped by it, they must understand this either of indeterminate or determinate quantity. Not the first,

because, apart from the fact that this is not given simultaneously with matter — as the Thomists hold against the Averroists — it would still not be fit to stamp matter, since stamping implies determination, and determination cannot proceed from what is in itself indeterminate. Moreover, those who admit this indeterminate quantity in matter also admit that the numerically same matter with the same indeterminate quantity can be found successively in many composites. If they mean determinate quantity, then further: either this quantity has its subject in prime matter or in the composite. If in the composite, as they are bound to say, then it presupposes a singular composite substance, as every accident presupposes a singular subject. Moreover, the substantial composite as such, which by its nature precedes the quantity inhering in it as in a subject, is truly posited as the adequate terminus of substantial generation — and therefore it will truly be singular before quantity accrues to it, since generation terminates at the singular. If, on the other hand, it is said that quantity has its subject proximately and immediately in prime matter, this is still not sufficient to stamp matter so that it belongs to this composite and not to another — because it is possible, not only by divine power but even naturally, that the same portion of matter that was in this composite with such-and-such a quantity should successively be placed in another with the same quantity, as is evident in the case of a rod that is first green and then dry.

Mercenarius, *disp. cit., cap. 11*, responds that by the determinate quantity through which matter is stamped we should understand not merely a quantity constituted by certain dimensions of length or breadth, but quantity affected by certain dispositions — such as a particular rarity or density or other qualities — by which matter is determined to this form rather than that. In this way matter is rendered incommunicable to other individuals and remains assigned to this one alone. Suarez, *sec. 3, cit., n. 11*, says that in this sense it can be admitted that matter designated by quantity — that is, thus proximately disposed — is so proper to this individual that it cannot be in another. Nevertheless, he says, those who respond in this way are inconsistent with themselves, since then matter would be the principle of individuation as designated not by quantity but by qualities. Moreover, it would follow that those qualities are per se and essentially included in the principle of individuation of substance — which was refuted above.

But even granting that these objections and replies damage the solution given, it is nonetheless false that, as Suarez said, matter so affected and proximately disposed is so assigned to this form and composite that it cannot belong to another. For perhaps even naturally it is possible, as the Doctor notes at *loc. c., 2. d. 3, q. 4, infra G*, in the circular generation of fire from water and water from fire — for in homogeneous substances it can well happen that several numerically distinct forms, being of the same nature, require matter to be informed under the same dimensions and dispositions in the same degree. Or at least if this cannot happen naturally, it can happen supernaturally — as, for example, if God were now to place another substance of bread under the numerically same remaining

accidents of the Eucharist, in which there appears no contradiction. For in such a case the terminated quantity, even in this sense, could be with diverse individuals — which suffices to prevent matter so designated from being so proper to one individual that it cannot belong to another. And if you say this happens through a miracle, I say that this suffices to show that the individuation of the composite cannot depend on matter so designated. For if it did, since individuation is inseparable from the proper individual — being really identified with it — the designated and terminated matter could not in another individual even by divine power, since if God were to confer on it the same designation, he would also thereby bring about the same individuation.

Finally, the same argument of Scotus cited above, q. 5, always presses — and the Thomists themselves commonly use it against this first mode of explaining designated matter: a primary substance or substantial individual is an entity per se, directly placeable in the category — and therefore it cannot be constituted from an accidental aggregate, as is matter with quantity.

Capreol. and *Soncin.* respond that the individual is not for that reason an accidental entity, since what is called accidental is what imports things of different genera on an equal footing, and this does not happen in the case at hand — for the individual includes accident not in the strict sense but obliquely, not as a part of its essence but as its determinant, and not from its primary signification but secondarily. *Bannes* adds in support of these authors that quantity does not pertain to the individuation of substance as a proper reason determining it, but as a condition without which individuation is impossible. This last claim was refuted above. Nor does the other solution hold, because the individual difference belongs to the intrinsic concept of the individual as much as the specific difference belongs to the intrinsic concept of the species — proportionately, of course — and I see no disparity that could be alleged except that the former is the ultimate and incommunicable difference and not the latter, which is certainly irrelevant to the point. But the specific difference does not belong obliquely and secondarily to the concept of the species — it belongs as primarily and principally as the genus does, and both concur equally to constitute one per se concept, as several realities belonging to the same genus and ordered to each other as act and potency. Therefore, proportionately, the same must be said of the individual difference in relation to the individual. Therefore, to avoid the individual substance being an accidental entity, every accident must be excluded from the character of its differential.

Secondly, it is proved that designated matter is not the principle of individuation in the sense given by Cajetan in *de Ente et Essentia*, c. 2, q. 5 — namely, as proximate potency to receive this particular quantity, and thus capable of this quantity and no other. The argument considered most powerful for proving this is the very argument by which Cajetan himself, 1. p., q. 29, art. 2, retracted his own position: because the potency of matter toward quantity is itself also an accident belonging

to the same category of quantity, since act and potency belong to the same category, from *lib. 10 and 12, Met.* Hence from this mode of speaking as well, all the same inconveniences follow as were pressed against the former: that the individual of substance would be an accidental entity, and that the individual would be constituted by something belonging to another category — all of which are absurd. And this consequence is proved because the potency of matter to receive quantity is no less an accident than quantity itself, since it belongs to the same category.

Javellus and Bannes attempt to resolve this by saying that the proposition "a potency is in the same genus as its act" is not universally true, but only when understood of the act that the potency regards per se and primarily, not secondarily — in which way matter regards accidental forms. *Fonsec.* and *Raguf.* attempt to break down this solution by arguing that act and potency are in the same category whether the potency regards such an act primarily or secondarily.

In truth, the argument of Cajetan is weak — not because of the solution offered by Javellus and Bannes, which is nothing, since Cajetan would say (as *Ripa, art. 5, notes*) that although matter in its potency as such regards substantial form primarily and accidental form secondarily, yet as designated it regards this quantity primarily — but rather and especially because the proposition on which it rests, that passive potency belongs to the category of its act to which it is receptive, is altogether false, whether that act be regarded primarily or secondarily. Nor did Aristotle pronounce this of entitative act and objective potency, but of objective potency, as the Doctor explains at *2. d. 16, q. un., lit. A, §rationes item.* For this reason it was stated in *disp. 3, Physic., q. 2*, that the passive potency of substance to receive accidents — whether they are received immediately in prime matter or in the composite — belongs to the category of substance and is really identified with it, since it is nothing other than a kind of aptitude or capacity in substance to receive them, as was proved at length there. Through this the objection of *Raguf.* is also refuted, by which he tries to prove that that proposition is universally true in every category.

And so the motive of Cajetan is sound — namely, that the second mode of explanation also cannot be sustained, because even the proximate potency of matter toward this quantity is an accident. But this accidental character must be proved on another basis than the identity of category of potency and act. It can be proved thus: the proximate potency of matter is proximate only from antecedent dispositions introduced by the agent, which determine matter — of itself indifferent to all forms — to this particular form. And Cajetan himself admits as much at *loc. cit.*, saying that matter is by its nature capable of quantity, but as such cannot be the complete principle of individuation, since it is indifferent to any quantity just as to any form. Through the prior action of an agent it is determined to be capable of this particular quantity and no other, and thus is said to be the principle of individuation; and by "quantity" there he says

we must understand not merely mathematical quantity but physical quantity — that is, quantity affected by physical qualities and dispositions. If, then, matter is not understood to be stamped and proximately capable of this quantity except when taken together with these dispositions, it is already clear that it is the principle of individuation insofar as it is an accidental aggregate — and it is the principle of individuation not so much as designated by quantity as by qualities. So from this mode of speaking the same inconveniences follow as from the first.

Furthermore, as *Suarez* rightly argues, in the Thomist position the potency of matter either in no way regards accidental forms — because they are not received in matter immediately but in the composite — or if it does regard and receive them, this is only secondarily and mediately, through the mediation of the substantial form. Therefore the potency of matter is determined to this substantial form even before it is determined to this quantity; therefore matter is not stamped or determined to this form through a potency toward this quantity, but rather the reverse — through determination to this form it is determined to this quantity. Hence matter with its relation to this form rather than to this quantity ought to constitute the principle of individuation.

Moreover, it is difficult to explain by what the universal capacity that matter has of itself toward all forms and quantities is determined, so as to make it capable of this numerically particular quantity and no other. For this determination cannot proceed from quantity itself, since then quantity would confer its formal effect on matter before being understood to inhere in it — for this capacity is understood to be determined before the advent of quantity. And within matter considered according to its capacity, this quantity no more than any other can be received. If you say it is determined by the agent, insofar as the agent disposes matter for this numerically particular form — then clearly those dispositions cannot determine matter to receive this numerically particular form unless the dispositions themselves are singular and individual. But if they are posited as such, it will have to be asked whether they are singular of themselves and through something intrinsic to them, or through something extrinsic. If the first, then the same can be said of this singular matter — that it is numerically one through something intrinsic to itself and not through an extrinsic designation borrowed from quantity or quality. If the second, then what this is must again be explained.

Confirmation: speaking absolutely, the numerically same quantity can by God's absolute power be in diverse matters, and the numerically same dispositions likewise; and conversely, the same matter can be under diverse quantities and dispositions. Therefore neither through quantity nor through dispositions is matter so bound to this numerically particular form or composite that it can be posited as the principle of individuation of that composite. Moreover, if it were so, it would follow that when the matter of wood had been prepared for the form of fire and for the quantity proper to that form, and generally for all that accompanies that form, God could not in that instant — which is the first instant

of the non-being of the form of wood — introduce into it the form of water, making that same instant the first being of water, and of this water. But the consequent is false and contrary to divine omnipotence; therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence is proved because it implies a contradiction to posit in something the constitutive principle of this individual and then to make it constitute another individual.

You will say that it cannot be denied that matter is determined by the agent and by antecedent dispositions to this form rather than that — for all philosophers concede this. I respond that matter is determined from antecedent dispositions to a certain form in species, not in number. For while matter still stands under dispositions for fire, it is indifferent as to whether this numerically particular form of fire rather than that one is educed from it, just as when water is approximated to fire, it is still indifferent whether this or that numerically particular heat is educed from it. Hence, in *disp. 8, Physic., q. 2, art. 3*, I said that the determination of any particular effect in the individual depends immediately on the first cause, even in free causes.

Again, matter, even with this proximate potency toward such a quantity, is incommunicable to many and can be divided into universal and particular. Therefore even with such proximate capacity it cannot be the principle of individuation — since the principle of individuation must be per se primarily, as that by which (*ut quo*), incommunicable and indivisible into many things opposed to numerical unity. The assumption is proved: there can be this matter with such proximate potency toward such a quantity, and this other matter with another proximate potency toward such a quantity — since a fire can dispose not only the matter of this wood to this form of fire and its consequent quantity, but also the matter of other wood. Therefore it must necessarily be admitted that matter so affected with proximate disposition to such a quantity cannot be the principle of individuation — unless recourse is had to this matter so affected with such a disposition toward such a quantity. But this cannot be said unless another principle of individuation is posited with respect to this matter and this quantity, which can be nothing other than something intrinsic to them — in which there is a terminus, as we shall say below.

Finally: for the second mode of explaining how designated matter is the principle of individuation — as proximately capable of this quantity — to be properly defended, it would be necessary to defend the claim that such capacity for this quantity adds nothing really distinct from matter itself, as *Cajetan* said at *loc. cit., de Ente et Essentia*. For if something really distinct and a superadded accident were posited, the same inconveniences return as were pressed against the former mode. But it is impossible to maintain that such proximate capacity is really identified with matter and is not rather a superadded accident, because it accrues to matter and departs from it without matter's corruption — and therefore it is truly a superadded accident.

Cajetan, *loc. cit.*, *de Ente et Essentia*, attempted to defend that mode of speaking, following *Aegid.*, *quol. 1, q. 5, art. 1*, by saying that this designation in matter precedes quantity and is something really caused by quantity yet still really identified with matter itself. But the Doctor, *3. d., q. 4, §contra ista positio*, shows this defense to be altogether fictitious and chimerical. For it is unintelligible how this designation can precede quantity in matter and yet be really caused by quantity — which, on this mode of speaking, is presupposed not yet to be in matter — and it is even more inconceivable how it could be really identified with matter, given that matter can exist without such designation, as when it is understood to be only in remote and not proximate potency toward this quantity. Moreover, as the Doctor argues there: whenever two things are related to some third, and one of them is naturally prior to the other, if the prior is not really identical with that third thing, the posterior will be even less so. If, therefore, quantity — which is prior to the designation caused by it in matter — is not really identical with matter, then even less will the designation caused by quantity be identical with it. Cajetan attempts to evade this and other arguments that the Doctor levels against Aegidius's position, but since this mode of speaking is not accepted by recent Thomists, I did not think it worth pursuing further. Anyone who wishes to see it further refuted may read *Faber* and *Rada* at *loc. cit.*, where there is much against Cajetan's disputation on this point.

Thirdly, the third mode of speaking devised by Cajetan — *1. part., q. 29, art. 1* — and now commonly received among recent Thomists, is on principal grounds repudiated: namely, that matter, insofar as it virtually and radically contains this particular quantity rather than another, is the root of individuation, so that designated matter, as such, means nothing other than being the root of this numerically determinate quantity.

Because this mode of speaking is very obscure, and the Thomists have not yet explained well what they mean by those words — "matter as it pre-has and virtually and radically contains this quantity is the principle of individuation" — it must be asked how they understand matter to be the root and principle of quantity. *Suarez, disp. 5, sec. 3, n. 18*, thinks they mean that matter is the root and origin of quantity in the genus of material cause, because matter — especially on the Thomist position — does not pre-have quantity in the genus of efficient cause, but quantity comes about or results from the form through an extrinsic agent. But this is nothing other than saying that matter virtually contains this quantity as its subject, from which such quantity can be educed, and has the capacity for this numerically particular quantity. If they mean this, it is immediately evident that this third mode coincides entirely with the second, as *Suarez* rightly presses — and it must therefore be refuted in the same way. If, on the other hand, they mean this in the genus of efficient cause, as *Bannes* seems to wish at *lib. 1, de gen. et cor., q. 20, art. 8*, they are speaking entirely contrary to their own principles — since they insist that matter is wholly passive potency, yet by saying this they also make it active. Moreover, they themselves hold that quantity flows from the whole

composite and not from matter alone, since it has its adequate subject in the composite. If they say the composite is the adequate subject quo and matter is the subject quo and inadequate, I reply — as I said in *disp. 3, Physic., q. 1* — that although it is true that matter is also the quo and inadequate subject of accidents, it is nonetheless an indeterminate subject, and form alone is the determinate quo subject — that is, the subject that determinately receives such a quantity and such a quality, since from such a form there follows this and that quality, such and so much quantity. Therefore form is rather the root of determinate quantity than matter; and for this reason form rather than matter ought to be posited as the principle of individuation of the composite.

Furthermore, either this virtual and radical order with respect to such quantity adds something to the essence of matter or it does not. If it adds something, the difficulties raised against the other modes return. If it does not, then matter alone and considered according to its essence will be the principle of individuation — which has been sufficiently refuted in the preceding article, since matter according to its proper being can be with this or that form and in this or that composite, and hence, unless something is added, it cannot be bound to this form or individual.

Confirmation: either prime matter has this radical containing of such a quantity from itself and by its proper formal account, or from another and through something superadded. Not the first, because then all matters would have the same designation, since all are of the same species. Not the second, because the same difficulties as before return. Further confirmation from *Suarez*: matter virtually contains quantity only insofar as it virtually contains the form from which quantity follows. Therefore matter is first the foundation, root, and origin of this form before it is of this quantity — and hence matter rather as virtually containing form than as virtually containing quantity ought to constitute the principle of individuation.

Blasius a Concep., disp. 3, Met., q. 4, denies that this particular form is contained in matter prior to this particular quantity, because although the substantial form is caused by matter prior to quantity, it is not necessary for matter to contain its effects in the same order in which it causes them — which he illustrates by an example of the efficient cause: it is certain that the qualities that dispose toward the introduction of the substantial form proceed from the generating agent prior to the introduction of the substantial form in the thing being generated, before those dispositions in the agent.

Against this: just as matter is said to actually cause quantity because it actually causes the form from which quantity follows, so too it is said to be causative of quantity — or capable of causing quantity — because it is capable of causing the substantial form from which quantity follows. For as the effect in act is to the cause in act, so the effect in potency is to the cause in potency, from *2. Physics*. Therefore in the same order in which matter actually causes its effects — namely

form and quantity — so also it contains them in potency and in virtue. Confirmation: if matter did not virtually contain the substantial form, it would not virtually contain quantity and the other accidents consequent upon form. Therefore matter contains those effects virtually in the same order in which it actually causes them. Nor is the example about dispositions to the point — indeed it tells against the position — for there is a difference between dispositions that precede form in matter and those that follow it. Those that follow emanate from the agent in exactly the same order in which they are contained in it along with the form; and just as form is contained prior to them, so also it is produced prior to them. Hence the same must be said in the present case about quantity with respect to the substantial form that it follows: form is contained in matter prior to quantity.

Moreover, when they say that matter is the principle of individuation insofar as it virtually and radically contains this numerically particular quantity, they must understand this either of terminated or of indeterminate quantity. And indeed *Blasius a Concep., loc. cit.*, admits that this cannot be understood of terminated quantity — both because St. Thomas says so expressly, *opusc. 30, q. 4, art. 2*, and because quantity is not terminated except through shape, since shape is the terminus of quantity. Since, therefore, quantity as contained virtually in matter is not there according to its formal being in such a state, it follows that it is not there as figured, and hence it is understood to be in matter as indeterminate. But above, at n. 83, it was shown that indeterminate quantity is altogether unfit for stamping matter, because stamping implies determination, and determination cannot be had through what is wholly indeterminate.

The author responds that it is not the same for quantity to be terminated and for it to be determined — for it can be determined even if it is not terminated. And so this quantity, as virtually contained in matter, although according to such being it is not terminated — for it is not capable of shape except when it has its formal being in matter — is nevertheless determined, because a thing can have a determined being not only in itself but also in its principle.

Against this: quantity is not determined except by the shape under which it actually exists, and for quantity to be determined in this sense is for it to be thus or thus figured; but the very moment quantity is figured it is also terminated. Therefore for quantity to be terminated and to be determined are the same. Moreover, since it is equally the case that for quantity to be indeterminate and to be undetermined are the same, it will conversely be the same for it to be terminated and determined. Further: even conceding, as the respondent argues, that there can be indeterminate quantity together with determination, still such determination is not such that matter through it is stamped to this form and composite — for everyone concedes that matter with indeterminate quantity can be under diverse forms and with diverse individuals. Therefore, however much quantity posited as virtually contained in matter is determined, if it is still

indeterminate, it can be under diverse forms simultaneously with matter — which is sufficient to prevent matter with it from being the principle of individuation.

There is the further point that those who admit indeterminate quantity hold that it is perpetually connected in its formal being with matter, and never admit that matter is in potency toward it.

Finally, matter considered in this way — as virtually pre-containing this quantity — is still really distinct from material composite substance. Therefore it cannot be the metaphysical principle of individuation of that substance, for such a principle must be really identified with the individuated thing. There is also the consideration that God can conserve the same matter with the numerically same quantity — and hence with what has proximate order of virtual containing only with respect to such quantity — and yet can at least successively place diverse forms in it, at the variation of which the constituted individuals would also vary. Therefore matter, even as virtually containing such quantity, is ill posed as the principle of individuation. The antecedent is proved: this does not escape divine omnipotence — for in fact in the Eucharist God conserves the numerically same quantity that was previously in the substance of bread, and if he now conserves it alone, all the more could he conserve it in matter. The consequence is proved: God cannot multiply and vary individuals while the same principle of individuation remains. And indeed this argument seems to me most evident.

Fourthly, the fourth mode of speaking set out above at the beginning of the question, at n. 67 — that by "designated matter" should be understood matter stamped to such a substantial form, which stamping comes from antecedent dispositions and especially from quantity — is on principal grounds rejected. For, apart from the fact that against this mode the same difficulties return as against the others, with which it in reality coincides, I ask again: what is this stamping of matter to a substantial form effected by quantity and antecedent dispositions? Either it is some superadded accident, or some mode of matter, or nothing. If nothing, it counts for nothing, and matter will be constituted the principle of individuation through nothing. If an accident, all the arguments made above against the first mode of explaining designated matter return — for it matters little whether the accident joined to matter in order to individuate material substance is quantity, quality, or some relation. If it is said to be some mode of matter, then again it is asked whether it is really identified with matter, such that matter can never exist without it, or can it exist without it. If the second, then it is truly a superadded accident, for it can be present or absent without the corruption of matter — and it matters little whether it is an absolute or modal entity, as long as it is something superadded to matter without which matter can exist.

If the first is said — apart from the fact that the arguments made by Scotus against Aegidius, 2. *dist.* 3, q. 4, return (for he posits such designation in matter as something truly caused by quantity, and these authors posit it as caused by

antecedent dispositions, and yet still really identified with matter) — another great absurdity follows: that matter is in fact conserved in a being to which this mode, supposedly identified with it, has been destroyed. For it is clear that matter does not always remain under the same designation, just as it does not always remain under the same form, but successively passes to different forms and new designations, while numerically persisting throughout all of them, substantially unchanged.

Confirmation: whether this stamping is said to be had in matter through quantity or through antecedent dispositions, it is either something altogether fictitious or, if something real, it still cannot be the reason for individuating substance. For if it is something real and superadded, it can only be something accidental, which is insufficient for the individuation of substance, as was proved above. If it is something fictitious or a merely rational relation, it is clearly also unfit for the individuation of a real entity.

You will say, with the Thomists, that this designation certainly imports something real in matter, though not really distinct from it. Against this: matter can exist without such designation, since numerically the same matter can pass from one form to another and thus acquire a new designation. Therefore it is not really identified with matter. Moreover, if it is really identified with it, it will be something pertaining to the entity of matter intrinsically and substantially. But matter according to its total substantial being, even in an individual, is indifferent as to being under this or that form, and consequently as to constituting this or that composite. Therefore matter, even with such designation, cannot be the principle of individuation.

Finally, a general argument is raised against all the modes set out for positing designated matter as the principle of individuation. For this designation of matter is either the quantity already received in matter — as the older Thomists said — or at least the order of matter toward receiving or initiating quantity, as others following Cajetan have more recently said. But whatever is said, the same absurdity is always encountered: that the individual of substance is intrinsically constituted in such being by an accident. For it matters little whether such an accident is relative or absolute — indeed, it is more absurd to posit it as relative than as absolute. For an absolute accident, though in the character of accident it is opposed to substance, yet concurs with it in the character of the absolute; whereas a relation is opposed to it in both respects.

If it is said that such an order of matter toward quantity is not predicamental but transcendental, and really identified with matter — this was just refuted above, because matter can exist without such designation and order, and therefore it is not transcendental but predicamental. Moreover, if it is transcendental and pertains to the substantial being of matter, all matters will have the same designation, since all belong to the same species. Or if it pertains to the individual being of matter — since this individual matter can in itself be found numerically

under diverse forms and in many composites — it will not be able so to stamp matter as to be the principle of individuation.

Confirmation by Scotus's argument against Aegidius, 2. d. 3, q. 4: whether this stamping in matter is had through quantity or through antecedent dispositions, it will always be posterior to quantity. And therefore, just as quantity is unfit for individuating substance by reason of such posteriority — as was proved above, q. 5 — since the prior of one category is not individuated by the posterior of another category, so too this stamping, depending on quantity, is likewise unfit.

You will say that this designation is not sought from actual and existing quantity — for such designation would indeed be posterior to matter and the composite, just as actual quantity itself is — but from possible quantity, in which way it can in matter precede composite substance. Against this: just as actual and existing quantity is posterior to matter or the composite as existing, so possible quantity is posterior to matter or the composite as possible, for the same proportion of priority and posteriority must always be preserved in the being of existence as in the being of possibility, since the possibility of a thing exists only in order to existence, nor is a thing possible except in the mode in which it can exist. Moreover, just as matter and the composite in the being of existence do not depend absolutely on quantity and other accidents but only in a qualified sense — so that absolutely and by divine power substance can be conserved without any accident — so too the possibility of substance even in the individual does not depend on the possibility of accidents. Hence if all accidents were impossible, any substance whatever — both simple and composite — would still be possible. Therefore neither for existence nor for the possibility of substance even in the individual is any designation borrowed from accidents required — whether said to be sought from those accidents as actually existing or as possible.

Finally, according to the Thomists the proper subject of accidents is not matter but the composite. Therefore matter cannot receive any designation from accidents, since it cannot receive them immediately in itself. The consequence is evident: a stamp cannot leave its impression in a subject in which it cannot immediately be impressed. And this one argument alone suffices to convince them on their own principles.

Objections Addressed

In opposition, the Thomists commonly urge: the principle of individuation is that to which it is per se and primarily repugnant to be communicated to many things in the way in which the universal is communicated to inferiors. But designated matter is of this character, because it is so proper to one thing that, although absolutely speaking it could belong to another, it cannot do so with this particular designation. The major is evident. The minor is proved: from 2. *de Anima* 41, the measure of magnitude and growth is determined for all things constituted by nature. Moreover, it is repugnant to designated matter to be conceived as

universal — therefore it is per se primarily singular, and consequently is the principle of individuation. And third: the principle of individuation is that which, when posited with all else removed, the individual is posited, and which, when removed with all else posited, the individual is not posited. But designated matter is of this character — therefore, and so on. The major is evident. The minor is proved: if from a material individual anything other than designated matter is removed, the incommunicable substance will still remain; but not if designated matter is removed. Finally: in composite substance something must be assigned that is the root or principle of individuation, and in it there is found nothing but matter and form. Such a root cannot be form, which is of itself communicable, nor matter taken bare, since as such it can successively be found in many individuals. Therefore, and so on.

I respond to this argument — which the Thomists boast of as a demonstration — in several ways. First, by denying the minor: as is clear from what was said at n. 83, matter even with the same designation can successively be under diverse forms and constitute many numerically diverse individuals. For although it might be said that individuals diverse in species require diverse designations in their matter, no reason compels us to assert this also of homogeneous individuals of the same species — such as two portions of water. Nor is the authority from 2. *de Anima* relevant: for Aristotle there wished only to teach that living things determine for themselves a certain measure and magnitude of quantity — one owed to the whole species, not to the individual alone — which they cannot exceed.

Furthermore, if this argument were valid, one could use it to argue that the individual difference is the principle of individuation: because under such designation it is so proper to Peter that it cannot belong to another. And yet this reasoning does not hold, because through the designation and contraction effected by Petriety, the individual difference is appropriated to Peter only extrinsically, while intrinsically and essentially it remains common to many. Similarly in the present case: even if it were conceded that matter under this designation is so proper to one that it cannot belong to another, since this belongs to it extrinsically and not from its intrinsic account, it cannot be inferred that it is per se and primarily proper to this individual — rather, it is proper only in conjunction with the designation, and the designation itself would be the true principle of individuation, not the designated matter.

Therefore, to the argument, it must be absolutely denied that designated matter is the per se primary reason for the composite's incommunicable being. For this designated matter is individual and singular as that which (*ut quod*), and it still remains to be asked by what it has been rendered incommunicable and individual. Moreover, other things are individual and singular that have no matter — such as angels, accidents, and simple forms. And even if this composite requires this matter — since a singular composite is composed only of singular

principles — it is still certain that the composite is not primarily this through matter but through its own individual difference. Hence at most that argument proves that this matter has its singularity not from elsewhere but from within itself, and that matter is the physical principle of the individual composite — not, however, the principle of its individuation.

To the second point, the consequence is denied. For Peter too is repugnant to being conceived as universal and communicable to many, and yet from this it does not follow that Peter is per se primarily singular and a principle of individuation — but only that he is singular as that which (*ut quod*), and is himself the individual. Hence, not what is singular as that which, but what is singular as that by which (*ut quo*), is the principle of individuation. From that antecedent it can only be deduced that designated matter is singular as that which.

To the third: even if this form is removed from this composite, that incommunicable substance no longer subsists — not because its incommunicability was attended to from this form as its formal or proximately radical principle, but because this form is the physical principle of this composite, and when one part of the composite is removed, the whole composite must dissolve. Therefore the argument equally proves that designated matter is the physical principle of the individual composite substance — not the principle of its individuation. To the last: I concede that in each thing a root or principle of its individuation must be assigned, though not one really distinct from the individuated thing. And therefore neither form nor designated matter is well established as the principle of individuation of composite substance. Hence that argument proves at most that matter together with form is the physical principle of the individual composite thing — not that the composite substance is primarily this particular thing through designated matter. For just as composite substance says an entity really distinct from matter and form taken separately, so too it has its own intrinsic principle of individuation distinct from the principle of individuation of matter and form.

Blasius a Conceptione, disp. 3, Met., q. 2, further argues: that through which primary substance is radically constituted in the account of primary substance is the root of individuation. But primary substance is radically constituted in the account of primary substance through prime matter as designated by quantity. Therefore, and so on. He proves the minor because primary substance is that which is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject, and this per se primarily belongs to designated matter — for as such it can neither be in a subject nor be predicated of a subject. For although, considered precisely in itself with its indifference to being in many composites, it can be predicated of this and that matter, nevertheless as designated it cannot be predicated of another.

I respond by denying the minor. For Michael too is primary substance and is directly placed in the category, yet does not have designated matter. To the proof: it is true that in material substances it belongs primarily to singular and

designated matter neither to be in a subject nor to be predicated of a subject — not because it is the principle of individuation, but because it is itself a kind of primary incomplete substance that concurs physically toward the constitution of the complete composite substance. And this author is greatly mistaken in thinking that matter can be predicated of this and that matter because it is indifferent to being under this and that form and in this and that composite. For this indifference is not the one that constitutes it as universal and predicable of many. That indifference is physical — belonging to it even as individual, since from the fact that it is the common subject of all transmutations it can successively be found in many composites. The relevant indifference is rather metaphysical, belonging to matter as it abstracts from any haecceity in its own order — for in such a state it is proximately indifferent to being contracted by this or that haecceity, and to being predicated of this and that matter. The other arguments of the Thomists were resolved in the preceding article.

Question VII: Whether Form Taken by Itself, or at Least Together with Matter, Is the Principle of Individuation

Among the Averroist philosophers there is a frequent and sufficiently received opinion that form taken absolutely is the principle of individuation in material things. This appears to have been the view of Averroes in many places, especially in *3. Physic., com. 60; lib. 4, com. 38; 1. de Anim., com. 7; and lib. 2, com. 2*. So also: the Commentator beyond Averroes in his commentary on *2 of Galen's Ars Parva; Achilles, lib. 1, de elementis; Gandovenf., de substantia Orbis, q. 7; Bacon., 3. sent., dist. 11, q. 2, art. 2*; and some other Averroists, who say that form alone is the per se principle of individuation, and matter only per accidens, insofar as it is the subject of form, which is the per se cause of individuation.

Others combine form with matter, such that both together constitute the complete principle of individuation, with form being the preeminent and principal principle and matter the less principal, serving as a condition without which individuation is impossible: so *Zabarella, lib. de constitutione individui, c. 5, 6 and 7; Zimar., theor. 97; Pererius, lib. 6, cap. 12; Piccol., lib. 3, de prima rerum materia, cap. 17; Niphus, 5. Met., q. 5; Durand., 1. d. 44, q. 1 and 2. d. 3, q. 2; Contaren., q. de princ. ind., cap. 10* and the following — with whom *Suarez, disp. 5, Met., sec. 4, and Aversa, q. 9, Log., sec. 7*, also seem to partially agree. These authors also generally appear to maintain that form not only individuates the composite but also the matter that it informs.

Faber, our author, *theor. 90, cap. 10*, says that the opinion holding that form alone is the principle of individuation is true if properly understood. He notes there that form has various realities through which it is contractible and communicable to many: the specific form is common because it has diverse realities through which it can be communicated — for rationality is a real common form, but within it are enclosed many realities whose proper names we do not know, and these are what give being to individuals. One reality gives being to this individual

Sortes — which we may call Sortiety — another gives being to Plato — which we may call Platoneity — and so forth. Thus, just as the form "animal" is communicable through the various realities it includes — such as rationality and the other differences constituting other species of animal — so rationality is contractible through Sortiety, Platoneity, and so on, which are called individual differences. These realities are not distinguished from each other by further differences but are primarily diverse, and these are what are called particular forms. The reality by which Sortes is a man is called the particular form of Sortes. But it is not a form really distinct from rationality in common — it is really the same as the form that gives real being to the species, and is only formally distinct from it. Hence the form of the part can be taken in two ways: one way for the common form, another for the ultimate reality of the form. In the first sense, the opinion positing form as the principle of individuation is false; in the second sense it is true. He therefore concludes in cap. 2 that since the Doctor, 2. *dist.* 3, q. 6, does not determine what that reality is from which the individual difference is drawn — whether it is the reality of matter, form, or composite — it is more plausible that it is the ultimate reality of form, for the reason to be cited from him below. This mode of speaking was also embraced as representing the mind of Scotus by Brundugiensis, who wrote on 2. *sent.*, d. 3, q. 8. Contarenus, q. *cit.*, cap. 8, having seen these Scotists and no others, judges this to be the opinion of Scotus and the Scotists, and approves it on this basis. And Zabarel., *loc. cit.*, cap. 8, also thinks Scotus is not far from this opinion — the sign of which, he says, is that in his very lengthy disputation on this matter, where he diligently attacks all other positions, Scotus did not attack this opinion about form.

The conclusion is: neither form nor the ultimate reality of form is absolutely the principle of individuation, nor even if taken together with matter. The conclusion has three parts, as is clear. With respect to the first part, it is established against the first mode of speaking of the Averroists, who made form alone the principle of individuation. Although Scotus, 2. d. 3, does not treat this question expressly in terms of whether form is the principle of individuation, it is far from the case that he therefore agreed with that opinion, as Zabarella supposed — followed by Faber in his judgment. Rather, Scotus did not treat it *ex professo* precisely because he took it as a common position received by all that form is not the principle of individuation, and supposed it as a truth conceded by everyone and beyond controversy, as is clear from what he says at *dist.* 3, *cit.*, q. 5, where he proves that matter is not the principle of individuation because it is divided into universal and particular just like form, and is a part of the specific quiddity together with form — and therefore it cannot be the principle of individuation, just as for the same reason form is not posited as such a principle. And therefore this conclusion, as representing the mind of Scotus, is held by all the Scotists cited above: Canon., Tromb., Bassol., Rada, Poncius, Tatar., Lichet., Meurisse, and others throughout.

Here, however, this last author proves the conclusion by an argument that assumes something false and concludes nothing. He proves it thus, *q. cit., concl. 5*: form gives only specific being, therefore it does not give individual being. He proves the antecedent — that giving specific being is the adequate account of form as form is constitutive of grade — for we are not speaking of form as informing matter and constituting the composite. Therefore form gives only specific being. He proves the antecedent again: the adequate account of form as constitutive of grade is to place the thing under a determinate genus and to bring it about that it agrees with many others contained under the same genus; for just as form specifically distinguishes, so it assimilates things numerically distinct. But this is what it means to give specific being. Therefore the adequate account of form is to give specific being. This argument is worthless, or at least I cannot grasp its force — for it assumes something false: that form gives only specific being, since it also gives individual being, as the Doctor hints at *2. d. 18, q. un., sub C*, and *4. d. p. 11, q. 3*, more clearly at *3. dist. 22, q. un.*, where he assigns the reason: just as form and matter in common constitute the composite in common, so this matter and this form constitute the composite in particular, as its physical principles in particular. Therefore one cannot deny that form, in this way like matter, gives partial individual being to the composite. Hence also the proof of the antecedent is false — that giving specific being is the adequate account of form, if this means that form alone adequately gives specific being — for then form alone would be the whole quiddity of the composite, and matter would not give specific being in its own way, which expressly contradicts the Doctor at *loc. cit.* and truth. Nor do I sufficiently grasp what Meurisse says about speaking in the present case of form as constitutive of grade but not as informing matter and constituting the composite — for it is certain that form is constitutive of specific grade precisely insofar as it is constitutive of the specific and common composite, and it cannot be conceived as in any way constitutive of grade unless it is simultaneously conceived as constituting the composite in some grade.

The first proof, then, on better grounds: either the physical form is of itself an entity that is common and universal, or particular, or indifferent to both. If the first, it is already clear that it cannot be the principle of individuation, to which commonness is directly and per se repugnant. If the second, form will be unable to constitute the thing in specific being, nor will it be a part of the quiddity as such — and much less the whole quiddity, as those Averroists wish. If the third — as must truly be said — it follows still that form cannot be the principle of individuation but needs something else by which it is determined to individual being, since it is of itself indifferent to universality and singularity. *Faber, loc. cit.*, reports and at length refutes the various solutions and evasions of the adversaries, which I briefly summarize here.

Zimara responds that there are two kinds of form: one universal, constituting the species or specific being, the other particular, constituting the individual. Against this: then in each composite there would be several really diverse substantial

forms — one by which the composite would be, for example, a man, and another by which it would be this particular man — which is false, since the grades of the predicamental order do not require a multiplication of substantial forms in the composite, as was proved in *disp. 8, Met., q. 6, art. 1*, against the common Averroist who multiplies physical forms in composites to correspond to the multiplication of metaphysical grades. Hence *Faber, loc. cit.*, is less correct in saying that all these adversaries everywhere concede that it is the same form by which Sortes is body, animal, man, and this particular man.

Zabarella therefore responds differently: form can be considered in two ways — either as giving the being of essence, in which respect it is universal and gives specific being, or as giving the being of existence, in which respect it is particular and is the principle of individuation. *Faber* rejects this solution because one form cannot give two opposed modes of being — universal being and singular being are two opposed modes of being, since universal being is communicable being, and singular being is incommunicable being, and one form cannot give these opposed modes. This objection is no objection, however, since *Faber* himself in his refutation of *Zimara's* solution, immediately before, teaches that Sortes is a man and this particular man through the same form — and indeed he himself is bound by the same response to the argument, since he wishes that specific and individual being are both sought from the same form, saying that this is achieved through its diverse realities — namely, form giving specific being through its non-ultimate reality, and individual being through its ultimate reality. *Zabarella* will respond in the same way: certainly the same form gives universal and singular being, but not in the same respect — according as it gives the being of essence it confers specific being, according as it gives the being of existence it confers individual being. More aptly, this solution is refuted thus: if form is the principle of individuation insofar as it gives the being of existence, then form is not alone but together with existence the principle of individuation, or rather existence precisely — which was proved above not to be the principle of individuation, especially because existence presupposes a singularized nature.

Pererius finally responds that form, as far as it is from itself, is indifferent to universality and singularity; through abstraction by the intellect it becomes universal; and insofar as it is produced by an agent through singular dispositions, it becomes singular, and as such is the principle of individuation. But this response is also not to the point, because we are asking here for the intrinsic principle of individuation, not the extrinsic one, such as the agent. And if he says that form becomes singular through its order to singular dispositions — this is of no help, because those dispositions are accidents that cannot be the principles of individuating substance. Moreover, it still remains to be asked by what those dispositions are singular. And even if form became singular in that way, it would not follow that it could be the principle of individuation — but rather that it would be a kind of incomplete and singular individual as that which (*ut quod*).

The second proof proceeds from the very same arguments by which it was proved in the preceding question, art. 1, that matter is not the principle of individuation. For form is divisible into universal and particular; it is not primarily incommunicable in the account of form, but communicable to this and that form. Moreover, even if this particular form is incommunicable, it is not per se primarily incommunicable as that by which (*ut quo*) but as that which (*ut quod*), and through something superadded — whereas the principle of individuation must be solely incommunicable primarily and as that by which. Furthermore, form is really distinct from material composite substance — therefore it cannot metaphysically constitute material individual substance, since the principle of individuation is really identified with the individuated thing. Moreover, it would follow that if matter were multiplied and the same form conserved in each, the composite would be entirely the same — which is false. And finally: form alone is not the intrinsic principle constituting the whole entity of the composite thing — matter also concurs — and just as the composite in common includes not only form but also matter, so this composite not only essentially and intrinsically includes this form but also this matter. Therefore form alone is not said to be the principle of individuation.

The Averroists respond that form has the power not only of individuating the composite but also of individuating matter itself, because form gives being not only to the composite but also to matter; and hence, from the very fact that matter is joined to numerically the same form, it is itself numerically the same, and a numerically identical composite results. *Suarez, disp. 5, sec. 4*, reports that *Durandus, 4. d. 44, q. 1*, especially holds this — though others report that Durandus maintains only that, although matter in common belongs to the essence of the composite in common, particular matter does not belong to the essence of the particular composite. He consequently says that in the resurrection, even if the soul were given the same number body it had before made from other matter, it would be the same numerical man as before. Whatever Durandus's view may be, it is certain that many of the authors cited above hold that form individuates not only the composite but also the matter it informs. I now show the falsity of this claim in order to break down that solution.

Thirdly, then, it is proved that matter is not individuated through form. First, because it is false that, as the adversaries say, form gives intrinsic and essential being to matter as it does to the composite — for the reverse is rather the case: matter is the cause of form, since form is educed from matter's womb, and matter is presupposed to form at least by priority of nature as its subject. And just as form in common presupposes matter in common, so form in particular presupposes matter in particular and singular. Moreover, if matter received its own proper and intrinsic being from form, it would then be generated and corrupted along with the generation and corruption of form — all of which is contradicted by the established doctrine in physics. Furthermore, as the Doctor argues at *2. d. 12, q. 1*, matter terminated a peculiar production distinct from the production of form —

namely, creation — and action and production, as everyone agrees, is immediately terminated to a thing having certain and designated being. Moreover, the numerically same singular matter can successively be informed by several forms, since it is the common subject of all natural transmutations — otherwise the matter of what is generated and what is corrupted would not be numerically the same. And further, it would follow that one matter, really and numerically distinct from another, could become numerically identified with it if it received that other matter's form — which is impossible. It must therefore be concluded that matter is not individuated through form, since nothing is individuated — as has been said many times — through something really distinct from it. And especially because matter can by divine power exist without form.

You will say that matter is not individuated through form in itself, but through its order to a certain form — because just as matter in common regards form in common, so matter in particular regards this particular form and is individuated through its relation to it. But this solution cannot stand, because not only matter as such regards any form indifferently, but also this particular and singular matter is indifferent to all particular forms, so that it can successively receive each of them — and this indifference belongs to it insofar as it is the first and common subject of all forms. Moreover, if this matter were to determine to itself this numerically particular form, then the same matter could not be in what is generated and what is corrupted, nor could it be the common subject of all natural transmutations — of which it is essential that the numerically same matter persists under both terms of the change.

Fourthly, moreover, the conclusion is proved by showing the falsity of another claim of Durandus: that for the preservation of the numerical unity of the composite, the unity of form alone suffices, and therefore that if in the resurrection the soul were given not the numerically same body it had before but one made from other matter, it would still be the numerically same man it was before. This, I say, is altogether false and rejected by the common verdict of theologians. For the numerical unity of the composite requires, beyond the numerically same form, also numerical identity of matter, as the Doctor notes at *2. d. 20, q. 2, lit. B*. And for the resurrection of the same man it is necessary that the same soul be united to the same body, as the Doctor teaches at *4. d. 44, q. 1, §de secundo*, and *§ad argumenta* — which is the common opinion of theologians. This can be proved from what Durandus himself concedes: he concedes that matter in common is of the essence of the composite in common; but from this it follows that matter in particular is also of the integrity and essence of the individual in particular. The consequence is proved because just as the whole essence must be individuated and not merely a part of the essence in the composite, so individuation must fall upon the whole essence. Therefore the individuation that form in the physical order gives to the composite cannot individuate or suffice for the whole essence of the composite, since the whole essence of the composite is not constituted by form alone but also by matter.

Confirmation: the individuation coming from form cannot adequately extend over the whole essence of the composite in individuating it — but only over that part which form provides. Therefore it must be individuated in the other part through matter. Therefore for the perfect numerical unity of the physical composite, numerical unity of form is required but also of matter. A final confirmation: unity proportionately follows being, but the individual being of the composite is constituted not only from this form but also from this matter. Therefore its numerical unity also cannot be attended to from the unity of form alone but requires also the unity of matter — always speaking, however, of the physical mode of individuating, in which way alone can matter and form be said to individuate the composite, as intrinsic principles constituting it also in particular — not of the metaphysical mode of individuating, since this belongs only to the individual difference contracting and determining the specific nature to being this particular thing, as will be explained below.

The fifth proof establishes the second part of the conclusion: that neither the ultimate reality of form is the principle of individuation of a material composite, nor of matter itself, as *Faber* maintained. For although the ultimate reality of form may well be posited as the principle of individuation of form itself — since it is really identified with form and, being ultimate, can contract and determine the nature and essence of form as such to being this, and render it incommunicable as that which and as a superior to its inferiors — yet with respect to the composite and matter it cannot discharge this function, since it is really distinct from each of them. And nothing is individuated by something really distinct from itself, as has been said many times. If *Faber* denies that the physical whole is really distinct from its parts — because, he says, parts united in the whole pass into it through real identity — apart from the fact that this principle of his was extensively refuted in *disp. 5, Physic., q. 11, art. 2* — he cannot deny that form itself is really distinct from matter, and also from the composite taken per se and individually. Hence matter can by God's absolute power exist without form, and form without the composite, as is evident in the case of the separated soul. But the principle of individuation cannot be separated from the thing individuated through it, nor the individuated thing from that principle. Therefore, just as form for this reason cannot be posited as the principle of individuation of matter or of the composite, as was deduced above, so too the ultimate reality of form cannot be — for the same argument holds in this regard for both form itself and for its ultimate reality.

Confirmation: two individuals cannot be individuated by the same principle of individuation — for then either the principle of individuation would be common to many, which is directly repugnant to its account, or those things would not be many individuals but one and the same. Since, therefore, form as a certain nature is individuated through its own ultimate reality, that reality can in no way be the principle of individuation of the composite. If it is said that this holds for two complete individuals, but not for one complete and one incomplete that concurs

toward the constitution of the complete — this is no help, since although this incomplete individual concurs toward the constitution of the complete, it is still really distinct from it and can absolutely exist without it, as is evident in the case of the separated soul with respect to man. Therefore they cannot share the same principle of individuation.

Further confirmation: the same form can at least by God's absolute power successively inform many matters, for there is no contradiction in the soul that is in this body also being in another of the same nature — and yet it would not be entirely the numerically same composite, since for the perfect identity of the composite, identity of matter is also required, as was proved above. Therefore form through its ultimate reality is not the precise and adequate reason for individuating the composite. Moreover, the same numerical rational soul actually informs many parts of the same body — such as the head and feet — which are distinguished numerically and even more than numerically from one another. If you say that on our view diverse forms of mixture are found in each — this would suffice only to show that they are many incomplete individuals constituted in individual being through the ultimate realities of those partial forms. But because in their ultimate and complete being they are constituted through the same soul, it would still follow that those parts — the head and feet, for example — would not be numerically distinguished in the being of the complete individual and animated body, which is however false, since the head is a distinct animated part from the foot, and so on.

Furthermore, that argument of *Faber*, cited at the beginning of the question at n. 96, contains many falsehoods. In wishing to explain how the ultimate reality of the form of the part is the principle of individuation of the composite, he offers the example of rationality, in which he says there are enclosed and contained several ultimate realities — namely Sortiety and Platoneity — and he undoubtedly speaks of actual inclusion and containment, since the ultimate reality of form is contained in form as really identified with it. But it is false that rationality is the form of the part — for although it is a difference drawn from the form of the part in some way, it is not itself the form of the part. And further it is false that Sortiety and Platoneity are the ultimate realities of rationality — for they are rather the ultimate realities of humanity and of the whole specific nature, since they contract the whole nature and not just a part. And this is confirmed by the very proof he adduces: he says that just as this form, "animal," is communicable through the various realities it includes — such as rationality and the other differences constituting other species of animal — so rationality is contractible through the realities of Sortiety and Platoneity. Therefore, just as animal is what is communicated and contracted through specific differences, not sensibility — which is the constitutive difference of animal — so proportionately he should have said that humanity and the whole specific nature is what is communicated and contracted through individual differences, not rationality, which is the constitutive difference of humanity. Moreover, even granting this of

rationality, it is false that Sortiety and Platoneity are actually included in it — for inferior differences are not actually contained in superior ones, but at most in potency, as is evident from the case of ultimate specific differences with respect to generic ones. For rationality is not actually contained and included in sensibility; otherwise the brute would in some respect be rational, and man in some respect irrational, since both rationality and irrationality would be actually included in sensibility.

Furthermore it is false, as *Faber, loc. cit., c. 2*, was adding last, that the Doctor in *q. 6* does not determine what the ultimate reality is from which the individual difference is drawn — whether it is the reality of matter, form, or composite. Faber perhaps inferred this because he saw the Doctor speaking with a disjunctive particle and as if doubtfully. But far be it from us to attribute so notable a defect to the Doctor in resolving this question about the principle of individuation — a question he examined so carefully and diligently, weighing and rejecting the positions of others — as to leave the question unresolved. Indeed, the Doctor resolves it expressly and clearly at *ibidem, lit. K*, when he says: "And if you ask: what is this individual entity from which the individual difference is drawn — is it matter, form, or composite?" He answers that it is the ultimate reality of the entity that is matter, or that is form, or that is composite, where the particle "or" is not disjunctive but distributive, to be understood in the accommodated sense — so that the principle individuating matter as such and as a certain common nature is the ultimate reality of matter; the principle individuating form as such is the ultimate reality of form; and the principle individuating the composite is likewise its own ultimate reality. Hence Scotus there assigns not only the principle of individuation of the material composite substance — which is a complete nature — but also the principle of individuation of matter and form, which are common and incomplete natures. He says that each of these natures can be considered in two ways: either as nature or as this nature, and that in this way each is divided into two realities, one of which is not formally the other, and one is formally singularity, while the other is formally the entity of the nature. And several such realities, he says, are found not only in the complete nature of the composite but also in the incomplete natures of the parts. He then adds that these two realities cannot be things and things (*res et res*), as the realities from which genus and specific difference are drawn can be, but are always in the same — whether part or whole — realities of the same thing, formally distinct. By these last words, "whether part or whole, etc.," he expressly indicates that the whole is not individuated through the ultimate reality of any of its parts, but through its own ultimate reality really identified with it.

It should also be noted that Scotus in that question assigns the principle of individuation not only of material substance — which is what was being principally asked — but of any created nature whatever, including spiritual substances or angels, in whose interest he treated all those questions about material substances as well. Hence afterward, *q. 7*, he teaches that each angelic

nature is individuated through its own ultimate reality. Therefore by the ultimate reality he posited as the principle of individuation of material substances he did not mean to signify the ultimate reality of form, but the ultimate reality of any individuable nature whatsoever — whether material or immaterial, complete or incomplete — as will be more fully explained below when the principle of individuation is to be assigned in each kind of thing.

Finally, the last part of the conclusion is proved — that neither form together with matter constitutes the adequate principle of individuation as we speak of it here. The proof: matter and form are parts of the specific quiddity and essence, and they are essential principles in which all composite individuals agree, as everyone concedes and the Doctor teaches especially at *3. d. 22, q. un.* Therefore they are not principles of individuation but are rather themselves common individuable natures. The consequence is plain because the principle of individuation lies outside the essence of things and is not a principle of agreement among individuals but of their complete differentiation. Confirmation: although matter and form are intrinsic causes of the composite, the composite — especially on our view — says an entity really distinct from matter and form. Therefore it cannot be individuated through form even together with matter. The consequence is plain because nothing is individuated through something from which it is really distinct. Moreover, even if the composite — let me meet a tacit objection — cannot subsist separated from its parts, still the parts can be wrested from the whole and exist separately without the composite. Therefore they cannot be the principles individuating it. The consequence is proved because, by reason of the real identity of the principle of individuation with the individuated thing, it implies just as much for an individual to exist without its principle of individuation as for the principle itself to exist without the thing individuated through it.

The Thomists respond that the argument proves this only of matter and form in common, in which sense they are specific parts of the quiddity in material things, but not of singular matter and form, which, just as they are the constitutive principles of the individual, so also are the principles of its individuation. And so, they say, the confirmation also holds only for the formal metaphysical principle, not for the radical physical one. Against this: if matter and form as such are not singular but are of themselves common natures — communicable through differences to many particular matters and many particular forms, as a superior is communicated to its inferiors — then they must be made singular through something superadded to their common nature. And thus neither this matter nor this form will be per se primarily singular and as that by which (*ut quo*), but only as that which (*ut quod*), and through something else superadded. And this will be the true and proper principle of individuation, of which it no longer needs to be asked by what it is this — since it is such per se primarily and as that by which. And through this the response to the confirmation is also refuted — for, as has been said many times, we are not here seeking the physical principle of

individuation of material things. No one can doubt that matter and form are such principles, since the composite is this or that particular thing precisely insofar as it is composed of this and that form and matter. We are not, I say, seeking such a principle of individuation. For, as *Bassol., cit., 2. d. 12, q. 4*, notes, the true and proper principle of individuation is that which is per se primarily singular and of which it no longer needs to be asked by what it has been made singular and contracted. But this can only be verified of the individual difference contracting the specific nature — which is called the metaphysical principle of individuation — and not of matter and form even as singular, since it still remains to be asked regarding them by what they have been made singular. And hence it is that among philosophers only the metaphysical principle of individuation is called truly and properly such a principle, and not the physical one.

Even the authors themselves cited at the beginning who said that the composite is individuated through singular matter and form are willing to admit this. Thus *Aversa, q. 9, sec. 7*, after asserting this at *concl. 2*, immediately adds: "Yet by this I do not say that the principle of individuation in the composite itself has been sufficiently assigned, since in this way it is assigned only physically, not in the manner of a difference contracting and determining the specific nature — which is what is principally sought here." And *Suarez* likewise speaks in the same sense when he says that singular matter and form are the principle of the physical individuation of the composite. If the other followers of this opinion — such as *Zabarella* and *Contareni* — also intend this sense, I do not oppose them; but because they afterward assign no other metaphysical and ultimate principle of individuation, they seem to wish that singular matter and form are the adequate principle of individuation of the composite — so that none other need be sought — and therefore they do not philosophize well.

Objections Resolved

In opposition, first, it is objected to prove that form alone is the principle of individuation: already at *1. Physic. 69*, Aristotle called form "this something," and at *2. de Anima, text 2*, he says that through form something becomes "this something." But "this something" is nothing other than the individual, as is clear from the chapter on substance. And *Bassol., loc. cit.*, adduces many other authorities from the Commentator to this effect. Also from *7. Met. 49*: form is the act that separates and distinguishes individuals from one another. Therefore it is the principle of individuation. Also from *2. Physic. 91*: the distinction of matter is on account of the distinction of form. And from *1. de Anima, text com. 53*: the limbs of a deer differ from the limbs of a lion only because the soul of a deer differs from the soul of a lion, as the Commentator especially explains there. Therefore form alone is the principle of individuation.

Aversa, loc. cit., whom *Pasq.* also follows, responds to these and similar authorities and arguments drawn from them, that they do not prove that form alone is the principle of individuation, but only that it is the principal principle — not

excluding matter. This response would be good if they understood it of the physical principle of individuation, but not of the metaphysical; but since they speak absolutely, they respond less correctly. Hence it is better to say with *Bassol.* that through form something is numerically one or individual — not as through the immediate and proximate foundation of the repugnance to division, but as through the more principal intrinsic cause of what is numerically one or individual; for act is the more principal part than potency of any composite. Hence, as you see, *Bassol.* explains these authorities of the physical principle, not the metaphysical one, which is properly under discussion here.

Yet I am willing to respond to each authority. To the first: it is false that "this something" in those passages is taken as in the chapter on substance — namely for the individual and for what is numerically one — but is taken for what is perfect, complete, and placed in a certain determinate species. Hence form is said to be "this something" as that by which, and to give "this something" being to the composite, because it constitutes it in a certain and determinate species. This is the common explanation of all interpreters of Aristotle there, and especially at 2. *de Anima*, text 2, where "not being this something" means not being in act but in potency, and "being this something" means being in act — as *Mercenarius* notes. But because being in act contradistinguished from being in potency means formal and specific act, not the act of existence, this explanation falls back into the first. To the second, I respond in the same way: just as form constitutes things in a certain and determinate species — and not matter, which is of itself indeterminate with respect to all — so it differentiates things from one another by essential and specific distinction. Therefore Aristotle is not speaking there of numerical and individual distinction but of specific and essential distinction, as is gathered from the very context. To the third, I respond similarly: the passage speaks of specific and not numerical distinction, for the soul of the deer differs from the soul of the lion specifically, as the Doctor explains at 2. *d.* 3, q. 6, §*sed quae sit.*

Secondly, objections are raised by way of arguments. First: one matter is common to all forms and composites, but not form — rather, a determinate form belongs to only one matter. Therefore it is the principle of individuation, since it cannot be communicated to another composite as matter can, which is the same in what is generated and what is corrupted. Second: matter confers on the composite neither specific unity nor distinction — since composites diverse in species have matter of the same species — therefore neither can it confer individual unity and distinction. For what cannot be the principle of specific unity cannot be the principle of numerical unity either, since the latter is the greater unity. Third: matter has no actuality from which it could terminate and actuate a nature, but form alone has this. Therefore form alone is the principle of individuation, since to individuate is nothing other than to actuate and terminate a nature. Fourth: unless the numerical unity of the composite is derived entirely from form, it would follow that the animal that is nourished is not the same after nutrition as

before — since through nutrition it acquires new matter, and indeed in the course of time through the action of natural heat it changes all its matter, yet is said to persist numerically one by reason of form's unity alone. Fifth: if God were to annihilate the soul of Peter and create another in the same organic body of Peter, the resulting composite would be numerically distinct from the former, and this only by reason of the soul. Sixth: something is individual and the terminus of generation for the same reason — since generation terminates at the singular and individual; but form is the terminus of generation. Therefore, and so on. Finally: singularity is conferred by that by which existence is conferred, since nothing exists unless it is singular; but existence is conferred by form. Therefore, and so on. The adversaries pile up other arguments that reduce to these.

I respond: although numerically the same matter can successively be under many forms — since it is the common subject of all transmutations — it does not imply that the same form in turn can successively inform diverse matters. Indeed in man the same soul actually informs successively many portions of matter flowing and reflowing through the action of natural heat. Therefore it is false to say, speaking absolutely, that form belongs to only one matter. Moreover, even granting this, it does not follow from it that form is the metaphysical and ultimate principle of individuation of the composite, since it still remains to be asked by what form has been made this and appropriated to this matter. Hence at most the argument proves that form can constitute the physical principle of individuation of the composite — not the metaphysical one, which is what we seek here. To the second: it cannot be denied that matter also in its own way concurs in constituting specific unity, since it too is a part of the species and quiddity. But because it concurs as a potential and indeterminate part, it does not contribute to the distinction of one species from another, just as in the same way genus — though it together with difference constitutes the species — because it constitutes by way of the potential and indeterminate part, does not distinguish one species from another. Hence it contributes unity insofar as it makes the species undivided in itself, but not insofar as it renders the species divided from everything else. Yet whatever may be said of this, the consequence can be denied — because when matter has become singular and this, it is so mine that it is not yours, and therefore by reason of the superadded singularity it too can in its own way distinguish this composite from that, though less principally than form. Because even as singular it can successively belong to many — which does not happen with form — yet from this it cannot be deduced that either form or matter is the metaphysical principle of individuation, which is properly and simply such. To the third: it is true that to individuate properly means to terminate and actuate a nature ultimately so that it is no longer communicable as that which (*ut quod*). But it is denied that this belongs to form — since form terminates and actuates matter in the physical order, and it is the individual difference alone that terminates and actuates the specific nature in the metaphysical order. To the fourth: the same difficulty presses in brutes, which have a material and divisible

form that therefore flows and reflows with the flesh — and would prove that in them at least numerical unity of the composite cannot be attended to even in part from form. Therefore it must be denied — as I said in *lib. de Gen. et Cor., disp. 8, q. 7* — that in continued nutrition the whole matter of the animal is varied; for although it is varied with respect to some of the more impure and fluid parts, the numerically same matter always remains with respect to the more solid and pure parts, in which the identity of the individual is grounded. All of this, however, is to be understood of the physical numerical unity and identity of the composite and its physical principles — not of the metaphysical unity and identity, the principle of which we are here investigating. To the fifth, the argument equally proves that, speaking of the physical principles of individuation, form is the preeminent and principal principle and matter the less principal; but speaking of the metaphysical principle of individuation — by which the thing is internally and primarily this metaphysically — this in no way is form or the ultimate reality of form, but the ultimate reality of the composite, which contracts the common account of the composite to being this. To the sixth, I say with *Bassol.* that form is the quo terminus of generation, and the whole composite is the quod terminus — from which it cannot be concluded that form is the ultimate principle of individuation of the composite, since form itself is not of itself this but through superadded singularity, because it is of itself communicable to many, just as the species and any specific nature is. And even if it were conceded that form is of itself this, it could still not be the proper principle of individuation of the composite — because just as the composite says another entity from its parts, so it must also have a distinct haecceity. To the last: the major is false, and so is the minor. The major is false because, although it is true that nothing can exist unless it is singular, still the composite is not singular and existent in the same way — for, as has been said many times, the individual is prior to being singular than to existing, and the individual is contained in the predicamental series prescinding from actual existence, as the Doctor notes at *2. d. 3, q. 3*. The minor is also false: first, because the material individual contained in the category consists of matter and form and yet still prescinds from existence; second, because when it actually exists in the nature of things, it is not said to exist formally through the existence of form, but through its own existence — since just as the composite says an entity distinct from its parts, so also its own existence. Because, however, the entity and existence of the composite is caused by form and matter, it can be said to exist through them causally.

Faber, theoremate 90, cap. 2, thirdly proves that the ultimate reality of form is the principle of individuation of the composite: form is what constitutes the thing in being, and what gives being also gives distinction from everything that is not it. Since, therefore, the specific form constitutes the nature in specific and quidditatively being, and actuates matter, and the composite results from it and matter — so it must be said that the ultimate reality of form is what constitutes in individual being and actuates the ultimate reality of matter, and from the reality

of matter and the reality of form the individual results. For since matter has the account not of that which constitutes but of what is constituted, the ultimate reality of matter cannot be such a principle of individuation; nor can the ultimate reality of the composite be such a principle, because it is what results and has being from what constitutes — and therefore it cannot be the constituting one. Therefore the principle of individuation will be the ultimate reality of the specific form. So *Faber* argues for his opinion. To this I add two express authorities of Scotus. The first is at 2. d. 3, q. 6, lit. G, where it is said that the individual difference is drawn precisely from the ultimate reality of form. The second is at 1. d. 3, q. 6, lit. O, where he distinguishes differences into ultimate and non-ultimate, saying that non-ultimate differences are those drawn from an essential part and from the whole form — as from the intellectual soul is drawn "rational" — and says that of these, being is predicated in the quid (as per first mode), since this is in quid: "rational is a being." But ultimate differences are those drawn from the ultimate reality of form, and of these being is not predicated in quid, since they are simply simple — and such are the individual differences. Therefore the individual difference is drawn from the ultimate reality of form.

I respond by denying the parity assumed in the argument — that, just as form actuates matter and constitutes the composite in specific and quidditatively being, so also the ultimate reality of form must actuate the ultimate reality of matter and constitute the composite in individual being. First, because the actuation that the individual difference has regards the whole specific nature, not just one of its parts. Second, because something can certainly be constituted in specific and quidditatively being by something really distinct from it — as happens with the physical composite with respect to its parts — but it cannot be constituted in individual being, because the principle of individuation is really identified with the individuated thing. And because the ultimate reality of form is really distinct from matter and the composite — just as form itself is — it can constitute neither matter nor the composite in individual being. When *Faber* says that the ultimate reality of matter cannot be the principle of individuation of the composite, I concede this freely — not for the reason he gives, that matter does not have the account of what constitutes but of what is constituted (which is false, since matter concurs in its own way in constituting the composite just as form does), but for the reason we have now given: that both matter and its ultimate reality are really distinct from the composite. And finally, I wholly deny what he says — that the ultimate reality of the composite cannot be the principle of individuation — and when he proves it by saying that it results and has being from what constitutes, this is certainly true in the physical order, since it is concomitantly caused by the physical causes in causing the composite. But in the metaphysical order, by actuating and determining the specific nature of the composite, it exercises the function of its metaphysical individual principle.

To those authorities: when Scotus divides difference into ultimate and non-ultimate, by "ultimate difference" he does not mean the individual difference, but

the specific difference drawn from the ultimate reality of the same physical form — from another potential reality of which the genus is drawn. Conversely, by "non-ultimate difference" he means the specific difference drawn from a physical form different indeed from that from which the genus is drawn, but not from the whole of that form or from every reality of it — as *Suarez, disp. 2, Met., sec. 5*, understood, and as I explained above at *disp. 2, de natura entis, n. 1183* and *184*, and again at *n. 213*. And that specific difference which the Doctor calls "ultimate" is not so called because it is the last to specify and determine the nature — for in that sense only the individual difference is called ultimate — but rather because it is drawn from a single simple reality that contains no further realities and therefore has a simply simple concept, as was declared at *loc. cit.* And when the Doctor says at *2. d. 3, q. 6, sub lit. G*, that the individual difference differs from the specific in this: that the individual is never drawn from an added form, but precisely from the ultimate reality of form — by "form" there he does not mean the form of the part, but the form of the whole — that is, the specific nature, which through its own ultimate reality is individuated. The specific difference, on the other hand, is drawn from the form of the part, because it constitutes the thing in quidditatively being — which the individual difference does not, since it constitutes only in material being. This interpretation is gathered from the very context.

The fourth objection proves that form together with matter is the integral and adequate principle of individuation of the material composite, on the grounds that at *2. Physic. 38*, Aristotle assigns generic causes to generic effects and singular causes to singular effects — as reason also suggests, since the composite consists of matter and form, and is this particular composite precisely insofar as it consists of this and that form and matter. Confirmation: the principles of being are also the principles of unity in a thing; but this matter and this form are the principles of being for the individual. Therefore they are also the principles of its individual unity.

I respond that this proves only that matter and form are the physical principles of individuation of the composite and individuate it in the physical mode — not metaphysically, since they are really distinct from the composite, and they are themselves singular through something superadded, since their nature is equally communicable and specifiable as the nature of the composite itself. And therefore they cannot be the altogether first and ultimate principle of individuation. Hence *Bassol.* says that the composite is individuated through matter and form causally, but not formally and as the immediate and proximate foundation of the repugnance to division — for in that way it is individuated through its ultimate reality and haecceity. And through this the confirmation is also evident.

Contarenus, loc. cit., cap. 11, attempts to break down this solution by arguing that this haecceity, if it exists, is an effect of individuation effected through matter and form — and therefore is not its principle. And because matter and form are the most simple substances, and no real composition from something determining

— or distinguishing — and something determinable that is really distinct is admitted in them, therefore the matter and form of this composite are singular by themselves, and the composite is singular through them.

I respond by denying that haecceity is an effect of individuation — for it is rather individuation itself. Although it can be said to be concomitantly caused in the physical order by the physical causes constituting the whole from the physical parts, in the metaphysical order, by actuating and determining the whole nature of the composite, it exercises the function of its metaphysical principle of individuation. And although matter and form are simple substances speaking physically — since they do not admit composition of matter and form or act and potency as really distinct — they are nonetheless metaphysically composite from a determinable and determining reality, and they are not of themselves singular or from their own proper formal account. For in that case no matter in common could be given — corresponding to the composite in common — nor could matter be of itself divisible into many numerically distinct matters, nor form into many forms, which no one denies. And even if this were conceded, it should still not be conceded that the composite is individuated through them — since, especially on our view, just as it says another entity from the entity of its parts, so too it requires a distinct singularity of its own.

The fifth objection proves finally that matter itself is individuated through form, because matter has no actuality, indeed no being at all, except through form; but from the same source from which a thing has being, it has unity in itself and distinction from other things — since the same principles by which things are constituted are those by which they are distinguished. Therefore matter has its individual unity and distinction from form. Confirmation: matter in its essential being is constituted through its relation to form — therefore also in its individual being. The consequence is proved: just as matter as such is constituted in its essential being through its relation to form, so this particular matter through its order to this particular form.

I respond by denying the major as universally stated, as is clear from what was said in *disp. 2, Physic., q. 1* and 2. For just as matter has an entity really distinct from form and naturally prior to it, so it also has its own proper entitative actuality and proper existence — though incomplete — in virtue of which it was the terminus of creation, and proportionately it has its own unity and entitative distinction. And by reason of its entitative division, one matter can individually differ from another even prescinding from form, as is clear from the Doctor at 2. *d. 12, q. 1*. To the confirmation, *Aversa, loc. cit.*, says that matter can be understood to be individuated through its relation to form in two ways: either through its relation to a certain form — and this is false, since it is well established that any singular matter relates indifferently to all forms — or it is individuated through a certain relation to form — that is, this matter through this relation — and this is true: since matter essentially expresses a relation to form, this matter expresses this

relation, and that other matter its own relation, and thus it is individuated. This solution destroys itself: if this matter is individuated through this certain relation, it will consequently also be individuated through this form — since this relation is toward this form. Therefore the assumption is denied — because, as was said in *disp. 2, Physic., q. 5, art. 5*, neither an actual nor an aptitudinal relation belongs to the essence of matter in the first mode of per se predication, but only in the second mode, speaking of the aptitudinal — for matter in itself is a certain absolute entity intrinsically constituted through its essential predicates, prescinding from any relation whatsoever. And therefore just as matter as such is not constituted in its essential being through its relation to form, so neither is this particular matter through its order to this particular form — nor, any less, through this relation, as *Aversa* said. For, as was said above at n. 100, even this singular matter is indifferent to this and that singular form, as the common subject of all, and just as it relates indifferently to this and that form, so proportionately it relates indifferently to this and that relation. It must therefore be said that matter is individuated through its own ultimate reality and proper haecceity — not through form, which is really distinct from it, nor through its relation to form, which is posterior to matter itself, just as in general a relation is posterior to the subject of foundation — whether it be a predicamental or transcendental relation, at least in nature: the relative entity is posterior to the absolute entity.

Question VIII: Whether Substantial Forms Are Individuated Through Matter, and Accidental Forms Through Their Subject

St. Thomas, *1. p., q. 29, art. 1*, teaches the affirmative — saying that accidents are individuated through their subject: "this whiteness," he says, "is so called insofar as it is in this subject"; and *q. 39, art. 3*, he says that accidents, just as they have being in a subject, so receive unity and multiplicity from the subject; and *opusc. 29*: "It is to be noted that accidents are not individuated through prime matter but through their proper subject, which is a being in act, just as substantial forms are individuated through prime matter, which is their subject." The Thomists follow this throughout: *Cajet.* and other commentators on those passages, the *Salmaticenses, tract. de princip. individ., disp. 2, dub. 1*; *Blasius a Concep., disp. 4, Met., q. 1*; *Bannes, 1. de Gen., q. 20, art. 9*; *Joan. de S. Thom., q. 9, de Gen. et Cor., art. 5* — all of whom cite older Thomists. They maintain this throughout of all accidents except quantity, which they seem to hold is individuated by itself — a limitation that St. Thomas himself seems to have assigned at *quol. 7, art. 19*. With the sole exception of quantity, then, they teach that all other accidents without exception — whether material or spiritual — are individuated through their proper subject.

Aversa, q. 19, sec. 8, partially agrees with this view, judging it probable that certain accidents are individuated through their subject — namely those that are inseparable and relate to the subject as proper attributes. *Pasqualig., disp. 42, sec. 2*, also holds this, saying that modal and relative accidents are individuated through their subject.

The opposing position holds that no accident whatsoever — whether material or spiritual, absolute or relative — is individuated through its subject, and the same holds for substantial forms with respect to prime matter. Rather, each is individuated through its own intrinsic individual difference. So *Scotus*, 4. d. 12, q. 2, *§hic sunt duae opiniones*, and 3. d. 8, q. un.; and his commentators: *Rada*, *contr. cit.*, art. 3; *Faber*, *theor.* 95, *cap. ult.* and 92, where he speaks especially of the rational soul; *Poncius*, *disp.* 6, *Log.*, q. 8; *Meurisse*, q. cit., *concl.* 7; *Suarez*, *disp.* 5, *Met.*, *sec.* 7; and many others outside the school of St. Thomas. And this is the true position, to be held without any wavering, which will first be proved in general of all forms, and then in particular of those in which the difficulty seems greatest.

First, then, the Doctor, *loc. cit.*, proves this: no entity is singular formally through something belonging to another genus — for in every genus there is found a supreme term in its coordinate series and all intermediate genera and species, and in that series there is also found some lowest per se item of which all the superior terms are predicated per se, but which is not predicated of another — and the reason is that categories are unmixed. Therefore accidents are not individuated through their subject, which belongs to a different category.

Confirmation: a singular accident of any category whatsoever — such as this quantity, this whiteness — considered in itself is one per se, not per accidents. Therefore substance does not constitute it in individual being, since then it would be an accidental entity. Further confirmation: individual difference must be intrinsic to the individual and indeed really identified with it; but the subject is not intrinsic to this accident, nor matter to this form. Therefore, and so on.

The Thomists respond universally that when they say accidents are individuated through their subject and forms through matter, this should not be understood to mean that the subject itself is the intrinsic principle of individuation of those accidents, but that they are individuated through their order and relation to the subject. Hence *Bannes*, *loc. cit.*, *concl.* 2, says that all forms are individuated through their subject extrinsically and through their intrinsic order to such a subject. Against this: do they mean an actual or only an aptitudinal order and relation? If the first — the same arguments return, because the actual union or inherence of a quality to a substance, for example, is at least modally really distinct from the quality itself (as recent authors say) and belongs to another category. Moreover, the Eucharistic accidents remain numerically the same after consecration as before, even though such inherence is destroyed. Therefore such an actual order to a subject is not the formal principle of their individuation. The consequence is plain: a thing cannot be individuated and remain numerically the same while the same principle of individuation does not remain. Moreover, it still remains to be asked of that relation itself — since it is an accident — by what it is individuated. The Thomists respond that it should be understood of an aptitudinal order, which is a transcendental relation really and essentially identified with the form itself. And it is no inconvenience, says *Bannes*, for such a relation to be absolutely

intrinsic to form, as can be shown by many examples — through which they pretend to evade the argument and its confirmations.

But this solution, as easily as it is given, is as easily refuted. For it is false that this accident says a determined order to this subject, as though it were unfit to be placed in another subject of the same kind. Indeed every singular accident, as far as it is from itself, relates equally indifferently to any subject in its species proportioned to it. And no one doubts that if God wished to give the accidents of bread in the Eucharist a substance of bread again as their subject, he is not compelled to give that numerically same substance that has been transubstantiated into the body of Christ, but can give another numerically distinct one. A similar argument can be made about a substantial form with respect to matter, and about the soul with respect to the body — for the same substantial form can at least successively be placed in diverse matters, and the same soul in many bodies. Indeed, the same rational soul actually informs successively diverse material parts in the nutrition of the living, which continually flow and reflow through the action of the natural agent.

Furthermore, diverse aptitudes belong to diverse things because of their diversity, not through something common to them — otherwise the same aptitude would belong to all and each. Therefore diverse aptitudes cannot be the primary differentiating principles of things. Moreover, aptitude is not an absolute entity but a relative one, and the absolute is always prior to the relative — at least in nature — since relation is founded in the absolute, whether it be predicamental or transcendental. But individuation is at least simultaneous in nature with the individual and singular thing. Therefore the absolute form cannot be individuated through an aptitude toward this subject. Finally, although a transcendental relation is really identified with the absolute, it is not so formally and essentially — since a relation can never be of the essence of an absolute from *disp. 8, Log., q. 2*. But the individual difference, although it does not belong to the quiddity of the individual — which consists entirely in the specific nature — is still of the intrinsic concept of the individual as such. Therefore no relation, however transcendental, can constitute an absolute in individual being. And therefore from this angle the principal argument concludes that an absolute form cannot be constituted as individual through its order to a subject, even aptitudinal — for then the individual would not express a per se one concept, nor would the individual difference be intrinsic to the individual — that is, of its intrinsic and formal concept — because a relation does not together with an absolute make a per se one concept, nor is it of its essential and intrinsic concept, even if transcendental.

Secondly, it is proved by an argument that the Thomists commonly use against Scotus to prove that haecceity cannot singularize a nature but presupposes it as singular: a singular act presupposes the potency it must actuate to be singular, from 2. *Physic.* 38. Although this argument proves little and nothing with respect

to metaphysical act and potency — which are not really distinct, as I said above at n. 27 — yet in the present case concerning matter and form, subject and accident, which are as act and potency physically and are really distinct from one another, it concludes admirably.

You will say that from this it only follows that accident presupposes a singular subject, and similarly substantial form presupposes singular matter — not the other way around. Against this: this proportion of act and potency is founded on commensuration between them in the account of the receivable and the receiver. Since this is a mutual relation, as is evident in the case of quantities, it requires that just as a singular act presupposes singular potency, so conversely singular potency presupposes singular act. Confirmation: the reason why a singular act presupposes singular potency is that if potency were universal it would not be commensurate with and proportionate to it. Therefore by the same argument, conversely, singular potency requires singular act — for if act were universal it would not be commensurate and proportionate to it. Therefore before an accident is received in its subject, it must be understood as individual; and likewise form, before it is received in matter, and the soul in the body. Further confirmation: both form in matter and accident in a subject are received according to their own proper entitative and individual being, so that at least in some priority of nature they are presupposed according to such being prior to reception. Therefore they are individual independently of the subject. The consequence is plain, and the assumption is proved: they are received in the manner of a physically informing act, but this information occurs only according to physical and entitative being — and all such being is individual.

If you say this proves only that form is not individuated through actual reception in the subject, but not that it is not individuated through aptitudinal order and receptibility in the subject — against this: that solution was already refuted in the preceding argument. It is also clear from what was just said about commensuration — which must hold between act and potency not only in actual reception but also aptitudinally — so that just as potency is not capable of a singular act unless it is itself singular, so act is not receivable in singular potency unless it is in itself singular. Hence unless form were in itself singular, it would not have the aptitude to be received in a singular subject. Therefore that aptitudinal order in form toward a singular subject presupposes form to be singular, and is founded on its singularity — for if form were not singular, it would consequently not be proportionate to be received in a singular subject.

But I now further prove (a point most worthy of note) that when the Thomists say that accidents are individuated through their order to their subject or forms through their order to matter, they cannot understand this of aptitudinal order, but must necessarily — on their own principles — understand it of actual reception in the subject. For they say every form is individuated through its subject precisely because through the subject it becomes irreceivable in another

and consequently is rendered incommunicable in the mode of form or act to any other subject — as will presently be clear from their objections. But form does not acquire this irreceivability from the subject through an aptitudinal order to it, but through actual — through actual reception in the subject. For prior to that reception it is always, as far as it is from itself, receivable in any subject of the same kind. Therefore on their own principles they must posit that form is individuated through actual order to its subject. Moreover, being actually received makes it irreceivable, not being receivable — therefore on their principles form becomes individual through actual reception in the subject, not through aptitudinal reception.

Thirdly, many numerically distinct accidents can at least successively be found in the same subject — abstracting from another question to be discussed below in *disp. 12*, whether many such accidents can be found simultaneously in the same subject. Therefore accident is not individuated through its order to the subject — for if it were, neither could many accidents be numerically distinguished successively in the same subject, since as the subject is always the same, it would always give the same individuation. The assumption is evident from experience: water, for example, repeatedly becomes cold and then warm; air is repeatedly illuminated — and yet the light that returns is not the same, the cold is not the same, nor the same heat.

Bannes responds that just as for the numerical unity of motion, from 5. *Physics*, not only unity of terminus and of the mobile or subject is required, but also of time — so for the numerical unity of any other accident it must be said that not only is its being in this singular subject required, but also its being in this particular time; and therefore diversity of time suffices to distinguish numerically several accidents of the same species received successively in the same subject. Against this: by saying this, they now have accidents individuated through the circumstance of time, and not through their subject. Moreover, from their own principles they do not respond well — for their principal foundation for saying that accident is individuated through its subject and form through matter is that through these it depends in being and receives its being. But accidents do not receive their being from time, but only in time. Moreover, it was already proved above, *q. 5, art. 1, n. 53*, that the circumstance of time is unfit for individuating any effect — for this color, this whiteness, can just as well be produced today as tomorrow, and the heat now produced in my hand can last for a quarter of an hour and coexist identically in it during different parts of time.

Furthermore, it can happen that two numerically distinct heats regard their subject as it connotes the same temporal difference — for the same hand can, as far as the hand itself is concerned, be heated at the present time from this fire or from that one disjunctively at least, and therefore since the heat coming from this fire is numerically distinct from that coming from the other, two numerically distinct heats can regard the same subject at the same temporal instant. *Blasius a*

Concept., *disp.* 4, *Met.*, *q.* 3, near the end, adduces this argument and responds that the subject individuates diverse accidents of the same species not only through connotation of diverse time, but also through connotation of a diverse agent and a diverse action. And one of these connotations in the subject is sufficient to distinguish accidents numerically and individually. Hence it is no wonder that those two heats mentioned in the argument differ numerically — for although they would connote the same time at which they could be produced, they connote different agents and different actions through which they require to be produced. Against this: from this very response the weakness of the Thomist doctrine on the individuation of accidents is apparent. First they say absolutely that accidents are individuated through their subject and forms through matter. Then, because they cannot deny that several accidents of the same species are received at least successively in the same subject, they have recourse for the individuation of the accident to the circumstance of time. And finally, because they also cannot deny that the same subject can receive disjunctively at least two numerically distinct heats at the same time, they have recourse to diversity of agents and actions. It is therefore inferred that, on their view, accident is not individuated through its subject — which they admit is of itself indifferent to receiving this or that numerically particular accident — but through diverse circumstances in which it is found, which has already been refuted above, *q.* 5, *art.* 1, *n.* 53. And especially the circumstance of the agent cannot be the principle of individuation, as was proved at *disp.* 8, *Physic.*, *q.* 3, *art.* 1, where I show that numerically the same effect can be produced disjunctively by many agents of the same kind.

Finally, it is false what *Bannes* was saying — that for the numerical unity of motion, unity of time is required. For only the continuative unity is required, not the entitative unity, as I showed in *disp.* 15, *Physic.*, *q.* 7, *art.* 2; *disp.* 5, *de Gen. et Cor.*, *q.* 7, *art.* 1. And even if this were conceded of motion, it would not follow that the same must be conceded of every other accident — since motion is a successive accident, measured by time, and coexists successively according to its diverse parts with diverse parts of time; whereas heat, whiteness, sweetness, and so on are permanent accidents that according to their whole entity coexist identically with successive diverse parts of time.

Fourthly, if accidents were to differ numerically through their subject, then not only would two numerically distinct accidents in the same subject be repugnant, but also two accidents of diverse species — which is contrary to experience, since in the same apple, for example, we see whiteness and sweetness together. The consequence is proved: the same principle of individuation cannot individuate several numerical individuals — since it is proper to what it individuates. Therefore if the same subject can individuate many accidents distinct in species, it can also individuate many accidents distinct in number alone.

Bannes, *loc. cit.*, responds by denying the parity, because accidents of distinct species are said to be in the same numerical subject only materially; formally they

can be said to be in diverse subjects — for these forms, since they are of diverse species, also regard diverse potencies in the same subject. Hence the apple in one respect receives whiteness in itself and in another respect sweetness — for whiteness inheres in the thing insofar as it participates in the nature of the diaphanous, while sweetness does so according to the nature of the moist. The *Salmanticenses*, *tract. de princip. individ., disp. 2, dub. 3, §ad ultimum*, embrace and elaborate this response, saying that with respect to accidents distinct in species simultaneously present in one subject, there are several at least virtually distinct potencies — according to which those accidents are received — whereas with respect to accidents of the same species there is only one receptive potency; and therefore from the very fact that one such accident is received in the subject, it thereby fills the whole potency of the subject, so that it is not capable of another of the same kind, though it is capable of other accidents of diverse species — since it is not received in the subject according to potencies proper to other accidents of diverse species, and therefore does not exhaust the subject with respect to those potencies.

This solution, however, contains many difficulties and perhaps voluntarily stated conclusions. In the first place, no reason is assigned why potencies in the subject should be multiplied to match the multitude of forms distinct in species, but not also to match the multitude of forms of the same species — since relations toward a plurality of terms must be multiplied both in species and in number. Furthermore, granting that there is only one potency in the subject toward all and each of the forms of the same species, it is false that this potency is filled and exhausted by the reception of only one such form. For although this potency is one, it is not determined to such a form but is indifferent and indeterminate toward all and each — and since any one form is an inadequate terminus of such a potency, it consequently cannot adequately match and exhaust the potency, so as to make it incapable of another form at least successively and disjunctively. This suffices to prevent those accidents from being said to be individuated and distinguished numerically through the subject. Finally, the receptive potency of accidents is, according to the Thomists, an accident belonging to the same genus as the form that is received. Therefore of that potency there still remains the question of by what it is individuated — whether again through the subject, or through itself, or through its own difference really identified with it. If the first, the same difficulties as before return, and there will be an infinite regress. If the second, the same can be said of other accidents — that they individuate themselves through their own proper individual differences and not through the subject at all.

Fifthly, the same is proved of relative accidents, which recent authors call modal entities. It is proved, I say, that not even these — of which it seems most likely — are individuated through their subjects, but through their own proper haecceities, by reapplying the preceding arguments. For in the probable opinion of Scotus, several paternities are in the same father toward several sons — or at least can be

successively. And the Thomists will not deny this. Moreover, modes can also vary successively in the same thing: if Peter now sits, then rises, then sits again, there is no compelling reason why he should be said to sit afterward through the same session as before — but he must be said to sit through a newly produced session. Moreover, as *Suarez, disp. 5, Metaph., sec. 6, n. 15*, rightly notes: although the mode of union in the individual of this form to this subject cannot be in another form but must necessarily be assigned to it, still the same form can be joined to the same subject through another numerically distinct union. For if this union is dissolved and perishes, it is not necessary — if God wills to rejoin this form to this subject — that the same union that was before be reproduced, but it can join them through another union of the same kind. For the form is of itself indifferent to being joined through this or through that union. And although it may be possible for the same union to return when the same extremes return — as the Doctor notes at *4. dist. 43, q. 1*, near the end — this is not necessary, as in other modes of shape, session, or the like it is not necessary that the same numerically reproduce, since the same extremes return. Since, therefore, those unions can be numerically multiplied successively in the same form with respect to the same subject, it is a sign that even relative entities are not sufficiently individuated through the subject, but rather intrinsically through their own proper individual differences and extrinsically through subject and terminus. For if the individuation of relations must be sought from something extrinsic at least manifestively, there is no reason why it should be attended to from the subject or foundation alone, excluding the terminus. For just as the essence of relation is more usually explained through its order to the terminus than to the subject or foundation, so too we must philosophize about its individuation.

Pasqualig., disp. 42, cit., sec. 2, n. 3, responds that just as such modal accidents have no proper being but are entities through the entity of the subject, so they must also be individuated through the entity of the subject. But because such accidents arise in the subject from its being in such-and-such a mode, and it cannot be in such-and-such a mode unless certain extrinsic circumstances concur, their individuation also depends on the subject — not however simply and absolutely, but under such-and-such circumstances. Hence from the variation of circumstances it comes about that the same numerical subject can provide various individuations to such accidents.

This response is founded on the false principle that such entities — which recent authors call modal — have no proper entity other in reality from the entity of the subject they modify. For although they do not have a perfect entity in the same degree as their subject, they are something in themselves and have their own proper entity in their order, even though so slender and imperfect that they cannot subsist separately from their subject, as the Doctor noted at *2. dist. 1, q. 5, §quod si adhuc*. And therefore just as they have in themselves a proper entity other than the entity of the subject, so they must also have their own proper individuation. What he says — that the same subject can provide various

individuations to these accidents through the variety of circumstances — coincides with the response of the Thomists cited above at n. 114, and must be refuted in the same way.

Sixthly, *Poncius, disp. 6, Log., q. 8, concl. 2*, proves the same of inseparable accidents — that even these, of which it seems most likely, must not be said to be individuated through their subject, but through their own proper haecceities, by reapplying the preceding arguments. For there is no other argument than their inseparability — but this is no argument, since if something had to be individuated through that from which it is inseparable, God would be the principle of individuation of all creatures, since no creature can exist without God. But this argument does not give the adversaries much trouble — for the inseparability of accident from its subject, from which they deduce its individuation through the subject, is not merely inseparability regarding existence (in the way that a creature is inseparable from God because it cannot exist without God), but also inseparability regarding union. From the fact that we see some accident necessarily connected with its subject, they deduce its individuation through the subject. But in this sense the creature is not only separable from God but actually separated, since it is not united to God through inherence as form to subject. Better then is the conclusion proved with respect to this part: for either by inseparable accidents we understand those called such not because the subject cannot exist without them but because they cannot subsist separated from the subject — and inseparability in this sense does not require that accidents thus inseparable be individuated through their subject, as is evident in the case of modal accidents; or by inseparable accidents we understand those without which the subject naturally cannot exist, and hence are usually called its proper attributes (like heat with respect to fire) — and inseparability in this sense also does not require that the accident thus inseparable be individuated through its subject, since at least by God's power the subject can subsist without such an accident, or, if that accident is destroyed, can be informed by another of the same kind; or finally by an inseparable accident we mean a proper accident and proper attribute in the strict sense of some thing — and inseparability in this sense can indeed be a reason why the accident is individuated through its subject, because such inseparability arises from the real identity of the proper accident with the subject. Hence, since the proper accident does not say an entity other in reality from the entity of the subject, it can consequently be individuated through the entity of the subject. But this does not tell against the conclusion, in which we speak of forms that are really distinct from the subject they inform.

Finally, it is proved especially of the rational soul, that it is not individuated through the body. From *Scotus, quol. 2*, from the beginning, *lit. B*, and *2. dist. 3, q. 7, lit. A*: the intellective soul is, by priority of nature, the terminus of creation before it is infused into the body, because action is singular and is terminated at the singular, from *2. Met.* But in that priority it is this and singular. Therefore it is not singular through the body.

If it is said — as the Thomists truly respond — that the soul is not individuated through actual union to the body but through aptitudinal union, the Doctor objects against this in several ways. First: the nature and entity of the soul is absolute, whereas that aptitude is a kind of aptitudinal relation — since it cannot be understood without a terminus — but an absolute cannot be intrinsically constituted through a relation, and an absolute is always prior to the relative since relation is founded in the absolute. Second: inclination is not an absolute entity, since nothing can be inclined toward itself. Therefore it presupposes some absolute and distinct entity: because this soul is this soul, it has such an inclination — not the other way around. Therefore inclination is not the reason for being this soul but presupposes it. Third: what belongs to this individual and is repugnant to another of the same species does not belong to this individual per se according to what it has in common with that other — otherwise it would belong to both. But the aptitude toward this body belongs to this soul and is repugnant to that other soul. Therefore this soul is distinguished from that by a distinction antecedent to the aptitude. These arguments were touched upon above in refuting the Thomist solution to the first argument for our position at n. 112.

Cajetan, de Ente et Essentia, cap. 6, together with the other Thomists, concedes that the soul is not individuated through its actual union to the body but through its aptitudinal union. To the first and second objections he says they proceed of the aptitude taken formally — in which sense it is indeed a relation and is posterior to the soul, and souls are not distinguished substantially from each other through such aptitudes but only accidentally. But they do not proceed of the aptitude taken fundamentally — that is, for the very substantial commensuration of the soul to its body. For in this way the aptitude of the soul to this body is not posterior to the soul, since it is the very substance of the soul itself. *Ferrar., contra Gentes, cap. 81*, responds in the same way. Although *Cajetan, loc. cit.*, does not use the terms "formally" and "fundamentally" — these terms being given by *Ferrariensis* — *Ripa, de Ente et Essentia, ad cap. 6, q. 3*, has noted that they coincide. For the aptitude taken formally is what *Cajetan* calls a relation, and the aptitude taken fundamentally he calls substantial commensuration. To the third objection he denies the major — namely, that what belongs to one individual and is repugnant to another always presupposes their distinction. Sometimes it even carries and produces the distinction, as is evident in the case of rational and irrational: being irrational is repugnant to man and belongs to the brute, and yet does not presuppose any prior differentiating factor, but is itself the distinguishing difference. Indeed, he turns the argument against Scotus: the haecceity or singularity of the soul of Sortes belongs to it and is repugnant to the soul of Plato. Therefore haecceities presuppose the souls to be already distinct — which Scotus would certainly not concede.

To more fully refute this Thomist solution and doctrine, it must be declared what they mean by this substantial commensuration in the soul, which is the foundation of the formal and accidental commensuration, which is a relation. For

either it is a relative entity or an absolute one. It cannot be absolute, since it cannot be understood without order to something else. If it is a relative entity, the arguments already made return — that the substance of the soul, being an absolute entity, will be prior to it, and cannot be intrinsically and substantially constituted through it.

Cajetan responds that it is an absolute entity, because although it looks to another thing, it does not look to it as its terminus but as its subject and receiver. Hence this does not prevent the soul from being an absolute entity — for although it looks to the body, it looks to it not as a terminus but as a subject and receiver.

Against this: this doctrine was refuted in *disp. 8, Log., q. 1*, while rejecting the distinction put by the Thomists between predicamental and transcendental relation. For it matters little under what aspect this is regarded by another — that does not exclude it from being properly the terminus of such a regard, but only makes it the terminus of it under this aspect. Therefore, although the soul through such commensuration is referred to the body as to a subject or receiver, this does not prevent it from also being referred to the body as to the terminus of such dependence and inclination; nor does the function of receiving the soul exclude from the body the function of terminating such receivability. Therefore this commensuration will truly be a relation and a relative entity. Moreover, by the same argument we could deny that creation is a relation of dependence of the creature on God — for it could be said that the creature is referred to God through creation as to a primary cause, not as a terminus — which, as is plain, is to play with words.

Therefore the other Thomists — *Bannes, art. 9, cit.*, and others — leaving aside the Cajetanist ambiguities, freely admit that such commensuration and substantial coaptation is a relation — not predicamental, but transcendental — and hence is called substantial, because it is not an accident of the genus of relation but is intrinsic and essential to the substance. And there is no inconvenience, says *Bannes*, in such a relation being intrinsic and essential to the absolute — and indeed this is precisely how it is distinguished from predicamental relation, which accrues to things as an accident. But this doctrine is amply rejected at *loc. cit., disp. 8, Log., q. 1* and *2*. For although it is indeed true that transcendental relation is really and entitatively identified with the absolute and differs from predicamental relation in this way, it is nonetheless false that it can be identified formally and essentially — since then the same thing according to its essence and by its intrinsic principles would be both toward itself and not toward itself, both toward another and not toward another, which is a manifest contradiction, as was deduced there. Moreover, even a transcendental relation, though really identified with the absolute thing, is still understood as posterior to it — as it were, being founded and rooted in it, in the way in which an attribute, even though identified with its subject, is still regarded as posterior to it because it is rooted and emanates from it. The reason is that, even though an absolute is referred to another through a

transcendental relation really identified with it, it is always understood first to be toward itself before being toward another. Therefore, through the offered distinction of accidental and substantial coaptation of the soul to the body, the arguments of the Doctor are not resolved — since they conclude equally of the substantial coaptation that is really identified with the soul.

And from this is also refuted the solution of Cajetan to the last attack of Scotus. For when the Doctor assumes that major — "what belongs to one individual and is repugnant to another" — he is not speaking of what belongs to them by way of a first constituting difference, but of what belongs by way of a consequent attribute. For he speaks of aptitudes that follow upon things themselves as proper attributes — as is clear from the argument. Hence the instance that Cajetan brings of specific differences — such as rational and irrational, and individual differences with respect to this and that individual — is not to the point, because these are not aptitudes emanating from the essence as prior, but are themselves the differences and constitutive principles in specific or individual being. And if Cajetan considers that major to be simply false, I am surprised that he so freely accepted it as true in the same *lib. de Ente et Essentia, cap. 2, q. 4*, and through it so vigorously attacked the claim that ultimate haecceities cannot be the altogether primary principles of individuation — arguing that the haecceity of Sortes belongs to Sortes and is repugnant to Plato, and whatever belongs to one individual and is repugnant to another of the same species presupposes their distinction. Unless perhaps he wishes the same proposition to be true when he says it and false when Scotus says it.

The Thomists' Objections Resolved

In opposition, *Cajetan, 1. p., q. 29, art. 1*, adduces the first and principal foundation of the Thomists, which is as follows: accident depends on substance in being, therefore it is also individuated by substance — for from that by which a thing has being, it has individuation. Confirmation: from that by which a thing has entity it has unity; but accident has its entity from its subject, since it is a being of a being (*ens entis*), from 7. *Met.* Therefore it also has unity from its subject — and as the unity in the subject will be, such will be the unity in the accident.

The Doctor, 4. *dist. 12, q. 1, lit. G*, responds that the assumption is true only extrinsically — in the genus of efficient and subjective material cause — not intrinsically, in the genus of formal cause. And here, as has been said many times, we are not asking about just any principle of individuation in whatever manner it may be such. Speaking physically, there can be as many physical principles of individuation as there are causes of a thing. But we are asking for the metaphysical principle — that which intrinsically and formally gives to the individual the being of being incommunicable to many. From the fact that accident depends on its subject in this way, it by no means follows that it must be individuated through the subject or through its order to the subject — because given unity in the efficient and external material cause, there can be plurality in the effects, since

from the same efficient cause several numerically distinct effects can proceed, and in the same subject there are found several at least specifically distinct accidents. But if the argument were conclusive, it would equally prove that it is repugnant for there to be in the same subject several numerically distinct accidents as well as several specifically distinct ones — for from that by which a thing has being it has unity, both individual and specific, and so the argument would prove that accident is not only individuated but also specified by the subject, and that there cannot be in the same subject several specifically distinct accidents. Furthermore, even if the argument were somehow conclusive about material forms, it is by no means conclusive about the rational soul, since this has no such dependence on the subject — not being educed from the potency of matter.

To the confirmation: it responds in the same way — that it proves no less that accidents have their specific distinction and unity from their subjects than their numerical distinction and unity. And it is plain that if the Thomists concede that accidents have their specific distinction and unity from themselves or from some formality identified with them and not from the subject, I do not see why they should then deny this of numerical unity and distinction — since the same parity runs in both directions.

If they say they concede this of specific unity and distinction — not however of numerical distinction — because in fact several specifically distinct accidents are found in the same subject but not several numerically distinct ones: this is not a sufficient disparity, because it is false that in the same subject there are not found several numerically distinct accidents. For there are many intentional species differing only numerically in the same eye; several paternities in the same father having several sons, as the Doctor holds at *3. d. 8, q. un.* And if certain numerically plural accidents are repugnant in the same subject, this is not because they are individuated by the subject, but because either they are educed from the subject through motion — as the Doctor hints at *5. Metaph., q. 7, §ad quaestionem ergo* — or because they are destined to exactly the same function, or for another reason to be explained below in *disp. 12* in the proper question. Moreover, even if such accidents cannot be present simultaneously in the same subject, they can be there successively — which suffices to prevent them from being said to be individuated through the subject, as was proved above.

Secondly, *Jo. de S. Thom., loc. cit.*, presses another principal foundation of the Thomists: no receivable form is of itself individual and singular except through its order to the receiving subject. For every form is communicable unless it is detained and limited by the subject and rendered irreceivable in another subject. Therefore it is not individual and singular except through its order to the subject.

I respond that this foundation is also unsound, as is clear from what was said above at *q. 6, art. 1, n. 70*, where I showed that the incommunicability proper to an individual is not irreceivability in another in the manner of form in a subject. For prime matter considered in its own essence is thus irreceivable, yet is not

individual. And the Eucharistic accidents are individual yet are receivable. Rather, the incommunicability of the individual is that which excludes the communicability of the universal — which is common to many inferiors — and therefore the individual is said to be incommunicable as that which (ut quod), even if from another angle it were communicable as that by which (ut quo) and as form to a subject, as happens with individuals of accidents.

Moreover, as I was arguing above at n. 113: if accidents are individuated through their order to the subject, insofar as they are limited by the subject and rendered irreceivable in another subject, then they would have to be individuated through actual order and actual reception in the subject — not merely aptitudinal. For accident acquires its irreceivability in another subject when it is actually received in this subject — since prior to actual reception it always has receivable, not irreceivable being. Hence the Eucharistic accidents outside their subject are said to be receivable, not irreceivable. Since, therefore, the subject does not provide the accident with incommunicability opposed to the communicability of the universal, but only its own individual difference does — the accident cannot be individuated through its order to the subject.

Thirdly, *Blasius a Concept., loc. cit.*, argues: individual and numerical distinction is material and not formal. Therefore in an accident it must be sought from what materializes it, as from the first root. Therefore since the subject of an accident materializes it and renders it incommunicable in the mode of form or act to any other subject, the root of individuation of the accident must be sought from it. Confirmation: every act is formally limited in the character of act by the potency in which it is received. Therefore since the proper potency corresponding to an accidental form or act is the subject in which it is received, that from which the accident is limited and restricted in the character of act and form will be the subject in which it is received — and consequently it will be that from which the root of individuation of the accident is to be sought. Finally: either the root of individuation in an accident must be drawn from the accidental form itself or from the subject in which it is sustained — not the first. Therefore the second. The minor is proved: it is of the account of the individual and singular that it is neither in a subject nor predicated of any subject; but this character cannot be sought from the accidental form itself — since the accidental form, as far as it is from itself, seeks to be in a subject and to be predicated of it. Therefore this character must be sought, as from its first root, from its subject — through which the accident is rendered incommunicable to any other subject, both in being and in predication.

I respond: it has been said many times that individual and numerical distinction is called material and not formal insofar as material being is distinguished from the being that is called formal — from the form of the whole, as the Doctor notes at 2. d. 3, q. 6, H. And this material being is drawn from the matter of the whole — which is the individual difference — not from the matter of the part or subject.

And what so materializes the accident is not the subject but its own individual difference. And granting that the subject renders the accident incommunicable to another in the mode of form or act, it is denied that it therefore follows that the subject is the root of the accident's individuation — since this is not to be incommunicable in the way proper to the individual as such. For it is not of the account of the individual as such to be incommunicable as that by which (*ut quo*) and in the mode of form or act, but as that which (*ut quod*) and in the mode of a universal toward its inferiors.

To the confirmation: granting the antecedent with the first consequence, the further consequence is denied for the same reason — since it is not of the account of the individual to be incommunicable as that by which (*ut quo*) and in the mode of form or act.

To the final argument: the minor is denied — for in the accident too, individuation must be drawn from the ultimate reality of the same accidental form itself. When it is proved that individuation must be drawn from the subject and not from the form — because it is of the account of the individual that it is neither in a subject nor predicated of a subject — I respond that this is true of the subject of predication: the singular has no inferior of which it can be predicated in the mode of a superior by a predication saying "this is this." But it is not true of the subject of inherence — since it is not of the individual's account to be incommunicable as that by which (*ut quo*). Hence even if through the subject the form is rendered incommunicable as that by which (*ut quo*), nevertheless — since through the subject it is not rendered incommunicable as that which (*ut quod*), which is the incommunicability proper to the individual, but only through its own individual difference — this is precisely the root of its individuation, or the formal individuation itself, and not the subject or order to the subject.

Fourthly, *Pasqualig.* argues for modal and relative accidents: such accidents have no proper being distinguishable from the being of the subject. Therefore they also have no proper individuation other than the individuation of the subject. The consequence is plain: the reason we posit that accident has its own individuation is that it has its own entity other than the entity of the subject. The assumption is proved: if such accidents had proper entity, they would be called things and not modes, nor would they from their own account require being necessarily attached to the things they modify — whereas this neediness arises from their lacking proper entity.

Aversa argues further for inseparable accidents: a proper attribute is so connected with this subject that it cannot inhere in another. And the potencies of the soul are so constituted that this numerical intellect, this numerical will, can only belong to this soul, and no other intellect or will can belong to this soul.

I respond from what was said above at n. 116 by denying that such accidents have no proper entity — and indeed even proper existence — other than the entity of

the subject. For they say an entity that is really distinct from the entity of the subject they modify — to such a degree that, although they themselves cannot subsist without such a subject due to the imperfection of their own entity, the subject can exist without them. This is a sufficient sign to assert that the entity of the mode is other in reality from the entity of the modified subject. For if it were nothing other than precisely the entity of the subject, then it would imply for the subject to exist without such entity — just as it implies for it to exist without its own proper entity. Nor is the inseparability of one from another a sufficient sign for arguing real identity between two things — as though there were the same physical entity in both — as was said at *disp. 6, Met., q. 8, art. 2*. For such inseparability and necessary connection of one with another can arise from other sources. In the present case it especially arises from the imperfection of the mode — which, being a relative entity, cannot exist without the support of a foundation. And the reason why a mode, although it has its own entity other than the entity of the subject, is not called a thing but precisely a mode, is that by "thing" we understand what can subsist by itself without necessary connection with another. In this sense a modal accident certainly cannot be called a thing. But if "thing" is taken in a broader sense — for what has its own entity, whether it can subsist by itself or not — even the mode can be called a thing, as the Doctor notes at *loc. cit., 2. dist. 1, q. 5, §quod si adhuc*.

To the argument of *Aversa*: I concede the whole reasoning, because as is clear from what was said at n. 117, such inseparability arises from the real identity of the proper attribute with the subject and of the potencies with the soul. For this reason they cannot in the strict sense be called accidents, as the Doctor notes at *2. d. 16, q. un.* — since an accident is not really identified with substance — but are called accidents by taking "accident" for what is extraneous, inasmuch as neither potencies are predicatively proper to the quiddity of the subject, which is the soul, nor is the attribute — but they are its innate faculties.

Finally, *Cajetan* argues to prove that even the intellective soul is individuated through its order to the body. Just as it is of the essence of the human soul in common that it be proportioned to the physical organic body — which is placed in the soul's definition — so this soul is perfective of and proportioned to this body in such a way that it is not proportioned to that other body. And just as the commensuration to the human body in common does not follow upon the soul already human but makes the soul to be human and constitutes it in human being, so the substantial commensuration of the soul to this body does not follow upon the essence of this soul but constitutes it as this soul. He proves the antecedent — that the human soul is constituted in being through commensuration to the human body — because through this it is primarily distinguished from the bovine soul, since that soul is the act of a bovine body and this is the act of a human body.

I respond by denying the antecedent in the sense accepted by *Cajetan*. For, as *Scot., 4. d. 12, q. 1, lit. L*, notes, the particle "act" as it is placed in the soul's definition

is taken neither for the actual nor the aptitudinal formal relation of the soul's commensuration to the body, but only fundamentally and radically — insofar as the soul is the exacting principle of such proportion and commensuration to the body. Hence the soul is formally the act of the body only in the second mode of *per se* predication, and exigitively and radically in the first. And so the proof of the antecedent is also answered: the human soul is primarily distinguished from the bovine by this — that this one is the act of the bovine body and the other of the human body — taking "act" fundamentally and not formally. For in this way they are distinguished through act only concomitantly and *a posteriori*, as it were through their own proper attributes. And therefore the consequence deduced from this is denied — or it is conceded in the same sense: that this and that human soul are distinguished through commensuration to this and that body only *a posteriori* and concomitantly, as through their proper attributes, if such commensuration is taken formally as an order and transcendental relation to the body. But primarily and *per se* they are distinguished through their own proper haecceities.

Furthermore, even granting and not conceding the antecedent, the consequence is not well deduced from it — indeed the opposite follows. For if such an order of commensuration to the body is of the essence of the soul as such and belongs to the soul by virtue of its essence, then it cannot be posited as the formal principle of individuation — because individuation by its nature lies outside the account of essence in any created thing. And this argument universally proves of every form that it cannot be individuated through its order to the subject, if such an order is posited as belonging to its essence. Moreover, it still remains to be asked of such an order by what it is made this particular order — since it is of the essence of the form as such.

See *disp. 5, de Gen., q. 5, art. 2, n. 139*, where I say that to assert that the soul seeks to inform such-and-such a body — a hunchbacked one or an erect one — is nothing other, as *Hurtado* says, than to constitute some souls as hunchbacked, others as apes, others as squint-eyed — where I also resolve the common objection that pigmies are born from pigmies and black people from black people.

Question IX: What Is Truly the Principle of Individuation of Any Created Being

The Doctor, 2. d. 3, having examined and rejected the opinions of others through five questions on the principle of individuation of created things, finally in *q. 6* opens his own position with the greatest precision. He says in the body of the question that a nature contractible to an individual is individuated through some real positive element of its own genus added to it in some way. This real positive element — or positive reality — added to the nature is called the individual difference, contracting the nature to being this, and formally conferring on the individual the being of being undivided into many of which it would be

predicated by a predication saying "this is this," and the repugnance to such division into subjective parts. Hence, just as the specific difference contracts the genus to the most specific and atomic species, undivided into species, so this individual difference contracts the nature to the individual and formally gives to the singular or individual being undivisible into many numerically, as into subjective parts. And it is the principle of individuation — something real outside the intellect — and does not presuppose the nature to be this or this individual, but is the very formal principle of constituting this.

This individual difference is commonly called by all by the name of singularity or individuation, insofar as it constitutes the thing in which it is as singular, individual, and incommunicable. It is also called — especially in the Scotist school — haecceity (haecceitas), because it makes the thing determined and this. Nor is there reason for some metaphysical grammarians to abhor this term as barbarous — for philosophers attend not to beauty or elegance in speaking but to the truth of the matter, for the expression of which they employ terms, even unusual ones, provided they more intimately express the concept of the thing.

There is a question who was the first inventor of this term. For it is commonly supposed that Scotus was — but incorrectly, since such a term is not found in Scotus himself, although the Scotists use it throughout. *Suessanus*, 5. *Metaph.*, *disp.* 5, *c.* 3, says that Varro, Scotus's teacher, was the first to use this term — a claim that *Ragusejus*, *disp.* 24, *cit.*, *cap.* 33, credits, though I have strong doubts about it. For Varro's written sentences have not yet (that I am aware) been published in print but exist only in manuscript in some of our libraries, and therefore it is difficult for Suessanus to have seen this author in the original source. *Meurisse* says that Bassol, Scotus's disciple, was the first to employ the term haecceitas at 2. *dist.* 12, *q.* 4. But I do not find such a term in Bassol — or I have not read him patiently enough. I do however find it in Canonicus, who contends with Bassol in antiquity. But whatever the truth of this, it is certain that this term is now frequent not only in the Scotist school but in others as well, as being supremely expressive of the individual difference. This is the position of the Doctor at *q.* 6, *cit.*, and 7. *Metaph.*, *q.* 13, to be more fully explained presently.

Article I: The Individual Difference, Called Haecceity, Is the Principle of Individuation of All Things

This is the position of Scotus at *loc. cit.*, which almost all Realists outside the school of St. Thomas embrace throughout — with only this difference: that Scotus distinguishes the individual difference from the contracted or contractible nature by a formal distinction antecedent to all operation of the intellect, whereas others distinguish it only by a distinction of reasoning reason (*ratiocinantis*) or at most of reasoned reason (*ratiocinatae*). The following agree: *Ragusejus*, *disp.* 23, *cit.*; *Suarez*, *disp.* 5, *Met.*, *sec.* 2; *Aversa*, *q.* 9, *sec.* 9, where he notes that this position is also approved by certain Thomists — especially by *Cajetan*, 1. *p.*, *q.* 85, *art.* 7, *§ad haec argumenta*, where he admits that there is an individual difference as intrinsic

to the singular as the specific difference is to the species. *Ragusejus* and *Suessanus* also say that this position regarding differences that ultimately individuate and distinguish things is not new, but was held in antiquity by *Avicen.*, 5. *Met.*, by Plato, and by Proclus and other ancient philosophers. *Fonsec.*, 5. *Met.*, c. 6, q. 5, maintains the same. And finally *Canon.*, *loc. cit.*, says that this opinion of Scotus had its origin in St. Damascene's Logic, where he expressly concedes certain ultimate grades under the specific nature, as the last determinatives and contracting elements of it.

I said in the conclusion that such haecceity is the proximate and formal principle of individuation in all created beings in general — because this is the common and adequate mode for assigning the principle of individuation in all things. And in the various kinds of things it is not necessary always to assign different principles of individuation — as the Thomists do — but in each thing and each created nature it suffices to assign as the formal principle of individuation the ultimate reality of that nature, wholly incommunicable and indivisible, which is called haecceity. This holds whether the nature is substantial or accidental, material or spiritual, total or partial. Hence we need not worry much about investigating the principle of individuation of immaterial substances, for from the resolution of this question it will appear sufficiently.

First, then, before the position is proved, it must be declared in the following way. Since it is certain that in every created thing — whether simple or physically composite — there is a metaphysical composition, which coalesces from predicamental grades of genus, species, and difference, and since this composition must be real in some way and not entirely produced by the intellect — otherwise it could also be posited in God — corresponding to the plurality of predicamental grades, various metaphysical realities must be multiplied in each thing: some more common, some less common, and some so peculiar to this nature they constitute that they cannot belong to any other. The former realities are quidditatively determinable; and according as they are more or less common, they are called generic or specific. The latter are individual realities, the last determinants of the former. Hence the ultimate reality in a category — which last contracts all the predicamental grades contained in the straight line of genera and species, and together with all of them constitutes the individual — is called the individual difference, *per se* and primarily incommunicable, and therefore the principle of individuation.

To make this clear with an example: in *Sortes*, for instance, all the predicamental grades are present from the highest to the lowest — namely the grade of substance, of body, of animal, of man, and *Sortiety* itself. All prior grades except this last — which is the individual grade — are quidditatively generic or specific according as they are more or less common to many. And *Sortiety* alone, which is the lowest grade in the category, is *per se* primarily singular and incommunicable; and together with all the prior grades it constitutes *Sortes* in

the account of this designated individual. Hence it rightly is called the principle of his individuation. So on this doctrine, the Doctor says, the ultimate reality of any being whatsoever is the principle of its individuation — whether it be simple or composite, complete or incomplete, total or partial, substantial or accidental. And so the principle of individuation of matter is the ultimate reality of matter; the principle of individuation of form is the ultimate reality of form; the principle of individuation of the composite is its ultimate reality; the principle of individuation of Michael is his ultimate reality; and the principle of individuation of an accident is the ultimate reality of that accident.

Secondly, for a fuller understanding of this individual difference posited as the principle of individuation in all things, the Doctor, *loc. cit., lit. F*, most elegantly declares it through a comparison with the specific difference. For just as the specific difference can be compared to three things — to what is below it, to what is above it, and to what is beside it — so also the individual difference. If the specific difference is compared to what is below it, then per se primarily it is repugnant to being divided into many things that are essentially and specifically distinct — and consequently through the specific difference it will be repugnant to the species to be divided into specifically distinct species. Similarly, if the individual difference is compared to what is below it, then per se primarily it is repugnant to being divided into many things that differ numerically — and consequently through the individual difference it will be repugnant to the individual to be divided into many numerically distinct things.

But since the unity of the specific nature is less than this numerical and individual unity, from this it follows that the specific and numerical differences differ in this: that the specific difference is not repugnant to every division simply — for it is not repugnant to numerical division — whereas the individual difference is repugnant to every division. For numerical unity is the greatest of unities.

If the specific difference is compared to what is above it — namely to the genus — it is compared as act to potency, determining it. For the reality from which genus is drawn is potential with respect to that from which the specific difference is drawn; and in the composition of the species, difference behaves as act and genus as potency. And the reality of the specific difference is not formally included in the reality of the genus, nor conversely — for then one would be superfluous in the definition, since through the one the whole quiddity of the thing would be sufficiently indicated, or at least there would be tautology, since the same thing would be said twice — once in the genus and again in the difference. Similarly, if the individual difference is compared to what is above it — namely the specific nature, which it contracts to individual being — it bears toward it the relation of determining act to potential and determinable entity. For just as the specific difference contracts and determines the reality of the genus to the species, so the individual difference contracts the specific nature to the individual. Yet there is still a difference between the two differences even from

this angle: that the specific difference constitutes in specific and quidditatively being, while the individual difference constitutes in numerical and material being. The reason is that the reality from which the specific difference is drawn is a common reality, and it constitutes the composite in quidditatively being; whereas the reality from which the individual difference is drawn — or which is understood through the individual difference — is altogether different from the quidditatively entity, since it is of itself singular.

Finally, if the specific difference is compared to what is beside it — say, to the opposing specific difference — it is primarily diverse from it. And similarly, if one individual difference is compared to another, it is primarily diverse from it — they share neither a common reality nor a quidditatively concept founded in such a reality in which they agree. But while specific differences can be ultimate and non-ultimate in their simplicity, only those specific differences that are ultimate are primarily diverse. Whereas individual differences, since all are ultimate in ultimate simplicity, are all without qualification primarily diverse.

Thirdly, *Bassol.*, 2. d. 12, q. 4, art. 3, further declares the nature of this individual difference from an analogy once more to the specific difference, following the Doctor's example. Just as the specific difference is in its own way a certain real reality or formality distinct from the genus itself — not really but formally — and superadded to it in order to constitute the species with it, so the individual difference is a certain reality superadded to the specific nature and formally distinct from it. It is posited as accruing to the specific nature — or as it were accruing — in order to contract and determine it and to constitute the individual with it in individual being, as the formal principle of its individuation. Nor is it required that it be some thing really distinct from the nature in such an individual — just as neither is the specific difference really distinct from the genus; otherwise everything that is per se in a genus would be per se composite from diverse things, and likewise every per se individual, which is false in both cases — as is evident in the case of angels and accidents of the nine categories.

Yet there are especially two notable dissimilarities between the specific and individual difference. The first is that the specific difference pertains to the quidditatively being of the species and constitutes it in quidditatively being — that is, in the being expressed by the definition. But the individual difference neither pertains to the quiddity of the individual nor constitutes it in quidditatively being, even though it pertains intrinsically to the entity of the individual. For entity and quiddity — as "quiddity" is taken in the present context — are not the same, as the Philosopher hints at 7. *Met.*, where he says that in things in which the singular differs from nature, the quiddity or "what it is" differs from that of which it is the quiddity — so that the specific nature, although it expresses the whole quiddity of the individual, does not express the whole entity.

The other dissimilarity is that the specific difference contracts the genus as a reality more perfect and complete — or nobler — than the genus in itself, whereas

the individual difference does not contract the specific nature as a formal difference that is nobler and more perfect than the contracted nature. Rather, it contracts it as a material difference — not because it is matter as the other part of the composite, but because it gives the individual the ultimate subjectable being under all the grades of its genus that are predicable of it. In this it resembles matter, which is subject to all things. Or it contracts the nature to individual being — which does not pertain to the quidditative concept of anything — which quiddity Aristotle frequently calls form, while the individual or individual difference he calls matter, as was seen above.

That the individual difference does not pertain to quiddity is clear because every created quiddity is of itself communicable and numerically plurifiable. But that to which the individual difference intrinsically pertains is intrinsically incommunicable and unplurifiable — just like the individual difference itself. And consequently the individual difference must be of another kind from the quiddity it contracts, and altogether outside it. Moreover, the individual difference bears toward the specific nature the relation of act to potency — and act is always of another kind from the subjective potency or potency contractible through it. All this doctrine is transcribed word for word also by *Rada, to. 2, contr. 3, art. 4, par. 2*, for the explanation of Scotus's position from *Bassol., loc. cit.* — though, as is his habit, he does not mention him. This displeases me greatly, since one cannot pass over in silence without some note of theft or at least ingratitude the authors whose doctrine one uses, especially word for word.

Fourthly, from this it is easy to refute the doctrine of certain Thomists who, while admitting with Scotus individual differences as lowest grades that last contract the nature, nevertheless deny that they bear the character of act with respect to the nature. Rather, they say the contrary: that when the specific nature is contracted through the individual grade, it is not contracted through it as potency through act — as happens in the generic account when it is contracted through the specific difference — but rather it is contracted as act through its potency, and therefore when the specific nature descends to the individual grade, it is so far from being perfected that it is rather imperfect and limited by it.

Blasius a Concep., disp. 3, Met., q. 1, n. 3, gives the reason for this: if the specific nature descended to the individual grade by way of potency perfectible by it, then the specific nature would not express an altogether complete and perfect essence. For it is precisely for this reason that genus expresses an incomplete essence — because it descends to the specific grade by way of potency perfectible by it. Moreover, the atomic species is called such because it has been placed in the ultimate grade by the specific difference. Therefore when it afterwards descends to the individual grade, it does not descend by way of potency perfectible by it — otherwise it would not be atomic independently of the individual grade.

This Thomistic doctrine seems to me false, as is clear from what was just said. For in reality the individual difference is compared to the specific nature as act to

potency — which is shown by an evident argument: they are related to each other as the contracting and the contractible, the determining and the determinable. But whenever two things are so compared, the contractible and determinable has the account of potency and the contracting and determining has the account of act. Therefore, and so on.

From this, however — that they relate as act and potency — it does not follow that the individual difference is simply nobler and more perfect than the specific nature itself, as *Bassol., loc. cit.*, rightly noted. But it is so only in a qualified sense — for act is not always simply nobler and more perfect than the potency it actuates, as is evident in the case of accident, which indeed actuates and in some way perfects substance yet is not simply more perfect than it, since it brings perfection to substance only in a qualified sense and does not perfect and actuate it substantially but only accidentally. Hence act is more perfect than its corresponding potency, other things being equal — and especially when it perfects it in the same order, which does not apply to the individual difference's perfecting of the specific nature, in the way the specific difference perfects the generic one. For the specific difference pertains to the quiddity of the thing — as the generic reality does — and therefore perfects it in the same essential and quidditatively order and is more perfect than it. But the individual difference is outside the order of quiddities and is a material difference, not a formal one. Hence, because it does not perfect the nature in the same order — that is, within the same order of quiddities — it therefore does not follow that it is simply more perfect than it, but only so in a qualified sense. And so *Tromb., 5. Metaphys., art. 4*, also addresses this difficulty.

From this the response to the argument of *Blasius a Concep.* in the contrary direction is plain. The consequence is denied along with its proof. For genus does not express an incomplete essence because it descends to the specific grade by way of potency perfectible by it in whatever sense — but because it is perfectible by it within the same order and in a quidditatively mode. Hence the generic account considered without the specific account is called essentially incomplete and imperfect, because it is still perfectible essentially and in the account of quiddity by the specific difference. Similarly, the atomic species is called such because it is placed in the ultimate quidditatively grade and is not further perfectible in the same order — that is, quidditatively — by the individual difference, but only hypostatically and as it were accidentally. Furthermore, the primary substance is more perfect than the secondary, and hence is called "substance above all" (*maxime substantia*). But it adds to the secondary substance nothing other than the individual difference. Therefore in reality it cannot be denied that this difference adds some perfection in its own genus to the specific nature. I said "in its own genus," because in truth such perfection cannot be quidditatively and essential but rather hypostatic — which is not so much a perfection as the ultimate determination of quidditatively perfection.

Moreover, many Thomists hold that one soul is more perfect in substance than another with respect to individual grades — which cannot be maintained unless one says that the individual difference adds some perfection over and above the specific one, by reason of which one individual is said to surpass another in individual perfection. We will speak of this below. Therefore the individual difference is truly act in relation to the specific nature, and in some way perfects it in the manner of potency.

Fifthly, from all this the conclusion is directly proved along with the Doctor, *q. 6, cit., in corpore, §ad quaestionem*: the predelineated individual difference is the formal and proximate principle of individuation that we are here seeking. For if the singular nature adds to the nature something positive and from the nature of the thing distinct from it — which for this reason is called individual difference, since it contracts the nature to being this — then certainly the principle of individuation will be nothing other than this addendum, which is called individual difference. For this bears toward the individual the same relation as the specific difference bears toward its species. But the specific difference, because it determines the genus to a certain species, is called the principle of specification. Therefore the individual difference is truly called and is the principle of individuation.

Moreover, that must be posited as the principle of individuation which numerical unity follows upon as its proper entity — for every real unity follows upon its proper entity, as its attribute. But this is nothing other than the predelineated individual difference; for it cannot follow upon the entity of the specific nature, since that has its own proper unity lesser than numerical unity. Therefore, and so on.

Moreover: that is the principle of individuation of a nature which ultimately determines it and places it in the ultimate grade — indeterminable and incommunicable. But only the individual difference does this. Furthermore: that is the principle of individuation through which individuals are intrinsically distinguished — since the same principles are constitutive and distinctive — but individuals are intrinsically distinguished only through their individual differences, since they agree in the entity of the nature. Finally: the principle of individuation is that by which the individual exceeds the nature; but this is nothing other than the declared individual difference, as is plain of itself. Therefore the individual difference is the principle of individuation.

Bannes, 1. de Gen. et Cor., q. 20, art. 2, responds that such individual differences — through which the specific nature is contracted as the generic is contracted through specific differences — cannot be denied and are admitted by *Cajetan*, *Javellus*, and other more refined Thomists. Indeed this is the true, proper, and formal principle of individuation, as he establishes and proves there in *concl. 3*. Nor in this is there any controversy between Scotus and St. Thomas. Rather, the difference lies only in assigning the root and foundation from which such

individual difference — called haecceity — is drawn. For Scotus imagines that the individual difference is drawn from the side of form; St. Thomas draws it from the side of designated matter. Hence, just as we would not know how to contract "animal" to man and beast if there were not forms of the parts — namely the intellective and sentient soul of the lion — from which the specific differences are drawn, so we would not know how to contract the nature of man to this and that man unless there were designated matters from which the diverse individual differences are drawn, through which each individual is constituted in the category under its species and is distinguished from every other. He therefore concludes that just as the intellective soul is not itself the specific difference — namely "rational" — but is that from which it is drawn, so designated matter is not itself the individual difference but its root and foundation, from which it is drawn. Hence he notes that when in the following articles the question is asked whether quantity or form or matter is the principle of individuation, the question is not whether quantity or form or matter itself is the formal principle of individuation — for it is certain that this is the individual difference alone — but whether it is that from which such a difference originates. *Ripa, lib. de Ente et Essentia, cap. 2, q. 4, art. 2*, from the beginning, speaks in the same way, and from this deduces that Scotus did not well satisfy this question about the principle of individuation. For at *2. d. 3, q. 2*, Scotus himself says he is not investigating that by which it is formally repugnant to a nature to be communicable — since in that mode it is repugnant to it through its very repugnance — but rather that by which, as its proximate and intrinsic foundation, this repugnance inheres in it. And this, says Ripa, Scotus does not assign when he says in *q. 6* that the nature is this and singular through that positive entity — for this is merely its singularity, and so Scotus seems to say that the nature is singular through its singularity, which no one doubts. Therefore the starting point still remains: from what, as its proximate and intrinsic foundation, it obtains this singularity — and this, say the Thomists, is designated matter.

From this response it is clear how the Thomists at last — even unwillingly — descend to our position on the principle of individuation properly and simply so called: that it is the individual difference or haecceity of each thing. This I genuinely rejoiced to see — since I found that between us there remains nearly a dispute about name alone. Especially because what they say — that the root of such an individual difference is designated matter — has been abundantly refuted above. For matter, especially on their own view, is wholly incapable of quantity, and therefore can in no way be designated through it. The consequence is plain: a stamp cannot leave its impression in a subject in which it cannot immediately be impressed.

Nor is it true, as *Bannes* says, that Scotus imagines the individual difference to be drawn from the side of form — if by "this form of the part" he means the form of the part, as he seems to mean. For the Doctor acknowledges such individual differences also in accidents and separated substances, which lack matter and

form. But when the Doctor says that such a difference is drawn from the side of form, by "form" he means the form of the whole — that is, the whole individuated nature — and says it is individuated through a certain ultimate reality of it formally distinct from the nature. Hence, just as in the species we distinguish two realities — one potential and one actual — and from the whole specific nature we say that the account of genus is drawn from the potential reality and the account of the difference from the actual reality (as was said at *disp. 5, Log., q. 3, art. 2*, near the end) — so proportionately in the present case, from the whole individuated nature we say that the account of the species and the account of the individual difference are drawn by distinguishing in it two realities: one potential, from which the account of the species is drawn, and one actual, from which the account of the individual difference is drawn.

It is also false what *Ripa* was saying — that Scotus through his position does not satisfy the question. On the contrary, more subtly and accurately than others he assigned the proximate root and immediate foundation of the repugnance of communicability and divisibility into further subjective parts, when he said it is the ultimate reality found in the individual called haecceity. For it is precisely by reason of this reality that it is repugnant to the individual to have many subjective parts — since all the other realities are communicable and further determinable. And in affirming that the nature is singular through its own proper singularity, Scotus was not saying merely this — but declared what and of what kind that entity is that is called singularity. And therefore he perfectly satisfied the question.

Article II: The Thomists' Arguments Are Met

The Thomists raise many objections against the Scotist haecceity. But since they themselves also admit it — if it is said to be drawn from designated matter — many arguments pressed against us also weigh against them equally, since they attack haecceity taken absolutely, whether it is drawn from the ultimate reality of the individuated nature as Scotus teaches, or from designated matter as the Thomists contend. We will therefore first present and resolve the arguments of the older Thomists, and then those of the more recent.

First, *Hervaeus, quol. 3, q. 9*, as cited by *Flandria, 7. Met., q. 22, art. 7*, argues: this haecceity is either something diverse from designated matter and form, or not. If not, then Scotus agrees with the Thomists. If yes, then it is either substance, accident, or nothing. If nothing, it counts for nothing. If substance: either matter, form, or composite. Not matter and form, as was proved above. If composite — then the composite is individual by itself, which Scotus does not concede. If accident: either relative or absolute. Not the first, since a relative accident is posterior to every absolute. If absolute, this will principally be quantity — which was also refuted above. Therefore either this opinion is nothing, or it coincides with others already refuted.

I respond that this argument is magnificent only in the display of words but in reality empty — and the Thomists who admit haecceities and individual differences along with us must respond to it in the same way. It is very easily resolved from the doctrine of *Tromb.*, 5. *Met.*, q. 5, art. 4: the individual difference formally is neither substance nor accident, since, just as it does not formally include being — having a simply simple concept, as *Scot.*, 1. d. 3, q. 3, §*contra istam*, teaches — so neither does it formally include the subjective parts of being, such as substance and accident. Although it does not quidditatively include this or that, it is nevertheless really and identically one or the other. Hence the haecceity that determines substance to individual being is really and identically substance; and that which determines accident is really and identically accident. Thus the individual difference is identically of the same kind as the nature it contracts and determines. And so also in relative accidents it is identically relative, and in absolute accidents it is absolute. And so too in the category of substance — if substance is taken not as nature and quiddity (in which sense it abstracts from every haecceity), but as being in ultimate actuality — then the individual difference is identically the substance that is form, the substance that is matter, and the substance that is composite. So that, since each of these as nature is determinable through certain ultimate actual realities that are really the same as the determinable nature, it follows that the individual difference — which is such an ultimate reality — is identically form, identically matter, and also the composite. And we concede that each of these is really individual by itself — but not formally by itself and through its own essence, but through some reality superadded, which is per se primarily incommunicable. *Bassol.*, cit., 2. d. 12, q. 4, art. 3, ad 5, meets this argument in the same way.

Secondly, *Soncin.*, 7. *Met.*, q. 32, argues: if each thing is individuated through its own haecceity, it follows that in a physical composite there are three haecceities — of matter, of form, and of the composite itself — and therefore three individuals. But this is absurd. He proves the minor: first, from this it follows that there are several existences in the composite, since each individual possesses its own existence. Second, it follows that form is not united immediately to matter, but through that reality by which form is this — since that reality is more intimate to form than the union itself. Third, it follows that matter separated from all form would not only be in entitative act but also in formal act, since matter so separated would have its own haecceity, which would determine it — and to determine is proper to formal act, since everything that determines in this way has the character of something qualifying.

I respond: if the whole is really distinct from its parts — as our school holds — I freely concede that in the composite there are three haecceities, just as there are three entities: two partial and incomplete — namely of matter and form — and another total and complete, which is that of the composite. But if the whole is not distinct from its parts taken together, then the whole will not need a haecceity distinct from the haecceities of the parts, but will be this through the haecceities

of the parts taken together. And so proportionately it must also be conceded that there are three individuals in the composite: two incomplete — namely this matter and this form — and another complete and perfect, constituted from those two incomplete ones, which is the composite itself. And it is denied that any absurdity follows from this. For the first thing deduced — the plurality of existences — is not only not absurd, but indeed necessary. Since both matter and form have their own partial and incomplete essences and existences in the composite (as was said in the *Physics*), there is no absurdity in admitting, beyond the complete essence and existence of the composite, two other partial ones for the parts — one of which is potential with respect to the other, and thus together they can constitute one third thing that exists per se. Nor equally is there any absurdity in form being united to matter through its haecceity — since matter can only be united by form that is singular and existent, and this does not mean it is united mediately, since nothing mediates that is really distinct from form itself, given that such haecceity is really identified with the form itself. Nor finally does the third absurdity follow — since haecceity is not a physical but a metaphysical act, and the determination that is proper to form — or physical formal act — is not determination with respect to individual being but with respect to specific being. For it is form that physically constitutes the composite in a certain and determinate species.

Nor is every substantial act a substantial form as the other part of the composite — as *Bassol., loc. cit., art. 3, ad 1*, rightly notes in responding to a similar argument. But there is given a substantial act — or an act that is substance — which is nevertheless not such a form, as is evident from the specific difference, which is act with respect to the genus. And just as the specific difference is not per se and directly in the genus, but by reduction — insofar as it is included in what is per se and directly in the genus — so too it must be said of the individual difference.

Against this solution *Mercenarius, disp. de principio individuationis*, presses: it is useless to multiply so many haecceities in the composite, since one haecceity of the whole composite suffices to individuate all that belongs intimately to that individual. I deny the assumption. For each physical entity, just as it has its own quiddity communicable to many, so it must also have its own individuation, through which that common quiddity is contracted to individual being. And since in the physical composite there are found several physical entities, so also there are several haecceities. Yet it is true that just as several partial entities coalesce into one total entity, so also the incomplete and partial haecceities coalesce into one total individual. And thus just as in a physical composite there is found only one total entity, so also only one total haecceity — but just as the former arises from two partial entities joined together, so the haecceity of the whole arises from the haecceities of the parts.

Thirdly, an objection is raised — as a kind of reply to the solution just given. If haecceities are multiplied in the physical composite to match the multiplication

of physical entities, then they must also be multiplied to match the multiplication of metaphysical formalities. And so, since in Peter there are several common individuable natures — the grades of man, animal, living, body, substance — there must consequently be assigned as many haecceities through which those common natures are individuated. From this it finally follows that in the same individual there are several individuals — namely this animal, this body, this substance, and so on.

I respond: there are authors who concede the parity and say that to the individual grades existing in the category, proper haecceities correspond to each. Their principal reason is that there are generic individuals distinct from specific ones, of which even the genus itself is immediately predicated — namely this animal, this body, this substance, this being. These are accordingly usually called incomplete individuals — a position I myself set out in *disp. 5, Log., q. 1, art. 3*, as representing the mind of the Doctor at *1. d. 3, q. 6*, towards the end, and *d. 8, q. 3*, near the end, and more clearly at *4. d. 8, q. 2, lit. O*. This part is defended by *Albertin., tom. 2, princ. 1, Philosop., q. 10, dub. 2, concl. 1*; *Hurt., disp. 4, Metap., sec. 5*; *Poncius, disp. 6, Log., d. 9, n. 73*; and some others.

Nevertheless, I consider the opposite more probable — namely that one single haecceity individuates all the common grades that exist in the category, preserving the same order among them from the part of the thing in the category: so that through Petriety in Peter, first and immediately in the order of immediacy the grade of man is individuated, then the grade of animal, then of living, and so on. For although absolutely speaking, with respect to those grades as natures and quiddities, Peter is first called substance, then body, then living, and so on — yet he is not first called this substance or this body, but first this man. And the reason is that the generic nature is not joined to individuation except through the mediation of the specific nature.

And since this is the crux of the difficulty, it is shown by this evident reason drawn from what was said in the preceding article. The individual difference is compared to the nature it contracts and determines as act to potency in the order of metaphysical composition — and these must be proportionate to each other, so that the potency is the proportionate perfectible of the act. But only the specific grade is proportionate to the haecceity as immediately perfectible and determinable through it — the generic grade is not, but only through the mediation of the specific. Therefore, and so on. The major is plain. The minor is proved: since the individual difference perfects only materially and contracts the nature to individual being, it presupposes the nature it contracts and determines to be essentially complete — to have its ultimate essential complement. But only the specific grade is thus essentially complete, not the generic. Therefore only the specific grade is immediately actuable and contractible through the individual difference, while the generic is not, except through the superadded order.

Confirmation: the individual difference is called the ultimate grade in the category precisely because it altogether completes the predicamental nature to which it accrues. Therefore it presupposes in that nature all the superior essential differences, including the specific — by reason of which that nature is said to be essentially complete. Therefore it immediately actuates only the specific nature, and the other superior ones only mediately.

Finally, the parity is proved with the specific difference. For rationality alone — which immediately affects "animal" — suffices to specifically determine mediately all the superior grades: the grade of living, of body, of substance. Nor are several rationalities distinguished — one for contracting animality, another for corporeality, and so on — but one suffices for all. If, therefore, for all predicamental grades one principle of specification suffices, then also one principle of individuation can suffice — and this is the Doctor's argument for proving this assertion at 7. *Met.*, q. 13, n. 21, ad 4.

Nor does the argument to the contrary — from the existence of generic and incomplete individuals — obstruct this assertion. Indeed it rather confirms it. For in *disp. cit.*, *Log.*, q. 1, art. 1, explaining how such generic and incomplete individuals can be admitted, I said this is not to be understood as being from the part of the thing — for in that sense no individual can be given or can exist immediately under a genus, since every such individual is contained immediately under some lowest species. As the Doctor says at 2. *d.* 12, q. 2, *lit. B*: what determines the genus for itself determines for itself the species in that genus, and whatever determines the species for itself necessarily determines itself to being in some one individual of that species. Therefore such generic individuals cannot exist from the part of the thing, but only in the intellect as it conceives things inadequately and confusedly — as, for example, when it considers something existing in the nature of things and conceives it immediately under a superior grade of nature, without attending to the specific grade that it in reality participates. This is evident in the example of someone coming from afar: from his motion I perceive that he is some animal — indeed this designated animal — but I do not discern whether he is a horse or a donkey. Now here, when speaking of the principle of individuation, we speak of the natures of things as they exist and are individuated from the part of the thing — not as they are conceived inadequately by the intellect.

Nor finally does the parity hold that was assumed in the main argument about physical entities. For indeed to match the multiplication of those entities in the composite, haecceities must also be multiplied for each — since each has its own essence properly so called and existence, as is clear from matter and form, and one can exist separately from the other without the other. Therefore they cannot be individuated by the same singularity. But metaphysical formalities, as has been said many times, are not really distinct from one another and do not have a proper essence in the strict sense, nor existence — but in the same physical thing

all and each are immersed through identity in it, and at its existence they exist. And therefore just as in the same individual one existence suffices for all the predicamental grades, so also one single haecceity. This mode of speaking is also followed by *Fonsec.*, 5. *Met.*, c. 6, q. 5, sec. 3, ad 4; *Suarez*, disp. 6, *Met.*, sec. 6, n. 15 and 16; *Pasqual.*, disp. 43, sec. 4. But these authors, although they agree with us on this point, absolutely deny generic and incomplete individuals — as though these two assertions were mutually connected. But this is true only if generic and incomplete individuals are excluded from the part of the thing. If they are admitted only through the intellect conceiving inadequately, this does not obstruct our assertion.

Fourthly, *Cajetan*, *de Ente et Essentia*, cap. 2, q. 4, argues: a singular act presupposes singular potency, 2. *Physic.* 38. Haecceity is a singular act. Therefore it presupposes the nature as singular potency — and thus does not make it singular. Furthermore: whatever belongs to one individual and is repugnant to another of the same species, by Scotus's own principle, presupposes their distinction — otherwise it would no more be repugnant to one than to the other. But Petriety belongs to Peter and is repugnant to Paul. Therefore it presupposes them individually distinct, and thus is not the principle of individuation. Finally: individual individuations not only agree in the account of individuation as such, but the individuations of one species agree more with each other than with the individuations of another species — by reason of the individuated nature. Therefore they are not principles of individuation, since by Scotus these must be primarily diverse and agree in nothing quidditatively, lest there be an infinite regress. You should know, however, that these arguments are also touched upon by *Aureolus*, 2. d. 9, and the first especially is adduced by *Bassol.*, cit., 2. d. 12, q. 4, art. 3, in so many words, and is excellently resolved.

I respond that these and similar arguments equally press the Thomists — especially those who admit individual differences along with us. For the first presses them — since whatever they posit as the principle of individuation must certainly be a singular act, and thus it would presuppose the nature it ought to individuate as singular. The second equally presses them in the same way — for whatever they posit as the principle of individuation of Sortes belongs to Sortes in such a way as to be repugnant to Plato, and thus does not constitute but presupposes them distinct. The third finally presses them equally — since one designated matter as such agrees with another in the account of designation as such, even if not in the account of such-and-such designation; and designated matters for individuals of the same species agree more and are more similar among themselves than designated matters for individuals of diverse species. Hence it is also incumbent on the Thomists to resolve these arguments.

To the first: it is plain from what was said at n. 27 that that proposition holds of physical act and potency, which are really distinct, not of metaphysical act and potency, which are really indistinct — as individuation and nature are.

To the second: the major is simply false as assumed by Cajetan — otherwise it could be used to prove that rational and irrational are not specific differences, by arguing: being rational belongs to man and is repugnant to a horse, therefore it does not make but presupposes the distinction of man from horse. But Scotus in *quol. cit.* was speaking of the aptitude of the soul toward the body, which he says is not the first constituting reason of the soul in individual being — because it belongs to it in the mode of a consequent attribute. What belongs in this mode to one individual and is repugnant to another certainly does not constitute it in such being but presupposes it. But what belongs to one individual or species as its first constituting reason — as is the case with haecceities — in no way can presuppose their distinction, but formally affects it. Hence it is clear that Cajetan does not take the proposition in the same sense as Scotus takes it in *quol. cit.* — and hence what Scotus assumes holds, while what Cajetan assumes does not. See what was said on this same argument above at n. 119.

To the last: it is clear from what was said above at n. 24 that the individuations of natures of the same species agree more and are more similar among themselves than those of diverse species — but only concomitantly and indirectly, insofar as the natures with which they are identified are of the same kind — not however formally and directly, as though those natures were quidditatively included in them. Nor does such agreement remove primary diversity from them, because they are not on that account said to agree in any common account predicated of them quidditatively. For speaking formally and quidditatively, humanity is equally excluded from Petriety and Pauleity as from Bucephaleity itself. Whether all individuations agree quidditatively in the account of individuation as such, and whether such agreement removes primary diversity from them, we shall say presently — for this is the greatest difficulty of all.

Fifthly, *Ripa, de Ente et Essentia, cap. 2, q. 4, art. 2*, argues: if the nature is individuated through its own ultimate haecceity — as Scotus wishes — since this is not really distinct from the nature, it follows that the nature is individuated by itself. But this Scotus himself vigorously attacks at *2. d. 3, q. 1*. If it is said that Scotus attacked the nature being formally this of itself — not really — then Aureolus, Adam, and others who hold that the nature is of itself this can respond that they accepted this identically, even if not formally, and so his labor in that first question will be found vain.

Moreover, in *q. 6* he says that such a positive entity is the ultimate reality of the entity that is matter, of that which is form, of that which is composite. Therefore there are other realities in matter, form, and composite besides that ultimate one — otherwise it would be pointlessly called "ultimate." It is therefore asked whether those realities that are presupposed to this ultimate one are singular or not. If the first — then the last singularity is needlessly added to individuate them. If the second — then matter of itself will not be numerically one, will not be this — but will be determined by this ultimate reality, and since this reality determines, it

will exercise the function of form; and so matter without form will have formal act.

Finally, such a haecceity in the composite follows upon the union of form in the composite. Therefore the universal form would be united to universal matter in that priority — since the haecceity, which is the principle of individuation of them, is not yet understood to be present.

I respond by freely conceding that each thing individuates itself really — insofar as it is not individuated through something really distinct from it — but not formally by itself — that is, not through its own formal account. And in this sense the Doctor proves in *q. 1* that a created nature is not of itself individual, but through something superadded, as was explained above at *q. 2* of this Disputation. Nor can Aureolus, Adam, and the other Nominalists say they are speaking in this sense — for they wish every nature whatsoever to be of itself this, and consequently to be of itself singular, not only really and identically (as Scotus says), but also formally.

To the second: I concede the consequence — namely that other realities besides that ultimate one are found in matter, form, and composite: as many as there are generic and specific predicamental grades. And further I say that those are not of themselves singular, but are made such through the supervening ultimate reality, which — in determining them — does not exercise the function of physical form in matter, but of metaphysical form, as is said of the specific difference with respect to genus.

To the last: the assumption is true of the perfect, complete, and total haecceity — which is the haecceity of the composite — but not of the incomplete and partial haecceities, which precede the union in matter and form. Therefore the consequence is denied.

Sixthly, others argue: if the individual, beyond the specific nature, has that peculiar entity which we call individual difference, then when water is divided into drops, as many new entities would arise as there are drops, and as many again would perish if those same drops were reunited. This is not easy to believe — especially since no water is generated or corrupted by that division or conjunction. And in this way the same water — while remaining the same — could sometimes receive and sometimes lose the same individual difference, which is altogether impossible. For otherwise the same thing, while remaining the same, would sometimes be this and sometimes not be this — which implies a contradiction.

I respond that this difficulty about the homogeneous whole and its parts is also adduced by *Bassol., loc. cit.*, and excellently dissolved. Briefly: since no substantial generation or corruption of the waters occurs there, but only a new division or composition of some integral whole — which I also said is not really distinct from its parts at *disp. 5, Physic., q. 13, art. 2* — at most the argument asks whether those

divided integral parts are the same as before. And it must be said that they are — since the parts of water, whether united or divided, always preserve their own unity and entitative distinction, and consequently their own intrinsic haecceities. Only the quantitative unity or distinction is changed, which consists in the acquisition or loss of the indivisibles that terminate or join those parts to each other, as the Doctor notes at *4. d. 12, q. 4, lit. I*. Hence it must be concluded that the united parts of water are still entitatively distinct from each other — though quantitatively and integrally they constitute one water — and when separated they remain the same as they were in the whole. They do not acquire new entitative haecceities but only quantitative ones — namely new terminating indivisibles. For to each of the parts of a homogeneous whole, whether they exist in the whole or are separated from the whole, there correspond their own haecceities — always distinct on both sides. But they are not divided on both sides, and such is the nature of the composition of the continuum, as I explained at length in *disp. 9, q. 2, art. 6*, especially.

Seventhly, *Suessanus*, in several ways argues against Scotus's opinion at *5. Met., disp. 5*, whose arguments tend especially to show this: granting individual differences, the individuals of the same species would also have to be distinguished from each other essentially and specifically. This can be shown by these arguments, which when reduced to this form appear more robust than as adduced by him. Such differences are posited by Scotus as intrinsic and substantial to the individuals. But what differs through such intrinsic and substantial differences differs essentially and specifically. Therefore, and so on. Furthermore: every difference among things that goes beyond their proper and special accidents is essential and specific — as *Porphyry, cap. de differentia*, shows, where he distinguishes difference as common (drawn from common accidents), proper (drawn from proper attributes pertaining to the second mode of per se predication), and most proper (drawn from intrinsic predicates in the first mode — which is essential and specific). But individuals differ through haecceities that precede both common and proper accidents of the individuals. Therefore, and so on. Finally: haecceity constitutes the individual either per se — so that it belongs to it per se — or per accidens. If the second, then the haecceity could be separated from the individual while the individual itself remains, which implies a contradiction. If it belongs to it per se, then either in the first mode or the second mode — not in the second, since then the haecceity would be a singular attribute, not a difference constituting it in such being. If in the first mode, then it is essentially and quidditatively predicated of it and distinguishes it from everything else in the same way.

I respond to these and similar arguments — it is clear from what was said above in this disputation at n. 11 and 54. Yet to the first, *Bassol.* formally responds that whatever differs through substantial essential differences certainly differs specifically — but not through substantial individual differences, since, although these are compared to nature as act to potency, they are not formal but material

differences, because they do not pertain to the quiddity of the species. For they are understood to accrue — or as it were accrue — to the nature after the complete specific being, and hence they cannot vary such specific being.

To the second: the major is denied as stated absolutely, and its proof does not hold. For *Porphry* there truly means by "most proper difference" the essential and specific difference — since he is treating of the difference that is a part of the species, and which together with the genus constitutes the species. He did not wish to include the individual difference under that triple division of difference — since he intended to treat only those differences that can found universality and be predicated of many. Nevertheless, as I noted there at *disp. 5, Log., q. 3*, the individual difference can be reduced to the second member and said to make individuals differ accidentally — not with predicamental accidentality, since it is a substantial grade penetrating through real identity the whole substance and essence of the thing, but with predicable accidentality, insofar as it makes individuals differ not specifically but individually.

To the last: with *Trombet.* it is said that the individual difference belongs to the singular per se in the first mode. When it is inferred that it belongs quidditatively and distinguishes quidditatively, the consequence is denied. For predication is in the first mode not only when the predicate imports the quiddity of the subject or part of quiddity, but also when the account of the predicate is included intrinsically and formally in the account of the subject, as an essential part of it or as it were a part — and this whether that predicate is a quiddity — that is, an essence communicable to many — or something primarily diverse from the quiddity, like individual entity.

If you press: the first mode is when the definition is predicated of the defined, or part of the definition, from *Aristotle, 1. Post.* I respond that extending the name of definition to any account expressing the essential intrinsic elements of the thing, Aristotle's proposition holds true. But if definition is taken only for the quidditatively account expressing the quiddity of the defined, or part of the quiddity, then it is not true that only that predication is in the first mode in which a definition in this strict sense is predicated. For it should be noted that if some account could express whatever constitutes and belongs to the entity of an individual, yet that account would not be a perfect and rigorous definition — since it does not express the what-it-was-to-be (*quod quid erat esse*): for a definition strictly so called from Aristotle, *1. Top.*, expresses the quiddity of the thing. Hence it is conceded that speaking of definition in the strict sense, the singular is not definable by any definition other than the definition of the species; and yet the indefinable per se includes some entity added to the specific entity. But that per se entity it adds is not a quidditatively entity. And just as the singular has no proper definition in the way said, so it has no proper attribute — but only the attributes of the species. And therefore there is no demonstration or science of it

other than the science of the species. So the Doctor word for word at 2. d. 3, q. 6, *lit. M*.

Eighthly, the same *Suessanus* presses: if individuals differ from each other through haecceities, it follows that two individuals of the same species — such as Peter and Paul — differ from each other as much as two of diverse species — such as Peter and Brunellus. But this is false. The consequence is proved: such haecceities are primarily diverse from each other, since they agree in nothing quidditatively — lest there be an infinite regress. But whatever differs by things that are primarily diverse, differs equally — since things that are primarily diverse are maximally distant from each other.

Ragusejus, disp. cit., cap. 41, responds by conceding that individuals of the same and of diverse species differ equally through haecceities, since all haecceities are primarily diverse. But this is false — since individuals are constituted not through haecceities alone but also through nature. And therefore not all can differ equally, since individuals of the same species agree with each other by reason of the same specific nature, while individuals of diverse species differ not only through individual differences but also through specific ones.

Hence to this argument — which the Doctor himself adduces in so many words at 2. d. 3, q. 6, *lit. I* — the consequence is to be denied along with its proof. For there need not be as much distinction in what is constituted as in the constituting principles. For the individuating principles can well be primarily diverse while the individuals still agree in some common quidditatively account — since together with the individual difference they contain the common nature that is common to all individuals.

"For two things to be equally distinct," as the Doctor says, "can be understood in two ways: either because they are equally impossible — since they cannot be in the same thing — or because they agree in nothing whatever. In the first sense it is true that things distinguished are equally diverse as the distinguishing principles — for distinguishing principles cannot be impossible without the things distinguished also being impossible. In the second sense it is universally impossible — since what is distinguished includes not only the distinguishing elements but also something that is as it were potential with respect to the distinguishing elements, in which however the distinguishing elements do not agree."

Ninthly, others argue: if the individual is one per se, it is not apparent how from a specific nature and a haecceity something one per se can arise. For since they relate as act and potency, it does not seem that anything one per se can arise from them except through composition. But from another angle, composition is a certain real relation of union between the components. Yet there does not seem to be any real relation of the nature to the individual difference, nor conversely — since there cannot seem to be assigned any real relation of this kind, especially

since a real relation is between extremes really distinct from each other in the way in which nature and individual difference are not distinct.

The Doctor, 2. d. 3, q. 6, *lit. L*, responds that this is a metaphysical composition from reality and reality — such as is the composition of genus and difference — and the difficulty is no greater in one case than in the other. And the composition arises from this: that the specific reality of itself does not have, through identity, the individual reality included in it, but only some third thing includes both of them through identity. And such a composition is of a kind that cannot coexist with divine simplicity — for divine simplicity is not only incompatible with composition of thing and thing, of actual and potential, but also of actual reality with potential reality. For in God, comparing any essential attribute with any other essential attribute, each is formally infinite and therefore from itself has, through identity, whatever can be with it. The extremes are not precisely the same only because some third thing includes both, but in the present case neither the specific entity includes the individual one through identity, nor conversely — but only some third thing does. And thus they are said to be identified, insofar as they are identified in that third thing. And to put it in one word: this composition must be explained in precisely the way the composition of genus and difference was explained at *disp. 3, Log., q. 3, art. 2*.

Yet it is true that this metaphysical composition between matter and form, or subject and accident — as *Bassol., cit., 4, ad 1*, rightly notes — differs from the composition of genus and difference and subject and accident in the physical sense: because the extremes of this composition are really identical with each other at least in a third, and therefore they cannot be separated from such composition as though both extremes could exist in the nature of things without such composition, as happens with matter and form, subject and accident. Rather it can be called a relation consubstantial to each — or really identified with each — since neither can be inseparable from the other through any power.

Finally, an argument is raised that is the most efficacious of all, and which *Bannes* alone uses for the total destruction of our opinion: a nature cannot be made individual through something common. For it is always from this middle term that Scotus attacks the opinions of others. But haecceity is something common. Therefore, and so on. The minor is proved: all particular haecceities — for example, the haecceity of Peter and the haecceity of Paul — agree quidditatively in the common account of haecceity, since these are true: "the haecceity of Peter is a haecceity" and "the haecceity of Paul is a haecceity." Therefore haecceity is of itself something common, no less than any other contractible nature. Therefore it cannot be the principle of individuation.

Although the Thomists press this argument so forcefully, it is actually the argument of Aureolus, and is adduced as Aureolus's by *Canonicus, 1. Physic., q. 6*. Indeed it is Scotus's own argument, which he states in so many words in this very question at *lit. I*. For the resolution of this argument, the decision of the following

question is necessary. Meanwhile you should know that this argument also presses the Thomists who concede haecceity to be the principle of individuation, so long as it is said to be drawn from designated matter — and indeed it presses everyone, whatever they have posited as the principle of individuation. For any such principles of individuation will be similar in the account of individuating.

**Question X. Whether there is a common concept of individuation,
or of haecceity as such.**

The Scotists commonly deny this, on the grounds that the Doctor teaches throughout — *1 dist. 3 q. 3 F.* and *2 dist. 3 q. 6 §. Ad quaestionem* — that individual differences are primarily diverse and share no per se unitary quidditative concept, not even the most transcendent concept of being. This view was embraced by Fonseca, *5 Metaph. cap. 6 qu. 5 sect. 5*, and among more recent authors is strenuously defended by Pasqualigo, *tom. 2 Metaph. disput. 43 sect. 3*, and Poncius, *disp. 6 log. quaest. 2*. It is also partially held by Suarez, *disput. 5 Metaph. sect. 1 num. 20*, and Aversa, *qu. 9 log. sect. 11*. Suarez, though he grants that one individuation agrees with another, nonetheless denies that the intellect can conceive a common notion of individuation precisely abstracted from this or that particular individuation, on the grounds that individual difference is altogether simple and irreducible to further concepts. Aversa, for his part, while granting that the concept of individuation can be prescinded, still denies that it can be perfectly prescinded; and so, although he professes the affirmative side of this question, he in fact leans more toward the negative, because the reason for doubt proposed at the close of the preceding question either proves nothing, or proves that this concept admits of perfect precision, as we shall see presently.

I taught the affirmative side in *disp. 5 log. qu. 2 art. 4*, as the mind of Scotus and of the better Scotists, cited in several places there. Among these the most explicit text is that found at *1 dist. 22 qu. unic.*, where, after having disputed on both sides of the question, the Doctor finally resolves the doubt at the end of the question in these words: "Given this way of proceeding, then, as certain — that from persons some negative concept of negation in general can be abstracted, and this not only from persons as though already constituted, but also from their formal constitutives — there is a further question whether only such a negative common element is abstractable from them, or also something positive in common. And it seems that one must posit some positive element capable of being abstracted from them, on account of the text of Augustine in *De doctrina Christiana*, and the text of the Master in the letter at D. 25, which were adduced against the opinion. It can be said that from individuals there can be abstracted not only the species, which expresses the quiddity of individuals, but also something quasi-proper to them." These are the Doctor's words, from which it is clear that he is not speaking doubtfully, as Poncius tries to explain him at the cited place (where he cites this text at *1 dist. 26*, perhaps through an error of the copyist or printer, or through

inadvertence), but assertively — for his intention there is to resolve what he had previously disputed on both sides.

Nor does it avail to say, as Poncius does, that the Doctor there does not identify that something proper to individuals with singularity, or with the constitutive of the individual as such. Indeed, this objection is refuted by Poncius's own words, which he immediately adds in order to refute the interpretation of certain Scotists who understand by that "proper" element some property of the fourth predicable. For Poncius himself says that the Doctor there speaks altogether of something proper — that is, something that belongs in particular to individuals because they are such — whether that proper element be a property of the fourth predicable or not, but rather something essential. Hence within a few words he contradicts himself, for by these last words he retracts what he had just said. See Lychet explaining the Doctor in the same way in both places.

Still clearer and more noteworthy is the passage found at *1 dist. 26 qu. unic.* below letter I. For here the Doctor not only teaches that such a concept precisely abstracted from the ultimate constitutives can be given, but also explains the manner and sense in which this must be affirmed, lest he contradict himself in other places where he said that these are primarily diverse. Let us hear the Doctor's words. "To the other argument I say that, although some common concept can be had that is said in quid of divine generation and spiration — indeed perhaps one that is said in quid of divine paternity and created paternity — nevertheless no reality can be in the divine persons distinct in any mode on the side of the thing, from which that concept said in quid is derived, which reality is determinable by another reality, as a common concept is determinable in the intellect by another concept; and the impossibility of this, and the reason, has been sufficiently stated. I say therefore that paternity and filiation are not two things primarily diverse with respect to the intellect, such that the intellect could not abstract from them some real common concept, but they are primarily diverse with respect to reality and reality, so that they include no one grade of reality that is as it were potential and determinable by proper differences or quasi-proper ones, as whiteness and blackness include some reality of the same kind determinable by their proper specific differences, or the realities from which their specific differences are derived. And then that major proposition — that primarily distinctive things are primarily diverse — must be understood of the realities themselves that primarily constitute, in the sense that they do not share in any one formal reality that both formally include." These are the Doctor's words in the cited place, where, as you see, he expressly clarifies what he had said elsewhere — that primarily distinctive things are primarily diverse — for this must be understood with respect to reality, not with respect to concept, as shall be further explained presently. Let Lychet be consulted, who expounds the Doctor in the same way in both passages; though the text is so clear, as the cited words show, that it needs no exposition. Bargius also inclines in that direction, though he wishes it to be verified only of the ultimate constitutives in the divine persons and

not in created things, because, he says, the latter make one thing per se while the former do not, and therefore the former are primarily diverse while the latter are not — which is a certain logical reason of no weight, since in this respect the ratio is precisely the same for the ultimate constitutives in divine and in created things. Moreover, that reason does not fit the passage from *1 d. 26 q. un.*, where the Doctor says it can be probably defended that divine persons can be constituted by absolutes, according to which view a divine person expresses a logically per se unitary concept. In favor of this position many more recent authors also stand: Rubius, *capit. de specie q. 6*; Complutenses, *disp. 6 log. q. 6*; Hurtado, *disp. 5 sect. 2 q. 3 art. 2*; and very many among our own, such as Aretinus, *3 dist. 1 q. 1 art. 13*.

In confirmation of this position I adduced several arguments in the Logic at the cited place; here I shall adduce only the one argument for doubting proposed at the end of the preceding question, for that argument alone, properly understood, establishes this truth admirably. I therefore press it forward and demonstrate its force by refuting in turn each of the solutions offered by the adversaries. All individuations and haecceities agree not merely in a common name, but in the very ratio of haecceity itself, so that once the ratio of what haecceity is has been assigned, Petrinity and Paulinity will share in that ratio intrinsically and quidditatively — just as Peter and Paul themselves share in the ratio of humanity. Therefore a concept of individuation as such cannot be denied.

In the first place, Scotists respond by appealing to Scotus, *1 d. 3 q. 3 F.* and *2 d. 3 quaest. 6 I.*, that individual differences are primarily diverse, differ from one another by themselves and not through other differences, and therefore share no common concept. This solution is nonetheless unsatisfactory; indeed, the argument directly proves such agreement and receives no answer, nor is it explained what the nature of that agreement is. If one were to say that it is agreement in name alone, the argument disproves this as well, because this singularity and that singularity agree not only in the common name of singularity but also in the very common ratio of making things ultimately differ — no less than Peter and Paul agree in the ratio of humanity.

Second, other Scotists, in order to avoid the force of the argument, concede a certain analogical agreement among haecceities, which does not imply a precisely common concept but only a certain proportion that haecceities maintain among themselves in their mode of constituting and distinguishing — namely, incommunicably and ultimately. Thus, just as this individual is what it is through its own individuation, so too is each one what it is through its own. This solution is embraced by Fonseca at the cited place. Nor does this solution avail, for the argument directly proves not merely analogical and proportional agreement but also univocal agreement in a common concept of haecceity as such for each of the haecceities. And if someone stubbornly contends that the argument establishes only proportional agreement among haecceities and no unity of concept, then by the same token one could abolish the unity of concept not only

in transcendent concepts but even in predicamental ones. For it would be said that all beings agree only proportionally in the ratio of being, and likewise that all humans agree only proportionally in the ratio of humanity — because just as Peter through his humanity is a rational animal, so too is Paul through his — and whatever might be urged to prove univocal agreement between human and beast in the ratio of animal, or between Peter and Paul in the ratio of human, could equally well be applied to the individual differences themselves, to show that they too agree univocally in the common ratio of haecceity. In a word, this mode of responding opens the way to denying objective precisions of whatever metaphysical grades, both predicamental and transcendent.

Third, other Scotists say that by that common concept of haecceity one does not express some common ratio of individuation as such, but rather immediately and indeterminately all of them. In support of this they note that a concept sometimes explains one single objective ratio — as when it is said that man is a rational animal — and sometimes explains several things explicitly but indeterminately, as if one wished to express the concept one had of some animal that would have to be either rational or irrational by saying that it would have to be either capable of reasoning or incapable of it. Agreement in a concept of the first kind implies univocation, or univocal agreement among several things, because that concept is founded on one determinate ratio; whereas agreement in a concept of the second kind does not, because such a concept is not founded on one determinate ratio but on several immediately and indeterminately. For although it is true that this animal — say, a human — is rational or irrational, and that other animal — say, Bucephalus — is also rational or irrational, still it is certain that these animals do not share in any one positive and determinate concept signified by the predicate "rational or irrational." This solution is reported as the more common Scotist one by Poncius at the cited place, who says it always seemed difficult to him — and rightly so. For this mode of speaking, as he himself says, straightaway opens the way to denying the objective precision of other common grades; for it could equally be said that by the fact that man is a rational animal, nothing determinate is expressed but rather several things immediately and indeterminately, and that all humans do not share in any common ratio of humanity. Moreover, when the conjunction "or" or "either" appears in the explication, it is easy to infer that several things are expressed indeterminately — as is evident in the example they themselves adduce — but when no such particle appears in the explication, that is a sign that the concept expresses one determinate signification immediately rather than several immediately and indeterminately. Now the concept by which an individual or individuation as such is expressed is of this latter kind; therefore that concept expresses one determinate signification.

Fourth, Poncius himself therefore responds by conceding that singularities and all individuals as such are conceivable by a concept as determinate as that by which all humans are conceived as humans, and that they are equally similar to

one another and definable by a single definition that applies to them univocally, since the ratio is the same for all in this respect. Yet he still denies the consequence that was being drawn from this — namely, that they share in some ratio abstracted from them and precisely conceived — just as the multiple humanities, when abstracted from singularities, do not share in some one humanity abstracted from them. His reason is this: whenever a single abstract and precisely conceived ratio is given from certain things, there must be another ratio distinct from it by which it is contracted to those things from which it is prescinded. But in the case of humanities as prescinded from singularities, there is no ratio by which humanity as thus abstracted is contracted to them; and the same holds for singularities. Hence, just as of humanities as such it would be better to say that all of them as such are one ratio rather than that they share in one ratio, so too in the present case the same must be said of singularities.

This solution, however, contains much that is false and self-contradictory. It concedes that all singularities and all individuals as such are conceivable by a concept as determinate as all humans in the ratio of human, and that they are also as similar to one another and definable by a single definition that applies to them univocally — just as all humanities are when prescinded from singularities — and yet it denies that from this it follows that they share in some ratio abstracted and precisely conceived from them. This appears plainly self-contradictory. For univocation is founded on the unity of a precisely abstracted ratio from the univocates, as is evident from the definition of univocals and from the common understanding of everyone. If therefore all individuations are definable by a univocal definition and that definition applies to them univocally, then that definition expresses one ratio abstracted and precisely conceived from them; and if this unity of precision is denied, the univocation founded on it and consisting in it is likewise denied.

Furthermore, the example Poncius adduces — of several humanities as precisely prescinded from singularity — cannot be admitted even on his own account. For he himself above at *disp. 3 de universali, ut sic quaest. 2 num. 35 and 44* denies that humanities, once singularities are prescinded, can be called many. They cannot be called many specifically, as is sufficiently evident in itself; but neither can they be called many numerically, since numerical plurality is founded on haecceities, as is also real and entitative distinction, which presupposes existence in the distinct extremes — and this does not apply to precised humanities. And even if we were willing to admit some plurality and real distinction among humanities precised from haecceities, as Lychet admits at *2 dist. 3 quaest. 1 and 6*, those humanities would be said to be of the same ratio — as he explains there — insofar as, since each is in itself a common nature, it can be contracted to constitute Peter just as well as Paul. But this cannot be said of haecceities, because one haecceity — say, Petrinity, precised from humanity — is not of itself indifferent to constituting Peter and Paul, but can constitute only Peter; and the same holds for Paulinity. Therefore it is false that singularities precised from humanities are of

the same ratio among themselves in the way that humanities precised from them are, because singularities too, even as precised from humanities, are so primarily diverse from one another that the one that by nature constitutes this individual cannot constitute another.

Fifth, other Scotists say that Petrinity and Paulinity agree with each other more closely than Petrinity and Bucephalinity do, but that since this agreement is only concomitant and reductive — that is, through the real identity they have with the contracted nature, which is of the same ratio in the individuals constituted by them — this does not imply a common ratio, because the formal ratio of humanity, which they contract, is not included quidditatively and formally in them, but only in the individuals constituted by them. And so it can be said only of those individuals that they are not primarily diverse but share quidditatively in something — not, however, of the ultimate differences, for these still remain primarily diverse; and it suffices for things said to be primarily diverse in this way that they share in nothing quidditatively and directly, even if they can agree concomitantly and by reason of another with which they are identified.

But as I said above at n. 24, these Scotists do not appear to grasp sufficiently the force of the argument. For it is one thing to compare haecceities to the nature they contract, and another to compare them to the common ratio of individuation as such — which is what the argument is about. In the first mode of comparison they are related as contracting to their contractible, and therefore do not formally and quidditatively include the contracted nature, because the determinable must be outside the ratio of the determining. But in the second mode of comparison, haecceities are related to individuation as such as inferiors to their superior, and therefore must quidditatively and formally include it. Hence, although this response may be good for resolving the argument about the greater agreement of two haecceities of the same species compared to those of different species — as was said at the aforesaid n. 24 — it does not at all avail when the argument presses the agreement and similarity of all haecceities in the ratio of individuation as such, which is precisely how the argument set out above presses the point.

Sixth, Pasqualigo at *disp. 43 cit. sect. 3 n. 15* responds that the agreement whereby one individuation agrees with another in being an individuation is not an agreement founded on a common ratio, but is merely an agreement of equivalence, whereby each individuation is of the same ratio as another equivalently, insofar as each has from its own intrinsic principle that by which it constitutes such a numerically determinate individual. But neither is this response better than the others; it differs from the second response only in words. What those Scotists called a proportion of one haecceity to another, this author calls equivalence, so as to appear to offer something new, at least in terminology. Hence this solution too must be refuted on the same grounds as that one, since it likewise opens the way to abolishing objective precision in whatever

predicamental grades there may be. For whenever one attempts to prove univocal agreement between human and beast in the common ratio of animal, or between Peter and Paul in the common ratio of human, it will at once be answered that this is not agreement founded on a common ratio, but merely an agreement of equivalence. And whatever is urged to prove the unity of univocation between Peter and Paul in the ratio of humanity can equally well be applied to prove similar agreement between Petrinity and Paulinity in the ratio of haecceity. This is confirmed as follows: effects of the same ratio, when they are univocal — that is, when they proceed univocally from a cause — indicate that their causes are of the same ratio, not merely virtually and equivalently, but also formally and with respect to specific unity. But the formal effects of Petrinity and Paulinity with respect to singularizing and distinguishing nature are of the same ratio and proceed univocally from haecceities, since they proceed from them in the genus of formal cause. Therefore they indicate that those causes are of the same specific ratio among themselves, not merely equivalently but also formally. The equivalential agreement put forward by Pasqualigo therefore does not suffice to undermine the force of the argument.

Seventh, Suarez at the cited place, convinced by the argument, concedes agreement not only of equivalence but also of the same specific ratio of one haecceity with another, yet adds that they do not have within themselves further differences rationally distinct from the concept in which they agree, because they are absolutely simple and irreducible to further concepts, but are determined in themselves not by any new addition but only by a fuller expression of that concept. Therefore, he says, the intellect cannot conceive a common ratio of individuation precisely abstracted from this and that individuation. Thus Suarez concedes a common ratio of individuation without conceding that it can be prescinded. This solution is self-contradictory: it concedes that individual differences agree with and differ from one another, and yet denies that the intellect can prescind the ratio of agreement from the ratio of difference — two things that are mutually opposed. For whenever two things are so related that they partly agree and partly differ, the intellect can exercise its prescissive power and contemplate those two things from the side on which they agree, without considering the side on which they differ. This is confirmed as follows: it is for no other reason that the intellect in individuals themselves — say, Peter and Paul — prescribes the ratio of humanity from the individual differences, except that it sees them agreeing in that ratio of nature and differing in that of differences, and from this motive takes the foundation for thinking about the ratio in which they agree while not considering the ratios in which they differ. If therefore this is a sufficient cause for the intellect to be able to prescind nature from individuals, it will likewise be sufficient in the present case for a common concept of haecceity to be prescinded from Petrinity and Paulinity.

Eighth, Aversa at the cited place, even though by virtue of the proposed argument he concedes that from individual differences a common ratio of individuation in

which they agree can be prescinded — by not thinking of the peculiar ratios in which they differ — nevertheless denies that it can be perfectly prescinded, because those peculiar ratios are always found involved in that common ratio, and add nothing to it that is even rationally distinct. But this mode of imperfect precision in metaphysical grades has been refuted many times above at *disp. 2 q. 3* and in the present *disput. q. 2 a n. 16*. Moreover, although between individuation as such and peculiar haecceities on the other side a perfect precision of the kind that obtains between a specific nature and its contracting differences cannot intervene — because the determining and the determinable formally exclude each other perfectly — there can still intervene that precision which usually obtains between a superior and an inferior, where the inferior includes the ratio of the superior quidditatively but not vice versa, because inferiors are said to supervene upon superiors. Since therefore individuation in common stands to Petrinity and Bajardiosity as to its proper inferiors, it will perfectly prescind from them. Furthermore, this author admits that Petrinity and Bajardiosity agree univocally in the common ratio of individuation just as Peter and Paul agree in the common ratio of human, and as any other individuals agree in the common ratio of their specific nature. But the specific concept is perfectly one and precisely abstracted from its inferiors — this is proved from *7 Metaph. 31*, where for this reason Aristotle calls the species atomic (*atoma*), that is, perfectly one, because it perfectly prescribes from its inferiors and from their contracting differences. But when a concept is imperfectly precised, it is not perfectly one, because it does not altogether exclude the inferiors from which multiplicity derives, since it at least implicitly includes them, according to the explanation of imperfect precision given by those modern authors who prescind imperfectly.

Finally, other Scotists, pressed by the force of the argument, concede that such a concept of individuation is abstractable from Petrinity and Paulinity, that it is a perfectly one and precisely conceived concept that is also perfectly univocal — yet deny that it is said univocally of them, maintaining that it is said of them only accidentally and denominatively. In this way, they say, the Doctor at *1 dist. 3 quaest. 3 §. Ad quaestionem igitur* holds that being is indeed univocal with respect to its proper passions and contracting modes — because it is predicated of them according to unity of name and ratio — yet is not said univocally, because it is not included in them essentially and quidditatively, as was said above at *disp. 2 q. 7 n. 193*. Consequently they say that the predications "Petrinity is a haecceity" and "Paulinity is a haecceity" are not essential and quidditative predications but identical and denominative ones, in the same way that they are said to be being. This was the solution of Canonicus, *1 Phys. q. 6*, and Maironis, *1 dist. 23 qu. 3*, embraced by Ragusa at the cited disputation, *cap. 39*. Vigerius also explains in this way the passages cited at the beginning of the question in favor of our position; for when the Doctor says that some per se unitary concept can be abstracted from the ultimate constitutives and distinctives, Vigerius says this must be understood of a concept that is per se one and indeed also univocal, yet not said univocally.

But this response too is directly excluded by the very principal argument itself, which proves that particular haecceities agree in the ratio of common individuation not in any casual manner but intrinsically and quidditatively. For Petrinity is essentially an individuation just as Peter is essentially human — and this is so clear and established as to need no further proof. Nor does this explanation fit well with the passages cited from Scotus, because the Doctor there says not only that some concept that is in some way one, or even univocal, can be abstracted from the ultimate constitutives, but one that is said univocally and in quid — as is apparent to anyone who reads the text, especially *1 dist. 26*. Nor is the analogy that those Scotists drew from the concept of being to the point, because it is one thing to compare individual differences to the concept of being, and another to compare them to the concept of individuation as such. With respect to the former they are related as the ultimately contracting to the first contractible; with respect to the latter, however, as individuals to their superior. Now although the predication of the contractible of the contracting is denominative — as when we say "rational is an animal," because the contractible is outside the ratio of the contracting — the predication of a superior of an inferior is always quidditative; and such is the predication "Petrinity is a haecceity," or "Petrinity is individuation."

The conclusion must therefore be that a common concept of individuation as such can be given, though not one founded on some common reality that is contractible by another reality — as the Doctor notes at *1 dist. 26 q. unic.* — and that is adequately expressed by it, as the one reality that is contractible by another is adequately expressed by the concept of animal. Rather, the concept of individuation is founded either on several individual differences conceived inadequately, or on one — say, Petrinity — conceived inadequately, so that the adequate concept of Petrinity as such is indeed simple with respect to realities but composite in the intellect, composed of a common and a proper concept. This will become clearer from the solution of the objections.

Objections Resolved.

Against the opposite position, Pasqualigo first argues as follows: in haecceity one cannot distinguish a contractible ratio from a contractive one; therefore a concept of individuation as such cannot be given that subsequently descends — as it were through contractives — to Petrinity and Paulinity. The consequence is evident; the antecedent is proved as follows: individuation, according to its formal ratio of individuation, is essentially an ultimate contractive, and as such cannot be further contracted.

I respond that just as universality, although according to its formal ratio of universality it is essentially contractible and a quo, can still be contractive as a mode — as appears when a universal that is a genus is contracted to the five universals through diverse and particular universalities to constitute them — so conversely singularity, although in itself and as a quo it is contractive, can through

the operation of the intellect conceiving Petrinity, say, inadequately, become universal as a mode, or be conceived under the ratio of a universal, without any contradiction. This is in the manner in which the Doctor says at *1 dist. 2 quaest. 3 §. Ad illa* that this proposition must be conceded: "a singular is a universal" — because although what is conceived is a singularity, the mode under which it is conceived is universality, since what is conceived as conceived has indifference to many. The argument therefore only proves that on the side of the thing there is no common nature of individuation contractible to many individuals through other differences — as there is a human nature — which is indeed true, since haecceity on the side of the thing is only contractive, and exercises no other real function than contracting and singularizing. Nevertheless, that real contractive thing which is called haecceity can be conceived inadequately, as it agrees with another haecceity in the function of making things ultimately differ; and then it assumes the mode of something contractible. And so through the intellect conceiving inadequately, the very same thing on the side of reality can be divided and partitioned into two objective concepts, of which one is common and contractible and the other proper and contractive.

Second: the contractible and the contractive import different formalities, and one must be outside the formal ratio of the other; therefore a common concept of individuation as such cannot be given. The antecedent is evident; and the consequence is proved as follows: the contractives of that common ratio will not have the ratio of individuation, and what does not have the ratio of individuation cannot be the determinative of anything common.

I respond that the contractible and the contractive express different formalities in the same way that contraction is carried out. If contraction is on the side of reality, they likewise express different formalities on the side of reality; if contraction is through the intellect, they are likewise separated only by reason, and one is outside the ratio of the other. This is what occurs in the present case. For Petrinity, say, in the intellect conceiving it inadequately is partitioned into two objective formalities, of which one is outside the other by reason; and individuation as such, although as a quo it is an individuation, is not — given the mode of conceiving — an individuation but rather something indifferent to many as a mode. The proper and contractive formality is properly conceived under the mode of individuation and of incommunicable singularity.

Third: individuals are distinguished according to their entire individual being and agree only in the ratio of nature; therefore a common concept of individuation cannot be given in which all individuations agree. The antecedent is evident; and the consequence is proved as follows: if they also agreed in the ratio of individuation, they would no longer be distinguished according to their entire individual being, nor would individuation be only a ratio of distinguishing but also of agreeing.

I respond by denying the consequence, because we do not say that the individuals — say, of human nature — agree in the ratio of individuation as such, but rather that their individuations — namely, Petrinity and Paulinity — do. And Petrinity, say, on the side of reality is only a ratio of distinguishing; but conceived confusedly and inadequately it can be a ratio of agreeing.

Fourth: it belongs to the ratio of individuation that it be this and numerically one; therefore it is directly repugnant to give a common concept of individuation that, as something common, descends to this and that individuation. The antecedent is evident; and the consequence is proved as follows: in that case such an object would be conceived under a mode altogether repugnant to it on the side of reality. This can also be confirmed by the argument that Scotus uses at *2 dist. 3 qu. 7* to prove that several angels can be under the same species. For he argues from the beginning of letter A thus: every quiddity of a creature can be understood under the ratio of a universal without contradiction; but if it were of itself this thing, it would be a contradiction to understand it under the ratio of a universal — just as it is a contradiction to understand the divine essence under the ratio of a universal, because the ratio of understanding is altogether repugnant to its object as understood. But in the present case singularity is of itself this and altogether incommunicable; therefore it cannot be conceived under the ratio of a universal.

And do not say that the antecedent is verified only of signate individuation and of this as numerically one, and not of individuation as such. For first, by responding in this way one would beg the question, since that response assumes individuation as such as possibly conceivable in the way that is here challenged. Second, there seems to be no other formal ratio of individuation that can be assigned other than this: that it is the ratio per se of being primarily this and incommunicable, and apt to render the nature it contracts thus incommunicable.

I respond that this argument only proves that individuation as such cannot be called universal and common essentially and as a quo, as human nature, bovine nature, and the like are called — which really present realities communicable to many. It does not prove, however, that individuation cannot be called and conceived under the ratio of a universal denominatively and as a mode. Nor is it unprecedented for one opposite to be so denominated from its opposite through a supervening intention, as the Doctor teaches repeatedly in his questions on universals. In this way the genus is called a universal species by virtue of the particular intention of species that supervenes upon it; so too equivocals, insofar as they are defined, are called univocal determinatively and as a mode, insofar as they ground the intention of univocation. And so in the present case the reality that is individuation and singularity can, essentially and as a quo, be called universal denominatively and as a mode. What I just said must therefore be understood of the reality that haecceity expresses on the side of the thing; for if we speak of the common concept that that reality grounds when conceived

inadequately, that common concept is essentially common and as a quo, and not merely denominatively and as a mode.

To the confirmation: the Doctor there speaks of the universality that is founded on a nature truly communicable to many on the side of the thing and capable of multiplication — a universality that the divine nature can no more ground than individuation can, for the same reason, as the argument correctly concludes. You will say: therefore the divine nature too will be able to ground at least that universality which individuation can ground — for there seems no more ground here for saying that individuation can be conceived in common than there is there. Or else individuation is conceived as universal and common falsely and without any foundation whatsoever. I respond that, although both the divine essence and individuation are of themselves this thing on the side of the thing, individuation can still with greater foundation be conceived under the ratio of a universal, because individuations are many on the side of the thing, and moreover have among themselves a certain similarity and agreement on the side of the thing — at least virtual and fundamental — in the mode of constituting and distinguishing individuals, which the divine essence does not have. The divine essence is unique on the side of the thing and cannot have a similar nature — formally or even fundamentally — on the side of the thing; and therefore it is altogether repugnant to it to be conceived under the ratio of a universal. I confess, however, that this argument, on account of the confirmation from Scotus, has greater evidence than the others.

Fifth: individuation by virtue of its formal ratio has it that it distinguishes and multiplies; but if individuations agreed in a common concept of individuation as such, they would not distinguish but would posit unity and agreement. This is confirmed: the differences that divide a common ratio, insofar as they divide, cannot agree among themselves — as is evident with specific differences. Therefore, just as specific differences cannot for this reason agree in any common concept, neither can individual ones.

I respond that the major is true of individuation as it is on the side of the thing and as it is conceived adequately, or as it is such essentially and as a quo. But conceived inadequately or confusedly, and as a mode, it can be a ratio of agreeing — not on the side of the thing, but through the intellect conceiving inadequately — and not in the individuals constituted by it on the side of the thing, but in the individuations themselves by which they are constituted. To the confirmation I respond in the same way: differences do not distinguish the things constituted by them except on the side of the thing or as conceived adequately; but in the intellect — especially one conceiving inadequately — they can also be ratios of agreeing. And this same can be said of specific differences compared with one another, because although in themselves they do not share in any of the genera that they divide, they do agree in this — that they have a similar mode of dividing a genus and constituting a species — a common ratio that Porphyry himself

describes in *cap. de differentia* when he says that difference is divisive of genus and constitutive of species.

Sixth: individuation in the predicamental line imports the ultimate grade of being, at which nature and all grades of that predicamental coordination are ultimately terminated; therefore a common ratio of individuation as such cannot be given that descends to all individuations, since otherwise it would not itself be the ultimate complement but could be completed by others by which it is contracted. This is confirmed: since individuation is the ultimate grade in the predicamental coordination, it follows also that it is the ultimate distinctive; therefore it is impossible for one individuation to agree with another in the ratio of individuation, because then it would not be the ultimate distinctive.

I respond that this is so on the side of the thing, since just as individuation is the ultimate predicamental reality, so also is it the ultimate constitutive and distinctive of things. Yet even so, the intellect conceiving it inadequately can intentionally partition it into two objective concepts, of which one is common and the other proper; and according to the former it can still be further contracted and divided. You will say: therefore there could be a process to infinity. The consequence is denied, for on the side of reality there is a stopping point in the individual differences themselves, since they are simple realities and irreducible to further ones. As for how there is also no infinite regress among conceptual ratios, I have already said this at *disp. 5 Log. cit. quaest. 2 art. 4*, where I also explained the three arguments of Scotus by which he proved at *1 dist. 3 q. 3 §. Ad quaestionem* that individual differences are primarily diverse and do not share quidditatively in anything — for he is speaking of agreement with respect to reality, not with respect to inadequate and rational concepts.

Seventh, Poncius argues at the cited place as follows: if individuation can be a common ratio for all individuals or individuations, then what is constituted by it would not be singular but universal. Second, because human nature, for example, is a metaphysical universal because it is common in this way; therefore the same would have to be said of individuation if it were common in this way. Third, because Peter is a singular and not a universal precisely because he is not common to many; therefore if individuation is common in this way, it cannot be of itself this, nor can an individual be constituted by it in such being. Fourth, because that ratio as thus abstracted would have to be contracted to this and that individuation by other differences — just as animal in common is contracted to human and beast through rationality and irrationality — and so there would be a process to infinity. Fifth, because no common nature of this kind can be assigned, nor can any effect in the nature of things be assigned to which it would serve, nor any real and physical function it would exercise — as humanity is said to be the principle of rational operations, animality the principle of sensitive ones, and so on. Sixth, because singularity as thus abstracted would have to have some common nature corresponding to it that it would make singular — but this cannot be assigned.

Finally, because if Petrinity did not agree in such a common concept with Paulinity, it would still singularize Peter's nature and formally constitute Peter as singular; therefore such agreement with Paulinity in something common is assigned in vain.

I respond that these arguments tend to prove that haecceity cannot have such community on the side of the thing as other common natures have — such as human nature, equine nature, and the like — which is absolutely true, for we attribute to it community only through the operation of the intellect conceiving it inadequately; otherwise on the side of the thing we say it is of itself this and per se primarily singular.

To the first, then, I freely concede that no signate singular is constituted by individuation as such, because under that abstraction it does not constitute a singular; it does so as it is on the side of the thing, where it is of itself this and incommunicable. To the second: individuation cannot be called a metaphysical universal, because it has no community on the side of the thing — neither positive nor negative — indeed, as it exists on the side of the thing it is of itself this, and only through the intellect conceiving it inadequately can it have community of reason. To the third, I respond in the same way: individuation is not of itself common on the side of the thing as humanity or animality is, but only through the intellect conceiving it inadequately. To the fourth: there is no process to infinity on the side of the thing, because individuation itself — say, Petrinity — is the ultimately constitutive and distinctive reality on the side of the thing. And how there is likewise no such infinite regress in the intellect conceiving inadequately has been stated at the cited *disp. Log. quaest. 2 art. 4*. To the fifth: I freely concede that no effect or real operation can be assigned of which individuation in common is the principle, because there is no truly common and real nature on the side of the thing as there is with humanity and animality; it has community only through the intellect. The formal effect corresponding to it in that state would be to render the real common natures singular and individual — not in exercised being, because it performs that function on the side of reality, but as it were in signate being. To the sixth: individuation as such does not regard any nature as singularizable through it, because in that state it has rather the ratio of something contractible through the intellect than of something contractive. And if it has the ratio of something contractive, it has this in signate being rather than exercised being, and thus regards all real common natures indeterminately as contractible, but not any one certain and determinate nature. To the last: the antecedent being conceded, the consequence is denied, because the agreement of Petrinity with Paulinity in a common concept of individuation as such is not assigned on the grounds that it constitutes Peter in singular being, but for the reason adduced in proving the conclusion.

Finally: if the ultimate individual differences can share quidditatively in the concept of individuation as such, then they will equally be able to share in the

concept of being — especially since the concept of being itself, as was said above at *disp. 2 de natura entis*, is not founded on any contractible reality. But this is expressly denied by the Doctor at *1 dist. 3 quaestion. 3*, therefore and so on.

I respond that there is no lack of eminent Scotists who, on this ground, have admitted that the ultimate differences also include the concept of being quidditatively. Bassolis appears to hold this at *dist. 12 q. 4 art. 3*, where he says that by this the primary diversity of the differences is not removed, because the univocation of being is not real — that is, founded on a reality on the side of the thing contractible by another actual reality, as are the predicamental grades — but is according to a rational concept. Hence it is still compatible with the ultimate differences being primarily diverse from one another on the side of the thing, since they share in no real concept on the side of the thing. Lychet reasons in the same way at *1 dist. 26 qu. un. §. Sed contra*, where he says: "I say that being is predicated in quid of God and of the ultimate differences in the same way, although it is predicated in quid of the ten categories in another way. For of God and of the ultimate differences it is predicated in quid as expressing a concept not taken from a reality perfectible by another, whereas as it is predicated of the ten categories, the predicate expresses a concept abstracted from a reality as perfectible by another reality."

And indeed this manner of speaking seems to have great foundation in the Doctor at *2 dist. 3 q. 6 §. Ad quaestionem*, where he says that simple unity — which is numerical unity — follows per se upon individual entity or haecceity as its proper passion. From this assertion of Scotus the following argument can be made: everything that unity proximately follows upon is truly and formally being, since unity is an affection of being; but numerical unity — the greatest among all — proximately follows upon haecceity; therefore haecceity is formally and quidditatively being.

Nevertheless, it is far more probable that being is not included quidditatively in the ultimate differences, even if it does not express a reality but a rational concept. For this is the express mind of the Doctor at *1 d. 3 quaestion. 3*, as was proved at *disput. 2 de natura entis quaestion. 7 artic. 1*, because the contractible and the determinable is always outside the ratio of the contractive and determinative. Since therefore being is the first of all contractibles and determinables, and the individual differences are the ultimately contractive, it follows necessarily that being is not formally and quidditatively included in them. This is the principal argument used by the Doctor at the cited place to prove that being is not included quidditatively in the ultimate differences. Hence it matters little that, given quidditative inclusion of being in them, the primary diversity of those differences is not thereby abolished; for even granting this, the argument still presses that they stand to being as ultimately contractive, and therefore must necessarily exclude it from their formal concept.

From this it is also clear that the ultimate differences are not related to being as such, and individuation as such, in the same way. For they regard being as a concept contractible through them, and therefore exclude it from their formal ratio; whereas they regard the common concept of individuation as their superior, and therefore necessarily include it in their formal ratio.

As for what was adduced on the other side from Scotus at *2 dist. 3 qu. 6 §. Ad quaestionem*, it must be correctly understood. The Doctor does not there properly intend that individual unity follows upon haecceity as its proper passion, but says that it follows upon the individual — that is, the whole constituted from haecceity and nature — as its proper passion, and that haecceity is the reason why that passion follows upon it. Similarly, formal unity, which is less than numerical unity, does not follow upon the specific difference as its proper passion, but upon the entire species, and flows from the entire specific nature, although the difference is the quo principle and the determinate ground of that consequence. So likewise in the present case it must be said that individual unity truly and properly follows upon the whole individual as its adequate subject and flows from the entire individual nature, whereas haecceity is only the determinate but inadequate reason for that consequence — and therefore from this it cannot be inferred that it is formally being and quidditatively.

From the resolution of this question, the difficulty adduced by the Thomists at the end of the preceding question at n. 142 against the principle of individuation we have established is finally resolved. Nature, they said, cannot be made individual through something common — and the Doctor always uses this as a medium against the opinions of others — but haecceity as what is common to several haecceities (say, to Petrinity and Paulinity) is no less common than humanity itself is to Peter and Paul. For just as it is valid to say "Peter is a human" and "Paul is a human," expressing a predication of superior to inferior, so it is equally valid to say "Petrinity is a haecceity" and "Paulinity is a haecceity," and so on.

This difficulty, I say, is resolved as follows. When Scotus says that a nature cannot be individuated through something common, he is speaking of what is common of itself or not of itself this on the side of the thing, not of what is common through the intellect — as is clear from his question at *6 dist.* For he insists there that no created nature can be formally individual by itself, because every such nature is of itself common on the side of the thing, and therefore needs something contractive that on the side of the thing is of itself this and per se primarily singular. Such, he says, is the haecceity of every created thing, which is its altogether ultimate reality in the predicamental line. The fact that such a reality can be conceived inadequately and through the consideration of the intellect take on a certain community of reason does not prevent it from still being posited as a principle of individuation. For to this end it suffices that it is not something common on the side of the thing, even if the intellect through its operation can

impart to it some community of reason. It is therefore clear how that major proposition is to be understood in Scotus — hence the minor must be denied, along with its proof — namely, that haecceity is common to Petrinity and Paulinity in the same way that humanity is to Peter and Paul. For humanity is common on the side of the thing through the indifference explained in the preceding disputation to Peter and Paul; haecceity is not so to Petrinity and Paulinity — it is so only through the intellect.

But you will say: from the real agreement and similarity of Peter and Paul in human nature we infer the real community of that nature; but Petrinity and Paulinity assimilate and agree in the nature of haecceity as much as Peter and Paul agree in human nature; therefore haecceity will be equally real in common to Petrinity and Paulinity as humanity is to Peter and Paul.

I respond by denying the minor. For the agreement and similarity of Peter and Paul in human nature and in its operations is real and actual on the side of the thing, and therefore requires a real and actual foundation — namely, the real unity and community of nature in both through indifference. The similarity and agreement of Petrinity and Paulinity in the nature of haecceity as such, however, is not real and actual but only virtual and fundamental; hence on the side of the thing those two haecceities are altogether of a different ratio and primarily diverse from each other.

But you will say again: since in the quidditative predicates common to haecceity, Petrinity and Paulinity agree as much as Peter and Paul agree in the predicates pertaining to humanity, why is the agreement not equally real and actual in both cases, or equally merely fundamental and virtual in both? I respond from the Doctor at 2 *dist. 3 quaest. 6 §. Ad quaestionem*: because agreement in constitutives is never as great as agreement in what is constituted, and every difference of differing things must be reduced to some things that are primarily diverse — that is, sharing in nothing quidditatively on the side of the thing — lest there be a process to infinity, as Aristotle teaches at 5 *Met. cap. de eodem*. Now these primarily diverse things, to which one must finally arrive in the predicamental line, are the ultimate individual differences; and therefore their agreement in the common ratio of haecceity cannot be posited as formal and actual, but only as virtual and fundamental. Nor can any more immediate reason be given for this most difficult point.

Question XI. Whether among individuals of the same species there is an inequality of perfection, and also some dissimilarity beyond the fact that one is not the other.

This question has two parts. In the first, the inquiry is whether individual difference brings with it some inequality of perfection, such that one individual is more perfect than another in its individual being. Although this question is usually treated in particular by authors in connection with rational souls — asking

whether all are equal or unequal in individual perfection, given the supposition that they are all of the same species — yet since this difficulty is common to all individuals of whatever species, including inanimate ones, it must be treated here universally of all, just as it is reasonably proposed concerning souls because we see one soul operating better and more perfectly than another. So too it must be proposed and examined concerning all other individuals, because one fire is hotter than another, one wine acts more powerfully and is finer than another, one flesh more delicate than another, and so on. For this reason I rightly did not treat this question in the book on the soul — as others do — but deliberately deferred it to this place, for common disputation concerning all individuals, so that what is to be said about all of them might be stated once and in common.

For the sense of the question in this part to be clear, it should be noted that the question here is not about equality or inequality in accidental and extrinsic perfection, nor about intensive or extensive perfection of individuals — for everyone agrees that one individual is more perfect than another in this sense, since one has better accidents: a better constitution, finer form, and keener intellect than another. Similarly, in individuals of quantity or quality that admit extension or intension, one line is longer than another, a heat of four is more intense than a heat of two and therefore more perfect within the same species. Nor again is the question about equality or inequality in essential and quidditative perfection, since here too everyone agrees that individuals of whatever species are altogether equal in this perfection, because individual differences are not formal differences pertaining to quiddity, and therefore bring with them no perfection of this order. The difficulty is therefore solely about intrinsic entitative perfection, which cannot vary among different individuals and consists precisely in the individuating differences constitutive of the singulars themselves.

Likewise the title of the question regarding its second part about dissimilarity must be explained — especially since the more recent authors treat the question only in this sense. Since it is agreed by everyone that individual differences introduce among individuals a distinction such that one is not the other, the question is whether they import only this distinction — that one is not the other — or whether they can introduce some further greater inconvenience within the same species. Here again the difficulty is not about accidental dissimilarity, which everyone concedes among individuals of the same species, but about intrinsic and entitative dissimilarity, which indispensably pertains to the intrinsic and individual being of a thing.

On this controversy there are two extreme opinions and one that is quasi-intermediate. The first extreme teaches that individual differences not only bring with them a distinction of individuals, but also an inequality in individual perfection, such that by reason of individual difference not only is this individual not that, but it is also more perfect than it in entitative being. For this position are cited: the Master at 2 *dist.* 32; Bonaventure and Richard at the same place, *qu.* 4

art. 1; Aegidius, *qu. 4*; Thomas, *part. 1 qu. 85 art. 7* with Cajetan and Bannes; Ferrariensis, *1 contra Gent. cap. 13*; Javellus, *8 Metaph. quaest. 6*; Rubius, *2 de Anim. cap. 3 qu. 3*; and very many others from among the more recent, especially Arriaga, *disp. 1 de Anim. sect. 7 subsect. 2*, and Oviedo, *controv. 1 de Anim. punct. 8 §. 4*. Whether individual difference necessarily always imports this inequality of perfection universally in all individuals, or only in some, is a matter on which some affirm the first — as Fonseca, *5 Metaph. cap. 28 q. 16* — and others the second — as Arriaga at the cited place and Aversa, *q. 9 sect. 14*. The arguments they put forward prove this especially of rational souls, as they treat this question specifically with regard to those. Accordingly they also answer affirmatively on the second part of the question about dissimilarity — namely, that there can be found, and indeed that there actually exists, an individual difference that, beyond being this and being that, imports some further greater inconvenience within the same species.

This they prove especially from the act of vision by which one whiteness is seen, compared with the act of vision by which another whiteness is seen. For those acts differ not only in being this and that vision, but also because they are ordered to different objects — and this order is intrinsic and substantial to them, not accidental. The same occurs in relations that are to terms of the same ratio, in all acts of cognition and appetite whose terms are of the same ratio, and in other accidents of this kind. So appear to think Fonseca, *5 Metaph. cap. 10 quaest. 7 sect. 3 and 4*, and Suarez, *disput. 5 Metaph. sect. 8 num. 15*. Arriaga at the cited place explains it thus: those things are said to differ in species that differ notably from each other and are notably dissimilar — for they can in this way be said to differ essentially. Hence if two things are found to differ even in intrinsic predicates, yet through such predicates are not notably dissimilar, they must not be said to differ in species but only in number; and still it must be said that such dissimilarity belongs to them by reason of individual differences, because it does not belong to them by reason of differences that make them differ notably, such as are only essential and specific differences. From this he infers that, although two visions terminated to two numerically different whitenesses differ more intrinsically than several terminated to the same whiteness, since they do not differ notably they must not be considered specifically distinct, but only numerically distinct by reason of individual differences.

Oviedo at the cited place, while agreeing with Arriaga that only notable difference is specific difference and that therefore the said visions do not differ in species, does not wish them to differ merely in number, nor by reason of individual differences alone; rather, he holds they differ by reason of some predicate common to all those terminated to the same whiteness, which does not belong to those terminated to different whitenesses. Since this does not make them notably dissimilar, it does not make them differ in species — though it does make them differ more than in number. Hence he consequently admits that there must be some intrinsic predicate common to several that distinguishes them from others

more than numerically, though not specifically, because it does not distinguish them notably. This common predicate — which is the cause of a difference intermediate between specific and individual — he consequently holds must be called intermediate between specific and individual: less universal than the specific, and more broadly ranging than the individual.

The other extreme opinion entirely denies this inequality of perfection among individuals arising from individual differences, and asserts that the entire function of individual difference consists in this: that this is this and that is that. And accordingly it likewise responds on the other part of the question that individual differences introduce no greater inconvenience or dissimilarity among individuals of the same species beyond the fact that one is not the other. Consequently it says that visions terminated to numerically different whitenesses differ in species from those terminated to the same whiteness, or if they differ only in number, the greater inconvenience found among them is not intrinsic but accidental and extrinsic — in the sense that, although it is inseparable from them, it is not of their formal ratio, because such inseparability proceeds only from the real identity with them of that determinate order to this or that whiteness, and not from formal and essential identity. For this position are cited: Henry, *quol.* 3 q. 9; Durandus, *dist.* 32 qu. 3; Argentine at the same place, *qu.* 1 art. 2; Soncinas, 8 *Metaph.* qu. 27; Soto, *in Log. cap. de Subst. quaest.* 2 art. 5; Zimara, *theor.* 44; Toletus, 3 *de Anim. quaest.* 18; Pasqualigo, *tom.* 2 *Metaph. disp.* 44. And this is the position of Scotus and the Scotists, at places cited presently.

The third intermediate opinion is that of Aversa at the cited place, *sect.* 13, who notes that "species" can be understood in two ways: logically and physically. In the first way it is taken for the infima species as predicable, which is so predicated of many differing numerically that it is the first and proximate intrinsic predicate in which the individuals agree, and no other predicates are intermediate between such a species and the ultimate individuals. Physical species, on the other hand, is what is used for some one species, although in truth it does not import one predicate that immediately stands to individuals in the way the logical species does, but rather some intermediate predicates between it and the individuals. Given this distinction, he reconciles the two extreme opinions. For if the discussion is about logical species, it is plainly true that individuals neither are nor can be of unequal perfection, nor can they admit any greater dissimilarity beyond the fact that one is not the other — so that they agree in all intrinsic predicates except individuation; and in this sense the second opinion is true. But if species is taken physically, by reason of that intermediate predicate, individuals can be found unequal in intrinsic and substantial perfection and differing more than by being this and being that. This he shows by the same examples used by the first opinion. In this Aversa and Oviedo agree — for Oviedo also admits such a predicate intermediate between the specific and the individual, in which several individuals can agree and by which they are distinguished from other individuals of the same species, by a difference intermediate between individual and specific.

I say first that this intermediate opinion is altogether unreasonable and useless. This is proved as follows. If by physical species is meant a predicate that is not immediately contracted through individuation but through another predicate intermediate between it and individuation — as Aversa explains — then it is plainly clear that this is not a species but a genus in reality, as Pasqualigo rightly argues at the cited *sect.* 2. The consequence is proved because every predicate mediating between genus and individual differences is an essential predicate pertaining to the constitution of nature, and thus it will be a specific predicate; and so individuals participating in such a predicate will differ in species from other individuals not participating in it — not merely in number or more than in number within the same species.

This is confirmed: the common predicate by which two visions of the same white differ from two visions of two different whites is a specific predicate; therefore what immediately contracts it is generic, and the things distinguished through it will be specifically distinct. The antecedent is proved: that predicate is predicated essentially of several things differing in number, and this is the essential ratio of a specific predicate, as is evident from *cap. de specie*. This is confirmed again: that predicate is not individual, because nothing individuated is common to many; nor is it generic, because it is common to several differing in number only; therefore it will be specific.

Oviedo responds that the predicate common to two visions proceeding from the same faculty and tending to the same white is not individual — because it is common to several — nor specific — because it does not notably distinguish those two visions from other visions terminated to another white. And so that predicate is intermediate between specific and individual, and likewise the difference rooted in it: purely individual — since it is common to several — yet not purely specific — since it is not notable. But this response inverts logical and metaphysical principles. For from it it would follow that the infima species (species specialissima) is not atomic, nor is it immediately contracted through individual differences to its individuals in the predicamental line.

Oviedo responds again that such a predicate intermediate between specific and individual does not belong to the predicamental line, and that metaphysicians or logicians do not treat of it when they divide the supreme ratio of a category down to the ultimate ratio, because they did not much care to know the nature of these predicates — since no constituent differs notably by reason of them. But against this: that predicate belongs to the intrinsic constitution of those individuals to which it is common; therefore it must itself belong to the predicamental line, just as do other metaphysical grades. Moreover, individual grades make things differ less notably than do these intermediate predicates invented by these authors; therefore, if the latter are not fictitious, logicians should have treated of them just as they did of others. Furthermore, even granting these intermediate predicates, if the greater-than-numerical diversity is had by reason of them and not of the

individuations themselves, the question posed is not answered — since the question proceeds only about diversity arising from individuations, not from any other source. Finally, if this greater-than-numerical diversity is through some predicate that is in some way essential and intrinsic, it will be a specific diversity.

Oviedo responds again that it is not a specific diversity, because it is not notable; hence he infers that in two actions regarding fire A, say, the common predicate of regarding this principle does not make those two actions differ in species from actions that cannot reach this principle but must regard another and different one — because by that predicate these actions are not notably dissimilar, for regarding this fire rather than that one is esteemed as small by prudent judgment, and is therefore insufficient to constitute an essential and specific difference.

Against this: as Poncius rightly argues at *disp. 6 Log. quaest. 10 in fine*, it is a very notable difference that this action cannot, even by God's absolute power, proceed from the principle from which that one proceeds, and that this vision cannot extend to the white that is the object of the other. And certainly even by prudent human estimation many things are judged to differ in species in which there is no such notable difference as that which obtains between those actions and visions — as is clear from many herbs, fishes, and stones. Furthermore, it is altogether vain to want to base the essential and specific difference of things on the moral estimation of humans, because every thing has its intrinsic and essential predicates independently of such estimation. Moreover, when a small difference between two things can be underestimated by moral estimators — as Oviedo himself admits — such a difference may be an essential difference for physicists. Furthermore, when it is said that specific difference obtains only between things that differ notably, this is understood either of notability on the side of the thing or on our side — so that we perceive that notable distinction between them and they are therefore said to differ in species. The latter cannot be meant, because though we do not perceive any notable distinction between a lion and a sheep, they still differ in species. If the former is meant, then I will say that a greater-than-numerical difference, if it occurs through essential and intrinsic predicates and not through accidents, is a notable difference — sufficient for it to be called specific.

I say second: there is no inequality of entitative perfection among several individuals of the same species. I said this is Scotus's position at *disp. 5 de Gener. et Corrupt. qu. 5 art. 2*. Although in *8 Metaph. qu. 3* he appears to proceed problematically on this matter — disputing whether substance admits of more and less — in the Sentences he repeatedly favors this negative conclusion, as may be seen at *2 dist. 16 q. unic. in fine*, where he denies that the powers of the soul are more perfect in one than in another, and at *dist. 20 q. 2*, where he holds that individuals of the human species can be produced indifferently by any parent — just as in other species — which could not occur if individuals in the genus of substance were of unequal individual perfection, since the more imperfect

cannot produce the more perfect. The same is gathered from *4 dist. 44 quaest. 1 supra F.*, as I deduce there at n. 134, where I also adduced in favor of this conclusion Tataretus, *capit. de substantia quaest. 2 dub. 2*; Bargius, *1 dist. 8 quaest. 2 §. Ad aliud de attributione*; Maironis, *passus 17 in praedic.*; Cavellius, *disp. 1 de Anim. sect. 10*; and it is best defended by Poncius at the cited place. For other passages of Scotus bearing on this see above, *disput. 8 quaest. 7 num. 227*, where the Doctor requests inequality in species just as he requests equality in individuals. I proved this conclusion at the cited place on *de Generatione* specifically of material substances, showing that they do not admit of more and less — not divisibly and successively, as the Averroists held, nor indivisibly and simultaneously, as the Thomists hold (with whom some Scotists agree in this point, as I said there). My proof there proceeded a priori at n. 135 from what it means to admit more and less in material forms, as commonly explained. For this is nothing other than several portions of the same specific form being united and compenetrated with one another to constitute a more perfect form. Since such a gradual union, or union of individual grades of substance, is repugnant — as proved there — I conclude that no material substantial form admits of more and less in an individual, and that one is not individually more perfect than another.

From this I then deduce at n. 136 that for the same reason such inequality cannot be admitted even in rational souls, because since the soul is an indivisible substance — both extensively and intensively — like an angel, it cannot admit such a union or compenetration of several individual grades within itself. Or at least this inequality of perfection in spiritual substances must be explained in some other way.

If it is said that in spiritual substances individual perfection does not import that plurality of grades, but rather a certain substantial mode through which nature is determined to this and that individual, so that one individual is more perfect than another and has a more perfect substantial mode by which it is constituted in the being of such a perfect individual — which substantial mode does not really differ from the individual difference — this response was rejected there at n. 137. For if in material things this greater or lesser individual perfection is explained through gradual latitude or the plurality of individual grades of the same form, it should be explained in the same way in immaterial forms as well; or if in the latter such inequality is explained through the variety of a certain substantial mode, it should be explained in the same way in material things — or it should be denied in all. Furthermore, this substantial mode either flows from nature or from the individual difference. If from nature, then it will not be more perfect in one individual than in another, since nature is of the same ratio in all. If from the individual difference, the same follows, since individual differences, antecedently to such a mode, are posited as altogether equal in individual perfection. See this argument developed more fully at the cited place.

Second, the conclusion is further proved by a general argument a priori for all individuals. Individual and ultimately constitutive entities are not quantal beings — that is, they do not express perfection and a quantity of virtue — as I showed at *disp. 7 Metaph. quaest. 2 num. 31* from the Doctor at *quol. 5 in fine* and *quol. 19 art. 2*, and more clearly below at letter R, where he says: "properly speaking, perfection does not seem to belong except to quidditative entity, because hypostatic entity is not that according to which something is perfected, but according to which something receives perfection, or at least is determined to the perfection received." So according to the Doctor, individual difference is not so much a perfection as a determination of perfection. The reason is that just as it does not formally and directly include the ratio of being — from what was said at *disp. 2 de natura entis quaest. 7* — so neither does it include proper and formal goodness, nor consequently proper quantity of perfection, which is an intrinsic mode of being and the foundation of the latter. If therefore individual differences are not quantal beings, it follows that equality or inequality in perfection cannot belong to them, since these are passions of being as quantal alone, as was stated at the cited place. Hence when we say that all individuals of the same infima species are equal in entitative perfection, this must not be taken strictly and positively — as if each included an equal grade of perfection, since none formally includes any such grade — but rather negatively: insofar as no individual as such includes any perfective grade. This, for Scotists, must be the a priori reason why in whatever species no individual can be more perfect than another. Nor can any other answer be given than to deny that individual differences do not formally include the ratio of being — which has been proved more than sufficiently at the cited place.

This is confirmed: everyone admits that individuals of the same species are equal in essential and specific perfection, on the grounds that all and each participate in a nature of the same ratio, on which such equality is founded. Therefore, when we say that individuals of the same species are equal in individual and entitative perfection, this must not be taken positively — for then it would follow that individuals as such participate in some entity of the same ratio, in which such equality would be founded. This is altogether repugnant, because individuals by reason of their individuations are primarily diverse and participate in no entity of the same ratio other than the specific nature. It must therefore be understood only negatively: insofar as no individual as such formally includes any perfection by reason of individuation.

Third, because the argument just made concludes only on Scotist principles, it is further proved that even granted that each particular individuation brings some special perfection to its individual, it still cannot be said that one brings more perfection than another. This I prove from the formal effect of individuation, which is to terminate nature incommunicably and render the individual one certain, designatable, and incommunicable thing. Since this formal effect of individuation is equal in all, the formal cause of it — which is individuation —

will also be equal as regards conferring this individual perfection. The consequence is evident from the proportion of formal effect with its cause: the more perfect the formal cause, the more perfect the formal effect flowing from it. The antecedent is proved: nature is not more incommunicably terminated through one individuation than through another, nor is Peter rendered more certain, designatable, and incommunicable through Petrinity than Paul is through Paulinity. Therefore the formal effect of individuation is no more perfect in one individual than in another, but is equal.

This is confirmed: for one individual to be said more perfect than another in individual being, it would have to be more completely and terminately individuated — in the sense of being more certainly, designatedly, and incommunicably terminated — than another individual through its own individuation. But this is impossible, because every individual is equally incommunicable in its own way, and individuation in each is the ultimate complement and ultimate terminus with respect to communicability as a quo. Since therefore one individual cannot be in a more perfect condition than another with respect to incommunicable being, it will plainly be impossible for one to be more perfect than another in individual perfection.

This argument is also adduced by Pasqualigo at the cited place, but it could be weakened by an analogy drawn from species with respect to communicability. For all species are equally communicable, and one is not more communicable than another, yet they are still unequal in quidditative and essential perfection. Therefore the same should be said of individual perfection: that although one individual is not more incommunicable than another, it can still be individually more perfect.

But this instantiation is easily blocked, because the ratio is not the same in this respect for specific difference in relation to species and for individual difference in relation to the individual. The specific difference confers not only communicable being on the species, but also a grade of essence that can be nobler and more perfect than the grade of essence conferred by another — as is clear with rational and irrational. But this cannot be said of individual differences, for these give precisely the being of this determinate and incommunicable thing — which is conferred by all and each in exactly the same manner. Therefore no inequality of individual perfection can be assessed from them.

Fourth, from this another argument can be derived: the function of individual difference as such is nothing other than to make nature this and individual, and to make this individual not to be that. Its function extends no further, and this entire distinction among individuals is had by its virtue without any excess of perfection of one over another. Therefore such an excess cannot be assessed on the basis of individual differences, because the entire power of haecceity is exhausted in making this individual not to be that — not in making this individual more perfect than another.

This is confirmed: whatever excess of perfection is admitted among individuals introduces among them a greater distinction than numerical and individual — namely, that this is not that — as is evident in itself and as the adversaries concede, who say that individual distinction is preserved without an excess of perfection. But individual differences, of their own nature, cannot cause a greater distinction than individual — namely, that this is not that — as will be proved in the following conclusion. Therefore through them no inequality of perfection can obtain among individuals.

Some respond that it is true that by virtue of individuation as such only individual distinction is had — making things be this and that — but that by reason of such individuation some greater distinction can be had. But this solution is rejected from what was said in the preceding question, where it was concluded that all individual differences are primarily diverse on the side of the thing, and that there is no real concept of individuation (but at most one through the intellect) that is contracted to such and such an individuation. Therefore on the side of the thing individuation as such cannot be distinguished from such and such an individuation. Furthermore, if so many formalities could be distinguished in the same haecceity — such that according to one it gives individual distinction and according to another a greater distinction — then it could equally be said that it also gives specific distinction, indeed generic distinction, by multiplying formalities in it. Therefore Oviedo at the cited place says that the excess of perfection would be founded on that common predicate which some individuals of the same species would participate in and others would not, and by which the former would be distinguished from the latter. But it has already been shown in the preceding conclusion that there is no such common predicate intermediate between the specific and the individual. Furthermore, even granting it, if that greater distinction is not had by reason of individuations but by reason of such a predicate, and likewise the excess of perfection, we are already outside the present question — which proceeds about distinction and perfection that can be had precisely from the individuations themselves. And finally, given the opposite position, it is not clear why — if several individuals can exceed others in perfection — one individual taken singly cannot exceed another; and given that case, this response collapses, because then the one would exceed not by reason of some predicate common to it with others, but precisely by reason of its own haecceity.

Fifth, there are some individuals of the same species in which no excess of perfection is discernible — as is clear in homogeneous things. For if water is divided into several parts, several individuals result that are equally perfect in individual being. But the ratio is the same for these and for all others of whatever species. Therefore all will be altogether of the same individual perfection. The minor is proved: in other individuals of other species nothing is found beyond the specific nature except the proper individual differences; since therefore in the example of several waters the individual differences do not posit an excess of

perfection of one individual over another, the same must be said of individuals of other species, because in this respect all individual differences are of the same ratio in whatever species.

This is confirmed: if any inequality of perfection could arise from individual difference, it would arise most of all from the individual difference of rational souls, because we see one soul operating better than another — and from a more perfect operation a more perfect form is argued. But this is not sufficient for such inequality to be posited in them; therefore still less so in others. The major is evident: this is the reason why the present question is treated specifically of rational souls by authors rather than of other individuals. The minor is proved: whatever excess of perfection is found in the operations of the soul among different humans is also found in the same human at different times. A great variation is seen in the same person when young, adolescent, or old; and a great variation also occurs from certain customs. This is not because the same soul is at one time substantially more perfect and at another time less perfect than itself, but from the varying temperament of the body and its organs, which are at one time more and at another time less purified. Since therefore such difference or variation in the operations of the soul is sufficiently explained from the variation in accidental temperament and other humors alone, without any substantial or individual difference in body or soul, it is wrong to argue from this to an excess of substantial perfection of one soul over another.

This is further confirmed: if from a more perfect operation we always wish to argue to a greater substantial perfection in the agent, then such perfection or excess of perfection would have to be attributed to nature rather than to individual difference, because nature is the ratio of acting while individual difference is only a condition of acting or of the agent. Therefore such inequality could in no way be assessed on the part of the differences.

Finally, in support of this conclusion there is the express authority of Aristotle at *3 Metaph. 11*, where he teaches that among individuals of the same species there is no prior and posterior — that is, no more and less perfect — as is gathered from the words of the text, which I weighed at the cited *disp. de Gen. n. 133*.

I say third: among individuals of the same species, by virtue of individuations, no greater substantial dissimilarity or diversity can be found beyond the fact that one is not the other. I said "substantial," because a greater accidental distinction can certainly be had above being this and being that — namely by reason of intension, or extension, or another accident following upon this or that individual difference.

This conclusion follows from the preceding one, where it was proved that any excess of entitative perfection found among individuals — if it were given — would introduce among them a greater distinction than individual — namely, that this is not that. And since it was proved there that no such excess obtains

among individuals of the same species, it follows that no such greater dissimilarity can obtain among them. Hence the conclusion is proved by virtually the same arguments as the preceding one. The principles of constitution and distinction are the same; and in the same precise manner in which they constitute, they also distinguish — so that what constitutes specifically also distinguishes specifically, and what constitutes individually also distinguishes only individually and not by a greater distinction. But individual difference constitutes only individually; therefore it also distinguishes only individually. The major has been proved; the minor is evident in itself; and the consequence is clear. And this argument seems to me so evident that I do not see what can be probably responded to it.

For if one says that by virtue of individuation as such only individual distinction is had, but that by reason of such individuation some greater distinction can be had — apart from the fact that this evasion was blocked just above at n. 171 — it is refuted by the same argument: the reason a superior distinction is greater than an inferior one is that it is more universal and distinguishes according to more common being. If therefore by reason of individuation as such only individual distinction is had — namely, that this is not that — it is self-contradictory that through such individuation a greater distinction can be had, since individuation is the inferior ratio to it. And if it is said with Oviedo that such a greater distinction is had by reason of a common predicate that some individuals under the same species may participate in and others may not, this too was refuted at n. 171 cited.

This is confirmed: individual distinction — making this not to be that — is the last and least among all substantial distinctions. Therefore if a greater substantial distinction obtains or can obtain among individuals of the same species beyond being this and being that, it will be a different genus from individual distinction, and cannot be had through individual differences. The first consequence is evident: if it is a greater distinction than being this and being that, it is not an individual distinction, since individual distinction of its kind is the last and least among all. The second consequence is also evident, since through individual differences only individual distinction can be had.

Furthermore, if there were a greater distinction among several individuals of the same species beyond being this and being that, and such distinction is through intrinsic and substantial predicates, a contradiction would follow: they would be and would not be of the same species. They would be of the same species by supposition; they would not be, because they are said to differ more than in number — and every such distinction, when through intrinsic and substantial predicates, is an essential and specific distinction. For just as there cannot be a substantial predicate intermediate between individual and specific, so there cannot be a distinction intermediate between specific and numerical, as is clear from what was said in the first conclusion against Oviedo and Aversa.

This is confirmed: we now argue that human and horse differ in species because from their operations we argue a greater diversity or dissimilarity between them than that one is not the other. Therefore if such greater dissimilarity is found among several individuals of the same species and is had through predicates intrinsic and substantial to them, it can be deduced that they are not of the same species but of different species — just as by the same argument we deduce that Peter and Brunellus differ in species.

You will say: not any intrinsic and substantial predicates, if diverse, infer specific diversity among what is constituted by them — only quidditative and essential ones do, and such are not the predicates that distinguish some individuals of one species. Against this: if such predicates were given, they would be intrinsic and common to several, and therefore nothing would be lacking for them to be quidditative and essential, and consequently to distinguish their constituted things specifically from others. The consequence is clear, because philosophers by quidditative and essential predicates usually understand intrinsic predicates common to several. And if you say with Arriaga and Oviedo that such predicates do not distinguish specifically because they do not distinguish notably, this evasion was blocked above at n. 167.

Arguments on the Opposite Side Resolved.

Against the second conclusion, the adversaries first object that just as genus is contracted by unequal specific differences, so species too ought to be contracted by numerical ones. Then Arriaga at the cited *subsect.* 2 argues as follows: cognition of Peter alone does not differ in species from cognition of John and Paul — as everyone admits — but cognition of John and Paul together is more perfect because it represents more objects than cognition of Peter alone; therefore two individuals of the same species can be unequal. Oviedo again argues at *cit.* §. 4 n. 30: two individuals can have some predicate common to them that is not common to others; therefore they can in that predicate physically surpass the predicate corresponding to it in other individuals; therefore according to this predicate they can be more perfect than those individuals; therefore unequal. Finally they argue from the authority of Solomon, *cap.* 8, where he gives thanks to God that he received a good soul in comparison to other men; and from Aristotle, *2 de generat. animal. cap.* 3, where he says that as the soul is more or less perfect, so it prepares the body.

I respond by denying the analogy, since inequality of perfection is not repugnant to specific differences but is repugnant to individual ones, as has been proved. To the second: the argument supposes something false — namely, that when Peter and Paul are known together they are known by the same act, which I have already shown to be false against Arriaga at *disp.* 6 *de Anim. qu.* 9. To the third: the antecedent is denied, for such an intrinsic predicate common to several individuals of the same species but not to all has been shown to be repugnant in the first conclusion. And even granting it, if the inequality of perfection of those

individuals is founded in it, it will not be had from the individual differences themselves — and they will still be equal. To the last: Solomon gives thanks to God for having received a soul that is better — not substantially, but accidentally, by reason of bodily disposition and the added gifts of grace and of nature. In the same sense must be understood what is commonly said: that the soul of Christ the Lord was more perfect than the soul of Judas. Aristotle at the cited place is speaking of souls different in species; and if it is contended that he is speaking of those of the same species, he must be interpreted as speaking of greater accidental perfection. The remaining arguments pressing against this conclusion — both about rational souls and about other material forms — have been resolved at the cited *disp. 5 de Gener. quaest. 5 art. 2*.

Second, Arriaga argues against the second conclusion: Peter and Paul are individuals of the same species, yet have a greater dissimilarity between them than a numerical one; therefore and so on. He proves the minor as follows: Peter and Paul include unions more dissimilar to each other than merely being this and that union; therefore they themselves differ more than in number — though not specifically. The consequence is evident; and the antecedent is proved because the union of Peter is of itself determined to the matter and form of Peter, such that it cannot be placed between the matter and form of Paul; and this is not a merely numerical difference, because such a difference obtains also among several possible unions between the matter and form of this or that individual. Therefore it is a difference greater than numerical — yet not specific.

Poncius at the cited place responds by denying the minor; and to its proof he says that Peter or Paul does not include such a union as having that greater difference, because Peter would be numerically the same even if he did not include that union but any other whatsoever. And if Peter by his nature required such a particular union more than numerically distinct from the union Paul would require, then they would have to be said to be of different species. Nor does it matter that they are commonly reputed to be of the same species, because they are considered commonly as humans and as including the formalities pertaining to the being of a human as such — along with those that follow upon those formalities. Since in these formalities they have no dissimilarity, they are rightly regarded as of the same human species — though according to other considerations they would be of different species.

This solution is false in both parts. As to the first: it is false that Peter would be numerically the same human if he had Paul's union, because those unions have different numerical terms and foundations; hence Peter having Paul's union would not have the same numerical matter and form from which he now consists, and so would not be numerically the same human. It is therefore impossible for Peter as such to be constituted from Paul's union. As to the second part it is even more evidently false: for who but a madman would concede that Peter and Paul are of different species? Nor does it help to say that they must be said absolutely

speaking to be of the same species because they are commonly considered as humans including formalities pertaining to human being as such — namely, animality and rationality — for this does not suffice to avoid the absurdity. First, because the adversaries deny that union belongs to the essence of the composite. Second, because here applies that maxim of Scotus, so great and general, assigned at 2 d. 1 q. 6 ad 1. *princ.*: that any difference suffices to distinguish, but not any identity suffices for the perfect identity of things. Hence according to that rule, Peter and Paul from the specific diversity of their unions ought simply and absolutely to be said to differ in species rather than to agree by reason of animality and rationality.

A better response can therefore be given in three ways. First, by denying the minor — that the distinction between Peter's union and Paul's union is greater than numerical — and to the proof it is said that the greater diversity they appear to have beyond numerical is not intrinsic to them but accidental and extrinsic, by reason of the diversity of their extremes, as shall be more fully explained presently in the solution of the following argument.

Or, granting such diversity between those unions, the consequence drawn from it is still denied — namely, that the same diversity redounds to Peter and Paul themselves — because union is not included in the essence of the composite but only as a condition without which it does not exist (*sine qua non*), as was said at *disput. 5 quaest. 12 articul. 2*. Hence even if the unions of Peter and Paul were of different species, it would still not follow that Peter and Paul are of different species and more than numerically distinct.

Poncius attacks this solution, however, because — even if unions were not included per se in the composite but by way of condition — the matter of Peter so regards the union of Peter that it cannot underlie the union of Paul. Therefore there is a greater-than-numerical difference between the matter of Peter — included per se in Peter — and the matter of Paul; and consequently Peter and Paul are distinguished more than in number, no less than they would be if they included the unions per se. Furthermore, whatever things from their intrinsic nature presuppose conditions of a different ratio are of a different ratio; but Peter presupposes (as is supposed in this second response) a union of a distinct ratio from the one presupposed by Paul; therefore Peter and Paul are of a distinct ratio.

Nevertheless this response is not to be despised, since the Doctor himself judges it probable at 4 *disput. 43 quaest. 1 in fine lit. I*, where he says that the composite can return as the same even if the same union of its parts does not return, because that union is not of the essence of the whole. Nor do Poncius's attacks cause difficulty, because it is false that the matter of Peter so regards the union of Peter that it cannot underlie the union of Paul. The union of Peter determinately regards the matter of Peter — since as an essential determination it cannot be indifferent — but not vice versa, because matter of itself is indifferent to any union, just as to any form. Indeed, Poncius himself admits this very thing in his

own solution to this argument, when he says that Peter would be numerically the same human even if he did not include that union but any other whatsoever — and so within a few words he contradicts himself. To the other attack: whatever may be said of the major, which it does not prove, the minor is denied; for in this second solution it is indeed conceded that the unions of Peter and Paul are of a different ratio, or at least differ more than in number, but it is not conceded that Paul from his intrinsic ratio presupposes a union of a different ratio from that through which Peter is constituted — since union is posited as a pure condition and not as something intrinsic and essential to him, and therefore he does not presuppose it from his intrinsic ratio. Finally, even granting that union belongs to the essence of the composite and that the unions of Peter and Paul are of a different ratio or at least differ more than in number, it is still denied that Peter and Paul must be distinguished in the same way; for as the Doctor notes at 2 *distinct. 3 quaest. 6 I.*, the distinction in what is constituted need not be as great as that in the constituting elements — since constituents can not only differ in species but even be primarily diverse, as is clear with individual differences, while what is constituted still agrees in some common quidditative ratio, because along with individual difference it includes a common nature that is common to all individuals. So likewise in the present case: even if the unions of Peter and Paul were of a different ratio or differed more than in number, since beyond the unions they contain matter and form of the same ratio in both, they still differ only in number — and therefore it does not follow that Peter and Paul must be distinguished as their unions are.

Second, Arriaga and Oviedo argue by pressing the examples hinted at above at n. 164, which the first opinion adduced. A vision of one whiteness differs more from a vision of another whiteness than it does from another vision of the same whiteness; therefore it has some dissimilarity with the vision of another whiteness greater than numerical. Similarly, local presence by which Peter is placed in Rome is more dissimilar to the presence by which he is placed in Venice than to another presence by which he would be placed in Rome; therefore between the Roman presence and the Venetian one there is a greater difference than between several Roman ones — but the latter differ in number; therefore the former differ more than in number, though all are of the same species according to what was said in Physics. Similarly, the two actions by which fire A and fire B can produce two numerically distinct heats are more dissimilar or differ more from each other than the two actions by which fire A or B could produce the same numerical heat disjunctively; but the latter two differ in number; therefore the former two differ more than in number within the same species.

Poncius at the cited place responds that the action by which one heat is produced, precisely because by its nature it is determined to that heat such that it cannot by absolute power be terminated to another, is altogether of a different species from another action by which another numerically distinct heat is produced. And he

says the same must be said in due proportion of place (Ubi) and visions and other things of the same kind.

This solution — held by many more recent authors — is attacked by Oviedo as follows: from it it would follow that individual humans differ in species, because the mode of union belongs to the essence of a human; therefore if the union in Peter differs in species from that in Paul, it follows that Peter and Paul too are thus distinguished. But this argument has already been resolved above. Therefore the aforesaid response must be attacked by that common medium: that specific distinction of relations and actions must be taken from the term or foundation, or from the ratio of founding, or at least from some special condition and connote — as was said in the Logic. But from none of these can a specific condition be derived for the adduced examples, since all those relations obtain between terms and foundations of the same species. Therefore the enumerated relations cannot be posited as specifically distinct.

This is confirmed a fortiori: certain other relations — both of reason and real — that have terms or foundations more diverse than the enumerated ones, are still not posited as specifically distinct, because they have a ratio of founding of the same kind or a similar mode of denominating. This is evident from the relation of genericity founded in substance and accident, or the relations of specificity founded in human and horse, which the Doctor therefore posits at *quolib.* 6 X. as only numerically distinct. The same also holds for the similarities between two whitenesses and two blacknesses, as I said at *disp.* 8 *Log. quaestion.* 10 *artic. 1 in fine*: although the natures that are the extremes of those relations are of a different ratio, the mode of unity — which is the proximate ratio of founding them — is of the same ratio on both sides, in the way that arithmeticians say that the double proportion between two and four is of the same ratio as that found between five and ten, even though the numbers that found them differ in species. Just as therefore by this reason — from what was said there — all paternities are of the same ratio among themselves, and all similarities, and all dissimilarities (for it is altogether accidental to their ratios that they are found in these or those natures differing in species), so a fortiori the same must be said in the present case of the relations enumerated in the argument: that they are all of the same species, because they obtain between extremes of the same species and all have a ratio of founding of the same kind.

As for the fact that those relations are so constituted that those which affect these extremes cannot affect others — this does not make them to be of a different ratio, because such repugnance does not arise from their nature and essence, but rather from their haecceity. Therefore it does not make them of a different ratio from other relations that require other extremes, but can only indicate a numerical distinction among them — not a greater one. Just as from the fact that the negation of identity with another individual is found in one and not in another, no greater distinction than numerical is argued between them. And when it is

pressed that a greater distinction at least within the same species must be argued — because all relations that can be between the same numerical extremes are more akin to one another than with other relations of the same ratio that cannot be between those same extremes but require other numerically distinct ones, and therefore since all the former differ among themselves in number, they must differ more than in number from the latter — I respond that such distinction is greater by accidental greatness, not substantial and intrinsic greatness. This is somewhat in the manner in which we are accustomed to say that several heats of four differ more from a heat of six than they differ among themselves — they differ more not by greater substantial distinction but by accidental distinction, from a greater or lesser plurality of grades, which is accidental to heat as such. So likewise in the present case: several Roman presences, say, differ more from Venetian presences than the Roman ones differ among themselves; but this greatness is not substantial but accidental, because it is accidental to presence as such to be Roman or Venetian. Nor does the Roman denomination belong to those several presences I can have in Rome by reason of some predicate intrinsic and essential to them, but from some superadded respect to a center or poles — which is accidental to those presences, if not physically and separably, then at least metaphysically. Therefore it is not a common intrinsic predicate of them, one that would induce a greater-than-numerical substantial distinction between them and other presences — say, Venetian ones. And the same must be said in due proportion of the several possible unions between the matter and form of Peter and other possible ones in Paul: all are of the same ratio, all differ in number, and yet the Petrine unions differ more from the Pauline ones than the Petrine unions differ among themselves. But this excess of distinction is not substantial but externally accidental, because it belongs to them through some predicate that is accidental to them at least metaphysically — just as we would say that several white humans differ more from several black ones than white ones differ among themselves: more, I say, accidentally and not substantially.

And still more easily is the argument resolved with respect to visions and other acts of intellect or appetite compared to the same numerical object or to several of the same ratio. For acts of this kind are not pure relations — as the enumerated ones in the other examples — but are absolute entities of the genus of quality, as the Doctor notes at *quod. 13*. And therefore the order to an object is not intrinsic and essential to them, because a relation is not of the essence of an absolute entity, but at most really identified with it. Hence, since an absolute entity precedes at least by nature the relation founded on it — whether predicamental or transcendental — it cannot be individuated through the order to another. And therefore the Doctor says that when acts are said to be distinguished through objects, this must be understood as manifestative and as it were extrinsic. And so in the present case, two visions terminated to two whitenesses differ numerically in the same way as two determined to the same one; nor do the former differ more substantially among themselves than the latter two, because the greater

disconvenience found among the former — namely, that they are terminated to numerically different whitenesses such that the one terminated to one cannot be terminated to the other — is extrinsic and accidental to them, really identified with them but not formally and essentially. Hence each of those visions, even insofar as it is this vision, is of itself — as much as is in its nature — equally able to be terminated to this whiteness as to that, because such a relation does not singularize the visions but presupposes them individuated.

**Question XII. Whether individual unity is the principle of number,
and whether this is found in all things; including the root of
individual multiplication.**

Besides transcendental unity — which is the adequate passion of being as such — and essential or formal unity — which is posited as proper to common predicamental natures — in this final question individual unity must be explained. Individual unity is said to be the greatest of all and is posited as the passion of the individual. And since it is commonly called numerical unity even among metaphysicians, it must be examined whether this is rightly said, and whether it alone is properly called the principle of number, and whether it can also principiate number in every being, of whatever category.

The Nominalists at 2 *dist.* 24 teach that not only individual unity is the principle of number, but also any other unity — both formal and transcendental. Their foundation is the common way of speaking, according to which we say not only "two stones," "two humans," but also "two natures," "two genera," "two categories," and indeed "two or three beings." So Rubio at the cited place with other Nominalists. Others, however, commonly outside the Nominalist school teach that individual unity alone is the principle of number properly so called; though they still disagree among themselves. For some so limit this unity that is the principle of number that it is found only in quantal things, such that only individual unity of the genus of quantity is the principle of number properly so called. Their sole foundation is that number is a species of quantity, and from the division of continuous quantity is said to result (3 *Physics* 68). The Thomists seem commonly to hold this view, following Thomas: Capreolus, *distinct.* 24 *quaest.* 1 *artic.* 1; Javellus, 4 *Metaph. quaestion.* 8; Soncinas, 4 *Metaph. quaestion.* 25; Durandus, *quaestion.* 2; Fonseca, 5 *Metaph. capit.* 13 *quaest.* 3 *sect.* 3; Suarez, *disp.* 4 *Metaph. sect.* 9 *numer.* 8 and following. Consequently they deduce that the unity that is the principle of number is an accident superadded of the genus of quantity, and therefore that such unity is found only in material and quantal things. Others, on the contrary, do not restrict the unity that is the principle of number to the sole category of quantity, but extend it to whatever category and whatever genus of beings, so that every individual in every genus has its unity that can be the principle of some number if counted along with other beings. This is also the Nominalist position at the cited place, as well as others among the Realists outside the school of Thomas. Our Alensis at *Metaph. tex.* 18 and *lib.* 10 *ab initio*, and again

at *tex. 21 in the same book*, says this manner of speaking is also probable according to the Philosopher's mind — though he says the former is more probable as the mind of the Philosopher, who seems to have posited number only in things that result from the division of the continuous. But from among our own, Bassolis holds this position explicitly at *1 distinct. 24 quaest. unic. artic. 3*; as does Tataretus in *Logic. capit. de quantitat. notab. 3*; and other Scotists, and more recent authors follow it commonly.

I say first: individual unity alone is the principle of number properly so called, and constitutes number when joined with other similar unities. This is the common position against the Nominalists, and can be proved from the common way of speaking not only of ordinary people but also of the learned, who by numerical unity — the principle of number — understand individual unity alone; which is why by numerical unity singular and individual unity alone is signified. Thus Scotus speaks throughout *2 dist. 3 quaestion. 1*, where he always calls individual unity "numerical," and this manner of speaking was taught by Aristotle himself at *3 Metaph. 14*, where he says: "for to say numerically one or singular differs not at all, for we call 'singular' what is numerically one." And at *10 Metaph. text. 1* he repeats: "numerically, then, the singular is indivisible." And of this one-in-number — which he wishes to be the same as the singular — he immediately adds at *text. 2* that it is the measure of number, which would not be true unless it imported true and rigorous numerical unity.

From this common way of speaking the first argument for our conclusion can be constructed: the sole numerical unity is the principle of number properly so called, since it is for this very reason called numerical — because it causes and constitutes number. But among all grades of unity, only individual and singular unity is called numerical unity. Therefore individual unity alone is the principle of number.

Furthermore: that unity is the principle of number properly so called — as we are speaking of it here — which altogether excludes numerical multitude and is incompatible with it, for numerical unity is directly opposed to numerical multitude. But such is individual unity alone, not specific, generic, or transcendent unity. Therefore it alone is the principle of number. The major is evident; and the minor is proved: because specific unity is compatible with numerical multitude, generic unity with specific multitude, and transcendent unity with generic multitude — so that only singular unity altogether excludes every degree of magnitude. Therefore this alone is the principle of numerical multitude.

This is confirmed: the one that is the principle of number must be indivisible into several things numerically, from Aristotle at *10 Metaph. ab initio*; but such is only the numerically one — not the one in species or genus. And so on. This is confirmed again: because through number things are separated and distinguished from one another. But through universal unity — such as specific, generic, or

transcendent — the numbered things are not distinguished but rather are confused and united in them; and they are distinguished from one another only through singular unities. Therefore this unity alone is the principle of number.

Furthermore, if not only individual unity but also any other specific, generic, and transcendent unity can be the principle of number, then numerical unity will be not only the lowest of all but rather the highest of all — indeed all others will be certain species of numerical unity, including transcendental unity itself, which is posited as the adequate passion of being. But this is altogether evidently false, because then some concept more common than being itself would have to be admitted, of which numerical unity as such would be the passion — a unity that would be posited as more common than transcendental unity itself on this Nominalist account.

This is confirmed: either numerical unity is posited as a certain determinate species of transcendental unity, or vice versa. If the first, the intention is had — namely, that transcendental unity cannot be the principle of number, because numerical unity adds something to it, by reason of which it is the principle of number. If the second, what was said before follows — namely, that numerical unity is more common than transcendental unity, which is the adequate passion of being. Finally, we see that universal ratios and common natures are numbered only insofar as they are understood as contracted through haecceities and individual differences. For "two animals" signifies this and that animal, "two beings" this and that being. Therefore numerical unity follows upon individual differences alone, and by reason of them can be applied in some way to common natures — but not by reason of their universal grade, as the Nominalists hold. See Pasqualigo, *tom. 2 Metaph. disp. 46 sect. 3*, where he defends this conclusion along with us; and Meurisse, *lib. 2 Metaph. 3 quaest. 7*.

The foundation of the Nominalists is frivolous, because number is applied only abusively and improperly to common natures — in the same way it is also applied to beings of reason, second intentions, and chimeras. For we say "two beings of reason," "two species," and so on. Likewise we say "this and that genus," "this and that species" — yet from this way of speaking it does not follow that singularity properly belongs to those natures considered in their community, since this is said only abusively and not properly, but by transference, intimating through the vocabulary of haecceity a determinate — if common — grade of those natures in the entire order of beings. To this is added what we were saying above: that number is applied with any propriety to common natures only insofar as they are understood as in some way contracted, even if incompletely, through singularity. Therefore singularity — or better, the singular — is the proper and immediate root of numerical unity.

I say second: this unity that is the principle of number is found in every being, and not only in material things or in the sole category of quantity. This is held by Bassolis, Tataretus, Meurisse, and other Scotists, as well as the Nominalists, against

the Thomists. But it is excellently defended and proved both by authority and by reason by our most acute Aureolus at *1 distinct. 24 artic. 3 propositio. 1*. For at *John 19* a duodecimal number is attributed to angels: "Do you think I cannot appeal to my Father, who would at once send me more than twelve legions of angels?" Similarly, the Demon replied at *Luke 8* that his name was Legion — a number which, according to Jerome and Bede, is six thousand six hundred sixty-six. Therefore number is truly found in non-quantal things.

This is then proved by reason: number, as discrete quantity, is the subject in arithmetic. But with all material things annihilated and only the multitude of angels remaining, arithmetic would still have its place with regard to that multitude, since in it there would be even and odd, cube and square, and so on among all the properties that the arithmetician considers. Therefore and so on. Furthermore: wherever there is a true ratio of a sum, there is the ratio of number — which consists in the sum. But diverse sums can be found in angels: they can be attributed a ternary, quaternary, thousandfold, and so on. Therefore and so on. Furthermore: a form is not diversified however much it is applied to subjects of a different ratio — hence whiteness is the same specifically in a pearl and in snow. But the formal ratio of number consists in the measuring enclosure that is imported by three, four, and so on. Therefore whether such measuring enclosure is found in material and quantal things, or in immaterial and abstract ones, it will remain of the same ratio in all.

Finally: where there is a discrete whole and discrete parts, there is truly number, which is called discrete quantity. But in angels there is a discrete whole and also discrete parts — for ten angels form a whole constituted from ten angels distinct from one another, not continuous or united, as is evident. Therefore there is truly in them number as discrete quantity, and the unity that is the principle of number.

From this the a priori argument for our conclusion can be derived: number according to its formal ratio can be preserved in non-quantal and immaterial things; therefore it is wrongly restricted to material things alone and coarctated to the category of quantity. The antecedent is proved: numbered number — which is what we are speaking of here — formally consists in a certain collection of unities importing discretion and numerability. Hence the collection stands as the material of number, while discretion or numerability stands as the formal. But all of this is had in immaterial and non-quantal things: a collection of unities — that is, of several individuals — can be had, and also discretion of such unities. And although this is not discretion through discontinuation or through the negation of continuity, it is nonetheless had through the diversity of haecceities, which discretion suffices to constitute a plurality that can be numbered just as in quantal things. Therefore in immaterial things number cannot be denied — with all propriety — nor the unity that is the principle of such number. This is the fundamental argument for the conclusion, commonly used by the Nominalists.

The foundation of the opposing position is easily resolved, because it rests on a pure authority of Aristotle, who is to be interpreted charitably: when he places number in the category of quantity, he is speaking of quantitative and material number, which results from the division of the continuous and whose principle is quantitative unity consisting in the division of the continuous — as Tataretus and Bassolis explain. He makes mention of this number especially because the number of material things is more perceptible to the senses and better known to us. But for this reason number is not to be denied in other things as well, if in them the same or a similar ratio is found for which it is posited in quantal things. It belongs to that category in which the numbered things are found — especially since number is not something wholly distinct in the nature of things from the numbered things. It is commonly called transcendent number, because it ranges through all and each of the categories and is found in all things within their own genus or species of multiplicity; and in the same sense the unity that is the principle of this number is called transcendent — not because it is the one that immediately follows upon being itself, but because it is not coarctated to any special grade of being but ranges through all things.

I say third: the unity that is the principle of number is not something really distinct from the numbered thing, and especially is not an accident of the genus of quantity really superadded to it. The conclusion is against the Thomists, and follows from what was said above at *disput. 5 de unitate transcendentali*, where we said that transcendental unity is really identified with being as such as with its own proper and adequate subject. Since numerical unity is a certain species of it — being a certain determinate unity — it must also include the ratio of unity as such, which is transcendental, as the indeterminate beginning of whatever inferior grade of unity. Since therefore numerical unity must maintain proportion with unity as such, as with its genus, it follows that just as transcendental unity is really identified with being as such, so likewise every such unity must be identified with every such being; and so in the present case numerical unity must be identified with the numbered thing.

This can further be proved by all those arguments by which at the cited place it was proved that the one as such is not really distinct from being. For just as there it was argued that that really distinct thing superadded to being would have to be one not only as a quo but also as a quod — because it would not be merely a formality but a true and proper thing, and therefore would have its own proper unity in recto — so the same can be argued in the present case about numerical unity: if it is something really superadded to the numbered thing, and especially an accident of the genus of quantity, then it too would have its own numerical unity, could be numbered along with other beings, and so there would be a process to infinity.

Furthermore, as Rubio argues at *distinct. 24 cit. quaestion. 2*: if a really distinct element from the numbered thing is precisely set aside, and the thing is

conceived only according to its proper being, it can still be numbered and — taken together with others — compose a ternary or quaternary number, as a unity. Furthermore: every substance can be without every actually inhering accident, especially an absolute one. But it is impossible for three angels or three humans to be without the ternary number. Therefore neither such a number nor the unities from which it results is an accident really superadded.

This is further proved and clarified: it is one thing to speak of quantitative unity, which is the principle of quantitative number — said to result from the division of the continuous — and another to speak of entitative or individual unity, which is the principle of transcendent number. For quantitative unity, consisting in the division of the continuous, is indeed an accident really superadded to material substance — just as quantity itself is accidental and extrinsic to it. And so quantitative number too is an accident of the things themselves numbered, which therefore can exist without such number. Hence two drops of water when joined lose their quantitative duality and regain it when separated again. But the other numerical, entitative unities are intrinsic to the things whose unities they are, because whatever is intrinsic to a thing is one in itself. Hence just as things cannot be found without such unities, so neither can they be found without the number resulting from them. Hence when two drops of water are joined, although they lose their quantitative duality and become one water through continuity, they still retain their transcendental duality — because they still retain their haecceities, and are still two things, not one by identity but only by conjunction. The reason for this, as Anthony Andreoli noted at *19 Metaph. quaestion. 3*, is that quantitative unity negates the division of the continuous, whereas all other numerical entitative unity negates division arising from contradiction — because since this being is not that being, it is thereby said to be one.

It is not worth recounting the arguments of the Thomists one by one here, because they are very easily dissolved from the doctrine just delivered. Moreover, Soncinas at *4 Metaph. quaestion. 25 cit.* does not prove the opposite of this conclusion except through certain authorities of the Commentator — which are of little concern to us, since we are not in the school of the Commentator but of Scotus.

Finally, it should be added — as Pasqualigo rightly noted at the cited disputation — that the ratio of measure, which Aristotle at *10 Metaphysics text. 2* says belongs to unity as the principle of number, does not pertain to the formal constitutive of unity, but is a passion following upon such unity insofar as unity is a part composing number. This is proved because the concept formed of unity as the principle of number is not the same as that formed of it as the measure of number. For it is called the principle of number by reason of the indivision it imports in itself and the division from another, by reason of which it can be a co-part with that other in composing number. But it is called measure insofar as repeated and frequently reiterated it manifests the sum of number and how large

it is — for to measure is to manifest through something known something else that is unknown, as the Doctor teaches at *quolibet*. 14. If these concepts are compared with one another — namely, that such a thing as an undivided part enters into the constitution of number, and that it is the measure of the constituted number — it is sufficiently clear that the former is prior and the latter posterior, and that the latter is derived from the former. For unity is the measure of number precisely because it is its indivisible part, as Aristotle teaches at the cited place. Hence unity can be well conceived as a constitutive part of number while prescind from the fact that it is a measure — but not vice versa. The general rule holds that whenever several concepts belong per se to something, that which belongs to the thing first and from which the others derive their origin must be constituted as the essential ratio — as is clear in the human, who has several proper concepts belonging to him per se: rationality, risibility, discursiveness, and so on, and only rationality is constituted as his essential ratio, because it belongs to the human first while the others belong secondarily and derive from it, and therefore are constituted as passions. So therefore the same must be argued in the present case regarding indivision and measure in unity as the principle of number: the former is its essential ratio, the latter its passion.

But the objection is raised that by reason of indivision in itself a thing is divided from another, and division formally expresses a recession; but numerical unity expresses an accession, since the unities composing number must come together with one another. Therefore unity by reason of indivision cannot be the constitutive principle of number. But Pasqualigo excellently meets this at *cit. sect. 4*: it is indeed true that each thing in this way recedes from another through its unity, insofar as it does not communicate with it in the same being. But from this very recession it has that it can at the same time approach another in composing number — because the opposite of that recession does not occur through this accession, namely through communication in the same being, but through another accession: through the collection of discrete parts. This accession in first act expresses indivision in itself and division from that to which it approaches as a discrete part in constituting number together with it.

For the completion of this disputation on the principle of individuation and individual unity, there remains from what has been said the doubt about the root of individual multiplication — that is, from what it arises that within the same species individuals can be multiplied in number. The Thomists commonly say that this root is matter, especially signate matter. Hence some of them explain that when matter is posited by Thomas as the principle of individuation, this must not be understood as the formal principle — for they themselves admit that to be individual difference — but as the radical principle, because matter is the root from which individual multiplication arises, and from which, when multiplied, all individual differences are drawn. For they suppose matter has its individuation from itself, and that it can be divided into different parts; and consequently they

deny that spiritual substances can be numerically multiplied under the same species, on the grounds that they lack matter and cannot be acts informing matter.

Others, however, hold this opinion to be probable in material things, because in them matter is truly the cause and reason why individuals can be multiplied — though spiritual substances can be multiplied from elsewhere. Aversa at *quaest. 9 sect. 6 concl. 3* follows this manner of speaking among more recent authors. He proves it because Aristotle has in several places expressly indicated that matter in these lower things is the principle of multiplication of individuals. For Scotus, he says — at *2 d. 5 qu. 6 §. Ad quaestionem quintam* — does not rightly try to explain that by matter must be understood the individual difference itself, because it appears sufficiently manifest from the text that Aristotle meant physical matter, as the very name "matter" truly and properly sounds. He also proves it by reason: the reason why more and more individuals can be multiplied in material things is precisely that matter by its nature has several parts and can be divided into several portions in which it can receive several forms. And the reason why the forms themselves can be multiplied is that they have an abundance of matter; and even rational souls can be multiplied by reason of their relation to matter — because from the side of matter there can be several bodies. Thus matter is the cause by which individuals can be multiplied.

Nevertheless, the Doctor at *quodl. 2 art. 1* lucidly shows that matter is not the radical principle of the multiplicity of individuals. For in order to be such a principle, it would have to be not only itself multiplicable into different portions, but also be the reason for the multiplicity of forms — both substantial and accidental — as even the Thomists concede, who on this account posit it as the root of all individual multiplicity in material things. But this is false, as the Doctor solidly proves there and as was shown above from the present investigation at *quaest. 8*. Furthermore: individual multiplication of form can be had without individual multiplication of matter; for even speaking naturally, the same numerical matter can successively be found under numerically different forms through various changes. Therefore matter is not absolutely speaking the root of individual multiplicity. Furthermore, those authors speak still less consistently who want matter to be the precise root of individual multiplicity in material things, and yet still admit such multiplicity in spiritual substances. For in precise causes, if affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation too on the contrary is the cause of negation. If therefore matter is the precise root of individual plurality, where there is no matter no such multiplicity can be admitted — in which the Thomists speak more consistently, since they do assert this and consequently deny that separated substances can be numerically multiplied.

This is confirmed: if material and formal nature agree in the effect of individual multiplicity, they ought also to agree in its root — because the same formal effect is not had except through the same formal cause, and the same passion wherever it is posited always has the same root from which it flows. Either therefore matter

must be posited in all natures capable of such multiplication as the precise cause and root of the same passion, or in none — to speak consistently.

It must therefore be said, with the Doctor at *quol. 2 art. 1* and *2 dist. 3 quaest. 1 and 7*, that either the discussion concerns actual multiplication or aptitudinal multiplication, that is, multiplicability. If it concerns actual multiplication, nature is actually multiplied through individual differences that divide and contract it, since those are the formal principles individuating nature. If however the discussion concerns aptitudinal multiplicity, since this is a passion of created nature itself, its root must be assigned on the part of nature itself; and this root is the fact that individuation is not of the essence of nature. For as soon as a created nature is conceived as not being of itself this, or as not including singularity in its concept, it is at the same time conceived as being of itself multiplicable and contractible through various differences. This can be proved both from the contrary and from a parallel case, with the Doctor.

From the contrary: the reason the divine nature is not multiplicable into several similar natures is that it is of itself this and includes singularity in its intrinsic concept. Therefore conversely, because created nature is not of itself this and does not include singularity in its intrinsic concept, it is of itself multiplicable into several similar natures — and this is the proximate root of such multiplicability.

This is also proved by a parallel case from generic nature, because the formal cause of its specific multiplication is the specific differences that divide and contract it, while the radical cause of its multiplicability is its very essence — insofar as in itself or in its intrinsic concept it does not include specific differences. For by the very fact that in its quidditative concept it does not include specific determination, it remains of itself indifferent to being specifically determined through various essential differences. Therefore likewise in the present case: because specific nature does not include in its quidditative concept individual differences, it remains of itself indifferent to whatever determinative of the same ratio — which is to be individually and numerically multiplicable.

This position on the root of individual multiplicity is also held by Pasqualigo at *disp. 44 sect. 2*, though he does not mention Scotus there — who was however the principal author of it. This is a common fault of more recent authors, who pass over the ancients in silence so as to appear to be authors of new doctrines.

The authorities of Aristotle that are frequently adduced in favor of the Thomist position have already been explained above at *quaest. 6 art. 1 a num. 37 and following*. And it is false, as Aversa says, that Scotus interprets all of them as referring to matter for individual difference — for some he does so explain, because from the very context it is gathered that Aristotle is speaking of matter so accepted; others, where Aristotle speaks of the part's matter or physical matter, he explains in another way, without forcing any authority — as was amply shown at the cited place. Nor is the argument adduced by Aversa of any moment. For

that matter is not the cause of the multiplicity of forms is sufficiently clear from what was said above at *qu.* 8. Just as in matter no extrinsic root of individual multiplication is assigned — because it is of itself and from its own intrinsic principle multiplicable — so neither must such a root be assigned in form; but form too must be posited as multiplicable from within, just as universally any created nature, both complete and incomplete. It is also clear from what was said at *quaest.* 6 and 7 that matter is the root of the multiplicity of individuals only insofar as it is their intrinsic constitutive principle physically — insofar, namely, as the composite consists of this matter and that of another. For the same reason form too could be called the root of their multiplicity, since as both are physical parts of the natural composite, just as the composite cannot consist without matter and form, so neither can it be multiplied without them. For in order to be multiplied, the entire and integral being of the composites must be multiplied, and therefore the matter and form from which they consist — from which it cannot be concluded any more that the root of individual multiplicity is matter rather than form.

Disputation XI: On Substance and Subsistence

The task of metaphysics is to consider substance and accident in themselves — this was stated at the outset of this work, *disp. 1, quest. 1 and 2*. It was likewise stated at the beginning of this second volume, *disp. 7*, that the primary division of finite being is into substance and accident, from which all the categories are subsequently derived. Since the common and particular grades by which substance and accident constitute the predicamental line have now been thoroughly discussed, it remains to examine in the following disputations the nature and essence of substance itself and of accident — topics treated by the metaphysician as the primary subjective parts of finite being. Because the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VII states from the outset that substance is prior to the entire genus of accident, we shall treat substance and its subsistence first in the present disputation, and then treat accident and its inherence in the one that follows.

Question I: What Substance Is, as Distinguished from Accident

As the very title of the question makes clear, substance is not taken here in the sense of the highest genus of the predicament of substance — that is, in the sense applicable only to those things of which this highest genus is predicated as an answer to the question "what is it?" That meaning of substance was explained in its proper place in *disp. 7, Log., quest. 1, art. 1*, when I was establishing the structure of the predicament of substance. Rather, substance is here taken in the sense of what is opposed to accident as a whole genus, whether it be finite or infinite, complete or incomplete. In this sense, the name "substance" encompasses God, angels, substantial composites, matter, substantial form, their parts, and finally all the differences, modes, and properties of these substances. It is true, however, that substance taken in this way — as opposed to accident — does not divide finite being but rather being taken transcendently, as I said in *disp. 7, Metaph., quest. 1, n. 24*, insofar as it is common to God and creatures. And although the discussion in this disputation concerns primarily created substance as a subjective part of finite being (as I said in the preface to the disputation), yet because created substance shares, by the very ratio through which it is distinguished from accident, something with uncreated substance, it is reasonable to pose the question about substance as common to both. For it is in this sense that substance is adequately distinguished from accident. Among earlier thinkers this problem was not much debated; they all appear to have assumed rather than demonstrated that substance and accident differ by fitness or unfitness for inherence — taken either formally or at least radically — without further inquiring what inherence or non-inherence in a subject actually imports. But among more recent thinkers the matter is most hotly disputed, as may be seen in *Hurtado, disp. 10, Met., sect. 2*; *Oviedo, contro. 6, Metaph., pun. 1*; *Aversa, quest. 17, Log., sect. 1*; *Poncius, disp. 12, Log., quest. 1*; *Meurisse, lib. 3 of his Metaphysics, quest. 1*; and *Arriaga, disp. 4, Metaph., sect. 2*, where he does not hesitate to call this matter one of the most difficult in all of

philosophy, barely touched by the ancients and not yet adequately explained by the moderns.

All appear to agree that being-through-itself, or "through-itself-ness" (perseity), is the formal constitutive ratio of substance, just as, conversely, being-in-another, or "in-another-ness" (inalietas), is the constitutive ratio of accident. Yet although all agree on this point, Meurisse nonetheless states at the end of the cited *quest. 2* that he does not dare to determine whether being-through-itself is the quidditative ratio of substance; he rather suspects that it is not, because the Doctor, in *4, dist. 12, quest. 1, in the responses to the principal arguments*, reasons about being-through-itself with respect to substance in the same way as about being-in-another with respect to accident, and yet does not hold that being-in-another is the quidditative ratio of accident — as is clear from *1, dist. 3, quest. 2* and *dist. 22, quest. 1* — and teaches that for us in our present state we cannot have a quidditative concept of substance. This consideration, however, should not lead us away from the common opinion, because the ratio of being-through-itself and the ratio of being-in-another are not the same. For "in-another-ness," by its formal concept, expresses a relation — whether actual or aptitudinal — of the accident to the subject in which it inheres or can inhere. Hence the Doctor rightly says in *4, loc. cit.* that an absolute accident cannot be constitutively defined by such a relation, since a relation is never per se included in the ratio of an absolute. But "through-itself-ness" does not express any such relation; on the contrary, by the very force of the name it abstracts from every such relation. Therefore the same reasoning does not apply to perseity in constituting substance as applies to inalietas in constituting accident. It is therefore false, in this sense, that the Doctor reasons in the same way about being-through-itself with respect to substance as about being-in-another with respect to accident. If he reasons in the same way, this would be in the case where perseity is taken as a kind of unfitness for inherence — as a certain transcendental relation in substance — virtually opposed to the accident's aptitude for inherence. In that sense, the same reasoning does indeed apply on both sides, and it is equally true that perseity so understood cannot be the constitutive ratio of substance for the same reason that an absolute accident cannot be constituted by inalietas, as we shall say below. But when the Doctor says in *1, dist. 3, quest. 2* and *dist. 22, quest. 1* that in our present state a quidditative concept of substance cannot be had, he spoke truly, because in our present state we can only track it down through accidents, as stated in *disp. 6, An., quest. 6, art. 2*. Nor do we here claim to assign the bare and pure quidditative concept of substance; we only claim to assign the ratio by which it is most nearly and intimately grasped and circumscribed. And this, with the common teaching, we say is perseity. The question is how perseity ought to be explained so as to suggest to us as closely as possible the quidditative ratio of substance. This is the state of the proposed question, regarding which there are various positions, which I now intend to set out and examine one by one in order to find the more probable one.

First, Socinus, in 4, *Met., quest. 1 ad 2* and *quest. 29 ad 7*, and more explicitly in 9, *Met., quest. 14*, teaches that the perseity constituting substance is a pure negation of being in another. He therefore says that the mode constituting substance and determining being toward it is nothing but a negation, so that even though being is quidditatively included in substance, it is not included in that by which being is contracted to the concept of substance, since that alone is a certain negation, which we circumscribe by the expression "through itself." This position is universally rejected as wholly irrational. I recall having refuted it in *disp. 7, Log., quest. 1, art. 1, at the beginning*, and in *disp. 2, on the nature of being, quest. 6, art. 2, n. 167*. But beyond what was said there, it is refuted afresh: because the same could be affirmed about the inalietas constitutive of accident — that it says nothing but a pure negation of existing in itself and through itself — and so beyond the ratio of being there would be nothing positive in the whole order of beings, which is the most patent absurdity. Furthermore, if, to avoid this absurdity, it is conceded that inalietas says a positive ratio in accident, then by a stronger argument the same must be conceded of substance, which under the ratio of substance is more perfect than accident; and if this is not conceded, one must concede that accident is more perfect than substance, which is an absurdity no less evident than the first. Again, if substance and accident are compared with each other, just as they positively agree in being, so too they positively differ by their own proper rationes; therefore substance must be constituted in its being as substance by something positive, through which it positively differs from accident. Nor does it matter that perseity is commonly explained through the negation of being in another as in a subject after the manner of an accident, because conversely, inalietas is also customarily explained through the negation of existing in itself and through itself. Nor is it new for the constitutive differences of things to be explained by certain accompanying negations that are more familiar to us, as for instance: animality (*brutalitas*), the positive constitutive difference of brutes, is explained through irrationality, which is the negation of rationality; spirituality, the positive constitutive difference of spiritual substances, is explained through immateriality and incorporeity, which are negations of materiality and corporeity; the positive infinity of God through the negation of finitude — and so on, as is commonly done for other differences unknown to us. And even if we grant that the positive element by which being is contracted to constitute substance does not formally and quidditatively include the ratio of being itself — since what determines a genus or higher concept never formally includes it — it does not follow that it is a pure non-being or pure negation, because it includes being at least really, as was explained in *disp. 2, cit., de natura entis, quest. 6, art. 2*. It must therefore be held with the common teaching that the perseity constitutive of substance imports a positive ratio, in which the ratio of being itself is also contained — either formally, as the Thomists maintain, or at least really and identically, as the Scotists say.

Second, others have explained the perseity constitutive of substance through a formal relation of positive unfitness for inherence, a transcendental relation, on the grounds that accident is constituted by the opposite relation of aptitudinal inherence. This position is rightly rejected by *Poncius, loc. cit.*, because substance is essentially something absolute, and no absolute can be essentially constituted by something relative, since it would then be essentially toward itself and not toward itself, toward another and not toward another. Furthermore, every such relation presupposes something peculiarly positive in substance by reason of which this relation belongs to substance and cannot belong to accident; therefore this positive element is properly the essential constitutive of substance, and such a relation of unfitness given in substance belongs to it by way of a property. By the same arguments the Doctor proves in 4, *dist. 12, quest. 1* that accident cannot be essentially constituted by a relation of aptitudinal inherence, as will be seen in the following disputation. From this, Poncius infers in his final conclusion that the perseity constitutive of substance is best explained as that positive element to which there formally follows an unfitness for inherence — whether that unfitness is something positive or a mere negation. He proves this because in reality the unfitness follows upon the constitutive of substance and upon nothing else, and the perseity cannot be better explained than in this way. He confirms: because by the very fact that we conceive some positive element accruing to being — a positive element to which, as its formal root, such unfitness follows, without our understanding anything else — we understand that what is constituted from being and such a positive element is something subsisting through itself, and by this we can distinguish it from every accident.

Nevertheless, this latter position also fails to satisfy. For even if it is true that the perseity constitutive of substance consists in the root or exigitive principle of unfitness for inherence, just as conversely the essence of accident consists in the root or exigency of the opposite aptitude, still it is not yet explained what this actual or aptitudinal inherence in accident says, nor what the opposite unfitness in substance says. And yet the whole difficulty of this question consists precisely in this point. For however inherence is explained through the dependence of accident on its subject, it seems to apply equally to material substantial forms, which are in matter as in their subject and depend on it for their being, coming-to-be, and conservation — no less than accidental forms depend on their subjects, as will become evident from what follows. Before we explain the essence of substance through the root of this unfitness for inherence, we must first explain what the aptitude for inherence in accident and the opposite unfitness in substance actually say. Once that explanation has been given, I readily concede that the essence of substance will be best explained through the root of the unfitness for inherence, and the essence of accident through the root of the opposite aptitude. Confirmation: if we say, for example, that the essence of quantity consists in the root or exigitive principle of extension or divisibility, we must first explain what kind of divisibility is proper to quantity — whether it is

divisibility into entitative parts or only into quantitative parts. Simply saying that the essence of quantity consists in the root of divisibility does not adequately explain its essence. The same reasoning must be applied here to the root of unfitness for inherence, in which the essence of substance as distinguished from accident is said to consist.

Third, others, following the preceding position but wishing to explain the matter further, declare the rationes of inherence and non-inherence through dependence and independence from a subject, such that substance and accident are quidditatively distinguished from one another by such dependence or independence — or at least by their exigitive principles — and the one is essentially constituted by dependence, the other by independence, from a subject. But in truth this is not a sufficient distinction between substance and accident, because every material substantial form, in the opinion of nearly all, is causally produced from matter and therefore depends on it in its being, coming-to-be, and conservation — no less than accident depends on its subject, whether quantity, quality, or the like — as was said in *disp. 2, Phys., quest. 7, art. 2*. Therefore even material substantial forms would be in their subject through inherence; hence substance and accident cannot differ on this basis, since the concept of inherence would be common to both.

Some reply that material substantial forms do not depend on matter in the same way as accidental forms, because the latter truly depend on matter as on the subject from which they are educed, while the former depend on matter as on a necessary condition for their coming-to-be and conservation, and therefore accidental forms are truly said to inhere in their subject, whereas substantial forms are not. Against this: it is just as naturally impossible for a material substantial form to exist or come to be without matter as for an accidental form to exist or come to be without a subject. The need seems equal on both sides, and consequently the dependence on a subject is equal. Moreover, one must assign a reason why a substantial form requires its subject only as a condition, for by the same reasoning one could equally assert this of an accidental form — that it depends on its subject only as a condition — since the exigency appears equal on both sides.

Fourth, others explain the matter thus: to be in a subject through inherence is to be in another with which it does not constitute one thing through itself but only accidentally. Hence, although a substantial form is in a subject and depends materially on that subject, it is not said to be in it through inherence but through simple information, because it constitutes one thing through itself together with matter. And Scotus himself appears to have explained matters in this way in *Quodlib. 9, from the beginning, §. de fecunda*, where he says that substance, as distinguished against being-in-another, is being-through-itself, and thus being-through-itself simply means "not inhering actually or aptitudinally." In this sense every substance — not only composite but also matter and form — is a being-

through-itself, because a substantial form, even though it is in matter by informing it, is not there by inherence; for to inhere is not to inform through itself, since what inheres is not an act simply but only an act in a qualified sense, and does not make one thing through itself with that to which it inheres — the contrary being the case for what informs through itself. So the Doctor, *loc. cit.* But even this does not satisfy, because it is prior for a form to be in itself a substance or an accident than for it to constitute one thing through itself or one thing accidentally. Rather, it should be said that a form constitutes one thing through itself and substantially because it is a substance, not conversely that it is a substance because it makes one through itself and substantially. Therefore the assigned reason why this form is a substance and that one an accident is not sufficient. Furthermore, this appears to be a *petitio principii*, for that is precisely what is being asked: given that the form of a horse and the quantity of a horse are both present in matter, why is the equine form said to constitute one thing through itself substantially with matter and therefore called substantial, but not the quantity, which constitutes only one thing accidentally and is therefore called accidental? Nor did the Doctor, in the cited passage, when he drew this distinction between substance and accident, intend it as an *a priori* and ultimate difference; rather, he gave the reason why one form is said to inform through itself and make one thing through itself, while another makes only one thing accidentally — namely, because what inheres is not an act simply but only an act in a qualified sense. And this is indeed the true *a priori* reason, as will be explained below.

Fifth, others explain accidental form as being in matter through inherence, but not substantial form, because the latter is in matter by way of constituting something together with it, as a component part; whereas accidental form is not in matter in this way, since it is neither a part of it nor of any composite that it jointly constitutes with it. And indeed Aristotle himself appears to have explained the inherence of accident in its subject in this way in the *Ante-predicaments*, chap. 2, where he says: "I call being-in-a-subject that which, being in something, not as a part, cannot exist apart from what it is in." This explanation also misses the point, because either substantial and accidental forms are compared to the subject they inform — and in that case neither is constitutive of it — or they are compared to the composite formed from them and from their subject, and in that case each is a part of it. For man and whiteness are parts of one composite, namely the white man, just as soul and body are parts of man. Therefore substantial and accidental forms do not differ at all on this basis but run in parallel. And Aristotle in the cited passage merely wished to indicate that accidental form is not a part of a composite that is one through itself, as substantial form is — which is perfectly true — but he did not assign the reason for this, which is what we are here investigating.

Sixth, others explain accident as that which can be present or absent without the corruption of the subject, and therefore is said to be in the subject through inherence; whereas substantial form cannot be absent except with the corruption

of the subject, and therefore is not said to be in the subject through inherence — an explanation that Scotus himself seems to have suggested in *quest. 15 of the Predicaments*. This too is universally rejected, because both substantial and accidental form can be absent without the corruption of the subject, and neither can be absent without the corruption of the composite formed from the form and the subject. For a man remains whole in his essential being even when whiteness departs, just as body or prime matter remains even when soul departs; and just as the departure of whiteness destroys the composite "white man," so the departure of the soul destroys the composite "man." Perhaps you will say that matter would be corrupted if, on the departure of one substantial form, another did not succeed. Against this: first, this has no bearing on inherence or non-inherence. Second, in our view the soul departs from the body and no form succeeds in its place, yet the soul is not thereby an accident. Finally, in some accidental forms too, the succession of one form to another is necessary — no subject can exist without some presence or location, and when one is lost another must necessarily succeed in it — and yet this does not make presence or location a substantial form. And it is false that Scotus in the cited passage distinguishes substantial from accidental form in this way; rather, he distinguishes them on the grounds that the former gives simple being to matter, while the latter gives being in a qualified sense to the subject, which is the true difference, as will be explained below.

Seventh, the Thomists are accustomed to explain the matter as follows: a substantial form is one that accrues to a being in potency, while an accidental form is one that accrues to a being in act and therefore cannot constitute one through itself with its subject, because one thing through itself cannot be constituted from two beings in act, from *Metaphysics* VII, 49. Hence an accidental form is said to be in its subject through inherence because it informs a being in act, whereas a substantial form is there through substantial union because it informs a being in potency. But this account too does not sufficiently explain the matter. For when the Thomists say that the substantial form of a stone, for example, is substantial because it accrues to its subject as a being in potency, either the meaning is that it accrues to a being existing in potency with respect to the form of stone itself — and then accidental form likewise accrues to its subject as to a being in potency toward every act, including entitative and existential act — and in this sense it is false that accidental form accrues to a being in act and substantial form to a being in potency, since the substantial form in that case presupposes its subject as existing with its own entitative act, just as accidental form does, as is clear from what was said in *Physics*. Or the meaning is, as the Doctor better explains in *quest. 15 of the Predicaments*, that accidental form accrues to a being already complete and specific in act, constituted by a substantial form, whereas substantial form does not — and in this sense too it is false, at least in the Doctor's view, that every substantial form accrues to a being in potency, i.e., stripped of all substantial act. For the soul does not accrue to bare prime matter

but to matter already informed and prepared through the form of the mixture or corporeity. Hence it is not of the ratio of substantial form, as distinguished from accidental form, that it always constitutes the thing in its perfect and ultimate specific being. Finally, what is here sought is the quidditative concept of substance as common to matter, form, and the composite; but the concept assigned by the Thomists — that it is of the ratio of substance to accrue to a being in potency and of accident to accrue to a being in act — would not be common to all the said substances but proper only to substantial form. Indeed, it could not even be the first and proper concept of substantial form itself, because it is prior for a form to be in itself a substance than for it to accrue to a being in potency; and similarly it is prior for whiteness to be in itself an accidental form than for it to accrue to a being in act. Therefore the ratio of each and the distinction of the one from the other a priori is not well explained by this.

Eighth, Suárez explains the matter differently in *disp. 16, Met., sect. 1, n. 13*. He says that whiteness, for example, is in its subject through inherence because it is not of the same order and predicament as that subject, and therefore does not make one through itself with it; whereas the form of a stone, for example, is of the same order and predicament as the matter it informs, and therefore constitutes one through itself with it. But this is a manifest *petitio principii*. For that is precisely what is being asked: why is this form — say, the soul — substantial and of the same order and predicament as the matter it informs, and not quantity, whiteness, and similar forms, which are called accidental? Furthermore, the construction and distinction of the predicaments is wholly posterior to the natures of things; hence it is prior for these natures to be substantial than for them to be distributed in the predicament of substance, and likewise for accidental natures. The philosophers distinguished different classes of things based on differences discovered in things themselves; therefore a form is not substantial rather than accidental because it belongs to the first predicament rather than to the posterior ones, but rather the opposite is the case.

Ninth, others have said that the proper concept of substance is to underlie accidents — that is, to receive accidents in itself and to sustain them. This explanation is attributed to Boethius and is commonly attacked because some accidents also receive and sustain other accidents in themselves — as the common opinion holds regarding quantity. But this objection does not press hard, because when those authors explain the concept of substance through its underlying accidents, they mean that it sustains accidents as the wholly primary and ultimate subject, which belongs to neither quantity nor other accidents. The position is rather to be attacked on the grounds that what is being sought here is the quidditative concept of substance as encompassing even God, who cannot underlie accidents. Furthermore, as Scotus teaches in *1, dist. 8, quest. 3, lit. F*, although created substance is so called both from the reason of subsisting and from the reason of underlying — because it can underlie accidents — nevertheless both these rationes belong to it in such a way that only the ratio of

subsisting, or of existing through itself, is essential and primary, whereas the ratio of underlaying is secondary and concomitant. For it is not primary in substance to underlie others; it is prior for a thing to be in itself than to underlie others. A substance does not exist and subsist through itself because it underlies accidents, but rather the converse — which is why Aristotle in the *Categories* numbered the ratio of underlaying among the affections of substance and did not assign it as substance's formal ratio. Hence when we say that substance is what underlies accidents, the quidditative ratio both of substance and of accident, and the quidditative distinction between them, are already presupposed as known; this does not assign that ratio. Otherwise there would be a vicious circle, as Arriaga rightly noted — explaining one through the other and the unknown through the equally unknown, saying that substance is what underlies accidents and that accidents are what inhere in substance.

Tenth, many others explain the concept of substance through being the root of subsistence, and the concept of accident through being the root of inherence — understanding perseity as constitutive of substance and inaliety of accident in this sense. This position, as a probable one, is held by *Aversa, quest. 17, Logic, sect. 1, in fine*. But this too is universally rejected, because it cannot be admitted without a vicious circle: substance cannot be explained except through substance, nor inherence except through accident, and so the unknown is explained through the equally unknown. Furthermore, if one asks why quantity or quality cannot be the root of subsistence and humanity the root of inherence, the immediate answer will be: because these are accidents and that is substance. If then, conversely, one asks why this is substance and those are accidents, and one answers: because this is the root of subsistence and those of inherence — the circle is clearly committed, as Arriaga and Oviedo note.

Eleventh, *Hurtado, disp. 10, Metaph.*, devised yet another way of explaining the quidditative concept of substance. He says that substance, as distinguished from accident, is what is properly called a "thing" (*res*). He proves this because when asked "what is this thing?" one does not answer "white" or "black," but when one asks "what is this?" one answers "Peter" or "a horse"; and when asked what quality or quantity it has, one answers "white" or "small." Therefore that through which one answers the question "what?" he calls "a thing," and in this sense he says that substance is a thing — in which mode of explaining the concept of substance and accident this author is quite pleased with himself, since by this explanation, he says, he has reduced the resolution of this question to first principles. But by speaking in this way he appears rather to have reduced this difficulty to a question about the name "thing" — whether accident can truly and properly be called a thing. And indeed if "thing" and "real being" are synonymous, then just as accident is truly and properly called a being because it includes the quidditative ratio of being no less than substance does, so it can also truly and properly be called a thing. Indeed, the Doctor says in *Quodlib. 3, art. 1* that if we wish to take the name "thing" more properly — as distinguished from the mode or circumstance of a

thing, in the way Boethius uses it in *lib. 1 de Trinit.* — then in that sense the first three genera, namely substance, quantity, and quality, designate a thing, while the others designate circumstances of a thing. And if the name "thing" is taken still more strictly to signify only substance while the rest are modes or circumstances of substance itself, the Doctor says in 2, *dist. 1, quest. 1, §. quod si adhuc* that this contention is only about the name "mode" and "thing": even if a mode is not a thing in the same way as that of which it is a mode, it is nonetheless not nothing, nor is it nothing as a being, for then it would be nothing. Hence the Doctor concedes that in this sense and in comparison with substance, quantity or quality can be called a mode or circumstance; this nonetheless does not prevent them, speaking absolutely, from being truly and properly called things. Therefore Hurtado explains the quidditative concept of substance poorly and inappropriately through the name "thing," since this name belongs to accidents as well — whence it would have been better to explain the concept of substance through the very name "substance" than through the name "thing," because the name "thing" is common also to accidents, whereas the name "substance" is not.

But Hurtado replies that he does not take the name "thing" indiscriminately, but precisely for that through which one responds to the question "what?" — when we ask "what is this?" — to which one does not respond by an accident, saying it is white or black, but by saying it is a man or a horse. So too, if someone is asked what he bought, he does not answer "something white or black" but "a horse" or "an ox." Against this: even in this sense the name "thing" applies to accidents, or to accidental composites. For if someone buys a statue, when asked what he bought, he answers "a statue," and if you ask "what is this?" he answers "a statue." Moreover, just as we say one bought a man, so we also say one bought an Ethiopian, which denotes an accidental form. Hurtado replies that artificial objects like statues and chairs are commonly called a "thing" in a qualified sense and not absolutely, because it is correctly recognized that the same wood remains whether or not the statue is made or destroyed, and that the figure is an accident. He also says we say we bought an Ethiopian to distinguish that man from others. But this solution does not address the argument, whose force consists in showing that accidental concretes perfectly well answer the question "what?" — whether for this reason or that, it matters little. It suffices that by such an answer the question "what?" is satisfied, whatever the cause. Furthermore, if wood absolutely is to be called the thing and not the statue itself — because, as Hurtado says, it is correctly recognized that the same wood remains when the statue is made or destroyed — then substance is not called a thing in the absolute sense because it is a thing, but because it remains the same wood when the figure of the statue comes or goes. In that case this position coincides with the sixth already reported, which explained substance by its opposition to accident, whose nature it is to be able to be present and absent without the composition of the subject.

Twelfth, *Oviedo, cit. controuv. 6, Metaph., pun. 1, §. 2*, defines substance as that which nature intends primarily and for itself. That which is intended for itself and

primarily, he says, is what is not intended for the sake of something else that is adequately distinct from it. For what is intended for itself is said to be so intended: thus matter and form, even if intended for the sake of the whole, are intended for themselves because the whole is not adequately distinct from matter and form and their union. Hence he concludes that substance can be defined as that which is not intended for the sake of something else adequately distinct from it. But this position appears to depart greatly from the common way of explaining substance and accident through *perseity* and *inalietas* — of which I said at the outset of the question that all agree — unless perhaps one were to say that being-through-itself means what is intended through itself, and being-in-another means what is intended for the sake of another; but then the difficulties noted above return, for in this sense a substantial form would be said to be for the sake of another, because it is a being-in-another, namely in matter. And if being-for-itself and being-for-another are taken in the more proper sense as this author explains them, grave difficulties still arise. For substantial form is the end of matter, and matter is truly and properly for the sake of form, from *Physics* II, 23. Therefore matter would not be a substance but an accident. Again, matter and form and their union are for the sake of the composite, which in our view is adequately distinguished from matter and form taken together, insofar as it constitutes a third entity beyond them. Furthermore, in our view admitting several substantial forms in animated beings, one is ordered toward another and is for its sake — for example, the form of the mixture is intended for the sake of the soul, which is adequately distinct from it. Therefore in our principles this position cannot be sustained. Moreover, in accidental composites some things are intended for themselves, as is clear in artificial objects: when an artisan makes a statue or a chair from wood, he properly intends the figure, or the whole concrete of wood and figure, and orders the wood toward the figure and not conversely. Furthermore, the elements are ordered by nature for the composition of mixed bodies, which are bodies adequately distinct from the elements, and yet they are substantial bodies. Therefore substance is not well defined as that which nature intends primarily and for itself.

Thirteenth, Arriaga, in *disp. 4, Metaph., sect. 6*, explains the concept of substance as whatever intrinsically constitutes the first thing. By "first thing" he understands what is intended first and through itself by nature, or what exists first and through itself, or what is the first root of the rest. By this definition, he says, all simple substances are included because they exist first and through themselves; prime matter is included as existing through itself; all substantial forms are included as first roots. But quantity, qualities, colors, duration, location, and artificial beings are excluded from the ratio of substance, because none of these exist first and through themselves, nor belong to the concept of a first root — rather, they accrue to the first thing. This explanation too is sufficiently tangled and contains much that is false. For in the very definition itself, by "first thing" he seems to understand a thing that is first constituted, and then in the explication of "first thing" he includes not only God and all simple substances but also prime matter and all

substantial forms; yet matter and form are not the first thing constituted but the constituting parts. Furthermore, in explaining what he means by "first thing," he says he understands what is intended first and through itself by nature, or what exists first and through itself, or what is the first root of the rest. From this it follows that this priority does not belong to substances in comparison with accidents by reason of one ratio common to all substances, but disjunctively by rationes peculiar to each — which is false, because substance as a whole genus precedes accidents under the ratio of substance as common to all substances, both composite and simple, complete and incomplete. Again, in proving by virtue of this explanation that all substances are included under this definition and all accidents excluded, he says that God and simple substances and matter are included because they exist first and through themselves, all substantial forms because they are first roots of the rest, and all accidents are excluded because they neither exist first nor belong to the concept of a first root. From this it is clear that from the three conditions appended for the priority of "thing" — i.e., of substance — the latter two suffice for the constitution of all substances and the exclusion of accidents, since in enumerating all substances he calls them such because they either exist first and through themselves or are first roots of the rest, making no mention of the first condition that the thing be intended first and through itself by nature. Therefore this condition is superfluous for the constitution of substance, since the other two suffice. Finally, even granting this explanation, it follows that matter alone is substance and not form or the composite. For the two conditions constituting the priority of substance belong to matter alone: form does not exist first and through itself but in matter and after matter; the composite likewise exists through matter and form; and matter alone is the first root of the rest. Indeed quantity and other dispositions precede form in matter, according to the principles of this author, and do not flow from form; moreover, matter is not only the root of accidents but also of the substantial form itself, which is rooted in it. Therefore, truly and properly, matter alone would be substance on this account.

Resolution of the Question

In order to make clear what must be said on this problem according to the mind of our Doctor and in accordance with truth, the elegant doctrine he teaches in *4, dist. 11, quest. 3, lit. Y* must be noted. I have frequently adduced it in *Phys., disp. 2, quest. 1, art. 3* and *disp. 5, quest. 11, art. 1* and *disp. 5, de gen. and corruption., quest. 1, art. 1*, and elsewhere often. Since the whole difficulty in assigning the distinction of substance from accident hangs on the side of material substantial form, which is in a subject and rests on it just as accident does, and therefore appears not to differ from accidental form, the Doctor, *loc. cit.*, uses this very point — that substantial form gives simple being and accidental form gives being in a qualified sense — to distinguish substance from accident consequently and a priori: substance is being simply, and accident is being in a qualified sense. To clarify this distinction he distinguishes being simply, following Aristotle in *1, de gen., text 12*

and elsewhere, where Aristotle proves that something cannot come from non-being simply. "Simply" is either taken for "universally," and then non-being simply is pure nothing, so that something cannot come from non-being simply in that sense — and what is opposed to this non-being is any being whatsoever, however small its entity; or it is taken as distinguished against being in a qualified sense, and then being simply is substance, and being in a qualified sense is accident. When it is said in the present context that substantial form differs from accidental form in that the former gives being simply, this should not be understood as being simply in the first sense — that which immediately follows upon non-being simply — but as being simply as distinguished from being in a qualified sense. This is proven because if accident were to accrue first to matter and give it its first formal being, it would still not give it being simply but only being in a qualified sense, because it is not an act simply but only in a qualified sense. Equally, no material substantial form gives being simply to matter, if by being simply we mean being simply in the first sense — being that recedes from non-being — because matter already has being simply in that way even without any form. Therefore substantial form alone does not give being simply in the sense of universally, nor simply in the sense of first.

But taking being simply in the second way — as divided against being in a qualified sense — the Doctor says that just as being is divided into prior and posterior, or first and second, with the prior containing substance and the posterior accident, so likewise "simply" in this understanding is equivalent to "what is naturally first," and "in a qualified sense" is equivalent to "what is naturally posterior." And so every accident gives being in a qualified sense, from which the Doctor finally concludes that substantial form, whether it accrues to something that already has being or not, gives being simply in this second sense — but not in the first — just as accidental form, however it accrues, gives not simple being but being in a qualified sense. The Doctor repeats and further clarifies this doctrine shortly after in the response to the second argument, *lit. Dd*: if "giving being simply" is taken as "giving being first" — the first being that immediately follows upon non-being — it belongs neither to every nor only substantial form. For if quantity were first to accrue to matter, it could give it the first formal being, though not the first being that recedes from non-being; and a substantial form can accrue second or third, as in the opinion that posits several substantial forms in the same composite. But if being simply is distinguished against being in a qualified sense — as what is naturally first against what is naturally second — then every substantial form gives being simply and first, while accidental form gives not simply but in a qualified sense. Therefore, concludes the Doctor, do not seek the difference between substantial and accidental form — and do not try to recognize whether a given form is substantial or accidental — by asking whether it accrues first or second to something. For whenever it accrues, it is of the kind suited to give the kind of act that the form is in itself.

From this it is gathered that substantial form should not be absolutely distinguished from accidental form by the fact that the former gives first being and the latter second, because regarding the term "first" there can be equivocation. If by first being is meant the first being that recedes from non-being — that which immediately follows upon non-being — then neither form gives first being in this sense to the subject, because each presupposes it in being. If by first being is meant the extrinsic and formal being that is first communicated to the subject by the form informing it, then neither can substantial form be distinguished from accidental in this sense by giving first being to the subject, because if quantity is coeval with matter and the dispositions in matter precede the introduction of substantial form, then an accidental form gives first formal being rather than a substantial form. If finally first being is taken as naturally first being — as distinguished against naturally second being — then substantial form gives first being to the subject because it gives being simply, even if it accrues after an accidental form; and conversely accidental form gives only second being because it gives being in a qualified sense — as the Doctor says: if you ask where it can be proven that substantial form gives being simply while accidental form does not, if by the ratio of neither is it to give the being that immediately recedes from non-being (which properly seems to be being simply).

And I in turn raise another difficulty: where can it be proven that substantial form gives naturally first formal being — as distinguished from naturally second — when it does not immediately and without mediation inform prime matter? The Doctor responds to the first difficulty and says: if you are asking about the thing in itself, there is no cause why this gives being simply and that being in a qualified sense, other than that this is a substantial form and that an accidental form. For just as there is no cause why heat heats — because this is immediate, and between an immediate cause and its effect there is no other mediate cause — so too in the genus of formal cause this immediacy holds: heat constitutes something hot and soul constitutes a man, and there is the immediacy of a form to its formal act. But if you ask in relation to our knowledge, he says that philosophers distinguished substantial form from accidental form by certain posterior means — such as: this one has contraries and does not admit more and less; this other does not have contraries and does admit more and less; this is knowable to be and not to be; and so on. But briefly, to the point, he says there is one medium by which the distinction is most manifestly made as far as our knowledge goes — which form, even when accruing to a being in act, is substantial, and which is accidental. For as long as one proceeds through substantial forms, each posterior one is more perfect than its predecessors; but when one arrives at accidental forms, what follows is less perfect than the last preexisting substantial form. Which is more perfect cannot be known to us except a posteriori, and this is reasonable both in itself and for us: in itself, because within the same genus no form accrues to a form except to constitute it more perfectly within that genus; from another genus, whatever accrues — namely, as accident — is less perfect than any presupposed

substantial form. One may also say that a substantial form gives being simply because, being a substance, it is a being simply, and so gives being of the same ratio as itself; an accidental form gives being in a qualified sense because, being an accident, it is a being only in a qualified sense — as Aristotle teaches in 7, *Met.*, text 14, where one should consult Alensis in the short question he raises about whether accidents are beings simply. He concludes with Aristotle that substance alone can be called a being simply, by reason of its fixed and stable being that it has of itself — something accident lacks, which has being that is fixed and stable in another and therefore cannot be called a being simply but only in a qualified sense and with the addition "in another."

You will object that a material substantial form too has its being fixed in another, not in itself, and therefore also cannot be called a being simply or properly a substance, but rather an accident. The reply is to deny the consequence, because even though it has some dependence on matter, this dependence is not on another of a different genus — as is the case with accident, which depends on substance for its being, and therefore is rightly with all propriety called a being in another. From this it is gathered why a material substantial form, even though it depends on matter for its being, coming-to-be, and conservation, is still said to have its perseity and stability to a degree sufficient for it to be called a substance — because it does not need another of a different genus in order to be said to exist and be, as accident does.

From this the reply to the second difficulty is also evident: why substance as a whole genus is said to be naturally first being, and accident naturally second being, and consequently why a substantial form is said to give naturally first being even if it informs matter later than an accidental form or does not immediately inform prime matter — as is the case with the soul. The reason is that, speaking naturally, what has being that is fixed and stable of itself precedes in being that which has being only as resting upon it, because the latter needs the former for its being and existence, and not vice versa. Thus a substantial form, however mediately it informs matter, still gives being simply and naturally first, because it gives such fixed and stable being as cannot come from an accidental form; and conversely, an accidental form, however immediately it might inform matter, will always give being in a qualified sense and naturally second, because it does not give firm and fixed being as the substantial form does.

And from this the easy resolution of the whole question is finally apparent: substance and accident do not differ quidditatively from each other, and are not essentially constituted in themselves, except by what Aristotle and others with him always assigned — namely perseity and inalienability, taken at least radically — explaining them, however, as we have just said. Thus perseity says the fixity and stability of an entity in itself without dependence on or sustaining in another of a different genus; for in this way every substance, including material form, is said to be through itself and to exist through itself, in a way that does not belong to

accident. I do not speak of substantial modes, because these according to our principles are not directly and quidditatively substances but are called substantial insofar as they are among substances and touch them under some substantial ratio — as was said of substantial union in *disp. 5, Phys., quest. 9* — even though they are in fact accidents of the genus of relation. Inalietas, conversely, which circumscribes the difference of accident, says the opposite dependence on another of a different genus as on a subject, and the need for it in order to be sustained and supported in it — which is sufficiently explained by the phrase "being in another through inherence." For inherence by the force of its name appears to import in the inhering form a greater need for something sustaining than what a material substantial form has, and a lesser firmness of being — which is why this mode of being in another has been appropriated by the philosophers to accident. These are what seem to me to be the things that must be said in explanation of the perseity of substance and the inalietas of accident according to the principles of our subtle and irrefragable Doctor. See Scotus, 2, *dist. 12, quest. 1, in the response to the second principal argument*, where he not obscurely intimates this whole doctrine, saying that every being of whatever genus other than substance — that is, of accident — is more imperfect than whatever is a part of substance, because it needs to be sustained by another that is of a different genus.

Question II: Whether a Singular Substance Is Constituted as Actually Existing Through Itself and Subsisting by Something Really Superadded and Distinct From It Ex Natura Rei

As is evident from the very title, the question concerns singular created substance, since in the divine nature nothing really distinct from it is admitted by which it would become actually existing through itself and subsisting. Those who did not distinguish between subsistence and the through-itself existence of substance reason in the same way about both; and so those who do not distinguish existence from essence really and actually, consistently say that a singular substance exists through itself in reality independently of a subject by itself and not by something really superadded — and they likewise say that it subsists by itself. Aristotle himself seems to have held this view in 7, *Metaph., text 41*, where he appears to acknowledge no difference, at least on the part of the thing, between a singularly existing substantial nature and subsistence. He holds that by the very fact that a singular substance exists in reality it is subsisting, without any new addition. From this opinion there is little or no distance from the view usually attributed to Durandus, 1, *dist. 34, quest. 1*; Henry, *Quodl. 4, quest. 4*; Aureolus, 3, *dist. 1*; and others, who posit between nature and supposit only a distinction of reasoning reason (*distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*), or a distinction in the abstract and concrete modes of signifying. They say that this humanity, which is the singular nature, and this man, who is called the supposit, differ only in mode of signifying — the concrete and the abstract — insofar as the abstract signifies the nature through itself and the concrete signifies the thing after the manner of one having the

nature; yet in reality nature and the one having the nature, or the supposit and the subsisting thing, are entirely identical.

Capreolus, on the other hand — who also does not distinguish between through-itself existence and subsistence — concedes without difficulty in 3, *dist. 5, quest. 3, art. 3*, with some other Thomists, that since he really distinguishes existence from essence, a singular substance does not exist or subsist through itself, but through something really superadded: a mode of existing through itself superadded to substance as distinguished from accident. Others, who distinguish between subsistence and through-itself existence, reason differently about each according to their own principles. Those who do not really distinguish existence from real and actual essence consequently say that a singular substance exists through itself and not by something really superadded, independently of a subject; yet they hold it subsists by something really superadded and really distinct from it. This is the common view of Scotists and more recent thinkers. Those who really distinguish existence from essence, as the Thomists do, hold not only that singular substance subsists by something really superadded to it, but also that it exists through itself by another mode superadded and distinct from subsistence; and among these modes they posit not only a distinction but also an order of priority and precedence. They hold that subsistence in singular substance precedes existence, and that nature is not capable of existence until it has first subsisted. So Cajetan, 3, *p., quest. 4, art. 2*; Medina, *ibid.*; and other Thomists.

I say first: a singular substance exists through itself really and independently of a subject by itself and not by something really superadded. This conclusion is Scotus's, 4, *dist. 12, quest. 1*, and is common to all who do not really distinguish existence from real and actual essence. It can first be proven from this principle, because if it is universally true that existence is not really distinguished from essence — as was shown at length in *disp. 8, quest. 2* — then through-itself existence, which is proper to substance, will not be really distinct from substance; just as in accident its proper existence is not really distinguished from it. Moreover, although subsistence is something really superadded to the singular substance and distinct from it *ex natura rei*, the same judgment should not be made about through-itself existence. This is gathered sufficiently from the different functions for which they are destined: subsistence is given to singular substance so that it may be constituted as incommunicable to another as nature to a supposit; whereas through-itself existence is assigned to it so that it may exist through itself independently of a subject in the sense explained in the preceding question. Now a singular substance, even though it is not incommunicable to another supposit by its own entity but by something superadded, as will be shown in the next conclusion, is still independent of a subject by its own entity — and therefore it exists through itself independently of it, by itself and not by something really superadded. Furthermore, if through-itself existence were really distinguished from singular substance as subsistence is, it could then be separated from it, as subsistence is in fact separated in the nature assumed by the

Word. In that case I ask: if this separation were made, would a singular substance stripped of its proper existence still exist through itself independently of another as a subject in which it might inhere? Or would it be sustained in another as in a subject after the manner of an accident? The first cannot be said, because then it would still exist through itself even with its proper existence removed — which is contradictory — or it must be conceded that such through-itself existence is really identified with it. The second is also contradictory, because just as the entity of a substance cannot pass into the entity of an accident, so it cannot come about that a substance inheres in another and is sustained in it as an accident in a subject. Furthermore, even though the human nature is in the Word — as we are taught by faith through the mystery of the Incarnation — it is still not in the Word as in a subject, but as a nature in an alien supposit and through the union called hypostatic, not through the inhensive union that is the union of accident with subject. Therefore the human nature, even existing in the Word, exists through itself in this way — that is, independently of another as a subject — and therefore has not lost this ratio or mode of through-itself existence. This is sufficient indication that this mode of through-itself existence is not really distinct from the singular nature itself. See the Doctor, 3, *dist. 1, quest. 1, ad 5, princ.*, where he says that the human nature existing through itself and the person constituted by created personhood are not the same, and he denies that through-itself existence in intellectual nature is personhood — taking "through itself" as distinguished from being in another as in a subject — because personhood requires independence with respect to another supposit.

I say second: taking "to subsist" properly as "to exist incommunicably to another as to a supposit," a singular substance does not subsist through itself really but by something really superadded and really distinct from it *ex natura rei*. This is the common view of all theologians and is more secure in faith against those philosophers who did not distinguish between a singular substance and a supposit. Although it cannot be efficaciously proven by natural reason and the light of nature — as all theologians acknowledge, because the entire motive for recognizing the distinction between a singular nature and subsistence or supposit dawned on us from the mystery of the Lord's Incarnation, through which it came about that human nature subsisted not in its own but in an alien supposit, namely the divine — nevertheless, granted the light of faith, such a real distinction between singular substance and subsistence or supposit is evidently shown. And indeed some theologians — *Centinus, de Incarn., disp. 1, cap. 5; Aversa, quest. 18, Phil., sect. 2; Aretinus, 3, dist. 1, quest. 1, art. 10*; and other theologians — first show it from the mystery of the Trinity. For absolutely speaking, many things are attributed to the divine supposits that are not attributed to the divine nature, and vice versa, as is held in the chapter *damnamus* extra de Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica. For the Father is said to generate the Son and the Son to be generated by the Father, and the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father and the Son; yet the divine nature is said neither to generate nor to be generated, neither to spirate nor to be

spirated. The divine nature itself is said to be communicable to several persons, while no person is said to be common to three. Again, in God there is one singular essence and nature, and there are three supposits constituted and distinguished by three personal subsistences. Therefore beyond the singular nature there is a subsistence that terminates nature and together with it constitutes the supposit. Hence one may rightly argue from this that the same holds in created things and that some distinction intercedes between nature and supposit. However, this argument does not seem sufficiently efficacious to me for proving what is proposed. For in the proposed conclusion we intend to prove a real distinction between a singular nature and subsistence or supposit — or at least such a distinction that the singular nature can be deprived of its proper subsistence. And although some distinction exists between the divine nature and the three supposits in which it subsists, one cannot admit such a great distinction as is here intended. Moreover, in Scotus's view, which formally distinguishes the relations of origin in the divine from the divine essence *ex natura rei*, it may be possible to conclude from the mystery of the Trinity some distinction *ex natura rei* between nature and supposit in created things; yet in the principles of the Thomists and other theologians who do not actually distinguish them *ex natura rei*, no greater distinction can be deduced between nature and supposit than one of reason at most. But Durandus and Aureolus, who hold the opposite of this conclusion, also admit such a distinction in creatures. Furthermore, the singular divine nature is still communicable to several as a "that which," whereas this is not the case with singular created substance. Therefore from this angle there seems to be more reason to conflate in creatures the singular substance with the supposit than in the divine, and so no sufficient argument for concluding the distinction of singular nature from supposit in creatures is drawn from that, since the singular created substance is more incommunicable than the divine.

The conclusion is better proven from the mystery of the Incarnation, by which we are taught in faith that the divine Word assumed human nature in the singular (in *atomo*) — that is, as singular — yet did not assume a created person or supposit. Likewise, human nature in the Word lacks its proper subsistence and subsists by the subsistence of the Word, as the holy Fathers regularly say and the Councils teach. Therefore some distinction in reality must intercede between this humanity and its proper supposit, and between the singular nature and its proper subsistence — a distinction great enough that the former can be separated from the latter and assumed without the latter. Confirmation: if nature and subsistence are entirely the same *ex natura rei*, then what is said *ex natura rei* of one must also be said of the other. Since the created subsistence is not assumed, neither can the nature be said to be assumed; and if the nature is assumed, then so is it. Both alternatives are heretical. Furthermore, even those theologians who defend the opposite of this conclusion, if they wish to think catholically, are compelled to confess that the Word assumed nature in the singular — that is, singular humanity — and not a human person or supposit. Therefore something is lacking to the

assumed humanity, through the lack of which it cannot be called a person or supposit — and this is nothing other than the mode of proper subsistence, by which the singular nature is formally constituted in the ratio of a supposit. If they reply that the assumed humanity is not called a person or supposit because something is added to it — namely the union to the Word, which properly is said to have the humanity, while the humanity is said to be in the Word as form or nature in the supposit, and therefore that humanity cannot be called a supposit or a man, because it has another mode of being by reason of which it is rather in another than in itself — against this, as Suárez rightly infers, from this solution it follows that for the ratio of supposit and subsistence, at least a negation of union to another or a lack of the mode of existing in another is required, and that the formal ratio of subsistence consists formally in this negation. This suffices for our purpose: even if it be only a real negative distinction between singular nature and subsistence — in the way that matter is said to be really distinguished from privation, because a real and separable negation is said to be distinguished from its subject not merely rationally — this suffices for our purpose. Nor do we here yet dispute whether subsistence adds above the singular nature something positive, really superadded and positively distinct, since this will be disputed below.

You will object with Durandus that the assumed humanity is not called a person because it is not conceived after the manner of a concrete and of one having a nature, but after the manner of one had and possessed by the supposit of an alien nature. Against this: neither a person nor a supposit is constituted in such being by our mode of conceiving, but from those things that really belong to it and from the thing itself, whether they be positive or negative predicates. Therefore if the humanity of Christ has everything that is really required for the intrinsic constitution of a supposit and person, it could truly be called a person — which was the heresy of Nestorius. Furthermore, if for the ratio of person and supposit it suffices, as Durandus says, that it can be conceived as a concrete and as one having a nature, the humanity of Christ could still be called a person, because the humanity assumed by the Word was individual and singular, and an individual and singular thing with respect to the specific nature and quiddity, as such, has the ratio of a concrete and of one having a nature, because nature is truly included and contained in the individual. Therefore in the opposite opinion it could truly be called a person. Confirmation: in the divine, God as the concrete of Deity and conceived after the manner of one having Deity is not a person nor a supposit, because so concretely taken he is still common to three persons. Therefore it is false that for the ratio of a supposit it suffices for the nature to be signified in the concrete; rather, something must really be superadded to the nature *ex natura rei*.

I say third: subsistence in the sense of the preceding conclusion should not be confused with the through-itself existence of singular substance, by which it is said to be independent of a subject. This conclusion follows from the two

preceding ones. For subsistence properly taken renders substance incommunicable to another as form to a supposit, while through-itself existence only renders it independent of another as a subject, even if it is communicable to another as a supposit — as is clear of the singular nature assumed by the Word, which is communicated to the Word as an alien supposit and therefore lacks its proper subsistence, but does not depend on it as on a subject and therefore does not lack its proper through-itself existence. Therefore the mode of subsistence should not be confused with the mode of through-itself existence, since nature can lose one without the other. Confirmation: even if in common and more extended speech subsistence of a substance is sometimes confused with its through-itself existence, and both terms are used interchangeably to distinguish it from accident, nevertheless properly speaking they must be distinguished from each other as entirely different modes. Therefore, to remove all confusion, the Doctor says in *Quodl. 4, M.* and *Quodl. 5, V.*, but most especially in *Quodl. 9, from the beginning*, that "to subsist" or "to exist through itself" can be used in multiple senses. In the most common sense, what subsists or exists through itself is that which exists in isolation — and in this sense through-itself existence can belong to accident when it is separated from its subject, as in the Eucharist. In a less common second sense, through-itself existence belongs to everything that neither inheres in another nor has the aptitude for inherence; in this sense every substance — not only composite but also matter and form — can be said to subsist, because a substantial form, even though it is in matter by informing it, is not there through inherence, as was explained in the preceding question, since to inhere means not to inform through itself, because what inheres is not an act simply but only in a qualified sense, and does not make one through itself with that to which it inheres. In the third and proper sense, finally, what subsists is that which is in ultimate actuality, such that it is no longer orderable to any further act simply beyond the act it has — which further act could be its act through itself. What is said in this way to exist through itself is properly called subsisting and is usually called a supposit, and in an intellectual nature a person, because every such being is the first substance and no longer communicable to another — neither as a "that which" (*ut quod*), that is as a universal to its inferiors, nor as a "by which" (*ut quo*), such that it could be an essential part of another or a principle of acting or a quo-principle. In this final sense we say that subsistence should not be confused with through-itself existence, which is proper to any substantial nature; rather, subsistence is a peculiar mode of singular substance distinct from the existence of the same. Finally, against Capreolus it can be proven that subsistence does not coincide with the existence of the singular nature — from that universal principle accepted outside the Thomistic school — that existence is not really distinguished from real and actual essence. Since subsistence is distinguished from the singular substance in the way stated in the preceding conclusion — because nature can be without it, as is clear in the nature assumed by the Word — it follows that it does not coincide with its existence but is a mode distinct from it and destined for a different function: it serves not for existing through itself

independently of another as of a subject, but for existing as not communicable to another as a supposit, so that it renders the singular nature wholly incommunicable.

I say finally: subsistence does not precede but rather presupposes existence in the singular nature. This is the common teaching against Cajetan, and it is proven first from the common way of speaking of all, who say that subsistence is the ultimate term and complement of nature — it could not be such if existence in nature were still expected after it. Furthermore, far from the truth is what Cajetan used to say — that nature is not proximately capable of existence unless it is first understood as subsisting — for things are entirely the opposite: nature is not proximately capable of subsistence unless it is first understood as existing. I show this as follows: subsistence, especially if posited as a positive mode as the Thomists hold, cannot be founded in the entity of nature except as actual and outside its causes. For actual subsistence cannot be founded in a nature that is wholly possible, since what is founded must be proportioned to the foundation and vice versa. But by the very fact that nature is posited as actually being and outside its causes, it is understood as existing. Therefore in singular nature existence is prior to subsistence. Furthermore, that which belongs to a thing inseparably is prior in it to that which belongs to it separably, because the latter is understood more as accruing to it than the former; but existence belongs inseparably to the singular nature, whereas subsistence does not, since the assumed nature in the Word — according to the more common and truer view — still retains its proper existence but not its proper subsistence. Furthermore, it is prior for a thing to exist than to exist incommunicably; and therefore even in the divine, existence — which is essential — is prior to the personal and incommunicable subsistences. But singular substance is constituted in actual being outside its causes through existence, while through subsistence it is rendered incommunicable to another as a supposit. Therefore in nature existence precedes subsistence and not the other way around. But let us not waste time on what is self-evident and conceded by all, and which I also treated in *disp. 8, Met., quest. 3, in fine, n. 164*.

Dissolution of the Opposing Arguments

Against the first conclusion it is objected: through-itself existence in substance is explained in the same way as inherence in accident; but accident is constituted as inhering in a subject by a mode of inherence distinct from it; therefore substance too is constituted as existing through itself by a similar mode. Furthermore, the quidditative ratio of substance is not the mode of through-itself existence itself, but the exigitive principle of it, just as the same is said about inherence in accident; therefore nothing prevents a mode really distinct from it from being posited. Again, in fact, in the Word human nature does not exist through itself independently of another as of a subject, since it is sustained in it; therefore such through-itself existence is a mode distinct from substance, since it can exist

without it. Finally, the accident separated in the Eucharist is said to exist through itself in the manner of a substance, by a certain mode of through-itself existence newly granted to it by God and opposed to the mode of inhering. Therefore in fact and naturally, substance exists through itself by a similar distinct mode.

The reply is to deny the parity: since an absolute accident can fail to inhere in a subject — as is clear in the Eucharist — whereas substance cannot fail to exist through itself. Therefore, just as within the genus of accident, modal or relative accidents do not need a distinct mode of inhering because they cannot fail to inhere in a subject, so in the present case, because substance cannot fail to exist through itself, it does not need a distinct mode of through-itself existence — as it does need a mode of subsisting. To the second objection: the consequence is denied, because neither is existence in creatures a part of the quiddity of a thing, yet it is not posited as a mode really distinct from essence; it is distinct only in that degree by which an intrinsic mode is distinguished from the thing of which it is a mode — a distinction far lesser than a real distinction. And in this same way, through-itself existence will be distinct from substance as its intrinsic mode but not really, such that substance could be without it. To the third: the assumption is denied, because the human nature even in the Word exists independently of it as of a subject, since it is not in it through inhesive union — as accident is to its subject — but through hypostatic union, which is that of nature to a supposit; nor is it sustained in it as accident in a subject, but in a looser way, in the manner in which nature is said to be sustained in a supposit — not properly as in a subject, but rather as in the ultimate term of its dependence, as will be more fully apparent from what will be said below. To the last objection: the assumption is denied, as I said in *disp. 2, Phys., quest. 4, art. 2*, from Scotus, *4, dist. 12, quest. 1 and 6, §. Ad argumenta*. And even if it were conceded, the consequence is still denied, because to the separated accident, so that it might exist through itself, God would give that mode of through-itself existence because accident is of itself unfit to exist in that way and would therefore need a new superadded mode for so existing. But substance is of itself fit to exist in this way, and therefore such a mode of through-itself existence must be posited as congenitally intrinsic and substantial to it — as natural to it. Hence the argument rather establishes the opposite: from the very same ground from which the need for such a mode of through-itself existence is argued in a separated accident, one argues that substance has no need of such a mode distinct from itself.

Against the second conclusion — proving that subsistence adds nothing really distinct to singular substance — it is argued that a supposit is nothing other than the composite of this matter and this form, and beyond these there is nothing that can be thought. But all of this is the same as this singular nature. Therefore a supposit adds nothing real beyond the singular nature, but only in our mode of consideration. Furthermore, the concrete and the abstract do not differ more in the predicament of substance than in the predicament of accident; but in the predicament of accident, "white" and "whiteness" signify entirely the same thing.

Therefore likewise, in the predicament of substance, "supposit" and "nature," "man" and "humanity." Furthermore, those things that are generated by the same generation and cease by the same corruption are not really distinct from each other — for this is the primary sign of real identity — and this is how singular nature and subsistence stand. Furthermore, a singular nature existing through itself is a being in act, since it is constituted by form; therefore if subsistence supervened upon it as a distinct mode, this would be an accident. Finally, what belongs to all supposits of a species pertains to the specific nature; but subsistence belongs to all supposits of a species; therefore subsistence is not distinct from the specific nature. These last three arguments are drawn from *Acerbus, lib. 2, quest. peripat., quest. 11* by *Aversa, quest. 18, Phil., sect. 2* — though that author, even while calling the opinion of Henry and Durandus probable, says the opposite opinion is far more probable at the end of the question.

The reply is to deny the assumption; for the humanity of Christ is composed of this matter and this form, and yet it is not a supposit — as faith teaches. This is because in our view the composite designates a third entity beyond this matter and this form, and its proper subsistence — which we are speaking of — is a mode of incommunicable being by reason of which such a singular nature, as supposed and subsisting, cannot be the act of another. This may not be distinguished from a singular composite by the philosophers, yet from the mystery of the Incarnation we have come to know that it is distinguished. To the second argument: the parity can be denied first, because accident does not subsist as substance does; then, granting the parity as to the minor, it must be said that although "white" and "whiteness" signify entirely the same in their principal signification, the concrete says more than the abstract as regards its connotation, because beyond the form it adds the subject in which the form is found. And so by parity the substantial concrete, beyond the nature congruous to it, connotes a supposit — from the Doctor, *1, dist. 4, quest. 1, in fine* — to which the nature is said quasi to inhere, from the same Doctor, *Quodl. 5, lit. V*. Hence the argument rather establishes the opposite. And it must further be noted that there is a difference between a concretized personal term like "Peter" and an unpersoned one like "man" corresponding to humanity as such, the latter being what Durandus uses as his example. For even if it were conceded of such a concrete that it signifies the same as Durandus says, this could not be conceded of the other concrete. To the third argument, Aversa replies in the cited place that some things can be made and corrupted simultaneously even if distinct, and even if made by distinct actions, and that this is the case with subsistence and nature. But this reply does not address the argument, for the argument does not assume in the major that things that are simultaneously made and simultaneously corrupted are not really distinct — in which case the major could simply be denied, as Aversa does — but rather that those things are not really distinct that come to be by the same generation and cease to be by the same corruption, which is plainly the primary sign of real non-distinction, as I said in *disp. 6, Met., quest. 8, n. 185*, taken from

Aristotle, 4, *Met.*, text 3. Therefore the minor is rather to be denied; for even if subsistence follows upon the singular nature by natural resultance when not prevented by God, it does not immediately come to be by exactly the same action as the nature, and in this sense Trombetta explains this rule and Aristotle's dictum in 4, *Met.*, 3 in *Formalities*, part 4, art. 4: that those things which are generated by one production are the same should be understood of those things that are made through themselves and immediately by a single real action. But those things said to be produced or rather co-produced by one action precisely because one results from the other need not at all be really the same; they are only said to be the same in subject or by some connection, because in reality they are not immediately and proximately made by one and the same indivisible real action. Note, however, that this response holds especially in the position that holds subsistence to import a positive grade superadded to nature; for if it is held to consist in something negative, it cannot properly be said to be generated or produced, but only to follow upon singular nature by the very fact that it is not united to another supposit.

To the fourth argument: Aversa replies in the cited place that nature antecedently to subsistence is in act with the actuality of nature, but not with the actuality of a supposit; hence a substantial mode can supervene upon it in the ratio of a supposit. But this reply does not address the argument, which contends that subsistence would be an accident if it supervened upon nature constituted in act as something really distinct that could be present or absent. For nature is constituted in act with the actuality of nature by form, and what accrues to a being so in act is an accident. Furthermore, it is false that subsistence accrues to nature only constituted in the act of nature, as Aversa says, because it accrues to nature constituted also in the act of singular being. Wherefore it is rather to be said with Mairon, 3, *dist.* 2, *quest.* 11, that the suppositional ratio in creatures does not simply constitute, because it accrues to nature already constituted in singular being; it only gives incommunicable being. Hence it is gathered that it is more probable that it consists in a negation than in something positive, because if it accrued to a being in act and were really distinct from it, it would be difficult to avoid its being an accident. And this too will be an argument from which it can be proven that subsistence consists in something negative. To the last argument: Aversa replies that what belongs to all supposits of a species indeed pertains to the species itself, but need not necessarily pertain to nature as distinct from the supposit — and this is how subsistence stands. But this reply is not legitimate, because it is wrongly conceded that subsistence is of the ratio of the specific nature even as identified with supposits. For even the individual difference and existence are closer to the specific nature than subsistence is, and yet they are not said to pertain to the specific being. Therefore that major should not be absolutely conceded — that what belongs to all supposits of a species pertains to the specific nature — but rather it should be distinguished thus: what belongs to all supposits of a species by reason of the species itself pertains to the specific nature, because it is held to

be an essential predicate of the first or at least the second mode; but what belongs to all individuals of a species not by reason of the species itself but from elsewhere, it is false to say that it pertains to the specific nature. Otherwise even the individual difference would pertain to the specific nature because it belongs to all and each individual; hence the argument proves more than the arguer intends. For he intends only to prove that subsistence is not really distinct from the singular nature but is entirely the same as it *ex natura rei*; yet the argument proves it to be also entirely the same as the specific nature.

Question III: What "Subsisting" and "Subsistent" Signify

Although in the preceding question it was proven that subsistence — taken as the incommunicable existence of singular substance — is really distinct from it *ex natura rei*, such that it can be separated from it by the power of God, as was done in the mystery of the Incarnation, it is still not clear what the formal ratio and formal effect of such subsistence is — the effect it communicates to nature when it renders it formally subsisting. The resolution of this difficulty must be premised because the resolution of the principal question of this matter depends on it: whether a supposit adds above the singular nature something formally positive or only something negative. For if the formal effect of subsistence is positive — that is, such that it cannot be had except by a positive form — then it will consequently have to be asserted that subsistence or suppositionality adds a positive formality above nature; but if the formal effect of subsistence is precisely negative — that is, such that it can be had through a simple negation — then there will be no need for subsistence to add something positive above nature; a negation alone will suffice, and entities should not be multiplied without necessity. This difficulty is so arduous that some theologians entirely yield to it and find rest in no position, as *the most eminent Cardinal de Lugo testifies in disp. 12, de Incarn., sect. 3, n. 25*. Yet since the resolution of the more principal question of this matter depends on it — as I said — and also all other less principal questions that are usually ventilated about subsistence, this difficulty must not be surrendered to; rather, every effort must be made to investigate the truth, or at least its more probable resolution.

In order to separate certain from uncertain matters, and controversial from commonly granted ones, in this question it must be noted that the names of subsistence, suppositionality, and personhood are used interchangeably by all, as signifying the same formality, differing only in what they connote — that is, in the different natures they affect. For from the fact that this formality affects the substantial nature as such, whether it be an intellectual nature or not, it is called absolutely "subsistence" and "suppositionality"; if the nature affected by it is intellectual, it is called not only subsistence and suppositionality but also "personhood," because person is found only in intellectual nature. Hence the denomination of personhood in the formality superadded to the singular nature is a denomination purely extrinsic, derived from the nature it affects when that

nature is intellectual. Some also distinguish subsistence and suppositionality by their different connotations, saying that subsistence can affect indifferently both complete and incomplete nature, but that when it affects complete substance it is called suppositionality, whereas when it affects incomplete substance it is called subsistence precisely. Hence a separated soul can be called subsisting but not a supposit. Thus the names of subsistence, suppositionality, and personhood — and their concretes "subsisting," "supposit," and "person" — stand in relation as more and less common, because a person is a supposit and subsisting, but not vice versa; a supposit is subsisting but not vice versa. Hence Peter or Michael is a person, a supposit, and a subsisting thing; a horse or a stone is indeed a supposit and subsisting, but not a person, since they are not supposits of an intellectual nature. Likewise a soul, if we attribute partial subsistence to it, is indeed called subsisting but not a supposit, because it is not a complete nature. This doctrine is commonly conceded by all.

The name "hypostasis" likewise signifies the same as "person" — that is, a supposit in intellectual nature. Although in antiquity it suffered some equivocation — sometimes signifying the same as "substance" — which is why the holy Fathers refused to admit three hypostases in the divine, lest they seem to multiply essences, it is now by common usage employed for "person," and thus it is granted by the Church that one can without danger speak of three hypostases in the divine. What a person is, Boethius defines in *lib. de duabus naturis et una persona Christi* as an individual substance of a rational nature. This definition is received by *Thomas, 1 p., quest. 29, art. 1*. But so simply stated, as the words sound, it does not please the Doctor, *1, dist. 23, quest. unica, §. Ad quaestionem*, because it would follow that the soul is a person, since it is an individual substance of a rational nature; similarly the Deity would be, and indeed the nature assumed by the Word, since it is individual. Moreover, only man is properly said to be rational. Suárez, however, in *lib. 1, de Trin., cap. 1*, whom *Poncius* follows in *disp. 18, cit., quest. 6, n. 59*, strives to defend this definition, saying that by "substance" one understands complete substance, and hence the rational soul is excluded; also individual and particular substance, signified by the term "individual," which term also signifies incommunicability, and hence the Deity is excluded; and by "rational nature" is taken an intellectual nature.

Now if Suárez had attended properly, he would not have said that the Doctor simply rejected Boethius's definition; for even though he does not approve the said definition as so simply stated, he does receive and defend it by expounding or correcting it through the definition handed down by Richard, *4, de Trin., cap. 22*, which is: a person is the incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature. Here "rational" is replaced by "intellectual," "individual" by "incommunicable," "substance" by "existence" — and Suárez expounds Boethius's definition in this same way. This definition is therefore excellent, because there is placed there something as genus — namely existence or subsistence, taken as meaning the subsisting being; second, something in place of a difference — not specific or

ultimate, since this belongs to a supposit too — which is "incommunicable"; and finally something in place of an ultimate difference, though taken through connotation — namely "of intellectual nature," through which person differs from supposit. The Doctor further clarifies the incommunicability which he says person is, as twofold — opposed to twofold communicability. For something can be called communicable in two ways: either as a "that which" (*ut quod*), in the way that a universal is said to be communicated to its inferiors such that each of them is it; or as a "by which" (*ut quo*), in the way that a form is communicated to something by which that something is such according to it, but is not itself that form — as a soul is communicated to the body. And in both ways the Deity is communicable, while a person can be communicable in neither way, and both forms of incommunicability pertain to the ratio of person. Hence the soul is not a person because it has the second communicability, nor is God because it has the first, nor is the divinity because it has both. Although this definition does not fully fit a supposit — since it does not fit a stone or a horse — yet if "of intellectual nature" is removed and in its place is put "of substantial nature," the definition fits a supposit as well. From these definitions we finally have that every person, every supposit, or subsisting thing as such is an incommunicable substance, and that personhood, suppositionality, or subsistence formally says some incommunicability — to the point that being incommunicable is the formal effect that subsistence or suppositionality bestows upon the nature it affects. The whole difficulty lies in explaining what kind of incommunicability this is; for although Scotus expressed it clearly, more recent thinkers have cast the densest darkness over this material with their speculations.

Article I: Various Positions Are Set Forth and Rejected

First, some have held that the formal ratio of subsistence consists in the collection of accidental conditions, so that its formal effect is to render nature as underlying accidents and informed by them. This opinion is attributed to *Henry, Quodl. 3, quest. 2; Aegidius in his tract de comp.; Argentinus, 3, dist. 6, quest. 1*; and Thomas himself seems openly to agree in *1 p., quest. 3, art. 3*. But this position is universally rejected. For subsistence pertains in some way to the substantial complement of substance, whereas accidents pertain only to accidental complement. Hence in fact the collection of accidents varies when one is lost or a new one is acquired, and yet the ratio of supposit does not change. And if by God's power the singular substance were stripped of all its accidents, it would still remain in itself subsisting and terminated in the ratio of substance. Nor can it consist in the collection of individuating conditions, because if by "individuating conditions" is meant the intrinsic individual difference of nature, it is clear that subsistence does not consist in this — since it accrues to the singular nature and presupposes its singularity. But if extrinsic individuating conditions are meant, since they import nothing other than a varied collection of accidents, the argument about accidents recurs. Furthermore, in the humanity of Christ there are all the accidents naturally following upon humanity; there are also all the individuating conditions

in whatever way they are taken, because, as the Fathers say, he assumed nature in the singular — that is, as certain and singular. And yet Christ lacks his proper subsistence, as faith teaches. Therefore subsistence cannot formally consist in such a collection, nor can its formal effect be to underlie accidents, because the humanity of Christ underlies its accidents and yet lacks its proper subsistence.

You will say: the humanity of Christ underlies accidents by reason of the divine subsistence supplying the functions of created subsistence. Against this: the divine subsistence cannot be the reason for receiving accidents, nor does it supply the functions of created subsistence except in those matters that abstract from imperfection. Furthermore, for sustaining accidents it suffices in substance to have the intrinsic mode of its through-itself existence, by which it is constituted as independent of another as a subject — for from the very fact that it is so independent, it can terminate the similar dependence of another, as the Doctor notes, 4, *dist.* 12, *quest.* 1. And this through-itself existence, which I said in the preceding question to be distinct from subsistence, the humanity still retains in the Word; therefore by reason of it the humanity can underlie accidents.

Finally, this position is rejected because subsistence must be explained by some incommunicability, as is clear from the definitions assigned to person and supposit accepted in every school; but in the said explanation of subsistence no mention is made of any incommunicability — rather it is said precisely that its formal effect is to render substance as underlying accidents. If it acknowledges some incommunicability through the claim that subsistence consists in the collection of individuating conditions, it still does not satisfy, because this is the incommunicability as a "that which" — which is the formal effect of singularity, not of subsistence. For singularity renders nature incommunicable as a "that which," and this — even if it is required for subsistence from Scotus, *loc. cit.* — does not formally constitute subsistence, because it is common to both singularity and subsistence.

Second, some have said that the formal effect of subsistence is to render nature capable of acting, because subsistence is the ratio of acting or at least the condition entirely required for acting, since actions belong to supposits. So some more recent thinkers, cited by *Arriaga*, *loc. cit.* This position too is universally rejected. First, by that general reason that subsistence, as such, necessarily imports some incommunicability, of which this explanation makes no mention. Second, it is false that subsistence — whether posited as positive or negative — is the ratio of acting or a condition so necessarily required that nature could not act without it, if it could exist without it, as will be evident below in the proper question. And so, leaving aside these and other positions that in explaining the formal ratio of subsistence or its formal effect do not derive it from incommunicability — as altogether improbable — we must examine others that explain it by some incommunicability, which all schools confess to belong formally to the ratio of supposit and person.

Third, others say that the incommunicability which a supposit formally says — or which suppositionality formally bestows — is the incommunicability opposed to the communicability of accident, that is, unfitness for inherence in another as a subject. So Suárez seems to hold, *loc. cit.*, when he says that one of the chief formal effects of subsistence is to render nature independent of a subject of inherence. This position too generally displeases, and is rejected by *Arriaga, disp. 4, Met., sect. 8, n. 48*, as follows: dependence on a subject of inherence also belongs to substance in reality, since the dependence of accident on its subject does not in reality differ from the dependence of material substantial form on the same subject — even if one is called inherence and the other is not. For substantial form does not depend less than accidental form. Therefore subsistence, which is proper to substance, cannot be constituted in such independence from a subject of inherence. But this argument assumes something false in its antecedent, because dependence on another as on a subject of inherence directly conflicts with substance as distinguished from accident; and although material substantial form depends on matter in its being and coming-to-be, just as accident does, it is still true that it is not in matter through inherence, nor is even the dependence of substantial form on matter as great as that of accident on its subject — because the latter depends on another of a different genus for its being, whereas substantial form does not — as was explained in *quest. 1 of this disp., nn. 19 and 22*.

Oviedo, controuv. 4, Met., pun. 3, n. 4, and *the most eminent de Lugo, cit., n. 31*, attack this position on the grounds that even with proper subsistence removed, the thing remains independent of a subject; therefore the thing has this independence from some source other than subsistence. They prove the antecedent: from the very fact that matter or the rational soul terminates a creative action, it is understood to be independent of a subject — yet creation is not subsistence but production. Therefore antecedently to subsistence the thing is understood to be independent of a subject. Although this argument is more efficacious than the preceding one, it still does not seem to convince absolutely, because an absolute accident too — such as quantity or quality — can terminate a creative action if produced in itself and not in a subject, and yet from this it cannot be rightly inferred that it is independent of a subject as substance is, since it still at least aptitudinally depends on it. You will say: at least actual independence can be inferred, which it has by reason of a certain mode of perseity that God grants to the accident by the very fact that he produces or conserves it outside its subject — as is clear in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, where he conserves accidents outside their subject through a certain mode of perseity similar to substance. Against this: it is false that God in such a case grants to the accident a new positive mode of perseity similar to substance, because such a mode conflicts with it — as I showed in *disp. 3, Phys., quest. 4, art. 1*. Rather, in that case the accident is said precisely to be created and to terminate a creative action because it is not produced in a subject — which is a certain merely negative mode of perseity, not positive, of the sort that the independence of substance with respect to a subject

imports. Therefore from the mere fact that something terminates a creative action, it is not straightway deduced that it has the positive independence of a substance, since in that case an absolute accident as the terminus of creation could in no way be.

Poncius, disp. 18, quest. 6, n. 60, attacks it differently: every complete or incomplete substance has of itself an unfitness for inherence; therefore no separable mode distinct from it need be superadded by reason of which this unfitness formally proceeds. The consequent is evident; the antecedent is proven, because if it were posited per impossibile that humanity existed without any separable mode, it would still have that unfitness; second, because accident has of itself aptitude for inherence without a superadded mode; therefore conversely substance does not need a distinct mode to be called unfit for inherence. But this argument does not proceed rightly, because here the discussion is not about aptitudinal independence of substance from a subject — all concede this belongs to substance not by a distinct mode but by its own entity, just as conversely the opposite aptitudinal dependence on a subject belongs to accident by its own entity — but the discussion is about actual independence. And the authors of this position say that this is had in substance by a distinct mode called subsistence, just as conversely in accident actual dependence on a subject is had by a superadded mode of inherence. Therefore this position is to be attacked on the basis of what was said in *quest. 2 of this disp., concl. 2, n. 24*: namely that substance actually exists through itself by a certain mode of existence distinct from subsistence and intrinsic to it and really identified with it — which real identity is deduced from the fact that not even by God's power can substance ever inhere in a subject. Hence even the humanity of Christ, although in the Word, is not in it as in a subject; whereas absolute accident inheres by a distinct mode of inherence, because by God's absolute power it can be found without such a mode — as is clear in the Eucharist. This same objection Poncius also applies, in order to escape the instance just made against his argument.

Fourth, others say that the incommunicability which subsistence bestows upon the singular nature is the incommunicability in the manner of a part with respect to an essential or integral whole. Scotus seems to favor this in *Quodl. 9, from the beginning, §. de secundo*, where he says that what is properly called subsisting — by subsistence properly so called, of which we here speak — is that which has ultimate actuality, such that it is no longer per se orderable to any further act simply beyond the act it has, which further act could be its act through itself. Others refute this because even the substantial parts in a composite have their proper subsistence and yet are communicated to and united with the other parts to constitute the whole. And even if this were denied of them while they are actually in the composite, it still cannot be denied of them when they are outside the composite — namely of the separated soul and body — since then they have proper subsistence and yet the one is orderable to the other and both are ordered to the whole they are suited to constitute. But this argument does not press hard,

because the Doctor, *loc. cit.*, denies proper subsistence to essential parts whether in the whole or outside the whole, because they are orderable to a further act and to constituting something one through itself. Hence he concludes that only the complete whole — whether composite or simple, like an angel — can be properly called subsisting through itself and a supposit. But it is proved still more strongly that not even with respect to the complete whole can subsistence be explained in this way — through incommunicability, namely, in the manner of an essential part — because since the complete whole is of itself incapable of such communication in the manner of an essential part, it is superfluous to posit subsistence in it as a distinct mode by which it becomes incapable of such communication. By the same reason the preceding position was also rejected — that explaining subsistence through independence from a subject of inherence was rejected because, since substance is of itself incapable of such inherence, a distinct mode by which it becomes incapable of it is superfluous. I confess this reason does not sufficiently prove that subsistence of the complete whole cannot be adequately explained by this incommunicability — since it is itself incommunicable in this way and not through a superadded mode. Hence it must be said that the Doctor, *loc. cit.*, does not intend to adequately explain subsistence by this precise incommunicability, but only indicates that this incommunicability also concurs, at least presuppositively, alongside the others to be explained later, which formally constitute it. As for incommunicability in the manner of an integral part, nearly all concede that this does not formally belong to subsistence or constitute its formal effect — because such communication, or communicability, is perfectly compatible with subsistence. For in fact my nature, affected by proper personhood, is communicated to integral parts newly acquired through generation, with which it constitutes one thing through unity of continuity and integrity. And although one part is communicated to another, it is not communicated as a "by which" (*ut quo*), in the way a nature can be communicated to a supposit — since one part does not receive such a denomination from another. Nor is the case the same for essential and integral parts: essential parts, being constitutive of an essential physical whole — which is a certain third thing really distinct from them — are of themselves essentially incomplete beings, and therefore incapable of proper suppositionality and subsistence properly so called. But integral parts are not constitutive of any whole really distinct from them when united, as is clear from what was said in physics; hence they are not parts in such a way as to be essentially incomplete beings. On the contrary, they are essentially complete beings just as the whole itself is, and are directly placed in the same predicament and directly receive all predicamental superiors quidditatively just as the integral whole of which they are parts does. For this log is said quidditatively through itself to be a half-palm log, just as the whole palm log it constitutes is. Since therefore subsistence says the ultimate complement of substantial nature, subsistence will not conflict with integral parts on this basis, because they are not essentially incomplete beings as

essential parts are; nor will incommunicability in the manner of an integral part belong to the formal ratio of subsistence or pertain to its formal effect.

Fifth, *Poncius, disp. 18, cit., from n. 64*, strives with many arguments to explain this incommunicability that subsistence and personhood import, and finally in *n. 67* concludes that this incommunicability is opposed to the communicability by which the divine nature is communicated to three persons and human nature to the Word. And in *n. 68* he poses this conclusion: for some singular complete substance to be called personated, no other negation is required than that of actual communication — whether formal or real — with another with which it would make one through itself. I do not know by what reason this author introduces the communicability of the divine nature to three persons in order to explain the incommunicability of personhood, since this is plainly more difficult than the incommunicability of the person itself. Moreover, here the discussion is not about divine personhood nor about personhood common to both divine and human, but about created and human personhood precisely — which is of an entirely different kind from the divine. Furthermore, the communicability that belongs to the divine nature is removed from created nature by singularity itself and not by personhood, for by the very fact that a created nature is singular, it is also incommunicable to several as a "that which" — since such communicability is the special privilege of the divine nature by reason of its infinity. Therefore although created personhood immediately removes from nature that communicability by which the humanity of Christ is in fact communicated to the Word, it does not immediately and formally remove the communicability by which the divine nature is communicated to several persons — that is removed by singularity and therefore does not pertain to the formality of a person except presuppositively. Furthermore, the Doctor says in *3, dist. 2, quest. 1, art. 3* that for the constitution of a person it does not suffice to have only the negation of actual communication to another as a "by which" (*ut quo*), because then a separated soul would be a supposit and person, since it has such a negation. But he will say he speaks in his conclusion of singular complete substance, and therefore the instance about the rational soul is invalid. But it would have been better to speak absolutely and to conform to Scotus in his way of explaining personhood through the double negation of actual and aptitudinal communication, whose necessity he removes by speaking of complete substance. Nor does he achieve his intention even so, because as the Doctor says, *loc. cit., lit. E*: although the negation of potential dependence on an alien supposit belongs to no created nature — since every such nature is in obediential potency toward God — yet the negation of aptitude inheres in every personally constitutable nature in itself, even when it actually depends, as is clear of the assumed nature. Therefore even for a complete nature to be called personated in itself, the mere negation of actual communication does not suffice; the negation of aptitudinal communication is also required. Finally, what he holds in that first conclusion — that the negation of actual communication of nature with another with which it would make one

through itself is required for constituting personhood, and that personhood consists in such a negation — contradicts his third conclusion in *n.* 72, where he says that the incommunicability that person says is not well explained as being that by which it cannot be communicated to someone with whom it makes one through itself; because the divine Word is a person and yet in fact in Christ it is communicated through itself to the human nature assumed, with which it makes one through-itself man. This seems to me a manifest contradiction in the first and third conclusion of this author — or else I do not understand him, because he speaks there so obscurely and perplexedly that it is barely possible to perceive what he wishes to say.

Sixth, *Cardinal de Lugo* — *most eminent in both learning and dignity* — *disp.* 12, *cit.*, *sect.* 3, *n.* 31, says that the formal effect of proper subsistence is to render nature subsisting — that is, terminated in itself alone and existing through itself and not in another. He proves this from the very meaning of the word: for "to subsist" (*subsistere*) in Latin means so to stand firm as not to proceed further; hence "to subsist in oneself" will be the same as "to stand firm in oneself" or "to be terminated in oneself." Therefore this termination and negation of communication is the primary and most important effect of subsistence, which is therefore called *perseity* or personhood because it makes nature exist through itself. But to exist through itself is the same as not to exist in another, as is clear from the terms. Further on, in *n.* 35, he declares this primary effect of proper subsistence to be something positive — namely, to perfect and complete the substantial nature, which of itself was incomplete and required a sustaining ground upon which to rest, as accident requires it, though not with the same imperfection. For accident, through its weakness, requires to be sustained and propped up by another or in another's supposit; but substantial nature through its own perfection does not need this — rather it sustains itself, since from itself it has by emanation that sustaining ground by which it is sustained without another's help. And therefore it is said to be sustained in itself and to be through itself and to subsist in itself, because even if the sustaining ground or subsistence is something superadded, it is still proper to the substantial nature itself, and through it the nature sustains itself. And he says this formal effect is gathered from the mystery of the Incarnation, because from it we have that subsistence in man is something superadded by which nature needs to be perfected and substantially complemented, and it is not apparent what other perfection it could receive from that superadded entity than what has been said. Finally, in *n.* 54, he says that from this positive formal effect there arises the incommunicability which nature has from subsistence. For although there is some incommunicability so essential to substantial nature that it does not need a superadded mode to have it — since a complete substantial nature is incommunicable to another as a subject or to a whole through the manner of a part, as was said above — still from subsistence added to nature there can come the negation of that communication which, without subsistence, could at least

divinely be: for example, humanity with its proper subsistence removed could at least divinely be communicated to an alien supposit, whereas subsistence accruing impedes this communication. And therefore subsistence is called the ultimate term of nature, because it brings it to a halt and as it were surrounds it with a wall lest it have any exit toward another substance. *Oviedo and Arriaga, loc. cit.*, hold the same opinion with this difference: Oviedo makes no mention of this secondary effect, whereas Arriaga rightly says that from the positive effect of subsistence — that it is the substantial complement of nature — there follows another negative one: namely repugnance *ex natura rei* with any other proper or alien subsistence, because by the very fact that it is the complete nature *ex natura rei* it conflicts with another complement, since two forms producing entirely the same effect are superfluous in the same subject.

I confess that this position is superior to those adduced thus far, and therefore it has deservedly had followers among the eminent man's renowned colleagues of his Society as already cited. And as for that incommunicability which he calls the secondary effect, I readily also confess that it is the formal effect of subsistence of which we here speak and which is superadded to nature — and by reason of it the incommunicability belongs to the singular nature. And indeed Poncius wrongly denies this, *loc. cit.*, *n.* 62, saying that nature has of itself the natural incommunicability — the negation of communication — with respect to whatever it cannot be communicated to except supernaturally. For if that were true, all subsistence and suppositionality would simply be done away with, and no incommunicability whatsoever could be the formal effect of it, because he says my nature, for example, has of itself the negation of communication with that to which it can be communicated only supernaturally — and not by reason of the proper subsistence that now terminates it. This is wholly false, because if such incommunicability or non-communication belonged to it in that way, it could not be removed even by God's power. It must therefore be conceded that such non-communication — the negation of communication which my nature now has with respect to an alien supposit — is the formal effect of my subsistence or personhood, and belongs to the singular nature by means of it. Hence if my proper personhood were removed from my nature, it could immediately be communicated to an alien supposit and terminated by an alien subsistence — as the most learned de Lugo argues brilliantly, and Arriaga also agrees. However — with all due respect to so great a man — I cannot approve what he says about that primary and positive effect: namely that the primary effect of proper subsistence is something positive, consisting in perfecting, completing, and sustaining the substantial nature. For if we attend to the matter rather than strain over words, we shall find that this effect — which is primarily attributed to subsistence — is negative, not positive, and can be had through a mere negation. This is gathered from the very word "subsistence": to subsist (*subsistere*), as he himself teaches, is to stand firm in oneself or to be terminated in oneself and not to proceed further. But it is the case that nature, by the very fact that it is not understood as

communicated — neither as a "that which" nor as a "by which" — is sufficiently understood to stand firm in itself and to be terminated in itself. Therefore subsistence in nature is a precisely negative effect. Furthermore, if nature being personated in itself is explained by the fact that nature is sustained in some thing or positive mode distinct from itself — as these authors explain — then in truth nature would not stand firm in itself but would proceed further to the supposit, which is posited as something distinct from it. And then it would most of all not be alone in itself but in the supposit, which is something different from it. Nor does it help what the eminent Lugo says — that even so the substantial nature is said to stand firm in itself and to sustain itself, because even though subsistence and the supposit are something really distinct from it *ex natura rei*, it is still proper to the substantial nature itself and is not of a different genus, as is that in which accident is sustained. Therefore it is not said to be sustained in another but in itself. I confess that this is excellent doctrine, which I myself used in *quest. 1 of this disp., in fine*, to show the difference between the perseity of substance and the inherence of accident — and since the accidental form depends more greatly on its subject than the material substantial form, even though both depend on the subject in their coming-to-be and conservation in the genus of material cause. But this does not save the situation: if nature seeks something distinct from it — even if in its own genus and proportion — it can no less be said to be sustained in another and not properly in itself. This is likewise clear from the parallel case of substantial form, which, even though it is not propped up in another of a different genus as accident is but in something from the genus of substance proportioned to it, still, because that something is really distinct from it, is not said to be sustained in itself but in another. Therefore the same must equally be said in the present case, if nature is truly sustained in something positive superadded to it and really diverse from it, however much it may be posited to be of the same genus.

Furthermore, *Cardinal de Lugo, disp. 12, cit., sect. 7, in fine*, speaking of the material cause of subsistence, says it is the nature itself — since subsistence is a substantial mode, it must of necessity depend on a subject, and there is no other subject than the nature itself from which it can be sustained. From this I argue as follows: subsistence or personhood is truly sustained and in a positive mode in the singular nature from which it emanates, as the authors with whom I disagree say. Therefore nature cannot conversely be truly and properly said to be sustained in subsistence in a positive mode — but only in a negative mode, insofar as it is terminated in itself and does not proceed outside itself to stand firm in another as accident does. The consequent is proven because even in the view of those authors, causes cannot be causes of each other in the same genus of causality or by the same reason, but only in different genera — as was said in *disp. 8, Phys., quest. 1, art. 1, n. 6*. But this would happen if nature were sustained in personhood and conversely personhood in nature. Confirmation: very many of these authors are accustomed to explaining terminative indivisibles of the genus of quantity

through the mere negation of further extension with the Nominalists — point through the negation of further length, line through the negation of further width, and surface through the negation of further depth. Therefore all the more can terminatives of substance — such as modes of subsistence — be explained through the negation of sustenance in another, so that substance is truly said to subsist in itself and to be sustained in itself because it is not sustained in an alien supposit nor does it have dependence on an alien supposit. The consequent is proven because terminatives of quantity ought to serve more positive functions than terminatives of substance. Therefore if despite that, terminatives of quantity can be explained through mere negations, all the more can terminatives of substance.

Seventh and finally, seeing that no particular incommunicability sufficiently explains substance, some have said that the formal effect of subsistence is to constitute nature as wholly incommunicable — because subsistence constitutes a supposit existing through itself and nature subsisting in itself, and it is repugnant to it by virtue of this subsistence to be in another — whether as in a subject, as in a whole, as in an alien supposit, or in any other way. So *Vásquez, tom. 1, in 3 part., disp. 32, cap. 4*. This position is usually refuted in various ways, but briefly it is rejected from what has been said, because it is in fact false that subsistence excludes all communicability from the subsisting nature. For according to the more common view, it does not exclude communicability through the manner of an integral part; indeed some contend quite probably, as was said in *n. 43*, that it also does not exclude communicability through the manner of an essential part, for which reason they attribute proper subsistence to physical parts in a composite — on which account they say these parts can be immediately assumed by the Word in themselves, which is why in the three days of death the body and soul of Christ, separated from each other, still remained immediately united to the Word in themselves. Furthermore, a complete substance — whether simple or composite — is of itself incommunicable to another as a subject and as a whole, and not through any superadded mode, as was proven above. Therefore it is false that subsistence brings all incommunicability to nature, since nature has several incommunicabilities of itself and not through superadded subsistence. Mairon, however, notes in *3, quest. 11* that although only the incommunicability of opposition is formally of the ratio of subsistence — as we shall conclude in the following article — the other incommunicabilities he enumerates can still concur toward the ratio of the supposit at least fundamentally and presuppositively, in the mode to be explained shortly at the end of the following article.

Article II: The Formal Ratio of Subsistence and Its Formal Effect Are Explained

As is clear from the definitions offered at the beginning of the question for person and supposit, the formal ratio of personhood and subsistence easily deduced is that it consists in incommunicability — or in the negation of communication or

communicability. For a person is called the incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature, and a supposit is likewise called that which exists incommunicably in a substantial nature. Hence it is clear that a singular substance is constituted in the being of a supposit and a person — if it is of intellectual nature — precisely through incommunicability. And consequently the formal effect of subsistence is seen to be merely negative — namely, to render nature incommunicable. Therefore those who seek some positive effect of it labor in vain, for to expect a positive effect from a negative form such as personhood is futile — as is sufficiently established from what was said above in *n. 46* with Cardinal de Lugo. What remains, therefore, is only to declare what kind of non-communication or incommunicability personhood or subsistence brings with it.

Although this was sufficiently expressed by the Doctor in *1, dist. 23, quest. unica, §. ad quaestionem*, when he declared the definition of person as I said above in *n. 39*, the matter must be enucleated still more clearly from *Scotus, 3, dist. 1, quest. 1, art. 3* and *Quodl. 19*, where he treats this matter expressly. Three kinds of communication can chiefly be conceived and assigned, which subsistence eliminates and impedes in substantial nature — as Cardinal de Lugo also noted, *cit., n. 33*. The first is in relation to some subject by which it is sustained in the genus of material cause through the manner of inherence; the second is in relation to a whole, by which parts are said to be communicated when they constitute it and to each other; the third is in relation to an alien supposit or alien subsistence by which nature is said to be sustained. Now the first communication or incommunicability is not removed from singular substance by subsistence — of which we here speak and which is something superadded to nature — but by a certain other mode intrinsic to and identified with substance, by which it is distinguished from accident, and which is called through-itself existence contradistinct from accident's inherence, as was said in *quest. 2 of this disp., n. 24*. Nor is the second communication or incommunicability — through the manner of a part — removed from singular substance by subsistence, because communication through the manner of an integral part is well compatible with subsistence; and communication through the manner of an essential part is also according to some compatible with at least partial and incomplete subsistence. But from complete substance — whether simple or composite — communication through the manner of an essential part is removed not by superadded subsistence but by its own entity and formal ratio as a complete being, for under this ratio it entirely conflicts with being communicated to another and entering into the constitution of another through the manner of an essential part. Therefore only the third communication or incommunicability — namely, in relation to an alien supposit in which nature is sustained — can be impeded by proper subsistence, when it renders nature incommunicable to an alien supposit. For this is precisely the reason why the humanity of Christ lacks proper subsistence — because it does not have this incommunicability, since it is communicated to an alien supposit and in it it subsists. Hence through the

negation precisely of such communicability the formal effect of subsistence is best explained.

For a further declaration of this communicability — which subsistence formally impedes — and of the incommunicability it formally posits, it must be noted that, as far as our purpose goes, dependence and communicability signify the same, and likewise negation of dependence and negation of communicability. Now this dependence of nature, or communicability as a "by which" and in the manner of the form of the whole by which something is said to be such, in relation to a supposit, can be threefold: actual, aptitudinal, and potential — as the Doctor teaches in 3, *dist. 1, quest. 1, art. 3, §. non afferendo*. The first says act and consists when some nature is truly communicated to the supposit of another nature and consequently depends on it in this regard — as is now the case with human nature in Christ. We say something depends actually on another when such dependence is actually terminated at it, as for instance vision or intellection is said to depend actually on an object when it is actually terminated at it, even if the object is a merely terminative and not a motive one. The second dependence says aptitude, and consists when nature has an inclination and propensity to depend on and be communicated to some supposit — as in the same example of human nature in Christ, which has an inclination to depend on its proper, created, and human supposit. The third finally abstracts from aptitude and says mere capacity or non-repugnance to thus depend on some supposit — in which way the same human nature in Christ is said to have mere capacity or non-repugnance to depend on the divine supposit. Just as there is threefold dependence or communicability of nature to a supposit, so there can be threefold negation of dependence and communicability: namely negation of actual, aptitudinal, and potential dependence. The first is had in nature when it does not actually depend on an extrinsic supposit — so my nature now has the negation of communication with an alien supposit. The second negation is had in nature when it has no inclination toward the opposite act — so the same nature of mine is said to have such a negation, because it has no natural propensity toward an alien supposit. The third negation finally says repugnance toward the act, for on whom a potency is denied, the act too is repugnant. From the Doctor this threefold negation can also be explained with other examples outside the present context: if, say, a surface is not white, it is said to have a negation of the first kind; a stone resting above has a negation of the second kind, because it has a negation of aptitude toward being above — since it is inclined toward being below — but not of the third kind, since it does not imply contradiction for it to be above. An angel is finally said to have this third negation with respect to whiteness, because whiteness conflicts with it.

Having premised this doctrine, the Doctor says, *loc. cit.*, that for a singular nature to be able to be called a supposit or to subsist, it must have a double negation of communicability as a "by which": namely actual and aptitudinal, such that the singular nature is independent of an alien supposit both actually and aptitudinally — that is, neither is it actually communicated to it, nor has it an aptitude for such

communication. The reason is that the first negation alone — namely of actual communication — does not suffice for the ratio of a person, for even the separated soul has this negation because it is not actually communicated to the body, and yet it is not called a supposit or person, because it still has aptitudinal incommunicability toward it — or has aptitudinal dependence on it. Nor is the second negation alone — namely of aptitudinal communication or dependence — sufficient, because the human nature in Christ has such a negation with respect to the divine supposit, since it has no natural propensity toward the divine substance but only toward its own. And yet in Christ it does not have proper subsistence and personhood. Therefore both negations are required simultaneously and together for a singular nature to be said to subsist in itself. The third negation, however, is not required — for no created nature has repugnance to being communicated to the supposit of another nature, at least divine, since it is in perfect obediential potency to the divine will. Hence a created nature can be said to subsist in itself even if it has potential dependence on existing in an alien supposit. From this it is deduced that subsistence adds to the singular nature only that double negation of communication as a "by which," or dependence on an alien supposit — both actual and aptitudinal — and formally consists in that double negation. And therefore its formal effect is merely negative: to render nature both actually and aptitudinally non-communicated to an alien supposit. The Doctor teaches this not only in the cited place, *3, dist. 1, quest. 1, art. 3*, but also in *dist. 6, quest. 1, A.* and *Quodl. 10, art. 3* and *1, dist. 7, C.* and *dist. 23, §. Ad quaestionem*, and Scotists regularly explain the formal ratio of personhood and subsistence in this way. Given this explanation, it is not necessary for substance to superadd to nature anything positive distinct from it, because since its formal effect is only negative it can be had through a negative concept of substance.

You ask: is the negation of communication to an alien supposit that subsistence presents and superadds to the singular nature properly a negation or rather a privation? *Rubion, 3, dist. 2, quest. 2*, says it is a privation, because negation properly taken — as distinguished from privation — is of what is impossible for the subject of which it is said, like non-sight in a stone; privation is the lack of something not impossible for the subject but possible, whether naturally or supernaturally, like blindness in an eye. Since therefore a created supposit adds to the singular nature not the negation of potential communication with an alien supposit but only with respect to a divine supposit, the negation that personhood says in a human supposit will be a privation, and only in a divine supposit will it properly be a negation. But this is a controversy about a name, because if negation and privation are taken in the sense assigned by Rubion — that negation connotes a subject wholly incapable of the negated form, as non-sight in a stone, and privation connotes a subject capable of it — then there is no doubt that the negation that created subsistence says is to be called a privation, since a created nature can depend on an alien supposit. But if privation is taken more properly

as the negation in a subject that has an aptitude for it, then it cannot be called a privation, because it is a negation of dependence not only actual but also aptitudinal — since every nature has aptitude only for subsisting in itself, or has only the connatural exigency of its proper supposit and not of an alien one. But if aptitude too is taken for any inclination and propensity prescinding from connatural co-exigency — since in this sense even created nature has aptitude toward the hypostatic union with the divine supposit, as will be said below in *n.* 60 — even in this sense the negation imported by created subsistence could be called a privation. Hence it is clear that from the true acceptation of negation and privation, both can be probably asserted.

In opposition, *Cardinal de Lugo*, *sect. 3, n. 34*, argues first, proving that this explanation of subsistence through the double negation of communication to an alien supposit is insufficient, because through it only the secondary effect of subsistence is explained and not the primary formal effect. For this non-communication of nature with an alien supposit does indeed come from proper subsistence, but the quiddity of subsistence seems altogether to be understood in relation to some other positive perfection that it formally bestows upon the subject, and from which that incommunicability arises. Otherwise it would seem pointless for this entity called subsistence to exist — just as if you were to say that cold is given to a subject only so that it might impede heat in the same, and heat only so that it might impede cold: the primary effect of these qualities would not be explained, but only the secondary, and they would be pointless if they had no other effect. *Oviedo* confirms this by insisting on the preceding argument: that subsistence's preventing my nature from being communicated to an alien supposit is the secondary effect of subsistence; but every form beyond its secondary effect must have a primary one; therefore since the said double negation explains only the secondary effect of subsistence, it is insufficient.

The reply is that this argument with its confirmation, if well attended to, supposes what is in controversy and thereby in some manner begs the question, because having a primary effect distinct from a secondary one usually belongs to positive forms, not to privations or negations. Hence when the argument supposes that the impediment that proper subsistence brings to nature — preventing it from being communicated to another supposit — is its secondary effect, and that therefore beyond this a primary one must be assigned, the argument already speaks of subsistence as if it were a positive form, and is therefore not free from fallacy. Sustaining, therefore, that the formal ratio of subsistence consists in the said negation of communication with another supposit, it must be said that such impediment is not the secondary but the primary effect of every negation, because negation directly and through itself excludes the negated form. For example, whiteness in a wall has joined to it the negation of the union of blackness with it; and such exclusion is a secondary effect with respect to the whiteness itself, but with respect to such negation it is its most formal and entirely primary effect, because such negation directly and through itself primarily opposes

blackness or conjunction with blackness, and no other primary effect prior to this should be sought in it. Moreover, conceding that this repugnance of communication of nature with another supposit is a secondary effect, if one asks for the primary one from which this proceeds, it is clearly not something positive imported by subsistence, but rather it must be said to be the singularity of the substantial nature itself, to which that double negation naturally follows if it is not forestalled by a superior agent which impedes such consequence by suppositing the nature in an alien supposit. And so it should not be said that the non-communication of nature proceeds from proper subsistence, but rather that it is itself subsistence — following upon the singularity of substantial nature in the manner of a secondary effect connaturally, unless forestalled by a supernatural agent. And this secondary effect can well be explained through a simple negation, because it is exhibited in a negative mode by not allowing nature to be communicated to another supposit.

Arriaga argues secondly: even if subsistence has this — that it formally impedes communication of nature with another supposit — this still cannot be its proper effect, because this is an effect common to other things. Hatred, for example, renders a subject incapable of love, and love renders it incapable of hatred; assent renders it incapable of dissent about the same object. But it would be inept to explain the formal effect of hatred as rendering a subject incapable of love, and conversely the formal effect of love as rendering a subject incapable of hatred. *Oviedo* argues similarly, reducing the arguments more to form. The reply is that this argument also labors under the same fallacy, because it argues about subsistence as if it were a positive form. Granted that supposition, certainly its essence would not be well explained by the fact that it renders a subject incapable of another subsistence — as the example in the argument about other positive forms rightly proves. But prescind from such supposition, I say that the proper effect of subsistence is to render nature non-communicated to another supposit, and thereby standing firm in itself and subsisting, insofar as it does not rest on an alien supposit. Nor is this effect common to all other forms, for although every form renders its subject incapable of the opposite form — and in this function every form agrees when considered in common — still thereafter they are distinguished, in that this one excludes this form and that one excludes that one; hence the opposition is not the same for all, nor are the extremes the same. And it is false that — as *Oviedo* presses — we cannot from such opposition of forms investigate a posteriori their natures and distinction: from the fact that we see heat fighting against cold and not against dryness, and dryness against moisture and not against heat, we gather that the nature and condition of these qualities are different.

I add further that this and the preceding argument can be pressed equally well against singularity — that it is not well defined or that its formal effect is not well assigned as: rendering the nature it contracts incommunicable as a "that which" to another individual. But this is also how Adversaries themselves explain the

formal effect of singularity: they confess that nature is of itself indifferent to being communicated to this or that individual, and that it is determined and rendered extrinsically incommunicable to another individual through singularity. But that this difficulty militates against singularity in the same way as against personhood will be apparent by applying the same arguments to singularity: one could argue thus — by saying that singularity is what determines nature to constituting Peter, for example, and through which it is rendered incapable of another singularity, no proper effect is explained, because this is an effect common to all other forms. For one substantial form renders matter incapable of another substantial form, and universally one form impossible with another renders a subject in the composed sense incapable of it — hence the formal ratio of singularity is not well explained through that concept. Furthermore, what it is for the haecceity (thisness) of Peter to render his nature incommunicable to Paul or Francis and to impede it from being affected by those singularities is the secondary effect of singularity. Therefore beyond this a primary one should be cited. You see, then, how this argument — which more recent thinkers press so ardently and unanimously against Scotus for explaining personhood through the fact that it renders nature incommunicable as a "by which" to another supposit — militates equally well against the common explanation of singularity accepted by all: that what formally renders nature incommunicable as a "that which" to another individual is singularity. Therefore by whatever reason this is answered as made against singularity, it should equally be dissolved when made against personhood.

Oviedo argues thirdly: by explaining subsistence through the fact that it renders nature incommunicable to another supposit, the same is defined and explained by the same — since in this explanation the supposit is posited, to which nature is said to be incommunicable, and this supposit is constituted through subsistence whose nature we are investigating and which should be known if we were to know what it is for nature to be incommunicable to another supposit. By the same reason, *Poncius, disp. cit. 18, concl. 3, n. 72*, condemns this explanation of subsistence.

Furthermore, he proves that the formal effect of subsistence cannot consist in anything negative, because the formal effect is the whole resulting from form and subject; but subsistence is something positive, nature as affected by subsistence is positive, therefore the whole resulting from nature and subsistence is something positive; therefore, etc.

The reply is that this argument militates equally against the definition of the singular, when it is said to be what is indivisible into several singulars of which it is predicated as a superior of its inferiors — and also against the explanation of singularity through which nature is rendered incommunicable to another singular or individual. Because in these and similar explanations, the singular is posited, whose nature is sought and investigated. Hence it must be said that something of the same kind as what is defined can sometimes be placed in its

definition — not indeed as something properly explaining the defined itself, since the unknown would be explained through the equally unknown, but as something added. Thus "absolute" is defined as what is not referred or ordered to another absolute, a highest genus as what is not subsumed under another genus, etc. — where you see that the absolute is not properly declared through another absolute placed in its definition, but through the negation of order and reference toward it; and that other absolute is placed as merely added, not as clarifying the defined. So in the present case, a supposit is defined as what is incommunicable to another supposit, where the other supposit is placed as added, not as clarifying the defined — for the supposit is properly clarified through that incommunicability as a "by which," and the supposit is placed so that the terminus of such incommunicability may be explained. This can be observed in many other descriptions as well. Moreover, the supposit placed in that definition is a divine supposit — which consists in something positive — not a created one, since the latter cannot terminate the dependence of another nature.

Nor is Poncius sufficiently consistent with himself, since in *n.* 72 he condemns this explanation of the person, whereas a little above in *n.* 67 he himself had explained the incommunicability of the person through the negation of the incommunicability by which the divine nature is communicated to three persons and human nature was in fact communicated to the divine supposit. Therefore he too is obliged to admit this explanation at least in part, since he also explains the ratio of a created supposit through incommunicability to an extrinsic supposit. To the other argument, the minor is denied as to its first part — that subsistence formally taken is something positive — for this Oviedo gratuitously assumes without any proof. Whether it truly imports something positive will be seen in the following question.

Fourth, it is argued: nature is said to depend on its proper supposit and to be sustained in it; but this is a positive effect, not negative — for nothing is said to depend on a negation or to be propped up and sustained in a negation. Confirmation: in fact the assumed nature is properly said to be propped up and sustained in the Word and to rest upon it, and in this function the divine Word is said to supply the functions of the created supposit. Therefore the created supposit performs toward nature the positive function of sustaining it.

The reply is that these words of dependence and sustenance of nature in the supposit are in truth used only by authors who posit subsistence in something positive; otherwise among others they are not considered apt for explaining the function of subsistence, or by them nothing is understood except that communicability which nature says to a supposit. Hence there is not truly dependence nor truly sustenance — such as accident in its subject — nor can it be explained in what genus of cause nature depends on its proper subsistence. But if by this is intended only a dependence a posteriori and not as from another influencing into the nature itself, one can still say that nature depends on proper

subsistence in this way — even if it is posited as a mere negation — in the way we say a man depends a posteriori on the negation of animality. So noted about this use of the words "dependence" and "sustenance" by *Lychet*, 3, *dist.* 1, *quest.* 1; *Aretinus*, *ibid.*, *art.* 12; and before them *Ockham*, 3, *sent.*, *quest.* 1. To the confirmation: *Aretinus*, *ibid.*, concedes that when nature is in an alien supposit it truly depends on it and is sustained in it; hence the assumed nature is truly sustained in the Word. And *Poncius*, *disp.* 18, *cit.*, n. 74, seems to think the same, explaining this dependence of nature on the Word by the fact that in fact the humanity would neither be produced nor conserved without union with the Word. Yet he too confesses there that this is not the dependence of an effect on its cause in any genus of cause properly influencing its being — as the Doctor teaches, 3, *dist.* 1, *quest.* 1, *art.* 1. Hence in truth nature cannot be said to depend on it except as on the pure term of the union it founds toward it as toward an alien supposit to which it is communicated as a "by which," denominating it a man. Hence it can only in this sense more truly be said that nature depends on an alien supposit than on a proper one, because when proper subsistence is a mere negation, nature is not truly said to be communicated to the proper supposit, nor can a negation properly be said to terminate its dependence and communicability; whereas it can in this sense be said to depend on an alien supposit, because it is truly united to it and truly communicated to it as a "by which," bestowing on the extrinsic supposit the same denomination it would bestow on an intrinsic and proper one. Since, therefore, the Word can no more truly be said to prop up and sustain the assumed nature than it would be sustained in its proper supposit — and since the sustenance in the latter does not import something positive — neither does the Word in sustaining it supply a positive function.

Fifth, it is argued: subsistence is not well explained through incommunicability to an alien supposit, because in this way it is explained through the negation of a communication that is naturally impossible — indeed one that appears to imply contradiction. For nature cannot be communicated to another except either as a "that which" or as a "by which": it is communicated as a "that which" to many individuals of which it is predicated as a superior of its inferiors; it is communicated as a "by which" when it is communicated to its proper supposit — not indeed as the form of a part but as the form of the whole, denominating it quidditatively such, since Peter is a man through humanity and is this man quidditatively through this humanity. But in neither of these ways can nature be communicated to the supposit of another — especially of another nature — because it cannot intrinsically constitute it in the being it bestows, and therefore cannot denominate it quidditatively such or be communicated to it as a "by which" in any way.

The reply is that, as theologians commonly grant, we have no other trace for conceding a distinct mode of subsistence except from the mystery of the Incarnation, by which we are taught that humanity lacks proper subsistence

because it is communicated to the divine supposit. From this we argue that subsistence — as a mode superadded to singular substance — says non-communication or incommunicability to another supposit, because precisely for this reason the assumed humanity is said to lack proper subsistence: because it is communicated to the divine supposit. And Cardinal de Lugo noted in *disp. 12, cit., n. 31* that subsistence was explained in this way by Epiphanius the Deacon in the seventh general council, *act. 6, tom. 3, past the middle*, where he says that the nature subsisting through itself or existing through itself is that which does not need another in order to subsist — which is not needing communication with another nature in order to exist through itself. For the substantial nature has of itself proper subsistence by which it subsists without the partnership of another nature. We have from faith, therefore, that one nature can be communicated to the supposit of another nature, and from such communication loses its proper subsistence. Hence we rightly deduce from this that subsistence consists in the negation of such communication. It must also be deduced from this that it is false that nature cannot be communicated as a "by which" except to its proper supposit, because through the assumed humanity the Word is truly and properly called a man, and humanity is the act and ratio of being such with respect to that supposit. And although it is not an essential and quidditative act, it is a denominative one, because the Word is truly and properly denominated a man. You will say: the divine Word, which is a supposit, is in fact communicated in Christ to human nature. Therefore it is not of the ratio of a supposit to be incommunicable to another. The reply is that here the discussion is about the created supposit, which is constituted through a negation — not about the divine, which is positive. Furthermore, the Word is united to nature precisely as terminating its dependence, which is not repugnant to incommunicability.

Lastly, it is argued: when we even wish to explain subsistence through the negation of communication of nature to another supposit, this should be done precisely through the negation of actual communication and not of aptitudinal communication — and the reason is that nature has of itself such inaptitude for being communicated to the supposit of another nature, and not by something superadded and distinct from itself. Confirmation: the negation that personhood imports contingently belongs to nature and is separable from it, just as personhood itself is; but the negation of aptitude toward an alien supposit is necessarily conjoined with nature, because it belongs to it by reason of the aptitude it has for subsisting in itself. Therefore such negation does not pertain to personhood nor is it had from it.

Rubion, 3, dist. 2, quest. 2, art. 1, in the response to the first argument, replies to this difficulty by conceding everything assumed in the argument and its confirmation. He therefore concedes that the negation of being in another supposit aptitudinally belongs to the singular nature of itself and is inseparable from it, and that only the negation of being in another actually is separable — not belonging to it of itself but by reason of the divine will not assuming it or placing

it in another supposit. Hence he seems finally to conclude that only the negation of actual communication pertains to the formality of a person, the other only fundamentally and presuppositively — insofar as a nature that does not have actual communication with an alien supposit is presupposed to not have aptitudinal either. This solution is also followed by *Poncius, disp. 18, cit., n. 77* — if I understand him rightly, for he speaks quite obscurely — and *Aretinus* seems to do the same, *3, dist. 1, quest. 1, art. 12*. For after posing the first argument of the Doctor against the opinion about the negative — that personhood cannot import only the negation of actual communication, because then a separated soul would be a person — and after responding with the Doctor that the argument proceeds from an insufficiency, because for the ratio of a person the negation of actual dependence does not suffice but the negation of aptitudinal dependence is also required, which a separated soul does not have since it depends aptitudinally on the body, he adds that even if the soul had both negations, it would still not be a person, because it is an incomplete substance; for what is to be called a person must, beyond the double negation of dependence, be a complete substance not suited to resting on another — which does not belong to a separated soul. And indeed the proposed argument with its confirmation seems to convince and even extract this from me.

Indeed the Doctor himself, in *Quodl. 19, art. 3, lit. Y*, in the clearest words concedes everything that the proposed argument contends, saying: for proper created personhood two negations must concur — the first and the third (the first being, as he had premised, the negation of actual dependence on an alien supposit, and the third the negation of aptitudinal dependence) — such that the third is quasi-habitual, necessarily belonging to the nature for which it is suited, whether it is personated in itself or in an alien person; but the other negation — namely of actual dependence — supervening upon this negation completes proper personhood. In these words the Doctor manifestly confesses that such a negation of aptitudinal dependence on an alien supposit belongs of itself and necessarily to nature, not contingently and separably by reason of something superadded to nature and separable from it — as personhood is in created nature. Therefore this solution seems to me good and necessary; nor did the Doctor wish that negation of aptitudinal dependence to concur toward personhood except fundamentally and presuppositively, as the last cited words intimate: "but the other negation — namely of actual dependence — supervening upon this negation completes proper personhood." From this it is clear that he wished the negation of aptitudinal dependence on an alien supposit to pertain to personhood only presuppositively and fundamentally — insofar as the negation in created nature of actual dependence on an alien supposit does not have the ratio of personhood unless the subject of it is first understood to be unfit for depending on an alien supposit. This too the Doctor indicated in *3, dist. 1, quest. 1*, saying under *lit. E* that the negation of this aptitudinal dependence must be conceded in created nature personated in itself with respect to the Word, lest it be said violently to be in its

proper supposit — as a stone rests violently above. By these words he indicates that this negation does not pertain formally and directly to the ratio of personhood, but only materially and presuppositively in the now-explained manner — lest nature be said to rest violently in its proper supposit as a stone above — and not because it formally constitutes, together with the negation of actual dependence, the ratio of the supposit and person.

You will say: if for this reason the negation of aptitudinal dependence on an alien supposit is necessary in nature personated in itself, then when it is personated in an alien supposit it will be in it violently — which is false, since then the human nature would rest violently in the Word. Therefore this negation of aptitudinal dependence on an alien supposit is in no way required for the ratio of a created person. Some reply from Scotus, *ibid.*, *lit. F*, that this does not follow, because even if there is no natural aptitude of created nature for depending on the divine supposit, there is still the aptitude of obedience, because that nature is in perfect obedience to depend through the action of a supernatural agent. But this reply does not satisfy, because the Doctor in 3, *dist. 27, F*, concedes that if water were to ascend above through obediential potency such ascent would still be violent for it. From which I said in *disp. 6, Phys., quest. 1, art. 1, n. 14* and *disp. 12, n. 15* that obediential potency in things does not suffice to simply remove violence when they are moved by God against their proper and innate inclinations. Nor does the Doctor, *cit.*, 3, *dist. 1, quest. 1, F*, teach the opposite: for he does not there intend by the aptitude he calls "of obedience" to exclude from created nature violence toward existing in an alien supposit, but only non-repugnance for being placed in it, whether this happens with violence or not. For these are his words: "nor does this independence of aptitude posit repugnance toward actual dependence, because even if there is no aptitude of such a nature for depending, there is still the aptitude of obedience, because that nature is in perfect obedience," etc. He therefore says that the potency of obedience excludes from created nature not repugnance for being placed in an alien supposit, but he does not say it excludes violence.

There are various solutions and glosses of Scotists on this difficulty. But the true solution, gathered from the Doctor's own text, is this: the Doctor, when he posits in created nature an aptitude for proper subsistence and an inaptitude for alien subsistence, does not speak of aptitude as signifying a simple passive inclination toward receiving some form, nor of inaptitude as the simple negation of such aptitude; rather, he speaks of aptitude and inclination in what they call the active sense — that is, one conjoined with an active power of acquiring the form toward which the subject has inclination — and by inaptitude he understands the negation of such aptitude. This is gathered from his own words written *loc. cit.*, 3, *dist. 1, art. 3, lit. E*: "it must be distinguished between actual, potential, and aptitudinal dependence — calling 'aptitudinal' that which, of itself as far as it can, would always be in act — in the way a heavy body is by nature suited to be at the center, where it would always be as far as it is concerned, unless impeded." As you

see, he takes aptitude in a certain special sense: a soul separated from the body does not have aptitude toward the body, because the soul cannot unite itself to the body but needs the assistance of an external agent. But a heavy body is so suited to being below that along with aptitude and inclination it also has an innate active power of making itself go below and of immediately acquiring for itself that perfection unless impeded by an extrinsic agent holding it above. This aptitude — or rather active inclination — the Doctor intends to deny in created nature toward the hypostatic union and toward depending on the Word; not the aptitude taken as a mere propensity and passive inclination of the thing. Otherwise he would expressly contradict himself, since he admits such aptitude and natural inclination in beings of the natural order toward supernatural perfections in *quest. 1, prol.* And he must be understood in the same way when in *Quodl. 19, art. 3, sub lit. V*, he denies aptitude in created nature toward supernatural forms — as Gadius explains him there. Therefore created nature supposit in the Word is not said there to exist violently, because toward such union it has not only pure passive obediential potency but also some propensity; but because it does not have this with the active power of acquiring it for itself as it has toward proper subsistence, it can in this sense be said to suffer a certain violence in a qualified sense (*secundum quid*) in the Word — though not simply (*simpliciter*), because simple violence in the patient is reckoned against the passive principle, of which nature is principally said, and not against the active, of which it is said less principally, as I said in *disp. 6, Phys., quest. 1, art. 1*. Indeed, holding with the more common Scotists that nature is said precisely of the passive principle and that no violence is given against the active principle, then nature in the Word would suffer absolutely no violence at all; yet that some violence is also given against the active principle is explicitly gathered from the Doctor, *loc. cit., 2, dist. 1, quest. 1* and *Quodl. 19*, where he says a stone is violently detained above — not only because it has a passive inclination toward being below, but also because along with such passive inclination it has an active power by which it would immediately make itself go below and acquire for itself such a perfection unless impeded by an extrinsic agent. Others say that nature in the Word suffers absolutely no violence at all, because it receives from it a subsistence far more perfect than its proper and due subsistence — which *Lychet, 3, dist. 1, quest. 1*, approves.

Question IV: Whether the Subsistence Superadded to Nature Is Something Positive or Negative

Nearly all theologians agree against Durandus, Aureolus, and other Nominalists that subsistence or suppositionality adds something real above the singular nature it renders subsisting — something that can also be separated from it at least by divine power, as was established by faith to have been done in the mystery of the Incarnation. All also agree that suppositionality or personhood adds to the singular nature a negation of dependence on an alien supposit, whether one or several — it matters little for our purpose. For it is sufficiently evident that by the

very fact that some nature subsists in itself, it is not united hypostatically to an extrinsic supposit in the way the assumed nature is now said to be united to the divine Word, and therefore it has in itself the negation of such union and communication with an alien supposit. All theologians, I say, agree on this; but the difficulty is whether personhood adds above nature precisely this real negation, or rather also some positive entity — having the ratio of a mode or thing, it matters little which — through which nature is formally rendered incommunicable to another supposit, and to which the said single or double negation of communication with it follows. The first part is defended by *Ockham*, 3, *dist.* 1, *quest.* 1, where Rubion, Marsilius, and other Nominalists concur; the second part is commonly defended by Thomists, 3, *p.*, *quest.* 4, *art.* 2, where Cajetan and others of the Dominican family; likewise by the Jesuits commonly: *Suárez*, *disp.* 34, *Metaph.*, *sect.* 2, and in 3 *p.*, *loc. cit.*; *Vásquez*, *ibid.*, *tom.* 1, *disp.* 31; *Cardinal de Lugo*, *disp.* 12, *de Incarnat.*, *sect.* 2; *Hurtado*, *disp.* 11, *Met.*, *sect.* 2; *Arriaga*, *disp.* 4, *Met.*, *sect.* 11; *Oviedo*, *controv.* 6, *Metaph.*, *pun.* 2; *Aversa*, *quest.* 18, *Phil.*, *sect.* 2; *Blas de Concepción*, *disp.* 8, *Met.*, *quest.* 2; *Joannes de Santo Tomás*, *quest.* 7, *Phys.*, *art.* 1; *Ripa*, *de ente et essentia*, *cap.* 5, *quest.* 3, where again *Cajetan* and other Thomists; *Ferrariensis*, 4, *contra Gentes*, *cap.* 41; *Capreolus*, 3, *dist.* 5, *quest.* 3; and very many others outside the Thomist school as well.

Scotus in 3, *dist.* 1, *quest.* 1, *art.* 3 appears to have judged both opinions probable. For when he inquires there what that is which a supposit or person adds above nature — and by which it is formally said to be supposed in itself and personated — whether it is something positive or rather negative, he says: "what that proper thing is by which nature is called personated in itself, two opinions seem probable." Hence the Scotists are divided among themselves on the mind of the Doctor in this point. Some hold that in the Doctor's view both opinions are equally probable and therefore solve arguments for both sides. Others concede that he judged the opinion about the negative to be probable but the opposite about the positive more probable, and therefore defend precisely the latter — such as *Lychet*, 3, *dist.* 1, *quest.* 1; *Rada*, in 3, *controv.* 1, *art.* 1; *Centinus*, recently, *disp.* 1, *de Incarn.*, *cap.* 5; *Herrera*, in 3 *sent.* and in his *Theological Manual*. Others conversely concede that the opinion about the positive was probable for the Doctor, but the other about the negative far more probable, and therefore embrace precisely the latter — such as *Aretinus*, 3, *dist.* 1, *quest.* 1, *art.* 12; *Vulpes*, *tom.* 3, *part* 1, *disp.* 63, *art.* 2; and several others. Others finally deny absolutely that Scotus was problematic on this matter and say he firmly adhered to the opinion about the negative — such as *Faber*, in 3, *dist.* 1, *quest.* 1, *disp.* 2; *Meurisse*, *lib.* 3, *his Met.*, *quest.* 4; *Poncius*, *tom.* 3, *his Cursus*, *disp.* 18, *quest.* 6, *n.* 91, where he says that even though Scotus calls the opposite opinion probable, it does not follow that he wished to hold it as probable himself — since we too consider many opinions of the Thomists probable which we ourselves do not hold as probable. And the older Scotists follow it in this same sense: *Bassol*, 3, *dist.* 1, *quest.* 1, *art.* 1; *Mairon*, *quest.* 11; and others.

Article I: The Opinion About the Positive Is Probable

I do not speak here of the probability of this opinion in itself — for the number and what matters more, the weight of the authors who hold it, and the probability of the arguments with which it is championed, sufficiently demonstrate its probability. Rather, I speak of its probability also in the school of the Subtlists and in Scotus's view. And I say that this opinion is truly not entirely alien from the mind of the Doctor; indeed he judged it probable — and although he deemed the opposite more probable, he did not hold this one as improbable but left it under the title of probability.

This conclusion is posed against Faber and other Scotists who dare to deny that the Doctor was problematic in this controversy and assert that he so firmly adhered to the opinion about the negative that he entirely deemed the opposite about the positive to be improbable. It is clearly gathered from the Doctor's express words already cited from *3, dist. 1, quest. 1, art. 3, §. Ideo propter istum*, where he calls these two ways or opinions — about the positive and the negative — probable; and below in the same article, proceeding to the resolution of the question under *lit. E*, he uses a problematic and non-assertive mode of speaking, by which mode of speaking he clearly did not wish to indicate that he held both opinions in the same degree of probability as some Scotists deduce, but only that he did not lean so strongly toward the opinion about the negative as to appear to entirely abhor the opposite.

The same is also indicated by that mode of speaking about subsistence which he uses in *Quodl. 5, lit. V*, where in declaring several modes of subsisting he says: to subsist is equivocal — in one sense it is taken for existing through itself; in another sense... something is understood not quasi as subsisting but quasi as inhering in the subsisting and quasi as having a mode of inherence. This cannot be understood of the double negation mentioned, because no positive being can be said to quasi-inhere in a negative; it must be explained of the positive entity that personhood or suppositonality superadds to nature and upon which the nature itself rests. The same is again gathered from that mode of speaking he uses in *3, dist. 1, quest. 1* and *Quodl. 19*, when he says that nature is sustained in the supposit and depends on the supposit, and that the hypostatic union is a relation of the sustained to the sustaining. For that mode of speaking, as was said above, can only be used by those who hold that the formal effect of subsistence is positive and that subsistence imports something positive; since that phrase indicates that subsistence exercises some real and positive function toward nature. Since therefore the Doctor admits such a mode of speaking as appropriate and uses it frequently himself, this is an argument that he admitted the opinion about the positive as probable.

Furthermore, Scotus in *3, dist., quest. 4* probably holds that a created supposit can terminate the dependence of another created nature; but this opinion cannot be consistent unless it is asserted that subsistence says something positive. Therefore

the opinion about the positive is probable in his doctrine. The minor is proven: because such union would occur in a person, not in a nature. Then this union is either terminated at something or at nothing; if the first, the intended conclusion is had; if the second, then a non-being would terminate the real dependence of a positive being — which implies a contradiction.

Faber, disp. 2, cit., cap. 5, followed by *Meurisse, cit., quest. 4*, replies by denying the minor. To the proof he says that the formal terminus of that union is the said double negation, and the material terminus is the singular nature, from which the adequate terminus is integrated. For just as prime matter (he says) without privation cannot be a subject capable of receiving a form, but through privation formally becomes capable, so the singular nature without that double incommunicability cannot formally assume another nature into union in a person, because then it would not formally be a person in itself. But later in the same chapter, responding in the sixth reply to how the Word can supply the functions of a created supposit, he says that the created supposit — or that mode of nature existing incommunicably — is something real, even if not positive but negative, and hence it is false that such a union is terminated at nothing.

This reply does not satisfy, because this is what the argument proves: that a negation cannot be the formal ratio of terminating a real relation. And it matters little that the singular nature concurs as a material and mediate terminus, since the whole difficulty is about the formal and immediate terminus — which is personhood. For the material and mediate terminus stands as merely accidental and remote. And what Faber adds in support of his solution about matter — that it is the subject of form through privation, and that through privation it formally becomes capable of receiving form — is altogether false. For matter is the subject of form as long as it underlies it, and yet privation is not then present, since it departed at the advent of form, as they are impossible. Nor does matter become formally capable of receiving form any the less through privation — for to be a subject capable of receiving form is something positive, since it expresses a real relation to form, and therefore cannot be constituted by something positive. What deceived Faber was the vulgar way of speaking, by which it is commonly said that matter is in potency toward a form only when it lacks it and can receive it. This does not prevent the potency from truly persisting in matter even after the act has arrived and privation has departed, as I explained in *disp. 6, Met., quest. 5, n. 104*, where I also explained the meaning of that common saying.

You will say: a real relation can be terminated at an unreal and not actually existing terminus — from what was said in *disp. 8, Log., quest. 6, art. 1*. Against this: that was conceded at most for transcendental relations, but by no means for predicamental ones; indeed, it was said there that a predicamental relation necessarily requires a real and actually existing terminus. But such a union of an assumed nature to a created supposit would be an actual and predicamental relation, from what was said in *disp. 5, Phys., quest. 9, on substantial union*.

Furthermore, even if it were granted that a real relation can be toward an unreal terminus and a pure negation, this still cannot be said of the foundation — since the foundation cannot be of lesser entity than what is founded on it. But that union between the assumed nature and the created supposit assuming it would be a mutual and real relation on the part of both extremes, due to their limitation; and therefore in the assuming supposit it could not be founded in a pure negation as its proximate and immediate foundation or ratio of founding.

Nor does the other solution satisfy either — which *Faber* hints at — that the double negation in which personhood consists is a real being at least privative and negative, and therefore can terminate a real relation. For first, it is false that any privation or negation, from the mere fact that it is given on the part of the thing prior to any operation of the intellect, can be called a real privative or negative being, because real being as such says a positive concept, and hence it is contradictory and as it were an implication in terms to divide real being into positive and negative — as if something were divided into itself and into its opposite. From the fact therefore that some privation or negation is given on the part of the thing in a subject prior to any operation of the intellect — as blindness in an eye, darkness in air before any intellectual operation — it should not be inferred that it is a real privative or negative being, but only that it is a real privation, a real negation, as was expressly said in *disp. 4, Phys., quest. 1, art. 1*. And in this sense we too here say that subsistence or created personhood adds something real above nature — not that the double negation is something real privative or negative, but because it is a negation found formally on the part of the thing in nature, and not through the work of the intellect, since on the part of the thing such nature is not united and communicated to an extrinsic supposit. But even if all this were conceded, the argument is still not solved, because that union of the assumed nature to the created assuming supposit would be a real union and a positive real being. Therefore it still could not be founded or terminated at merely negative real being — since the foundation cannot be of lesser entity than what is founded upon it.

Other Scotists therefore reply by denying that a created supposit can terminate the dependence of another nature, and they deny that Scotus said this assertively or even probably in *loc. cit.*, 3, *dist. 1, quest. 4* — since, as is clear from the text itself, he resolved nothing assertively there but remained in doubt. But even this does not satisfy; rather it confirms what we say: that the Doctor judged the opinion about the positive to be probable. For if he had entirely rejected it as improbable, he would not have remained in doubt about that point but would have firmly denied that a created supposit can terminate the dependence of another nature, since it is certain that a real union cannot be terminated at a negation. *Poncius, quest. 18, cit., n. 132*, replies that the Doctor remained in doubt about that point not on the assumption of his own opinion about the constitution of a person through negation — since in that opinion there could be no doubt about it, as it is certain that no real relation can be terminated at a pure negation or be founded

in it — but he says he remained in doubt on the assumption of the more common opinion about the constitution of a created person through something positive, in which opinion even so the matter is entirely doubtful. But the Doctor remained in doubt about that point from neither angle: not from the first — that is, on the assumption of the opinion about the negative — because on that path it is well established that a created supposit cannot terminate the dependence of another nature, as the ratio of doubting sufficiently proves. But not from the other angle either, because on the other opinion about the positive it is false that the matter is still entirely doubtful; rather it is certain and established on the affirmative side, since no sufficient reason of repugnance can be assigned why this cannot be done. Wherefore it must rather be said that the Doctor remained in doubt and proceeded problematically in the resolution of that difficulty, because its resolution depended on the division of this question — whether personhood says something positive or negative — and since both sides were probable for him, he therefore remained in doubt about the resolution of that question, leaving the decision to each according to one or the other way. As *Father Bellutus, my colleague, has rightly noted in his tract de Incarnat., disp. 3, quest. 2, n. 16.*

Furthermore, Centinus strives to prove this very same with an argument he calls not common: the Doctor in 1, *dist. 26*, speaking of the constitutives of the divine persons, says they are constituted through relations, which are something positive. Therefore the Doctor cannot assertively hold in 3 *sent.* that a person is constituted through negations, because then he would be inconsistent with himself. Therefore either he must embrace only the opinion about the positive or at least approve it as probable. But this argument is altogether common and is solved by the Doctor himself in the cited place, 3, *dist. 1, quest. 1, §. per hoc ad argumenta*, where he denies the parity between divine and human persons, because the human and created person says only the double negation of communication to an alien supposit — the actual and the aptitudinal — but not the potential, since it does not say repugnance for being so assumed. But the divine person says beyond those negations also repugnance; and because repugnance toward some affirmation belongs to a subject only on account of an intrinsically and necessarily competing opposite affirmation, and on account of some positive entity, it follows that the divine person must of necessity be constituted through something positive, whereas the human person need not. However, *Centinus* in the cited place presents this response as if it were Faber's and not rather Scotus's own, and attacks it as follows: the ratio of a person, from Scotus in 3, *dist. 1*, says nothing positive in common. Therefore neither in the divine will it say something positive according to Scotus's rule — whatever such things are, wherever they are posited, they are such. If therefore the ratio of a person does not demand a positive entity, neither divine nor created persons will admit a positive entity. He adds (says Centinus) that Scotus in 3, *dist. 1* draws the disparity between persons not on the basis of the constitutive but on the basis of the implication of more or fewer negations: for divine persons spurn any

dependence whatsoever — whether actual, aptitudinal, or potential — whereas created and human persons do not refuse potential dependence, being subjected to the imperial power of the divine will in obediential power. This reply is of less force than the principal argument, for it assumes as false that the ratio of a person as such — in common to both created and uncreated — says nothing positive or says a negation from Scotus in *3 sent., dist. 1, quest. 1*. For when the Doctor there says that a person is constituted through negations in the ratio of a person, he expressly and more than once protests that he speaks of the created person, not of the divine person or of person in common to both. And it is furthermore false that the Doctor there posits the difference between the created and divine person only in terms of more or fewer negations and not in terms of the constitutive, since from the fact that the divine person has absolutely a repugnance for being communicated to an alien supposit — which the human person does not — he deduces that the former must be constituted through something positive but not the latter.

Against this, Centinus insists again: because the ratio of person as such is in some way univocal to the divine and created, as the Doctor concedes in *3, dist. 1, quest. 1, lit. G*. If therefore person as such in common says something positive, the intended conclusion is had; if negative, then the divine person is constituted through something negative, which the Doctor denied in *1, dist. 26*. The Doctor himself addresses this replica in the cited place — indeed Scotus raises this difficulty in its own terms — for in constituting the created person formally through negations and the divine person through something positive, it does not seem that person would be univocal in the divine and in creatures, because there something formally incommunicable absolutely exists, whereas here not. The Doctor responds that the ratio of person as such — insofar as it says the double negation, namely of actual and aptitudinal communication — is univocal to God and creature, or to the divine and created person; for a negation is univocal to many when the same thing affirmed by several is negated. But insofar as it says also the negation of potential dependence — in the way it is found in the divine — the ratio of person in this sense is not univocal. Hence he concludes that if the incommunicable, insofar as it pertains to the ratio of a perfect person, says not only the negation of communication in both modes but also repugnance for being communicated, then no perfect person will exist except the divine. For only the divine includes something absolutely by which it is contradictorily repugnant for it to be communicated in any way — as a "that which" or as a "by which." For the divine person has not only the negation of actual and aptitudinal communication, but also the potential and such repugnance can never be without a positive entity — and therefore it follows that this person can never be without such an entity. But the created person is not incommunicable in this way, and therefore a such an entity need not be attributed to it.

You will say: if therefore person, insofar as it says the double negation of communication — namely actual and aptitudinal — is univocally common to

created and divine, then a concept could be given prescinding from positive and negative. This was refuted in *disp. 2, de natura entis, quest. 9, art. 3*; the consequent is proved, because the created person is something negative as to its formal element, the divine person something positive. The reply is to deny the consequent, because the concept of person in common to created and uncreated, according to that double negation, is precisely a negative concept and belongs to a person insofar as it precisely says that double negation and not insofar as it says something positive. Therefore it is false that that concept of person in common, as such, prescinding from positive and negative — for it is precisely negative. Nor in *disp. 2, de natura entis, quest. 2, art. 3*, did I absolutely deny that a concept can be given prescinding from positive and negative; indeed I conceded it of the concept of a principle of coming-to-be in *disp. 1, Phys., quest. 1, concl. 2*. But there it was denied precisely of the concept of real being, because real being as such, from its formal concept, says something positive, and therefore it implies for it to be of itself prescinding from positive and negative. Hence just as in the cited place in Physics I therefore conceded the concept of a principle of coming-to-be — common univocally to matter, form, and privation — to prescind from positive and negative, because the ratio of a principle of coming-to-be as such does not necessarily say a positive order or relation of principle to principiated but prescinding from both and equally saved in matter, form, and privation; and in the same way I was there reasoning about the genus of morality — that morality is something common univocal to the species of goodness and badness, the latter consisting formally in privation — so too in the present case one could say that a concept of person can be given univocal to the divine and human which prescends from positive and negative. For person as such from its formal concept does not necessarily say something positive as real being does, and therefore it can prescind from both as is said of the concept of a principle of coming-to-be in the physical genus and of the concept of morality in common in the genus of morality. Therefore from this univocation of divine and human person in the common ratio of person, it is not necessarily deduced that Scotus ought to have embraced the opinion about the positive regarding the constitution of the created person — as Centinus was deducing — nor can it even be rightly deduced that he ought for this reason to have approved that opinion as probable, since that univocation can still be saved even by precisely holding the opinion about the negative regarding the constitution of the created person and entirely rejecting the other, as has now been shown.

Finally, the probability of this opinion about the positive in the school of the Subtlists must be deduced from the weight of the authors defending it, for it is held and championed by the foremost among all Scotists and Scotus's most faithful expositor, *Lychet, 3, dist. 1, quest. 1* and *1, dist. 23*, to whom *Bargius* also seems to adhere there; likewise *Rada, part 3, contro. 1, art. 1*, who has rendered great service to Scotist doctrine; and recently *Maurice Centinus, Bishop of Melita*. And among currently living Scotists, it is defended no less elegantly than

tenaciously by the Very Reverend Father Master *Modestus Gavatius of Ferrara*, most closely bound to me by the perpetual bond of love and friendship and most versed in Scotist doctrine — as the most subtle disputations he published on Original and Habitual Sin show. Indeed he defends it not only as probable but also as far more probable than the opposite. On this point, however, I prefer truth to friendship; let it suffice for friendship that I confess and declare the opinion about the positive to be very probable and not alien from Scotus, and I make this declaration in his favor.

But *Faber, disp. 2, cit., cap. 3*, objects that Scotus in *3, dist. 1, quest. 1* presents both opinions — about the positive and the negative — adduces arguments for both sides, but then refutes the opinion about the positive and solves the arguments for it; while he neither refutes the other about the negative nor dissolves the arguments adduced for it, but only explains how it ought to be understood and defended. Therefore Scotus was not problematic on this matter but assertively adhered to the opinion about the negative. He then cites another place: *Vulpes, in 3, dist. 9, quest. 2, §. Ad aliam quaestionem*, where Scotus determines that a created person could not be assumed by the Word in the way a singular nature was assumed, and gives the reason — because in *quest. 1, dist. 1* it had been said that created personhood says the negation of actual dependence on another as on a supposit of that nature. Since therefore it is a contradiction that a nature actually depends on an extrinsic person and does not depend, and since for a nature to be assumed is for it to depend on this special dependence, it is a contradiction for it to be assumed and yet to have proper personhood. Then the Doctor adds these words: "but those who would posit created personhood to say some positive entity above the singular nature — on account of which it would be repugnant to it to be assumed, though not to the singular nature — would have to seek another reason why a person cannot be assumed. But this supposition is refuted in *quest. 1*, and against it the argument that was touched upon about the division of substance and accident, and of substance into three, proceeds well." So the Doctor — from which it is clear that he firmly adhered to the opinion about the negative and rejected the opposite as unproven.

To the argument of Faber, Centinus replies that the inference is voluntary, because if the Doctor considered both sides probable, he could at his pleasure treat only that one which seemed to be entangled in greater difficulties, leaving the other to the judgment of readers. I do not know what Centinus means by this solution, because Faber does not admit — as I concede — that the Doctor considered both sides probable. Hence it does not follow, as Centinus says, that the Doctor could at his pleasure treat only the one that was burdened with greater difficulties; rather the contrary: he ought to defend the one that appeared to suffer lesser difficulties — which he in fact did. Hence because he found the opinion about the negative more expedient and exposed to lesser difficulties, he for this reason embraced, declared, and dissolved arguments against it. And so he declared the opinion about the negative more probable, leaving the other in its

probability — without thereby declaring the opposite about the positive to be entirely improbable. And the same reply must be made to the other passage cited by Vulpes — that from it only this is deduced: that the Doctor judged the opinion about the negative far more probable than the opposite about the positive, not that he wished the latter to be entirely improbable.

Perhaps some follower of the opinion about the positive might wish me to dissolve here the arguments to be raised against it in the following article, in order to demonstrate further the probability of this opinion. But I cannot and should not do this, because although I deem it probable, I still consider the opposite more probable. I would not consider it more probable if I dissolved arguments against both sides — for then I would declare both equally probable and declare there to be no more convincing arguments for one side than the other. Moreover, I do not intend to establish this opinion about the positive in a higher degree of probability than the Doctor himself did. Just as therefore the Doctor did not dissolve arguments against it — in order to show the opposite to be more probable — so I too must do the same, following in the footsteps of my Teacher. It suffices therefore to confess that the arguments for the opposite opinion about the negative, to be adduced shortly, are indeed valid and of most difficult solution — but not altogether insoluble demonstrations.

Article II: The Opinion About the Negative Is More Probable

That this opinion was always more probable than the opposite for Scotus is evidently clear from the fact that he always more greatly declares and defends it, as is clear from 3, *dist. 1, quest. 1, art. 3*; *Quodl. 19, art. 3*; and when difficulties emerge on this matter he always resolves them on the assumption of the opinion about the negative — as is clear from 3, *dist. 5, quest. 2, lit. C*, in the difficulty of whether a created person can be assumed. There he also says the opinion about the positive has been sufficiently refuted in *dist. 1, quest. 1* — to the extent needed that it not be called more probable. And in 1, *dist. 2, quest. 2, C.*, *dist. 23*, and *Quodl. 19*, and wherever he speaks about the supposit, he always defines it as what is incommunicable as a "that which" and as a "by which" — both actually and aptitudinally, but not potentially, speaking of the created supposit. And in 3, *dist. 6, quest. 1, lit. B*, he says that subsistence adds beyond existence nothing except the negation of double dependence — actual and aptitudinal. That this therefore was the mind of our Doctor leaves no room for doubt.

That this is also more probable in the school of the Subtlists is clear, since — with the exception of three or four Scotists already cited — others generally defend the opinion about the negative as absolutely truer or at least more probable: thus *Bassol*, *Tartaretus*, *Mairon*, *Faber*, *Meurisse*, *Poncius*, *Bellutus* my colleague, in his tract *de Incarnat.*, *disp. 1, quest. 1*; and others frequently. Nor is this opinion only probable in the school of the Subtlists, but also of the Nominalists and others. Hence *Wandingus*, a Jesuit theologian (as *Poncius* reports, *disp. 4, de Incarnat.*, *n. 39*), says it is common among Scholastics and is held by Thomas and the Fathers; and in *n. 47*

he says he has read thirty-eight doctors who hold it expressly. Hence some more recent thinkers are wrong to say that this opinion about the negative does not go beyond the boundaries of our school.

And indeed the probability of this opinion could be sufficiently deduced from what was said in the preceding question, where it was shown that the ratio of subsistence and suppositionality formally consists in the negation of communication of the singular nature to another supposit, and that it exercises no positive effect around the singular nature — only a negative one — by rendering it incommunicable or non-communicated to another supposit. Hence the entire definition of person or supposit there given from Boethius and Richard and received in every school — that it is the incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature — can fully belong to the singular nature if it is understood with only this negation and no positive superadded. For by that very fact it would be a singular substance existing and subsisting in itself and through itself and communicated to no other supposit as a "that which" or as a "by which"; and so nothing would be lacking to it to be called a person or a supposit.

You will say it would be lacking what it takes for it not to be a person or supposit, since it is not a nature complete and terminated in itself — unless that positive superadded is understood, posited as its complement and terminus, and indeed until then it cannot be called incommunicable since no positive entity is assigned as the cause of such negation, for it cannot immediately follow upon the singular nature itself — since then such negation would of itself belong to it and be inseparable from it. Against this: such a response cannot be assigned without a manifest *petitio principii*. For I ask: why, with every positive thing distinct from singularity set aside, is my humanity said to be a substantially incomplete entity and in what sense? It cannot be called an incomplete entity as matter and form are, since it is a total entity — nor can it come into the composition of some other essential physical composite of which it would be an essential part, and it is directly placed in a predicament. Therefore it is a complete entity, which is sufficient for it to be called a person or supposit in the predicament of substance; and singularity will be called the ultimate complement and ultimate terminus of nature in the predicament of substance, not something substantial superadded to singularity. If you discover another genus of complement or terminus, I shall say it is superfluous and merely fictive — nor can it be assigned without a *petitio principii*.

You will say: singularity is the ultimate complement and terminus of the communicability of nature as a "that which" but not as a "by which," since a singular — even complete or total — nature is communicable to another supposit as a "by which." And therefore something more must still be superadded through which its communicability is totally terminated — both as a "that which" and as a "by which." I gladly admit this, but I deny that this superadded element must be something positive; a pure and simple negation of communication to an alien

supposit suffices. You will say it must be positive, because just as the communicability of nature as a "that which" is completed and terminated through something positive — which is singularity — so likewise its communicability as a "by which" must be completed and terminated through something positive superadded to singularity, which is called subsistence or suppositionality. Against this: if this parity were valid, one could argue that just as nature is rendered incommunicable as a "that which" through something positive really identified with it — which is singularity — so likewise it should be rendered incommunicable as a "by which" through something added to it really identified with it and entirely inseparable from it. Hence the same judgment should not be made about the negation of incommunicability as a "that which" and as a "by which." For the first negation essentially and inseparably belongs to the singular nature — and therefore belongs to it necessarily through some entity intrinsic to it; whereas the negation of communicability as a "by which" does not necessarily and inseparably belong to it. Hence it need not inhere in the singular nature through some entity intrinsic to it — it suffices that it naturally follows upon it from the fact that a supernatural agent does not assume it or place it in another supposit, in the way that the negation of whiteness follows upon a surface — not through any entity intrinsic to it, but from the mere fact that a natural agent does not place whiteness in it. This follows the rule the Doctor gives about negations in 3, *dist. 1, quest. 1, G.* and *Quodl. 19, art. 3*: a negation that comes from within and belongs necessarily and indispensably to the subject presupposes something positive as its cause; but when a negation comes from without and belongs to the subject accidentally and not necessarily, there is no need to give any positive thing as its cause.

You will say: subsistence must be a positive and terminative complement of substance, as a point is the terminus of a line in quantity, a line of a surface, and a surface of a body. Against this: even some among the authors with whom we dispute explain the terminative indivisibles of quantity with the Nominalists through the mere negation of further extension — point through the negation of further length, line through the negation of further width, and surface through the negation of further depth. And so the uncertain is explained through the nearly equally uncertain. Furthermore, the terminative indivisibles of quantity are posited as real and positive beings in the continuum, because they must serve real and positive functions in the continuum — as was shown in *disp. 9, Phys., quest. 2, art. 2*. But subsistence serves no such function in substance, nor does it present any positive formal effect to substance but only a negative one — as is clear from *quest. 3 of this disp., art. 2*. For it renders substance precisely incommunicable to another supposit; but no positive thing should be posited precisely to have some negation follow upon it, especially when that negation comes from without and contingently in the subject — as in the present case regarding the negation formally imported by subsistence.

Although this reason alone would suffice for the proof of this opinion, it will still be worthwhile to prove it further by proposing very many and very weighty difficulties by which the opinion about the positive is vexed — and in whose solution the defenders of that opinion disagree and fight not less among themselves than with us on the principal point of the controversy. These difficulties conversely do not trouble the opinion about the negative, or are easily dissolved by it.

First Difficulty

The first difficulty of the opposing opinion consists in determining what this positive entity called subsistence or suppositionality is. Some say it is the intrinsic singularity of nature; but this is false, because singularity is really identified with the nature it singularizes — as is clear from the preceding disputation — and is entirely inseparable from it, whereas subsistence is not. Moreover, singularity renders nature incommunicable only as a "that which" and not as a "by which," whereas subsistence or suppositionality renders it incommunicable also as a "by which." Furthermore, singularity is also found in accidents and in the humanity assumed by the Word, in which however subsistence is not found. Others say that subsistence imports the collection of accidents or characteristic accidental properties. But this too is false, however it is explained, as I said in *n. 40* — because a supposit says a substance ultimately completed in the genus of substance, which in this way prescinding from any accident is prior since what is prior is not constituted in its being through what is posterior. Furthermore, no one gives what he does not have; accident is neither subsisting as a "that which" nor as a "by which"; therefore, etc. Furthermore, the Word assumed humanity with all the accidents befitting a man, and yet did not assume a supposit. Others say it is the very existence of substance as opposed to inherence — like Capreolus; and this was refuted above in *quest. 2, n. 27*, because such through-itself existence of itself belongs to substance and not through something superadded to it. Furthermore, such through-itself existence is found in the assumed humanity — which does not inhere in the Word as an accident — and is also found in the parts of a substantial composite, without the incommunicability that is the proper effect of subsistence of which we here speak. Furthermore, speaking universally, existence is not really distinguished from actual essence — from what was said in *disp. 8* — whereas subsistence is, since it is separable from it. Therefore *Blas de Concepción* strives entirely in vain with two lengthy and exhaustive *quest. 3* and *4 in disp. 8, Met.* to give some color of truth to this opinion. For although he might perhaps achieve this in the school of Thomas, outside it this could never please anyone; indeed even within it many very weighty authors entirely abhor it, since however it is explained it always suffers immense difficulties — as can be seen in *Suárez, disp. 34, Met., sect. 4, from the beginning*.

Some Thomists therefore say that subsistence is a certain entity intermediate between nature and existence, through which the singular nature itself becomes

capable and receptive of existence itself. So *Cajetan*, 3 p., quest. 4, art. 2, whom *Nazarius*, 1 p., quest. 58, art. 2, *controv.* 3; *Cabrera*, 3 p., quest. 4, art. 2, *disp.* 3; *Banes*, 1 p., quest. 3, art. 3, *dub.* 1, follow. But this too was rejected above in quest. 2, n. 28, and does not please other distinguished Thomists, who assert that Thomas never admitted that intermediate reality between essence and existence, and say that without the approval of the holy Teacher, the school was introduced from outside by Cajetan — as *Blas de Concepción*, *loc. cit.*, testifies, pursuing it also from the principles of Thomas.

Hence *Joannes de Sancto Thoma*, quest. 7, *Phys.*, says that subsistence adds above nature a certain terminus or substantial formality excluding the mode of inherence and the mode of a communicable part — thus rendering nature terminated and incommunicable to a further terminus, as a point also terminates a line by positive addition and termination. He also agrees with Cajetan that subsistence first terminates nature and ultimately existence accrues — as what primarily and through itself belongs to the supposit and through the supposit to the nature itself. But this author also had to explain what this substantial formality is — whether matter, form, or composite — which he did not express. Furthermore, he wrongly says that through this substantial formality the mode of inherence and the mode of a communicable part are excluded, insofar as the nature of the whole cannot inhere in another or come into the composition of another through the manner of a part. For as was said above in n. 48, substance — whether simple or composite — is of itself incommunicable to another as a subject or as an essential whole, and not through anything superadded and separable from it. And if he speaks of communicability also through the manner of an integral part, it is false that this is the formal ratio of subsistence or its formal effect — since this portion of water, which is a supposit, can be united with another portion of water to constitute some integral whole, as was said above in n. 43. What he finally asserts about subsistence with Cajetan — that existence accrues above subsistence — was refuted in n. 28, *disp.* 8, quest. 3, n. 164; and it is refuted from the very example he gives of the terminative indivisibles of quantity, which accrue to an already existing quantity and presuppose the quantity they affect as existing. And so the same must likewise be said in the present case about subsistence, if it were in the same way a terminus of substance — namely that it could not affect it unless it presupposed it as existing. But that not even this example is proportionate to our matter was said a little above in n. 74, since the terminatives of quantity are destined by nature for real and positive functions — whereas subsistence, of which we here speak, is not.

For this reason other more recent thinkers commonly concede that subsistence accrues to the singular nature already actually existing, since it is prior for this singular nature to exist than to be supposed. Hence in Christ the human nature remains as singularly actually existing without being supposed in its proper supposit. But saying this, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this entity accruing to the singular nature is an accident — as *Bassol*, 3, *dist.* 1, quest. 1, art. 1, §.

sed quantum ad istum articulum, rightly presses. For every positive real thing accruing to nature and presupposing it as singularly actually existing is an accident for it, because accident is what accrues to a pre-existing thing in effect according to its ultimate being — complete in the genus, species, and individual of such genus — as all say of accident. And reason also persuades this, since such a thing is neither the genus nor the species nor the substantial difference of that to which it accrues, nor any grade in the predicament. Therefore if that by which a supposit is formally a supposit says some positive real thing, it must necessarily be an accident; but it is impossible for a substance to be supposed through an accident.

Therefore *Wandinus*, *disp. 4, de Incarn., dub. 2, §. 1*, as *Poncius, cit.*, reports, holds that a supposit adds nothing positive to nature; but later in *§. quinto*, wishing to explain what suppositionality formally says, he says it consists not in a negation but in the very positive totality of the singular nature. But this is immediately rejected, because if things stood this way it would follow that the Word assumed not only human nature but also the person and suppositionality itself. The consequent is proved, because the Word assumed not only the parts of human nature but also the humanity itself as a certain whole constituted from them; indeed it coupled this to itself first and immediately — as the Doctor says in *3, dist. 2, quest. 2*. *Wandinus* replies that even though the Word assumed the whole nature, it did not assume the totality of nature in which personhood consists, because with the denomination of totality and person that assumption or union of nature to the Word is incompatible. To clarify, he gives an example from the temperament of the human body, but more apt would be the example of one portion of water separated from another — since in that state of separation from another it has the ratio of a whole and the denomination of totality, which it loses by the very fact that it is joined and united with another water, even without losing any of its parts or intrinsic predicates. But since without a denominative form there is no denominated thing, if the Word assumed the entire human nature or the whole constituted from parts, it also assumed the totality — for without totality it could not be called a whole. Therefore it also assumed a person. Furthermore, if the denomination of a person is not compatible with the union of nature to the Word, this is a sign that the negation of such union is of the formal ratio of the person — that is, that personhood consists in such negation. For when that negation is posited the denomination of person is had, and when it is removed with every other positive remaining, it is not had. Therefore personhood consists precisely in this negation and not in the totality itself.

The example about water is not to the point, or if it is, it works for our side. It is not to the point, because here the discussion is about essential totality — which humanity retains in the Word — whereas in the cited example the discussion is about integral totality, which this water loses by the very fact that it is joined with the other. For if the discussion were about essential totality, it is false that it loses it when joined with another water. Furthermore, as I was saying, the example

works rather for our side, because this portion of water is said to be integrally one whole in itself as long as it is separated from another portion — or as long as it has the negation of conjunction with it — and it loses this denomination by the very fact that it is joined and united with another water. Therefore totality or the denomination of totality in this sense in the present proposal too can be better expressed through nothing than the negation of union of nature with another supposit. See this position more extensively attacked in *Poncius, disp. 18, cit., n. 87*, who also replies to that example about temperament.

Second Difficulty

The second difficulty against the opinion about the positive is this: whether this positive entity that subsistence superadds to nature is a thing or a mode — of whose distinction I spoke in *disp. 2, Met., quest. 6, art. 1. Suárez, disp. 34, Met., sect. 4, n. 33; Vázquez, tom. 1, in 3 p., disp. 31, cap. 6; Cardinal de Lugo, disp. 12, de Incarn., sect. 7, n. 83; Aversa, quest. 18, Phil., cit., sect. 7; Aretinus, Herrera, and Rada, cit., — all defending the opinion about the positive as probable — teach that subsistence is not a thing but rather a mode of existing of the singular nature itself. Not an intrinsic mode, of the kind we say finitude of a creature and infinity of God are — as *Centinus, disp. 1, de Incarn., cap. 5, n. 76*, wrongly understood them, not discerning between the intrinsic mode familiar to Scotists and the extrinsic mode equally familiar to more recent thinkers, of whose distinction I also spoke in *disp. 1, Met., cit., quest. 6, art. 1*. Rather it is an extrinsic mode — as *Aretinus* well noted — in which sense they are accustomed to call union, presence, action, and the like, modes. *Hurtado, disp. 11, Met., sect. 5, n. 30*, and *Arriaga, disp. 4, Met., sect. 12, 2, subsect. 2*, however affirm it is a thing and not a mode; *Oviedo, controuv. 4, Met., sect. 6, n. 6*, holds both to be probable. *Centinus, loc. cit.*, finally denies both, and says this positive entity superadded to nature is neither a mode nor a thing properly speaking, but a reality; and he attacks it as not being a mode against the former authors, because subsistence is really distinguished from the singular nature and can be separated from it, whereas an internal mode is not thus distinguished from the thing modified — as is clear with existence with respect to essence. But this attack, as I said, proceeds from ignorance of the acceptation of mode in the sense of more recent thinkers and of the distinction they posit between a thing and such a mode, which I treated at length in *disp. 2, cit., Metaph., n. 141* and *disp. 6, n. 158*. For they say that a thing and a mode in this sense are distinguished modally — in that the thing can be separated from the mode and exist without it, but not vice versa — and not really, since those really distinguished can be without each other and exist separated. Hence it is clear that *Centinus's* attack is not to the point.*

Rather therefore, the authors saying that subsistence is a positive mode of substance in the said sense can be attacked. First, from the general doctrine given about these extrinsic modes in *disp. 2, de natura entis, quest. 6, art. 1, n. 143*: because such modal entities, speaking generally, are entities of the genus of relation, and from this proceeds that fatal indispensable necessity — since of their very nature

they require to be always affixed to the subjects and things modified. For if they were of the genus of absolutes, they could at least through God's power exist through themselves. Since therefore subsistence is posited by these authors as an absolute entity, it will not be a mode but rather a thing. You will say: there can be absolute modes, as is clear with terminative indivisibles of quantity and with figure, which is the fourth species of quality. Against this: then of their very nature they would not require to be affixed and determined to other things, for this directly conflicts with the nature of absolutes, by which they are distinguished from relatives. And those examples are not to the point, since a line and a surface are not modes of quantity but truly its species, and can be separated from the continuum by God's absolute power; and figure, which is posited as the fourth species of quality, is in reality rather a relative entity and pertains more to the predicament of relation than to the absolute — as was said in *disp. 7, Log., quest. 3, art. 2*.

Furthermore, they can be specifically attacked in the present case: because subsistence must make and constitute the thing formally subsisting in itself and standing through itself — attached and joined to nothing else, whether as a subject or as a supposit. But this formal effect that subsistence must present directly conflicts with the nature of a mode, which of its very nature requires to be affixed and bound to other things. Therefore subsistence cannot be posited as a mode. You will say: this only proves that subsistence cannot be called subsisting as a "that which" — which is certainly true — yet it is still called subsisting as a "by which," which suffices. For a form need not itself formally receive and be called such what it gives as an effect, as whiteness is not said to be white even though it gives being white — as is commonly seen in other forms. Against this: even if the form need not be formally such as a "that which" as what it gives as an effect, it still must be such as a "by which" — so that the formal effect may be proportionate to it and not repugnant to its nature. But in the present case, to be subsisting even as a "by which" is a formal effect directly repugnant to the nature of a mode, which requires to always be affixed to another. Furthermore, otherwise we could say that substance can be formally constituted as subsisting even by accident or by a mode of inherence — which protrudes against the fact that it is formally subsisting as a "by which" though not as a "that which." Indeed in the same way we could protrude with other forms, saying that water is formally constituted as cold through heat, and a wall as formally white through blackness — saying that even if heat is not cold as a "that which," it is cold as a "by which," and similarly that blackness is white as a "by which" though not as a "that which." By which reasoning I proved in *disp. 2, Phys., quest. 4, art. 2* that the rational soul of man cannot give corporeal being to man — since it is in itself spiritual — and I attacked the solution of some who said it is such as a "by which" though not as a "that which."

Those who concede that subsistence is a properly so called thing, however, must be attacked by the argument Scotus makes in *3, dist. 5, quest. 2*: because substance — which is properly a substantial thing, as thing is distinguished from mode — is

divided from 2, *de anima* and 27, *Met.* into matter, form, and composite. And at the very least it would have to be conceded that it is a substantial form, since its function is to ultimately terminate and actuate nature; it would be a form rather than matter or a composite. And so subsistence would make with nature a true physical composition from through-itself act and through-itself potency; hence in immaterial substances, beyond the metaphysical composition, a physical one would also have to exist; and in all material substances, there would be several substantial forms and several substantial composites — all of which are absurd.

When finally Centinus said that subsistence is neither a thing nor a mode but a reality, he brought no clarity at all to this difficulty, because he did not explain what he understands by the name "reality." If he takes the name "reality" as it is commonly taken in our school for the formality and "something-ness" of a thing — as is said of "Petreity," "rationality," "animality," etc. — then certainly subsistence will not be properly a thing; but neither will it be able to ground a real distinction with respect to nature as he contends in *concl.* 3, *n.* 70. For a real distinction properly so called is only between a thing and a thing; and all the less will it be separable from nature, since a reality is then submerged through identity in the thing and entity of which it is a reality, and neither can be separated from the other through God's power. But if it can ground a real distinction from nature, it will be properly a reality but rather a thing, since a thing is what can ground a real distinction properly taken — as was said in *disp.* 6, *Met.*, *quest.* 8.

Third Difficulty

The third difficulty is whether this entity superadded to nature makes some true and real composition with it. *Cajetan*, 3 *p.*, *quest.* 4, *art.* 2, whom *Nazarius*, 1 *p.*, *quest.* 50, *art.* 2, and *Fonseca*, 5, *Metaph.*, *cap.* 8, *quest.* 6, *in fine*, follow, denies this. For as Aristotle teaches in 7, *Met.*, 49, from two extremes nothing one can be made unless one stands as act and the other as potency. But nature and subsistence are not compared to each other as act and potency, since subsistence respects nature through the manner of a terminus only — and so just as a point makes no composition with the line it terminates, so neither does subsistence with the essence. Hence they conclude it makes at most a composition "with them" (*cum* his) but not "out of them" (*ex* his).

Against this: a created supposit is not something simple but truly composite — unlike the divine supposit — and is not composed with them only but also out of them, since it is something one through itself even for these authors, nor is it composed of things of different genera. Therefore suppositionality makes a true composition with nature. Furthermore, they are shown to be compared to each other as act and potency — to exclude that response about composition "with them" — because subsistence by terminating nature perfects and completes it, and therefore they are compared as act and potency. The example about a point terminating a line is not to the point, because the composition of a line with a point is only integral composition and therefore only a composition "with them";

but the composition of nature and subsistence in the present case is essential — since it pertains to the substantial complement of nature — and therefore it must be called a composition "out of them." You will say that subsistence with respect to nature has only the ratio of a terminating act and not of informing it — as is clear of the subsistence of the Word terminating human nature in Christ — and therefore that composition would be "with them" and not "out of them." Against this: created subsistence truly affects, modifies, and actuates nature; it is truly received and remains in nature as in a subject — since it depends on it in the genus of material cause. Therefore it truly has with respect to it the ratio of an informing act and not purely terminating; hence the example of the subsistence of the divine Word is not to the point, since by its infinity it is purely terminating and cannot inform the assumed nature or be received in it — whereas these characteristics are not repugnant to created subsistence.

But if one answers affirmatively with *Suárez, cit.*, and *Aversa, quest. 18, sect. 6*, even greater difficulties arise. For if they stand as act and potency, it is not clear whether it should be posited as an accidental or rather a substantial form. For on the one hand it seems it should be posited as an accidental form, since it accrues to a being complete in act — namely this humanity, which is a through-itself being in act, constituted by its specific and individual substantial form which is this soul. On the other hand it seems a substantial form, since it is posited as substance and as pertaining to the substantial complement of nature. But then the absurdities pressed just above recur, because since nature and subsistence are really distinct extremes, beyond the metaphysical composition in immaterial substances there would have to be another substantial physical composition. And in material beings there would be several substantial forms and substantial compositions. Furthermore, it would then bestow on nature incommunicable existence in the genus of formal cause; but that causality cannot be supplied by God. Therefore the Word could not supply the functions of the created supposit with respect to the human nature — which is false.

Suárez, tom. 1, 3 p., disp. 8, sect. 3, replies by conceding that subsistence stands in the manner of an act but not in the manner of a form, since act is broader than form, just as capacity is more general than passive potency. And this because form includes in its concept the imperfection of an incomplete being by nature ordered to completing one integral essence with something to which it is united as subject. Hence the ratio of form is found in God in no way, whereas what it is to subsist does not say that imperfection in its concept and therefore is found in God and consequently can be supplied by God. Against this: form as form says some incomplete being ordered to constituting something one; but created subsistence says such an incomplete being ordered to the constitution of the supposit with nature; therefore it is truly a form. As for what Suárez says — that the ratio of subsistence is found in God but not the ratio of form — this matters little, since even being-intellectual in its concept does not include imperfection, and therefore is found in God; yet created intellectual being says imperfection

and cannot be supplied by God, as is clear — for man cannot be called rational without a rational soul. And so by parity, because created subsisting includes imperfection, it will stand in the manner of a form and cannot be supplied by God.

Others then, to avoid the other absurdities deduced about several physical compositions, reply that even if subsistence and nature jointly compose the supposit, they are not on this account to be called parts, and it is not necessary for every composition to be said to be made from parts; it suffices to say it is made from component extremes — since by parts are properly understood those that compose the nature, namely matter and form. So *Aversa, loc. cit.* Against this: this solution is plainly entirely verbal, because the reason must be given why those composing extremes cannot be called parts. For whenever two extremes concur to the constitution of one thing — which adequately includes both in itself and is only inadequately constituted from each of them — those two extremes are plainly said to have the ratio of a part in proportion to the quality of the whole constituted: they will be integral parts if they constitute an integral whole, essential parts if they constitute an essential whole. Confirmation: given this solution, one could deny every composition — both physical and metaphysical, both essential and integral — for one could say that each composing thing has the ratio of extremes and not of parts. And when it is said that by parts are properly understood matter and form which compose the nature, this is absolutely true; but from the hypothesis that subsistence says a positive entity superadded to nature and really distinct from it, with which it constitutes something one through itself called a supposit, we deduce that there must be another substantial physical composition and that beyond the substantial form of the composite there must be another constitutive of the supposit, and beyond prime matter — which is immediately capable of the form of the composite — there must be another "second matter" as it were, per se orderable to receiving another form by which the supposit is constituted. And this will be the singular nature itself, which on this account is not yet substantially complete but must be completed by another quasi-substantial form supervening.

You will reply again that subsistence cannot be called a substantial form even if it actuates and perfects nature, because it is a mode, not a thing, and a form is a thing that can exist by itself at least by God's absolute power. Against this: subsistence for the Adversaries is substance at least as distinguished from accident, and it actuates nature and substantially perfects it — which are the functions of a substantial form. Furthermore, it is not of the ratio of a substantial form as such that it be able to exist without matter, since even if it had a necessary connection with matter it would not on that account cease to be a form. Hence Aristotle acknowledged a substantial form and yet did not know it could exist without matter by divine power; therefore the fact that it cannot so exist does not remove from it the ratio of a form. Furthermore, there are those who hold subsistence to be a thing and not a mode, and that by divine power it can exist

separated from nature. Therefore nothing is lacking for it to be called a substantial form.

Fourth Difficulty

The fourth difficulty is raised by Scotus explicitly in 2, *dist. 1, quest. 1, §. Contra primam viam, in the fourth argument*: if created personhood consists in some positive entity and is really distinct from it — or at least modally in the sense of more recent thinkers — then nature could be produced and conserved without personhood, which is a great inconvenience. This difficulty is easily avoided in the opinion about the negative, since personhood cannot be removed from nature unless what whose negation it is accrues to it — since negation is immediately and formally removed by the positive form it negates. And since this form is union to another supposit, it follows that nature cannot be deprived of proper subsistence except through union to another supposit, and therefore by the very fact that it does not subsist with proper subsistence it subsists with alien subsistence. But in the opinion about the positive, grave difficulties press from both sides.

If it is denied that nature can exist without any personhood — proper or alien — even by God's absolute power, as in fact *Suárez, disp. 34, Met., sect. 6, n. 35; Fonseca, lib. 5, Met., cap. 8, quest. 6, sect. 5; Aversa, quest. 17, cit., sect. 3*, deny — against this the consequent of the argument is efficaciously proven: God can make every naturally prior and really distinct thing without what is posterior; but nature as singular is prior and really distinct from this personal reality; therefore God can make the singular nature without personhood. By this reason the Doctor proves in 2, *dist. 12, quest. 2* that matter can exist without any substantial form by God's power.

Suárez and *Aversa* reply that the major is not universally true, since quantity is prior to figure and to every local presence, and yet it cannot exist without any figure or presence. *Arretinus* adds that just as God could not, given the foundation and the terminus, prevent a relation from arising — since it follows by the necessity of nature — so neither can personhood fail to sprout from the very nature if it is left to itself, since even though nature is prior to personhood, it seems impossible for it to remain while the entity of personhood does not. But this solution is universally rejected by others, because quantity can exist without situational figure if reduced to a point, and a body can be stripped of all local presence as the Doctor teaches in *Quodl. 11*. If one is unwilling to concede these things with others, then the parity with subsistence on the one hand and with figure and presence on the other must be denied, in relation to quantity — since figure and presence are relative entities that necessarily tend to follow upon extremes once posited in being, if they are internally accruing, or at least approximated, if externally accruing. But subsistence is posited as an absolute entity; and therefore Scotus deliberately adds in 2, *dist. 12, quest. 2, §. respondeo ad questionem*, that for the major — "every prior thing really distinct from what is posterior can exist without contradiction without it" — to be universally true and

admit no instance, it must be added that this prior thing really distinct from the posterior must be absolute, in order to exclude instances about relatives. By this also Aretinus's solution is rejected, since there is not the same necessary connection between one absolute and another that follows from it really distinct, as there is the necessary connection of two extremes with the relation that follows from them.

You will say with some: it cannot happen that this positive mode does not flow from the singular nature, given that it is not forestalled by an alien supposit, and therefore nature must necessarily and indispensably have proper subsistence if it does not have an alien one. But this escape is easily blocked, because — as *Meurisse* rightly presses — for the same reason that God impeded its flowing in the Incarnation of the Word, he could have impeded it even if the Word had not been incarnate, since the impediment of such flowing does not have the necessary and intrinsic inclusion of another supposit. Confirmation: the impediment of such flowing is naturally prior to the union of another supposit with nature — from which it is supposed to flow as that mode. Therefore it can be impeded by God without union of nature to an alien supposit. You will say it is impeded formally by the very actual union. Against this: the very reason nature is united by God to an alien supposit is that through impediment of the flowing of proper subsistence, a place is given to the alien one; therefore the impediment of such flowing is naturally prior to the union of nature to an alien supposit. Furthermore, such flowing is in the genus of efficient cause; but every such efficiency of a secondary cause can be impeded by God through the mere suspension of his concurrence, without production of any positive thing by which it is impeded — as theologians commonly say.

Therefore others commonly concede that nature can remain divinely stripped of all subsistence — both proper and alien. So *Cajetan*, 3 p., *quest.* 4, *art.* 2; *Medina*, *ibid.*; with other Thomists; *Valencia*, *ibid.*, *disp.* 1, *quest.* 4, *pun.* 2; *Hurtado*, *disp.* 11, *Met.*, *sect.* 9; *Arriaga*, *disp.* 4, *Met.*, *sect.* 13, *subsect.* 6; *Cardinal de Lugo*, *disp.* 12, *cit.*, *sect.* 7; *Albertinus*, *de praed. substantiae*, *dist.* 3, *quest.* 4; *Oviedo*, *controv.* 6, *Met.*, *pun.* 6; *Lychet*, 3, *dist.* 1, *quest.* 1; *Centinus*, *disp. cit.* — which *Aretinus*, *cit.*, also considers more probable. Yet even these are not immune from difficulties. First, because substance either must exist through itself or in another, with no middle ground; therefore either with proper or alien subsistence. Nor does it avail to reply that it would still be through itself because not in another as in a subject of inherence. For no one doubts this, nor is this the discussion about subsistence insofar as it excludes such inexistence — since being-through-itself excluding such inexistence belongs to substance of itself and not through a superadded mode. Rather the discussion is about being-through-itself insofar as it excludes being in another as in a supposit by which nature is said to be supposed and personated. In this sense — of the humanity being in the Word — nature must necessarily be either in itself or in another.

The defenders of this position reply that in the given case the nature — for example, humanity — would then exist through itself negatively, that is, not with another, but not through itself positively. *Aversa, cit.*, attacks this: just as it cannot be understood that a nature exists in another only negatively, so it seems likewise it cannot exist through itself only negatively and without a positive mode of subsistence. But this attack has little force, since it manifestly assumes a disparity, because for nature to be in an alien supposit most formally says the positive relation of union; whereas for it to be through itself and not in an alien supposit does not necessarily carry a positive concept but can be saved by a negative one. Rather those who respond thus are deficient because by so speaking they step with both feet into the opinion about the negative — since then nature truly could be called supposed and personated from the mere fact that it exists negatively through itself, i.e., not communicated to another supposit.

Then principally against this latter mode of speaking it is argued: either the singular nature — for example, the singular humanity of Peter — in this state of being stripped of all subsistence could act, suffer, and have other operations natural to nature, or not. And neither can be asserted without great inconvenience. For it cannot first be said that it would not have its proper operations, because it would still have their proximate and remote principles — for example, the humanity of Peter would have a soul and its powers: intellect and will; therefore it could understand and will. Furthermore, such actions can be exercised by the soul separated from the body; therefore all the more can it be their principle while constituting the singular humanity, even if not supposed. The consequent is proved because its rational powers would not be more incomplete and insufficient in that state than in the state of the separated soul. You will say that in that case the humanity of Peter would not act — not because it lacks the principles of acting, but because the condition of the agent or of acting is lacking, which is suppositionality, since actions belong to supposits from *1, Met.* Against this: there it is stated that actions belong to singulars and not to supposits; and in the posited case nature is singular; therefore the condition of the agent or of acting is not lacking. Furthermore, that can at most be verified connaturally and according to what happens in the common course of nature; but in the present case we are in a miraculous situation in which that dictum would not need to be verified. Finally, that dictum absolutely speaking is false, because accidents separated in the Eucharist also act, and the soul in the state of separation understands and wills — which are not supposits.

But if it is conceded that the singular nature in that state without subsistence could have proper operations, then another absurdity follows: namely, that personhood and subsistence are altogether superfluous in the singular nature — since they seem to serve no purpose at all, given that it can equally well suffer and act with them as without them. You will say they are necessary for the ultimate complement and consummated perfection of nature. Against this: a form is said to perfect the subject it affects insofar as it renders it apt to behave well in relation

to some action or passion; if therefore subsistence does not bestow this on substance, it is not clear how it can be said to bring it the ultimate substantial complement and consummated perfection. You will say it is necessary for terminating nature, which without it would be indeterminate, even if it had its proper operations. Against this: if in that state nature behaves equally well in every respect without subsistence as with it, nature will be said to be sufficiently terminated positively through singularity itself and not to need a further positive terminus. And that terminus is gratuitously feigned. You will finally say that subsistence or suppositionality is necessary to render the singular nature incommunicable to another supposit. Against this: for that purpose a mere negation suffices, as Scotus says, and no positive form is necessary for it; indeed it is entirely unfit for that purpose, since no positive form is posited precisely in a subject to present a merely negative effect. Indeed at most that will be its secondary effect, since its primary effect must be positive — as the argument of Cardinal de Lugo reported above in *n. 52* rightly proves. If therefore no positive function can be assigned that this positive subsistence bestows upon the singular nature — when it can behave equally well toward every action and passion with it as without it, as has been proven thus far — this positive subsistence is posited in vain, and it will be better to admit with Scotus only negative subsistence. See *Poncius, disp. 18, cit., n. 93*, where he pursues this argument at length.

Fifth Difficulty

The fifth difficulty concerns the material and efficient causes of subsistence, which in the opinion about the negative is easily resolved: the material cause is the singular nature not communicated to another supposit, and the efficient cause (though in the way in which negations can be said to have a cause) is the supernatural agent not assuming it or not coupling it to another supposit. But in the opinion about the positive there is a grave difficulty about both causes.

First, about the material cause: some assert with Cajetan that no such cause should be assigned to it, and that nature cannot by any means be called the subject of its subsistence, because since subsistence formally gives and says through-itself being, nothing is more repugnant to it than being in another and being in a subject. And therefore they say subsistence has the ratio of a pure terminus and is subsisting. Others on the contrary firmly assert that subsistence depends on nature in the genus of material cause and that nature is the subject of subsistence, since a mode truly inheres in the thing it affects and modifies. So *Cardinal de Lugo, disp. 12, cit., sect., in fine; Arriaga, disp. 4, Met., in fine; Oviedo, contro. 6, Met., pun. 6, n. 17; Aversa, quest. 18, cit., sect. 6*; and others commonly. That this is not repugnant to the mode of subsistence, as the former said, they declare thus: it is of the ratio of subsistence to be through itself not as a "that which" but as a "by which" — that is, not that subsistence itself should subsist through itself and be through itself, but because it is that by which nature has through-itself being. And therefore just as for whiteness to make something white, it is not necessary that it be white as a

"that which" but it suffices that it be white as a "by which" — so for subsistence to make something subsist it is not necessary that it itself subsist as a "that which" but it suffices that it subsist as a "by which." So *Blas de Concepción, disp. 8, Met., quest. 3, n. 31*, explains the matter against Cajetan. Now even though, granting the opinion about the positive, I think these latter authors reason better, I showed above in *n. 79* that through this doctrine the argument of the former is not resolved. And therefore *Aversa, cit.*, responds differently, saying that subsistence does not give through-itself being by taking through-itself being as not depending on a subject — since in this sense substance of itself exists through itself — but insofar as it negates communication to another supposit; and this ratio of through-itself being — that is, this incommunicability — is most of all had by subsistence. But even this solution does not suffice, because this positive entity called subsistence is in fact communicated to another — namely to the singular nature it affects as a form to a subject. Therefore it cannot bestow such incommunicability upon the supposit. Furthermore, the formal effect of subsistence is to constitute a thing existing in itself in such a way that it is attached and coupled to nothing else — whether that other thing stands as a subject or as a supposit. But this directly conflicts with subsistence, since being a mode it indispensably requires to always be affixed and bound to another. Therefore it cannot give to nature an effect entirely repugnant to itself — as I was deducing above in *n. cit., 79*.

Furthermore, these authors can be attacked by the argument touched upon in *n. 47*: if subsistence is truly subjected in the singular nature and sustained in it, it follows that causes are causes of each other in the same genus of causality and by the same ratio — which all deny against the Thomists. The consequent is proved because in the opinion about the positive, nature is truly sustained in its proper supposit and truly depends on and rests upon it — which locutions the authors of that opinion use to demonstrate the true causality of the supposit toward nature. And since it is explained through the relation of the sustaining to the sustained, it does not seem to import anything other than material causality, which is usually explained through such a relation. Therefore if conversely subsistence depends on nature in the genus of material cause, there will be a circle in these causalities, and nature and subsistence will be causes of each other in the same genus of causality and by the same ratio — which I already said was false in *disp. 8, Phys., quest. 1, art. 1*. For nature will be said to be sustained by subsistence and to rest upon it, and conversely subsistence to be sustained in nature. If one says that nature is sustained in personhood as in a supposit and personhood is sustained in nature as in a subject — which are different genera of causality and sustenance — these authors are likewise obliged to declare this difference, which they by no means explain. Hence since on both sides there are grave difficulties, it is better to deny with Scotus that subsistence is a positive mode received in nature, and that nature is sustained positively by subsistence.

About the efficient cause there is a greater difficulty: whether it immediately flows from the very nature it affects, or rather is produced by the same generator of

nature, so that it is co-produced with it by the same agent. *Cajetan and Capreolus*, followed by *Vásquez*, 3 p., disp. 34, cap. 4; *Albertinus*, cit., quest. 12; *Aversa*, quest. 18, sect. 8, say that subsistence is produced by the generator and not by the nature itself. Their chief reason is that actions belong to supposits — that is, they proceed from nature in a prior instant of nature already terminated through subsistence — therefore subsistence cannot proceed from nature of which it is the subsistence, since it would presuppose itself before it existed. Confirmation: not only does the external efficient cause produce the substantial nature but it also produces the supposit — for example when fire generates fire or God creates an angel. And this must be understood not only concomitantly (says *Aversa*) because it produces a nature to which subsistence constitutive of the supposit belongs, but properly and formally — in that it produces the very formal ratio through which the supposit is constituted.

Others on the contrary contend that subsistence is produced proximately and immediately by the nature — only remotely and mediately by the generator. So *Lychet*, 3, dist. 1, quest. 1; *Medina*, 3 p., quest. 4, art. 2; *Suárez*, disp. 34, *Metaph.*, sect. 6; tom. 1, 3 p., disp. 6, sect. 3, dub. 3; *Hurtado*, disp. 11, *Metaph.*, sect. 9; *Cardinal de Lugo*, sect. 7, cit., n. 144. Their chief basis is that connatural passions are commonly said to proximately flow and result from the essence of which they are passions, due to the necessary connection they have with it; but the mode of proper subsistence has an even greater connection with nature than other natural properties; therefore, etc.

However, as *Arriaga*, disp. 5, cit., sect. 13, subsect. 3, and *Oviedo*, pun. 6, cit., n. 19, have rightly noted, there is no convincing reason for either side. Not the reason of the former, because that principle is absolutely false — since separated heat acts and the separated soul understands; hence it would better be said that actions belong to singulars, as Aristotle says in 1, *Metaph.*, not to supposits. And as *Oviedo* says: even granting that nature must be presupposed as subsisting for producing other effects distinct from subsistence, it does not follow that it must likewise be presupposed as subsisting to produce subsistence itself — just as for producing or receiving presence, the subject need not be presupposed as present, and if for other effects the subject must be presupposed as extended, this does not follow that it must be so presupposed for receiving quantity — since through quantity it formally becomes extended. So too in other similar forms. Nor does that confirmation press much, since just as actions are not properly said to belong to supposits principiatively but to singulars, so too terminatively. For it suffices that an action reach something certain and designated in the nature of things produced through it — for which singularity suffices without subsistence. And it suffices for actions to be said to belong to supposits terminatively only concomitantly and consecutively — namely that the action is terminated to such a nature to which subsistence follows, even if not formally by that first action — which the opposite of this *Aversa* does not prove.

But neither is there a convincing reason for the other side, since if subsistence is held to be in some way necessary for acting at least as a condition, then there is a manifest disparity between subsistence of nature and other properties of it. For before subsistence there would not be in nature whatever is desired for acting and operating, whereas before other properties there would be; and therefore the latter can well flow from nature and be attributed to nature as their proximate principle — but not subsistence, which would have to be produced by the same agent from which nature is produced. And even conceding that subsistence is in no way necessary for acting but stands with respect to actions as merely material and concomitant, there is still a disparity between subsistence and other connatural properties, since subsistence is even more intimate and immediate to nature than other connatural passions or accidents. (For by passions here I understand connatural accidents, conforming to the common mode of speaking.) So much so that due to such intimacy and immediacy it ought not to be produced from nature but rather simultaneously with it from the same cause, as it is so intimate to nature that it is considered entirely coeval with it. Since therefore it cannot be determined what in reality is the efficient cause of this positive entity that they say subsistence imports, it will be better to deny that such positive entity is imported by subsistence than to admit a positive effect whose efficient cause we cannot assign.

Sixth Difficulty

The sixth difficulty, and one of great moment, is theological. For the debate among them is whether a created person as such could be hypostatically assumed by the Word — that is, not only whether nature could be assumed but whether personhood itself could be formally assumed, or at least whether the nature could be assumed while retaining proper personhood. And because Nestorius asserted that there were two persons in Christ — divine and human — lest theologians appear to favor this heresy, nearly all reply negatively — excepting a few more recent ones, as *Cardinal de Lugo, disp. 12, cit., sect. 6, n. 68*, testifies. And indeed in the opinion about the negative this impossibility is very easily shown — as the Doctor notes in *3, dist. 5, quest. 2, §. ad aliam quaestionem*. If the discussion is about personhood alone, and if this is held to consist only in the negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence on an alien supposit, it evidently follows that it cannot be assumed, since what is not something positive cannot be assumed nor can it be, since it cannot ground a real and positive union with another supposit. If the discussion is about the personated nature — that is, the whole aggregate of singular nature and personhood — it also follows evidently in this opinion that a created nature retaining proper personhood cannot be united to another supposit; since, as the Doctor argues in the cited place, contradictories would be verified of the same nature — for from the fact that it were assumed it would actually depend on another, and from the fact that it is presupposed to be personated in itself and to retain proper personhood, it would not actually

depend on another. And so it would simultaneously and at once depend on another and not depend on another.

But in the opinion about the positive it is difficult to save the conclusion that a person as such could not be assumed by the divine supposit in either sense. For if we speak of the person as to its formal element — that is, of personhood itself — even though all acknowledge it to be an unassumable entity, they still have difficulty rendering the reason for this; since every positive created thing seems assumable — as all positive being is in perfect obediential potency toward God — as the Doctor argues in 3, *dist. 1, quest. 1, art. 3, §. Contra primam viam*.

Nor does the common solution of the Adversaries avail: that only what pertains to the truth of human nature or to the formal constitution of man is assumable, and personhood does not pertain to this. It does not avail, because first, if personhood says something positive, no reason can be assigned why singularity rather than personhood pertains to the truth of human nature. Furthermore, neither does singularity pertain to the ratio of human nature and the essential constitution of man as such; yet it is posited as assumable and in fact assumed by the Word. Furthermore, the argument of Scotus always presses: that every positive created or creatable entity is equally in obediential potency toward God, and therefore they are obliged to assign the reason why every positive entity pertaining to the ratio of nature is assumable but not every ratio pertaining to the ratio of a person. Otherwise a manifest *petitio principii* is committed, because this is what the argument proves — that a person as such is also assumable if personhood says something positive, since it is equally in obediential potency toward God. From this very fact that it is unassumable, we straightway deduce that it is not a positive entity.

Therefore Suárez, 3 *p., tom. 1, disp. 14, sect. 1*, strives to assign a reason — lest he appear to beg the question — why personhood is not in obediential potency so that it can be assumed. And he gives the reason: even though personhood says something positive, it is not assumable, because it is a mode of existing through itself incommunicably; and therefore it implies contradiction for that mode to be communicated to another — whereas to be assumed personally is to be communicated to another. Therefore personhood is formally incommunicable and unassumable. He gives an example: inherence formally includes repugnance toward being through itself; for even though accident can be without its subject, the mode of being of accident — namely that inherence — formally includes repugnance toward being through itself formally. And therefore it is repugnant to the latter to be and exist through itself. So too the mode called personhood has repugnance for being assumed and terminated by another person and communicated to another from its formal ratio. Against this: if this reason derived from the condition of a mode — which cannot communicate its formal effect except only to the thing of which it is a mode, since it alone is bound and affixed to it — suffices to show the unassumability and incommunicability of my

subsistence, say, to another supposit, then the same can be concluded about all other modal entities — that they are unassumable and incommunicable to another. Since this is of the ratio of every mode: that it cannot communicate its effect except to the thing of which it is a mode. You will say this reason is not derived from the general ratio of mode but from the special ratio of such a mode — namely a mode of existing through itself incommunicably. Against this: personhood is itself incommunicable to the singular nature it affects — and the portion of substance in the hand is united with another portion of subsistence in the arm. Therefore it is not primarily through itself incommunicable. Furthermore, I showed above in *n. 79* that if subsistence is posited as something positive, it is rather to be called a thing than a mode — since it is posited as an absolute entity; and since it is posited as substance, by God's power it can be separated from nature and exist through itself. For if God can do this with absolute accident — as faith teaches in the Sacrament of the Eucharist — how much more can he do it with substance. But by the very fact that it existed through itself it could be assumed; hence that example of inherence is not to the point, since repugnance for all perseity or through-itself existence conflicts with inherence formally, whereas the supposedly positive subsistence does not have all incommunicability repugnant to it — as has been shown. Indeed that example is rather for the opposite side, since the mode of inherence cannot by any power exist through itself — because it is a relative entity that necessarily moves between these extremes, and when these are removed the inherence must also perish. But this positive subsistence is posited as an absolute and substantial entity; hence nothing prevents it from being able to exist through itself — and existing through itself, it can be assumed.

But it is with even greater difficulty saved that a person — as substrate — could be assumed, meaning a nature retaining proper personhood united simultaneously to another personhood. Hence even *Cardinal de Lugo*, who with other older theologians holds this to be impossible, confesses it is difficult to adduce an efficacious reason showing such impossibility. This has led some more recent theologians — against all antiquity — to dare assert that by God's absolute power a created nature can simultaneously be terminated by proper and alien personhood; because they see no efficacious reason produced by the ancient theologians for the opposite, as one can see by running through some — many others being set aside — which *Suárez, loc. cit.*, objects as inefficacious.

Cajetan, 3 p., quest. 4, art. 2, proves it because through its proper personhood nature is terminated intensively and extensively, and therefore proper personhood admits no partnership with another personhood. But this is a manifest *petitio principii* — to say that nature is terminated intensively and extensively by proper personhood amounts to saying that nature is so terminated by it that it cannot simultaneously be terminated by another personhood. As *Aretinus, 3, dist. 5, quest. 2, art. 1*, rightly noted. *Cajetan* further proves it because from that mode in which humanity is terminated by proper personhood, it follows that while it is so

terminated it cannot be assumed without that personhood being assumed, due to the natural connection they have with each other. But even this reason does not avail, as *Aretinus, ibid.*, noted: since personhood is a thing or a mode of a thing really distinct from nature, nothing seems repugnant to humanity being assumed — which is capable of assumption — while personhood remains unassumed, since it is incapable of such assumption according to these authors. He then adduces other reasons there and rejects them as invalid. And since he himself probably defends the opinion about the positive, he adds that in that opinion such impossibility could be shown thus: the suppositional ratio in creatures does not simply constitute, since it accrues to the nature already constituted in singular being; it only gives incommunicable being. Hence from the positive entity by which nature is personated in itself, the said double negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence necessarily follows connaturally and from the exigency of the personated nature. Therefore if a person were assumed, the contradiction that the Doctor infers in that question would still follow — namely that the same person would depend and not depend.

But this reason is also not valid, since the Doctor, *loc. cit.*, *dist. 9, quest. 2, §. ad aliam quaestionem*, says that the reason deduced from the contradiction excellently concludes in the opinion about the negative — that the same nature would depend and not depend on the alien supposit — but those who posit personhood as something positive must assign another reason why a person cannot be assumed or a nature personated while retaining proper personhood. Although the Doctor does not declare how that reason holds in the opinion about the negative and not in that about the positive, it can still easily be declared from the principles of those who posit personhood in something positive. Since, as is clear from what was said in *quest. 3, art. 2*, they attribute to personhood not only a negative effect — of excluding another personhood from the nature terminated by it — but also another positive and primary one: namely of terminating nature and taking away its ultimate substantial complement — as *Cardinal de Lugo, sect. 3, n. 34*, well explains. To this primary effect of terminating and completing nature they say there secondarily and connaturally follows another negative one: the exclusion from the nature terminated by it of another subsistence, just as universally of any positive form whatsoever happens: beyond the primary formal effect it bestows on the subject proportionate to its nature, it naturally brings with it another secondary one — which is the expulsion and exclusion of another form impossible from the same subject. But it is certain for all theologians that even though God cannot impede through his power the primary effect of a form existing in a subject — since this manifestly includes repugnance — he can impede the secondary one: namely the exclusion or negation of another form in the same subject. For this reason God is said to be able to put two bodies in the same place and two contraries at their highest degree in the same subject, as was said in its proper place. Therefore, even if it is true in the opinion about the positive that from the positive entity by which nature is personated in itself, the

exclusion or negation of conjunction with another personhood naturally and from the exigency of the personated nature follows — still supernaturally this secondary negative effect can be impeded. Once it is impeded, the nature retaining proper personhood can still be united to an alien supposit. In the opinion about the negative, however, this cannot be done, since subsistence has no other effect except precisely negative — namely to make nature formally not united to another supposit. This negation cannot be removed except by positing said union; and hence the contradiction also follows in the opinion about the negative — that nature would actually depend and not depend.

But *Cardinal de Lugo, sect. 6, cit., n. 74*, still strives to show that some contradiction follows from this: by virtue of proper subsistence nature stands firm in itself and tends no further toward an opposite; by virtue of the other it is placed in another supposit; but being in oneself and being in another are virtually contradictory terms. Therefore nature cannot be terminated simultaneously by proper and alien subsistence. However, from the same doctrine that this author elsewhere approves in the same disputation, this argument is easily solved by *Oviedo, controuv. 6, cit., pun. 9, n. 10*: for nature standing firm in itself says two things — one positive, another negative. The positive is that nature has its proper terminus, by virtue of which it needs no other and is constituted as fully complete on every side. The negative is that nature is not terminated by another subsistence. The first positive is the primary effect of subsistence inseparable from it; the second negative is the secondary effect of subsistence, just as the negation of cold in a subject is a secondary effect of heat informing the subject; which secondary effect is distinguished from the first and is separable from it. Therefore it is well said in the argument that those terms "being in oneself" and "being in another" are virtually contradictory — not formally — insofar as nature under proper personhood requires that it not be terminated by alien subsistence; yet this requirement can coexist with the opposite of what is required — as is said of other impossible forms with respect to God's absolute power, by conserving simultaneously in the same nature both proper subsistence and also alien personhood. And then it follows only that the same nature is in its proper supposit and in an alien one — but not that it is in its proper supposit and not in its proper supposit, or is in an alien one and not in an alien one. Just as if I were to say my body now existing in the school were simultaneously in the church or choir, then one could indeed say I was in the school and was outside the school — namely in the choir — but not that I was in the school and was not in the school. And therefore *Lugo* finally confesses that not even this reason is convincing.

For this reason *Hurtado, disp. 11, Metaph., sect. 8, n. 24*; *Arriaga, disp. 4, Metaph., sect. 13, subsect. 4*; *Oviedo, loc. cit., n. 8*, hold that there is no implication in a person being assumable — that is, a nature retaining proper personhood also terminated simultaneously by another. They prove this by an ineluctable argument in the opinion about the positive: proper subsistence does not formally constitute nature as not united to another supposit, but only has it that it can of itself require

that the nature it affects not be united or terminated through another subsistence. Therefore it does not imply that a personated nature be assumed in the composed sense. The consequent is evident, because from this formal contradictories do not follow — namely that nature is united and not united to another supposit — but only virtual contradictories: namely that nature is subsisting in its proper supposit and simultaneously in an alien one. The antecedent is proven: nature not being united to alien subsistence formally says the negation of union with alien subsistence; whereas being terminated through proper subsistence formally says proper subsistence making nature a terminus; therefore for nature to be terminated by this subsistence and to lack alien subsistence are distinct effects, just as positive and negative are distinguished. This reason, I say, is ineluctable in the opinion about the positive; but in the opinion about the negative it is immediately solved by denying the antecedent with its proof. For according to that opinion, since proper personhood formally says the negation of union of nature with another supposit, it is entirely the same thing formally for nature to be terminated by proper subsistence as for it to not be united to another; nor can positive and negative effects be distinguished in personhood itself, since it presents no positive effect whatsoever toward nature, as I said in *quest. 3, art. 2*.

Therefore, in order to hold with the common view of theologians that a person is unassumable — lest any support at all be given to the Nestorian heresy — it is better to defend the opinion about the negative, because on the other opinion it cannot be evidently shown against Nestorius that only the nature was assumed and not the person. You will say: Nestorius is sufficiently convicted from this — that the same nature cannot naturally be terminated by double subsistence; hence from the fact that faith teaches us that humanity was assumed by the Word and subsists by the subsistence of the Word, the Fathers and Councils rightly inferred that only the nature was assumed and not the person, since miracles are not to be multiplied without necessity. But *Cardinal de Lugo, sect. 6, cit., n. 69*, presses this very well: it would be an equal and perhaps greater miracle to take away from a complete substantial nature its proper subsistence than to preserve proper subsistence along with the alien one. For just as the repugnance between those two subsistences is given according to them as only natural and not essential, so likewise it conflicts only naturally — and much more — for a complete nature to remain without proper subsistence, which is a passion connaturally due to it. Why then is it rather to be said that proper subsistence is taken away — lest the same nature subsist miraculously through double subsistence — than rather that proper subsistence remains, lest nature remain without its connaturally due passion? This argument is similar to that which the Doctor uses in *4, dist. 10, quest. 2, E.*, to prove that if God can put the same body in several places definitively and sacramentally, much more can he do so circumscriptively and dimensionally — since the former miracle is greater than the latter.

Oviedo, cit., n. 1, replies that assuming the subsistence of the Word terminating human nature, there is no miracle in this lacking proper subsistence; because even if subsistence is due to a complete nature when it lacks an alien one, and when it is due to the same thing to lack an alien one so as to have proper subsistence, proper subsistence is still not due to the same nature on the supposition that it has an alien one. Just as cold is not due to water on the supposition that it is informed by heat — since such supernatural information would be above what was due to the water and against what was due to the heat by which the water is supposed to be informed. Against this: nearly all concede that humanity in the Word has an inclination toward its proper supposit and an appetite for proper subsistence. Hence all strive to explain how, with such inclination standing, the assumed nature does not exist violently in the Word. It is therefore false that a nature existing under alien subsistence does not have the debt of its proper subsistence — since if it has an inclination toward its proper subsistence, it also has the debt upon which such inclination is founded. Confirmation from that very example about the coldness of water, which is plainly due to water existing under heat — since if it were not due to it in that state, certainly that state would not be violent or even neutral for it. You will say: cold cannot connaturally be received in water persevering under that very heat. Against this: when we say cold is due to water existing under heat, this should not be understood reduplicatively — as cold, insofar as it is hot, for in that sense it is not capable of cold, and rather cold is repugnant to it — but specifically: that is, to what is under heat, since in this sense it is capable of it and has a natural appetite toward it. Therefore heat existing in water does not remove the debt of having cold, but only in the composed sense. Finally I show that absolutely speaking it is a greater miracle for humanity in the Word to lack proper subsistence than if it retained its own along with the alien one, because while nature lacks proper subsistence it is deprived of its primary effect and of some perfection it would acquire through it; whereas while retaining proper subsistence and being also terminated by alien subsistence, it is deprived only of the secondary effect of subsistence, which is a certain negative effect — namely the exclusion of another subsistence. Therefore in the first case it is constituted in a more preternatural or violent state than in the second, since in it is deprived of a connaturally due effect more due to it than the second — for the primary effect of a form belongs per se and primarily; the secondary belongs quasi accidentally and secondarily, and therefore the former is more due to it than the latter. Therefore the first case involves a greater miracle than the second, and since greater miracles in the mysteries of faith should not be presumed when they can be accomplished through lesser ones, it would rather have to be said that nature in the Word has proper subsistence simultaneously with the divine — if this is possible — than that it lacks proper subsistence and subsists through the subsistence of the Word alone. *Scotus* and *Scotists* add other theological reasons for the opinion about the negative in this matter, but since we are in metaphysics and not theology, this one theological reason is sufficient.

But against this, *Suárez, disp. 34, Metaph., sect. 2, n. 17*, objects that rather in our opinion about the negative there follows that inconvenience — that the supposit and person is absolutely assumable. He proves the consequence: just as we absolutely concede that a darkened air can be illuminated and a separated soul can be united to a body — because "being darkened" and "being separated" say only a negation — so it would have to be conceded simply that a supposit can be assumed or united to another, which is against the teaching of the Fathers and Councils.

Vásquez, loc. cit., admits that this argument does not press, and he therefore solves it by saying that the ratio is not the same for a supposit with respect to the negation of dependence as for air with respect to darkness, because darkness is not of the essence of air, and therefore with darkness expelled air can be illuminated. But the independence or double negation of dependence is of the essence of a supposit from Scotus, and therefore for no reason can that be said to be able to be assumed. But this solution does not please *Suárez*, since he could reply that just as darkness is not of the essence of air which it denominates as dark, so neither are those negations of the essence of nature which they denominate as independent; and just as those negations are of the essence of independent nature as such, or of personated and supposed nature, so likewise darkness is of the essence of darkened air as such, taking that for the aggregate of subject and negation or privation — in the same way that whiteness is said to be of the essence of white man as such. From another angle therefore the disparity must be assigned — and it is this: a supposit has a different mode of signifying its negation that it imports than dark air has in order to signify its privation. For a supposit — being a single and simple name — signifies nature and the joined negation after the manner of one thing and the supposed nature in the composed sense, such that from the mode of signifying it cannot make a divided and specificative sense but only a composed and reduplicative one. Whereas "dark air," being a complex term, signifies the subject and the privation in a divided sense, not composed, and therefore admits a specificative sense — meaning it signifies air that is dark, without making a reduplicative sense unless the reduplicative particle is added, saying "dark air as such." And this is the reason why one can absolutely say dark air can be illuminated but not that a supposit can be assumed and communicated — because the term "supposit" includes and reduplicates the negation of communication or communicability. As *Poncius, cit., n. 128*, rightly noted. Not because dark air says only the negation of light, as *Suárez* was saying — for it is no less truly and properly said that dark air can be illuminated than that cold water can be heated with cold expelled, and a black wall can be whitened, even though whiteness and cold say positive forms and not a mere negation.

But *Suárez* insists again against this response in *n. 18*: because this composed sense that the supposit makes by signifying nature as supposed is a manifest indication that the supposit does not signify formally a negation — as "separated" and "dark"

do — but signifies a positive form constituting the supposit and grounding that negation, on account of which the supposit is said to be unassumable and incommunicable. And unless we say this, the proposition "a supposit cannot be assumed" would make a ridiculous sense, since it would signify that some nature remaining independent and communicated in the composed sense cannot depend and be communicated — which says nothing. For it is just the same as if one were to say that a separated soul cannot be united to a body, understanding that it cannot be united while remaining separated.

The reply is that this argument — which consists entirely in words and in the mode of speaking — even rightly pondered, also presses the Adversaries. For even though they posit personhood formally in something positive, they still confess that from that positive thing there follows the negation of communication; and so on account of the negation involved in the name of a supposit, that proposition would also in their opinion make a sense in some way ridiculous and nugatory — that it cannot be assumed along with the positive thing to which the negation of assumption or communication is necessarily joined, since then it would be assumed and not assumed. The assumed along with the positive thing, not assumed by virtue of the negation necessarily connected. Confirmation: even according to them, "supposit" says singular nature not united or communicated to another — whether formally and primarily or concomitantly and secondarily, it matters little for avoiding the nugatory sense. For it will always make the sense that independent and non-communicated nature in the composed sense cannot depend and be communicated. It must therefore be denied that that proposition makes a false and nugatory sense — just as it is denied that "a separated soul cannot be united to a body" makes a nugatory sense. For this proposition absolutely stated is false, because from its mode of signifying it makes a divided and specificative sense, and it is false that a soul which is separated cannot be united to a body. If you wish to verify it through the composed and reduplicative sense, this must be done through the force of the reduplicative particle joined to it — for example "insofar as" or "qua," so that the sense is: a separated soul, as separated, cannot be united to the body. This sense is certainly true but ridiculous and nugatory, because the sense is that a soul cannot be united to the body while it remains separated. But the proposition "a supposit cannot be assumed" does not have such a sense; rather that sense is true and serious for the reason given — because it signifies nature and negation after the manner of one and from its mode of signifying makes a reduplicative and composed sense, not a divided and specificative one.

Article III. Physical arguments against the opinion of the negative resolved

Against our opinion of the negative our opponents heap up many arguments, both metaphysical and theological, which indeed must be reported and resolved separately — first the metaphysical, and afterwards the theological. It is therefore argued from Cajetan on *3. part. quæst. 4. art. 2.* and other Thomists there, that

second substance is constituted through something real and positive; therefore all the more so is first substance, which is the supposit, since this is substance in the highest degree and more perfect than the other, from the chapter *De substantia*. Second, because all admit that these names — hypostasis, person, this man — and again these pronouns — I, you, he — formally signify substance, not negation. Third, the supposit, insofar as it is a supposit, expresses perfection, and this is the most perfect thing in the genus of substance; but negation implies no perfection, since it is a non-being; therefore, etc. The major premise is proved, for what the created supposit adds to individual substance pertains to the perfection and completion of substance, whence subsistence is usually called the greatest perfection in the genus of substance. Suárez calls this an ostensive reason, and Oviedo proves the same major in *punct. 2. num. 12*: because if subsistence did not perfect and complete nature, it would be entirely idle and would fulfill no office or formal role by which the supposit could be constituted, as he says he will prove in the following point. Fourth, because then the supposit would not formally signify something substantially one per se, but a kind of aggregate composed of real nature and negation — which nevertheless is contrary to the common manner of speaking and conceiving, on which reasoning the Scotists who hold the opinion of the positive rely, as can be seen in Rada and Centinus. Fifth, because negation is formally nothing, or a being of reason; therefore if the supposit is formally constituted by negation, it follows that it is formally nothing or a being of reason. Sixth, every negation according to Scotus himself is founded on something positive and follows upon some prior affirmation, and no negation in his view can of itself be incommunicable except through the affirmation it follows; by this reasoning he himself in *2. dist. 3. quæst. 2* against Henry proves that the individual adds some positive specific difference; therefore the negation of communication, or of communicability, which the supposit expresses, must be founded on some prior affirmation which it follows. Finally, because this opinion of the negative seems to differ only in words from the opinion of Durandus, who said that nature and supposit do not differ except with respect to the concrete and abstract mode of signifying; for Durandus also admits that in a complete substantial nature there must be the lack of hypostatic union with another person, in order that it may be called a supposit.

I reply that Aristotle, by first substance, understood singular substance, and called it most properly substance, and more perfect; therefore in that being — namely, as singular — it cannot be constituted through negation. Scotus himself uses this argument in *2. dist. 3. quæst. 2. B* against Henry to prove that the singular cannot be constituted through negation. But whether first substance is altogether the same as supposit, and whether they are mutually convertible, is a question among the Doctors, some of whom affirm it, because this is substance altogether complete and perfect in the genus of substance, and every such thing is a supposit; others deny it, because the humanity of Christ is this numerical humanity and singular, and yet it is not a supposit. But this question is examined either

according to the mind of Aristotle, or according to the truth. In the first sense I have already said above at n. 34 that according to the mind of Aristotle, first substance or complete singular substance and supposit are convertible; for even if we wished to concede that he recognized some distinction between singularity and suppositality (which is not altogether certain), he did not recognize so great a one as theologians have known through faith — namely, that singularity could be separated from suppositality. For in his view every complete singular substance is necessarily incommunicable, not only as *quod*, but also as *quo*, and has repugnance to being communicated to another supposit; and therefore first substance and supposit in his view are the same, at least materially, and are convertible. But if this question is examined according to the truth of the matter, then a distinction must be made regarding the signification of the name "first substance." For if by first substance is understood only singular and individual substance, then indeed first substance and supposit are not the same, because the humanity of Christ is this numerical and singular humanity, and yet it is not a supposit. But if by first substance is understood substance altogether perfect and complete in itself, both actually and aptitudinally independent of another supposit, then first substance and supposit in this sense are convertible. Hence it is clear that this is a question about the name. In the first sense, therefore, in which first substance is not the same as supposit but only as complete singular substance, the argument concludes nothing at all. In the other sense, in which they are the same, one must say with Bassolius cited that first substance, which is called supposit, is substance in the highest degree insofar as it includes singular substance itself, but not with respect to what it superadds to it, which is negation. Just as singular substance itself is called most perfect and the greatest substance with respect to singularity, which it superadds to the common nature contracted, but not with respect to the negation of division into several inferiors and of communicability to them, which follows upon singularity itself.

To the second: I grant that these names and pronouns in the common manner of speaking signify substance, and indeed reasonably so, because those names signify not only suppositality and personality, but also nature — just as "individual" or "singular" does not signify individuation precisely, but the composite of nature and singularity. And thus, because the nature which they signify is substance, they are therefore said to signify substance, because they signify the whole composite of nature and suppositality. Yet here too there arises a controversy almost about the name; for since in the entire signification of supposit or person two things are contained — namely nature and the negation which personality implies, or suppositality — it is disputed whether the name of person or supposit primarily signifies nature and connotes negation, or conversely, or rather expresses both equally. The last cannot be asserted, because then the concept of person and supposit would not be per se one, since from positive and negative such a concept cannot per se cohere into one through which both would be expressed equally. Therefore, in order that its per se unity may be

preserved, one must be formally imported, and the other connoted from the mode of signifying the principal signified, according to the rule which the Doctor frequently teaches for preserving the per se unity of the concept of concretes. For although a per se unity of concept arises from things of different genera, nevertheless when both are not imported equally as parts of such a concept, but one as the principal signified, and the other as an addition, then the per se unity of the concept is not impeded. I have taught this frequently in Logic with Scotus in *qu. 8. univers.* at the end, and *qu. 15. ad 3.*, and *q. 8. prædicament.* from *4. dist. 1. qu. 2. litt. A*, and *quol. 13. § De tertio principali*; see *dist. 2. Log. qu. 6. art. 2.*, and *disp. 6. qu. 3. art. 2.* Therefore in the matter at hand, in order that the per se unity of the concept of supposit and person may be preserved, it is necessary that either nature be imported *in recto* and the negation of communicability be connoted, or conversely. Whether one or the other is said makes little difference, because the Doctor judged both probable in *1. dist. 23. quæst. un. D and E*. For the rest, since in the whole and entire signification of person, both nature and personality are found, and of these personality has the role of determinative — because it determines nature to being a person — hence consequently one must say that by the name of person and supposit, personality is signified more formally than nature, according to the rule assigned by the Doctor in *4. distinct. 13. quæst. 1. I*: when there are any two different things imported by one name, it is reasonable that it should principally and more formally signify that which is formal, and connote that which is material; and that is considered more formal which has more the nature of determining and qualifying, as he teaches in *4. distinct. 11. quæst. 1. E* — such as in the matter at hand is personality with respect to nature. Hence those who place personality formally in the positive consequently say that person formally signifies the positive and connotes that twofold negation, as Rada in *1. part. controvers. 22. art. 2* holds, so that the person is formally incommunicable existence having an intellectual nature. But those who place it in the negative consequently say that by the name person that twofold negation is principally imported, and nature existing is connoted, as Bassolius in *1. distinct. 23.* cited, so that the person formally is the incommunicability of one having existence in an intellectual nature. Whatever may be said about this, since, as I have said, it is nearly a dispute about a name, it matters little for the present difficulty, because however one speaks, it is always true that those names and pronouns signify substance, whether in the principal signification or in the connotation.

To the third: Some Scotists deny the minor, because a negation can also express perfection, if it is the negation of an imperfection — as is the case here, because personality is the negation of dependence on another supposit, and such dependence expresses imperfection in nature. This doctrine was Mayron's in *1. dist. 24. qu. 2.* and Poncius proves it here at n. 127 and in *disp. 12. Log. qu. 1. nu. 8.* I have, however, taught the opposite in *disp. 5. Metaph. num. 47*, which Bassolius also teaches here in the solution to 2, where he says that no negation whatever can be

a perfection, even if it is the negation of an imperfection, because the negation of anything — whether of a perfection or an imperfection — is not something positive, and therefore cannot participate in a passion or intrinsic mode of being, such as perfection is. Moreover, even if this doctrine were true, it would still be misapplied, because it is false that dependence on the divine supposit, in whose negation created personality consists, is an imperfection, since it is rather the greatest perfection. Therefore, with Bassolius, it must be said that the created supposit, according to its formal character and according to what it adds to nature, does not express perfection, although it does indeed deny the imperfection of nature's depending upon or relying upon an extrinsic supposit. This must be understood on the hypothesis that a created supposit could terminate the dependence of another nature, for then indeed such dependence would posit imperfection in the dependent nature. And this is the very doctrine of Scotus in *quolib.* 19, where he deals with this matter, and below in *lit. D* he says that hypostatic entity is not simply perfect, nor simply a perfection; and in *lit. K* he says that hypostatic entity is not that according to which anything is formally perfected, but that according to which it receives perfection, or at least is determined to a received perfection. Nor should this be surprising, since not even the divine supposit as such, or rather divine personality, expresses perfection simply (although it does not express imperfection either), as the Doctor proves in *quol.* 5. Hence when it is said that to subsist is the greatest perfection, the Doctor replies there in *lit. V* that "to subsist" can be taken in two ways: either for being per se, or for being per se incommunicably. In the first way it expresses perfection, and being most perfect; not, however, in the second way. And likewise, when the supposit is said to be most perfect in the genus of subsistence, this should not be understood formally, insofar as it expresses negation, but fundamentally and presuppositively, inasmuch as personality presupposes complete nature in the genus of substance, in which it is founded. Finally, to Oviedo's other proof: it is denied that personality properly and positively perfects and completes nature — for this cannot be understood except negatively, namely insofar as it excludes dependence on any extrinsic supposit. And it is false that if it did not exercise some other positive function toward nature, it would remain entirely idle, for it performs as much as negation can perform. It is false moreover that it can perform a positive office; and to his proofs, in the following point cited by him, I have abundantly replied in *q. 3. art. 2*.

To the fourth: Poncius here retorts that argument, as well as some others, because the same thing could be done against the singular, which in the common opinion of recent authors is constituted through negation. Yet I have not seen recent authors maintaining that the singular is constituted through pure negation; rather, they unanimously argue against Henry, to whom that opinion is attributed. Hence it would be better retorted from what was said at n. 77, where I showed that if the supposit is constituted through something positive supervening upon singular nature, since it would come to a singular nature

actually existing and complete in the genus of substance, it would be an accident, and thus with singular nature it would make one per accidens. To the argument, therefore, Bassolius grants that the supposit as such is not something per se one, but indeed the singular and individual is, which is included in it, and by reason of it the supposit is called per se one, and the universal is predicated in the concrete of the supposit itself — not, however, by reason of the negation. Rubio also replies this way in *3. dist. 2. quæst. 2.* Or one may say, as in the solution to 1, that the unity of the concept of person is still preserved, because it does not import the positive and negative equally as its constitutive parts, but signifies one and connotes the other, which does not impede the unity of the concept according to Scotus in the passage cited. Lichetus raises this same difficulty in *3. dist. 1. quæst. 1. § non asserendo*, to which he himself also replies, although he held to the opinion of the positive, yet he did not consider it particularly effective.

You will say that this argument is made in the very terms used by the Doctor in *2. dist. 3. quæst. 2. B* against Henry, who said that the singular is constituted through negation, and likewise that the solution we have drawn from Bassolius is refuted in those very terms. For the argument he makes is of this kind: of a singular there is predicated per se primarily that of which it is the singular; but of something taken under negation there is not predicated per se any entity by reason of the whole subject, because the whole is not per se one. If by reason of a part, namely by reason of the included nature, then it is not a predication of a superior of an inferior, but of the same of itself. So the Doctor. But this is our response just given — namely, that the universal is predicated of the supposit by reason of the included individual, or singular; therefore it is not adequate, nor according to the mind of the Doctor. The consequence is denied, for the argument proceeds well against the singular, which is not constituted through negation, but not against the supposit or person. The reason is that if common nature — for example, humanity — were predicated of Peter not by reason of the whole subject, but by reason of the included nature, then humanity would be predicated precisely of itself, as the Doctor infers, and thus it would not be a predication of a superior of an inferior, but of the same of itself. But it is not so in our case, because when it is said "Peter is a man," understanding this of the supposit, humanity is not predicated of itself, as in the first case, if the singular were constituted through negation, but it is predicated of this singular man who is called Peter, and by reason of this singular humanity included in the supposit, it is likewise said of the supposit. Hence according to the solution given, humanity can well be predicated quidditatively and per se of this singular humanity which is found in this supposit, and it will be said to be predicated of the supposit itself, because it is said of singular nature as connoting those negations which suppositality expresses. Hence it does not follow that the same is predicated of itself, as would follow if the singular were constituted through negation. And the reason is that the nature which is part of the singular and individual is the very common nature contracted by such a difference; hence what is predicated and that of which it is predicated

would not be distinguished. But the nature which is the constitutive part of the supposit is the singular nature itself, which receives per se the predication of the common nature; hence what is predicated and that of which it is predicated are not the same.

To the fifth: the consequence is denied, for it is one thing to speak of suppositality, and another of the supposit itself. For the supposit expresses two things — both singular nature and that twofold negation, as was said to 2. Suppositality, however, is precisely that twofold negation. I therefore grant that that negation is nothing positive, although it should not be granted that it is a being of reason, since it is a true and real negation following upon singular nature from the nature of the thing prior to any operation of the intellect, as the Doctor notes in *1. dist. 23. quæst. unic.* But what is deduced from this — that the supposit is formally nothing — is denied, because the supposit, besides the negations, includes singular nature. Whether singular nature expresses the negations by connoting them, or imports the negations by connoting the nature, makes little difference, and therefore it ought not to be called nothing.

To the sixth: the Doctor himself responds in *3. distinct. 1. quæst. 1. articul. 3. § per hoc ad argumenta*, saying that the major is not universally true, but is verified only of a negation which arises from the intrinsic and induces repugnance in the subject to the opposite affirmation. Such is the negation of irrationality in man, and therefore it is necessarily founded on something positive, by reason of which it necessarily belongs to it — and this is rationality. Such likewise is the negation of communicability as *quod* in the individual, because it is altogether repugnant to it to be divided into many of which it might be predicated in the manner of a superior; and therefore such a negation must belong to it through some positive entity in which it is founded, and to which it necessarily follows. But such is not the negation of communication, as *quo*, of singular nature to another supposit, for such a negation belongs to it contingently and extrinsically — that is, through the defect of an extrinsic cause assuming it: since it is not assumed, therefore it is personalized in itself through that negation. Hence, because such a negation belongs to nature accidentally and entirely from the extrinsic, no positive thing need be given that would be its cause, as is clear from the negation of light in the air, which, since it belongs to it contingently and from the extrinsic — namely, from the absence of a luminous body — therefore does not belong to air through any positive entity intrinsic to it.

You will say that although this can be said of the negation of actual communication with another supposit, it cannot be said of the negation of aptitudinal communication, which indeed belongs to substantial nature from the intrinsic, because as far as it is from itself it seeks to exist in itself and through itself. Therefore it must belong to nature through something positive, and such will be the entity of nature itself, because this negation is related as a passion flowing from nature itself; and therefore the character of personality is not well

explained by that twofold negation of communication and communicability. The answer is that all this is granted gratuitously, even according to the mind of the Doctor in *quolib. 19. art. 3. Y*, above in this disputation at n. 57, where it has been said that the negation of aptitudinal communication does not pertain to the formal constitutive of the person, but only fundamentally and presuppositively.

To the last: the assumption is denied. For Durandus placed the formal character of the supposit in the entity of nature signified concretely, and hence it differed from nature only in reason. But we posit a real distinction between supposit and nature — not indeed positive, because we say that suppositality is a negation, but negative, such as is between being and non-being. And I gladly grant that Durandus could be kindly interpreted — that when he says that the supposit adds nothing to singular nature, it was not his mind that it adds nothing at all, neither positive nor negative, but only that he meant to assert that it does not add anything positive, although in his mode of speaking he somewhat went too far.

You will say, with Rada, that the argument made against Durandus's opinion still presses against the opinion of the negative, because the supposit and nature could still be predicated of each other by identity, saying that Peter is his humanity. The consequence is proved: for still according to this manner of speaking, nature and supposit do not differ except according to the mode of signifying, and not by any real positive elements. Bassolius denies the consequence in the solution to 5 cited. For the reason why nature is not predicated by identity of the supposit, although it adds nothing real and positive to nature, is that for predication by identity one of the extremes, or both, must be either formally infinite, or at least permissively infinite, and consequently positive — which does not obtain in the matter at hand. I add that in the opinion of the negative that predication cannot be verified by identity for nearly the same reason that it is not verified in the opinion of the positive. For in the latter the proposition "Peter is his humanity" is not verified, because Peter is not precisely his humanity, but something more. And the same holds in the opinion of the negative, preserving proportion, because Peter is something more than his humanity — not indeed positive, but negative — which suffices to falsify that predication by identity, because the complex of humanity and negation is distinguished from humanity precisely taken.

Second principal argument to the same point: No imperfection is repugnant to any being except on account of some perfection belonging to it, which is a positive entity. But to depend on that supposit is an imperfection, which is repugnant to the supposit and not through nature, because the Word assumed this nature, yet not as subsisting; therefore through some entity superadded to it. The major is proved — indeed, the argument is just that — from Scotus in 2. d. 3. q. 2. *lit. B*, where he asserts that nature is individuated through something positive because through individuation imperfection is excluded from nature, namely divisibility and being divided. Second, because nature is no more determined from itself to suppositality than to singularity — indeed, less so, because a created

nature can stand without its own suppositality, but not without singularity. But it is determined to singularity through something real and positive superadded to nature, as is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation; therefore all the more so to suppositality. Third, the mode of being of an accident is not more perfect than the mode of being of a substance; but the mode of being of an accident, which is to inhere, expresses something positive; therefore also the mode of being of a substance, which is to subsist. Fourth, an accident depends ultimately on the supposit of substance; therefore the supposit is constituted in the being of supposit through some real entity. The consequence is proved: because the terminus of a real dependence must be real. The assumption is proved: because the dependence of an accident is of a communicable thing, which cannot be terminated except in something altogether incommunicable, and such is only the supposit of substance. Fifth, Scotus in *3. d. 1. q. 4* holds that a created supposit can, at least formally if not effectively, sustain another nature — which cannot be said unless it is constituted through some positive entity in such being. Finally, argument is made from the offices which personality exercises around nature, for nature is said to be sustained in its own supposit, to depend on it, to rely on it; likewise to incline toward its own personality, to be perfected and completed by it — all of which offices are positive.

The response to this is given by the Doctor himself in *3. d. 1. q. 1. art. 3* and *quol. 19. art. 3*, where he adduces the argument in those terms. If depending on an alien supposit were repugnant absolutely to a created singular nature, just as it is repugnant to it to be divided into many of which it might be predicated, it would necessarily be repugnant to it through something positive. But this cannot be so repugnant to any created nature, because every created entity not only depends on the uncreated as on a cause, but can also depend by this special dependence. So the Doctor. But for a more perfect solution of the argument, it must be added that the major and minor premises taken in the argument, stated absolutely, are not universally true — neither the major, because, as Lichetus notes in *2. dist. 3. qu. 2. § in istis tamen*, in those divine relations constituting the persons, every imperfection is simply and absolutely repugnant, and yet they themselves formally express no perfection, since they are non-quantitative beings according to Scotus in *quol. 5*. Hence it is not always necessary that a positive excluding simply imperfection from something import formally a perfection, but it suffices that it not express imperfection. Indeed, Bassolius says in the solution to 2 cited that to exclude some imperfection formally in the way in which negation excludes affirmation can belong to something which does not express perfection, because no negation expresses perfection. It is true, however, that that negation is reduced to some positive thing from which it excludes that imperfection, as is the case here; and that positive thing frequently is not the reason for necessarily excluding such imperfection, because that positive thing is sometimes indifferent to that imperfection and to its negation. That it stands under one or the other arises from the action of an extrinsic agent, or the suspension of it, as is the case

in the present matter regarding the negation imported by the supposit. Nor is the minor absolutely true, as Lichetus notes in the passage cited. First, because to be communicated to something in the role of supposit expresses no imperfection, for the divine essence is communicated to three divine supposits without any imperfection. Then, because in a created nature, although to depend on an alien created supposit might express imperfection, nevertheless dependence on the divine supposit is so far from expressing imperfection that it rather posits the greatest perfection in a nature united to such a supposit.

To the second, from Bassolius: the parity is denied, because to singularity nature is so determined that it is simply repugnant to it, while remaining the same, to be divided and multiplied into many; and therefore it is necessary that this be repugnant to it through something positive, namely through individual difference. But nature is not thus determined to a created supposit, but contingently to it, such that nature remaining the same can not be supposed by that one but by another. And therefore, although it is not determined of itself to a supposit, nevertheless not through something positive superadded, but through something negative.

To the third: it is clear from what was said in question 2 that through the mode of subsistence here under discussion, substance is not constituted as independent of the subject of inhesion, but is only constituted as incommunicable to another supposit. It is, however, independent of the subject of inhesion through some intrinsic mode really identified with it, opposed to inherence, which is the proper existence of substance; and indeed this is more perfect and more noble than the mode of being of an accident.

To the fourth: the Doctor himself replies in *quol. 19. P. and Q*, that "to terminate ultimately" means two things: the first is to terminate; the second is to terminate in such a way that nothing further terminates. As regards the first, the terminus of real dependence is some positive entity, namely singular substance; as regards the second, the terminus can well be something negative. Hence to the argument the consequence is denied, whose proof proceeds concerning that which terminates, not concerning that which ultimately terminates.

To the fifth: the Doctor does not assert that resolutely, but only probably according to another opinion of the positive, which he himself considered probable, as is clear from what was said in article 1 of this question at n. 64 and following, where this was extensively discussed.

To the last: it has already been said above at n. 55 that that mode of speaking about the dependence and sustaining of nature in its own supposit pertains to the opinion of the positive; otherwise in the opinion of the negative it cannot be used except improperly, as was there explained from Ockham in *3. quæstion. 1* and Lichetus in *3. distin. 1. quæstion. 1. § non asserendo*. So also when nature is said to incline toward its own personality, it must be understood as if it were said to be

inclined to standing per se, not leaning on another. And likewise it must be understood when it is said to be perfected and completed by its own personality, inasmuch namely as the negation imported by it formally excludes from nature dependence on any extrinsic supposit, which dependence would posit imperfection in it if it were to another created supposit. Hence through it nature is said to be perfected negatively; it is also said to be completed, because existing under such negation it cannot be communicated to another, with which it would make a composite in some way per se one. And these offices, so explained, can well be exercised through a simple negation.

Third, John of St. Thomas argues in *quæst. 7. Physicæ articul. 1*: the independent is more perfect than the dependent; but the dependent is something positive; therefore independence in that genus cannot be a mere negation, although it is explained through negation. Hence the argument is formed: every non-subsistent, insofar as such, is more imperfect than the subsistent, or perfectible through subsistence, as is clear in the separated soul, and any other part, which is more imperfect than a subsisting thing, since it is incomplete and perfectible. The subsistent, however, is integral, perfect, and complete. Therefore the non-subsistent rather expresses the negation of that perfection, which the subsistent thing merely adds as a negation without any positive perfection above nature. The response is that it is sufficiently clear from what has been said that subsistence, or the name "subsistence," has several significations which must be distinguished, lest a fallacy arise in the argument and there be a transition from one to the other. For subsistence is sometimes taken insofar as it excludes from the subsistent thing communication and inexistence in another, as in a subject of inhesion, or in a whole which it constitutes in the manner of a part; and thus indeed it is true that the subsistent is more perfect than the non-subsistent, and the independent more perfect than the dependent in such a genus. And in this sense it is granted that subsistence expresses something positive. Yet this is not the subsistence here under discussion, and which is a mode superadded to nature, because every complete substance, both simple and composite, is of itself independent and incommunicable to another as to a subject and as to a whole, and not through any superadded mode, as was said in questions 2 and 3. But here the discussion is of subsistence insofar as it expresses suppositional incommunicability, or to another as to a supposit, and independence from another, as from a supposit terminating nature. In this sense it is not universally true that a nature subsisting in itself and independent of an alien supposit is more perfect than a nature subsisting in another and depending on another. For if such dependence were on the divine supposit, then the dependent nature would be more perfect than the independent, because it subsists in a more perfect mode than in itself. And because we explain the subsistence of created nature in the opinion of the negative precisely through independence from the divine supposit, and we deny that a created supposit can terminate and supply such dependence, hence we say absolutely that the negation of dependence, which the supposit imports,

expresses the negation of some greater perfection, namely of hypostatic union to the divine supposit, because only through this union can proper subsistence be excluded from created nature, since no other supposit can assume it except the divine one.

But against this solution, which this Author here well foresaw, he objects threefold. First, because natural and proper subsistence is opposed not only to hypostatic union, but is also opposed to the mode of existing of an accident, which is inherence, and to the mode of existing as an incomplete part — for both are repugnant to the supposit and consequently excluded by it. So it is restricted in vain to the negation of hypostatic union. Then, because proper subsistence is something natural *primo et per se*, because it constitutes something of the natural order; therefore it cannot *primo et per se* consist in the negation of hypostatic union, which is supernatural, although it also excludes it, just as in any natural thing there is found the negation of a supernatural reason — yet natural things are not constituted by this negation *primo et per se*. Finally, because either this negation of hypostatic union is taken privatively, or purely negatively; if purely negatively, it cannot constitute person, for the negation of hypostatic union belongs also to accidents, and even to beings of reason. If privatively, it belongs only to nature as capable of hypostatic union — and it is only capable through obediential potency; therefore the privation also belongs to it according to this capacity. Therefore if natural subsistence is constituted through it, natural subsistence will belong to nature according to obediential capacity — than which nothing more absurd could be said.

The reply is to deny the assumption. For although a supposable or supposed nature is incommunicable to another not only as to a supposit, but also as to a subject of inherence, and as to a whole of which it is a constitutive part, still it is false that these communicabilities are formally excluded from it through suppositality. For from itself it is thus incommunicable to another, and not through some mode superadded to it and separable from it; for such incommunicability belongs to it perpetually and indispensably. Hence it remains that only supposital incommunicability belongs to the essence of the supposit as such, and only through suppositality is the communicability opposed to it excluded. And therefore rightly it is restricted to the negation of hypostatic union alone, as is clear from what was said in *q. 3. art. 1. and 2.* To the second, the consequence is denied, because the negation of a supernatural form is a natural negation and constitutes the thing in a natural being. Thus the negation of grace in our soul is called natural, because from its natural principles grace is not owed to it. And so in the matter at hand concerning subsistence, which constitutes created nature in a natural being, because from natural principles nature does not co-require existing in a divine supposit, but in itself. Nor do I see any other mystery in this argument. To the last: it is clear from what was said at n. 51 that the negation of hypostatic union in a created nature can be taken in the manner of a negation and of a privation. Insofar as it is capable of it through obediential

potency it is called a privation; insofar as it does not have an aptitude related to it, or a natural co-requirement for it, it can be called a negation. But from the fact that such a negation can be called a privation considered in the nature's obediential capacity, which it has toward hypostatic union, I plainly do not see how it would follow that natural subsistence likewise would belong to nature according to obediential capacity. For we say that nature has an aptitude and natural inclination to its own subsistence, insofar as it is connaturally owed to it; and only in order to divine subsistence do we say it has obediential capacity. Therefore that consequence is drawn gratuitously and without reason.

Fourth, Arriaga in *disp. 4. sect. 11. subsect. 1.* argues specifically against the manner of speaking of Scotus, who explains subsistence through two negations — one of aptitudinal dependence, another of actual — and constitutes in these the essence of the supposit. For by speaking thus, he places the negation of the supposit in the negation of a thing otherwise altogether repugnant to nature, no differently than if he were to say that in a stone the essence of supposit consists in the negation of aptitudinal and actual intellection. For it is altogether repugnant to nature to depend on an alien supposit among created things, since that is negative, and therefore cannot terminate real dependence of nature. Then, if one negation says that even by divine power nature cannot be terminated in an alien supposit, surely there is already included the fact that actually it is not terminated: why then are two negations posited? Finally, since an alien supposit is a negation, it follows that in me the negation of another supposit would be the negation of a negation — which is plainly chimerical. For negation is always with respect to a positive term, but to posit two negations which negate no positive term, but one negates the other and have nothing further, is imperceptible.

The reply is that Arriaga, arguing thus, shows that he has not sufficiently grasped Scotus's mind in this matter. For Scotus, even if he explains created personality through a twofold negation of dependence, or of actual and aptitudinal communication, with an alien supposit, still adds that a third negation — namely of potential communication — should not be added, because every creature is in obediential potency to God to be communicated to an alien supposit, and only divine nature has such repugnance. Therefore only the divine supposit enjoys that triple negation. Therefore Scotus does not place personality in the negation of something altogether repugnant to nature, because every created nature can be terminated in an alien supposit — if not a created one, because it is negative (though still many of our Scotists nonetheless assert this), then at least in the divine one, which suffices for the solution of the argument. Then it is also false that personality cannot be explained through the negation of a thing, or dependence, repugnant to nature, for so in fact is divine personality explained, since it expresses also the negation of potential dependence on an alien supposit — even if it is true that such a negation requires some positive entity intrinsic to divine nature, on account of which it necessarily and indispensably belongs to it,

and which is the cause of such repugnance. Hence, although created personality cannot be explained thus, divine personality can well be so explained.

To the second: Scotus did not say that a created nature cannot be terminated even by divine power in an alien supposit, but only that it does not have an aptitude for an alien supposit, because it requires to subsist in itself and not in another. Nor should the negation of aptitudinal and potential dependence be confused: a created supposit has the first, not the second. Although the negation of potency indeed entails the negation of act — for what cannot come to be does not come to be — nevertheless the negation of aptitude does not always entail the negation of act, because a stone has no aptitude for being above, and yet sometimes it is actually above. So in the matter at hand, human nature is not apt with the aptitude of requirement to be in a divine supposit, and yet in fact it subsists in it.

To the last: the consequence is denied. First, because created personality is not explained except through incommunicability with the divine supposit, because by the light of faith it is not clear to us that it can be communicated to another supposit. Then, when it is also explained through incommunicability or negation of dependence on a created supposit, which is negative, still that consequence does not follow, because my personality does not express the negation of another supposit immediately, but the negation of communication, or hypostatic union, with another supposit — which union is not a negation.

But against this Arriaga presses, proving that created personality is not well explained through the negation of communication precisely with the divine supposit. First, because human subsistence would be the same even if divine subsistence were not something positive, in which case according to Scotus human subsistence could not be explained. Then, because the character of subsistence insofar as it abstracts from created and uncreated will not be more common to them than being is common to being and negation. Hence creatures will have no true and real subsistence. Finally, because this manner of discoursing is vain — to posit in creatures one entity or suppositality only to negate union with the supposit of God — for by this reasoning we could also posit in a stone another supposit to negate its union with man, and another to negate its union with divine sanctification, etc. — which is manifestly false.

The reply is that, on the contrary, created personality cannot be better explained than through the negation of communication with the divine supposit. And the reason is that given by the most learned Cardinal de Lugo in *disp.* 12. cited, from n. 54: because not every incommunicability is to be considered as imported by personality, or conferred by personality, but only the negation of communication with respect to that to which it could be communicated supernaturally by divine power. For only through faith have we had knowledge of subsistence, of which here is the discussion. Hence, since from faith it has become known to us only that created nature can be communicated to the divine supposit, we cannot by right reason explain the personality of a created nature except through the

negation of communication with the divine supposit. And when Arriaga says that human subsistence would be the same if the divine were not something positive, it is denied, because then a created nature would be unassumable, and thus a singular substance would have no other subsistence besides that by which it is distinguished from an accident — which we indeed grant is something positive, not however really distinct from substance. Nor should this be surprising, because we do not know such a subsistence superadded to nature except because faith teaches that in Christ there is humanity without its own and connatural subsistence. To the second: enough has been said above at n. 68 and 69, and soon we shall say more. To the last: Scotus's discourse is not vain, but rather the one Arriaga makes, for suppositality must indeed be explained through some incommunicability, as all grant, nor can it be better explained than through supposital incommunicability. And this in order to a supposit from which a created nature can be assumed. And since it is not clear from faith that it can be assumed except by the divine supposit, it is reasonably explained through negation toward it, but not toward others, which cannot terminate such dependence.

Article IV. Theological arguments against the same opinion resolved

In addition, our opponents attack the opinion of the negative with theological arguments. First, they produce an argument from the mystery of the Trinity, for divine personality expresses something positive, as all theologians admit. Therefore also created personality, for created personality is a certain participation of divine personality according to that saying of Paul: *from whom all fatherhood in heaven and earth* etc. Also, because divine nature is per se and essentially subsistent, and yet something positive incommunicable, at least distinguished by reason, is added to it; therefore all the more does created nature need such an addition, since it is not per se essentially subsistent as divine nature is. Also, because the addition of such a positive to divine nature seems less appropriate on account of its supreme simplicity, and yet it is admitted there; therefore all the more must it be admitted in created nature. Also, because otherwise the univocation of the concept of person as such to created and uncreated is not preserved, if one is posited as positive and the other as negative — because positive and negative have nothing univocally common. Thus argue Suárez, Cajetan, Fonseca, and Hurtado in the passage cited, who therefore think that Scotus spoke rather inconsistently, since he admits that the transcendental predicates, among which is personality, are univocal to God and creatures. And therefore, since he grants in *1. sent.* that divine personality imports something positive, he ought to have granted the same also regarding the created in *3. sent.*, in order to speak consistently with his principles.

The response, granting the antecedent for the reason often given — namely because the divine person has repugnance to being communicated to another supposit, which repugnance supposes a positive entity in the person, which is the

intrinsic root of such repugnance — denies the consequence as applied to created person, which does not have such repugnance. To the first proof: I say that it rather proves the opposite. For if created personality is a participation of divine personality, then already it must fall short of it in perfection, and therefore be constituted by the negative. For by this cause, as the Doctor notes in *3. dist. 1. quæst. 1. G.*, a created person falls short in the perfection of personality from a divine person, because this is simply and altogether incommunicable, whereas the created is only so in a certain respect — namely as long as it retains the negation of union with another supposit, which, however, is absolutely separable from it. Nor does this absolute consequence hold: created personality is a participation of the divine, therefore it must be positive as the divine is. For thus one could also argue of other perfections common to God and creatures, saying: created wisdom is a participation of divine wisdom, therefore it is a substance, as the divine is. Then, because personality in divine things exercises some positive office, especially in relation to notional acts, but not in created things. For although it is in some fashion a condition required for operating in the manner to be explained in the following question, still it is not properly a principle of operating.

To the second proof of that consequence: I say that divine personalities are added to nature not from any need — namely that through them it might simply and absolutely subsist, as the argument insinuates — but in order that through them it might be rendered incommunicable. And where, before their advent, it was understood to subsist communicably, through them it might afterwards be understood to subsist incommunicably. Hence this proof also tends rather toward the opposite, because since subsistence is added to nature in order to render it incommunicable, from this ground divine nature needs some superadded positive more than singular created nature, because this, apart from any other addition, is already incommunicable, at least as *quod*. But divine nature, even in its singularity, is communicable to several; and therefore from this ground divine nature more needs a superadded positive than created nature.

To the third proof: it is denied that the addition of the positive, by which divine nature is rendered incommunicable, is repugnant to its supreme simplicity, as the Doctor extensively proves in *1. d. 2. q. 7. Ad 4.* Faber in *disp. 2.* cited, *c. 5.* denies absolutely that person is said univocally of divine and created, and says that this is the response of the Doctor in *3. d. 1. q. 1. art. 3.* But this is false, because the Doctor there under *litt. G* grants that the divine person is univocal with the created in that twofold negation of dependence — namely actual and aptitudinal — on an alien supposit; but not in the third negation, namely of potential dependence, because this necessarily presupposes something positive in which it is rooted, and is found only in the divine person, which is a perfect person, not in the created. But about the univocation of divine and created person it was extensively discussed above in *art. 1. n. 68. and 69.* Nor is there reason why our opponents should so fervently press this argument drawn from the univocation of personality against the Doctor and marvel at his consistency, as if the Doctor

had not foreseen this argument and the inconsistency that could be objected to him in this assertion of his. For he himself in *3. d. 1. q. 1. art. 3. § per hoc ad argumenta* foresaw this entire difficulty and solved it most excellently in those terms. Hence finally this argument drawn from the mystery of the Trinity against the opinion of the negative Arriaga and Lugo, cited, grant is not effective.

Second, Hurtado in *disp. 11. Metaph. sect. 2.* argues: divine nature precisely understood by the intellect apart from the relations has no dependence on another, but rather the negation of it, both aptitudinal and actual; for there is no imperfection there, nor does nature depend on relation more than the latter on the former. But nature so precisely understood is not a supposit; therefore the supposit is not constituted by the negation of dependence — otherwise divine nature, so understood as independent, would be a supposit.

The reply is that Scotus by the dependence of nature on the supposit understands its communication to the supposit. But nature is communicated to its own supposit as if by identity with it — not that supposituality is not really distinguished from nature itself and is separable from it, but because it is included quidditatively in the constitution of what arises from it and actually singular nature, to which it is superadded. It is communicated, however, to an alien supposit through hypostatic union with it. Hence it is more properly said to depend on a supposit when it is communicated to an alien supposit than when it is communicated to its own, because to the latter it is not communicated as to something extrinsic distinct from it. Thus the Doctor explained this dependence in distinct terms in *quol. 19. § Secundo potest, lit. M.*, where he says that nature depends on the supposit by its being communicated to its own or alien supposit. According to this explanation, it must be denied that the divine essence precisely taken apart from the relations has the negation of both dependences. For although as such it is not understood as actually communicated to divine supposits, yet it is communicable to them, and therefore in this sense it does not have the negation of aptitudinal dependence, namely of communicability; and therefore it cannot be called a person.

You will say that at least, as thus precisely taken from the relations, it is incommunicable to an alien supposit or one of another nature, which suffices for it to be called a person, if personality consisted in such incommunicability. The reply is that not even so can it be called a person, because it is communicable to its own supposit, of which communicability also the person must be deprived.

Third, they further draw arguments from the mystery of the Incarnation, for many things are said by the Councils and Fathers which cannot in any way be preserved in the opinion of the negative. First, it is said that the divine person in Christ our Lord supplies created personality; but it would supply nothing if personality is nothing. It is also said that the Word, in assuming humanity, consumed the created person, not the nature; but it would have consumed nothing if created personality were nothing. Second, it is said that the Word

assumed human nature, not the supposit — which definition of the Councils would be vain and ridiculous in Scotus's opinion of the negative. For either the sense would be, as Hurtado says, that the Word united humanity to himself, not leaving it ununited or without union to himself, or, as Lugo says, the sense would be that the nature assumed by the Word did not remain existing per se without union to the Word — which is so clear that no one of sound mind could think that Nestorius or any other heretic doubted it. For who would say that, given such union, a created supposit remained in Christ? That would be formally to say that humanity was united and not united to the Word. Nor would there have been needed such a long and serious disputation to reject this error with heretics, since it could have been immediately convicted of the most patent contradiction. When therefore the Church in the Council of Ephesus defined against Nestorius that the Word assumed nature, not person, it did not only intend to teach that through the union of humanity with the Word the negation of union was removed from nature, because that was clear of itself and gratefully granted by heretics; but it wished to teach that some positive entity was removed, which constituted the created supposit, which Nestorius wanted to be assumed together with nature. Thus Arriaga concludes. Third, it is said that by this union human nature was exalted; but in Scotus's opinion it would rather have been depressed, because without such union it would have been independent of another, and through this union it becomes dependent; but the independent is more noble than the dependent. Fourth, they say that the assumed nature was for no instant under its own personality, but always subsisted by the subsistence of the Word. This, however, would be false in Scotus's opinion, because the humanity of Christ was first produced, at least with priority of nature, before the hypostatic union was produced in it. But in that prior instant it had the negation of actual and aptitudinal communication. Therefore in that prior instant it was personalized in itself, if personality consists in such negations.

The reply is: the assumption is denied, for through the opinion of the negative all things well are preserved that are said by the Fathers and Councils about the mystery of the Incarnation, if they are rightly understood. To the first proof, Faber replies in *disp. 2. cit. cap. 5. ad 6*, that the person of the Word supplies the mode of being of singular nature, which consists with that negation of twofold dependence. For if created singular nature were left to itself, it would exist per se — that is, it would not depend actually or aptitudinally on an extrinsic supposit — and this it would have from itself and not from elsewhere. But through the assumption it has come about that created nature has this same being with that twofold negation — namely that it does not depend actually or aptitudinally on an alien supposit. For created nature now assumed by the Word is so perfectly personalized by an alien person as if it were personalized by its own personality. And in this sense he says that the person of the Word supplies created personality, and therefore it is not said to supply nothing, but something, although not positive, namely that mode of being.

This solution, however, is false, for it is false that the person of the Word supplies created personality in Christ in this way — that it makes it actually independent of an alien supposit, as a created personality would if created personality would do if separated. For if the assumed humanity actually depends on an extrinsic supposit, it therefore does not have the negation of such actual dependence. Perhaps Faber will say that the person of the Word makes the assumed humanity actually independent of any extrinsic supposit besides the supposit of the Word. But although this is true, still it is not rightly said that humanity is in the Word with the negation of actual dependence on an extrinsic supposit, because it actually depends on the Word itself, which is an extrinsic supposit of the assumed nature. Hence it is an implication in terms that the nature is assumed by the Word and is actually independent of an extrinsic supposit, because then it would be united and not united to the Word. Nor even in that sense would it be well said that the divine person supplies the mode of being independent which created personality would bestow upon the assumed nature left to itself. For this renders the nature it affects independent of an alien supposit, such that it makes it altogether actually independent of any extrinsic supposit. But divine personality cannot do this, for by the very fact that it terminates created nature, it renders it actually dependent on some extrinsic supposit, namely the divine. Therefore this solution of Faber posits an implication in terms. And when he says that divine personality does not supply nothing, but something, because created personality, whose role it fills, is something negative, although not positive, I have already rejected this above at n. 66, because negation, even if it is real, is wrongly called a negative being or something.

For the exact solution of this difficulty, therefore, it must be observed that — as the most learned Cardinal de Lugo teaches — what is commonly said, namely that divine personality in Christ supplies the role of created personality, and that the human nature of Christ receives from the substance of the Word all that it would have from its own substance, is not to be understood in all rigor. For although it is true that Christ's humanity subsists through the subsistence of the Word, still it is certain that it does not subsist through it in quite the same way in which it would subsist through its own created subsistence. For created personality, whether placed in the positive or in the negative, bestows upon nature, according to all, that it depends actually on no extrinsic supposit — which divine personality plainly cannot perform, as was said against Faber. First, because through its own subsistence nature subsists in itself and through itself, and is not communicated to another; and through an alien subsistence it subsists in another and with another. Through this doctrine the last argument of Hurtado is entirely refuted, which he adduces in the passage cited § 32, where he contends that the Word must so supply the role of created hypostasis and personality that it bestows upon the assumed humanity absolutely all the formal effects and every denomination which a created hypostasis bestows, which he proves cannot

happen if created personality consists in negation. It is refuted (I say) because it is false that this is so.

Therefore the Word is said to supply or perform the role of created personality both as regards being and as regards operating, in this sense: as regards being, because in that instant in which human nature, if it had been left to itself, would have had that twofold negation, by reason of which it would be said to be per se and not to depend on another, the Word forestalled that nature, lest it stand per se, and caused it to depend on another. And what there, left to itself, would have been personalized in itself, now, having been assumed, is said to be personalized in another. Just as, on the contrary, regarding the Eucharistic accidents, God is said to supply the role of the subject — not because he subjects himself to the accidents and receives them in himself, but because by a special concurrence according to the mode of being he now conserves those accidents without a subject just as previously he conserved them with a subject. As regards operating also, in this sense it is said to supply the role of a created supposit, as Father Bellutus, my colleague, well declares in *tract. de Incarn. disp. 1. q. 1. nu. 18*. For just as a created supposit is that which is ultimately denominated as acting and suffering, so the Word is ultimately denominated as acting and suffering with respect to human actions. For this, however, a positive entity in a created supposit is not required, because, as will become clear in the following question, the supposit does not concur physically by influencing through subsistence upon actions. And this is that "something" which the Word is said to supply. Hence it is clear that this argument, which our opponents so magnify, can be retorted against them, since even according to them the personality of a thing furnishes many effects to nature which an extrinsic personality cannot supply.

To the other argument concerning the consumption of created personality by the uncreated, Faber cited *num. 43* says it must be understood in this sense: that the personality of the Word, in assuming nature, consumed created incommunicability, or that mode of being with that twofold negation, because that mode is not in the human nature of Christ. Thus through the union of Incarnation nothing positive is removed from human nature, but only the acquisition of twofold dependence occurs — namely actual and aptitudinal — and the loss of twofold independence. But this solution contradicts what he had said immediately before at *num. 42*. For regarding the supplement of created personality by the uncreated, he said that this supplement occurs inasmuch as through the assumption it has come about that created nature would have this very being with that twofold negation of dependence — namely actual and aptitudinal — in the Word toward an alien supposit. But in this latter response he says that this twofold negation is consummated in the advent of uncreated personality, and that there is acquisition of twofold actual and aptitudinal dependence, and loss of twofold dependence. Behold a manifest contradiction in few words! Then it is false that through hypostatic union the negation of aptitudinal dependence is lost in the assumed humanity. What is indeed lost, or

rather impeded, is the negation of actual dependence, but the negation of aptitudinal dependence it always retains in the Word, as the Doctor repeatedly teaches. Finally, Faber's manner of speaking does not please me — that uncreated personality is said to have consumed the created in this sense, that through hypostatic union the negation of actual dependence was destroyed in the way a privation is consumed in the advent of a form. For by such a manner of speaking it is signified that the nature in some prior instant had the negation of actual dependence on the Word, and therefore was personalized in itself, and that afterwards through the hypostatic union of that humanity to the Word that negation was expelled and consummated. And so plainly Faber seems to think, from his manner of speaking. But this cannot at all be said, as will soon be made clear, because the nature assumed by the Word was never personalized in itself, but always in the Word.

When therefore the Fathers or Councils say that the Word consumed created personality in the assumed humanity, the sense is that, in assuming the nature, in the very instant in which it was to be personalized in itself, it prevented in it the resultance of created personality — which is well verified if created personality consists in negation, just as if it consisted in the positive. But if that locution be taken in the rigorous sense, as the argument claims, and not rather in the sense now given, then plainly it would prove not only that created personality is something positive, but also that it was in the nature before it was assumed, and was destroyed and consumed in the very actual assumption — which cannot be said, because then the nature for some instant would have been personalized in itself before being united to the Word.

To the second proof of that assumption from the Fathers and Councils, saying that the nature was assumed, but not the person, against Nestorius: Poncius in *disp. 18.* cited from *num. 123* excellently shows, against the recent authors brought forward in the argument, how the determination of the Councils against Nestorius concerning the assumption of nature and not of person is not in the opinion of the negative inept and ridiculous; rather, it is truer and more serious than in the opinion of the positive, since the opinion of the negative more evidently convicts the error of Nestorius than the opinion of the positive, as I showed in *art. 1. difficultate 6. a n. 89* and following. But for the exact understanding of this point, it must be known that Nestorius did not acknowledge a true, real, and physical union between human nature and the Word, but only a union of assistance, or a moral union according to dignity, affection, and grace. Hence he called Christ only man, not God, but one in whom God dwells by a special prerogative, as Alphonsus of Castro reports in *l. 4. tit. Christus hæresi 2.* And so, granted such a union only between nature and the Word, Nestorius could well affirm also the union of the human person with the Word, without any contradiction, because person does not express the negation of accidental union of nature with another supposit, but of per se and substantial union. And therefore the Council of Ephesus, to condemn this error, determined that

between the assumed nature and the Word there is not only an accidental and moral union — namely through assistance or effect or dignity — but a true, physical, real, and substantial one. From which determination made against Nestorius, it consequently determines that the Word assumed only the nature, not the person — because the concept of person, although it could stand with the accidental union of human nature with the divine supposit, cannot stand with a per se and substantial union or communication, because person in its concept includes such incommunication, whether formally or concomitantly. Hence both in the opinion of the negative and of the positive, with the union of nature to a divine supposit, the character of properly personality cannot be preserved in nature so united, because either it consists in the formal negation of such union and communication, or at least necessarily follows from it. And so it is clear how the Council, through this determination, does not favor one opinion more than the other — and if it favors, it rather favors the opinion of the negative, as that which more immediately and evidently convinces the error of Nestorius through evident contradiction.

Hence it is clear also how a fallacy is committed in the argument, to show that the determination of the Council is ridiculous in the opinion of the negative. For the recent authors suppose as granted by Nestorius a real and physical union between nature and the Word. Granted this, indeed the Council's determination would not have been necessary — that the Word assumed nature and not person — in the opinion of the negative, because person formally expresses nature not united to another supposit. But the assumption is false — that Nestorius granted such a physical union between nature and the Word; for he granted only an accidental and moral union. And if he did grant a physical union, the argument could equally be retorted against the opponents: that the Council's determination against Nestorius would have been ridiculous, or at least not at all necessary, because even in the opinion of the positive personality does not formally express the negation of union with another supposit, but expresses it concomitantly, such that nature with its personality is incommunicable to another supposit. Hence also according to this opinion, Nestorius, granting a physical union of nature with the Word, and also of person, would have contradicted himself, because nature personalized in itself, in any opinion, signifies nature not communicated to another — whether it expresses this negation formally or only concomitantly.

A second reply could also be made: perhaps Nestorius held the opinion of the positive, and, when he had thought of the nature having been assumed, he also thought that that entity which personality adds to nature according to this opinion had been assumed. And that therefore, to overthrow this error, the Council determined that nature indeed was assumed by the Word, but not that entity which Nestorius thought personality superadded to nature. But from the fact that such was Nestorius's opinion, it does not follow that the Council through its determination wished as regards this point to favor the opinion of the positive which Nestorius held; rather it left both opinions in their probability and defined

the point which was of faith — namely that only nature was assumed by the Word, not personality, if this expresses a positive entity superadded to nature, as Nestorius thought.

To the third proof: I say that the argument militates equally against both opinions. For even in the opinion of the positive, a nature subsisting in itself is said to be independent of an alien supposit, and in the very fact that it is assumed by another, it is said in some way to depend upon it. Therefore in both opinions it must be admitted that human nature in Christ, through the hypostatic union with the Word, was wonderfully exalted, inasmuch as it was assumed to a subsistence far more noble than its own. Hence dependence on an alien created supposit would indeed be more imperfect than independence, but dependence on the divine supposit is more perfect than the independence of nature in itself, as I said at *num. 108*.

To the fourth proof: the reply is given from Lichetus in 3. *dist. 1, q. 1, in § non asserendo*, denying the minor with its proof, because in the same instant in which the humanity of Christ was apt to stand per se and exist per se, it was assumed by the Word. Hence it is not to be understood that it, in some prior positive instant of nature, was actually existing per se, and in another posterior instant of nature was assumed and personalized in the Word, because then it would have been personalized in itself first. But it must be understood that simply in the same instant of nature in which it was apt to stand and exist per se, founding that twofold negation, it was assumed by the Word, and consequently was prevented by the subsistence of the Word from the resultance in the nature of that twofold negation, which connaturally should have followed upon it in the same instant.

You will say: the humanity of Christ was not produced through the action of hypostatic union, but in some prior instant of nature it was supposed to be produced before the union itself, as all grant. And in that prior instant it was existing per se, and without union to a divine supposit; therefore it was truly a person, if personality consists in the negation of such union. The reply, from Scotus in 2. *dist. 1, q. 3. § Respondeo* and 3. *dist. 3, q. 1. § respectu tertii*, is that one thing can be said to belong to another by priority of nature either by a positive order of nature — namely when one truly is in it prior to another, as is the case with animal and rational in man, matter and form in a per se composite, substance and accident in a per accidens composite — or by a privative order of nature, namely when one is said to belong to that third thing before another, not that it actually does belong first in fact, but because it would be first in it if it were not prevented by an extrinsic agent. In this sense privation is said to belong prior by nature to matter than form, even if matter were concreated with form — not indeed because privation truly is in it before form in such a case, but because it would be first were not the agent preventing its resultance by introducing the form into matter in that very instant in which privation should result. In this second way, therefore, it is said that the negation of union to the Word belonged

prior by nature to the assumed humanity than the union itself — not because in fact such a negation was first in it in some instant of nature, but because it would have been first, had not its resultance been prevented by a supernatural agent producing in it the union to the Word in that very same instant in which the negation of such union should have resulted.

You will ask whether at least human nature could have been personalized in itself before being assumed. Some theologians denied this, as Bassolius reports in 3. *dist. 5. qu. un. art. 3*, because then the nature would have been assumed together with personality — which is impossible — or personality would have had to be destroyed and consumed, so that only nature would be said to be assumed. But with the supposit corrupted, the nature is necessarily corrupted, because with first substances destroyed it is impossible for any of the others to remain, from the chapter *De substantia*.

The opposite, however, must be held entirely, as Bassolius there teaches: that a nature previously supposed and personalized in its own supposit can, or could have been, assumed by a divine supposit without its own suppositality remaining — just as now it has not remained. For it implies no contradiction that in such a nature there should be founded the relation of union, with its own suppositality receding, because it stands contingently under it. Also, because just as it is not repugnant to nature to be deprived of its own suppositality and to lean on another for the first instant, so neither is it for any other subsequent instant, because it is not more determined and tied to this in another instant than in the first, and vice versa. And if it were repugnant to it in another instant, it would also be repugnant in the first, and so it could never be assumed. Hence Bassolius also rightly replies to the motive of the opposite opinion that if the argument concluded, it would also prove that a nature could never be assumed, because nature must be deprived of its own suppositality in the first instant when it is assumed, just as if afterwards in another instant it were to be assumed. And that if the Word should now dismiss the assumed nature with its own suppositality restored, that nature would have to be corrupted and produced anew, or reproduced with its own personality — which is judged false by all. Therefore a nature already personalized would be assumed, leaving its own personality, which is supposed separable from it, since it belongs to it contingently. And through the hypostatic union it would acquire an alien personality. Hence no corruption of nature would intervene. And when it is said, "with first substances corrupted it is impossible for any of the others to remain," the reply is as given at *n. 99*: either Aristotle by first substance understood singular substance, which indeed destroyed, it is impossible for another to remain; or if he also understood the supposit, he said this because he did not recognize that a singular nature could be stripped and denuded of its own suppositality.

Fourth, Suárez, Arriaga, Lugo, Hurtado, and others argue further from the absurdities which would follow from our opinion. For it follows first that the

humanity of Christ would be as complete a substance from every part as the person of Peter and Paul, because no positive entity is lacking to it which Peter and Paul do not have. From which it further follows, second, that it cannot make one per se with the Word, nor can a substantial union mediate between them. For from two beings in act, such as humanity and the Word would be in this case — altogether complete and perfect — one per se cannot come to be. It is therefore necessary that something positive pertaining to it be lacking to the assumed humanity, and thus it be substantially incomplete, so that it could constitute one per se with the Word. It follows third that the Word itself after the union would not be a person. For precisely because in the opinion of the negative the assumed humanity loses its own personality, since it is united to the Word, and thus is no longer per se and in itself without another, therefore by parity of reasoning the Word, since it is united to another and no longer exists without another, loses its own personality. It follows fourth that the assumed nature still in the Word retains its own personality, because it has those two negations of actual and aptitudinal dependence, in which Scotus constitutes the formality of the supposit. That it has the second, Scotus himself grants; that it also has the first, is proved: because human nature has in Christ all the real concepts through which, if it were dismissed, it would subsist without new positive, according to Scotus. Therefore through the same it is now altogether independent of the Word in the character of supposit. Also, because humanity, while it exists in itself, does not depend on its own supposit, since this is something negative, which cannot terminate real dependence. Therefore when it is assumed by the Word, no dependence remains to be supplied to it. The consequence is clear by parity with the Eucharistic accidents, whose dependence on the subject is said to be supplied by God because in reality they previously depended on the subject. It follows fifth that Christ is not univocally a man with us, because the personality of his humanity is positive, and ours would be negative. Finally, Cajetan presses: because if the nature assumed by the Word were now dismissed, then it would be another person distinct from the person of the Word, and consequently another substance. Therefore person adds something positive to nature, because it adds to the number, and personal otherness is a positive substantial diversity.

The reply: denying that any absurdity follows from the opinion of the negative. Indeed, the first, which is deduced from it, is not only not absurd, but rather most necessary. Indeed, this is the second reason which the Doctor makes in *3. d. 1. q. 1. § contra primam viam* against the opinion of the positive: because from it it would follow that the nature assumed by the Word would lack that positive entity which is posited as the ultimate, and most actual, and most determinate in such nature. And indeed if Christ is as perfect a man as Peter and Paul, why should his humanity not be said to be as perfect and integral a substance as the humanity of Peter and Paul?

To the second absurdity deduced from this: if the argument is good, it follows equally for both opinions. For among the Philosophers it is as repugnant for two

complete and substantially perfect beings to make one per se as for one complete and one incomplete. For this reason an accidental form supervening upon a substantial composite does not make anything per se one with it, because although it itself is an incomplete entity, still the substantial composite is a complete being. And so in our case, since the divine Word is substantially complete, it cannot make per se one with human nature, however incomplete and imperfect it be posited. Therefore it must be denied that from the Word and the assumed nature there comes to be something per se one by unity of composition, from per se act and per se potency, as is assumed in the argument. For neither humanity nor the Word can have the character of an essential part. Also, because such union of nature with the Word is said to be wonderful and ineffable; but it would not be such if the thing constituted through it were one by unity of composition from per se act and per se potency, because this union is sufficiently known and familiar to philosophers. Rather, from the Word and nature there is said to come to be a being per se one suppositally or personally through the actual dependence of the nature on the Word, which is a mode of supernatural and ineffable union. And when it is said that from two beings in act one per se cannot come to be, this is true indeed of unity in nature and essence, but one in subsistence can well come to be. Many other things Poncius has for the solution of this argument in *disp. 18. cit. a num. 129*, but the solution given seems to me sufficient. For its more perfect understanding, however, the Doctor in *3. dist. 6. q. 3.* can be consulted, and Father Bellutus, my colleague, in *disp. 2. de Incarn. q. 2. an persona Christi fuerit simplex, vel composita, et an Christus sit quid unum per se, vel per accidens.*

To the third: it is said that this absurdity too makes against the opinion of the positive, because according to it personality is followed at least by the negation of communication, and such negation is not removed from nature unless the positive entity to which such negation necessarily follows is also removed. Hence, since in the Incarnation the Word is communicated to human nature, with the loss of such negation, it follows that it must also lose the positive entity to which it follows. Therefore, just as our opponents ask us why the union took away the character of supposit from the nature and not from the Word, since this too is united to the nature, so we ask them why, from the union of humanity with the Word, positive personality with the consequent negation is taken away from the nature, and not also from the same union is taken away the personality of the Word with the consequent negation. We are all, therefore, bound to the solution of this difficulty. For this, first, the parity must be denied, because the personality of the Word expresses something positive, and not the simple negation of hypostatic union, as created personality expresses. Then, because the union is not mutual in those extremes, for humanity alone founds the union, and the Word simply terminates it. Likewise, under such union humanity depends on the Word, but not the Word on humanity; and therefore humanity alone loses the negation of actual dependence, but not the Word. Moreover, because in truth not only is

humanity said to be united to the Word, but also the Word to humanity through the mere termination of the union which is founded in humanity. It must be added that not every union removes the character of supposit, but a union in the manner of act and reason of being, and of constituting something in such being — for this alone excludes incommunicability, as *quo*. But a union which is truly attributed is in the manner of constituted and terminating, which is not repugnant to incommunicability. Finally, personality expresses the negation of communication with an alien supposit, not with an alien nature; and therefore although the Word is united to humanity in Christ, it is not said to lose the character of supposit — well indeed is humanity, because it is communicated to the divine supposit.

To the fourth: it is denied that that absurdity follows, because although humanity in Christ has the negation of aptitudinal dependence, or communication, with the Word, still it does not have the negation of actual, since it is actually communicated to it. To the first impugnation of this I say that although the assumed nature has the same positive concepts in Christ as in itself, still it does not have the same negation of actual communication or dependence, because such negation does not belong to it from the intrinsic and by reason of such concepts, but from the suspension of the action of an extrinsic agent able to assume it and not assuming. To the other impugnation I grant the antecedent and the consequent, if dependence be taken for a true and real causality arguing imperfection in the dependent. However, both are denied if it is taken for communication, as the Doctor also explains in *quol. 19. § secundo potest*. For nature supposit in itself is truly communicated to its own supposit, because Peter is truly said to be man by humanity, and consequently in this way also actually depends on the Word, because the Word is man by humanity, with this difference, however: that it is communicated to Peter quidditatively, but to the Word denominatively.

To the fifth: rather that absurdity follows in the opinion of the positive, because, as I was saying from Scotus to the first at *num. 123*, the humanity of Christ would lack the positive entity which is its principal substantial complement in us. Hence it would not be at least a perfect man substantially, as we are. Therefore the consequence is denied, because humanity in the Word does not have its own personality, and that which it has in the Word is indeed positive, but is extrinsic and adventitious to it. Also, because univocation is considered according to the essential predicates of nature, not extraneous and adventitious ones, as are singularity and suppositality.

To the last: humanity now subsisting in the Word is another substance from the Word really, not however personally, because it is not a diverse person from that which, if it were dismissed by the Word, would become another substance personally — not indeed by the addition of a new substance, but by the addition merely of a new mode of being, inasmuch as previously it was joined to the Word

and now is separated. This separation suffices for it to be called another supposit, because such denomination is taken precisely from a diverse mode of being supposed through diversity of natures. As is clear from one portion of water which, while united to another, is not called another water from it, or a different supposit from it, well however by the very fact that it is separated from it without the addition of anything positive. And it should be noted — as Poncius also remarks — that this argument is also strengthened by Cajetan, since he himself admits that humanity can be dismissed by the Word without the restoration of its own personality. In which case he is bound to explain whether such a dismissed nature would be another substance from the Word, and how.

Finally Blasius of the Conception in *disp.* 8. § *Met. qu.* 2. presses the opinion of the negative especially with four reasons, of which the first, second, and fourth coincide with those hitherto adduced and solved. Hence it remains only to adduce and solve the fourth. If the supposit, he says, is constituted through something negative, it follows that God has not redeemed us; that the actions of Christ are not of infinite value; that there is no communication of idioms in Christ — which are all false and absurd. The consequence is proved, because if the supposit is constituted formally through something negative, actions cannot be refunded upon the supposit formally as upon the principle of them, because a negative cannot influence a positive. Therefore, since the Word in Christ supplies the role of human personality, the Word will not produce, as *quod*, the actions of the humanity of Christ; and thus the Son of God will not be called our Redeemer, but only the humanity of Christ. Nor will God be said to have died through the communication of idioms, nor will Christ's human actions be of infinite value, because they will not be refunded upon the Word as upon the principle *quod*, which is the reason why so great a value is granted to them by theologians. It is confirmed: because that substance which has everything that a created supposit has, has all those things into which an action can be reduced; but the humanity of Christ without the Word has all the positive things which a created supposit — for example, of Peter — expresses; therefore it has all those things into which the action of humanity without the Word can be reduced. Nor can it be reduced to the Word, nor from the Word will Christ's actions have infinite value.

The reply is that the actions of nature are not refunded upon the supposit as upon a principle *quo* or *quod* physically influencing them, but only as upon a principle *quo* through which the supposit is formally constituted and ultimately denominated as acting and suffering, or having actions and passions of nature, because it has the nature from which they proceed. This can belong to the supposit even if it is constituted in such being through mere negation. In this sense the actions and passions of Christ's humanity are truly attributed to the divine supposit supplying the role of a created supposit, inasmuch as it has united to itself a nature from which those actions or passions physically proceed. And therefore the consequences deduced in the argument are denied, because still in this sense it is well verified that the Son of God is our Redeemer, and the human

actions of Christ are of infinite value, as much as the supposit is worth in dignifying the actions, inasmuch namely as all the actions and passions of the nature are attributed to it as ultimately denominated and truly having in itself the nature from which such actions or passions physically proceed.

To the confirmation: the reply is from the same foundation, that although all actions and passions can be reduced to the nature as to a principle *quo* or *quod* physically influencing, still not as to that which is ultimately denominated as acting or suffering. For so they are attributed only to the supposit, and therefore the human actions of Christ cannot in this sense be attributed to the humanity, but must be attributed to the Word. But for greater understanding of this solution, the following question must be resolved.

Question V. Whether and how subsistence concurs to the operations of the supposit

Briefly and clearly this doubt is resolved by Father Bellutus, my colleague, in *tract. de Incarn. disp. 1. q. 1. in quarta dubitatione*, so that almost nothing remains for me to say further about the mind of the Doctor and the resolution of this question. However, because Father Blasius of the Conception in *disp. 8. Met. q. 6.* loudly complains about certain theologians, among whom he also mixes Scotus, and protests that they have removed all activity from suppositality, with great detriment to matters of faith, and not without injury to Christ the Lord, I have judged it necessary to declare the matter more fully, and to discuss it with the dignity it deserves, so that it may be clear how undeservedly — not to say rashly — this Author has inflicted so severe a censure on the opinion denying positive influx of suppositality in the order of the actions and operations of nature.

That the sense of the question and the matter in which the authors agree and disagree may be clear, it must be noted that all grant gratuitously that that common axiom, "actions belong to supposits," which gave occasion to this controversy, is not to be understood in such a sense as that absolutely no actions can be given which do not proceed from a supposit and into which subsistence does not influence. For it is certain that the separated soul is not a supposit and yet understands and loves. And, as is said by theologians in the tract on the Trinity, the divine nature is conceived to elicit operations, which they call essential, before it is conceived as personalized and terminated by its relations. Also separated accidents in the Eucharist are said to exercise their operations. Hence the only doubt is about actions which are in a supposed nature, for into these the Thomists contend that not only nature but also suppositality partially influences, so that from nature and subsistence the total and complete principle of all operations is integrated, which is called the supposit.

Moreover, all grant gratuitously that the supposit constituted from nature and subsistence is that to which operations are maximally attributed, as well as other functions, or is that which is denominated as operating and exercising other

functions; while nature is the principle *quo* by which the supposit operates. And for this reason subsistence and supposit are said to concur at least denominatively. And the reason for this is that which the Doctor assigns in 4. d. 12. q. 3. Aa. and 1. d. 12. qu. 1. ad 2: namely because nature is considered in the manner of a part, while the supposit is related as a whole arising from nature and subsistence. A part, however, even if it were also the total and adequate principle of some action, because it is related in the manner of a part, cannot be said to operate as *quod*, but as *quo*, because from the very fact that it is a part, and *quod* is that through which something else operates. This is clear in the inorganic operations of the soul, which are altogether immaterial, such as to understand and to will. Although these proceed from the soul itself as from a total and adequate principle, still they are said denominatively to be of the whole and are attributed to the whole, saying that man understands and loves as *quod*, not the soul, while it is joined to the body, but as *quo*, as Aristotle taught in 1. de anim. text. 64. Indeed, what seems less, this very thing is said of warm water: that it heats as *quod*, and not the heat in it, even though the heat alone, as is obvious, is an integral and adequate principle of heating, while the water concurs merely per accidens as subject and vehicle of heat. For this reason, therefore, all grant that any actions whatever, proceeding from a supposed nature, are of supposits denominatively. Nor is there any controversy about this. But the question is whether actions are also of supposits elicitive, such that subsistence physically partially concurs together with nature to operating, so that nature would indeed be a partial and incomplete principle *quo* of them, while the supposit would be the complete principle *quod*, arising from nature and subsistence.

With this preliminary declaration for the understanding of the title of the question, there are three opinions in this controversy: two extreme and one middle. The first extreme opinion teaches that subsistence is the per se and formal principle of all actions of the supposit, if not integral and adequate, at least partial and inadequate — so that it influences together with nature itself, and the action depends no less immediately and per se on subsistence than on nature. And thus they hold that actions are of supposits not only denominatively, as all grant, but also elicitive. And Blasius of the Conception in the passage cited says this is the common opinion of all Thomists at p. 3. q. 15. art. 1. and q. 1. art. 2., and among others he cites Nazarius *controv.* 3., Astoricensis in the *relectione de gratia Christi* q. 5. dub. 3, Alvarez *disp.* 5., and Flandria in *Met. lib.* 1. qq. 5. art. 2. However, John of St. Thomas does not so rigorously attribute actions to subsistence. For responding to the foundation of the opposite part he grants that subsistence does not influence as a principle of operating, but as terminating, or as modifying the principle itself and rendering it operative as *quod*, as he holds in q. 7. *Phys. art.* 2. The sole motive of the Thomists for attributing actions to the supposit in such rigor was (as Suárez well notes in *disp.* 34. *Met. sect.* 7) that they might defend that the actions of Christ proceeding from the humanity are in some way divine, or operations of God. For to verify these propositions they think it necessary that

they flow per se and proximately from the very subsistence of the Word, which supplies in Christ the role of a created subsistence. And for this reason Blasius of the Conception said that the opposite opinion cannot be defended without great injury to Christ and offense to pious ears.

The opposite opinion, diametrically, teaches that subsistence is in no way a principle of acting, nor is it required and concurs to actions per se, but merely concomitantly and per accidens. So Vázquez in *3. p. disp. 8. c. 2.* and *disp. 21. c. 3.*, where he says that subsistence — one's own or alien — is not even a condition required on the part of the principle for acting, but the action can be attributed to nature itself — for example, humanity — not only as to the principle of acting, but also as to the principle *quod*. Similarly Albertini *de prædicam. substantiæ quo, disp. 3. q. 1. n. 17*, Arriaga in *disp. 4. Met. sect. 13. subsect. 5*, and Oviedo seems to embrace this in *controv. 7. Met. 6. punct. 3. nu. 14*.

The middle opinion, finally, grants indeed that subsistence is in no way a principle of operating — neither adequate nor inadequate — but grants that it concurs as a condition necessarily required for acting, and in this way constitutes nature in proximate potency to act. However, because among the conditions necessary for the exercise of a cause, some are simply and indispensably necessary in relation to any potency, while others are only necessary in a certain respect and according to the common course of nature, the authors of this middle opinion are still divided among themselves. For some say it is a condition simply and absolutely necessary for acting, so that it cannot even be supplied by God, because it is a condition completing nature in substantial being, without which condition it would be proximately impotent to act. Thus speaks Aversa *q. 18. cit. sect. 9*, and our Faber *theor. 87. c. 2. in fine*, where he says that subsistence concurs not indeed as a reason for acting, but as a per se necessary condition of the agent — for if nature does not subsist, it cannot act — hence it can be the reason why nature is in proximate potency to acting, and therefore concurs per se, not merely per accidens and concomitantly. Thus he; and so Cardinal de Lugo also defends in *disp. cit. sect. 7. n. 100*. Others, however, say it is a condition necessary only in a certain respect and according to the common course of nature, because according to the natural order subsistence is per se presupposed in nature and prerequired for exercising operations. Yet, by God's absolute power, it can come about that operations proceed from nature without supposing subsistence. Thus Cajetan signified in *3. p. q. 2. art. 11*, and this is also Suárez's opinion in *sect. 7. cit.*, although he is usually cited for the former manner of speaking. For although at *n. 10* he says that subsistence does not relate merely concomitantly to action, but is a per se condition necessarily required on the part of the agent, he adds at *num. 15* that if by the possible or impossible a nature were conserved without any subsistence — proper or alien — that nature could still operate, and the general concurrence to its operations would be owed to it, because nature itself has in itself all the virtue required on the part of the principle for operating. And so also my colleague Father Bellutus teaches in the passage cited, from the Doctor in many

places. Nor does Lugo disagree, as is clear from what he has in the passage cited at *n. 103*.

I say first: created subsistence does not have a proper and immediate influx — neither total nor partial — upon the actions of the supposit. This conclusion is set down to exclude the first extreme opinion, and is Scotus's wherever he teaches that created subsistence consists in the negative. For he himself grants that subsistence cannot influence the positive actions of nature totally or partially. Outside the school of St. Thomas it is commonly received, and is proved first by a physical reason, even admitting the opinion of the positive. For among philosophers in a real action the formal principle of acting is nature. For that is the formal principle of acting which is the reason why the agent assimilates the patient to itself, which assimilation the agent formally intends in action — formally indeed if it is a univocal agent, or at least virtually if it is an equivocal agent. But the agent does not intend to assimilate the patient to itself in singularity or suppositality, but only in nature, for in this they agree and in that they differ. Therefore the formal principle, and the adequate reason for acting in any action, is nature alone. By this reason philosophers not only exclude suppositality from the formal principle of acting, but also singularity, which they say is a condition only, without which the agent cannot act. Therefore, singularity is excluded for this reason from the formal principle of action; all the more so must suppositality be excluded. First because the latter is more extrinsic to nature than the former, since singularity is really identified with nature and altogether inseparable from it, not so suppositality. Then, because singularity is more necessary for acting than subsistence, since action belongs to a separated soul and to separated accidents in the Eucharist, to which suppositality does not belong. And finally, it altogether implies that something act unless it be singular, because actions are of singulars and about singulars from *1. Met. c. 1*. Yet something can act even though it be not a supposit, as is clear in the examples adduced.

Confirmation: because an agent, by its action, while it intends to assimilate the patient to itself, intends also to communicate itself to it as much as it can. Therefore only that can be posited as a principle of such action which can be the principle of such communication. Therefore only nature can be such a principle, not singularity or suppositality. The last consequence is proved, since the rest are clear: because nature alone gives communicable being, while others give incommunicable being; singularity gives incommunicability as *quod*, but suppositality as *quod* and *quo*.

Further confirmed: because actions are proportioned to their principles, and in the effect some formality is always found in which it is assimilated to its cause, especially when it is univocal. But actions are proportioned to form, or nature, not to suppositality or singularity. Therefore these are not the productive principles of them, nor are they the reasons of acting. The major is proved: because if there were not such a necessary proportion between agent, action, and

its effects, then anything could be said to be produced by anything, and determinate effects would not have determinate causes. The minor is proved by induction: for heat and heating flow from heat, cold and cooling from cold, living from the soul; nor can any other formality be assigned in the produced effect in which it may be assimilated to its cause, except nature and essence — for through other formalities, namely singularity and suppositality, it is rather diversified and distinguished from it.

Finally confirmed: because nature is properly that which has the faculties and powers of acting. Therefore it alone, endowed with its faculties, is a sufficient principle, as *quo* and as *quod*, from which action flows. Therefore subsistence is added in vain as a partial principle of action.

Second, it is proved from the nature of subsistence itself. For this, in created things, is not something intrinsically constituting nature, but is a certain mode of nature; and therefore it supposes nature in its integral being — constituted not only insofar as it is the formal principle of being, but also insofar as it is the effective principle of operating, whether immediately through itself or through faculties which follow upon it. For this cause John of St. Thomas, cited, candidly grants that it does not influence as a principle in the operation of the supposit, but only as terminating, or as modifying the principle itself and rendering it operative as *quod*. This can indeed be performed, even if it is posited as concurring only as a necessary condition for acting, not as a partial principle.

Confirmation: because existence is a more intimate mode of essence than subsistence is, and yet commonly it is not posited as the reason or principle of acting, but only as a condition of the agent. Therefore all the less will this be asserted of subsistence, which is a more extrinsic mode than others, and supervening last. Again, union also is a mode of composite substance more intimate than subsistence, and yet it is not posited as a principle of acting, but only as a necessarily presupposed condition. Therefore all the less is subsistence. Finally, no mode universally supervening upon nature — whether intrinsic or extrinsic — confers upon it new active power in the order to operations connatural to it, because they are said only to modify nature and its activity, whatever supervenes after its integral constitution. Therefore the same must be asserted in like manner of subsistence — indeed all the more so, since it is the absolutely last mode pertaining to the completion of nature, as its terminus.

Third, it is proved from the nature of real action itself. For this, in order that it be exercised by nature, does not demand in it the character of subsistence. Therefore it is a sign that nature is of itself a sufficient principle of any operation without subsistence. The consequence is clear: because if subsistence were an absolutely necessary co-principle of operation with nature, nature could never attain any operation by itself alone. The assumption is proved by the example of the separated soul, which acts without suppositality, and also in accidents. For, as the Doctor teaches in *1. d. 4. qu. 2.*, this singular color existing, in order that it can act,

does not determine for itself the character of supposit, because the character of supposit properly is not found in accidents; and although it is in the supposit of substance, nevertheless insofar as it is understood without any subsistence in a supposit, as this existing color, it can be the principle of real operation, just as if the same whiteness were in three supposits or surfaces, it would have a real act, namely one reason for disgregating. And this is more clear in the accidents of the Eucharist.

Blasius of the Conception in the passage cited at *num. 93* replies that Thomists do not require absolutely and of total necessity a supposit for any action, such that an action cannot be given without a supposit, but only wish that actions which come from a supposed nature proceed not only from nature, but also from suppositality, as a co-effective principle with nature of those actions. To the case of the separated soul he grants that it has actions independent of the supposit, and therefore says that they proceed from it as from an incomplete and inadequate principle, and that therefore they are not operations so perfect as those which it elicits in the body. To the case of the Eucharistic accidents, finally, he says that they act in virtue of the supposit of the bread, in which they previously preexisted, and whose powers they are. And thus, although the supposit of the bread is no longer in itself, still it acts by existing in its virtue. This solution contains many false things, nor is it sufficiently consistent with itself. First, it grants that some action can be given without a supposit, and afterwards it denies this, contending that even separated accidents act in virtue of the supposit of the bread, which does not exist, nor is found in the nature of things — which plainly is repugnant, as I have shown in *disp. 7. Phys. q. 4. art. 1*. For existence is absolutely necessary in an efficient cause, from what was said there. Likewise he wishes that in man all animastic actions concur with the soul together with suppositality, and afterwards he grants that these proceed from the soul alone in the state of separation, as from an inadequate principle. Thus I argue: either suppositality in man is a co-principle essentially necessary with the soul concurring for animastic operations, or only in a certain respect. If the first, then the soul by itself alone could never elicit those operations — for one partial cause cannot by itself alone attain an effect for whose production it necessarily requires the concurrence of another partial cause, as is clear of the father and mother in the generation of offspring. But if suppositality is necessary only in a certain respect, then those operations, especially in the state of separation, proceed from the soul as from a total and adequate principle. Finally, if he grants that some real action can absolutely be given without the character of supposit, then by this very fact he admits that that axiom "actions are of supposits" is not universally true, unless by supposit we understand "singular," as is commonly wont to be expounded, since real actions can be given which are not of supposits.

Fourth, because this Author grants gratuitously at *n. 84* that the sense of that axiom is not that no actions at all can be given which do not proceed from a supposit as from a principle *quod*, but must be understood in this sense: that

actions which come to be in a supposit nature proceed not only from nature, but also from subsistence, as from a partial co-principle. To this response, I refute by what he teaches with the other theologians — that actions which come to be in a supposit nature proceed from nature alone as from a total and adequate principle. For in God the whole reason of acting outside [ad extra] is the nature, or the divine will, and the divine personalities have no influx upon the actions outside; for which reason it is a common axiom among theologians that the actions outside in the Trinity are undivided, just as the nature is undivided. Therefore also in a supposit or supposable nature, the nature is the total and adequate principle of its operations, suppositality being set aside.

You will say: the personal subsistences at least are the principle of the productions within [ad intra], for paternity constitutes the Father in the character of a principle able to generate the Son. Therefore also created subsistence can complete the formal principle of operating. Against this: because the divine nature even within is an integral and complete principle of the operations which they call essential, the relations being set aside — whence it is said in the matter on the Trinity, and this Author grants in the passage cited, before the divine nature is conceived as terminated by its relations, it is conceived as eliciting essential operations. Then also in the notional actions, or productions within, as are generation and spiration, the Doctor in *1. d. 7. q. un.*, to whom many theologians subscribe, wishes that the intellect and will, those powers fecundating the divine essence, are the integral and adequate principles of generating and spirating, while the relation of the producing person is only a necessary condition. And this suffices that the person be said to generate or spirate, but not the divine nature, as principle *quod*. And finally, if with other theologians it were granted that the divine subsistences belong to the adequate principles of generating and spirating, still the parity must be denied if it be deduced to created subsistences, because in divine things the subsistences alone distinguish the persons and consequently constitute the producing and produced principle, which as such must be distinguished. In created things, however, where natures are distinguished by themselves or by their own singularities, there is no need that nature be constituted in the character of producer through subsistence.

Fifth, a similar argument for proving the same is wont to be taken from the mystery of the Incarnation. For the Word, in the assumed human nature, supplied the role of created subsistence, and yet did not have a special effective influx upon the operations of that nature, because no divine person operates anything outside which those persons do not also operate, since operations outside are common to all. It is therefore a sign that created subsistence does not have a peculiar effective influx upon the operations of nature, which ought to be supplied by the Word.

The Thomists reply that indeed this peculiar influx of the personality of the Word upon the actions of the assumed humanity is necessary, so that those actions may

be said to be divine, or operations of God, and also so that the subsistence of the Word may be said in all things to supply the role of created subsistence — for if it did not supply this, it would fail in the principal thing. Against this: this evasion is precluded by the very argument, because actions of the Trinity outside are undivided, nor can one person effect something which is not effected by another. Therefore the subsistence of the Word does not supply created subsistence as regards any activity, but only as regards the termination of the assumed nature — otherwise some activity would belong to the Word outside through its own relation, which would not be common to the other persons. And for the truth of those propositions that the actions of Christ's humanity are divine and operations of God, that termination suffices. For by reason of such termination those operations were attributed to the divine supposit, and the divine supposit was truly said to have those operations, because it had the nature from which they proceeded.

You will say: the activity of the proper subsistence of the humanity of Christ is supplied not indeed immediately by the Word through its own relation, but through the divine will. For thus Blasius of the Conception seems to speak when he says that God through the person of the Word supplies in Christ the role of created personality. Against: because then it is granted what we intend — that the personality of the Word does not have an active influx upon the actions of the humanity of Christ. Also, because then the humanity of Christ would not have been the proper and integral principle of human actions, but divinity together with humanity would have been — which is said voluntarily and without foundation.

I say second: subsistence does not relate to the operations of the supposit merely per accidens and concomitantly, but in some way antecedently — not indeed by priority of causality, but by simple natural presupposition. This conclusion is established against the other extreme opinion, and is proved because if subsistence were related merely per accidens and concomitantly to the operations of the supposit, as that opinion asserts, then this predication "Peter operates" would be of the same character as "a musician builds" — which obviously is false, because the second proposition is of a subject merely per accidens, but not the first. The consequence is clear: because this predication "a musician builds" is of a subject merely per accidens because musicality is related altogether per accidens and concomitantly to building. If therefore the character of supposit is related to operation as such in the same way, this predication "Peter operates" will be of the same character as that.

Confirmation: because if suppositality is not more required for operating than music is for building, or has no greater connection with operation than music with building, no reason can be given why operations are rather attributed to the supposit than the building to the musician.

Arriaga replies that the difference between those propositions consists in this: that music is neither required for building, nor necessarily connected with the builder, because it is an accident of him in the fifth way. Hence, although that proposition "a musician builds" is true, it is still said per accidens. But subsistence, because it is per se connected with the operating nature, although it is not required for operation, just as music is not required, is still said to concur per se — not by per-se-ness on the part of the operation, but by per-se-ness of connection with the operating nature.

Against: because some accidents are necessarily connected with the operating nature, as those upon which at least a posteriori it depends in its conservation — such as location, duration (according to those who really distinguish it from the enduring thing), and certain other things of this kind — to which, however, operation is not attributed with such propriety as it is to subsistence. For a located or enduring thing is not so properly said to operate as is a supposit. If Arriaga should affirm this, still this is said voluntarily, because "actions are of supposits" is a common axiom and well-known saying, not however that actions are of located things or of enduring things. Therefore operations have some peculiar dependence on the supposit which they do not have on location or duration. And the reason is that subsistence in the operating nature is related in some way antecedently to the operations, while location and duration are related merely concomitantly.

This, however, is shown by proving the second part of the conclusion — namely that subsistence is related as something naturally prior to every operation and to all accidents naturally belonging to nature. For as the Doctor has it in *3. d. 2. q. 2. art. 2.* and *quod. 19. P.*, that negative or positive which subsistence imports immediately follows the singular nature, even if at that time it were exercising no operation, and was without all accidents naturally belonging to it. For everything pertaining to the substantial reason of being belongs to nature prior to anything else extrinsic. Since therefore subsistence pertains to the substantial mode of being of nature, because it is a mode of existing per se and pertaining to the first act, while operation is something adventitious pertaining to the second act, it plainly follows that subsistence precedes operation in the supposit, and does not relate merely concomitantly to it. And indeed, as the Doctor notes in the passage cited, this is true not only of nature in its own supposit, but also in an alien one, so that even an alien subsistence is related prior and more immediately to the nature than operations and other accidents. Because, as the Doctor says, in the same instant of nature in which it would be personalized in itself if left to itself, in the same it is personalized by the assuming person. Hence if proper subsistence is prior to nature than any operation, the same is also true of alien subsistence, which succeeds in nature in place of that in the same very instant in which that would arise. And hence is verified what theologians commonly say: that the soul of Christ could exercise no meritorious act before being united to the Word, by which it merited such union, because in the humanity of Christ hypostatic union

to the Word is presupposed in the order of nature before any operation is understood.

Finally, that this priority and precedence of subsistence to the operations in the supposit is not a priority of actuality, but of simple natural presupposition, which was the last part of the conclusion, follows from what was said in the preceding conclusion. For since there it was established that it does not pertain to the active principle, and has no activity in the order of operations, hence consequently it must be said that such priority is not of causality, which is explained through one being from another, but of simple natural presupposition, which is explained through this: that one is understood in one prior sign in which the other is not understood. In this way in the soul the intellect is said to be prior to the will, not because this potency flows from that, but because in the soul one is pre-understood to the other. It can also be called a priority in consequence, or from which there is no conversion of subsisting consequence. For it is valid to say "humanity operates, therefore it is supposit," but not conversely, "it is supposit, therefore it operates."

I say finally: subsistence in a supposit or supposable nature is related as a condition without which nature would not act. I say in a supposit or supposable nature, because in other natures which are not apt to be supposit, such a condition is not necessary, as is clear in separated accidents. This conclusion follows from the two preceding. For if subsistence, on one hand, is not related merely per accidens and concomitantly to the operations of the supposit, as was said in the second conclusion, and on the other hand does not pertain to the character of acting either adequately or inadequately, as was said in the first assertion, it remains that it is necessary for operating in the manner of a condition without which not. And therefore it needs declaration rather than proof, lest I seem to contradict Father Bellutus, my colleague, who in *disp. cit. q. 1. n. 26*. denies that it is a condition without which nature would not act. For if by a condition without which not is understood that which universally intervenes in every action and operation whatever, and even of any agent whatever — such as existence — thus indeed it is not a condition without which not, per se necessarily required for acting, because not in every nature is such necessity found, but only in a supposit or supposable nature. And in this sense my colleague Father denies the necessity of this condition for acting in the passage cited, when he proves it by the example of a separated accident. Otherwise, in a supposable nature, immediately below at *n. 27*, he grants that subsistence necessarily concurs to operation as something naturally prior.

Whether however in such a nature it is a condition simply necessary for operating and indispensably, as existence is, even by God's absolute power — or only regularly and according to the common course of nature, as is wont to be said of the approximation of agent to patient — depends on another point: whether namely a substantial nature can by God's absolute power be conserved without

any subsistence, both proper and alien. For if one answers affirmatively, then it must be said that subsistence is not a condition per se and simply necessary for acting, because if a substantial nature were without any subsistence, still that nature would have its integral active power, according to which, with that first miracle supposed, it could thereafter connaturally issue into the second act of operating. For if this is not denied to a separated accident from its proper inherence, all the more will it be able — indeed must — to be granted to a singular substance separated from its own subsistence, which is of a more perfect entity and activity.

Nor does it follow hence, as Oviedo urges in the passage cited § 17, that if an effect can be absolutely had without such a condition, it will not properly be a condition — otherwise it could be said that having a cap is a condition for understanding, and being a musician for building. Not, I say, does it follow, because wearing a cap with respect to understanding, or being a musician with respect to building, and other accidents of this kind, obviously have no per-se connection with those effects, nor even according to the common course of nature. And therefore they cannot in any way be called conditions required for positing those effects, because naturally they are posited equally well without those conditions as with them. But subsistence by the nature of the thing is connected with substance and precedes any operation of it, and therefore rightly deserves the name of a condition necessarily required for operating, at least according to the common course of nature.

But if it is held that substance cannot by God's absolute power be conserved without any subsistence, just as an accident in fact is conserved without all inherence, I grant the whole argument; still in that case it must not be said that subsistence relates to the actions of supposits merely per accidens and concomitantly, but rather as a condition required for them according to the common course of nature. But if the opposite is held — that substance cannot be conserved without subsistence, as must be said in the opinion of the negative — then consequently it must be said that the operation of substance depends more on subsistence than the operation of an accident on inherence. For through miracle we are taught in the Eucharist that accidents exist and operate without a subject, but we are not taught that substance has existed without some subsistence. Hence in the mystery of the Incarnation the humanity of Christ was indeed assumed by the Word without its own subsistence, but there it subsists through divine subsistence. Hence, as far as from the light of faith can be made known to us, substance seems to depend more on subsistence than accident on inherence.

Question VI. To what things subsistence belongs

That subsistence does not belong to an accident by its own nature, and especially when it inheres in a subject, is agreed among all. For as the Doctor taught in *1. d. 4. qu. 2.* in the body of the question, this singular color existing does not determine

for itself the character of supposit, because the character of supposit properly is not found in accidents. And the reason is that subsistence imports incommunicability to a supposit of another nature, while an accident by its own nature is communicable to a supposit of substance, and therefore cannot be called subsistent.

There is a doubt, however, among the Doctors, whether subsistence at least belongs to it while it is conserved outside a subject by God in fact in the Eucharistic Sacrament. Cajetan in *3. p. q. 78. ar. 1.*, Suárez in *tom. 1. in 3. p. disp. 59. sect. 2.*, Vázquez in the same place *disp. 194. c. 2.*, Coninck *de Sacramentis q. 77. art. 1. dub. 2.*, Becanus in the same place *c. 20. q. 1.*, Cardinal de Lugo *disp. 12. de incarn. sect. 7. n. 94.*, and other recent authors seem to embrace the affirmative part, wishing that to a separated accident some positive mode superadded to it is owed, by which it is constituted as existing per se, directly repugnant to actual inherence.

I hold the opposite, however, as altogether true, as the Doctor teaches in *4. d. 12. q. 1. and 6. § ad argumenta*, which I have proved extensively in *disp. 3. Phys. q. 4. art. 2.* The Doctor briefly indicates the reason in *3. d. 1. q. 9. § tertius articulus*: that mode which is truly proper to one genus does not belong to anything of another genus. For as it is proper to this, so it is impossible with any other. Nor does what is adduced about a separated accident, he says, conclude the proposition, because it does not have that mode which is proper to substance. For the mode of substance is to be per se naturally — that is, not to be inclined in being to another by natural aptitude — which is not so with a separated accident. Then, that mode collated to a separated accident according to those authors would be called the mode of subsistence, insofar as it is opposed to inherence, as they themselves declare. But here subsistence is not taken insofar as it is opposed to inherence, as has been said repeatedly in this disputation from the Doctor *3. d. 1. q. 1. ad 5. prin.*, because such subsistence belongs to substance of itself, and not through something really superadded. Therefore even if a separated accident had the mode of that subsistence, it still would not have this one of which here is the discussion, which even separated is apt to be communicated as *quo* to a supposit of another nature, namely of substance; and therefore even separated it lacks subsistence, nor can it be called a supposit.

Confirmation: because for this reason the Doctor denies subsistence in this sense to the separated soul, because it still retains communicability to the body. Therefore all the more must it be denied to a separated accident.

And there is a far greater difficulty about the parts of a composite substance, both essential and integral: whether namely individual parts have their own partial subsistences, from which the total subsistence of the composite arises, both essential and integral, or whether rather in the composite there is one simple and indivisible subsistence affecting all parts. On this matter there are three opinions among the recent authors, among whom alone this controversy is keenly ventilated: two extreme and one middle. The first is that of Suárez in *disp. 34. Met.*

sect. 5., whom Aversa follows in *qu. 19. Philosophiæ sect. 3.* and *q. 20. sect. 9.*, and Hurtado in *disp. 2. Phys. sect. 7.* — saying that any subsistence of a composite material substance consists of both essential parts corresponding to the essential parts of the same substance, and of integral parts corresponding namely to its integral parts. And therefore he maintains that any is divisible, so that with the parts divided from each other the total subsistence of the whole composite from them is indeed destroyed, but just as the parts remain, so also their partial subsistences remain, whether those parts were essential or integral. However, Suárez adds that the peculiar mode corresponding to material forms cannot properly be called even a partial subsistence, because they cannot exist separated per se, as the rational soul, nor are they incommunicable to a subject, as prime matter. Hence he calls only the mode of prime matter and of the rational soul subsistence — the former indeed because prime matter can exist per se and is not incommunicable to anything as a subject, the latter because the rational soul, even though it is communicable to another as a subject, still can exist separated per se.

The foundation of this opinion is: because if there were one mode, or one subsistence, in an essential composite, it is asked what it primarily and immediately affects — whether matter, or form, or both simultaneously, or the whole immediately and the parts mediately. Not the first, nor the second, because the subsistence of only one part is inadequate and incomplete; therefore it is unsuited to affecting the whole, which must subsist completely and adequately. Not the third, because the same undivided mode cannot affect two distinct things, or two distinct subjects. Also, because in man there would be a special difficulty, for either this mode would be spiritual, and so could not affect the body, or material, and so could not affect the soul, because they would be disproportionate to each other. Nor, finally, the fourth, because a composite according to the more common opinion does not have another third entity resulting from the union of the parts, to which entity subsistence could per se and proximately be attributed. But the entity of the whole is nothing other than the entity of its united parts. Therefore thus also the subsistence of the whole will be nothing other than the partial subsistences joined together.

Nor does it suffice to say with Lugo and others of the opposite opinion that the inconvenience is not that the same simple and uncompounded subsistence makes matter and form subsist in the composite, just as it is not an inconvenience that they are united by one simple union. For granted what is said about union (which, however, is false, as is clear from what was said in Physics), there is still a manifest disparity regarding union and subsistence. Because since union is posited as a mode in some way relative, it can also in some way affect both parts — one subjectively, the other terminatively — and thus one union between both could suffice. But subsistence is posited as an absolute mode, and therefore if received in matter alone, it cannot affect form in any way, nor vice versa. And this argument is still stronger in an integral whole — for example, in all water. For if its subsistence is indivisible, either it is indivisibly whole in the whole and whole

in any part of the whole sea — for example, in the manner of a spiritual thing, as the rational soul is in the body — and this cannot be said, because such subsistence is a material and corporeal thing, and therefore cannot be thus indivisibly diffused through the whole in the manner of a spiritual thing. Also, because then the same numerically, affecting the water of the Adriatic Sea, would simultaneously affect the water of the Baltic, Indian, or Atlantic — which naturally is impossible. Or such an indivisible subsistence would be in one certain point of the whole water of the Ocean. And neither can this reasonably be said, because, besides that such a certain point cannot be designated, since there is no greater reason for one than for another, still that designated does not suffice — because then such a point alone would be said to subsist, but not the other parts, because just as it would not affect them, neither could it render them subsistent. Also, because the Word, to supply the role of created subsistence, did not unite itself to any determinate point of the human body, but to the whole body and to its individual parts. Therefore this total subsistence of the whole integral must be posited as divisible and integrated from several partial ones joined together.

Another extreme opinion denies partial subsistences both in the essential and in the integral composite, and says that one simple subsistence suffices for the whole composite, which alone is said to subsist. Thus John of St. Thomas in *q. 7. Phys. art. 3.*, for whom he cites Cabrera, Alvarez, Nazarius, and other Interpreters of St. Thomas at *3. part. q. 2.* The foundation is that subsistence seems proper only to complete and total nature, nor to belong per se to parts, especially essentially incomplete ones, for it is posited to constitute the supposit, which is only a complete and total substance. Hence a complete substance must be pre-understood to which the mode of subsistence supervenes, constituting the supposit. Because therefore the part which constitutes the whole, whether essential or integral, cannot be called a supposit, so neither must it be said to have subsistence, which constitutes the supposit, except in a looser signification — as, for example, it is opposed to inherence. In which sense no one doubts that substantial parts have their own subsistence.

Confirmation: because subsistence, as we here speak of it, has to render nature incommunicable to another not only as to a subject, but also as to a whole and supposit. But matter and form, and also integral parts, such as hand and head, are most communicable, and actually are communicated while they are in the whole. Therefore proper subsistence cannot per se belong to them. Nor is the reply of the authors of the opposite part favorable, who say that it is not of the character of this subsistence here under discussion to be incommunicable in the manner of an essential or integral part, nor is its office to give incommunicability to another as to a whole, but as to a supposit of alien nature — or to bring about that the nature terminated by its own subsistence cannot be terminated by another. And therefore a part in a composite has its own subsistence, whether essential or integral, because it is not communicated to an alien supposit. Not, I say, is this valid, because although only suppositional incommunicability is of the formal

character of subsistence, other incommunicabilities can and must concur to the character of a supposit at least fundamentally and presuppositively. And thus also the Doctor seems to suppose in *quol. 9. ab initio § de secundo*, where he says that that is said to be per se subsistent by subsistence properly so called which has ultimate actuality, such that it is not per se orderable to any further act simply beyond that which it has, which further act could be an act of it per se. By which reasoning in the same place he excludes from the character of properly subsistent not only matter and form, but also the rational soul.

The third, middle opinion altogether denies subsistences or partial modes essential to matter and form, but admits partial modes corresponding to integrating parts, which however it still denies can be called subsistences, persisting in the same foundation of the preceding opinion: that it is of the character of subsistence to render the thing which it affects altogether incommunicable. Therefore, since a part, both physical and integral, actually existing in the whole, is communicated to the whole, and one part to another, none can be said to be truly and properly subsistent. Thus Vázquez in *3. p. disp. 32. cap. 4.*, Lugo *de Incarn. disp. 12. sect. 3.*, Lorca *disp. 29.* Arriaga in *disp. 4. Met. sect. 9.*, however, although he denies with Vázquez partial subsistence to essential parts, still he grants it also properly said to integral parts, because any integral part absolutely is a nature consisting of matter and form, hence it needs to be integrated by its own subsistence. But any essential part is not properly a complete nature, but a part of nature, hence it is not terminated by its own subsistence.

Poncius, in the cited *disputat. 18.*, although at *num. 155* he speaks in the same way of integral parts, granting to them their own partial subsistences, regarding essential parts distinguishes: if they are considered as they actually are in a material supposit, they do not have partial subsistences, but existing separately they do have them. For this is clear of the rational soul separated, and also because we conclude that humanity has its own personality because it is completed in fact through the suppositivity of the Word. But both the separated soul in the triduum and the separated body of Christ were completed through the suppositivity of the Word. Therefore, existing separately, if they were not united with the Word, they would have a proper complement, whether negative or positive, really distinct from them, and that complement would be a partial subsistence. Oviedo, finally, in *controvers. 6. Metaphysicor. punct. 4.*, admits all these opinions as probable, or doubtful, because he candidly confesses at *num. 13* that in this matter one can proceed only by conjectures.

What in such and so great confusion should be said, I confess I do not know, or can scarcely discern. And indeed it is sufficiently clear that difficulties of this kind derive their origin especially from the opinion of the positive, as will be clear to one weighing them. Hence, to avoid these, it will be better again to embrace the opinion of the negative given and declared above, according to which those

difficulties urge less. But because they can also in some way proceed in the opinion of the negative, first, according to this way, to individual integral parts a proper subsistence seems to be granted. And the reason is that which I insinuated above at *number 43*: because the communication, or communicability, of an integral part to constitute an integral whole is not that which subsistence formally denies, or at least presupposes as denied. For this part of water, or fragment of wood, is as complete a being and directly in a genus as all the water or the whole wood which it constitutes with the other co-part. And therefore from this ground any part of water can be said to subsist and be a supposit, because it is not ordered to constituting one per se with another co-part really distinct from itself. For an integral whole is not thus distinguished from its simultaneously taken parts, but is nothing other than the parts themselves simultaneously united and continuous to each other through their own indivisibles, as I said in *disput. 5. Phys. quæst. 13. art. 2*.

And although also one part communicates with another, this communication does not exclude subsistence, because it is not united hypostatically with it, as humanity was united to the Word, nor is it communicated to it as *quo*, as nature is communicated to the supposit. Hence no part receives such a denomination from another as the Word receives from the nature united with itself. For through humanity united to it the Word is called man; not so wine is called water, or water wine, from the fact that one portion of water is joined with a portion of wine, unless one is corrupted and substantially converted into the other. Therefore it must be granted that integral parts of any whole, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, have their own subsistences, and each can be called a supposit, because they are not parts in such a way that they have the character of an incomplete being, which cannot be called a supposit from the common acceptance of this name.

Hence it is not necessary to say what Poncius says in *disp. 18. cited num. 156*, that in this genus of integral composition two supposits, as two portions of water, can concur in the composition of some third supposit with their own suppositivities retained. Not, I say, is it necessary to assert this, because just as that whole water constituted from those two portions is not one per se whole distinct from those portions of water, but they are simultaneously conjoined and continuous, so neither is it one per se supposit, but two supposits simultaneously joined through indivisibles of the genus of quantity — although according to common manner of speaking it is usually called one supposit, as it is called one whole. And about an integral whole and its parts, this very thing must be asserted, even if it be held that subsistence expresses something positive.

Regarding essential parts, however, because they are truly and properly parts from which one per se third really distinct from them is constituted, as the Doctor shows in *3. d. 2. quæst. 2. art. 2.*, their own subsistence rigorously taken does not seem to be granted, but only in that sense which I said in *disp. 2. Phys. quæst. 2.*

articul. 2. For because they are incomplete beings and communicable to another in the manner of an essential part, properly called subsistence cannot seem to belong to them, as the Doctor says in *quol. 9. § de secundo*. And thus also Lichetus speaks in *3. distinction. 1. q. 1.* in the solution of the fifth principal. For although subsistence, of which the discussion is in this disputation, formally excludes only communication to another as to a supposit, not however as to a subject, or as to a whole, or to another co-part, still those incommunicabilities seem at least presuppositively or fundamentally to pertain to it. For since subsistence is altogether the ultimate terminus of nature, or of all its communicability, it seems necessarily to presuppose in a nature so terminable all other superadded incommunicabilities, according to what was said in *question 2. art. 1. nu. 43. and 48.* For if it were communicable in another way, and indeed in a substantial mode, it could not be called a nature ultimately terminated in its communicability through subsistence.

Also, because if parts in the whole had their own subsistence, especially positive, since humanity was immediately united to the Word, and through it the parts, as the Doctor teaches in *3. d. 2. quæst. 2.*, it would also follow that humanity in the Word has its own complete subsistence, because the causalities of intrinsic causes cannot be impeded by God. Since therefore the partial subsistences of matter and form are intrinsic causes of the subsistence of the composite — just as matter and form united cannot be impeded from constituting the whole, so neither can their partial subsistences be impeded from constituting the total and adequate subsistence — and thus humanity assumed by the Word would have its own subsistence caused by the subsistence of the parts. Either therefore it must be denied that parts in the whole have their own subsistence, or it must be said that they too are immediately united to the Word by a distinct mode of union from that of humanity, as Oviedo holds in the passage cited.

And finally, positing that the whole expresses a third entity really distinct from the parts, that third entity is a sufficient subject of one total simple subsistence, and this alone would suffice for the whole substance to be said to subsist in that way in which a substantial supposit must subsist per se. For this cause the authors of the first opinion multiplied partial subsistences, who denied that the whole expresses a third entity really distinct from the united parts. Therefore there seems to be no necessity of multiplying partial subsistences in a composite, except in the sense which I taught in *disputation 2. of Physics cit. quæst. 2. art. 2.* from the Doctor in *quol. 9. ab initio*.

But still there is a doubt about essential parts existing separately, whether in such a state they enjoy their own partial subsistences. For on the one hand it seems to be affirmed, because in the triduum body and soul separated from each other were immediately assumed by the Word and were completed through the subsistence of the Word, which was substituted in place of the proper one. Therefore they seem to have their own subsistence in such a state. On the other

hand it seems to be denied, because essential parts, even existing separately, are per se orderable to a further act and to constituting an essential whole. If therefore it is true that subsistence, importing incommunicability to another as to a supposit, supposes in such incommunicable nature also other incommunicabilities — namely to another as to a subject, as to a whole, and to another co-part — still to essential parts existing separately their own subsistence seems to be denied. For this reason perhaps both could be probably defended. Still more probable it seems that parts existing separately do not have properly said subsistence, for the reason just adduced: because subsistence does not seem able to stand with further essential communicability. For a nature so communicable cannot truly be said to be terminated in its communicability, nor to stop in itself, since it can still further progress and extend itself.

Nor does the reason adduced for the other part — that body and soul in the triduum were immediately united to the Word — seem to me to urge much, even if by others it is judged quite effective. Because many theologians teach that the Word could have assumed not only essential parts existing separately, but even an accidental form separated from its subject. And this seems to be deduced from the Doctor in 3. d. 22. *quæst. un. in fine*. And yet from this it cannot be deduced that a separated accident has its own subsistence. Therefore, from the fact that something can be assumed by the Word in both ways, it is not immediately permitted to deduce that it has its own subsistence or suppositality. And the reason is that the union of some created entity to the person of the Word can take place in many ways, as Father Bellutus my colleague notes in *disput. 3. de Incarnat. q. 4 numer. 56*. For it can happen either in the manner of personation, as when an intellectual nature is assumed, or in the manner of supposition and hypostasization, as when an irrational nature is assumed, or in the manner of a certain substantial sustentification, without the character of act and potency, as when something is assumed which is not of itself apt to be immediately supposed or to subsist, except insofar as to subsist excludes — so that it could not exist per se independently of another, as of a subject. In which sense the rational soul, or separated matter, would be assumed to subsistence. And such a union would not be to the Word as importing subsistence insofar as it exercises the office of an incommunicable terminus, but as it exercises the office of having being independently of another, as of a subject. For in this broad manner it is also said to subsist. Hence such independent being can also be supplied through immediate union to the Word, which is also in this way independent. Or finally, the union can happen to the Word in the manner of simple sustentification without the character of act and potency, and thus can be united to the Word all material forms, both substantial and accidental. It is clear therefore that not everything which can be assumed by the Word immediately assumes personality or subsistence, but only such independence as is apt to belong to the nature of the assumable thing.

Finally, it is wont to be asked whether subsistence, which a *parte rei* is distinguished from nature, belongs also to created spiritual substances, or Angels (for about subsistence taken for existing *per se*, as it is distinguished from inherence, the matter is without difficulty). And indeed St. Thomas in *part. 1. q. 3. art. 3.* openly taught that in those things which are not composed of matter and form the supposit does not differ from nature. He said the same in *2. distinct. 5. qu. 1. art. 3.* Therefore Hurtado in *disputatione 11. Metaph. sect. 4.* defends, as probable, that in Angels the supposit is not distinguished from nature. And Oviedo in *controv. 6. Metaphys. punct. 2. § 17* says it is not easy from the distinction of supposit from nature in man to infer the same distinction in an Angel. For from the fact that in man nature consists of matter and form, the same composition in angelic nature is not inferred. Therefore from the fact that a human supposit expresses composition from nature and subsistence, the same composition is not inferred in an angelic supposit. Also because the whole motive for distinguishing subsistence from nature, as often said, we have from the mystery of the Incarnation. But from this can immediately be inferred only such distinction in a human supposit, not in an angelic. Whence finally he concludes that at least a spiritual nature is possible which has subsistence really identified with it.

But whatever may be said of a possible spiritual substance, it must be certain that that which in fact has been created has its own subsistence really superadded to nature, and no less is the supposit distinguished in it from nature than is distinguished in man and other material substances. And thus all theologians universally suppose, and especially the Doctor *3. d. 1. q. 1.* and *d. 2. q. 1. art. 2.* And they commonly prove: because angelic nature is no less assumable by God than human. Therefore, just as by reason of such assumability the distinction of supposit from nature was concluded in the human species, because he assumed nature and not supposit, so it must also be concluded in angelic nature. The assumption is proved first by the authority of St. Paul in *Heb. 2*, where commending the benefit of the Incarnation toward us, he says: *nowhere does he take hold of the angels, but the seed of Abraham he takes hold of* — plainly thereby supposing that the Word could have assumed angelic nature, as it assumed human, if it had wished. Also by reason: because in fact the rational soul, which is of a spiritual nature, in the triduum of Christ's death remained immediately united to the Word. Therefore if the rational soul, which is an incomplete spiritual substance, has subsistence in its own way superadded, as is commonly said, by reason of which it could be assumed by the Word, all the more will an Angel have it, which is a complete spiritual substance.

Confirmation: because this subsistence does not belong to human nature from its special character — because it is material and corporeal — but rather from a certain general character common to it with Angels. Therefore from the distinction of supposit in human nature, the distinction can well be inferred also in angelic. The antecedent is the Doctor's in *quol. 9. ab initio*, where he discourses in the same way about an angelic and material supposit, and says that from the

same common medium properly called subsistence is concluded of fire as of an Angel — indeed of anything whatever that is completely in any species of substance. For an Angel is perfect in a perfect species — indeed more perfect than any species of material substance. If therefore some material substance is in ultimate act such that it is not per se orderable to any further act — otherwise there could be a process to infinity in material substances, as any could be a part of another — all the more is an Angel per se subsistent according to the prescribed intellect. Thus the Doctor there.

To the reason for doubt in the opposite: first it must be said that there is no lack of grave authors who also admit in Angels composition from spiritual matter and form, according to the probable doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor in *2. d. 3. p. 1. ar. 1. quæst. 2*, which Cavell defends in *lib. de anim. qu. 11*. Then in the common opinion not admitting such physical composition in Angels, the parity must be denied between composition from matter and form, and from nature and subsistence. For in material substances we argue for composition from matter and form especially from their corruptibility, which since it is not found in Angels, we consequently deduce that spiritual substances of this kind lack physical composition from matter and form. But it is not so regarding composition from nature and subsistence. For from the common medium we argue that both in material nature matter, and in spiritual nature subsistence, are of the same character, as has been said from Scotus in *quol. 9*. And consequently we must affirm the same composition of nature and subsistence in both natures.

To the other: we deny that from the mystery of the Incarnation is deduced only the distinction of supposit from nature in human nature. For although directly and immediately from such mystery it is deduced only in it, still consequently it is rightly deduced also in any other substantial nature, since any is equally assumable by God as another. Otherwise, if the argument were valid, neither in other material substances besides human must the distinction of supposit from nature be admitted. Nor does St. Thomas hold the opposite, since in *3. part. qu. 4. art. 1. ad 3.* he expressly teaches that angelic nature is as assumable by God as human, and can through hypostatic union be deprived of its own substance. The passage however cited on the opposite side is kindly interpreted by his Expositors — that namely by supposit he understood the individual, which indeed in fact is not distinguished from nature.

Cajetan however in *3. P. qu. 4. art. 2.* grants that St. Thomas in that passage truly spoke of supposit in its proper sense, and in spiritual natures denied the distinction of supposit from nature. But the matter more maturely considered in *3. p.*, where was the proper place for this matter, he corrected himself and retracted that saying.

Disputation XII. On Accident and its inherence

After the disputation on substance and its subsistence follows immediately the disputation on Accident and its inherence. Just as the preceding disputation was not established regarding substance broadly taken for the essence of any thing whatever, but specifically for a being which exists per se and subsists — in which way it is a subjective part of real being — so likewise the present disputation is established not regarding accident broadly taken for any predicate extraneous from the essence of a thing, which is wont to be called predicable accident (for about this it has been treated extensively in Logic), but specifically taken for a being which does not exist per se or subsist, but leans upon another as upon a subject, and inheres — in which way it is usually called predicamental accident, and is a certain subjective part of being contradistinguished from substance, which constitutes the first predicament. I have indeed made an integral disputation on accidental form in Physics, namely *disputat. 3.*, in which I have treated whatever pertains to it as it is a principle of accidental mutation. Nevertheless not its essence has been declared there, but reserved here in Metaphysics, as in its proper place. For this pertains to the Metaphysician to investigate, as that to the Physicist. Although I have treated many things there which by others are usually treated here, nevertheless here we shall treat those things which more seem to pertain to the essence of accident; the others, however, were to be seen in the said *Disputation 3 of Physics*, so that a full and exact knowledge of accident may be had.

Question I. Whether an accident is a being simply, having its own proper existence, and consequently really distinct from substance

An accident, as it is condistinguished from substance, is usually defined as a being inhering in a subject. This definition is received in every school. Indeed, by inherence to a subject is not signified any manner whatever of existing in a subject, for a substantial form is also in a subject and depends on a subject in its being if it is material. But there is denoted that manner of existing in a subject which is so proper to accident that it cannot belong to a complete substance or to its parts. What however this manner of inbeing is that is accidental, and how it differs from the substantial manner of inbeing, has been sufficiently declared in *q. 1. of the preceding disputation, number 19.*

Again, when accident is said to be a being inhering in a subject, this should not be understood of actual inhesion and union to a subject, because absolute accidents can exist without such inhesion by the absolute power of God, as will be clear in the second question. Nor also of aptitudinal inhesion, as it is commonly wont to be explained, for such aptitude is rather a property of accident than its essential difference, as will be clear in the same place. But it should be understood of radical inherence, such that the root or exigitive principle of such aptitudinal

aptitude is the essence and formal character of accident. Which definition will be further clarified from what follows.

From the fact however that accident is said to be a being inhering in another as in a subject, arises the proposed question. For hence some have said that accident is not intrinsically and essentially a being, but only through extrinsic denomination from substance, as Giles in *4. Metaphysicæ quæst. 3.*, Julius Sirenus in *disputatione de subjecto primæ Philosophiæ sectione 2. capit. 20.* Others, however, the Thomists, although they grant that accident is intrinsically and essentially a being, still deny that it can be said a being simply and absolutely, but say it is a being secundum quid, or a being with an addition, as a being in another, or a being of a being. As also Alensis teaches in *7. Metaphysicæ quæstiuncul. in textu decimo quarto.* Thus Scotus in *prædicament. capite quarto quæstion. 1. conclusion. 3.*, Javellus *7. Metaphysicæ quæstion. 2. in fine.*

For this same reason some Thomists deny accident a proper existence, and say that it exists by the existence of substance. Thus the same Scotus in *1. Physic. q. 6. un.*, and hence some have dared to say that for the accidents of the Eucharist there remains the same substantial existence of the bread and wine. This Bannes also judges probable in *part. prima quæstione quarta dub. 2. articulo 3. ad 3.*

Finally, regarding the distinction of accident from substance, the recent authors say that it is not necessary that it be distinguished from it really, as thing from thing. For although absolute accidents, such as quantity and quality, are thus distinguished from substance, because they can be mutually separated and exist separated, other accidents which are called modal, of the other predicaments, are not thus distinguished from it, but only modally. Because although substance can be separated from them and exist separately, these accidents cannot exist without it, as is clear in all relative accidents. Which genus of distinction among the recent authors is called modal distinction — not indeed that intrinsic modal distinction customary to Scotists, for they do not acknowledge this, but extrinsic modal. About whose difference I have spoken in *disputation 6. Metaphysicæ quæstione 10.* Thus Aversa discourses with the common opinion of the recent authors in *quæstione 21. Philosophiæ section. 9.*, where also at the beginning of the section he reports Ferrariensis in *2. contra Gentes cap. 18.* opining that it is not necessary that an accident a parte rei be distinguished from substance, but an accident can be found distinguished only by reason, to which inherence still belongs, which is said essential to an accident.

For the resolution of the question:

I say first: an accident is intrinsically and essentially a being, and consequently in this sense can and must be called a being simply and absolutely, although in another sense it can be called a being secundum quid and with an addition. The conclusion is common among all approved authors, which the Doctor teaches in *4. d. 12. quæstion. 1.*, and needs declaration rather than proof. And indeed as

regards the first part — that an accident is intrinsically and essentially a being — it is most evidently proved. For real being as such is said to be that which truly and really is, or at least can be in the nature of things without any operation of the intellect whatever; for by this it is distinguished from nothing and from a being of reason. But whether it is in itself or in another pertains to the peculiar modes of existing really. Therefore from the fact that accident is in another as in a subject, it does not on this account cease to be a being, nor is it excluded from the formal character of being. Indeed, it could not truly and really be in another unless it truly and properly were.

Confirmation: because by Aristotle real being is truly divided into substance and accident, in such a way that one being is substance and another is accident, and it is a division of the univocal into the univocates, as is clear from what was said in *disput. 8. quæstion. 1. num. 22.*, because being is said univocally of substance and accident, as has been extensively proved in *disp. 2. de natura entis quæstion. 5.* And although some analogy intervenes, still it is not such as excludes univocation, as is there shown. Therefore truly an accident is a being intrinsically and essentially, and in this sense accident also must be said simply and absolutely a being — for with all propriety that is called simply and absolutely such which intrinsically and essentially includes the character of it.

Because however accident participates intrinsically in the character of being through dependence on substance and through attribution, as Aristotle in many places teaches, in this way it can be called a being *secundum quid* and a being of a being — so that it is indeed truly and properly a being, but essentially depending on another. Hence when it is called a being *secundum quid* in this sense, that particle is not detractive of entity from accident, as though accident did not participate truly and essentially in the character of being, but diminutive of perfection in the degrees of entity, inasmuch as it falls short of the perfection of the entity of substance. Hence it is called a being *secundum quid*, not considered in itself and absolutely — for so rather it must be called a being simply — but in comparison to substance, as I said in *d. 2. de natura entis qu., nu. 11. and 124. and following.* And in this way Aristotle himself explains the matter in *7. Metaph. tex. 14.* Namely, that on account of such analogy and dependence of accident on substance in participating the character of being, substance is called a being simply, while accident is called a being *secundum quid* and with an addition. *For just as being is, it is indeed in all things, yet not similarly, but in this one primarily, in those others consequently* — as if he wished to say that the character of being essentially belongs to all through intrinsic denomination, but prior to substance and consequently to accidents. Hence when Aristotle calls accident not absolutely a being but with an addition, because a being of a being, and that accidents are not *per se* beings but affections of a being, namely of substance, in *7. Metaph. 2. and 3., lib. 12. tex. 13.*, through these and similar forms of speaking he intends to signify nothing other than the essential order of accident to substance, as the Doctor explains in *4. d. 12. qu. 1. cited.* This does not prevent, however, that accident in

another sense can be called a being simply and absolutely through its intrinsic entity. For a creature too is called simply and absolutely a being, even though it intrinsically does not participate being except dependently on God and through essential subordination to first being.

From this in the same way Alensis explained the intention of the Philosopher in the aforesaid *tex. 14. lib. 7. Met.* Because, he says, when a common thing is said analogically of several, taken simply and without addition, it is always understood of that which is the principal in the whole analogy. Since therefore being is said of the ten predicaments according to prior and prior and posterior, if pronounced without addition, it is always understood of substance; but with an addition of the other predicaments. And this is what the Philosopher said, that quality is a being, but not a being simply, and without addition, but a being which is a quality — that quality is a certain mode in relation to being, and nevertheless in itself is a true thing. Therefore for this cause also substance is called a being simply, as well as absolutely, while accidents with an addition, because although in themselves they are true beings, still in comparison with substance they put on the character of a mode. And through this doctrine are explained all those authorities of Aristotle which are usually adduced by Thomists against this conclusion, which you can see individually solved and explained in *disp. 2. de natura entis q. 5. a. 2.* — cited when they were being adduced against the univocation of being to substance and accident — not actually, but aptitudinally, insofar as accident is apt to inhere in another, or to have its existence leaning on another.

But Javellus in the passage cited urges: accident in the abstract is not per se subsistent, nor can it be conceived as per se subsistent. For one who should thus conceive accident in the abstract, it would be as if he conceived the Idea of Plato abstractly per se to be, which would be a false conception. Therefore it has being only in another and can be conceived only in another. Therefore it is not a being simply, but only a being secundum quid, or a being in another.

The Doctor replies in *4. dist. 12. qu. 1. L.* that no form can have a perfect quietative concept unless that of which it is the form is co-understood. A definition, however, expresses the perfect concept of the defined. And therefore however much the essentials of a form might be expressed without that of which it is the form — although its quiddity would be indicated — still it would not be a perfect concept quieting the intellect, and therefore not a definitive one. An accident can therefore be conceived as precised from the subject according to its essential predicates, and through a purely quidditative concept; and then it would be conceived not indeed as per se subsistent in the manner of Plato's Idea, because it would not be conceived with the repugnance to being in another that is had by what is conceived as existing per se subsistent — but it would be conceived by prescinding from inherence with another, especially actual. It is true however that this concept would be imperfect, because it would not be quietative. And even if one should grant that it cannot be conceived in any way — not quietatively, not

quidditatively — without another, but must be conceived in another, actually or at least aptitudinally, still from this it would not be well deduced that it did not have its own entity, but only that it has it with that dependence already explained on substance and with propensity for existing in it.

I say second: every accident has its own proper existence distinct from the existence of substance. This conclusion is the Doctor's in *4. d. 12. quæst. 1. § hic dicitur*, and must be undoubted especially among those who do not really distinguish existence from essence, as was said in *disputation 8. quæst. 4.* For if existence is really nothing other than the real and actual entity of the thing itself, plainly when accidents actually are outside their causes and in the nature of things, even if they do not subsist per se but in another, they must have their actual entity distinct from the actual entity of the subject, and consequently also retain the same in the case in which they were separated by miracle by God from their proper subject.

Indeed, the better Thomists grant this, even if they distinguish existence really from essence with Cajetan in *de ente, et essentia capit. 7.*, as can be seen in Flandria *7. Metaph. quæst. 1. artic. 5.*, where he proves this by multiple reasoning, but especially by this, which seems to me most evident. It implies that something be corrupted with its own proper being remaining, because that which is corrupted, after it has been corrupted, no longer is, since corruption is terminated at not-being. Hence, to assert that something is corrupted and after its perishing still its existence remains is to say that something is simultaneously corrupted and not corrupted — which implies in terms. But it is manifest to the sense that some accident is corrupted with the subject in which it was remaining. Therefore the being of that accident does not remain while the being of that subject remains. Since therefore it is not the same thing which remains in being and which ceases to be, it follows that the being of existence of substance and of accident is not the same.

And although Suárez in *disp. 31. Metaph. sect. 11.* says that those really distinguishing existence from essence can with difficulty prove that accidents enjoy their own existence, whence to the argument just made it could be said that no contradiction follows, because although with the accident corrupted its existence remains, it does not follow that it is not corrupted, because it did not exist by its own existence but by an alien one, namely through the existence of the subject — although, I say, the matter may so stand, this is little to our concern. Let the Thomists themselves see whether they speak consistently with their principles. It suffices for us that the aforesaid reasoning concludes in the common opinion not really distinguishing existence from essence. Another reason for this I adduced from Scotus cited in *disp. 8. qu. 4.*

But it is objected: accident is not a being except because it is of a being — that is, of substance — which would not be true unless the being of a being, which is substance, and of the accident itself, were the same. Then, the being of accident

is in-being — that is, to be in another, or to be through another — therefore it does not exist by its own existence, but by an alien one. Again, things which are produced simultaneously have one being, because production is terminated at the existence of the thing. But accidents are produced simultaneously with substance. Finally, a relation is a real accident, and yet does not have its own existence — because if it had it, it could at least through God's power be and be conserved without the extremes, just as on that account an absolute accident can be conserved.

The reply: accident is called a being because of a being — not because the being of substance and of accident is really the same, or the same existence — but because the being of existence of accident presupposes the being of existence of substance. And therefore the Doctor in *4. distinct. 12. quæst. 1. litter. G* said, whom Soncinas follows in *7. Metaphysicor. quæstion. 1.*, when accident is said to be a being because of a being, this is not understood in the character of formal principle, or efficient and subjective principle, insofar as accident depends on substance in the genus of efficient and material cause. To the second: the being of accident is called in-being, not however because it must exist by the existence of another. To the third: the major is distinguished. If they are produced simultaneously by the same indivisible action, it is granted; but if they are said to be produced simultaneously, but by diverse actions having connection among themselves, it is denied. And thus is the case with substance and the accidents which naturally accompany substance. In other altogether adventitious accidents, however, the minor is also false, because they come from the extrinsic to a substance already pre-existing in duration. To the fourth: also relation, if it is posited as an accident condistinguished from the extremes by the thing, must be considered as having its own existence condistinguished from the existence of the subject — although on account of its peculiar condition it is repugnant to exist without a subject, as well as a terminus. Nor from this is a sufficient argument deduced to deny to relation its own existence. For also in our opinion distinguishing the whole from the parts, indeed the whole has its own existence other than the existence of the parts, just as also another entity, even if it cannot exist without the parts. Or to use an example conceded by all, a creature has its own existence really distinguished from the existence of God, and yet cannot exist or be conserved without God. It can therefore be that some two distinct things indeed have distinct existences, and yet the existence of one cannot be separated from the existence of another on account of the peculiar connection which they have among themselves from their innate condition, mutual or not mutual. But since about this I have treated in *d. 8. c. q. 4.*, I pass on to other matters.

I say third: accident as here treated is really distinguished from substance. This assertion is also common, and indeed that mere rational distinction does not suffice is sufficiently clear, because substance and accident are so distinguished among themselves that substance can be separated from this or that accident naturally, or at least supernaturally. Therefore a greater distinction verses

between them than rational, for mere rational distinction does not suffice for such separation or separability. Then, because although such distinction could suffice between substance and accident taken for what is extraneous from the essence of the thing — in which sense difference is said to accrue to genus, which is usually called metaphysical and predicable accident — it does not suffice if accident is taken physically for that which inheres in another as in a subject, and is called predicamental accident. For such inherence is a certain real relation, which requires to verse between really distinct extremes. Hence what is distinguished from another only by reason cannot properly be said to inhere in it.

Moreover, that a real distinction intercedes between substance and absolute accidents such as quantity and quality, with all propriety — such as that which verses between thing and thing — all grant, because they can be mutually separated and exist separately at least by God's absolute power, as is clear in the Eucharistic accidents. And although the Nominalists deny this regarding quantity, it is because they do not wish it to be something superadded to corporeal substance. For if they granted it to be a superadded accident to substance, they would immediately grant also that it is really distinguished from it, as they say of quality. Therefore it cannot be denied that an absolute accident is really and entitatively distinct from substance.

Only the difficulty remains about relative accidents, which by the recent authors are called modal accidents. Because, although substance can be separated from them and exist separately, yet not conversely, they say therefore that such distinction from the nature of the thing found between them is not to be called real, but only modal — such as is usually called that which verses between thing and mode. However, the Doctor in *quolib.* 3. art. 1. and 1. d. 1. q. 5. § *quod si adhuc* says that this is a pure question about the name, as that which depends on the varied acceptance of the terms "thing," "mode," "real distinction." For he says that a relative accident can be called a thing and a mode — a thing indeed, insofar as it falls essentially under the division of real being, and every such thing is a thing, or real being. But it can be called a mode, insofar as it is an imperfect entity compared to any absolute whatever, not able to exist per se, but necessarily inhering in it and affixed to it as a mode of the thing modified through itself. So also if real distinction is taken in its proper signification for that diversity which is found between any two things, of which one can exist without the other — whether this can happen mutually or not — in this sense they must be called really distinguished. But if it is taken more rigorously for that diversity which is found between two of which one can exist without the other reciprocally, it is not called real, but modal.

Truly however, because this second acceptance of real distinction is voluntary — since for some two things to be called really distinct with all priority, it suffices that one can be separated from another and also exist without it, whether this happens mutually or not — it is better to say that substance and relative accident

are really distinct absolutely speaking. And the reason is that from the fact that a relative accident cannot exist without substance, and not conversely, it is not well inferred that they are not mutually really distinct, but only that they are not mutually really separable with the retention of their own existence — which is merely accidental to real distinction, which is sufficiently constituted by this: that one can be without the other, however that happens, whether mutually or not mutually. Finally, above in *disp. 6. quæstion. 10* I showed that this modal distinction of the recent authors is distinguished indeed from distinction of reason, and also from our formal distinction. However, it does not constitute a disparate species condistinguished from real distinction, but pertains to it and is reduced to it. Therefore simply and absolutely speaking, relative or modal accidents also must be posited as really distinct from substance. And for this reason in *disputation 5. Phys. quæst. 9*. I said that substantial union is really distinguished from the parts, and universally that every predicamental relation is distinguished from the foundation in *disputat. 8. Log. quæst. 3. articul. 11*.

It is also here usually asked whether accident is a simple form, or rather composite from matter and form. The Doctor replies in *8. Metaphys. quæst. 1.*, and with him Antonius Andreas in *quæstion. 5.* and Faber in *disput. 2.*, that it is altogether simple physically speaking. Metaphysically, however, it is composed from genus and difference — as he also teaches in *1. dist. 8. qu. 3. § Teneo opinionem meam mediam*. And indeed that metaphysically it admits composition lacks any doubt whatever, because in the predicaments of accidents generic, specific, and differential degrees are assigned, as in the predicament of substance. But that it is not physically composed, namely from matter and form, he proves, because then whiteness, for example, could not with its whole self inform the subject. Therefore such composition is repugnant to accident. The consequence is clear, because accident is destined by nature to be with its whole self the form of another, namely of substance. The assumption is proved, because although whiteness would be informative by reason of that essential part which is act, it would still be repugnant to it by reason of the other which is potency — since matter is altogether passive potency and informable, and can in no way have the character of informative. Also, because if the material part in an accident could inform, all the more could it in a substance, whose material part is a substance, and therefore more perfect than the matter of an accident. Indeed, neither could whiteness inform the subject by reason of the actual and formal part, because that formal part is the adequate act and form of its accidental matter. Therefore it cannot simultaneously and at once inform a substantial subject — otherwise it would not be the adequate act of its matter. By which reasoning also the Doctor proves in *2. d. 16. qu. un. § Alia opinio* that the rational soul is not composed of matter and form. So also expressly taught Aristotle in *8. Metaph. 12.*, where he has that accidents do not have matter *ex qua*, but only *in qua*; and the same has the Author *lib. 6. princip.*, where he says that accident is a simple form.

You will object: accident is definable; therefore it consists of matter and form, from which the definition consists, from 8. *Met. tex.* 9. Also second: it is generable and corruptible, as is clear; but all such consists of matter and form, because matter is the cause of corruption, from 7. *Metaph.* 22. Also third: every motion is toward some per se total terminus. Therefore alteration — for example, heating — must have some such terminus; but this cannot be, for example, hot water, because this is a being per accidens; therefore it will be the heat itself composed of matter and form. Also fourth: if accident were a simple form, then it would be more perfect than substance, because simplicity is a perfection simply, which is attributed to God. Also fifth: because a substantial composite would be more caused and dependent, because from intrinsic causes, than an accident; but dependent from the whole genus is more imperfect than independent; therefore substance also from this ground would be more imperfect than accident. Finally: what really agrees with another and really differs from it is composed of two, in one of which they agree, and by the other differ. But whiteness and blackness really agree in the character of color, and really differ by their own specific characters; therefore etc.

The reply, from Scotus cited, denying the consequence. Nor does Aristotle cited say that the definition consists of parts, of which one is matter and another is form; but that one is related as matter, namely the genus, and another as form, namely the difference. Which introduces in an accident only metaphysical composition. In what sense however genus is said to be taken from matter, and difference from form, has been said in *disput.* 5. *Log. qu.* 3. *articul.* 2. To the second, the Doctor says that accident is generable and corruptible, not indeed as a composite, but as every material substantial form is said to be generable and corruptible. And indeed matter is not only a cause of the corruption of a composite which it intrinsically constitutes, but also of the form which it sustains. Because with respect to it it is in the potency of contradiction from 9. *Met.* 1., and therefore has with it a contingent and dissoluble connection — otherwise the argument would prove that a substantial form also is intrinsically composed of matter. Therefore for this same reason an accidental form is said to be corruptible, because with its subject it does not have a necessary connection; and further, because it has an extrinsic contrary by which it is expelled, and the subject to which it attaches is corruptible — since its immediate subject is the composite, and not prime matter, from what was said in *disp.* 3. *Phys. q.* 1. — which does not belong to a substantial form.

To the third: it has already been said in *disp.* 5. *Phys. qu.* 13. *art.* 2. *in fin.* that accidental mutation is not said to be per se one from its first and adequate terminus, as substantial mutation, because no such is acquired through substantial mutation. But it is said per se one from the formal terminus, and if such is said from the adequate terminus, this will be the accidental form itself in the concrete — as the hot of heating — which so taken is per se one, because it

does not equally signify water and heat, but principally signifies heat, and connotatively the subject.

To the fourth: if the argument were valid, it would equally prove that both matter and form are more perfect than a substantial composite, which is false. The Doctor says therefore that the argument calls for a great treatise: how that which is simply a perfection does not always conclude this to be simply more perfect in which it is more excellently, but only *secundum quid*. This doctrine, however, he directly treats in *1. d. 8. q. 1. ad p.*, where he also solves this argument in terms applied to matter. First denying that the simplicity of matter expresses a perfection simply, because simplicity, as expressing a perfection simply, excludes from the simple not only composition but also componibility — which the simplicity of matter does not exclude. Then, even granting that the simplicity of matter expresses a perfection simply, he still denies that it is more noble than a composite. Because when there are two natures having peculiar and diverse perfections, that should be judged more noble to which there belongs a perfection surpassing another from the whole genus. For actuality is a perfection simply, and simplicity is a perfection simply. To a composite, however, greater actuality belongs, although not greater simplicity; but to matter, although simplicity belongs, not however so great actuality as belongs to a composite. And simply and absolutely speaking, actuality is more perfect than simplicity. And thus simply more perfect can be that to which actuality belongs without simplicity than that to which simplicity belongs without actuality. Thus the Doctor in the passage cited.

This whole response fits our proposition: for either it must be denied that the simplicity of an accident expresses a perfection simply, because it does not exclude compossibility with another, indeed not even an actual metaphysical composition. Or if it is granted to express perfection, still the consequence must be denied, because a composite substance is more actual than an accident, since it is the ultimate act altogether incommunicable to another in the manner of act; and actuality precedes simplicity from the whole genus.

And through this doctrine it is also clear to the fifth: because the actuality which belongs to a substantial composite surpasses from the whole genus of independence that which an accident has from intrinsic causes. Because such independence of an accident does not stand with such great actuality as a composite has, which cannot be the act of another, or inform another — neither *per se* nor *per accidens*, as Scotus shows in *quolibet. 9*. To which also this argument is to be added. Proved: if it concluded anything, both matter and form would be more perfect than a substantial composite, because less dependent.

To the last: the Doctor says that for preserving the real agreement and disagreement of species of accident, metaphysical composition from the realities of genus and difference suffices.

Question II. What inherence is, and how many kinds there are

Inherence is the union by which an accident is coupled, or is apt to be coupled, to a subject from which it depends in its being, becoming, and conservation. And it is usually assigned as twofold: one actual, the other aptitudinal. The first is that by which an accident in fact and actually inheres in a subject; the other is that by which it is said to be apt to inhere, or exigitive of inherence, even if it does not actually inhere, but exists per se — as is said of the accidents in the Eucharist. Thus all universally, and the Doctor agrees in *4. dist. 12. quæst. 1.*

But regarding each inherence there is a difficulty — what they express, namely whether they superadd anything of entity to the accident in some way distinct from the nature of the thing from it, or nothing at all. Regarding actual inherence, as the Nominalists deny that substantial union is any positive mode superadded to matter and form intimately present, so they speak likewise in our case regarding the actual inherence of an accident to the subject, that it adds nothing altogether to the accident and to the subject — indivisible and intimately present — wishing form and subject to be united immediately by themselves, and not through something superadded. Thus among the Nominalists Rubio in *4. d. 12. q. 1. art. 2* strenuously maintains.

Others, however, outside the school of the Nominalists, although they grant gratuitously that actual inhesion is something superadded to the accidental form and subject, mediating which they say they are united and coupled, still deny that aptitudinal inherence adds anything at all — even formally or distinct by reason — from the very entity and essence of the accident. Thus universally speak the Thomists, when they define accident through aptitudinal inherence and place it in its essence. So also thinks Alensis *7. Met. qu. 3. in tex. 3.*, whom Aversa follows in *q. 21. Phil. sect. 2. concl. 3*, where he says that truly nothing ought to be added above the essence of accident, nor another aptitude or proximate potency for inhering, distinct from the essence of accident, to be excogitated. Because there is no necessity or utility of constituting it, for it is very well understood that the accident itself, proximately through its essence, is apt for inhering, and that this aptitude is its essential character. And Poncius in *disp. 13. q. 1. num. 12* also judges this very probable, where he says he has never been pleased that any aptitudinal respects are given distinct from their foundations, because no efficacious reason can be adduced for this.

I say first: actual inherence is a positive mode really superadded to an accident, especially an absolute one (for about the relative we shall speak later), and a mode really distinct from it, or at least modally, from the extrinsic — a mode of which, however, it is. Thus the Doctor in *4. d. 12. q. 1.* with his followers. Which conclusion is also common outside the school of the Nominalists, and is proved by the same reasons by which in *disp. 5. Phys. qu. 8. art. 2.* was proved that substantial union adds something to indistant parts, against the Nominalists. The principal of which, applying it to our matter, can be argued thus: because an absolute accident

can be separated from a subject by God's power and conserved without inherence to it, as faith teaches in the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore actual inherence is not precisely the very entity of the accident, but something distinct from it, because the entity of the accident remains with inherence removed.

Rubio replies by granting that actual inherence imports something else besides the entity of accident, because it also imports its subject — or both extremes the accident and the subject — and these indeed not as absolutely taken, but as united and undivided. But beyond them so taken it adds nothing at all, because they can be united immediately with any medium distinct from them being circumscribed. And since they are no more distinguished nor less immediately united than accident and its inherence — which however also outside the school of the Nominalists are posited as immediately united, lest a process into infinity be given — although accident and substance are immediately united by themselves, they are not however necessarily, and consequently can be divided and one separated from the other.

This reply, common among the Nominalists, was sufficiently exploded in the passage cited. For God could now in the Sacrament of the altar not destroy the substance of bread, but conserve it undistant from the accidents, destroying only the inhesion of these to it. Therefore actual inherence adds something to the local union, or to the union by undistance of accident and subject. For upon such union it expresses information and sustenance of accident in substance. Therefore it expresses something else besides the extremes simultaneously taken, or only united through undistance. Also, because when they say that actual inherence imports both extremes, not absolutely taken, but as united and undivided, by this very fact they grant a union superadded to the extremes, because both disjunctively taken can be without union. Therefore when they are conceived as united, then they are conceived under some mode which they did not previously have.

The objection, however, which was brought regarding inherence itself, is not valid. Because since it itself is a relative accident, and consequently by no power whatever can by itself immediately exist, it is necessarily and indispensably affixed to another not through some other union — not only because in the character of uniting it is such a *quo* that it cannot be a *quod*, lest a process into infinity be given, but especially because it itself is not indifferent, whether to exist in another or by itself alone. But only that which is so indifferent needs a superadded mode by which its indifference may be determined, so that it is united with another. For without such an addition it would never be called united. Thus the Doctor in *4. dist. 12. quæstion. 1. litt. I* discourses, rendering the reason why whiteness inheres in a subject through inherence really distinct from it, while inherence itself inheres in whiteness and not through another inherence. Other reasons for this conclusion and the evasions of the Nominalists precluded, see in the passage cited in Physics.

Against this conclusion Rubio in the passage cited objects in many ways. Between things immediately united, or uniable, no intermediate form must be posited, because then they would not be immediately united. But every accident separated from a subject is immediately uniable to it; therefore etc. The minor is proved: because inherence is posited as thus immediately united to whiteness, from which actual inherence is no less distinguished than whiteness itself from the subject. Also second: because if such inherence were given, it would be posterior to the accident and subject, since when it is posited as a respect it presupposes the extremes already posited in being. Indeed, since it is extrinsically supervening, it not only presupposes accident and subject, but even the accident in the subject, because it supposes the extremes approximated. Therefore this inherence is superfluous, since the accident is in the subject antecedently to it. Also third: inherence relates to accident as subsistence to substance; but the latter does not posit something superadded to substance; therefore neither the former to accident. Also finally: because no efficient cause of such inherence can be assigned. Either it would proceed from the accident itself — and this cannot be, because not all accidents are active, as is commonly said of quantity, which is not in the genus of active things — or from the subject of the accident. And neither, because the subject can at most concur also in the genus of efficient cause in producing the very accident which it receives, but not some other form in the accident which it receives and produces.

The reply: actual inhesion does not mediate between accident and subject as *quod*, or as something united, but only as *quo*, or as the formal reason of uniting. This does not remove their immediate conjunction, just as when the eye sees the wall, not because vision mediates is the wall said to be seen mediately, but immediately — because vision does not mediate as the visible *quod*, but as the formal reason of seeing. Why however between inherence and whiteness, in which it is founded, nothing uniting and coupling mediates — neither as *quod* nor as *quo* — I said a little earlier: because inherence is not of itself indifferent to inhere or not to inhere, but is necessarily and indispensably always affixed to another, and therefore does not need another inherence.

To the second, I said sufficiently in *disp. 5. Phys. quæstion. 8. art. 2. numer. 104.* speaking of substantial union. Whether inherence is truly prior or posterior to the accident through it inhering, I shall soon say.

To the third, the Doctor says in *4. dist. 12. quæstion. 1. § ad argumenta principalia* that the parity about the per se being of substance and the being in another of accident does not run well, unless both are taken aptitudinally. For if they are taken actually, there is an open disparity between the subsistence of substance and the inhesion of accident, taking subsistence for per se existence as it excludes inherence. For inherence is distinguished from absolute accident, because the accident can be conserved without it. Hence relative accidents, which cannot be without a subject, do not need a distinct mode of inhering. And so likewise, since

a substantial nature cannot not exist per se, it does not need another distinct mode by which it may be constituted as thus existing per se, as an absolute accident needs that it be said to inhere in another. Parity can, however, be admitted taking subsistence for per se incommunicable existence, because this superadds something negative to nature, without which it can exist by God's absolute power, as is clear from the preceding disputation.

To the last: some have said that the mode of inherence flows effectively from the accident itself, to whom Suárez seems to subscribe in *3. part. tom. 1. disp. 8. sect. 3. dub. 3*. Others wish it to be caused rather by the subject in the accident itself, and in this they say consists the causality of the subject. However, since here it is a respect extrinsically supervening, because it is nothing but the actual union of accident to subject, and since such a respect can immediately terminate the causality of an efficient from the Doctor *3. dist. 1. quæst. 1.* and *quol. 11.*, it must be said that it flows effectively neither from the subject nor from the accident, but from the same efficient from which the accident is made, or by which the accident is united to the subject. And indeed, that it does not emanate from the accident itself, the Doctor expresses in *4. dist. 12. quæst. 1. litt. O*, where he says that whiteness does not make itself inhere in the subject, but the agent producing the whiteness. And that if the subject at times performs this office, this belongs to it in the character of agent, insofar as it contains the form not only potentially but also virtually. And below *litt. Q* he says that an accident cannot unite itself effectively to a subject. Hence if God should reduce the substance of bread, and do nothing else, the accident would remain without the subject as now, nor would it be united to the reproduced substance of bread.

That it also cannot emanate effectively from the subject insofar as it is a subject, is proved: because its causality in the character of subject is altogether passive, and is entirely consummated in receiving and sustaining the accident. It remains therefore that the inherence of accident emanates effectively from the same agent from which the accident itself is produced. For the same agent which produces accident in the subject also effects that it be in the subject.

Second, he argues: what is in a subject through another mediating cannot in any way be for it the reason of being in the subject, because then there would be a circle. But if inherence were a form distinct from accident, it would never be subjectively in substance except through the accident, its immediate foundation. For the inherence of whiteness cannot be in substance unless the whiteness itself is in substance. Therefore etc.

Confirmation: because since substance is immediately receptive of all accidents, no accident seems to be posited to which it is altogether repugnant to be received in substance immediately and first. But to such inherence, if posited, it is repugnant to be received first in substance, because the immediate subject of inherence must be the inhering thing.

Finally, if inherence is some real accidental form, it is asked in what genus it is to be posited. It cannot be posited in the genus of action and passion, because no thing of such genera can be the terminus of action, because of action there is no action. But such inherence is the terminus of action, since it is a respect extrinsically supervening. Also every action and passion regards some produced terminus, which this actual inherence does not do.

The reply: inherence is not received or subjected in substance, but in the accident immediately; nor is it properly called inherent, but is the reason why the accident, to which the mode is posited, is called inhering — just as neither subsistence, which is a mode of substance, is called subsisting, but is the formal reason why substance subsists, and is so *quo* that it cannot be *quod*.

To the Confirmation: the assumption is denied, for it is not necessary that all accidents be immediately received and subjected in substance, but it suffices if immediately or at least mediately they depend on it, as on the altogether first and ultimate terminus of their dependence. Indeed, in the more probable opinion only quantity immediately inheres in corporeal substance; other accidents, however, through mediating quantity, as was said in Physics.

To the last: the nature of the union of form to subject, whether substantial or accidental, is abundantly explained in *disp. 5. Phys. q. 9.*, and to what predicament it pertains. First it was said that it is not an absolute entity, but a merely respective one, from Scotus 3. *dist. 1. quæst. 1.*, because union is not to self but to another, nor can union be understood except of one to another distinct from self, which is a relative understanding. Then from the same Scotus 4. *dist. 12. quæst. 1. C* it was said to be a respect extrinsically supervening, because it does not necessarily follow from the extremes posited in being. For God can conserve form and subject separated without union, and union can per se terminate the unitive action of an agent, which is proper of a respect extrinsically supervening.

Of what genus however among those six the Doctor says in the passage cited, that perhaps it pertains to the genus of passion, if passion expresses not only the respect of patient to agent, but to form, or to the agent of action. If action expresses not only the respect of agent to patient, but of the informing form to that which is informed. Through which amplification of those genera, the argument adduced by Rubio is avoided. More briefly however there I said, from Bassolius in 4. *dist. 12. qu. 1. articul. 1.*, that inherence pertains to the predicament of habit. Because such habitude is in some way left from the adjacency of form to subject, or is the very adjacency of form. Hence the Author of 6. *princip.* places in that predicament "to be white" and "to be quantified," which is nothing but to have quantity and quality inhering. Therefore in logic the predicament of habit is principally constituted in that mutual habitude by which the subject is said to have the form, and the form is said to be had by the subject. Through which explanation is excluded the objection which Aversa makes against this in *quæstion. 21. section. 3.*, namely that that predicament consists only in extrinsic

denomination, or in the respect arising from the adjacency of clothes around the body. And consequently he teaches that inherence is not of a determinate genus, but wanders through several, and is common to the nine genera. Which also Meurisse holds in *lib. 3. qu. 5.* of his Metaphysics.

But you will say: what is of a determinate genus cannot belong to several genera. But accident, or the inherent, as regards the per se character of the name, agrees with all nine genera; therefore etc. The Doctor replies that it is not inconvenient that what is of a determinate genus denominate several genera, as some say of the respect of creation, that it per se pertains to the genus of relation and yet denominates anything other than God. Thus therefore in our case this respect can per se pertain to one genus, and yet denominatively be said of relations or respects of the nine genera.

You will say, from Simplicius on the predicaments: "to be in" does not constitute any special genus, because the one "to be in" is of all nine genera. The Doctor again meets this: either "to be in" is taken denominatively, and thus it encircles all the genera of accidents, as this "to inhere" or "to accrue" — or it is taken for the habitude itself per se signified by "to be in," and in this manner is taken some genus from "to be in," because it is a determinate species in one genus. But if he understands that "to be in," as regards the per se character which it imports, does not pertain to some determinate genus, but per se to several genera, it must be denied. For he is not of such great authority that on account of his saying the opposite of that which reason concludes must be granted. Reason however convinces that that concept which "to be in" imports can be quidditatively contained in some genus, although denominatively it is said of forms which are in many genera. For it is not said quidditatively of whiteness and line, because what essentially includes respect is not to itself according to Augustine *de Trinit. cap. 2.* Thus the Doctor.

Third, it is urged: because there is a difficulty whether this inherence is one relation, or one mode intervening between subject and form, or rather twofold — of which one is held from the side of the form, and the other from the side of the subject. For on the one hand one union seems to suffice, because union is essentially a union of two. Hence it is intelligible that union unite and not unite two extremes, and join one to another. By which reasoning the recent authors universally say that one union suffices between subject and accident. Some of whom wish this proximately and immediately to be in the subject, not however in the accident itself; others the opposite. But on the other hand a twofold mode of union seems to be doubled — one of inhesion from the side of the accident, which is said to inhere and reside in it; another of sustenance from the side of the subject, which is in the subject itself. Since they must exercise diverse offices, which cannot suitably be supplied through one and the same mode.

The reply, from Scotus in *4. distinction. 12. quæstion. 1.*, is that a twofold mode of inhesion must be posited between form and subject, of which one is held from

the side of the form, the other from the side of the subject. As was said likewise regarding substantial union between matter and form in *disputation 5. Physicor. quaestion. 10.*, where this assertion has been proved extensively with several reasons against the recent authors. Which reasons are common both for substantial union and for accidental, of which here is the discussion, and therefore they are to be consulted there. The reason however adduced in the opposite only proves that through one mode of union indeed one part is united to another, but not in the same way, but one is united intrinsically — namely that which founds the union — the other, however, only extrinsically, insofar as it terminates the union, although both must be posited as united intrinsically by the reasons adduced in the passage cited.

Aversa, however, in *q. 21. cit. sec. 3. con. 3* thinks there is one inherence between accident and subject, and that this proximately and immediately is in the subject, not however in the accident itself, which is said to inhere. He proves it, because inherence is the causality of the subject toward the accident itself. But causality ought to be something intermediate between cause and effect in that genus of cause in which it is exercised, and in some way prior the causality itself ought to proceed and depend from the cause, so that through its mediation the effect proceeds and depends. But if inherence were to be in the accident immediately, plainly it would not mediate in the genus of subjective cause between subject and accident, nor would it first proceed and depend from the cause, nor through it as mediating would the accident depend on the subject, nor would the accident itself depend on such causality. But rather, on the contrary, the accident would mediate between subject and inherence, and the accident would depend earlier on the subject than the inherence, and through the mediation of the accident the inherence would depend; and from the accident itself, as from its subject, the inherence itself would depend. Nor can all these things be preserved otherwise, unless inherence is said to be immediately in the subject.

It is confirmed because this inherence is related in the genus of material cause, just as action in the genus of effective cause. But it could not possibly come about that action proceeded immediately from the effect itself, but must altogether proceed immediately from the agent, so that through it mediating the effect is produced. Therefore likewise the causality of the subject toward the accident cannot be immediately in the accident itself, but must be immediately in the subject. Finally, according to Scotus, the subject is that which receives and sustains the accident, and yet not through a mode that is immediately in it. Therefore, conversely, for the accident truly to inhere, it is not necessary that the inherence be in it, but it suffices that it be in the subject.

The reply is that the argument proceeds from a false supposition in the major — that the causality by which the accident depends on the subject consists simply and absolutely in inherence and union — when rather it consists in the respect which is called eduction, as has been said universally about every material form,

whether substantial or accidental, in *disp. 2. Phys. q. 4. art. 1*. But even granting this, the minor must still be denied from what was said just now. For in reality causality does not mediate between cause and effect, nor does the effect proceed prior and more immediately from the cause by causality, because rather upon the absolute in the cause there immediately follows the absolute in the effect, and immediately afterward the relation of the effect to the cause, which is passive causality, and of the cause to the effect (if the cause is capable of relation), which is active causality. The effect, however, depends on causality as on that by which it is formally denominated caused and dependent. From which it does not follow that causality is simply prior to the effect, but that it is only prior to the effect as it stands under such a denomination of caused. I grant also that inherence does not mediate between substance and accident in the sense that Aversa contends, nor does it proceed from the cause earlier than the accident itself. It mediates indeed in the character of a formal and relative medium, and through its mediation the accident formally depends on the subject — from the sustaining subject — and the accident itself depends on such inherence as on that by which it is formally denominated inhering. When it is inferred from this that the accident would then rather mediate between subject and inherence, I grant that the accident mediates between subject and inherence insofar as fundamentally it is earlier attached to the subject than the inherence is said to arise between them, although in another sense — namely in the character of a relative medium — inherence must truly be said to mediate between accident and subject. For thus inherence immediately attains the subject in the character of a terminus to which it couples and joins formally the accident itself. Accident also depends on the subject fundamentally earlier than its inherence depends on the same as on a terminus, although not formally. However, through the mediation of the accident the inherence does not depend on the subject, because it does not depend on it except as on a terminus to which it joins the accident in the character of a relative medium, and therefore by itself it immediately depends on it.

To the Confirmation: again in the major it is falsely supposed that the causality of the subject toward the accident consists in inherence. But granting this, I say to the minor that it is indeed impossible that action itself proceed immediately from the effect as from a foundation — for thus it must altogether proceed from the agent, not indeed that the effect has being through its mediation in the sense intended by Aversa (for when it proceeds from the agent as from a foundation, the effect is already supposed to be in being as the terminus of such a relation), but that through its mediation in the character of a relative terminus the agent is said to be formally causing and effecting. Just as also for this same reason there must immediately proceed from the effect, in the same instant, as from a foundation, the passive causality, that it may be denominated formally caused and dependent. And so likewise it must be said in our case about the causality of the subject toward the accident.

To the last: the assumption is denied, for as has been said, there is also required on the side of the subject a proper inherence, so that through it the subject may be denominated formally as receiving and sustaining the accident. And by the same reasoning, a proper inherence will be necessary on the side of the accident, so that it may be said to be received and to inhere. For since these are intrinsic denominations, and moreover contrary and opposed, they cannot be taken from one and the same mode of inhesion, but each one from its own existing in its proper subject.

I say second: aptitudinal inherence is also something of the essence of an absolute accident (for we shall speak about the relative in the following question), not indeed really, but formally superadded from the nature of the thing, and distinguished from it in the same way. The conclusion is Scotus's in the cited *4. d. 12. quæst. 1.* against the Thomists and others who in no way distinguish aptitudinal inherence from the essence of accident. And indeed that it is not something really superadded to the essence of accident, and thus distinct from it, our opponents themselves grant, and it is sufficiently clear from a principle sufficiently familiar in Scotus — that aptitudes do not add a distinct thing above the apt nature, as the Doctor teaches in *4. d. 49. quæst. 10. ab initio*, and has been extensively proved in *disput. 5. Log. qu. 4. art. 1.* While it is shown there that the proper passion of any thing whatever, which especially consists in aptitude, is not really distinguished from its subject. For if risibility, which in man is the aptitude for laughing, and mobility, which in a natural body is the aptitude for motion, were really distinguished from those subjects — then just as in them a distinct aptitude for those acts of laughing and motion is assigned — so likewise another aptitude would have to be assigned to those distinct aptitudes, about which again the question would return, whether it were really distinguished from those subjects or not. If not, the same must likewise be asserted about that first aptitude; if so, a process into infinity will be given.

That however it is something formally superadded to the essence of accident from the nature of the thing, and thus distinguished from it, is proved from two principles sufficiently known especially in our school. The first is that aptitude universally speaking in absolute things supposes the thing of which it is an aptitude constituted in its quidditative being, and is said to flow and emanate from it. By this reasoning the Doctor proves in *2. dist. 3. quæst. 7. A.* and *quolib. 2. C.* that souls are not distinguished among themselves individually primarily and a priori through an aptitude and inclination to diverse bodies, because absolute nature itself is naturally prior to aptitude, which is a certain respective formality, or a certain aptitudinal respect. An absolute, however, precedes respect from the whole genus, whether this is actual or aptitudinal. Both because a thing is earlier to itself than to another, and because respect is founded in an absolute, and the founded from the nature of the thing always presupposes the foundation.

That the character of aptitude and inclination is respective, not absolute, is sufficiently clear in itself, because nothing is said to incline toward itself, but toward another, and aptitude is always an aptitude for some act.

The other principle, extensively proved by us in *disput. 8. Log. quæstion. 2.*, is that an absolute does not include in its formal and quidditative concept a respect, whether predicamental or transcendental. Because then it would be formally to itself and not to itself, to another and not to another. Since therefore aptitude expresses a transcendental relation, it cannot be included in the quidditative concept of an absolute nature, but follows upon it in the manner of a proper passion.

And from these two principles it is necessarily inferred that aptitudinal inherence is not the essence and quiddity of accident itself, but something immediately consequent upon it in the manner of a proper passion.

This is confirmed also from the principles of our opponents. For they too are accustomed to constitute the quiddities of things not in their aptitudes, but in the root or exigitive principle of them. Thus they are accustomed to say that the essence of man is not risibility, but its exigitive principle, which is rationality, or humanity. That mobility is not the essence of a natural body, but its root, which is naturality. Thus also they are accustomed to say that the essence of quantity is not constituted by impenetrability, but by its exigitive principle.

Therefore universally it is thus in absolute things, that aptitude does not constitute the essence of a thing, but supposes it as naturally prior, as the principle from which it is and emanates. And so likewise must it be said in our case about the aptitude of an accident for inhering, since there is the same reasoning about all.

If, however, from this general doctrine about the aptitude of natures they wish to exclude the aptitude of an accident for inhering, they ought not only to say this, as Aversa does, but also to prove and show a disparity between this aptitude and others.

For what Aversa says, that there is no necessity or utility in constituting this aptitude in the accident as distinct from its essence, and that it is very well understood that the accident itself proximately through its essence is apt for inhering, in no way proves this. For thus I too shall say about any other aptitude, for example, risibility, mobility, penetrability — that in vain are they distinguished from the essences, because it can be very well understood that man through his essence is proximately and formally apt for laughing, a natural body for being moved, and quantity apt for impenetration. Therefore a reason of disparity must be assigned why this can specially be asserted about the aptitude of an accident for inhering, but not about the others.

Poncius, however, in the passage cited, because he saw that the argument candidly either equally urges for all or for none, judges it probable that no aptitudinal respects are to be granted formally distinct from their foundations. Yet, lest he should seem to recede from the common opinion, he adds that if some are to be granted, only those are, whose concept is not involved in the essential concept of the foundation — as, for example, risibility, or the aptitude for laughing, which can be said not to be the difference essentially constituting man, because man can be understood according to essential predicates without its being understood that he is risible either radically or formally.

Nor does this satisfy, because I will likewise say that aptitudinal inherence is not involved in the essential concept of the accident, nor is its essential difference, because the accident can be understood according to essential predicates, if not quietly, at least quidditatively, as was said at *num.* 7, without its being understood to be inhering either radically or formally. Nor do I see why man can more be understood according to essential predicates without being understood to be risible radically or formally, than the accident itself not inhering radically or formally in its quidditative concept. Either therefore this must be asserted of any aptitudinal respect whatever, or of none, unless a serious disparity be assigned and not voluntarily stated.

Against this second conclusion Poncius argues in the passage cited, because such aptitude for inhering, superadded to the nature of the accident, seems altogether superfluous. For the accident through its essence and through its essential constitutives can furnish whatever can belong to it through such aptitude.

I reply that this argument equally proves about every aptitude with respect to any absolute essence whatever, or about none. And therefore for all the assumption is denied, because aptitudes refer absolute essences to another transcendently; and since no respect is included in the essence of an absolute, it must be said that an absolute essence is not so referred formally by itself, but through a relation formally superadded.

Against this Poncius objects, because the very essential difference of the accident, which they call the root of that formal aptitude, cannot be understood except in the manner of a respect — that is, in the manner of something which is by nature apt to cause that formal aptitude. And yet despite this, it is not a respect according to those who assert that aptitude to be formally distinct. Therefore something which is not truly a respect can still be of such a nature that it cannot be understood except in the manner of a respect. And he himself calls this a respect *secundum dici*, since, namely, in reality it is an absolute entity, but is called a respect because it cannot be explained except in the manner of a relative. For so afterwards he explains a respect *secundum dici* below in *disp.* 15. *de relatione num.* 6., where he gives the example of potency, part, habit, and the like. And by relations *secundum esse* he understands those which are truly relations, and not only in name or in our manner of speaking.

The reply: this discrimination between relatives *secundum esse* and *secundum dici* is not well explained, as I have shown in *disp. 8. Log. q. 2. in fine*. Because Aristotle in the chapter on relation enumerates among relatives *secundum dici* some which truly express a relation to another, such as sense and knowledge, and not only a relation in name. And such also are those which Poncius himself enumerates among relatives *secundum dici*, for potency, part, and habit truly express a relation to another, and not only in name. Nor is this the reason why they are called relatives *secundum dici*, but rather because they are accidentally and denominatively relatives, as distinct from relatives *secundum esse*, which are essentially relatives, as has been explained there at length. Also, because by explaining relatives *secundum dici* in this way, one could not distinguish between the absolute and the relative, but all could be called absolute beings at will — as paternity and filiation, which if they are explained by relation, it will be said to happen according to the voice and our manner of speaking, but in themselves they are truly absolute beings, even if by us they cannot be explained except through a respect — and it could be denied that relations are given which are truly relations, shamelessly claiming that all are absolute, even though explained through relation.

Regarding however what he said, that the very essential difference of the accident, which they call the root of that formal aptitude, cannot be understood except in the manner of a respect — that is, in the manner of something which is by nature apt to cause that formal aptitude — I confess that this urges sufficiently. But not only in our case, but universally regarding any essence whatever that is the radical and exigitive principle of some aptitude which we do not say to be a respect, or to essentially include a respect. Hence through this it would be proved that the essence of quantity is not well explained through being the exigitive principle of impenetrability, nor rationality or humanity through being the root of risibility, etc. Either it must always be granted that such absolute essences are formally and essentially relative, or a process into infinity must be given.

But this difficulty can also be satisfied, for preserving the aptitudinal respects in things formally distinct from them, if one notes the excellent doctrine of Scotus in *2. d. 1. qu. 6. in corpore quæsi § dico tunc ad quæstionem*. Where he says that whatever is able to act is some being having first act, and the character of first act according to itself is naturally prior to its relation to the second act of which it can be the principle. So that although that by which such a being is the principle of the second act is not something distinct from its nature, nevertheless its first entity is not its nature as it is the principle of such second act, but its nature as in itself it is this.

Thus likewise in our case, when we say that the aptitude for inhering emanates from the essence of accident, or the aptitude for impenetration from the essence of quantity, and so of others, it must not be thought that the essence is the principle of such aptitude through another aptitude. Because since such an

aptitude is always conjoined with its corresponding act or effect, and altogether inseparable from it by any power whatever — for quantity is always with impenetrability, humanity with risibility, etc. — such an aptitude for principiating passions of this kind is not distinct from the absolute essence of the thing itself, nor is it even formally distinct from it as a true relative formality, because it does not refer to a really distinct terminus. But those passions are true transcendental respects and formally distinct from it, because they truly refer it to a really distinct terminus. And again, they can be separated from their acts, as risibility from laughter, impenetrability from actual impenetration, and so on.

And again, when we explain the essence of things through the fact that they are the roots and exigitive principles of their passions, this is not to be understood reduplicatively, but specifically — that humanity is that absolute entity which is the principle of risibility, quantity which is the principle of impenetrability. Which concept, as is clear, is altogether absolute, nor does it reduplicate or involve in itself any respect, because as the Doctor said, although that by which such a being is the principle of the second act, or of some aptitude (to speak more to the point), is not something distinct from its nature, nevertheless its first entity is not its nature as it is the principle of such a second act or aptitude, but its nature as in itself it is this. Which doctrine is much to be noted for the solution of the present difficulty.

Second principally, it is argued from Alensis in the passage cited. Just as the nature of substance is apt by nature to be in itself, so the nature of accident is apt by nature to be in another. But the aptitude of being in itself adds nothing above substance; therefore neither does the aptitude of being in another add anything above the essence of accident.

Confirmation: either the essence of accident is in another by itself, or through something superadded. The first — we have the intended point. If through another, it is asked about that other, whether it is in the subject by itself, or through another. If by itself, the same could be said of the first; if through another, a process into infinity will be given.

The Doctor replies in 4. *dist.* 12. *quæst.* 2. *ad 1. prin.* that the parity consists in this: that just as the *per se esse* in substance denies the aptitude for inhering, so being in another, or being able to be in another, affirms that aptitude in the accident. By which manner of speaking he signifies that there is not in substance such a positive aptitude for being in itself superadded to it, as there is in accident for being in another, but only the mere negation of aptitude or potency for inhering. And indeed quite reasonably, because aptitude in accident for being in another can be admitted in the manner of a certain aptitudinal respect superadded to the essence, because that truly refers to another as to a really distinct terminus. And such an aptitude can be separated from its act, as is clear in the Eucharistic accidents.

Which indeed cannot be asserted regarding the aptitude of substance for being per se and in itself, because nothing truly is referred to itself but to a really distinct terminus. Nor can substance ever be separated from the act of existing per se and in itself (unless per se esse is taken for per se and in itself existing incommunicably) as the aptitude of accident for inhering is separated from actual inhesion. And therefore, properly speaking, the aptitude of substance for being per se and in itself is not something superadded to substance from the nature of the thing and formally distinct from its essence, but the very essence of substance, or at most a superadded negation of aptitudinal inhesion to another. And therefore the parity absolutely taken is absolutely to be denied.

To the Confirmation: the argument equally proves about actual inherence as about aptitudinal, that it is not something superadded to the accident. If therefore the argument is made about actual inhesion, it must be said, as above in the first conclusion, that an absolute accident inheres through inherence in the manner already explained. However, inherence by itself really and formally inheres in the accident, because it is not of itself indifferent, so that it can be or not be in another, but necessarily is tied to the thing, as a mode of the thing modified by itself, and is an essential determination of another, so that it may be called actually united. And thus a process into infinity is not given, but a stop is made in the mode of inherence, because another inherence does not inhere, but inheres by itself.

If, however, the argument is made about aptitudinal inherence, I say that the essence of accident inheres in another through a superadded inherence, not indeed really, but formally. And therefore it can be said to inhere in itself aptitudinally, because not through something really superadded. And thus a process into infinity never follows, neither in things nor in formalities.

Finally, Aversa, cited, argues: because if in accident an aptitude for inhering is distinguished, so likewise in a substantial form another informative aptitude must be distinguished beyond its essential character — which seems inconvenient.

The reply: granting gratuitously that also in a substantial form by the same reasoning an informative aptitude must be distinguished from its essential character.

Question III. Whether inherence is of the essence of accident

This question the Doctor treats by design in 7. *Metaphys. quæstion. 1.* and 4. *dist. 12. quæst. 1.*, where in the body of the question, § *ad quæstionem*, he notes that this difficulty is not raised about accident taken for what is per se signified — namely for accidentality itself, or accident, which is the formal and per se signified of accident as such, because this is most formally inherence itself. But about accident taken for what is denominated from inherence and accidentality — namely for that form which is denominated accident or inhering, whether this is an absolute form such as quantity or color, or respective, such as similarity or paternity.

Three opinions are usually reported here: two extreme and one middle. The first extreme opinion is attributed to Aristotle and other pagan Philosophers, who, not acknowledging the separability of accident from subject, seem to have affirmed that inherence, not only aptitudinal but also actual, is of the essence of any accident whatever, both absolute and respective. And this is held in the opinion of Aristotle by Jandun in 7. *Metaph. quæst. 1.*, Bacon in 1. *dist. 28. qu. 1. art. 3.*, Suessanus in *disp. 1. Metaph. cap. 4.*, and other Peripatetics.

Another extreme opinion denies that either is of the essence of accident as such, although it freely grants that aptitudinal inherence is really identified with accident as its proper passion, and therefore essential to it in the second mode of per se saying, not however in the first, because then it would properly be said to be of the essence of accident as its quidditative predicate. And this is attributed to Scotus in 7. *Met. qu. 1.*, where thus the metaphysical Scotists discourse: Antonius Andreas, Trombetta, Orbellus, Faber, Zerbius Meurisse in *lib. 3. of his Metaph. qu. 5. Canon 1. Phys. qu. 4.*, and again in 4. *dist. 12. qu. 1.*, where the theological Scotists Bassolius, Tatar, Aretinus, Faber, Iribarne, Rada in 4. *part. controvers. 12. artic. 1.*, and others.

The middle opinion finally teaches that actual inherence indeed is not of the essence of accident, but well indeed aptitudinal. Indeed, this is the essential character itself of accident and the quidditative difference constitutive of it. And this is attributed to St. Thomas *Met. 7. Met. Lec. 1.* and 4. *d. 12. q. 1. art. 1.*, and with him the other Thomists of *Metaph. 7. Met. q. 1.* — Javellus, Zanardi, and others. Cajetan *de ente et essentia q.*, Capreolus 4. *d. 42. quæst. 1. ad 1.*, Hervæus *quol. 4.*, and the recent authors universally.

I say first: actual inherence is neither of the essence of absolute accident, nor even really identified with it. The conclusion is Scotus's in the passage cited and is nearly common, with a few recent authors excepted who assert that for certain accidents even absolute, separability from subject is repugnant.

That it is not of the essence, the Doctor proves, and shows to be of the mind of the Philosopher under *lit. F*: because nothing is of the essence of anything except what pertains to its quiddity. But no respect can be of the per se concept of an absolute, otherwise in such a concept contradictories would be included — namely, to be to itself and not to be to itself, to be to another and not to be to another. Therefore, since actual inherence expresses the respect of the union of form to the subject to which it inheres, it will not be of the essence of an absolute being, which excludes every respect from its formal character.

Confirmation: because if respect were included in the quidditative concept of an absolute being, there would not be a greater reason why such an entity should be called respective rather than absolute. Hence either it would be simultaneously essentially absolute and respective, or neither — either of which is repugnant.

Julius Sirenus replies in *disp. de subjecto primæ Philos. sect. 2. C. 22.*, where he holds the opposite of this conclusion in the mind of the Philosopher, that accident as accident is not absolute but relative; but according to other considerations, it is absolute to each — namely as a being and as such an accident is according to individual species quantity, quality, whiteness, etc.

This solution is not to the purpose of where this present question is treated, for here the discussion is about accident for the material and for what is denominated from accidentality and inherence, not however for the formal and per se signified, as was said from the beginning of the question. Although in this second sense it is true that absolute accident is relative, as it stands reduplicatively under such denomination, it is still false about accident taken for the material and the denominated. Also, because if accident as such is formally relative, then quantity, quality, color, etc., will be relative, even as they are such accidents according to individual species, because species essentially includes genus, and a relative genus cannot be contracted by absolute differences.

Therefore Gandavus replies otherwise in the passage cited, that absolutely the minor is true of a totally absolute being — which an accident is not — which, although it is indeed absolute from a terminus, because it is not according to its entity to another, as a father to a son, is not however absolute from subject, because it essentially depends on it. Hence nothing is absolute from subject except substance.

Nor does this solution satisfy, because every order and relation is to a terminus. Therefore if an absolute accident essentially depends on a subject, it would depend on it as on the terminus of its dependence, and the subject of accident itself would be the terminus of such a relation of dependence. Also, because everything which includes a habitude to a terminus as something of its essence is to the terminus. Therefore if an absolute accident essentially includes such a habitude, it will be essentially to another as to a terminus.

Finally, the Doctor cited directly attacks this solution in § *Tertia conclusio*, proving that an absolute accident does not essentially depend on a subject. There is no essential and simply necessary dependence of some absolute on something which is not of its essence, but only is for it an extrinsic cause, except on the simply first extrinsic cause, namely on God. The subject, however, is not of the essence of accident, because then a white man would not be a being per accidens, which is against the Philosopher 5 *Met. cap. de ente*, and *cap. de uno*, and 7. *Met. cap. 3.*, because by adding to something that which is of its essence, a being per accidens is not had — especially if that in itself is a being per se. But accident according to itself is a being per se according to the Philosopher 5. *Met. cap. de ente*, hence also per se is in a genus. Nor is the subject a simply first extrinsic cause, but God precisely is such a cause, who is not the subject of accident. Therefore the dependence of an absolute accident on the subject is not simply necessary. I call simply necessary that whose opposite includes a contradiction (says the Doctor).

The major is proved, because the causality of any extrinsic cause with respect to any caused thing can be perfectly supplied by the first cause, because it has in itself every such causality more eminently than a second cause.

If you say the subject is a material cause with respect to accident, and God cannot supply the role of a material cause, just as neither of a formal — the Doctor again urges: because according to Aristotle 8. *Met.* 12. accidents do not have matter *ex qua*, but *in qua*, or if they have *ex qua*, that is not the subject, because the subject with the accident makes a being per accidens, as has been said. But the per se intrinsic to the essence of an accident, whether matter or form, does not constitute a being per accidens, because accident is a certain whole, and is composed of all things pertaining to its essence.

From this reasoning (the Doctor continues) is clear why the Philosophers said that an accident cannot be without a subject. Not indeed because they posited subject as of the essence of accident — indeed, from these a being per accidens is constituted. Nor because they posited inherence, or any respect whatever to subject, of the per se character of an absolute being, because it is a contradiction that in the per se character of an absolute any respect should be included, because then it would be absolute. But only because they posited an order of causes simply necessary, such that the first cause cannot cause the caused of the second cause without the second cause. The subject, however, has some causality with respect to the accident, speaking of the natural order of causes. And therefore, with this cause not posited in the order of its causality, they denied that the accident is. And for this reason it is said in 1. *Phys.* that the intellect seeking the segregation of passions from subjects will be seeking impossibilities — not indeed impossible as though it included something repugnant to the first character or quiddity of an absolute accident, but on account of this necessary order of causes posited by the Philosophers.

Aversa, finally, in the cited *q. 21. sec. 2. ad 1.*, who holds that actual inherence is of the essence of certain absolute accidents, to which in his opinion it is repugnant to be altogether separated from the subject, replies that the minor of the principal argument is valid only of predicamental respect, not transcendental. For a transcendental relation can well be found which is of the essence of an absolute being, and then such a thing will indeed be called absolute from a predicamental respect, but not from a transcendental, hence it can and must be called essentially relative. And he adds that for this reason Scotus too grants that of the essential character of created being is an order of dependence on God, so that it is to be wondered at why by this foundation he thought that inherence cannot be of the essence of accident.

But that such absolute accidents inseparable from subject are not given will soon be clear. Then this response, familiar to our opponents, has often been refuted, especially in *disp. 8. Log. qu. 2.*, because if the argument is well weighed it concludes equally about transcendental and predicamental respect. For its force

consists in this: that a contradiction would follow about the absolute, if it essentially included a respect — that it would be to itself and not to itself, to another and not to another — and whether predicamentally or transcendently, whatever is posited, a contradiction always follows.

As for what Aversa adds about our Doctor, that he may show him here as forgetful or not speaking consistently, how much truth it has, let the prudent Reader judge from the words which the Doctor himself has in the passage cited, *F*, proving this conclusion. For these are his words: *nothing is of the essence of anything except what pertains intrinsically to its quiddity. Some respect, however, although it may be the same as the foundation, as has been said about the respect of creature to God in the passage cited above, is not however of its quiddity, because then no essence of a creature would be absolute.* From which it is clear that Scotus holds wholly the opposite of what he reports, and never taught that of the essential character of created being is an order of dependence on God. He holds indeed that this dependence is essential, and also really identified with the creature, not however essentially and quidditatively.

The other part of the conclusion — that actual inherence is not even really identified with an absolute accident — is proved by Scotus in the cited *7. Met. q. 1.*: it is impossible that the same thing remain and be corrupted, because otherwise it would simultaneously be and not be. But with an absolute accident remaining and existing, actual inherence does not remain, as is clear in the venerable Sacrament, where accidents are separated without actual inherence. Otherwise, if that inherence remained, since because of it the subject was previously denominated from the accident and was called quantified bread, it would likewise be called bread quantified after the transubstantiation, which is false.

And indeed it is false, as Aversa said in the cited place, that certain absolute accidents are given to which it is altogether repugnant to be separated from the subject, and that in these actual inherence is really identified with them. Where he gives the example of figure in the genus of quality, which is inseparable from quantity; of time in the genus of quantity, which is inseparable from motion; of number, which cannot exist without the things numbered. And generally of modes, which by no power can exist per se separated from the things which they modify.

This, I say, is false, because every absolute accident, by the reason by which it is absolute, can by God's power be separated from a subject and conserved separated. And that this is likely of all can be deduced not without foundation from the Sacrament of the Eucharist, as has been proved by design in *disp. 3. Phys. q. 3. art. 1.* Nor are the examples adduced by Aversa to the point. Figure properly speaking does not import something absolute, but rather respective, as I said in *disp. 7. Log. 3. art. 2.* from Scotus *4. d. 12. q. 4. F.* It is called quality, however, because it has the mode of denominating quality, as was there said from Scotus *quol. 18. lit. I.* Again, neither time nor number are proper and true species of quantity; nor

if they were, would time have to be really distinguished from motion, and number from the things numbered, as has been said in *disp. 7. Log. q. 2. art. 1.*

And finally, modes such as union, presence, session, etc., are relative accidents, as has been said often, not absolute. And if any mode is posited as absolute, it will rather have the character of a thing than of a mode, and by God's absolute power will be able to exist by itself alone.

Against this conclusion many arguments by the Philosophers are wont to be made, which have already been solved in *disp. 3. Phys. q. 3. art. 1.*, where it has been proved that every absolute accident can by God's power be without subject. Other things also pertaining to the same point have been solved a little above in this *disp. q. 1.* The arguments of Gandavus, however, coincide with those reasons which are brought forward by the Doctor in the cited place *4. d. 12. quæst. 1.* below *lit. E, verse Contra istam conclusionem*, and are altogether to be seen. For they contain excellent difficulties, and the solutions to them are filled with wonderful doctrine, which I do not report here not because they should be passed over, but because they can be seen in the Doctor, for they are easy and clear, nor do they require greater declaration.

I say second: actual inherence is not only really the same with a respective accident, but is also of its essence. This is Scotus's in the passage cited and indeed as regards both parts below *litt. D. § Secunda conclusio*; and as regards the first part, it is against Canon cited *1. Phys. qu. 4*, where he holds that by God's absolute power even a respective accident can exist without a subject.

And it is proved from that maxim of Scotus *2. dist. 1. qu. 5. §*: that relation is the same with the foundation without which it implies that the foundation is from the intrinsic. But the actual inherence of a respective accident is of this kind. Therefore it is really identified with it. The major has been extensively proved in *disp. 8. Log. qu. 2.* from the Doctor in the cited place, and he proves the minor here: respect is a habitude essentially between two extremes. Therefore just as to remove the terminus to which a respect is, is to remove or destroy the respect, so to remove that which the respect is of — namely subject or foundation — is to remove the respect and destroy the character of respect. Therefore it is not because a respective accident is an accident (says the Doctor) that therefore it requires subject or foundation, but because a respect is a respect, therefore it requires that which it is of and that which it is to.

Someone will reply on behalf of Canonicus that it is one thing to be the subject of a respect, and another to be the foundation. The subject is that to which the proximate foundation of the relation inheres, just as the subject of similarity is that to which whiteness inheres, and which is called similar to another. But the foundation is whiteness. Now although a relation cannot be without a foundation, it seems nevertheless that it can be without a subject, just as also its foundation — namely whiteness — can.

This evasion, however, is null, because whiteness also ought to be called subject, and not only the foundation of relation, and it also properly speaking can receive the denomination of the relation which it founds — namely be called similar — as I said in *disp. 8. Log. quæst. 5*. And the reason is that since a created relation is an accident, it regards the proximate foundation in which it is founded not only in the character of foundation — which is common to it with divine relation — but also in the character of subject, insofar as it is an accident. Hence it is the same thing that a created relation cannot be without a subject, as without a proximate foundation. And therefore the adduced reason concludes excellently.

In addition, from Bassolius 4. *distin. 12. quæst. 1. § Dico ad hoc*: there are also certain respects which have the same thing for immediate subject and immediately and properly denominated by them, and also for foundation. Such are Ubi, or also motion, or mutation — for their foundation is immediately denominated by them, as their subject, as a body moved or located.

Then, in order for the relation of similarity to be said to remain, it suffices that whiteness remain, nor is it necessary that the subject of whiteness — namely quantity or substance — remain. Because these are not properly the foundations of similarity, but of whiteness itself. And therefore to defend that similarity can be separated from substance or quantity is not to defend the opposite of this conclusion, because the relation of similarity does not on this account remain in such a case without its proper foundation and proximate subject. But it is whiteness that remains without the subject, and that this is possible has already been granted in the preceding assertion.

It is true, however, about those accidents to which it is altogether repugnant to be without subject — whether namely they are so affixed to their individual subjects that they can only be in that determinate one; or rather have such indifference that they can be placed by God in this or another similar subject, so that only some subject vaguely determines itself. And although some say that they are tied to subject only in this second sense, the first is much more probable, and of the mind of the Doctor 4. *d. 43. quæst. 1. in fine*, where he notes that even by God's absolute power the same respect numerically cannot return unless the same foundation numerically returns, and the terminus. And the reason is that if it is said that the same respect numerically has such indifference that it can be placed by God in this or another similar subject, the same difficulty returns just as if we said that by God it could be conserved per se separated from every subject. For whether this or that is said, on account of such indifference the relation would need a distinct inherence, through which it would be determined so that it would be placed in this subject rather than in that, which would have to vary in the variation of subject. About which inherence the same difficulty would again return. Therefore it must rather be said that any respect whatever is affixed to some certain subject through an inherence really identified with it.

You will say that it is indeed thus, after such an accident has once been placed in a certain subject, that afterwards it cannot be transferred to another. But from the beginning it could have been placed in one or another similar subject. But contrarily, because if this actual inhesion in such a subject is identified with such an accident actually existing, thus also it would be identified in proportionate mode in the being of the possible, because the possible individual as regards all essential predicates and really identified ones is altogether the same as the individual actually existing.

Confirmation: because either such an accident, now produced, resides in such a subject through an inherence identified with itself, or not. If the first, it is a sign that also from the beginning from its nature it was determined to a certain subject, even in the being of the possible. If the second, then after the first inherence it will be able by God to be torn away from the subject in which it is now produced, and placed in another.

The other part of the assertion — namely that actual inherence is of the essence of a respective accident — is against Trombetta, Aretinus, Antonius Andreas, and other Scotists who indeed affirm that actual inherence is like a passion really identified with a respective accident, but deny that it is of the essence, moved especially by this reason, that relation is essentially constituted through *esse ad*, not however through *esse in*. Which supposition, however, is false. For as I showed in *disp. 8. Log. quæst. 4.*, relation is no less essentially constituted through *esse in* than through *esse ad*, and the Doctor clearly indicates this in the passage cited *litt. D* when he says that respect is a habitude essentially between two extremes, and therefore just as to remove the terminus to which respect is, is to remove or destroy the respect, so to remove that which the respect is of, is to remove the respect.

And since in a created relation, which is an accident, the character of foundation and of proximate subject coincide at least materially, as was just said, it follows evidently that if *esse in*, as in a foundation, is of the essence of relation, so also *esse in*, as in a subject. And thus, although a created relation in the character of accident as such does not essentially have to be actually in a subject, or not to be in it positively speaking, but only exigitively and radically, nevertheless in the character of such an accident — namely relative — it has essentially to be actually in a subject, because of the character of essential relation no less is *esse in* than *esse ad*, as has been extensively proved in the cited place, *disp. 8. Log. q. 4.*, where the arguments of other Scotists on the opposite have been solved, and to repeat them here is superfluous.

You will say: if *esse in* is of the essence of respective accident as such, then there will be given a concept *in quid* common to those seven genera inferior to the concept of being, superior to them — which consequently will be generic — and so they will not be most general. The reply: the same difficulty can be made about *esse ad*, which is a habitude common *in quid* to those seven genera. Wherefore it

must be freely granted that they are not most general and supreme genera simply and absolutely, but in a determinate series of beings, as has been said universally about all those ten genera in *disp. 6. Log. quæst. 1.* — about which the same difficulty runs as regards other common characters.

I say third: aptitudinal inherence indeed is really the same with an absolute accident, but is not of its essence. However, with a respective accident it is not only really the same, but also of its essence. This is gathered from Scotus cited, and indeed that it is really the same with each accident, all Scotists grant. And they prove it, because this inherence is nothing but the aptitude of any accident for inhering. But no aptitude is really distinguished from the nature of which it is the aptitude, as was said in the preceding question, *conclusion 2.* Also, because however much an absolute accident is separated from the subject, it still always retains that natural propensity to inhere in it. Therefore such aptitudinal inherence is really identified with the accident as such.

Moreover, that it is not of the essence of absolute accident likewise is granted by all the Scotists against the Thomists, and it remains sufficiently proved from what has been said, because no respect is of the essence of an absolute. But inherence of this kind is an aptitudinal respect of propension and inclination of the accident to the subject in which it is apt to inhere. Therefore it is not of its essence. And this very thing is proved by whatever things were adduced in the preceding question for the proof of the second conclusion.

However, that such inherence is not only really identified but also of the essence of a respective accident, the Scotists do not grant. But because they have no efficacious reason for this part, I hold the opposite as better grounded in reason, and it is proved: because if actual inherence is of the essence of respective accident, as has now been proved, then all the more aptitudinal inherence, because aptitude is more intimate to the essence of the thing than the act of such aptitude. Hence less consistently speaks Poncius in *disp. 13. quæst. 1.*, where in *conclusion 4* he holds that actual inherence is of the essence of a respective accident, and in *conclusion 2* he denies this of the aptitudinal, although he ought a fortiori to have granted the same of this also. Indeed, according to the rule handed down above in the preceding question *in fine*, aptitudinal inherence in a respective accident must not be distinguished from its essence. Hence, just as in a relation the aptitude for being to another is not distinguished from its essence, because the essence of relation is the formal and actual order or habitude to another, so neither from its essence must the aptitude for being in another be distinguished, since *esse in* is as much of its essence as *esse ad*. Therefore this aptitude for *esse in*, just as not for *esse ad*, is not to be posited as a formality superadded to its essence, as is posited in an absolute accident, but that it is its very quiddity and essence.

Confirmation: because therefore in an absolute accident aptitudinal inherence is formally distinguished from its essence, and is posited as a formality superadded

to it, because at least by God's power such an aptitude for inhering can be separated from actual inhesion, as happens in the Eucharistic accidents. Therefore conversely, because in a respective accident such a separation can never be made, hence it must be deduced that neither the act nor the aptitude for being in another is distinguished from its essence and quiddity.

From what has been said it is therefore clear that it is not well answered to this question by Scotists 7. *Met. q. 1.*, when they say universally that neither inherence is of the essence of accident, whether it is absolute or respective. Because although it is true about absolute accident, it is not however about respective. And although the Doctor there in 7. *Met. quæst. 1.* in the body of the question says in the first conclusion that neither inherence is of the essence of accident, it is sufficiently clear from his words that he is not speaking of each accident, both absolute and respective, as Antonius Andreas understood, and with him other Scotists, but only of absolute accident.

Moreover it is clear that the question cannot be resolved about accident in common as such, whether both inherences, or neither, or only one, is of its essence. Because neither is of the essence of absolute accident, and both are of the essence of relative accident. But for the resolution of this question, one must proceed, as we have done, by establishing peculiar conclusions about absolute and respective accident.

Hence finally it remains that inherence, or inality, which is the constitutive difference of accident as it is distinguished from substance, is disjunctively either actual inherence — as in respective accident — or the exigitive principle of it — as in absolute. And in this sense must be understood and explained the common definition which is handed down about accident as such: that it is a being inhering in another, adduced from the beginning of this disp. *num.*

Against this conclusion the Thomists urge, proving that inherence at least aptitudinal is of the essence of accident as such. First, from the definition itself of accident, which is said to be a being inhering in another, and the *esse* of accident in Boethius is said to be *inesse*. Since this cannot be understood of actual inherence, it must at least be understood of aptitudinal. Nor does it help to have recourse to radical inherence, because in accident this is not distinguished from the aptitudinal, nor must entities be multiplied without necessity.

Confirmation: because to inhere in a subject does not belong to accident merely from the extrinsic and beyond its nature, but most from the intrinsic from its proper nature. Therefore inherence at least aptitudinal will be of its essence.

Finally, being is essentially divided into substance and accident, and substance has being per se, accident in another. But perseity is the essential constitutive character of substance. Therefore inality will be constitutive of accident. Not actual; therefore aptitudinal. Thus Aversa discourses in *quæst. 21. cit. sec. 2.*

The reply: the *esse* of accident is *inesse* aptitudinally, not because in an absolute accident this aptitude for inhering is its essence, but because it is a proper passion accompanying it. And through passions the essence of things is usually circumscribed. Hence radical inherence will more rightly be the essence of accident than the aptitudinal, because the latter follows it. And it is false that in an absolute accident such aptitudinal inherence is not distinguished from the radical, as was said in the preceding *quæst., concl. 2*, although it is true of respective accident.

To the Confirmation: the consequence is denied, the antecedent being granted. For it is sufficient that it be its passion, and belong to it in the second mode of saying per se, so that it not be said to belong from the extrinsic and beyond its nature.

To the last: if it is valid, it concludes that not only aptitudinal but also actual inherence is of the essence of accident, because actual perseity, as it excludes actual and aptitudinal inherence, belongs to substance. So that if we also wish in substance to distinguish aptitudinal perseity from its essence — of which I have said the opposite is more probable in the preceding *q. in fine* — then it must be said, as the Doctor suggests in *4. d. 12. q. 1. ad 1. principale*, that that division of being into *in se* and *in alio* is not through differences or intrinsic modes, but through innate properties. Hence the true and per se division must be assigned thus, as Aretinus notes in *art. 1. of that question, not. 3*: of beings, some is that whose nature is to be per se, another whose nature it is owed to be in another. And then it only follows that *esse in alio* radically will be the difference essentially distinguishing accident from substance.

Second, Alensis cited argues: the analogy which accident has to substance is not accidental and contingent, but is of its essence. But this arises from the aptitudinal dependence which it has on substance; therefore this will be of its essence, like the analogy itself.

Then, because if such aptitude is not of its essence, accident will be able to be conceived without that inherence. Then, either it is conceived as a being in itself, or as in another. If the first, therefore it is conceived as substance. If the second, therefore it is conceived with an aptitude for inhering, which is against what was supposed, or must be granted to be of its essential concept.

The reply: granting that analogy does not belong to accident as accident, and from the extrinsic, but that it is essential to it in the second mode of saying per se, as is the aptitudinal dependence on substance itself, in which it is founded. And this suffices for it not to be said to accrue to it contingently, nor is it needed for this that aptitudinal dependence belong to it in the first mode.

To the other: Trombetta cited grants in *7. Met. quæst. 1. ad 2. prin.* that accident can be conceived without such aptitude, which conception, however, although it would be quidditative, because it would involve all essential predicates, would not

however be quietative. The reason of which I shall soon add. Trombetta would have said better, however, that accident can be conceived without conceiving the aptitude for inhering, rather than without it, because the first manner of conceiving is precise, which can happen without falsehood, but the second is divisive and mendacious.

And when it is asked whether in this conception or precision accident is conceived as in itself or in another, I say it is conceived as a being in itself and per se by the perseity of the third mode, insofar as it is not conceived as a being in another. From which it does not follow that it is conceived as substance, because being per se which is substance is a being to which it is altogether repugnant to inhere. Now in the nature of accident in such precision it is not repugnant to inhere.

You will say: this solution destroys itself, because that is apt to inhere to which it is not repugnant to inhere. But accident in such precision is of this kind; therefore etc.

Trombetta replies that the aptitude for inhering is twofold: one foundational and remote, the other formal and proximate. The first aptitude is the foundation itself and nature, to which the formal aptitude itself is by nature apt to belong, just as we say that man, with risibility set aside, is risible fundamentally — that is, is the foundation to which risibility is not repugnant, which is the formal aptitude for laughing.

Formal and proximate aptitude, however, is a certain respect supervening upon the foundation constituting it in formal and proximate being for eliciting the act for which there is aptitude. Taking aptitude in the first way, it is granted that accident in such precision is apt to inhere with fundamental and remote aptitude — which we said above was radical. But if aptitude is taken in the second way, it is denied that accident in such precision is thus apt to inhere. From which, however, it does not follow that formal aptitude is of the understanding of accident, but only fundamental or radical aptitude, which posits nothing positive — absolute or respective — above the foundation.

Third, for the same point, among others the Doctor moves this very subtle difficulty: the respect of accident to subject is more intimate to accident than the respect of creature to God, because accident is defined by subject, and creature is not defined by God. But the respect of dependence of creature on God is at least really the same with the creature. Therefore also the respect of dependence of accident on substance is of its essence in the first mode.

The Doctor replies by denying the assumption. To the proof he says that the identity of respect with the foundation, or non-identity, is not the reason why the terminus of the respect falls into the definition of the foundation as superadded. Nor also is essential and necessary dependence the cause that the terminus of dependence is added in the definition of the dependent foundation. For then God would more be placed in the definition of any created thing than substance in the

definition of accident. But the reason is that the foundation of the respect is sometimes a form informing another, and a perfection of the same giving it being simply or *secundum quid*. And since the perfection cannot be perfectly and distinctly conceived by a quietative concept of the intellect unless that of which it is the form is co-understood, therefore the terminus of the respect falls into the definition of the foundation as superadded, since it is perfectible through such a form — which is the foundation itself of the respect. And therefore, however much the essentials of the form might be expressed without that of which it is the form — although its quiddity would be indicated — still it would not be a perfect concept quieting the intellect, and therefore neither definitive.

But the caused — which is a certain composite subsisting in itself — if it is conceived in itself, the intellect there rests, not requiring to co-understand another. Hence if I conceive man as a rational animal, immediately the mind rests there, nor investigates further whether God is the creator of man.

Fourth, accident by its nature is ordered to effecting substance; therefore by its nature it must regard substance. Therefore such ordination will be of its essence, and therefore it is usually called "a being of a being."

The reply: all this is preserved without it being asserted that such ordination is of its essence, if it is said to be apt to follow from its nature and essence. And for this reason it is called "a being of a being," because dependence on substance necessarily follows its nature and essence.

Finally, the Scotists argue from Antonius Andreas *1. Metaph. qu. 1. concl. 1* to prove that neither actual nor aptitudinal inherence is of the essence of a respective accident, because the foundation of respect is something beyond the respect, since nothing founds itself. Hence according to Augustine, everything which is said relatively is something beyond the relation. Therefore inherence is not of the essence of a respective accident.

The reply: this reason, just as another adduced above, is put forward by Scotus *7. Metaph. quæst. 1. conclusion 1* to prove that inherence is not of the essence of an absolute accident, because it adds something to its nature really, if it is actual inherence, or at least formally, if it is aptitudinal. And therefore it is less aptly transferred by Antonius Andreas to prove this about a respective accident, to whose nature and essence neither inherence adds anything, as has already been proved.

Question IV. On the making or origin of accidental forms — namely, whether they are made from nothing, or rather from matter or a pre-existing subject

This question has already been resolved in the Physics, both concerning substantial forms in *disp. 2. q. 7. art. 2*, and concerning accidental forms in *disp. 3. q. 5*. And the resolution was that all forms — both accidental and substantial,

material and corporeal — with only the rational soul excepted, which is immaterial and incorporeal, are not made from nothing, but are made from matter and dependently on the subject, sufficiently so that they are not said to be made from nothing and created. For among all forms this is proper to the rational soul alone, which therefore is immediately produced by God alone; although afterward there is a difficulty about how forms are said to be made from a pre-existing subject — namely whether through some inchoations of them in matter, or rather through their simple containment in its passive potency.

And this is the common opinion, acceptably received in every school of Thomists, Scotists, Averroists, Nominalists, and finally in the free school itself of the Fathers of the Society — as can be seen in all authors treating of this matter, whom to list individually here would be long. Of this Suárez can be consulted *disp. 5. Met. sect. 2*, and others. And all have unanimously agreed in this view, as Aversa noted in *q. 20. of his Philosophy sect. 7*, in order to preserve and verify that forms are not made from nothing, which would be to be created, and cannot come about by the power of natural causes.

Since, however, after the first Physics edition of ours, Ferchius published ten questions or Peripatetic Investigations, in the first of which he holds that all forms are made from nothing, and therefore says that common axiom "from nothing nothing comes" is not so true, especially in Aristotle, as is commonly thought — therefore in *disp. 5. de gen. et cor. q. 1. art. 1* we showed the truth of that saying, and again confirmed from principles commonly granted by all that material forms are not made from nothing, but are truly educed from the potency of matter.

After several years, however, this opinion of his about the making of forms from nothing, against our refutation he took up a defense with such acerbity that he used not an apologetic but a funeral style. And because in the passage cited, that common opinion — that forms are not made from nothing but are educed from the potency of matter — we rather supposed as granted by all than proved, and only took care to satisfy his motives and foundations from the common doctrine universally granted in the schools as not only true in itself, but also in the mind of Aristotle and his Commentator — this Author in his aforesaid defense through nearly each page reproaches us that this common opinion has never been proved by us, especially from Aristotle, nor by all the philosophers of our class, or theologians, and that we all in this matter beg the principle by proposing our opinion, not by proving it.

For this reason, therefore, I have decided to treat this question again here, and not without reason, because as Suárez correctly noted in *disp. 15. Met. sect. 2*, as regards the making and education of forms from the potency of matter, there is the same difficulty concerning accidental and substantial material forms. For by whatever reason substantial forms will be said to be made from nothing, or to be educed from matter, by the same reasoning the same can and must be asserted

of accidental forms. Therefore here the discussion will be of all in common, since they do not differ as regards this.

And my purpose will be to show that that opinion — that forms are not made from nothing — in no way begs the principle, but from most solid reasons, drawn both from Aristotle and from true philosophy, had long ago been established and stabilized by the foremost leaders of Philosophy and Theology. To these reasons he either would not or could not reply, some of which were also adduced by us in the passage cited, although not all — because, as I said, that opinion is universally received by all, hence it was not necessary to adduce new reasons for it, but it was enough to dissolve the adverse ones adduced by that Author.

And because we write not a pure and ethnic Aristotelian Philosophy, which is distinguished from true philosophy, or philosophy in itself, as the same Author testifies in *lib. 1. Defens. n. 3*, as from the beginning of our work, and in the progress we have often protested — we shall be more careful to prove our assertions with reasons than with frequent authorities of Aristotle (although I shall not omit these either), since neither the testimonies of Aristotle himself are worth anything unless they are supported by reason. And it will be enough if I show that whatever I shall say in this matter about the making of forms is not against Aristotle, but quite consistent.

I wished to note this in advance to preclude that Author's evasion, who ridicules reasons and accepts no saying however rational unless it is corroborated by an express testimony of Aristotle. Hence when we say, from the common opinion, that material forms are called such because by their nature they depend on matter in their being, becoming, and being conserved, he says in *lib. 3. Defens. pag. 298. num. 42* that nothing here is had from Aristotle, and that our reason is not founded on Aristotle's authority, and that therefore it is not received in Aristotle's school.

When we say that these same forms perish as soon as they are torn from matter, even in the same number, again he rejects this saying under the same number because it is nothing from Aristotle. When we say that by this the rational soul is distinguished from such forms, which because of its immateriality comes to be and is conserved independently of matter, again under the same number he ridicules this saying because it is nothing from Aristotle. If we assume that the rational soul is an immaterial form, he denies under *n. 43*, saying that the rational soul is material. If also we sometimes say that material forms are distinguished from the rational soul by this, that they all are educed from the potency of matter, while the latter comes from outside — from *lib. 2. de gener. animal. cap. 3* — he says that we take the significations of terms with the philosophers of our class at our pleasure, not however according to Aristotle's phrasing, according to which the opposite must be said: that no other form is educed from the potency of matter except the intellective, *lib. 1. Defens. pag. 55. num. 53*.

If we say that the composite depends on matter and form as on internal causes, that form is made in matter and dependently on it, he says that this dependence is invented from our own capacity, not proved from Aristotle, *lib. 1. pag. 49. num. 46*. He reads indeed in *1. de Cælo text. 12. Met. 38* that effects depend on an efficient or final cause, that is, on an external cause; that they depend on an internal cause, he does not read — as if Aristotle had not expressly said this in *2. Phys. tex. 28*, where he speaks of intrinsic causes; or if Ferchius has not read it, Aristotle has not said it; or if finally Aristotle has not said it, it is not true, it is not to be received, nor asserted — as if it were valid to argue from authority negatively. These are the solutions which that Author commonly offers to refute our reasons.

This new way of philosophizing Ferchius learned from Cremoninus, who, as the very learned Ragusejus reports in *disp. 15. de formis elementorum part. 2. c. 2*, ridiculed all reasons without the testimony of Aristotle — as if reason needed Aristotle's testimony and not rather conversely. He said that many things are found in the Latin Interpreters which Aristotle did not even suspect in dreams.

"A most frivolous objection," says Ragusejus. "Is their doctrine therefore on that account to be despised? The Latins said nothing against Aristotle, but taught many things by disputing, which Aristotle himself would likewise have taught, had he been forced to respond to the same doubts proposed. Averroes began to make the Peripatetic philosophy more subtle by doubts proposed here and there, and by their solutions. This is not to introduce a new philosophy, but to expound and examine more diligently the already handed-down and commonly received Aristotelian philosophy. Nor is whatever is not found in Aristotle to be scorned and rejected as alien from truth." "Nor indeed is it necessary," says Ragusejus, "that Aristotle said everything."

And further in *p. 5. of the same disp. c. 5*, when Cremoninus was saying repeatedly that the Latins assert that the ultimate differences of things are unknown to us, and yet scarcely any passage in Aristotle is brought forward by them where this is written, Ragusejus meets this: "Suppose Aristotle wrote nothing on this matter; will therefore such a proposition on that account be false?" Therefore not every proposition needs Aristotle's testimony for its corroboration. And if Aristotle never said that the rational soul is an immaterial form, that a composite depends on its intrinsic causes essentially constituting itself — these propositions are still true, for manifest reason suggests them.

For who are there — authors who have written most learnedly on philosophical and metaphysical matters both old and new — who, without any testimony of Aristotle, prove their assertions by reasons alone? Let Rubio on the four books of Sentences be read, whom Ferchius himself on *pag. 270. lib. Defens.* calls a famous Doctor. And there is no doubt that he wrote most acutely on philosophical and metaphysical matters — nevertheless he never, or most rarely, produces Aristotle. Let the writers of this age of the Society of Jesus be read — very grave in number and erudition — also most rarely citing Aristotle, and caring little about his

authority. Shall therefore on that account these be expunged from the list of Philosophers?

The reason, however, why certain Peripatetics wish to argue and respond only from Aristotle's text, is well expounded by Ragusejus in the passage already cited *disp. 15. peripat. par. 1. c. 1*: because if once extracted from the history of Aristotelian text they are constrained by reasons, they immediately fail and languish in spirit, like fish out of the element of water, not knowing what to prove or reject except from Aristotle's pleasure, without any reason.

I do not say this, however, that Aristotle's authority in Philosophy should be altogether despised, for as I said in the epistle to the reader in the first Roman edition of the Physics volume, the extreme vices are: to wish to receive and approve nothing except on Aristotle's authority, or to despise this altogether as if he were some vulgar Philosopher. But Aristotle's authority should be held, not however in such a way that reason must be preferred to it. Therefore let Aristotle's sayings be held, especially those which are proved by reason — for he said almost nothing without reason. Not however so tenaciously should one swear on his words that whatever he has not said should be considered false, if by sufficient reason it has been well established. And this will be the ingenuous way of philosophizing.

Moreover, Ferchius in the passage cited wished to appear singular not only in defending the making of forms from nothing, but also in the signification of terms — wishing to depart from the common. For creation is commonly not distinguished by theologians and philosophers from the making from nothing, as can be seen in *2. sent. d. 1* with the Master, and *1. p. q. 45. art. 1* with St. Thomas. Hence it is universally defined by them as the production of a whole being from nothing.

But he, on the contrary, against the common opinion of theologians and philosophers, contends that creation properly and theologically taken is not only distinguished from the making from nothing, but rather altogether opposed to it, because it is the production of a being from some presupposed principle and internal to the thing produced — which he tries to establish with several authorities of sacred Scripture and the Fathers, as I shall soon report.

Therefore not only must we dispute with the aforesaid Author about the making of forms from nothing, but also about the very name of the making from nothing and of creation, which he most obstinately refuses to signify the same. And because the question about the name always precedes the question about the thing, from *1. Post.*, we shall first institute a disputation about the names of creation and of making from nothing, and afterwards we shall inquire about the thing itself — whether all material forms are made from nothing, or rather from matter, and how.

And since this whole disputation contains several points which cannot be resolved simultaneously, it will be divided into several articles, discussing each in order. In this disputation, however, I shall not repay him measure for measure in what pertains to insults and reproaches, with which that whole little book of his teems — I shall most gladly pass these over for the love of Christ, and according to the precept of the Apostle I shall not strive to conquer in evil, but to overcome evil with good, to reply to doctrine, to be silent at reproaches.

Article I. Whether making from nothing is creation, and conversely

Ferchius in *lib. 1. Defens. pag. 17. n. 9* denies this, because St. Augustine in *tom. 7. 10. 7. in lib. 1. contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum*, from sacred Scripture of the Old and New Testament, inquired by design into the significations of these words "to make" and "to create," because the Adversary from these two words attacks the God of the Law and the Prophets, asserting that God is evil because he is creating evil. Compelled by this necessity of responding, Augustine in the said *lib. cap. 23* posits two significations of these verbs. The first is that "to make" and "to create" are taken promiscuously and signify the same. The second signification is determinate, so that "to make" is from that which altogether was not, while "to create" is from that which was, and is changed into another appearance.

Excellently St. Augustine, as a most accurate Scrutinizer of sacred things, and supreme Doctor of the sacred Theologians after the canonical authors, speaks. For in *2. Mach. 7* it is written: "I beseech you, son, that you look at heaven and earth, and all things that are in them, that you may know that God made them from nothing." Therefore "to make" is properly taken when something is said to be made from nothing, but "to create" from something, as in *lib. Sap. 11* we read, "which created the world from invisible or formless matter," from St. Augustine. And in *Heb. 9* works made by artificers are called works of creation. Whereupon, according to the sacred Theologians, it is to produce something from some presupposed principle and internal to what is produced.

Francesco Vicomercato, a noble Peripatetic, in *lib. 1. de principiis rerum naturalium cap. 22*, writes thus about the natural Philosophers: "Whence all the Physicists agreed in this, that nothing is born from nothing, nor did they recognize that distinction between creation and generation which is handed down by theologians — that creation is from nothing, generation from a subject and matter. We do not know whence they received this distinction of terms, since it is not from the creation of the World described by Moses. Nor does that 'he created' which the Interpreter used signify a production from nothing. For where we have 'he created,' in Hebrew it is 'bara,' by which almost any action and formation is signified. Again in the same place it is added that God created great whales, likewise man — which however it is certain were not made from nothing."

To this Pererius in *Genesim lib. 1. cap. 1* observes in explaining that "in the beginning God created," that the Hebrew word "bara" and the Latin "he created" in

Scripture is not taken for a making from nothing, as the Scholastic Philosophers and Theologians wish, but "to make" and "to create" are confused — namely in the first signification of St. Augustine.

Therefore (Ferchius finally concludes), you Offenders exclude from the number of Theologians St. Augustine, the canonical authors of sacred Scripture, both the Prophets and the historians, as well as the Evangelists and the Apostles, and moreover God himself — you deny that he is a Theologian because when he spoke in the sacred Writers and in his incarnate Son, he did not take the term "creation" as you wish and the theologians of your class.

This is what Ferchius has there. By "theologians of our class," he understands the Proceres of Scholastic Theology: St. Thomas, Scotus, Alensis, Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, Giles of Rome, John Baconthorpe, Henry, and finally all the Scholastic Theologians together with the Master of the Sentences. According to whose custom we have taken the term "creation" for the making from nothing. With all these, I say, in his modesty, he says we deny that the Prophets, Apostles, Evangelists, and God himself is a Theologian, and that we have pushed this contention about a term this far.

Afterward, further below in the same book, *pag. 34 n. 27*, further declaring the matter, he says: "I distinguish that creation is taken either theologically or scholastically. For the Scholastic Theologians and Philosophers did not receive the signification of creation from divine Scripture — that is, from sacred Theology. Creation theologically is the production of a being from some presupposed and internal principle to the thing produced, and the genus of creation is production. And creation extends both within [ad intra] in God and outside [ad extra] in creatures. Within, primogenital Wisdom before every creature in Ecclesiasticus 24 speaks of herself: 'from the beginning, before the ages, I was created,' and with the 70 Interpreters Proverbs 8: 'The Lord created me, the beginning of his ways,' as is in St. Cyril 5. *Thesauri cap. 1. and 4*. Because the Son of God is produced not from nothing, but from the substance of the Father, presupposed and inexistent to the Son produced — therefore he is also said to be created.

Outside: Sap. 13, 'For your hand was not impotent, which created the Globe of the Earth from formless matter.' Gen. 5, 'male and female he created them,' namely from mud and rib. Creation scholastically is the making of some being from nothing of itself. The genus of creation in this sense is making, which is distinguished into making from something and making from nothing. However this signification is received, it is not from sacred Scripture, in which never is found this form of speaking 'creation from nothing.'"

Finally, in *lib. 2. Defens.*, to declare fully his opinion, he establishes an entire disputation on the terms "making from nothing" and "creation" from *pag. 242* and following. And in the first chapter itself, rendering the reason why in his first

investigation the locution of making from nothing was used, not of creation, he adduces two — and the second, which more pertains to the point, he has in the same *c. n. 94* in these words: "I was also grieved, and suffused with shame, I saw that I ought to show that Scholastic Theologians in that sacred term of creation commonly depart from sacred Scripture. Moreover, having turned to the Scholastic Philosophers, I saw that they never took the signification of that term 'creation' from Aristotle, but from their own capacity, so that on account of this I was terrified to say anything about the term 'creation.' I have promised however to show that the term 'creation' by the Offenders, both in the doctrine of Christ the Lord and in the doctrine of Aristotle, is not rightly taken — and consequently that creation is wrongly objected to me so many times, with so many clamors, as if it were not free for me to abstain from a disputation about a term discordant both from Christ and from Aristotle."

Then in *c. 2*, from various passages of sacred Scripture collected here and there, he strives to show that creation is not the making from nothing, but the production from some presupposed principle. Where as more notable testimonies he repeats what he had adduced earlier from *2. Machab. c. 7*: "I beseech you, son, that you look at..." etc., for making from nothing. But for creation from something, that *Gen. c. 1*: "male and female he created them," but man he created from the presupposed mud of the earth, woman from the presupposed rib of the man; but he did not create from nothing. Therefore in the Doctrine of God and of our Lord Jesus Christ, creation is from something, but creation from nothing is not handed down.

He repeats again what he had noted above in that *Gen. 1*: "In the beginning God created Heaven and earth," from Vicomercato and Pererius, that the Hebrew word "bara" and the Greek word does not signify a making from nothing, but any formation or production. He repeats again the passage of *Sapient. c. 11* (which passage however he had reported above from *c. 13* and under other words): "For your omnipotent hand was not impossible, which created the globe of the earth from formless matter invisible, or, as St. Augustine reads from the Greek, from formless matter." Whence God created Heaven and earth according to sacred Scripture and St. Augustine not from nothing, but from formless matter.

He again replies to the passage from *Gen. 1.22*: "God created the great whales," etc. Here fish and birds are said to be created, but from water.

Then at *n. 97* he again repeats the passage from *Ecclesiasticus 24*, where he applies the verb "to create" (where however he meant to say "to be created") to the second person of the most divine Trinity — that is, to Wisdom — saying of himself: "I proceeded from the mouth of the most High, firstborn before every creature." For this same Wisdom says of himself: "From the beginning, before the ages, I was created, and he who created me rested in my tabernacle." He repeats finally what he had said from *Proverbs c. 8*: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his

ways, before he made anything from the beginning," where the 70 read: "The Lord created me, the beginning of his ways."

In which passages it is certain that the Word of God was begotten of the substance of the Father, as of a presupposed principle, but internal to the Son produced — not however begotten from nothing. Wherefore in these passages, "to be created" does not signify to be produced from nothing. Therefore in the Symbol of the First Nicene Council, from *1. tom. Concil. car. 532*, it is said that the Son of God is "born, not made." Cautiously the most holy Fathers said "born," but they denied "made." They did not deny, nor affirm, "created." They denied that the Word of God is made, proving from the Gospel of John: "because through him all things were made; therefore the Word is not made." They did not say that he is created, lest they speak with Arius, who said that the Son of God is created, understanding that to create is a certain species of making itself. For Arius wished that to create is to make from nothing. They did not wish to deny that he is created, because sacred Scripture attributes the word "to be created" to begotten Wisdom itself.

From which observation two things seem to me to be collected (Ferchius adds, but the other stuck to the quill): First, that "to create" abstracts from "to make" itself and includes "to produce" itself. For thus "to create" signifies to produce from a presupposed principle in order of nature or time, and internal to the thing produced — in which sense both Solomon and Ecclesiasticus said that divine wisdom is created. Similar seem to be those in Ecclef. 1.1: "prior to all was created wisdom, understanding prudence from eternity; the fountain of wisdom is the Word of God in the highest," and a little after, "one is the most High creator of all, omnipotent, etc., he himself created her in the holy spirit." The Master in *2. dist. 1* explains these of Angels, so that a more suitable explanation would be to understand them of the Word.

Ferchius continues to gather other passages about the term "creation" from sacred Scripture, from which I abstain from reporting, just as he could have abstained from those — because in them there is indeed mention of creation, but it is not added whether it is from something or from nothing. And therefore they do not favor him more than us and the theologians of our class.

For proving the same, he repeats again in full under *num. 103* the authority of St. Augustine, *tom. 6. contra Adversarium Legis, et Prophetarum lib. 1. cap. 23*.

Finally at *n. 104*, because by common opinion annihilation is opposed to creation, again from certain passages of sacred Scripture he strives to show that in sacred letters, what is reduced to nothing leaves behind something of itself after annihilation. And afterwards in *cap. 3. nu. 105*, he proves that this same phrasing regarding creation and annihilation was Aristotle's — namely that creation is the production of a thing from something of itself, and annihilation is the resolution of the same thing into something of itself. Whence finally he concludes that whole disputation with these words:

"From which it appears that Christian Peripatetics do not posit or deny creation or annihilation with Aristotle, but from their own bent and talent feign their opinions to Aristotle. And because we, according to the custom of Christian Peripatetics and also of all Scholastic Theologians — the Master of Sentences, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Albert, Alensis, Giles, Henry, Baconthorpe, etc. — have received the name of creation and of annihilation, he so lashes us with these Theologians of our class that he says nothing about creation and annihilation is explicit from the doctrine of Christ the Lord and of Aristotle, that I might show my Offenders understood the name of creation neither in the Theology of Christ nor in the philosophy of Aristotle. Whence the Scholastics received their signification, because neither Vicomercato nor Pererius said, neither do I dare to say. I have spoken with Aristotle; and, God ruling, my speech was conformable with the sayings of God, who taught us making from nothing, he did not express creation from nothing."

These are the things which have moved Ferchius from the common opinion, and moved him to traduce all theologians as altogether departing in this matter from the Doctrine of Christ and Aristotle.

The opposite opinion — that making from nothing is creation and conversely — is common and famous among all the Scholastic Doctors of whatever School, whether theologians or Christian Philosophers, as Ferchius himself grants. Thus the notion of this name "Creation" was declared by the Master of the Sentences in *2. d. 1. part. 1* in these words: "The Creator is he who makes something from nothing, and to create properly is to make something from nothing. To make, however, is not only to work something from nothing, but also from matter. Hence both man and angel are said to make some things, but not to create. And such a one is called maker or artificer, but not creator. For this name properly fits only God, who both from nothing makes something and from something makes some things. He therefore is creator and artificer and maker, but he has properly retained the name of creator for himself, while the names of the others he has communicated to creatures. In Scripture, however, creator is often taken as maker, and to create as to make, without distinction of signification."

Thus the Master, in which last words he tacitly replies to those passages of sacred Scripture in which it is suggested that creation is a production from something.

St. Thomas *1. part. qu. 45. art. 1* moves this same question proposed by us: whether to create is to make something from nothing. He proposes for the negative part the authority of Augustine adduced against the Adversaries of the law and the Prophets: "to make is what altogether was not, but to create is from that which already was, leading out something to constitute it." Afterward in the body of the question he resolves that creation, which is the emanation of the whole being, is from non-being, which is nothing. And finally to the aforesaid authority he says in the *sol. ad 1* that "Augustine uses the name of creation equivocally, according to which they are said to be created in whom they are reformed for the better, as

when someone is said to be created into a bishop. Thus however we do not speak here of creation, but as has been said." Thus the Holy Doctor there.

Thus likewise Scotus 2. d. 1. qu. 2. in the resolution of the question, defining creation, says: "I reply, to create is to produce something from nothing in effect." Which definition he explains from the doctrine of Anselm *monolog. cap. 8*. Thus also teaches Div. Bonaventure 2. dist. 1. art. 1. 2. 3. qq. 1., and other theologians universally.

Second, it is proved by the authorities of the holy Fathers, whom the theological Doctors universally bring forward. Athanasius in *ser. 3. contra Arianos col. 16*, explains thus that the Word of God is not created: "there is not anything which has come forth from nothing." Augustine *lib. 12. de Civit. Dei c. 25*, at the beginning, explained creation through the making from nothing with these words: "Let that said species be attributed to whatever artificers you please, but this other to only one artificer, the creator and founder God, who made the world itself and the Angels without any world and without any Angels." And in *lib. de Genes. ad litteram imperfecto cap. 1*, shortly after the beginning he says that God created all things which are, insofar as they are, the catholic discipline bids say, such that every creature, whether visible or invisible, is not of God's nature, but made by God from nothing, and there is nothing in it which pertains to the Trinity, except that the Trinity founded it and is this founded thing.

Thus also he speaks in *lib. 1. de Gen. contra Manichæos cap. 2*, after the middle, and *tom. 1. lib. de Fide, et Symbolo cap. 4*. In which passages Ferchius himself also grants in *lib. 3. Defens. pag. 256* that Augustine took "to create" as the same as to make from nothing. Nor is Ferchius's recourse helpful, that in these passages of Augustine he speaks of creation improperly, but properly only in the passage cited by him against the Adversaries of the law and the Prophets, as to create is to produce something from something. For it is not likely that in only one passage he took creation in its proper sense, and in others always improperly. But rather, on the contrary, in that passage he took the name of creation equivocally and abusively, as St. Thomas explains in the passage cited; in others, however, properly and univocally, as I shall afterwards say.

Anselm *monolog. 8* says: "And without any contradiction it can be said that all things were made from nothing by the creative substance, in the way in which it is customary to say that the rich becomes from the poor: he who previously was poor is now rich, which he previously was not. In this way it can be understood that the creative essence created all things from nothing — that is, those which previously were nothing, now through it are made something."

Cyril *lib. 5. Thesauri cap. 3*, shortly after the beginning: "The virtue of creating produces the substance of things themselves from nothing to being." And *c. 4* (by which passage Ferchius cites him for himself), somewhat after the beginning:

"those things are said to be created which are understood to proceed from nothing to being."

Ambrose *lib. 1. Hexameron. c. 4. in fine*, expounding the first creation of things, says of God: "who in a moment of his command made this so great beauty of the World from nothing to be, which was not."

Damascene *lib. 1. Fidei c. 8*, a little before the middle, proves that the Son of God is not produced through creation: "for the Son of God has not been led from non-being to being." And after the middle: "A creature is made, not from God's substance, since it is from nothing led to being by his will and power."

Gregory *hom. 26. in Ev.* near the end: "It is far less for God to repair what was, than to have created what was not. Or what a wonder if he remakes man from dust, who created all things simultaneously from nothing? For it is more wonderful to have founded Heaven and Earth from no existing things, than to repair man himself from earth."

Indeed, Justin the Martyr in the *admonitorium contra gentes* testifies that this notion of creation was not unknown to the ancient Philosophers, because Plato distinguished between Creator and Worker — that the creator produces the thing from nothing, while the worker from a subject laid down.

Third, it is proved by the authorities of Councils. The Lateran, under Innocent III, in *chapter 1*, near the beginning, defines that it must be held by faith that God "simultaneously from the beginning of time founded both creatures from nothing," where the verb "to found" signifies the same as "to create." The Eleventh Toledo, in the profession of Faith: "The Son of God neither made nor from nothing" — that is, neither created.

But especially is this most evidently convinced, and inescapably, from the Council of Nicaea, *tom. 1. Concilior. a cart. 521*, where Arius was condemned because he asserted that the Son of God was created — that is, produced from nothing. Hence in the confession of Faith *lib. 2*, near the end, the Fathers anathematize those who say "because he was made from no existing things." And although it is proved wonderfully from all the acts of that Council, it is still more convinced from the disputation which the Fathers had with that Philosopher acting the Arian part.

For that man was proving that the Son of God, or the divine Word, was created, by that same authority which Ferchius adduces from Proverbs c. 8, according to the reading of the 70 Interpreters: "The Lord created me from the beginning of his ways." For the Philosopher contended, just as does Ferchius, that divine wisdom when begotten — which is the Word of God — so speaks of herself. The Fathers most constantly denied this, which they also demonstrate by various reasons there, and they explained that saying about created rational wisdom — that is, the nature both angelic and human — which as the supreme Artisan had

from eternity pre-conceived in mind as to be created, prior to any other creature by priority of intention and dignity.

Hence in this sense he says, "The Lord possessed me from the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning." In this sense he says he was created from the beginning and before the ages — not really, but ideally in the divine mind. In this sense finally he calls himself firstborn before every creature, as is extensively explained there.

From which discourse is precluded the evasion of Ferchius already reported from *pag. 249. n. 97*: that the Fathers in that Council did not deny that the Son of God was created, because sacred Scripture attributes the word "to be created" to the begotten Wisdom itself. Nor however did they affirm this, lest they speak with Arius, who said that the Son of God was created, understanding that to create is a certain species of making itself. For Arius wished that to create is to make from nothing.

This, I say, solution is removed from the aforesaid disputation held by the Fathers with that Philosopher, to whom they never wished to grant that the word "to be created" in sacred Scripture is attributed to begotten Wisdom itself, and they explained that authority of created intellectual wisdom. And when the Fathers in the Council of Nicaea did not expressly deny this, others did sufficiently openly deny it — and especially Athanasius in the Symbol, when he says: "The Son is from the Father alone, not made nor created, but begotten."

And when Ferchius says that the Fathers in the Council of Nicaea did not say that the Son of God was created, lest they speak with Arius, who by "to be created" understood to be made from nothing — this not only does not solve the argument, but wonderfully confirms the common opinion: that namely the Fathers themselves also felt that creation is the making from nothing, and therefore denied that he was created, lest they grant that he was made from nothing.

Then, of which matter there is manifest indication that the Fathers of the Council against Arius never used this argument: "to be created is to be produced from some presupposed internal principle produced, therefore the Son of God, although he is created, is still not born from nothing." Never, I say, did they use this argument, which however was obvious for convincing Arius; nor ever did they urge against him that he improperly took the vocabulary of creation.

It is therefore a sign that as regards the signification of the term "creation" they agreed with Arius, and therefore denied that the Son of God was created. For if they had not agreed with him in that signification, and had thought that creation was a production from something and not from nothing, there was no occasion to deny that the Son of God was created.

For the same reason, that authority too from Ecclef. 1: "prior to all was created Wisdom" — ought not to be understood of divine Wisdom as Ferchius wishes. Because as the Master says in 2. d. 2. par. 1, "That Wisdom which is God is not created; the wisdom of the Father is begotten, not made, nor created." But it ought to be understood either of created intellectual wisdom in general, as comprehending corporeal and spiritual, as the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea explained another authority of Proverbs 8, or it ought to be understood of angelic intellectual nature precisely, as the Master expounds, which in Scripture is often called Light and Wisdom.

And too audaciously Ferchius wants his exposition — that it be understood of the divine Word — to be more suitable than the exposition of the Master. Indeed, the irrationality of his exposition is deduced from the very following words reported by him: "he himself created her (namely wisdom) in the Holy Spirit." These, I say, words altogether persuade that that saying cannot be understood of the divine Word, because the Word is not said to be produced through the Holy Spirit, but conversely, since the latter proceeds from both. Hence I conclude that the Son of God cannot be said to be created within [ad intra] without manifest danger of Arianism.

Fourth, it is proved from sacred Scripture. And first from that *Genesis c. 1*: "In the beginning God created Heaven and earth," where the Gloss says that to create is to make something from nothing, and that by creation here we should understand the making from nothing. Manifest reason persuades this, as Aretinus notes in *commentary on Genesis c. 1*, because there the discussion is about the first altogether production of things, which presupposes no matter. Which exposition also Suárez in *de operibus sex dierum c. 1. n. 11* deduces from the holy Fathers, whose rule is that whenever things which altogether were not are said to be created, the verb "to create" signifies a production from nothing, because a thing lacking all real and actual being, both total and partial, is not capable of another mode of production. But in this way it is taken when God is said in the beginning to have created Heaven and earth. Which doctrine he says is Cyril of Alexandria's in *lib. 5. thes. c. 4*, where among other things he says: "when things not yet produced are said to be created, they must necessarily be understood to proceed from nothing to being." The same excellently in *lib. 1. in Genes. in principio*, and Chrysostom *hom. 2*, Rupert, and others — and finally Athanasius *de Incarnatione Verbi in principio*: "from nothing, and things altogether not previously existing, God the Father through his Word acknowledges to have made the whole universe of things, since in this way he speaks through his Word, 'in the beginning God created,' etc." And in the *epist. quod Nic. Synodus decreta sua congruis, et piis verbis contra hæresim Arianorum exposuerit*, not far from the beginning: "God does not thus create as man creates. Far be it! For God creates when he calls those things which are not, without any thing or work, but men, etc."

Nor say with Ferchius that the Hebrew word "bara," according to Vicomercato and Pererius, does not signify a making from nothing, but any formation or making. For the authorities of the Gloss and the Saints adduced, explaining that verb "he created" through a making from nothing, ought to be preferred to Pererius and Vicomercato, who was a pure Philosopher. And Pererius himself in *lib. 5. de materia c. 5* teaches with the other Theologians that that first production of all things, of which there is mention in *c. 1. Genes.*, was a making from nothing. And finally if Pererius explains it thus, Aretinus in the passage cited — of authority not inferior to him — gives a contrary exposition, saying that this Hebrew word "bara," which has been translated into Latin as "he created," properly signifies only the production of a thing from nothing.

Again, what Ferchius says on *pag. 246* is not valid: "heaven and earth were not made from nothing, but from invisible or formless matter; and therefore by creation cannot be understood a making from nothing." For it thus openly repugns the authority adduced from *2. Macchab. c. 7*. And by Heaven and Earth Aretinus says, from Augustine *lib. 12. confess. c. 17 in fine*, and *c. 19 and 20*, and *lib. 1. de Genes. contra Manich. c. 7*, must be understood prime matter, from which all bodies consist, but first and principally Heaven and Earth, and on account of this cause he called it by their names.

He also says from the same Divine Augustine *12. confess. c. 7* and Origen *hom. 1. in Gen.* that Moses by the name of Heaven understood angelic nature; by earth, however, the formless matter of all bodies. And indeed since there the discussion is about the production of all things, it was necessary to speak also about the production of prime matter itself, lest anyone think it was uncreated and co-eternal to God. And since it is necessary that this be made through a making from nothing, plainly its creation can signify nothing but a making from nothing.

So Augustine strives to demonstrate in *lib. de Fide, et Symbol. c. 2* against certain heretics who said that the matter from which God fashioned the world was unproduced and co-eternal to God. "If they grant the omnipotent God is the fabricator of the world, they necessarily confess that he made what he made from nothing. For there cannot be anything of whose creator he would not be, since he is omnipotent — because even if he made something from something, as man from mud, he did not make it from that which he himself had not made, because earth, whence is mud, he had made from nothing. And if he made Heaven and earth itself — that is, the world itself and all things which are in it — from some matter, as is written, 'who made the world from invisible matter or formless' — in no way is it to be believed that that matter itself, from which the world was made, however formless, however invisible, in whatever mode it was, could be through itself, as coeternal and coeval to God. But whatever mode of its own it had, it had not except from the omnipotent God."

Since therefore matter too was a terminus of creation, indeed the first thing created at the beginning of the world, as Scotus notes in *2. d. 12. qu. 2. § respondeo*

ad quæst. from the same Augustine *lib. 13. confess.*, and could not be produced outside [ad extra] except through a making from nothing, it is necessary that it be contained and fall under the word of creation which is placed in *Genesis cap. 1.*

Fifth, it is further deduced from other passages of Scripture. For in *Ps. 32* "He himself spoke, and they were made; he himself commanded, and they were created." This passage is wittily expounded for the common opinion by Richard *2. d. 1. ar. 1. d. 1. ad 1.*, where he says that when the Psalmist added "created" to "made," he certainly did not intend to distinguish creation from making by opposition, but to note that "making" is more than "creation." Hence the second part of that verse is rendered as a specification of the first, to show that creatures were not in any way made by God, but through creation, which is a making from nothing.

But Ferchius says on *pag. 248. n. 97* that the things of the world of which there is mention in *Genesis c. 1* were undoubtedly made from pre-existing matter, and therefore by "creation" here is understood the making from pre-existing matter.

This response repugns the exposition of St. Ambrose *lib. 4. de Sacram. c. 4*, where from the mode in which all things were produced from nothing by the virtue of the divine speech, he declares the wonderful mode by which bread in the Eucharist is transubstantiated into the body of Christ by the virtue of the divine speech. Which plainly does not come about from the pre-existing matter of bread, which does not remain in the body of Christ produced through transubstantiation: "Heaven was not, sea was not, earth was not, but listen to him saying, 'he himself said, and they were made; he himself commanded, and they were created.' Therefore so that I may reply to you: the body of Christ was not before consecration, but after consecration I tell you that now it is the body of Christ. He himself said, and it was made; he himself commanded, and it was created." Thus Ambrose.

Likewise *Eccl. 18*: "He who lives forever created all things simultaneously" — among which is comprehended also prime matter, which cannot come to be except from nothing. And *Colos. 1*: "in the beginning all things were founded in the Heavens and on the Earth, visible and invisible, whether Thrones or Dominions or Principalities or Powers — all things through him and in him were created."

From which passages of Scripture and similar ones Fasolus *1. tom. 3. q. 45. ar. 1* forms this discourse to show that the common opinion is founded in Scripture: If all things which are not God have been made by God himself, therefore they could not have been made from anything which is not God, since this other thing which is not God must necessarily be contained among all things made by God. Nothing, however, can be made from itself, because that from which a thing is made must be presupposed to the thing and its making. Therefore all things

which are not God were made from no thing at all presupposed — which is to be made from nothing.

But they were made through creation; therefore creation is the making of a thing from nothing. Therefore Scripture explicitly teaching that all things which are not God himself were made by God through creation, must necessarily be thought to teach at least implicitly that to create properly is nothing else than to make from nothing. Which argument Augustine touches on in *lib. de natura boni contra Manich. c. 26*, when he says God made all things from nothing, he proves: "For he does not create, whence he would make something; concerning which the Apostle says most openly, 'because from him and through him and in him are all things.'" And at the beginning of the chapter he confirms the same by the words of *Rom. 4* discoursing thus: "because God made all things, which of himself he did not beget but through his Word, not from those things which already were, but from those which altogether were not — that is, from nothing, he made them. So says the Apostle: 'who calls those things which are not as those which are.'"

Sixth, from the careful consideration itself which Ferchius says he made in the Scriptures regarding the terms of making and of creation, by turning the Concordances of the Bible, I show that creation from the intention of sacred Scripture is the making from nothing. For in that Disputation of his he brings many passages in which Scripture expresses that Heaven and Earth and all things outside God were made from nothing. He also brings several others in which Scripture says that all these things were made by God through creation simply and absolutely uttered, without adding or expressing the particle "from something." For although sometimes this particle "from something" is added to the verb "creation," regularly, however, it is not added, but is uttered absolutely, as experiment can be made in those passages adduced by Ferchius for himself.

From which I raise this argument: Heaven, and Earth, all things outside God were made from nothing, as Scripture teaches in several passages; but in several passages it teaches also that all these things were made by God through creation; therefore creation is the making from nothing, and in Scripture creation properly said is not distinguished from the making from nothing.

And from this is deduced why Scripture does not conjoin with the vocabulary of creation the particle "from nothing," but only with the vocabulary of making. The reason is that making is the proximate genus of creation and of other species of mutation by which things are led from not-being to being. Creation, however, is one determinate species of making, by which a thing is led from nothing to being. Since therefore Scripture speaks about the making of things created by God, it was necessary to add the particle "from nothing," so that the species of making by which they were produced by God might be expressed. Not however when it spoke about creation, because creation in itself and adequately taken already says making from nothing — just as when one says "man," it is not necessary to add the

particle "rational," because it includes it in itself. Well, however, when one says "animal" to signify man.

Hence so far from the fact that from this manner of speaking of sacred Scripture, that it does not add the particle "from nothing" to the vocabulary of creation, it must be deduced according to his phrasing that creation imports a making from something, as Ferchius thought — that rather the altogether opposite must be deduced: namely, that that particle is not added because in itself most formally it is nothing but a making from nothing. Most violently therefore, not to say unfaithfully, did Ferchius deduce from this passage that a form is made only from privation, not from matter.

Finally, because as the Master noted in *2. sent. d. 1. ab initio*, in sacred Scripture often "creator" is taken as "maker," and "to create" as "to make," without distinction of signification — because Scripture does not always speak in scholastic rigor — hence theologians universally — both in the Sentences indeed at that place, but in the Summists *p. 1. d. 45. ar. 1* — assign several and various significations of the term "creation," so that the passages of Scripture can be well understood, and so that the proper signification of this term can be discerned from others, which Aretinus individually enumerates in the *Com. cit. in Genesim*.

First, therefore, it is taken most broadly for the production of anything whatever, even if it is not from nothing, but from something, as from the substance of the one generating. In which sense St. Augustine in *lib. 1. de Fide et Symbolo c. 4* says that to create among the Latins is the same as to generate. In which sense many Fathers explain that *Prov. 8*: "The Lord created me before he made anything from the beginning," if it is understood of divine wisdom or of the divine Word, and not rather of created intellectual wisdom, as afterward the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea expounded, lest they give Arius an occasion to found his error in Scripture. Or it is understood of the divine Word itself, as man, not as Son of God, as other Fathers expounded — because truly the humanity of Christ was first begotten in the divine mind before every creature.

Second, it is sometimes taken morally for the regeneration through grace, in which sense the Psalmist said *50*: "Create in me a clean heart, O God," and *ad Galat. 5*: "Neither circumcision avails anything, nor the foreskin, but a new creature"; and *ad Ephes. c. 2*: "for we are his handiwork, created in Christ Jesus in good works," and *c. 4*: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man, who was created according to God in justice and in holiness of truth."

Third, it is still taken in a moral sense, so that to create is the same as to elevate a pre-existing thing to a higher state, in which sense someone is said to be created a Bishop or Cardinal. And this sense Saint Thomas *p. 1. q. 45. a. 1 ad 1* says is intended by Augustine in the passage cited *contra Adversarium legis et Prophetarum lib. 1. c. 23*, as is gathered from his express words. For distinguishing between "to create" and "to make," he says: "that is said to come to be which, if it did not come

to be, would altogether not exist; but to be created is to be founded or constituted from that which was, just as we say Magistrates and Cities are created."

From which is clearly seen that this acceptance of creation placed there by Augustine, as it is distinguished from making, is not proper and physical, but rather moral. And indeed that in this moral sense Augustine takes the verb "to create," not however for a physical production from some internal principle to the thing produced, as Ferchius contends, is deduced from this: because if he took it thus, he would not well solve the argument of the Adversary of the law and the Prophets, who urged that the God of the law is evil because he is creating evil, from *Is. 45*. To solve this argument, Augustine assigned the aforesaid acceptance of creation as distinguished from making. And taking creation in the aforesaid moral sense, the argument is excellently solved, and the sense is explained by which God is said to be creating evil, inasmuch as by his moral providence he causes evil to change its face and be converted into good.

Or, as Augustine himself says: "because upon sinners he converts those things into evil by the disposition of his severity, which by the largeness of his goodness were made good things." But if he took it in the physical sense pretended by Ferchius, for producing something from some presupposed and internal principle to the thing produced, it does not well satisfy the argument of the Adversary, because God does not create evil in this sense, since it is not something positive. It is, however, true that Suárez in *disp. 20. Met. sec. 1. nu. 22* grants that also in this sense creation is there taken by Augustine for a new production from pre-existing created matter, but he denies that this is the proper acceptance of creation.

Again, fourth, creation is usually taken for conversion or ordination, in which signification what is deficient in itself is said to be created, if it is converted to good or ordained. In which sense the Fathers usually explain the passage from Isaiah 45 already cited: "I am the Lord making peace, creating evil" — which sense is reduced to, or rather altogether coincides with, the mode reported from Augustine, and is a moral sense, not physical.

Fifth, which is physical, as it is taken for making from pre-existing matter, so that it is the same as generation. Thus universally and elegantly is called the procreation of children, and by Lucretius *lib. 2* nature is called the Creator of things. Thus it is said in *Genes. 1*, "God created the great whales," which however in the same place are said to be produced from the waters, not from nothing. And a little after, "God created man," whom nevertheless he did not make from nothing, but formed from the mud of the earth, as is read in the following chapter.

Sixth, it is taken for the production of that which finally proximately or remotely drew its origin from nothing. And production of this kind is called making, and the thing produced, made, and is called creature. And in this way it is taken in the common usage of speakers — and especially so taken is very often read in the sacred Scriptures. In this way in the Symbol of Athanasius it is said of the Son of

God "not made, nor created, but begotten," and in the Symbol of the Mass, "begotten, not made." And it is denied against Arius that the Son of God is created, or a creature. And taking creation in this way, the whole latitude of real being is divided into uncreated and created, into creator and creature. And every real being created by God and a creature is called something.

Finally, creation is taken for the making of a thing from nothing — that is, not from any subject, either intrinsic to it or on which it depends in its being. And this is recognized by all theologians as the legitimate and proper acceptance of the name of creation. And according to these various acceptances of the name of creation, the Scriptures in which various modes of creation are mentioned can be easily explained. These last two acceptances of the name of creation the Doctor assigned in *2. d. 11. q. 1. A.*

From what has been said, however, the things objected by Ferchius on the opposite can easily be met with. For he produces nothing new from the Scriptures or Fathers which had not been seen well by the scholastic Theologians before he was born, nor was it sufficiently resolved — indeed most sufficiently, to such an extent that my labor in this article for declaring a matter most known and controverted by no one in the schools has been altogether superfluous. That authority of Augustine against the Adversaries of the law and the Prophets, which he so exaggerates and seems to adduce as from his own stock (for he says on *p. 255. nu. 10g.*, "I have noticed, however, this same thing before me was observed by St. Augustine, etc.," as if that passage had not been observed by others), is universally adduced and explained by theologians.

Consult the expositors of St. Thomas *p. 1. q. 45. art. 1*, where together with St. Thomas they excellently explain that passage. Consult also Bassolius *2. d. 1. qu. 2. art. 1*, where he well explains the same passage of Augustine, saying that there he takes "to create" for "to re-create" and for the common acceptance of creation in use among the Scholastics. He adduces Anselm *monolog. 8* and Damascene in *Fidei c. 36*.

The objection about the Hebrew word "bara" translated into Latin as "he created" at *n. 60* has been sufficiently dissolved. The same two authorities — *Ecclef. 24* about wisdom saying: "From the beginning, before the ages, I was created," and again *Proverbs 8*: "The Lord created me from the beginning of his ways" — upon which he strongly relies to prove that the Son of God is created within, and which the Arians also used for the same position, the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea sufficiently explained, as reported above at *n. 58 and 59*, and also others cited at *n. 64*.

Why Scripture adds the particle "from nothing" to the vocabulary of making, not however to that of creation, was said at *n. 62*. And in what sense it sometimes adds to creation the particle "from something," as when it says that man was created

from the mud of the earth, and that God created all things from invisible matter, was explained at *n. 65*.

What he adds on *p. 256. n. 14* concerning the signification of the vocabulary of annihilation, that it leaves behind something of the thing annihilated, and proves from several authorities of the psalms: "He is brought to nothing in his sight, the malignant one" *14*, "They shall come to nothing, as water running" *Ps. 57*, and similar — it is sufficiently clear that they must be understood in a moral sense concerning the sinner collapsed from the state of grace. Hence annihilation in this sense is opposed to creation in the third or fourth sense.

Of the notion, however, of creation and annihilation according to the mind of Aristotle, we ought to be little solicitous. Both because this name is more theological than philosophical, and therefore its notion must be sought from theologians, not from philosophers. And because even though some wish Plato to have recognized the notion of creation as the making from nothing, as I said above from Justin the Martyr, yet about Aristotle the matter is not altogether certain. Many think, whom Pererius follows in *lib. de materia cap. 7*, that such a notion was altogether unknown to him. Hence if he sometimes uses this vocabulary, he seems to have used it only in the fifth sense. It is indeed true, however, that Scotus *1. dist. 8. q. 5* and *dist. 1. qu. 2* feels that from Aristotle the creation of intelligences, of Heavens, and of prime matter has been detected as eternal, although he did not express it under this formality of production from nothing. About which I said in *disp. 6. Met. q. 6. art. 125*.

That he adds, moreover, that with Vicomercato he does not know whence the Scholastic Theologians received their signification of creation, is frivolous. About Vicomercato it is no wonder, since he was a pure Peripatetic and more versed in reading Aristotle than the Fathers. But what he ignores with Vicomercato, Bannes opens in *p. 12. qu. 45. art. 1*, where he says that this acceptance is familiar to all theologians, which they drew from the Master of the Sentences in *1. d. 1* and from Augustine *lib. 12. Confess. cap. 25* and from other Fathers (I add from those already cited above). This acceptance therefore the holy Fathers taught us, Lombard, whom Ferchius himself on *p. 22* calls the Master of Theologians (because there he favors him in the inchoations of forms — although further below on *pag. 250* he does not deign to receive him even as a disciple when he rejects his explanation of that authority of *Ecclef. 1*: "The Wisdom of God, etc.," and says his own is more suitable) — and this finally confirmed by the universal consensus of all Scholastic theologians of whatever school. To these, in investigating the true and proper signification of creation, both from the Scriptures and from the holy Fathers, more must be believed than to Ferchius alone.

Hence he blathers too freely — not to say impudently and imprudently — that all scholastic theologians in that Sacred term of creation depart from sacred Scripture. He himself rather is altogether to be corrected, that he alone has wished in this Sacred term to depart from the common and unanimous consensus of

theologians. For by this audacity he incurs the mark at least of temerity, according to the canons reported by Aretinus in the *Prologomen. to 3. lib. Sentent.* on opinions to be qualified, where he writes thus: "Second, I say that the unanimous consensus of the Scholastic Doctors produces probability so vehemently that he who should think the opposite would be accused of temerity, as one who opposes himself to a most rapid river."

Article II. Whether forms are made from nothing by a natural immediate agent

Ferchius affirms this throughout the whole first investigation, where consequently he asserts that that proposition so famous in the Peripatetic school — "from nothing nothing comes" — is not so true as the Peripatetics boast. Indeed not even uttered by Aristotle as his own, but from the mind of the Ancients among whom this axiom flourished. And lest the reader immediately stricken be shaken by the unknown strangeness of the assertion that he is not accustomed to say and hear, he adduces a certain authority of Aristotle in the book titled *de Xenophane* at the beginning of the investigation *cap. 1*. Afterward in the progress he strives to show the falsity of that proposition in many ways.

We in *disp. 5. de gen. q. 1. art. 1* impugned his opinion by defending the truth of that axiom in the Peripatetic school, "from nothing nothing comes," especially through natural causes. Because of this, Ferchius, indignant at our impugnations, responds most sharply in *lib. 2. Defens.*, which he spends wholly in defending this making of forms from nothing, and in demonstrating the falsity of that saying in Aristotle, "from nothing nothing comes" — whose truth he says neither we nor the Philosophers of our class have ever sufficiently proved.

Therefore my part will be in this question to show that the point of which there is controversy, even though it has not been proved by us through many reasons, was sufficiently established by two arguments — and those founded in Aristotle. I said however the point of which there is controversy, because neither we in the cited place contend that this proposition is universally true — indeed we gratuitously granted that it is false with respect to a supernatural agent, God, even in Aristotle's view — to whose ears Scotus supports that Heavens, intelligences, and prime matter were produced from nothing by the first efficient cause, *2. dist. 8. q. 5*. We also granted that something comes to be from nothing from a natural agent, as from a *terminus a quo*, and in the manner of a pre-existing subject from which privation recedes and form succeeds. And in these two senses we said in the passage cited that it is not strange or new among the Peripatetics that something comes to be from nothing or non-being.

For in the first sense many Peripatetics grant according to the mind of Aristotle that Heavens, intelligences, and prime matter were produced from nothing — as "nothing" excludes every part presupposed of the thing to be made, a pre-existing subject — by God from eternity. And in the second sense all grant that a

composite comes to be per accidens from nothing, or non-being — that is, from the privation which was in the matter — in any natural generation, as Aristotle teaches in *1. Phys. 74 and 75*, and recedes upon the arrival of the form.

Nor do I here wish with Ferchius to contend about the name, who in *lib. 2. defens. cap. 15 and 16* gravely chides us for having said that privation is nothing and non-being absolutely speaking. For he says in *cap. 16. pag. 236* that "privation is nothing, no one of the ancient Peripatetics, so far as I know, has granted — that non-being in common is nothing — it is altogether false in Aristotle and the Peripatetics."

For I do not, I say, here wish to contend about a question which cannot be except about the name. It is certain that Aristotle in the aforesaid *tex. 75* calls privation non-being, when he says "from privation, because it is per se non-being, not from that which is in." It is also certain that Ferchius himself in that *cap. 4. investig. 1*, where he says he teaches the opposite — that privation is not nothing — does not say "privation is nothing" under *num. 10 in fine*.

For when he had there made this objection — that indeed Aristotle inferred the very thing to come to be per accidens from that which is, namely from privation, which does not remain in the thing made, but privation denies the entity of only one part and leaves behind the entity of the other part. Therefore the thing comes to be partly from being, partly from non-being, not however universally from no pre-existing part.

He responds there, and finally recapitulating his response says: "Something comes to be per accidens from non-being, either according to part or according to the whole, I grant, because nothing itself is not in the thing made; something comes to be per se from non-being, I deny, because nothing itself is not in the thing made." Where under the name "nothing" he also comprehends privation, which denies the entity of only one part and grants the entity of another part, and grants that something comes to be from non-being according to part (which precisely non-being according to him is privation) "because nothing itself is not in the thing made," and nothing, which is the *terminus a quo* of such making, is privation.

Then, it is false that he says he does not find among the Peripatetics that non-being in common, or non-being as such, is nothing. For St. Thomas is an excellent Peripatetic, and yet in *1. par. qu. 45. art. 1* in the corpus he says, "The same is nothing as no being." And he himself in *vestig. 1. num. 61* grants this signification of this name "nothing" from Scotus *quol. 3. ab initio*.

And even if neither Aristotle nor any Peripatetic said this, still it would have to be granted that non-being as such and nothing are altogether the same, and are mutually convertible. And still it would have to be granted that privation is nothing for the formal, even though it connotes something in which it is, as in an apt subject, because it is a negation in a genus.

It is, however, true that when we say a composite comes to be from non-being, or nothing, which is privation, we do not understand privation to be nothing in such a way that it denies every part of the composite, but one only, namely the form. Hence if in this sense Ferchius takes "nothing," it must be granted that privation is not nothing, because it is not the negation of both parts, but of one only. But as I said, this is a dispute about the name, and the acceptance of "nothing" in this sense is altogether of will.

That therefore in which there is controversy with him concerning the thing is the making of forms from nothing by a natural and immediate agent. We unhesitatingly deny this with all the Peripatetics, with only Philoponus excepted, as he himself says. And we pretend that it has been sufficiently proved in the passage cited from a double way — namely, from the side of the maker and from the side of the thing made. I shall use however synonymously in this question the vocabulary of creation and of making from nothing, both because I have already proved that it coincides in the preceding question, and because all so speak except Ferchius.

The first, therefore, and principal reason which we adduced there to exclude the making of forms from nothing through natural agents in *disp. 5. de gen. q. 1. art. 1. n. 11*, and which impelled the Philosophers to this common consent, was daily experience. For they saw that never does something come to be anew except with some other preceding from which it comes to be, as water from air, an animal from seed, and that never do natural agents work anything except in some subject, and while something is corrupted, there remains something in the generated thing which was in the corrupted. Hence they rightly concluded that natural causes cannot produce anything from nothing and work without a previous subject, nor can they, by destroying natural things, resolve them into altogether nothing.

Which reason is Aristotle's *1. Phys. 62 and 63*, although he is not cited there, where by this induction he proves that always in every action and natural transmutation something is subjected from which comes to be what comes to be. Since therefore a natural agent cannot work except around some subject, it is an evident sign that it cannot produce a thing from nothing, whether this be a form or a composite. For it always acts on presupposed and determinate matter.

This, I say, is Aristotle's reason, adduced by us in the passage cited *n. 11*, where also for this Peripatetic truth we cite Averroes *2. Met. com. 19. 5*. Wherefore undeservedly Ferchius in *libr. 2. defens. c. 1* says that we cite for this axiom "from nothing nothing comes" only Averroes, and adduce no reason from Aristotle. If he saw Averroes cited, he also saw the reason adduced, which although common and very frequent, has not lost its force because of frequency. Therefore he was bound to respond, or at least not to say that that axiom was established by us by Averroes' authority alone. Indeed he himself in *vestig. 1. cap. 14. n. 43 in fine* says that the independence of the second efficient from matter has been proved to be

most difficult. Therefore this reason adduced by us in the passage cited was not to be scorned or dissembled, but to be solved. It is also taken from St. Bonaventure *2. d. 1. art. 1. qu. 1. in fine*.

But at the place now cited he suggests a solution, and says that subject is something irrelevant to the making from nothing, but the negation of the *terminus ad quem* and of any part whatever which is something of the terminus is per se required in the *terminus a quo* of the making from nothing.

Against, because as Scotus teaches *1. d. 5. qu. 2. § ex Phys. 64*, generation in creatures has annexed mutation, which cannot be exercised except in a subject. Hence it can be considered in two ways: either in the character of production and making, in which sense it belongs to the composite, and in the character of mutation, in which sense it belongs to the subject and the mobile, which passes from privation to form, from Aristotle in the passage cited. Although therefore the subject is indeed irrelevant to generation, or making of form considered in the character of production, it is false that it is irrelevant as it has annexed mutation, and insofar as it is with the mutation of the subject passing from privation to form. Since therefore the making of form by a natural agent does not happen without mutation, in this sense the subject is per se and necessarily required, into which it acts and in which it produces the form.

Then, in the making of form, whatever it be, whether natural or artificial, we always experience a subject intervening. Therefore it does not relate to such making in an altogether irrelevant and per accidens manner, but necessarily and per se concurs to it. The antecedent is Aristotle's *1. Phys. text. cited 62 and 63*; indeed in the whole progress of that first book, where in every mutation and generation he shows that besides contraries a subject intervenes. The consequence is clear, because a per accidens cause does not necessarily and per se concur to the effect, nor does the effect have an essential connection with it.

He replies at the place cited *vestig. 1. n. 44* that for the most part the subject intervenes in the making of form from the character of the thing made, not from the character of the effecting. For when the thing made is apt to be in a subject, by whatever or however it is finally produced, it will be in the subject. As heat, whether produced by the Sun equivocally, or by heat univocally, whether naturally in air or violently in water, is always produced in a subject, because its character is such that it is apt to inhere in a subject. But through *2. Phys. text. 78*, each is acted as it is apt by nature.

When however the thing made is apt by nature to exist per se, and not in a subject, then the producer, although it produces by making, will make the thing not in a subject. The same he repeats in *lib. 1. defens. n. 19*, where he says that on the part of the maker matter is not required in its action, but on the part of the thing made. For the producer of the second makes the whole not in a subject; it makes the

form in a subject. Hence to require a subject in which it is, is from the need of the thing made.

Against this I urge in many ways. First, he wrongly says that for the most part the subject intervenes in the making of form by a natural agent, because Aristotle in the course of the whole first of the *Phys.* did not say that for the most part the subject intervenes in the making of form, but universally and always, and in any transmutation whatever, both substantial and accidental.

Likewise against this solution proceeds the argument of Scotus *4. dist. 12. qu. 4. H.* For an agent which has in its active virtue, completely, the terminus, can put it in being, if it is not impeded. Therefore a created agent, if it has of itself virtue effective from nothing, could put the terminus in being without any passive thing, and thus could make an accident without a subject, and a substantial form without matter. Which is clearly against sense. Hence a created agent (says the Doctor) for two reasons requires a passive thing, namely for itself, because the passive thing is a concause with the created agent, which has a limited power in acting, and therefore requires another cause, namely material, concurring in becoming. And for the effect also, which is composite from matter as a pre-existing part and form as the supervening part.

Then, according to him no substantial form depends in its being on matter, which he proves first in *lib. defens. a n. 47 up to 50*, and *lib. 3. cap. 7*, where in the end he concludes that independence from matter is common to all substantial forms. If therefore all substantial forms are independent of matter, then they will not need a subject or matter, because dependence comes from need. And thus the making of any substantial form whatever will be able to be exercised by a natural agent without the intervention of matter.

The consequence is proved, because here there will be no need for it either on the part of the maker, or on the part of the thing made. Not indeed of the maker, because although it is a second efficient, it still has according to Ferchius a virtue productive from nothing. Not on the part of the thing made, because no substantial form needs a subject according to him. Finally, when he would wish now to deny this about other substantial forms, this however cannot be denied of the rational soul. For this is a form apt to exist per se, and not only in a subject.

Thus also prime matter needs absolutely no subject, since it is the altogether first subject of others. If therefore the subject does not intervene in the making of the thing except from the need of the thing made, of which it is a part, as in the making of the composite, or of which it is the subject, as in the making of the form, plainly in Ferchius's view the reason cannot be assigned why a natural agent cannot produce the soul without any subject at all, and also prime matter. Since in the making of these there is no need of a subject either on the part of the maker or of the thing made.

Also because in the very response he says that when the thing made is apt by nature to exist per se and not in a subject, then the producer will make the thing not in a subject. And indeed of prime matter Ferchius seems to grant this freely — that it can be made from nothing by a natural agent. For *lib. 2. defens. cap. 8. n. 48*, epitomizing what he said singularly in *vestig. 1* not said by others, the ninth proposition is: "Thus, that one making from nothing is not only the first cause, but also the second, even with respect to prime matter, has been shown." Either therefore I do not understand this ninth proposition, or through it he grants that not only the first cause but also the second can make prime matter from nothing.

Whether this is absurd and against Aristotle, I leave to the Reader to discern. And if he understands in this sense that the second cause is making from nothing with respect even to prime matter, he manifestly contradicts himself. For he says in *lib. 2. defens. cap. 7. n. 45* that the foundation of his making from nothing is Aristotle's saying in the *lib. de Xenophane*: that this proposition "from nothing nothing comes" is false. But it is not false in composites; therefore in a simple form and simple matter.

But if a natural agent in the making of the composite should simultaneously make both matter and form, already the composite would not be said to be made from any presupposed part of itself, but would be said to be made from nothing, as "nothing" denies any pre-existing part whatever. And yet in *vestig. 1. cap. 13 in fine* he expressly denies that prime matter can be effected and made by a natural and material agent. Hence I do not understand in what sense he says at the place cited that he has proved in *vestig. 1* "that one making from nothing is not only the first cause, but also the second, even with respect to prime matter." Let him speak more clearly, if he wishes to be understood.

The second reason from the same way — namely on the side of the maker — is adduced to show that a material corporeal agent cannot produce forms from nothing, from Scotus *4. d. 1. qu. 1. § ideo dici potest concl. 3*. Where he proves that no material form can be the principle of creating or making anything from nothing: because just as in being it presupposes matter in which it is, so in acting it presupposes matter on which to act. Otherwise the terminus of action would be more separate from matter than the active form, which is false. Because the terminus of action cannot be more perfect than its productive principle, but it would be more perfect if it were more separate from matter, because to be separated from matter argues perfection.

But the formal terminus of action cannot be more perfect than the formal principle of acting, because nothing is formally the principle of producing something more perfect than itself — for nothing can act beyond its species. Therefore etc.

Ferchius adduces this reason of Scotus in *vestig. 1. cap. 13. num. 39*, with the Doctor's name suppressed, whom to attack with open war and despise he did not

yet dare. He does not however adduce it as Scotus shaped it. For the Doctor argues thus: "a material form, just as in being it presupposes matter in which it is, so in acting it presupposes matter on which to act. Otherwise the terminus of its action would be more separate from matter than the form itself."

But Ferchius shapes the Scotic reasoning as follows, so that he may more easily solve it: "what depends on matter in being cannot in acting be independent of matter. But a composite and a material form depend in being on matter; therefore also in acting. Wherefore they will not produce matter, but will presuppose it produced."

Where, as you see, he does not adduce the proof of the consequence which the Doctor makes — that namely then the terminus of its action would be more separate from matter than the form itself — although in this proof consists the whole force of the argument.

Indeed, an author is not bound to report the adversary's argument under altogether the same terms. Nevertheless, in adducing it he ought to omit no particle which pertains to the force of the argument. Ferchius therefore falls into the error which he is wont to reproach to others — that their arguments are not faithfully reported, that more essential particles are omitted, etc.

But let us see what he replies to Scotus's reason, as it is shaped by him. He replies that it proves too much, since every composite and every material form depends on the form and composite producing — on the composite as on the maker, on the form as on the reason of making. But according to them, what depends in being cannot produce something of the same character with that on which it depends. Therefore a composite could not produce a similar to itself, nor will form be the reason of producing a similar form, just as a composite cannot produce matter similar to that which it has.

But Aristotle 2. *de anim.* 34 says that it is most natural for living perfect things to generate similar to themselves. Which to many non-living things also, especially univocal agents, they grant. Afterward under *num.* 40 he brings a reason from Aristotle 2. *de Gener. animal. cap.* 6 why a form is not the reason of producing matter similar to that on which it depends. Which finally he says is: because matter is prior to form by nature and generation, from 1. *Phys.* 82 and 1. *de partibus animalium cap.* 2, and therefore cannot be effected by form, because nothing per se posterior in time or by natural origin can be an effective cause of its prior. For the generator precedes the generated. Form, however, since it comes to be from nothing of itself, re-vindicates from a corporeal agent that something comes to be from nothing.

This solution does not evacuate the force of the argument, since it not only proves that a natural agent always in its action supposes matter, into which to act, but also that it cannot produce form except dependently on it. Hence although it comes to be from nothing of itself as from a part, it still comes to be from

something, as from a proper and necessary subject, in which it comes to be. Which dependence removes its creation and absolute making from nothing, as Ferchius himself also grants. Who therefore, to avoid this and preserve the making from nothing, most obstinately denies that substantial forms depend on matter in any genus of causality whatever in their becoming, being, and conservation, as will later be clear. Hence when he grants such dependence of form on matter here, he manifestly contradicts himself, nor does he solve the argument.

What he says, however, that Scotus's argument proves too much — it is true that against him it proves too much, because it proves what he would not wish to be proved — namely that a material form cannot be produced from nothing by a natural agent. It does not however prove that it cannot produce a similar to itself, provided it does this dependently on matter.

When he attempts to show this from another argument (which the Doctor has 4. *loc. cit. infra litt. Ii* to prove that form cannot produce, or be the reason of producing, matter) because "what depends in being cannot produce something of the same character with that on which it depends; therefore a composite cannot produce similar to itself, nor will form be the reason of producing a similar form, because every composite and every material form depends on the form and composite producing" — I say that neither is the argument retorted as Scotus shaped it, nor is that consequence well proved.

For Scotus does not say that everything which depends in being cannot produce something of the same character with itself on which it depends, as Ferchius assumes, but argues thus: "a material form depends in being on matter, therefore in acting it cannot be the principle of producing something of the same character with matter." Which indeed is true, because it depends on matter as on the altogether first subject ungenerable and incorruptible. Hence he concludes the argument in the subject matter of which there is discussion, not universally in all, as Ferchius pretends to retort against Scotus.

But also that consequence is well proved, because the proposition assumed in its proof is false — that a composite and every material form depend on the form and composite producing. They depend indeed on those producing in that instant of time in which they are produced, but afterward they do not depend on them. Indeed a son depends on a father in being in the instant in which he is produced, but not afterward — indeed he is conserved in being after the father's death. But a material form is conjoined with matter and depends on it in its being, becoming, and conservation, as long as it endures. Whence it is clear that there is a great disparity between the argument as made by Scotus and as retorted by Ferchius.

When however he gives a reason from Aristotle 2. *de gener. anim. cap. 6* why form is not the reason of producing matter similar to that on which it depends —

because matter is prior by nature and by order to form — first, he manifestly contradicts himself. Since in *lib. 3. Defens. pag. 340. num. 81* he wants form to be prior by nature to matter, because it is more perfect than it, and the perfect is prior by nature to the imperfect. And he excludes Scotus, Aragonius, and Zerbius from the Peripatetic school as ignorant disciples of Aristotle, because they say against Aristotle that matter is prior by nature to form, and by generation.

But it is false that by so saying they stray from the doctrine of the common Preceptor, because he himself in this passage grants that that proposition is Aristotle's *1. de partibus animal. cap. 2*. Hence more reasonably he himself must be excluded from Aristotle's school rather than Scotus with his disciples. The reason by which he proves it, however, is plainly excellent, but not drawn from Aristotle in the passage he cites, *2. de gener. animal. cap. 6*, because about this matter he there neither treats nor speaks of the order of priority and posteriority preserved between matter and form, as is clear from his words reported by him. He only says that matter is the first and last subject of all forms. But the proof is taken wholly out of Scotus *4. dist. 1. quæst. 1. lit. Ii*, where by design he thus proves it: "When some things according to their whole genus have an order to each other, any of one has a similar order to any of the other. Example: if whiteness according to the whole species is prior to blackness, thus any is prior to any. But every material form according to its whole genus is posterior in origin to the whole receptive matter of it. Therefore any such form is posterior to any matter. But if a posterior in origin or generation is not the principle of producing the prior, therefore a substantial form cannot create matter." Thus the Doctor in the passage cited.

From which it is clear that this reason is not taken from Aristotle but from Scotus, whom he does not mention, lest he seem either to have read Scotus or to have profited from his reading, but from Aristotle, as is clear from his words in *lib. 3. Defens. pag. 332. ab initio*: "I shall not deny that I have sometimes read Scotus, and wish to say, I shall not say that I have profited from his doctrine, etc."

The third reason which we adduced for the same point in the passage cited *disp. 5. de gener. qu. 1. art. 1. num. 14 and 15* proceeds from the character of the thing made and directly destroys the foundation of Ferchius, on which he built his making from nothing. For his principal — indeed only — foundation for preserving that forms come to be from nothing is that they are not from matter, nor depend on matter in their being in any genus of cause, but rather conversely, form depends on matter — which he strives to prove in many ways, both from Aristotle and Scotus, and by reason. For if such dependence of form on matter in the genus of material cause is admitted, which they call extrinsic and subjective, they saw that it was necessary to confess that forms do not come to be from nothing, but from a pre-existing subject — because material and subjective concurrence removes the creation and making of forms from nothing.

Hence he says that we shall never prove from Aristotle or Scotus that form comes to be from matter and depends on matter in its being, and that to seek this in Aristotle is to seek a knot in a bulrush. Thus he speaks in *lib. 2. Defens. cap. 10. n. 62.*

Here in the same book *pag. 207. n. 54*, thinking he has sufficiently demonstrated this from Aristotle (as I shall soon report) from *tex. 58. 1. Phys.*, he turns to us and says: "Do you notice, most acute Offenders of mine, what Aristotle taught me? He taught, and I learned, that a musician does not come to be from a man, that a simple form does not come to be from matter. And you dare to assert against Aristotle that a musician comes to be from a presupposed man, a form from presupposed matter?"

Whence thinking by this to have reported a victory from his making from nothing, he demands this demonstration saying: "Now I argue for myself: this is the only evasion for the Adversaries denying that form comes to be from nothing. They say indeed that form comes to be from matter, but Aristotle expressly denies this, therefore it remains that, as Philoponus taught, form comes to be from nothing."

Since therefore that is Ferchius's principal foundation, with peaceful mind and demissive voice (with declamations set aside) I shall strive to show from Aristotle that material forms come to be from matter, and from Scotus that they depend on it in their being, becoming, and conservation. Because with dependence proved, his Ferchian making from nothing will be resolved into nothing. And if I do not prove this, I offer my pledge.

This however we have already proved in the passage cited on generation *num. 15*, because no passage is found in Aristotle where he has expressed that forms come to be from nothing in Ferchius's sense, but well indeed is a passage found where he expressed that they come to be from matter — so that we might convince this from authorities adduced by him himself for his making from nothing in *vestig. 1.*

We further produced *tex. 58. 1. Phys.*, where Aristotle says that the musical comes to be from the non-musical, which we explained with some Expositors as the same as that the form of music comes to be from a subject deprived of form. Against which exposition Ferchius vehemently inveighs in *libr. 2. Defens. cap. 9 and 10*, as altogether repugnant to the text. Since by "non-musical" Aristotle understands, it is collected from his discourse, a simple privation, not a subject deprived of form. For there he places a discrimination between opposite and subject — that is, privation and matter — as regards the very becoming of form from them. And he says that of privation not only is locution made in the direct, saying "the non-musical becomes musical," but also in the oblique, "from the non-musical is made the musical." But of the subject we do not speak in the oblique but in the direct: "for not from a man was made a musician, but a man became a

musician." In which example of Aristotle "musical" is a simple form and "man" is simple matter. And he says that we cannot say that the musical comes to be from man — that is, that form comes to be from matter.

With which text concurs another in 7. *Met.* 25, where Aristotle says that "from a sick man becomes healthy, but not from a man becomes healthy" — where by "healthy" he understands the form of health, and by "man" matter. Whence finally he concludes that from that context the opposite is gathered of what we intended to prove through it — namely that form does not come to be from matter as from a subject, but from privation as from a terminus.

But against, I prove that our explanation is accommodated to the text, indeed more than the opposite. And I deduce this from *tex.* 43, where Aristotle says that the musical comes to be from the non-musical, not indeed from every, but from the un-musical. Thus therefore he intends in this *tex.* 58 that the musical comes to be from the un-musical, as there. But in *tex.* 43 by "un-musical" he does not understand the simple negation of music, but the negation of music in an apt subject. Therefore likewise in *tex.* 58 by "un-musical" he understands privation as in a subject, or a subject as deprived of form.

The major is clear, because it is the same proposition here and there: "the musical comes to be from the un-musical." The minor is proved from the common of the Expositors, who note that Aristotle in that text 43 said therefore that "the white comes to be from the non-white and the musical from the non-musical, but not from every, or from a determinate one — namely from the black and the un-musical" — because "white" and "non-white" as such, and "musical" and "non-musical" are contradictorily opposed. But "musical" and "un-musical" are opposed according to privation and habit, between which there is the greatest difference. Since the privatively opposed denies the form in a subject and supposes that subject to be apt by nature to receive it — which does not apply to contradictorily opposed.

Therefore by "un-musical" he does not there understand a simple negation of music, or a privation prescinding from a subject, but a privation as in a subject capable of form opposite, or a subject as deprived of such a form. Thus noted Cartarius *controv.* 1. *in eum textum*, and Toletus in the same place, who also confirms this from St. Thomas. For moving there a doubt, why from one contrary as a terminus another comes to be, he replies from St. Thomas: because the subject which must receive the other contrary must be in proximate potency to it. Therefore by "un-musical" he understands there a subject deprived of music and in proximate potency to it.

Whence the same Toletus afterwards consistently with Aristotle below *tex.* 58 and following, when he says that the musical comes to be from the un-musical, says in *tex.* 60 that "un-musical" says a subject with privation, or form opposite to music, according to the explanation given above *tex.* 43.

Ferchius foresaw that this *tex. 43* would be hostile to him and very profitable for our explanation, and therefore in *lib. 2* at the same *c. 9. n. 60* contends to prove also in that passage that by "un-musical" is understood a simple privation, or "non-subject," not however a subject under the opposite. Because in that passage he treats only of contrary principles, namely from *tex. 41 to 51*, and from *51* he begins to prove that a third subject is given for two contraries. Therefore in *tex. 42* Aristotle could not denote by "un-musical" a subject not yet known.

But plainly this does not prevent, that still in *tex. 43* by "un-musical" be understood a subject deprived of form, or a privation as in a subject. For although he begins to prove by design that a third subject is given for two contraries only from *tex. 51*, that however implicitly he insinuated there which was to be explicitly demonstrated later.

Then principally, that in *tex. 58* by "un-musical" is understood not simple privation and opposite, but a subject under privation, or under opposite, I prove by an evident reason. For there he says that of opposite is said not only in the oblique — that the musical becomes from the non-musical — but also in the direct, that the non-musical becomes the musical. But this proposition in the direct would be altogether false if "non-musical" imports simple privation prescinding from subject. Therefore it must import a subject as deprived of form, or a subject under opposite.

The minor is proved, because in no genus of opposites can it be verified that opposite becomes its opposite, just as blackness does not become whiteness, nor darkness light, nor universally does privation become form, and nothing something.

Confirmation: because that proposition pronounced in the direct, "the non-musical becomes musical," can have only two senses. The first is that simple privation is turned into form per se and first, and non-music into music — and this is altogether false. The second is that per accidens non-musical — namely privation — becomes musical — namely by reason of the substratum to which it adheres, which passes from privation to form. And this sense is true, which is intended by Aristotle, and is afterward explained in *tex. 75* when he says: "We however say that something comes to be not simply from that which is not, but still comes to be from that which is not, as according to accident. For from privation, which is per se non-being, not from that which is in, it comes to be."

I stop therefore in the explanation already given, that there by "un-musical" is understood a subject deprived of form, not however simple and pure privation prescinding from subject. Aristotle says however that the musical does not come to be from man, not to indicate that form does not in any way come to be from matter, as Ferchius expounds, but to indicate that it does not come to be from matter absolutely taken, because then any would come to be from any — or from

a subject existing under opposite, because contrary comes to be from its contrary, as he had said above in *tex. 43*.

But if Ferchius still tenaciously insists that there by "un-musical" is understood simple privation, I do not wish to argue further, because to tell the truth, from that context it cannot really be gathered whether Aristotle granted or denied that form according to the thing comes to be from matter or from privation alone. Because according to all the Expositors, Aristotle there as regards this places a discrimination between opposite and subject not as to the thing, but only as to the voice and manner of speaking. And therefore there is no reason why Ferchius should make such force in that context which we have adduced — not to absolutely convince this, but as I said rather to revivify him from his own sayings and retort back upon him the dart which he had thrown.

Also the *tex. 25* which he produces from *7. Met.*, where he says Aristotle denies that "healthy" comes to be from man, where by "health" he understands form and by "man" matter, to signify that form does not come to be from matter — it is less faithfully adduced. For there Aristotle does not absolutely deny that from man comes healthy — indeed he clearly teaches that healthy comes to be from both, namely from privation and from matter — more properly however from privation than from matter.

Behold the words of the text, which wonderfully favor us and demonstrate that what is consequently inferred from it by Ferchius is false — that form is said to come to be only from privation, not however from matter: "*causa vero est, quia fieri contingit ex privatione, et subjecto, quod dicimus materiam, ut puta, homo, ægrotus fit sanus, magis tamen dicitur ex privatione fieri, veluti ex ægroto sanus, quam ex homine*" — "The reason, however, is that coming to be happens from privation and from the subject which we call matter, as for example, a man, being sick, becomes healthy — but more is it said to come to be from privation, just as healthy from sick, than from man."

Note that he says that form — namely health — comes to be from privation and from the subject, although in the usage of speaking it is more said to come to be from privation than from matter.

And what is more noteworthy, Alensis in this place expounds this text through *text. 58. 1. Phys.* and says: "the first proposition is clear from *1. Phys. tex. 58*" (which is cited in the margin), "for sometimes we say that from the non-white becomes white, and sometimes we say that from potentially white, which is matter, becomes white."

Through which Alensis suggests that Aristotle in *1. Phys. 58* did not wish to deny that the musical comes to be from the un-musical, taking "un-musical" for a subject. Then he also declares why in the common manner of speaking "white" is rather said to come to be from "non-white" — namely from privation — than from a subject potentially white. Namely because this preposition "from" seems

to note a certain order and a certain passage. For when we say that from this comes this, the sense seems to be that with this corrupted comes to be this, because in generation matter remains under the generated form and the privation of the generated form is corrupted. Therefore it is more properly said that from this comes this of privation than of matter.

Most violently therefore — not to say unfaithfully — did Ferchius deduce from this text that form comes to be only from privation, not from matter.

Finally, to prove this more firmly according to the mind of Aristotle, and that all the passages adduced by Ferchius militate against himself, I produce from 5. *Metaph. cap. 24*, where by design Aristotle recounts and examines six relations, or significations, imported by the particle "from something" — among which finally he enumerates these two as the principal: to come to be from matter as from a part, which is proper to the composite, and to come to be from matter as from a subject, which is proper to form. I produce the words of the text from the common version which circulates: "*Ex sensibili namque materia composita substantia est, forma quoque ex materia*" — "For from sensible matter there is a composite substance, form also from matter."

And indeed much clearer is this authority for our eduction of forms from matter — that form also comes to be from matter — than that adduced by Ferchius for the making of forms from nothing: that "musical does not come to be from man," from 1. *Phys. 58*. For this authority freely admits the gloss already given: that the musical does not come to be from man, but from the un-musical, because form does not come to be from matter considered in whatever way, but from a subject deprived, which must also cast off privation when it receives form.

But the authority adduced for me is so clear and obvious that it admits no gloss without violence. For how do you wish to gloss this Aristotelian saying, "form comes to be from matter," so that you show that form does not come to be from matter? Behold now, dearest Ferchius, the mode sought in itself and found, behold more clearly expressed in Aristotle, that form comes to be from matter — not from nothing.

But although the passage is clearer for our assertion than could be desired, and lest you deduce this text into strange senses and say that it is other than the words present, receive in its confirmation the exposition of the Irrefragable Doctor (because the authority of the exposition of Scotus does not please you, who to you is an Aragonius, although not to Maurus, Fabri, Cavello, and other Scotists universally). He in the passage cited 5. *Metaph. tex. 29* has these words: "It must be diligently noted, that as the Commentator wishes at the beginning of this chapter, although 'from' is said in many ways, nevertheless the most famous mode of it is when 'from' notes the relation of material cause, such that 'from this comes this' is like 'from the potency of matter' — the sense is not that this comes to be after

this, but the sense is that this is perfected through this, namely potency through form, and this is drawn to this, namely matter to perfection."

Nor suspect that this passage escaped Ferchius, who for this matter turned the whole Aristotle wherever he spoke of the signification of this preposition "from." He saw, and from this very passage wished to convince us of falsity before the Readers of his Defense, not of Aristotle. Hence in *libr. 2. cap. 10* he thus addresses us charitably:

"I beseech you, breathe to the truth. Aristotle *1. Phys.* posited the very coming-to-be from, as from a terminus, or as a part; in *1. de gen. anim.* he added two significations: to come to be from an efficient, and to come to be after something. In *5. Met. 29* he posited six significations subdividing some of these four. And what is notable, in no of these passages through the particle 'from' did he declare the relation of material cause to the coming-to-be of form, both accidental and substantial, of form to matter — so that you seeking this in Aristotle seem to seek a knot in a bulrush."

Thus Ferchius with his usual superciliousness. How much truth, however, this account of Ferchius has concerning the passages of Aristotle where he recounts the significations of the particle "from," from the words themselves of *tex. 29. lib. 6. Met.* anyone can judge. For in that very passage Aristotle most clearly says that form comes to be from matter. And yet he still dares to say that it is notable that in no of the passages cited by him through the particle "from" did he declare the relation of form to matter. Not notable is what Ferchius says, since the whole opposite is found in the pre-cited text.

But plainly notable is the act adhibited by this good man in reporting that passage. For from the passage *1. Phys.* he refers two significations there posited by Aristotle, "to come to be from" as from a part or as from a terminus. From the passage *1. de gen. anim.* he refers two other significations there expressed by Aristotle, "to come to be from the efficient" and "to come to be after something." But from the passage *5. Met. 29*, very hostile to himself, where by design Aristotle explains the relations of the particle "from," he only in general refers six significations, not recounting them individually, lest he be compelled to report that saying which beheads Taurus: "form also comes to be from matter."

Thus candidly and faithfully he speaks, who reproaches us everywhere in that book — or rather that little book entirely — of falsity, lying, and unfaithfulness, and often calls us falsifiers of Aristotle's texts.

But neither did he report faithfully the passage from *1. de gen. anim.* For there in *cap. 18* Aristotle not only recounts those two significations, "to come to be from the efficient" and "to come to be after something," but also many others, and especially one contrary coming to be from another contrary, as from a terminus receding — namely form from privation, and from another as from a subject remaining, namely from matter.

Behold Aristotle's words: "for contrary is born from contrary which is corrupted" — this pertains to the coming-to-be of form from privation, which is cast off — "something else must be subjected, from which first, being inherent, is made." This pertains to the coming-to-be of form from matter, as from a subject. Nor can it be said that here "from which" says the relation of a part, because here the discussion is about the coming-to-be of simple contrary — namely form — not about the coming-to-be of composite. Also because about this relation "from which" as from a part he had spoken above, when he had said: "in another way, when a statue comes to be from bronze, or the bed from wood, and whatever we say comes to be from matter, as from something which is in and is formed, the whole comes to be."

It is clear therefore that all the passages adduced by Ferchius for himself militate against him — and that they are reported truncated by him, or falsified.

The fourth reason must be deduced from the authority of Scotus, against whom he says we fight when we say that material forms come to be from matter and are educed, and depend on it in their being, becoming, and conservation. And here again I shall show that in those very same passages which he adduces against us, Scotus teaches the opposite.

Thus in *lib. de primo principio cap. 2. concl. 9* he says that matter is prior to form according to independence, because what concerns and informs seems to depend on what remains and is informed, because what is formed is pre-understood as formable. And if you ask, in what order is it prior, he responds, he says, according to that order according to which form is caused from matter first caused by the Necessary Being itself.

Thus Scotus there, and *concl. 14*: "not every dependent is exceeded by that on which it depends. It is clear: the composite depends on matter, since it is much more perfect. Similarly form depends on matter, as was touched in *concl. 9*. In *theor. 19. concl. 9*: Causes can be mutually causes of each other in a diverse genus of causality, not in the same. The first part is proved, because through the efficient is the end, and conversely. Through matter is form, and conversely. Therefore etc."

Therefore according to Scotus matter is the cause of form in the genus of material cause, which they call extrinsic and subjective. In *1. d. 9. q. 1. ad 2. princ.* he expressly grants the dependence of form on matter.

In *2. d. 12. q. 2. in fine* he makes this argument against himself: "Matter seems to depend more on form than any form on matter. But some natural forms cannot be separated from matter, therefore neither matter from form." He responds that it can be said that although the entity of matter is less perfect than that of form, it is not, however, more dependent — indeed less — and therefore it can come to be without form, not conversely. By which words he makes matter less dependent on form, and form more dependent on it.

In *4. d. 1. q. 1. lit. Ii* he thus argues: "A material form depends in being on matter, therefore also in acting." And *lit. Kk*: "The Philosophers posited an order of secondary causes simply necessary, such that a material form cannot be produced by another agent except with matter concurring, as a necessary cause presupposed to the terminus of production." By which words he openly admits the material concurrence of matter in form through the manner of passive eduction.

In *quol. 7*, not far from the beginning, from a certain Parisian article he acknowledges that material forms are educed from the potency of matter — which eduction is the causality of matter in form, as has been declared by design in *disp. 5. Phys. q. 4. art. 1*.

And *quol. 9. lit. B* he says: "From this is clear also why the separated soul is not a person. For although it is not apt to inhere, and therefore is a being per se in the second mode aforesaid, although it can also be a being per se in the first mode — namely solitarily — not only through the virtue of an extrinsic cause, as an accident can, or a material form, but by the virtue of its own nature left to itself, and this because it does not necessarily depend on matter in its own being."

By which words he distinguishes the rational soul from all other material forms, because it does not depend on matter in its being, becoming, and conservation, as the others depend. And indeed this is so certain and explored in the doctrine of Scotus that to doubt about this is impiety. And he who denies this has little versed in it.

See *4. dist. 12. qu. 4. H*, where he most clearly says that the subject concurs simultaneously with the agent in the genus of material cause. Thus also *2. dist. 18. qu. un. lit. A*.

Moreover, I prove this from Ferchius's own pleasure, to whom it is frequently pleasing to contradict himself, so that he can impugn us. For in *vestig. 1. c. 13. n. 40* he moves this doubt: "but why form is not the reason of producing matter similar to that on which it depends, it is more laborious to say." In whose doubtful proposition he already openly confesses that form depends on matter in its being.

Then in the following *cap. n. 44*, asking why a subject is required in the making of a material form, he responds that it comes from the character of the thing made, not from the character of the effecting. For when the thing made is apt by nature to be in a subject, by whatever or however it is finally produced, it will be in a subject — as heat, whether produced by the Sun equivocally or by heat univocally, whether naturally in air or violently in water — always is produced in a subject, because its character is such that it is apt to inhere in a subject. But through *2. Phys. 78*, each is acted as it is apt by nature.

And the same he confirms in *lib. 1. Defens. nu. 19*, where he says that on the part of the maker matter is not required in its action, but on the part of the thing made.

For the efficient of the second makes the whole not in a subject, it makes the form in a subject. Hence to require a subject in which, is from the need of the thing made — namely the material form.

By which words also he openly confesses that material forms by their nature depend in their being, becoming, and conservation on matter. For dependence arises from need, and therefore is the effect said to depend on the cause, because it needs it to be placed in being — and if it did not need it, it would not depend on it. To say therefore that material forms by their nature need a subject on which to lean and by which to be sustained is openly to confess that they in their being, becoming, and conservation depend on matter as on their material and subjective cause.

Hence in the *preced. disp. q. 1. n. 7* I said that by this reasoning — namely through dependence and independence from the subject — the substantial form is not well distinguished from the accidental.

The fifth reason for the same point — namely that a material form cannot be created or made from nothing by a natural agent — is adduced by Scotus *4. d. 1. q. 1. § ideo dici potest*, where he thus proves this: "The form which is created is naturally prior from the efficient cause than it informs matter. But a material form cannot be from any creature naturally prior than it informs its matter, or its potential. Therefore etc."

Proof of the major, because if it is not naturally prior, therefore it does not receive being from the cause except by that action by which the subject is informed. But that information is a mutation properly said, and thus not a creation, or a simple making from nothing, but from a presupposed subject.

Proof of the minor: no creature can give to a material form absolute being in itself — that is, without informing its potential. For if it could thus give being, it could also conserve it, such that really by the virtue of the creature there would remain in some duration such a form without matter. A material form, however (says the Doctor), is every one which by its nature necessarily inclines naturally to be the act of matter, whether it be substantial or accidental.

Ferchius does not adduce this reason, but from his principles will perhaps respond by denying the major. For an agent can produce a form in a subject, even in that first instant in which it produces it, and still it will be said to produce it from nothing, because although matter is presupposed, it is not presupposed as a part of the thing made, but as an extrinsic subject of the form. For to remove creation the presupposition of the subject does not suffice, in which the form necessarily comes to be, but the presupposition of a part is required, whence it is that the composite is not said to come to be from nothing, because it comes to be from matter as from a presupposed part of itself. Form however comes to be from nothing, because it does not come to be from any pre-supposed part of itself, however much it comes to be in a pre-existing subject.

But against, the mere presupposition of a subject concurring in the genus of material cause to the production of form suffices to exclude its making from nothing. Therefore the response adduced — which is also common to the inchoators of forms — does not remove the force of the argument. The assumption is proved from the same argument, because such presupposition of the subject causes that action to be essentially transmutative and connected with mutation. For by the very fact that the subject is presupposed, already there will be action in the subject, and consequently it will not be creation, because creation is an action independent of the subject.

Then, because therefore something is said to be created, or come to be from nothing, because it emerges totally from the active virtue of the agent without the concurrence of another cause. If therefore to the making of form the subject necessarily concurs in which it comes to be, and on which it depends in being and being conserved, plainly that will not be a making from nothing, but dependent on something besides the active virtue of the agent — which is against the character of creation and of making from nothing.

Then, because therefore the rational soul among all substantial forms is said to be produced through creation, because although it is produced in a subject, namely in the body, not however dependently on it in the genus of material cause — namely subjective and sustentative — because left to its own virtue it can also be conserved outside the body, which does not happen regarding other forms. Therefore such dependence of form on matter in its becoming, such that it cannot come to be except in matter, nor can it be connaturally conserved outside it, removes the character of creation and of making from nothing.

Then, because if such making of form with the need of a subject on which it depends is still creation and making from nothing, the soul will not more be the terminus of creation than other forms. Nor will there be any discrimination between the creation of the rational soul and the making of other forms, for equally all will come to be from nothing and be created. For if it is said that the discrimination is that the rational soul does not come to be with the need of a subject on which it must lean, as other forms — this discrimination will be refuted immediately, because the need of a subject does not remove the character of creation and of making from nothing.

Then, because since creation is said by Theologians to be proper to subsisting things and independent of a subject, if any substantial form indifferently is created and comes to be from nothing as the rational soul, then all substantial forms, as Suárez infers in *disp. 15. Met. sec. 2. n. 9*, would be subsisting and independent of matter in becoming, and consequently in being — which is most absurd. Otherwise all souls of brutes would be immortal.

Then finally, because if substantial forms are said to be created or to come to be from nothing on account of the said cause — namely, because they do not come

to be from any presupposed part of themselves — also accidental forms must come to be from nothing, because an accidental form also comes to be from nothing of itself, and does not pre-exist actually in the subject either according to its whole self or according to a part, as the same Suárez infers.

And indeed Ferchius grants that accidental forms are dependent on the subject in *lib. 3. defens. cap. 8. num. 46*. For this seems to be the discrimination which he establishes between substantial and accidental forms — that the former are independent in their being and becoming, but not the latter. If therefore the latter depend in their becoming on matter, they will not be said to be created, or to come to be from nothing, as the substantial — on account of such dependence on matter — and yet still any comes to be from no presupposed part of itself. Therefore not only the negation of the presupposed part removes the character of creation or of making from nothing, but also of the pre-existing subject.

But if Ferchius should affirm that both forms come to be from nothing, because neither comes to be from any presupposed part of itself, then it is not seen why rather one comes to be independently of a subject than the other.

Finally, because this too is one of Ferchius's principal foundations: that to the making from nothing, or from something, the character of a part per se pertains, not of a subject — as he proves in *libr. 2. defens. cap. 12*. Hence, granting the antecedent — that a material form comes to be from matter, or dependently on it — he still denies the consequence, that it does not come to be from nothing, because matter precedes only as its subject, not however as an intrinsic part. This foundation too must be demolished as much as possible.

I therefore prove that to creation, or to the making from nothing, or from something, not only does the character of a part per se pertain, but also of a subject. And to prove this, I presuppose what I have often said: that the philosophy which we profess and write is not a pure Aristotelian philosophy teeming with many errors, but a true philosophy, which is the handmaid of Theology. Wherefore in philosophy such a notion of creation, or of making from nothing, must be assigned which introduces no absurdity in Theology.

But if we define creation to be precisely the making from nothing as from a presupposed part, and not also as from a presupposed subject, a great absurdity follows in Theology, unless inchoations of forms are admitted, which however neither Ferchius admits. Therefore etc.

The minor is proved, because with such a definition of creation given, and with the seminarium of forms denied — as Ferchius does — it follows that in fact a creature is given, indeed every creature in fact creates not only some accident, but also some simple substance, namely a substantial form.

But no Catholic affirms that any nature has been created by God to which, as to a principal cause, it would belong by its own and native virtue to create. And only

is it disputed among them whether at least some such creature is possible, to which God would communicate the creative virtue. And also in this question, by God's absolute power, the greater and senior part of the theologians stand for the negative.

Thus the Master in *4. d. 5*, St. Thomas in *p. 1. qu. 45. art. 5*, Scotus *4. d. 1. q. 1.*, Ockham *2. q. 7*, Henry *quol. 4. q. 36*, Giles *quol. 5. qu. 1* — whom as leaders of sacred Theology the recent authors universally follow: Suárez *disp. 20. Met. sec. 2*, Vázquez *par. 1. disput. 175. capite 1*, and others.

Indeed, that in fact no creature can create as a principal cause — that is, through an intrinsic active form attaining the terminus of creation, especially of some substance — they hold to be of faith, as Aretinus notes in *4. d. 1. q. 1. art. 9*. And they prove both from Councils and from the holy Fathers.

For the Lateran Council *cap. firmiter de Summa Trinitate* acknowledges only God as the Creator of all things. And in the Symbol of the Council of Nicaea it is said "maker of Heaven and Earth, etc."

St. Augustine *12. de Civ. Dei cap. 24* and *3. de Trin. cap. 8*: "Neither good, nor Angels can be creators of anything." And *lib. 9. de Genes. ad lit.*: "to create nature no Angel can, nor himself."

St. Athanasius *serm. 3. contra Arianos*: "Neither can Angels create, since they too are creatures — indeed not even the Sun, since it is a created thing, could ever effect that what is nothing, something becomes." Where the Holy Father from the character of creature infers the impossibility of creating.

Cyril of Alexandria *libr. 6. thesauri cap. 2*: "No creature ever will be able to produce substance from nothing. For of finite virtue it cannot be." And below: "For who can excogitate, a creature of sound mind, to create what is created, and from nothing to produce what is produced from nothing? The chief property of true God is that from nothing he can produce substances." And *lib. 14. cap. 6*: "the power of creating is only in the divine nature." And *lib. 2. contra Julian.*: "This above all militates against the divine glory, to think that others too can create and produce from nothing. For it is not right to say that those things which are proper and outstanding to the divine and ineffable nature naturally can belong to certain things made by it."

And finally Damascene *lib. 2. de fide cap. 3*, near the end: "Whoever say that Angels are founders of any substance whatever, they are, he says, of the Devil himself — their father."

From which testimonies of the holy Fathers two things are collected against Ferchius: one pertaining to the preceding question — that with them it is the same to create as to make something from nothing (which two he distinguishes); the other pertaining to the present question — that no creature can create and make something from nothing, which he asserts in the present question.

To avoid which absurd conclusion, all theologians and philosophers either conceded a seminarium of forms, or said that to the making from nothing, or from something, not only does the character of a part per se pertain, but also of a pre-existing subject — neither of which Ferchius admits.

I see however what he will respond to this, namely to hurry to his usual evasion, saying that he speaks in the view of Aristotle, that he investigates the mind of one pagan, not truth; that the sacred ought not to be mixed with the profane, because he wishes his philosophy not as a handmaid to serve the Mistress Theology, but to oppose as a rebel — not to construct it and give foundations, but to destroy.

Ferchius in *lib. 2. cap. 11* cites Mayron for his making of forms from nothing. But how much he favors him is gathered from what he has in *2. d. 22. qu. unic.*, where having made this argument: "If seminal reasons are not given in matter, it seems that form comes to be from nothing."

He responds: not so, because there concurs the material cause, which in its mode causes it, just as the agent causes. Not that something passes from matter into form, but the soul comes to be from nothing, because it does not depend on matter.

Ferchius's Objections are retorted and dissolved

Confusedly and indistinctly, here and there in *lib. 1. p. 2. and 3. Defens.*, this Author proves — whether occasion calls for it or not — his making of forms from nothing, and the independence of any substantial form whatever from matter in being, becoming, and conservation. Both by authorities of Aristotle and Scotus, and also by reasons, which I shall strive to collect here into one.

And indeed from Aristotle he brings especially two authorities and repeats them most often in *lib. 2. capite 9. 10. and following*, by which he intends to show that form does not come to be from matter, or dependently on it. The first is from *1. Phys. 58*, where he says the musical does not come to be from man, where by "musical" is understood form and by "man" matter. The other akin is had in *7. Met. 25*, where he says that "healthy" does not come to be from man.

From which he erects such an argument in the cited *cap. 9. nu. 54*: "This is the only evasion for the adversaries denying that form comes to be from nothing. They say indeed that form comes to be from matter, but Aristotle expressly denies this in the cited passage. Therefore it remains that form comes to be from nothing."

Reply: these testimonies favor us no less than Ferchius from what was said at *num. 79 and following*. For although in the first passage he denies that the musical comes to be from man — that is, from matter nakedly and absolutely taken, because any does not come to be from any, but contrary from its contrary, from *1. Phys. 43* — nevertheless there he grants that the musical comes to be from the un-musical — that is, from a subject existing under opposite, or under privation, as was explained there.

Also in the second passage, namely 7. *Met.* 25, he does not absolutely deny that form comes to be from matter. Indeed he expressly teaches that health comes to be from both — namely from privation and from matter — although in the common manner of speaking it is more said to come to be from privation than from matter, as I explained at *num.* 81.

But here again it must be noted that indeed Aristotle in the cited passage by "musical" and "healthy" understands form. But music and health are accidental forms, which Ferchius posits as dependent on matter in their being, becoming, and conservation, in *lib.* 3. *Defens. cap.* 4. and *cap.* 8. *num.* 46.

Hence such texts will also militate against him, since Aristotle there expressly denies, according to him, that accidental forms come to be from matter, or dependently on matter. Finally, to the argument erected from those texts I deny the minor — that Aristotle there expressly asserted only that form does not come to be from matter. For indistinctly he teaches that it comes to be from matter and privation, as is clear from what has been said.

Indeed, since in 5. *Met. cap.* 24. *tex.* 49 he expressly affirmed that form comes to be from matter, from what was said at *num.* 82, I retort the argument: Ferchius's principal evasion to establish form as coming to be from nothing is that form does not come to be from matter. But Aristotle expressly affirms the opposite — namely, that form comes to be from matter. Therefore it remains that it does not come to be from nothing.

Second, to exclude this dependence of material form on matter in its being, becoming, and conservation, he argues again in *lib.* 1. *pag.* 49. *num.* 46, and says that this dependence of material form on matter is born of us, not of Aristotle, and therefore he will not grant dependence of form on matter unless we prove it from Aristotle. He reads indeed in 1. *de Cælo tex.* 100 and 12. *Met.* 38 that effects depend on an efficient or final cause — that is, on an external cause. To depend on an internal cause he does not read.

Reply: the argument is also retorted against him, because he himself grants — which he cannot altogether deny — that a composite essentially depends on its parts as on internal causes constituting it, *ibid.* *num.* 47 and *pag.* 214. *num.* 64, from Aristotle 1. *Phys.* 82, and 2. *Phys.* 28, when he defines material cause as "that from which something comes to be, when it is in." To come to be imports dependence — on which principle he proves against us that form does not depend on matter, because it does not come to be from matter.

Therefore because a composite comes to be from matter as from a part, it is necessary that he confess it depends on it, as on an internal cause. Indeed the dependence of a composite on its internal causes is more essential than on the efficient — at least created, as Scotus teaches in 4. *dist.* 12. *qu.* 1. Since many effects depend on an efficient in becoming, not however in conservation. But a

composite depends on its parts in being, becoming, and conservation so essentially that not even God himself can supply such dependence.

Therefore it cannot be denied that an effect also depends on an internal cause. Whence although Aristotle in the passage cited says that effects depend on an efficient and final cause — that is, on an external cause — he does not however deny that they depend on an internal one.

Whence this is an argument from authority negatively: "He reads that they depend on an external cause, he does not read that they depend on an internal cause, therefore such dependence is not to be admitted." Which way of arguing he himself greatly reproaches to Pererius in *vestig. 1. cap. 11. numer. 30*. Where he lays down this rule: "What Aristotle affirms and denies, a Peripatetic must affirm and deny. But if Aristotle does not affirm, nor deny, it must not be affirmed or denied by a Peripatetic."

Without the vice of the consequent it is not said. Many truths Aristotle does not even touch on; many also, by the consent of all, he wrote which have not come to us. Nothing therefore except to say is to deprive us of truth and judgment. Thus Ferchius there, and most truly. Therefore from him something true can be brought forward besides Aristotle. And from the fact that Aristotle did not say something, it is not well deduced that it should not be asserted without the vice of the consequent even by a Peripatetic. Therefore he sins by arguing thus against the warning given by himself.

Finally, that authority is outside our proposition, because here there is no dispute about the dependence of a composite on internal causes. Nor do we say that form depends on matter as on an internal material cause, but in the genus as of an extrinsic and subjective material cause, inasmuch as it is deduced from it, not from which it is composed.

Third, he argues by reason, *ibidem*: "Every caused thing per se depends on any per se cause of it, and from nothing else per se does it depend. But matter is per se caused by form in the genus of end by 2. *Phys. 23.* and 1. *de partibus cap. 1.* Therefore matter per se depends on form. Since, however, form is in no way caused by matter, it remains that form in no way depends on matter."

And because this argument seems sufficiently valid to him, he repeats it in *lib. 3. pag. 327* under these terms: "No per se principle depends essentially on the principled, but rather the converse. Form is the per se principle of matter itself, and of the being itself found in matter. Therefore form cannot essentially depend on matter. The minor in 2. *Phys. cap. ult.* is proved by Aristotle, namely that form is the final principle of matter."

Reply: he has too quickly forgotten what he had said immediately before in the preceding argument. For there he said that he read in Aristotle 1. *de Cælo 100* and 12. *Met. 38* that effects depend on an efficient or final cause — that is, on an

external cause. To depend on an internal cause, he does not read. Therefore he does not consistently assume in this argument, which he makes immediately after, that major as universally true: "Every caused thing per se depends on any per se cause of it." For a composite is per se caused by matter and form (even according to him *pag. 214. num. 64*) as by internal causes, and yet in Aristotle he does not read of dependence on an internal cause.

I, however, to do a gracious thing, not only grant that major, but also the whole first discourse entirely. But I deny the assumption under the ultimate enthymeme: that "form is in no way caused by matter." For this is a controverted proposition which he assumes in the argument, and does not prove. And therefore he begs the principle. He proves indeed that matter depends on form in the genus of final cause, but he does not prove that form is in no way caused by matter — about which is the question.

So therefore matter depends on form in the genus of final cause, and form in turn on matter in the genus of material cause, not indeed intrinsic, but extrinsic and subjective. In the way in which Ferchius himself grants that an accidental form depends on its subject on which it leans and inheres. Nor is this inconvenient, because causes are mutually causes of each other there 2. *Phys. 20* in a diverse genus of cause and according to different characters.

Which there is declared by example in the efficient and final cause, as labor is the cause of good health, and the latter of laboring, but not in the same way, but this indeed as end, but that as principle of motion. Especially however he brings the example in the efficient and final cause, because this we more evidently experience in them. Not however because such saying cannot and must not be extended to other genera of causes, as was said in *disp. 8. Phys. q. 1. art. 1*. For intellect is the efficient and material cause of intellection, and intellection is the formal cause of it, insofar as it is understanding. And Scotus himself in *theor. 19. concl. 9* extends this saying also to intrinsic causes: "for through matter is form, and conversely" in a diverse genus of cause.

To the same argument as it is formed by him in *lib. 3. pag. 327*, the reply is through the same. Otherwise by the same argument it would be proved that labor cannot be the cause of health in this way: "No per se principle essentially depends on the principled, but rather the converse. Health is the per se principle and cause of labor, because labor depends on it in the genus of final cause. Therefore health cannot essentially depend on labor." Which however Aristotle denies in the passage cited.

Just as therefore to this argument it is said that in the genus of cause in which health is the principle and cause of labor, indeed labor cannot be the cause of health, but well in a diverse genus of cause, in which there is no contradiction — because not in the same genus of cause is something a principle and the principled, a dependent and independent, but in a diverse one — so also it must

be said in our case about matter and form: that this is the cause of that in the genus of final cause, but matter is the cause of form in the genus of material and subjective cause.

The argument concludes therefore that form, inasmuch as it is the principle of matter in the genus of final cause, plainly in this genus does not depend on matter, but matter on it. But in the genus of material cause, the matter is conversely so — that form is principled and caused by matter, and the latter is its principle.

To which must be added what I said in *disp. 7. Phys. q. 8. art. 5*: the causality of the end is not physical and real, but rather moral. Because when the end causes, it is not existing, and yet existence is either the reason, or at least the condition essentially necessary for physically causing. Hence absolutely speaking, and in the physical genus, form more depends on matter than conversely, as the Doctor suggests in *2. dist. 12. qu. 2. in fine*.

Fourth: "Nothing having more perfect being in any genus depends on that which has less perfect being in such a genus," from Scotus *1. d. 35. L.* "But act and form in the genus of substance have more perfect being than potency and matter. Therefore a substantial form does not depend on matter." Thus he argues there.

And because this argument too he esteems inescapable, he again repeats it in *lib. 3. pag. 300*, with the authority of Scotus set aside, under this form: "Every dependence is imperfection formally, or necessarily has annexed imperfection. But a substantial form is not more imperfect than matter, indeed it is a divine good and desirable, matter is dregs of substances. Therefore no form in becoming, being, and conservation depends on matter."

Reply: first to the argument in itself, as it is formed in *lib. 3. cap. 7. pag. 300*; then as it is established by Scotus's authority. And here again I say that he has too quickly forgotten what in that chapter *num. preceding* he had reproached us with. For when we said that material forms are therefore called such because by their nature they are immersed and tied to matter in their being, becoming, and conservation, he says that "immersed and tied" are metaphors to be disputed, forgetful that he himself had elsewhere more than once adhibited these metaphors.

For in *vestig. 1. cap. 19. num. 62. ab initio*, natural science is called by him "tied to matter," and in *vestig. 6. 1. 1. p. 254. col. 1* above *num. 16*, the Physicist is called by him "tied to matter."

I therefore do not ask him himself, when he says in *cap. cit. num. 43* that "matter is the dregs of substances," whether this is a proper and genuine locution, or rather metaphorical and figured. The first he cannot assert, because "dregs" properly signifies the thicker part of liquors settling at the bottom of a vessel. If therefore it is a figured locution and metaphorical, why in the same chapter *num. immediately preceding* does he forbid us from using metaphorical locutions in

disputation? Perhaps because all is licit to him as to a man of great authority, nothing to us?

But whether in sciences it is licit to use metaphors, we shall discuss below from Aristotle.

Now let us return to the argument, and before it is solved, let us consider whether it is in form: "Every dependence is imperfection formally, or necessarily has annexed imperfection." This is the major. "But a substantial form is not more imperfect than matter, indeed is a divine good and desirable, matter is dregs of substances." This is the minor. "Therefore no form in becoming, being, and conservation depends on matter." This is the conclusion.

In which it is plainly gathered that is concluded what was not sown in the premises. Because this conclusion depends on this proposition: "Nothing more perfect depends on a less perfect" — which however was not premised in the syllogism.

Because therefore the argument is not in form, I reply to the matter, and say that the argument, if it is valid, concludes more than it wants. So that it can be retorted against him. For not only will it prove that form does not depend on matter, but also not even the composite — which indeed is more perfect than every substance, even form itself.

And therefore it must be said from Scotus 2. d. 12. quæst. 2. in fine that although the entity of matter is less perfect than that of form, it is not however more dependent — indeed less — and therefore it can be without form, not conversely. By which the Doctor grants that form depends more on matter than matter on form. Nor is it inconvenient that more perfect sometimes depends on the less perfect. Because although as regards this the dependent as such is more imperfect than the independent, it can be from another capacity that that on which it depends is simply more imperfect, and the dependent simply more perfect. Because it can be that in the dependent thing there is found some perfection which from the whole genus excels independence itself. Such in our case is the actuality of form and composite, which from the whole genus surpasses the independence of matter, which is mixed with many other imperfections.

Which doctrine the Doctor clearly declares in 1. d. 8. q. 1. ad 1, and 4. d. 12. q. 2. E and F, where he teaches memorable things about this matter. But why do I delay? The reply to the argument is had in terms from the Doctor in *lib. de primo principio cap. 2. concl. 14*, which is this: "not every dependent is exceeded by that on which it depends." And he proves: because the composite depends on matter, since it itself is much more perfect. Similarly form depends on matter, as he says has been proved *concl. 9*, and yet form is more perfect.

Nor is this argument new. Indeed it is commonly usually adduced *lib. 7. Met. quæst. utrum forma sit prior materia et composito*, to prove that form is more perfect than

the composite, because this depends on that, and dependence always argues imperfection from the independent. To which argument I have long ago satisfied *disp. 8. Phys. q. 2. art. 2. nu. 37*: that although a composite is dependent on the parts, still with this it is more actual than they, and actuality is a greater perfection than independence is.

To this also pertains the solution which the Doctor brings to a similar argument in *8. Met. quæst. 1. ad conf. 2. princ.*, where he says that although a caused being is simply imperfect because dependent, nevertheless that limited being, whose proper entity necessarily requires that it be caused, can be more perfect such a being, if it is caused from several, than another being which is caused from fewer, which does not receive so great a perfection. For in dependent things, that dependent can well be more perfect which depends on several, from any of which it receives some perfection of itself, all of which are required on account of its perfection, so that no per se would suffice.

Hence commonly more perfect caused things, which are not immediately from God, depend on several causes, which on account of their greater perfection do not suffice so few for causing them, just as other imperfect ones. With which agrees St. Bonaventure *2. d. 15. art. 1. q. 2. ad 3.*

To the same argument as it is firmed by the authority of Scotus *1. dist. 35. L.*, I say that that major suffers the same instance about the composite, which is more perfect than matter and form in the genus of substance, and yet still depends on them. Likewise in the genus of quantity a body is more perfect than a surface, and a surface than a line, and yet a body depends on surfaces, and a surface on lines.

It must therefore be attended to what the Doctor intends to prove there by that proposition "Nothing having more perfect being in any genus depends on that which has less perfect being, in such a genus." For he wants to prove through it that an actual relation does not depend on something as on a terminus which is only a potential being, and not an actual, as he himself there explains. And yet it is certain that the terminus of relation is not necessarily of the genus of relation, because it is terminated in an absolute.

The Doctor therefore wants to say that in whatever genus absolutely speaking, what has actual being cannot depend on that which does not have actual being, but only potential, because a real and actual dependence must be terminated in something real and actual. And in this sense it is true that more perfect in whatever genus cannot depend on less perfect.

And thus also in our case indeed neither an actual form nor an actual composite can depend on matter only in possible being, but this must also be actual, just as dependence is actual. And this still does not prevent that form or actual composite depend on matter equally actual.

Fifth, Scotus 1. *dist.* 35. *F* posits that if a real relation is between some things, or between extremes, there is either mutual coexigence, if the relation is mutual, or in one extreme there is dependence, if the relation is not mutual. But now through 2. *Phys.* 26, matter says relation to form, nor is there mutual coexigence between them, because to another form there is another matter, and not conversely. Therefore dependence is in matter to form, and not conversely.

Confirmation: because from 5. *Met.* 20, in measure there is no relation, but in the measured. Measure indeed is said to something, because another is referred to it. But act is the measure of potency, form of matter in the genus of substance. Therefore matter, as measured, depends on form, and not conversely.

Reply: the minor is denied as regards the second part, in which it is said that form is not mutually referred to matter. For both actually and aptitudinally they mutually regard themselves, and all respects which verse between them in the character of act and potency, perfective and perfectible, are mutual, as the Doctor notes in 2. *dist.* 1. *qu.* 5. *ad* 5. *pro opin.* and St. Bonaventure 1. *dist.* 16. *art.* 1. *qu.* 1. *ad ult.*

Nor is the text 2. *Phys.* 26 faithfully adduced in proof of this. Aristotle there says indeed that matter is referred to form, and that to another form there is another matter. He does not however deny that form is conversely referred. Indeed from the Philosopher's manner of speaking it is excellently gathered that if to another form there is another matter, another and another form is also to another matter.

For by the common of the Interpreters, by "another matter" Aristotle there does not understand prime matter as such — for thus there is one matter of all forms — but he understands second matter, namely with dispositions and accidents necessary for any forms in particular. So that the sense is that this matter is to this form — that is, matter under certain dispositions rather regards this form than another, as matter of wood disposed through heat and dryness rather regards the form of fire than of water or stone.

By the very fact however that matter thus disposed is determined to the form of fire, thus also the form of fire is so ordered to matter thus disposed, that it is not so ordered to matter under other dispositions. Therefore this order, by reason of proximate dispositions, will be mutual from here and there both on the part of matter and form. It is said however more in the common manner of speaking that matter is ordered to form rather than conversely, because the imperfect is said to be ordered to the perfect, not conversely.

To the Confirmation: also the object is the measure of science and cognition, and these measured by it. And nevertheless the object in the character of motive says relation of the producing to the produced to cognition, because from object and potency is born notion. Thus likewise in our case, although form, insofar as it is the measure of matter, may not really be referred to it, it can still be referred to it under another character, insofar as it is its effect in the genus of material cause,

and insofar as it is received and sustained in it, although not insofar as it measures it.

Otherwise, if the argument with its confirmation were valid, it would be equally well proved by it that form does not say active information, so that it founds a union with respect to matter. Nor would the soul truly be said formally to be the act of the physical body, because matter says relation to form from 2. *Phys.*, not conversely, and form is the measure of matter, measure however is not referred to the measured.

Just as therefore this does not exclude other relations of form to matter, so neither the relation of dependence of which we speak. And only concludes that form under this character — namely insofar as measure of matter — is not referred to it, but by what pact also measure can be referred to the measured, and mutuality may be found in the relations of the third mode, if the extremes are uniformly assigned, I have already said in *disp. 8. Logicæ articulo secundo* explaining the third mode of relatives.

Sixth, he argues in the same chapter: "what is not in anything cannot be educed from it, as blood from stone. If other forms are in the seminarium of matter, from it they can be educed. Mind, which is not in the seminarium, cannot be educed. But according to you forms are not in the seminarium, and nothing pertaining to the proper and true entity of form is in matter. Nor is matter according to its entity either the whole form or a part of form. It only has the character of a receptive potency for form, which relation is neither a substantial form, nor part of form. Therefore the proper entity of form according to you cannot be educed from matter."

Furthermore: "every absolute is naturally prior to a relative founded in it, or terminated to it. A substantial form is something absolute. The relation of dependence to matter is a relation, just as also the relation of potency founded in matter terminated to form is a relation, speaking of real potency. Therefore form naturally prior has its essence and real existence than it either founds the respect of real dependence, or terminates the respect of real potency. Therefore it is first educed in the being of essence and existence proper, and consequently it will be said to be educed not on account of those real respects, but on account of the seminarium in which it is."

Reply: this is the common argument of the Seminariists, by which they contend to demonstrate that a seminarium of forms is given in matter, so that they can truly be said to be educed from it or from it, and not created. In reality however it does not conclude, because the major is false — that it is necessary for the effect to be actually contained in something either according to the whole or according to a part, so that it can be educed from it. For to verify this it suffices that it be contained in it either potentially, as form is said to be contained in matter, or virtually, in which way it is said to be contained in the active potency of the agent.

Just as therefore in order for the effect to be said to emerge from the agent, or to be placed outside its cause and outside the active potency of the efficient cause, it is not needed that it pre-existed in the cause according to its total or partial being, which would lie hidden in it, but it suffices only that it be virtually contained in it. So likewise in our case, for form to be said to be educed from the potency of matter, and to be drawn outside it by the agent, it is not needed that it be pre-contained in it according to its actual being either totally or partially, but it suffices that it be contained in it potentially — not only as regards being received, for thus also the rational soul would be said to be contained in the potency of matter, but also as regards being sustained. In which way only material form is said to be contained in the potency of matter, inasmuch as it necessarily needs it in its being, becoming, and conservation. Such that it cannot come to be and exist connaturally except in it and dependently on it — which is to be educed or educible from the potency of matter.

Hence to the minor I grant that forms are not, or pre-exist, in the seminarium of matter, as if they pre-existed in it according to some actual being of theirs. They pre-exist however potentially in the predeclared manner, inasmuch as matter has the potency not only of receiving them, but also of sustaining them. So that afterward when they come to be, they are said to come to be dependently on it — which is to be educed.

Whence it is clear that the second part of the minor is false — that matter has only the character of a receptive potency for form. For with respect to material and corruptible forms, matter not only has the character of a receptive potency, but also of a sustentative one, inasmuch as they are apt by nature to come to be in it, and dependently on it. And in order to the rational soul alone, it has the character of a pure receptive, not sustentative potency — which is in cause, so that it is not said to be educed by it, nor properly contained in the potency of matter, but to come from outside, as Aristotle said *lib. 2. de gener. anim. cap. 3*.

And through this it is saved that all forms except the rational are not created or made from nothing. For that is said to be created or made from nothing which not only does not come to be from any presupposed part of itself, but neither from a presupposed subject, nor dependently on it. Wherefore when these forms come to be dependently on it, although no part of them pre-exists, they are still not said to be created or made from nothing. All of which have been extensively explained in *disp. 2. Phys. qu. 7. art. 2*.

To the other: I say that the argument proves more than it wants. For it proves universally regarding any effect whatever, that it says no dependence on an efficient cause, which however not even he grants. For "every absolute is naturally prior to a founded relation. A substantial form is something absolute. And dependence on the agent is formally a relation. Therefore form naturally prior has its essence and real existence than it founds or terminates the respect of real dependence on the agent."

Rather by retorting I wished to reply to the argument in this way, to avoid the improper and nugatory propositions which Ferchius makes. For the major is improper, not to say false: "every absolute is naturally prior to a relative founded in it." For an absolute is not properly said to found a relative, but a relation. And the absolute afterward founding its relation as such is called relative. The minor is nugatory: "the relation of dependence to matter is a relation." Hence to avoid nugation he ought to have said: "dependence on matter is a relation," as I said in retorting the argument.

Again, the argument proves that form is first in matter, and informs it, than it founds union toward it, or terminates. Since union is a relation, substantial form is something absolute. Therefore since an absolute is naturally prior to a founded relation, form naturally prior has its essence and real existence in matter than it founds or terminates the relation of union toward it.

Since therefore the argument does not make a special difficulty about the causality of matter with respect to form through eduction, but about any causality whatever and in any genus whatever, because causality is a relation which presupposes the extremes in being, and therefore seems to presuppose the effect, and thus be superfluous in the character of relation, it must be responded from the doctrine of Scotus *1. distin. 35. quæst. unic. L* and *2. dist. 1. quæst. 2. E*: that upon the absolute in the cause there immediately follows the absolute in the effect, and immediately afterward in the same instant of time there follow the relations of passive and active causality in the effect and in the cause (if it is capable of relation — which is added on account of the first cause incapable of relation).

Hence the relation of causality properly is not necessary for the effect to be placed in the nature of things absolutely speaking. Because upon the absolute virtue of the cause there immediately follows the absolute effect. Nor is relation the active virtue, or reason of acting, but it is necessary in the character of a form denominating — active indeed in the cause, so that it is denominated formally causing — and passive in the effect, so that it is denominated formally dependent and caused, as the same Scotus teaches *4. d. 13. q. 1. lit. P*. Which doctrine I have extensively explained and defended against the Nominalists and recent authors, whose is the present argument, in *disp. 5. Phys. q. 2. concl. 2*.

From which to the argument in our proposition, the whole first discourse must be granted, and the ultimate consequent deduced from it must be distinguished: "therefore form is first educed in the being of essence and existence proper, and consequently it will not be said to be educed on account of those real respects" — granting this fundamentally, denying it formally and in the character of a form denominating. As is universally said in other causes, because as I said, this difficulty is common to all causalities.

Seventh, he argues to the same in *lib. 1. cap. 7. num. 54*, proving that forms are not contained in the potency of matter from which they are educed: "Form before it

is actually received in matter is neither in matter, nor in the potency of matter. If indeed form is said to be possible, or possible to be received, either from matter or from the receptive potency of matter, form will be denominated possible, and in potency, either by formal denomination or by causal denomination from the potency of matter. Not in the first way by formal denomination, since the potency of matter is a relation, which is formally founded in matter, and formally denominates matter as able to receive forms. Therefore that same potency numerically is neither formally in form, nor formally denominates form as possible to be received, or as being in receptive potency. Since the same relation numerically cannot be formally founded, both in foundation and in essentially diverse terminus. Wherefore form is formally denominated possible to be received from a relation of potency which is either founded in a form having being simply, as the rational soul pre-existing before actual reception is denominated possible to be received in the body; or it is founded in a form having being secundum quid — namely possible being from causes. And in this way from a potency founded in form, terminated to matter, form is formally denominated receptible."

"Nor is form in receptive potency causally from matter, since form is not caused by matter in the genus of extrinsic efficient or final cause, as is clear; nor in the genus of intrinsic, or material, or formal cause — otherwise form would not be simple. Rather matter is in potency by reason of form, not form by reason of matter. Because form is receptible, therefore matter is sought which is receptive, which if form were not in receptive potency, God and nature would not have made matter. But because the soul of a man or lion can be received, therefore the members of a man or lion are made such as are required, so that the said souls can be received causally. Therefore, potency of matter, and matter, is in form, and in the potency of form, just as a being for an end is in the end, or efficient. Form is not in the potency of matter, or in matter causally, but form formally can be received through a potency founded in the essence of form, just as also the essence of form is received actually in matter, whose is potency, of it is act, and conversely."

Reply: this whole long argument can likewise be retorted in the efficient cause, in whose active potency form is contained just as in the passive of matter, preserving proportion. For when form is said to be possible to be made by an agent, or by its potency — as, for example, health by medicine — either it is denominated thus by formal denomination, or causal. Not the first, because the active potency of the cause is a relation which is founded in the very entity of the cause, not in the very entity of the effect, and therefore can only denominate the entity of the cause itself as able, not however the effect as possible. Nor the second, since health is not on account of medicine, but medicine rather on account of health. Therefore health cannot be said to be possible causally from the active virtue of medicine, but rather this ought to be said to be possible on account of health.

It is clear however that this whole argument retorted in the efficient cause does not conclude, because a thing before it is produced by its efficient cause is said to be possible objectively through extrinsic denomination from the active potency itself of the cause — not however through some positive relation founded in itself, because before it is produced, it is nothing, and has no proper formal being in which any such relation could be founded, which would denominate it really possible, as the Doctor suggests in *1. d. 36. q. un. M.* And still more declares *Canonicus 2. Phys. q. 1. art. 2. in primo dicto*, where he says that the possibility, or potency, by which a creature is said from eternity to be possible, is not some potency formally existing in the creature — since in such a state it is actually nothing — but the same potency by which God can produce creatures, creatures are possible to be produced by him. Which I have extensively declared in *disp. 6. Met. q. 2. a num. 65* explaining objective potency as it is distinguished from subjective.

An effect can also be denominated possible from the active virtue of the cause causally, as, for example, health from medicine, inasmuch as through it it can be caused in the genus of efficient cause. Because although medicine is, and comes to be, on account of health in the genus of final cause, health however comes to be from medicine, or through medicine, in the genus of efficient. This whole solution therefore must be applied to the argument, since it is about the material cause, in whose passive potency form is contained.

For it can be said by it to be possible both by formal denomination and by causal denomination — formally indeed, because although the potency of matter is a certain aptitudinal relation founded in the entity of matter, and intrinsically can only denominate matter, in which it is founded, as able, yet by extrinsic denomination it can also denominate form as possible to be received in it. In the way in which God is denominated creator through the relation of creation, not indeed existing in himself, but in the creature itself, as the Doctor warns in *1. dist. 30. quæst. 2. lit. I.*

Form, however, cannot be denominated really possible to be received through any relation of potency founded in itself, as the arguer says. Because as long as it exists in the active potency of the efficient, and in the passive of the material cause, it is nothing real, and has no proper formal real or actual being besides the being of the cause itself able to place the effect in being. Whence it remains that it can only be said to be possible objectively through extrinsic denomination taken from the potency of its causes, both efficient and material. I said "objectively" because about logical potency it must be discoursed otherwise according to what was said in *disp. cit. Met. quæst. 2.*

It can also be said to be possible causally through matter, inasmuch as through it it can be caused in the genus of material cause, although matter is said with its potency to depend on form in the genus of final cause, because matter is on account of form, not conversely. And when this is impugned — because if form

were caused by matter in the genus of material cause, since this is a genus of intrinsic causality, then form would not be simple but composite — I say that matter exercises intrinsic causality only with respect to the composite, in which it remains as its essential part. But it exercises another extrinsic one with respect to form, which is called subjective causality, inasmuch as form in its being, becoming, and conservation depends on it necessarily and indispensably. And it is called extrinsic inasmuch as it does not constitute form in the manner of a part, in which way it constitutes the composite. Although from another capacity it can still be called intrinsic, insofar as through it it is necessarily united to form, and is necessarily joined with form as long as form exists. In which still it is distinguished from other extrinsic causes, final and efficient, which are regularly disjoined and distinct from the effect.

Which genus of material causality although Ferchius denies with respect to substantial forms, still even unwillingly he is compelled to admit with respect to accidental forms, which he posits as altogether dependent on the subject, since they are altogether inseparable from it. And indeed since this is a certain dependence of the posterior on the prior, on which it depends and is conserved in its being, it can only be a dependence of causality. And since this cannot always be posited in the genus of efficient cause, because not all subjects immanently cause accidents in themselves, as is clear of heat in water, it is necessary that it be in the genus of material cause — not indeed of that species by which matter is said to cause the composite in the manner of a potential part, but of another character, which is called subjective, inasmuch as an accident by its nature not only seeks to be received in its subject, but also to lean and be sustained. Which sustenance and leaning is a material causality by which the subject is said to cause the accident in the genus of material cause, and matter all substantial forms with only the intellective excepted.

And that matter exercises this material causality toward form, and that such material causality must be admitted besides that which it has in order to the composite, Zerbius perspicuously declares in *lib. 7. Metaph. quæst. 3. § Propter tertium, in fine*, where he moves this doubt: "Whether matter with respect to form has some causality." And for the negative part he adduces the reason touched in the argument: because the whole causality of matter is intrinsic. But matter with respect to form does not have some intrinsic causality; therefore it is not its cause. The major is proved, because matter and form are posited as intrinsic causes in *Second Physics* and *5 Metaphysics*, while efficient and end extrinsically. But it is impossible for any extrinsic cause to cause intrinsically, or conversely. Therefore etc. The minor principal however is deduced, because if matter intrinsically caused form, then it would be a part of form — which is not possible.

Zerbius responds afterward by deciding the question affirmatively, that namely matter has the character of cause with respect to form, since form depends on it. And to the reason on the opposite he says that causality can be called intrinsic in

two ways: one way from the fact that the cause is an intrinsically constitutive part of the caused, and in this way that major assumed is not true; in another way more generally, from the fact that the cause is united to something with which it constitutes some one thing intrinsically, and in such a way the major of the reason is true — in which way the minor assumed under it is false, as is clear.

Another argument also against this he makes there, which you can see solved in the same Author. But whether matter is more causative of substantial form than accidental, he says he has treated in *lib. 5. Met. quæst. 15*.

It is therefore sufficiently clear that material causality not only extends to the composite, but also to any material form whatever, both substantial and accidental, as I said in *disp. 5. Phys. quæst. 4. artic. 1. and 2*. Here, finally, note Ferchius's manifest contradiction in his sayings: for here — namely *lib. 1. Defens. capit. 7. number 54* — he denies that forms are contained in the passive potency of matter, which he grants in *vestig. 1. capit. 4. in fine*, where he says it is possible to be double — possible transmutable, in the way things are said to be in the passive potency of the subject, and possible makeable, in the way an effect is said to be in the factive potency of the efficient. Thus he.

Ferchius, in *lib. 2 Defens. cap. 10*, takes up again the same point he intends to prove, namely that form does not come to be from matter and does not depend on matter for its existence. His argument runs as follows: one and the same thing, considered under one and the same aspect, cannot stand in more than one relation of a single kind; but a simple form is one thing of one kind, and the simple matter to which the form is related is likewise one thing of one kind; therefore a simple form bears toward simple matter only one relation of one kind. Now the relation signified by "being in" is different from the relation signified by "being from," since the rational soul, as you maintain, comes to be in the subject matter but not from it. So too, from *1 de Anima 65*, if sight were to migrate from the eye of an old man into the eye of a young man, it would come to be in the young man's eye, not from it. Similarly, an intellect migrating from a body that has perished into a body newly generated comes to be in the new body, not from it. And under the hypothesis given at *4 Phys. 58*, color or sound existing outside a subject, if it were newly received into a subject by an efficient cause, would come to be in the subject, not from it. Therefore a form, which bears toward matter the relation signified by "being in" — as at *7 Met. 26–27* and *4 Phys. 43* — cannot simultaneously bear the other relation signified by "being from" or "coming to be from." Hence Aristotle rightly says that form does not come to be from matter, just as a healthy man does not come to be from a man as such (*7 Met. 25*), and a musical man does not come to be from a man (*1 Phys. 58*). In confirmation: Aristotle at *2 Phys. 28* and *5 Met. 2* describes the causality of matter with respect to the composite, not with respect to form, writing that matter is that from which something comes to be when it is present within it; and at *1 Phys. 82* he similarly describes prime matter as the primary subject from which, as something already

present, a thing comes to be — not merely by accident — and into which it ultimately resolves upon corruption. Matter, therefore, is the cause of the composite, not of the form; as likewise at *1 de Gen. anim. cap. 18* — paragraph 99.

In response, I concede the entire first argument, which is grounded in a major premise that is a kind of supreme axiom of Scotus — though Ferchius does not cite it — from *Quodl. 12, lit. A*. As for the minor premise that is subsequently introduced, I say that the relation signified by "being in" can be taken in two ways: either as denoting the pure and simple reception of form in a subject — in which sense even the rational soul is said to be in the body and to come to be in the body — or as also denoting sustentation, that is, the form's complete dependence on matter for its being, coming to be, and preservation. For those forms that require a subject in this way are said not merely to be received in the subject but to rest upon it and be sustained by it. Likewise, the relation signified by "being from" can be viewed in two ways: either as "from" denoting the relation of a part, or as denoting the relation of a subject. For this latter meaning was demonstrated above from Aristotle at n. 82, *5 Met. tex. 29*, and *1 de Gen. anim. cap. 3*. Thus if "being from" is taken as denoting the relation of a part, it is altogether a different relation from "being in," however the latter is understood. But if "being from" is taken as denoting the relation of a subject — in which sense form is said to come to be from matter at *5 Met. 29* — then this relation coincides with "being in" taken in the second way, though it remains distinct from "being in" taken in the first way. For the intellective soul is said to be in matter but not from matter, because it is in matter by simple reception and information, and not by sustentation and resting upon it — which latter implies essential dependence. Hence, taking "being in" and "being from" each in the second sense as explained, it is the same thing to describe the causality of matter toward form through "being in a subject" as through "being from a subject," because in this sense they are not different relations but one and the same. And in this sense we said at *disp. 5 Phys. q. 4, art. 1* and *disp. 5 de Gen. q. 1, art. 1* that Aristotle frequently explains the causality of matter with respect to form — whether substantial or accidental — through the relation of "in which," yet explains it in such a way that it fully coincides with the relation of "from which," as from a subject. For he explains "being in" by the necessary and indispensable resting of form upon a subject, such that form depends on that subject necessarily for its being, coming to be, and preservation. It is nevertheless true that Aristotle more frequently explains the causality of a subject with respect to form — especially accidental form — through the relation "in," rather than "from," in order to suggest that an accident does not have matter as a "from which" in the manner of a part, as a composite does, but only matter as an "in which" — though one upon which it necessarily and indispensably depends for its being and coming to be. This is said at *7 Met. 26–27* and *4 Phys. 23*, but not at *tex. 58*. As for those texts from *1 Phys. 58* and *7 Met. 25* that the opponent so repeatedly invokes, it was already shown above that they favor his position no more than ours — and especially the second of them. As for the confirmation:

although in those passages at *1 Phys.* 82 and *2 Phys.* 28 Aristotle intends primarily to describe the causality of matter with respect to the composite rather than with respect to form, he has elsewhere described its causality also with respect to form — sometimes through the relation "in which" taken in the second sense, and sometimes also through the relation "from which" or "from that which," likewise in the second sense, as at *5 Met.* 29 and *1 de Gen. anim. cap.* 3, from what was said above at n. 82.

Second, Ferchius argues from the authority of Scotus. For at *Theor.* 21, *concl.* 7, Scotus says that form, in every composite made up of material parts capable of remaining divided, is something distinct from those parts and not made from them; and at the final chapter of the same citation, Scotus at *7 Met., final chapter*, is adduced — therefore, with Scotus, form is not from matter, and this Scotus accepts from Aristotle at *7 Met., final chapter*. Furthermore, at *9 Met. qu.* 13, Scotus considers three relations of matter: to the agent, to the composite, and to the form; he explains the first relation by "into which," the second by "from which," and the third by "in which." And to the point he writes that matter is properly only the receptive principle of form — hence "in which," not "from which." Likewise at *Quodl.* 2 D, he writes that matter is not the per se cause of form, though it is the matter of form according to Avicenna — and he adds that there appears to be no way that something is what it is through another thing that is not its per se cause. Finally at *Quodl.* 9, *lit.* H, he concedes, following Aristotle, that the substantial form is independent with respect to matter, because the being of a primary principle is independent with respect to what is principiated and with respect to a secondary principle; and therefore form is said to be more of a being than either matter or the composite.

In response to the first passage: I candidly confess that I cannot make good sense of the cited words of the Doctor, nor of how it is supposed to follow from them that form does not come to be from matter. For those words are so confused that I cannot even extract a grammatical construction from them. The phrase "something other than those parts" ought to refer to the composite, yet the composite is not placed in the nominative in that proposition; form is placed in the nominative, but "something other" cannot be construed with it. If it is construed with the composite, it is true that the composite is something other than the parts — but there is no reason to add "nor from them," since the composite is truly from them. Nor is it well referred to form or construed with form, as Ferchius seems to want, in order to deduce therefrom that form does not come to be from matter — because the phrase "nor from them" is most immediately construed with "something other," which cannot without solecism (a grammatical error) be referred to form. Moreover, when Scotus there cites *7 Met., final chapter*, he does not cite that passage as one in which Aristotle teaches that form does not come to be from matter — for Aristotle does not teach that there — but rather intends to indicate that in that place the otherness of the composite from its parts is established, parts which can remain separately and in dissolution

after the composite is destroyed. This is what Aristotle proves there from the example of the syllable BA, which no longer remains even though A and B remain after dissolution — from which BA appears to import something more than A and B. The Doctor also uses this same authority at *3 dist. 2, q. 2* to prove the same point, namely the otherness of the whole from its parts. Hence, as far as I can discern, I suspect that Scotus through that proposition intended to indicate, from *7 Met., final chapter*, the otherness of the whole from the parts — not at all that form does not come to be from matter. This must be said all the more strongly lest we make the Doctor contradict himself almost in the same passage; for a little earlier, at *Theor. 19, concl. 9*, he manifestly asserts that matter is the cause of form and form of matter, each in a different genus of cause.

As to the second passage: the Doctor there explains the causality of matter with respect to form through the relation "in which" rather than "from which," lest he confuse it with the causality that matter exercises toward the composite, which is usually explained through the relation "from which," as a part. Nevertheless, as I said at *disp. Met. qu. 1, art. 3, n. 34*, when explaining this division, "from which" must be subdivided into a purely receptive potency — such as matter's potency with respect to the soul — and a simultaneously sustaining and receptive potency, which matter has with respect to other forms. And this latter potency "in which" coincides with the potency "from which," as from a subject. Moreover, the Doctor in that question appears to hold the contrary position openly, for in the argument introduced at the beginning of the question on the negative side he proves that matter is in some way a principle with respect to form, and that with respect to certain forms — namely material ones — it bears a relation other than merely receptive, which we call sustaining, and which includes or necessarily presupposes the receptive relation. He leaves that argument unresolved, whereas he usually resolves the principal arguments in other questions as containing something true. And in the argument for the opposite side he concedes and endorses the common distinction of forms — that some are drawn out from the potency of matter and others are not — which cannot be understood except through the eduction explained above at n. 94. For the eduction by inchoations of forms and seminal reasons he states, there at *lib. 7 Metaph., qu. de rationibus seminalibus*, to have been refuted.

As to the third passage from *Quodl. 2, lit. D*: I say that the opposite is more readily deduced from it — namely that matter is the cause of form and concurs in its being. For the Doctor has these words there: "now whatever entity, especially an absolute one, is primarily in its own being through itself, because it primarily withdraws from non-being to being through itself — even though many things concur in its being, as matter concurs in the being of form and form in the being of matter, yet no concurring factor is for it the primary reason for being in its own being; therefore it is primarily such through itself." Here, as you see, he expressly says that matter concurs in the being of form. When, however, in the subsequent conclusion he says that matter is not the per se cause of form, he means that it is

not its per se cause in the sense of an intrinsic cause — as it is the cause of the composite — since otherwise he would contradict himself within a few words. That this is indeed the intended meaning of the Doctor's words is plainly evident from his argument there, for he intends to show that the soul — and universally every form — is not individuated by matter as its per se principle of individuation, as the Thomists held. He demonstrates this as follows: the formal principle of individuation of a thing must always be something intrinsic to it; but matter is not the per se cause of form — that is, its intrinsic cause — as it is of the composite; therefore the principle of individuation is not an intrinsic cause with respect to form. But matter is not an intrinsic part of form; therefore matter is not the principle of individuation of form. And that this is the meaning of the Doctor is clearly gathered from the conclusion of that very argument, where he finally concludes: "therefore it is fruitless to seek the ground of determinate singularity through something extrinsic as a formal principle — however much something extrinsic may be a concomitant cause of some sort — because the primary formal ground of designated singularity must always be something intrinsically belonging to the singular." By these words he again concedes that matter is in some way a cause of form, when he says "however much something extrinsic may be a concomitant cause of some sort" — yet because it is not an intrinsic cause nor something intrinsic to form, he denies that it can be posited as the principle of individuation. Hence Hadrius there constructs the Doctor's argument thus: whatever is the principle of individuation of a thing must be an intrinsic principle of the singular. The opponent, then, did not understand the cited passage and made the Doctor contradict himself almost in the same breath, simply to press his objection.

As to the passage from *Quodl.* 9: I have already said that in that quodlibet the exact opposite is found — not only at *lit. B*, as was noted at n. 83, but also at *lit. C*, where Scotus shows that a third argument introduced to prove that an angel cannot inform matter — because it does not depend on matter as inferior forms do — does not conclude. For it might be said that an angel can indeed exist without matter, and even in a more perfect way than the intellectual soul, but it can nonetheless exist in matter, because even if depending on matter is a mark of imperfection — as is plain in the other inferior forms — it is not evident that being able to communicate one's actuality to matter is a mark of imperfection, especially when such communication can take place without dependence. By these words the Doctor indicates that all inferior forms, except the intellectual soul, are communicated to matter with dependence on it — as Gadius notes there — from which he concludes that forms communicating their being to matter fall into two different classes: some with dependence on matter, such as the sensitive form and the form of corporeity, and some without dependence on matter, such as the intellectual soul. Hence when Scotus later at *lit. H*, in the section on the third principal point, resolving that first argument that form is more of a being than the composite, says that this is not to be understood as meaning that form is

prior and greater in perfection, but in principality and independence — because the being of the more primary principle, namely form, is independent with respect to what is principiated and with respect to the less primary principle, namely matter — Gadius says this is not to be understood as independence taken absolutely and in every genus of cause; otherwise the Doctor would manifestly contradict himself. Rather, it is to be understood as independence in the genus of final causality, because in that genus of cause — which is the most noble of all — form does not depend on matter, but on the contrary matter exists for the sake of form, not the other way around, as at 2 *Phys.* 23. To want to deduce from this absolute independence in every respect would be the fallacy of reasoning from "in a certain respect" to "simply."

Third, he argues in the same chapter that even granting that form comes to be from matter — which has never been proved — it still does not follow well that it does not come to be from nothing, because not every relation signified by "coming to be from" excludes production from nothing, but only the relation signified by the mode of a part. Hence later, in the following chapter, that is, cap. 11, at the end, he again repeats the same argument thus: what comes to be from no pre-existing part of itself comes to be from nothing, and according to the inchoatists is created; but form comes to be from no pre-existing part of itself; therefore it comes to be from nothing and is created according to those authors. He adds that the argument is insoluble unless we arbitrarily change the meaning of terms and seek to escape a real difficulty by a merely verbal solution — but that he finds it unavoidable. And because he saw that we would immediately deny the major together with Scotus at 2 *d.* 18, *qu. un.* and 4 *d.* 1, *q.* 1, *Pp.* and 7 *Met.* *q.* 12, as insufficient — because for production from nothing the negation of a presupposed subject is also required — he immediately adds: by whatever ease you affirm as your position that production from nothing requires the negation of a presupposed subject, with equal ease we deny it. Prove it; do not beg the question. And then in the following chapter, at nn. 74–75, he likewise reproaches Scotus for having asserted this at the cited places but never proved it, and for having begged the question — adding that although Scotus asserts it, it carries no such authority that one cannot deny it, because Scotus is not the oracle of God such that one may not contradict him. And to bring Scotus's authority against Scotus's adversaries — among whom he himself professes to be numbered by pressing the argument in this way — is to beg the question. You do not accept Aquinas; we do not accept Scotus. So he says, with considerable audacity.

In response: whether it has been sufficiently proved that form comes to be from matter, both from Aristotle and from reason, is clear enough from what has been said. As for that allegedly insoluble argument: I regret, first of all, that in constructing it he calls those who posit inchoation "inchoatists" — having sharply reproved us throughout his entire book of *Defensiones* for calling them by that name, which he deems injurious and abusive. All things are permitted to him; nothing to us. I likewise regret that neither St. Thomas with his entire flourishing

school, nor Scotus with his entire subtle school, both of whom deny that forms are produced from nothing and deny their inchoations, could manage — for all their efforts — to solve that argument except verbally and by distorting terms. I regret that Scotus is charged with having said but never proved that for production from nothing — or creation — it does not suffice to negate a pre-existing part, but that the negation of a pre-existing subject is also required — since Scotus proved this vigorously at the cited places, and especially at *4 d. 1, qu. 1*, where he shows that a natural or created agent cannot create or produce anything from nothing because in every one of its actions it presupposes a subject — from which experience and necessity the wiser philosophers and theologians, by unanimous consent, have concluded that a natural agent cannot create or produce anything from nothing. The holy Fathers cited above agree. I regret, finally, that Ferchius — a man of the Franciscan order — should say that to adduce Scotus's authority against him is to beg the question, and that a Franciscan may say: you do not accept Aquinas, we do not accept Scotus. A Dominican may say this; a Franciscan never — unless as a rebel and deserter. Especially in the matter we are discussing, where no Franciscan would deny Aquinas, nor any Dominican Scotus. But while he reproaches Scotus and us with begging the question, he falls into the very pit he dug himself. For he argues as though insolubly, and assumes the major premise that what comes to be from no pre-existing part of itself comes to be from nothing. He then reports our response of denying the major as insufficient — because production from nothing further requires the negation of a presupposed subject. And when the major was to be proved after being denied, he tells us: prove it; do not beg the question. Remember, Ferchius: at this point you are the one arguing; we are the ones responding. It is therefore your burden to prove without begging the question — not ours. So prove it; do not beg it, lest you fall into the very error you reproached us for.

He did, however, prove that major premise at one point, namely at *vestig. 1, cap. 14, n. 43*: if having a presupposed subject is what removes production from nothing, then not having a presupposed subject is what constitutes production from nothing; therefore if the soul were to pre-exist before the body, the man newly made from the pre-existing part would have been made from nothing — which is absurd. He repeats this argument several times afterward in his *Defensio*, beginning immediately at *lib. 1, cap. 1, n. 8*. Yet this was already answered long ago at *disp. 5 de Gen., qu. 1, art. 1, n. 16*, by denying the consequence — because that mode of arguing is valid only in precise causes. Even if having a presupposed subject sufficiently removes production from nothing, it is not for that reason the precise and adequate cause. Seeing that this argument was resolved in almost a single word, Ferchius at *lib. 2 Defens. cap. 12* tries to strengthen it and to break down our solution. For he says that two propositions underlie the argument. The first is that what belongs per se always belongs: for what is per se belongs to everything and at every time. The second is that what affirmation affirms, negation denies — for in contradictory propositions the same predicate is

affirmed and denied with respect to the same subject. Now if we consider production from something and production from nothing, "something" and "nothing" are contradictories; therefore the same relation is affirmed in production from something that is denied in production from nothing, by the second proposition. If, therefore, in production from nothing the negation of a presupposed subject were understood, and the presence of a presupposed subject inferred the negation of production from nothing, then in production from something it would have to be affirmed that there is a subject presupposed per se — just as in production from nothing a subject is denied per se. But that is false, because if the soul were to pre-exist before the body, the man newly made from the pre-existing part would have been made from nothing — which is absurd. And because what belongs per se always belongs, but in this production "from something" — namely of a man from a pre-existing soul — the affirmation of a presupposed subject does not belong, therefore this affirmation of a presupposed subject is accidental to production from something, and as such is not required for it; hence also the negation of a presupposed subject is accidental to production from nothing, and does not remove it.

He then argues further from the doctrine delivered by Aristotle at *1 Poster. 99* on the precise or proximate cause — for such a cause when affirmed affirms the effect, and when denied denies it; whereas a remote cause behaves otherwise and grounds only a negative demonstration, so that the remote cause is predicated of the effect but denied of the subject. Given this, he argues as follows: everything that removes production from nothing is a presupposed subject; in the production of man from form alone as a pre-existing cause there is no presupposed subject; therefore in the production of man from form alone there is nothing that removes production from nothing; hence the man thus made will have been made from nothing — which is absurd. The conclusion is therefore false; the premises are not false as to the minor; therefore the major is false — namely that a presupposed subject is the cause removing production from nothing. He concludes finally that just as in production from something the ratio of a part is per se required and always present, while the ratio of a presupposed subject is not per se required — for it is purely accidental that one part should receive another as its subject — so also in production from nothing the ratio of a part is per se denied, while the negation of the ratio of a subject is entirely accidental. For since the relation of a presupposed subject is neither a per se proximate nor a per se remote cause, and since demonstration treats of what is per se while the sophist deals with what is per accidens, this relation of a presupposed subject in production from something or from nothing is to be set aside entirely.

In response: the fallacy of these arguments can be detected in many similar cases, and they can be turned back. The formalists, speaking of real identity and distinction, say that things are really identical when they are neither separated, nor separable, nor related as producer and produced — and they say that all these

clauses are to be taken conjunctively; hence the inference does not hold: this is not separated from that, therefore it is really identical with it — because matter and form in a composite are not separated, yet they are not really identical. Those same thinkers say that things are really distinct when they are actually separated, or can be separated, or at least stand as cause and caused, producer and produced — and they want these clauses taken disjunctively, because it suffices for inferring real distinction to have any one of these conditions, since each of them is a sufficient cause of real distinction, though not a precise and adequate one. Similarly, in constituting a person, a double negation of dependence on an alien supposit is required: one actual, and one aptitudinal — as Scotus teaches at *3 d. 1, q. 1* — and one without the other does not suffice. The negation of actual dependence alone does not suffice, because then the separated soul would be a person, since it does not actually depend. The negation of aptitudinal dependence alone does not suffice, because the human nature assumed by the Word has this, yet is not a person. To remove personhood, however, the failure of either negation alone suffices — as is plain from the examples given. Nor must both necessarily be absent, nor this one or that one in particular — it suffices that one of them indeterminately be absent. Hence if a nature depends actually but not aptitudinally, it is not a person; if it depends aptitudinally but not actually, it is still not a person. So also in our present matter: for the account of creation, or production from nothing, a double negation is required simultaneously — namely, the negation of a pre-existing part and the negation of an underlying subject — and one without the other does not suffice to constitute production from nothing. For if a part pre-exists but not the subject — as for example the form but not the matter, or the soul were to pre-exist before the body — the man produced from it is not said to have been made from nothing. If the subject of the form to be made pre-exists but not any part of it, still it is not said to come to be from nothing, but from something. Thus for positing creation both negations are simultaneously required; but for removing it, the failure of either negation suffices — whether the pre-existence of a part or of a subject — disjunctively. Either one of them is a sufficient cause for removing creation, though not a precise and adequate one. Just as therefore in the example of identity and distinction the first argument does not hold when one reasons thus: for real identity the negation of separation is required, and by positing separation the negation of real identity — i.e., real distinction — is inferred; therefore for real distinction the actual separation must be affirmed per se, just as it is denied per se in identity — which is false, because if two things are not actually separated they can still be really distinct, because separability suffices — so likewise the same argument will not hold in our present case concerning production from nothing and production from something. And just as in the argument from identity and distinction the fallacy consists in this — that the positing of separation and separability is required simultaneously and conjunctively for distinction, just as the negation of separation and separability is simultaneously and conjunctively required for identity — so likewise the fallacy in the argument concerning

production from nothing and from something consists in this: that the positing of a subject is put forward as being as necessarily required for production from something as the negation of a subject is required for production from nothing — which is false. For production from nothing requires both negations simultaneously — both of a pre-existing part and of a subject — while for production from something the failure of merely one of the negations suffices, namely either the pre-existence of a part or of a subject.

When it is then added in the same argument that what belongs per se always belongs — but in this production "from something," namely of a man from a pre-existing soul, the affirmation of a presupposed subject does not belong — therefore the affirmation of a presupposed subject is accidental to production from something and thus not required for it, and hence the negation of a presupposed subject is accidental to production from nothing and does not remove it: I say this instantia (objection) is in turn crushed by the example cited regarding identity and distinction, reasoning thus: what belongs per se always belongs; but in distinction, actual separation of the distinct things is not necessary; therefore this affirmation of separation is accidental to distinction, and hence its negation is accidental to identity and does not remove it. But it is plain that this objection does not proceed well in arguing from distinction to identity, because although the affirmation of separation is not necessary for real distinction — since separability alone suffices — the negation of separation is necessary for identity, since in identity all those clauses are taken conjunctively. So likewise in our matter it is not valid to argue from production "from something" to production "from nothing" — as though, just as the affirmation of a presupposed subject is not necessary for production from something, so likewise its opposite negation is not necessary for production from nothing — because those two negations are simultaneously necessary for production from nothing, while for production from something it suffices that one of the negations fail: either the pre-existence of a part or of a subject. Nor, because pre-existence of a part or of a subject is only disjunctively necessary, does it rightly follow that the positing of a subject is entirely accidental to production from something and consequently irrelevant to it. For this heat in my hand, for example, is produced per se by fire in such a way that the very same heat numerically could also have been produced disjunctively by the sun as a per se cause — because for the account of a per se cause it suffices that it directly influences the effect according to its proper nature and not through some accident present there and indirectly, as a musician is said to build a house according to Scotus at *1 dist. 2, qu. a. 1*. Nor is it essential to the effect of a per se cause that, according to its own entity, it cannot proceed from another per se cause — as was said at *disp. 8, qu. 3, art. 1*. For the very same numerical effect can be produced per se by several causes disjunctively. And finally, when it is said that what belongs per se always belongs — for what is per se belongs to everything and at every time, and hence belongs to every subject and at every time — this only entails that the negation of a presupposed subject

must belong to every production from nothing, because it belongs to it per se in the first mode; it does not entail that the opposite affirmation must belong to every production from something — because the negation of a presupposed subject does not concur in constituting production from nothing, and its opposite affirmation in constituting production from something, in the same way, as has been explained.

To the other argument drawn from Aristotle at *1 Post. 99* on the precise cause: I say that it can likewise be turned back in the examples given, by arguing thus: everything removing identity is actual separation; but between a form informing and the matter being informed there is no actual separation; therefore between matter and form so understood there is nothing removing identity. This conclusion is false; the minor is not false; therefore the major is false — and rightly so, because although actual separation is a sufficient cause or sign of real distinction, it is not the precise and adequate one, since real distinction between two things can be had from other causes even apart from this one. So likewise in our present case concerning production from something and from nothing, the major is false — not indeed in the sense in which it is being drawn by the opponent, that a presupposed subject is the cause removing production from nothing (for in that sense, taken absolutely and indefinitely, it is actually true) — but it is false in the way it is assumed in the argument itself, with the universal sign: everything removing production from nothing is a presupposed subject. For production from nothing is not precisely and adequately removed by the presupposed subject alone, as that major suggests, but either by the presupposed subject or by a pre-existing part: because of the first, a material form is not said to be created or produced from nothing; because of the second, a composite. Note here another fallacy introduced by the opponent to deceive: for in stating the major he offers a universal proposition thus: everything removing production from nothing is a presupposed subject. But then after the entire first argument, when he subjoins: the conclusion is false, the minor is true, therefore the major is false — namely, that a presupposed subject is the cause removing production from nothing — you see that this was not the major assumed; for the major assumed was universal in the first argument, while in the second it is put as indefinite or absolutely taken, in which sense it is true. Since therefore so many fallacies are entangled in these two arguments, some prolixity was necessary to expose them.

He presses this same argument there, as more compelling, against those who say creation is production from nothing where "nothing" precisely excludes matter and subject — among whom he numbers Bassolis at *2 dist. 1, qu. 2*. I concede that the argument presses against these thinkers, because if the negation of a subject precisely posits creation, then the positing of a subject will likewise precisely posit production from something. But Bassolis is falsely cited among these, for at *2 d. 18, qu. unic., art. 2, §. nota hic*, and *§. et ita dico*, he expressly says that creation is removed either because something comes to be from something as from a part

— as a composite — or as from a subject — as a material form — and he concludes that either mode excludes creation. And at the place cited by Ferchius himself, 2 *d. 1, qu. 2, art. 1*, nothing of the sort is found: Bassolis only says that creation is the production of something not from anything — without specifying whether "from" denotes the relation of a part or of a subject — but immediately afterward he seems to suggest that it denotes both, when he writes: "and thus I believe all philosophers have conceded it, for Plato, Aristotle, and Avicenna posited simple and incorruptible entities as effectively produced by God, not from anything — not from matter, nor from a subject, nor from any pre-existing nature" — by which last clause he hints at the relation of a part.

Fourth and finally, in the same *cap. 10, lib. 2*, he presses what he is accustomed to call his foundation: according to Aristotle in the book on Xenophanes and Zeno, something comes to be from nothing. This statement must be verified either in simple things or in composites. Not in composites, because composites are from some pre-existing part of themselves at 7 *Met. 22 and 24*. If therefore a composite comes to be from some part of itself, it does not come to be from nothing of itself; and although it comes to be from privation, privation is not nothing, because it is only the negation of a formal part — whereas "nothing" denotes the negation of every part. It therefore remains that simple things come to be from nothing. Matter is not such, since throughout the entire course of the universe it neither comes to be nor perishes at 1 *Phys. 82*. Therefore Aristotle's statement must be verified at least in form — so that form itself comes to be from nothing. This argument he repeats and rehashes very frequently throughout the first and second book of the *Defensiones*.

In response: even if that book is genuinely Aristotle's, the production of forms from nothing is not rightly deduced from what is said there — even by Ferchius's own testimony. For as he himself reports at *vestig. 1, cap. 5*, after denying that the statement "nothing comes to be from nothing" is universally true, and wishing to explain which things are made from nothing, Aristotle has these words: "for concerning these very things it is said in a fitting way both that things that do not exist come to be, and that not many things have been made from what does not exist." Ferchius himself explains these words there as follows: what is "not many"? Because all composites, which come to be day by day, come to be from what exists and is present within it, and have been made from what does not exist; but those that are "not many" are the primary entities — such as matter and immaterial substances. And if someone should object the many forms, recall that they do not properly come to be, that many intensible forms come to be from something of themselves, that many do not terminate actions, and that just as relations to something are so too are action and passion — so Ferchius there. In the first place he confesses that what Aristotle said in the cited book — that things made from nothing are "not many, but few," namely the primary entities such as matter and immaterial substances. And because one might object that all substantial and accidental forms also come to be from nothing, and therefore what comes to be

from nothing is not few but many, he excludes the objection by saying that forms do not properly come to be, and that many come to be from something of themselves. Thus in that chapter Ferchius most openly admits that from that statement of Aristotle — that something comes to be from nothing in the aforementioned book — it can be gathered only that prime matter and immaterial intelligences come to be from nothing, not forms. Since this is so, as can be seen at *vestig. 1, cap. 5*, I do not see how he could afterward have said that the production of forms from nothing is grounded in that Aristotelian statement — given that he himself explains that statement in the cited chapter as not extending to forms, because then things made from nothing would be many, not few, contrary to Aristotle's express words: "not many things have been made from what does not exist." Indeed, if Ferchius laid no other foundation for his production of forms from nothing besides that Aristotelian authority, his production from nothing is founded on nothing — because Aristotle does not intend this there; rather, the opposite follows from Ferchius's own explanation, as cited.

Another solution to this authority was given at *disp. 5 de Gen., qu. 1, art. 1, n. 16*: namely that Aristotle rightly said that the proposition "nothing comes to be from nothing" is not as universally true as the ancients expressed it — because from nothing something comes to be as from a terminus a quo (the starting point), and privation is truly one of the three principles of natural things, as I showed extensively at *1 Phys.* against the ancients. Hence he rightly said it is not universally true, because in this sense it is false. But against this solution and this doctrine Ferchius inveighs vehemently at *lib. 2, cap. 15 and 16*, reproaching us for having confused nothing with privation — because neither Aristotle nor any peripatetic he knows of ever said that privation is nothing. He also reproaches us for having confused production from privation with production from nothing, and for saying that composites come to be from nothing because they come to be from privation — in which we speak not only against Aristotle but contradict ourselves. These are the charges he levels against us in the said chapters 15 and 16, which he had also raised before in the same *lib., cap. 3*, repeating largely the same things in both places.

I already said from the beginning of this article at n. 71 that I have no wish to dispute with Ferchius about nothing, but about something — nor to be drawn with great inconvenience into questions of mere words, especially regarding names that can have various meanings, as "nothing" does in the present case. For being and nothing are contradictorily opposed; and just as in however many ways one of the opposites is said, in that many ways the other is said as well — in however many ways something can be said to be a being, in that many ways can it be said to be nothing. Ferchius himself reports this from Scotus at *Quodl. 3, vestig. 1, cap. 18, n. 61*. Now just as the proper and primary meaning of being is what has or can have existence outside the mind and in the nature of things, so "nothing" properly denotes what neither has nor can have existence outside the

mind — that is, what cannot have true essence and existence. And thus are all negations of real being: if they exist in some subject they are called negations within a genus; if outside a subject, they are called negations outside a genus — from the same Scotus at *1 dist. 23, qu. unic., H.* Hence it is commonly said that negation outside a genus is the terminus a quo of creation and the terminus ad quem (the endpoint) of annihilation, because it negates both the part and the subject of the thing to be made; and that negation within a genus is the terminus a quo of generation and the terminus ad quem of corruption, because it negates only the formal part of the thing to be made, but does not negate the subject — rather it presupposes it as that in which it is grounded; and if the subject is apt to receive the negated form, that negation within a genus is called privation, from what was said in the *Physics*.

Although, as I said, from the beginning of this article I resolved to abstain from this question of pure words — I intended to dispute about something, not about nothing — yet because Ferchius raises a great clamor about all this in the cited place, as if to batter my ears completely, as though it were heresy in philosophy to call privation "nothing" and to say that things in that sense come to be from nothing — inasmuch as they come to be from their own privation — I here briefly intend to prove that both usages are correct, both according to Aristotle and according to truth, and that sound authors employ this language everywhere.

First, according to truth: being and nothing are contradictories, as is admitted by all; therefore since privation is not a real being, it will be nothing. Likewise, "nothing" and "not something" are equivalent for the logician; privation is not something, or not a thing; therefore it is nothing. Again, "non-being" and "nothing" are equivalent, as are "nothing" and "not something"; but privation is per se non-being at *1 Phys. 75*; therefore it is per se nothing. And finally: nothing in its proper meaning — as Ferchius himself concedes — denotes that which neither has nor can have existence outside the mind, i.e., which can have neither true essence nor true existence; but privation is of this sort, since it is per se non-being and therefore entirely excludes from itself the account of real being. Therefore privation is truly and properly nothing. From this I deduce: if privation can be called nothing, then natural things can also be said to come to be from nothing in this sense, inasmuch as they come to be from privation as from a terminus a quo. For in truth every natural thing is said to come to be from its own privation, and privation is called the third principle of natural things. If therefore privation is nothing, then in this sense something is said to come to be from nothing. It is true that this cannot be said absolutely, because if it were said absolutely it would signify that the composite comes to be from no pre-existing part of itself; yet with the stated qualification it can be said. And in fact the most approved authors speak this way in the *Physics*, in the question of whether privation is some positive entity and whether it is a principle of natural things in their coming to be. For in the resolution of the first question they say that privation is formally non-being, is nothing, and only materially and

connotatively is something; and in the resolution of the second they say that although non-being and nothing cannot be a principle of natural things in their completed being, they can well be so in their coming to be. See *Canon. 1 Phys., qu. 10; Ant. And. de tribus principiis, qu. penult.*; and others treating these questions in *lib. 1 Phys.*, who speak in this way. See also *Ant. And. 7 Met., qu. 11, ad primum princip.*, where he calls privation formally nothing and says that generation is production from nothing, if "from" denotes the relation of a terminus — because it is from privation, which is nothing.

That this mode of speaking is not alien to Aristotle either is gathered from Ferchius himself at *vestig. 1, cap. 4*, where from a twofold limitation made by Aristotle to that saying "nothing comes to be from nothing," he shows in what sense it is true and in what sense false for his view. The first limitation is found (says Ferchius) at *1 Phys. 73–77*, from which at *tex. 75* he writes: "but we ourselves also say that nothing comes to be simply from what is not, yet it does come to be from what is not, as it were accidentally — for it comes to be from privation, which is per se non-being, not from what is in it." By these words he teaches that something comes to be from non-being — namely privation — accidentally, because privation does not remain in the thing produced, not per se. If therefore Aristotle by this statement limits that proposition "nothing comes to be from nothing," and declares in what sense it is true and in what sense false, then by "non-being" — which is privation — he means the same as "nothing"; otherwise this would not be a limitation or declaration of the proposition "nothing comes to be from nothing." And again it must be noted that this mode of speaking in Aristotle — when at *tex. 75* he says that from non-being, which is privation, something can come to be accidentally — employs the same formula of speech that he had used above at *tex. 33–34* in reporting that proposition from the mind of the ancients, where he speaks thus: "Anaxagoras seems to consider things infinite for this reason, because he believed that the common opinion of the physicists was true, that nothing comes to be from what is not." And immediately at *tex. 34*: "for if everything that comes to be must come to be either from what is or from what is not, and it is impossible for it to come to be from what is not — on this all who speak of nature agree." Just as therefore at *tex. 33 and 34*, by "nothing coming to be from what is not," he means — from the mind of the ancients — coming to be from nothing absolutely; so likewise below at *tex. 75*, wishing to limit and declare that proposition — in what sense it is true and in what false — he must, in those words "something comes to be from what is not, as it were accidentally," mean by "what is not" the same as nothing, just as it was understood above at *tex. 33 and 34*. And so it is verified that something comes to be from nothing — not per se, but accidentally. Therefore in Aristotle's idiom, privation can be called nothing, and something can be said to come to be from nothing — as from a terminus a quo — understanding by "nothing" privation itself. In confirmation: what "is not" in Aristotle carries as much the sense of "absolutely nothing" — as at *tex. 33 and 34* — as of privation itself — as at *tex. 75*.

Therefore in Aristotle's language, privation can be called nothing; and since at *tex.* 75 he says that from what is not something can come to be accidentally, this is equivalent to saying that from nothing — which is privation — something can come to be accidentally.

It adds to this, as was noted above from the beginning of the article at n. 69, that Ferchius himself in the same *cap. 4, sub n. 10* expressly concedes all of this, when drawing together the statements of a response to an incidental doubt he writes: "something comes to be accidentally from non-being, whether according to part or according to the whole — I concede this, because the nothing itself is not in the thing made; something comes to be per se from non-being — this I deny, because the nothing itself is not in the thing made." He had just declared immediately before that what comes to be from non-being according to part is the composite — because matter pre-exists, and the non-being that is the terminus a quo of its production does not negate all the parts of the thing produced, but only one of them. And what comes to be from non-being according to the whole is form — because when form comes to be, it comes to be entirely anew, and the non-being that is its terminus a quo negates all the parts of the thing produced. Since therefore he concedes that something comes to be from non-being, whether according to part or according to the whole, accidentally — because the nothing itself is not in the thing produced — he clearly by "nothing" understands the terminus a quo of production from non-being, both according to part and according to the whole. And production from non-being according to part is the production of a composite; so from start to finish he calls the terminus a quo of the composite's production "nothing," and declares that the composite comes to be from nothing accidentally, because the nothing itself is not in the thing produced according to part. By the same reasoning form is said to come to be from nothing accidentally, because the nothing itself is not in the thing produced according to reality.

But because Ferchius saw that by these words he had manifestly called privation "nothing" and thus conceded that something comes to be from nothing accidentally — inasmuch as it comes to be from privation — and that we had grounded and candidly deduced all of this from his own cited words: at *lib. 2 Def., cap. 3, in fine, n. 20* he transcribes these very words from *vestig. 1, n. 10*, which he says he is retranscribing so that the reader may know that my assailants saw this but fraudulently suppressed it. He retranscribes them thus: "I gather from what was said: something comes to be accidentally from non-being, whether according to part or according to the whole — I concede this, because the non-being itself is not in the thing made." Compare these words with those he has at *vestig. 1, n. 10*, and you will see that the word "nothing," which was there, is here fraudulently changed to "non-being," lest he be proved to have called privation "nothing" and to have conceded that something comes to be from nothing accidentally inasmuch as it comes to be from privation. From this the reader will be able to judge which of us has fraudulently omitted or altered words. Thus falsely and

calumniously does he complain that it was fraudulently imputed to him that in *vestig. 1, cap. 4* he called privation "nothing" and conceded that the whole comes to be accidentally from nothing inasmuch as it comes to be from privation — which is non-being and nothing — as from a terminus a quo and in the manner of casting off. For he openly speaks that way there, as is plain from the argument cited; and the fraud rather rebounds upon him, who denies and alters his own words. And finally he can be compelled by reason to admit this as well: since white comes to be from non-white — understanding by "white" the form and by "non-white" the negation of whiteness — surely this negation of whiteness can by his own account be called nothing, because it negates all parts of the thing made or makeable. He does in fact call it nothing, and on that account says that form comes to be from nothing. I then ask: is such a negation of whiteness — from which white comes to be as from a terminus a quo — in a subject capable of whiteness, or not? The second cannot be said, because that negation is succeeded by whiteness in the same subject. If it is in a capable subject, then it will be a negation that is a privation — for privation is a negation in an apt subject. And so privation is nothing — since that negation is nothing according to Ferchius — and since from that same privation the composite comes to be — for it is not from a different privation that form comes to be and the composite — the composite too in this sense can be said to come to be from nothing.

But Ferchius objects at *cap. 15*: we manifestly speak against Aristotle when we call privation "nothing" and say that coming to be from nothing is coming to be from privation. For wishing to show at the cited book on Zeno the falsity of the saying "nothing comes to be from nothing," Aristotle proves it by the authority of Hesiod, who concedes that some things were made from nothing in his verses. "First before all else Chaos came into being; then the broad-bosomed Earth, the firm seat of all; and Love, who surpasses all immortal beings in beauty." From these, other things are said to have been generated, but those themselves from nothing. Hence Aristotle makes two members or orders of things that came to be: in the first he places the primary things generated from nothing — namely Chaos, or prime matter, and Love, the first of the immortal gods to be generated; in the second member or order he places all other generated bodies as coming from the primary things. In this second member he posits production from something pre-existing, and consequently from pre-existing privation in a subject. Therefore according to Aristotle, coming to be from nothing is not coming to be from privation.

In response: this argument is easily turned back against the opponent, who wants forms to come to be from nothing. For when white comes to be from non-white, it comes to be either from a privation pre-existing in the subject or not. The second cannot be asserted, as is already proved — because that negation is in a subject, not outside it. Or if the first is granted, then it must be conceded that privation is nothing, so that form — namely whiteness — is said to come to be from nothing. Or else forms do not come to be from nothing — which he denies.

To the argument: we are asserting that privation can be called nothing — not, however, that nothing can be called privation, since nothing is broader than privation, comprising under itself both negation within a genus and negation outside a genus. Hence every privation is nothing, but not conversely. And so we consequently say that coming to be from privation is coming to be from nothing, because the inference from a less general to a more general term holds affirmatively; but we do not say that coming to be from nothing is coming to be from privation, because from a more general to a less general the inference does not hold affirmatively. Nor do we say that in Aristotle coming to be from nothing is always coming to be from privation — but that he sometimes understands by "nothing" privation itself, and that in this sense he concedes that something can come to be from nothing, because all natural things come to be from privation as from a terminus a quo. It is nevertheless true that in the book on Xenophanes he does not only say in this sense that something comes to be from nothing, against the ancients who did not acknowledge privation or who, acknowledging it, scorned it — but also by taking "nothing" as denoting negation outside a genus, of any pre-existing part or subject whatsoever. For in this way he concedes with Hesiod that prime matter and the intelligences were produced from nothing immediately by God. And although in the solution given to this authority at *disp. 5 de Gen., qu. 1, art. 1, n. 16*, only the first sense is expressly stated, the second is not denied, as the argument contends — as if we had said that Aristotle there, when he said something comes to be from nothing, meant precisely "as from privation and negation within a genus."

Then Ferchius objects at the same *cap., n. 83*, saying that we contradict ourselves, because at *disp. 5 de Gen. cit., qu. 1, art. 1, n. 15* — in explaining the definition of creation as "the production of a being from nothing" — we say that "nothing" signifies two negations: the negation of all parts of the thing produced, and the negation of a presupposed subject. Therefore when at n. 16 in explaining the authority from the book on Xenophanes we say that privation is nothing, it follows first that since form comes to be from privation, it comes to be from no subject and from no part — which we deny. It follows second that since the composite comes to be from privation, it comes to be from nothing — i.e., from no pre-existing part and subject. It follows third that the same composite comes to be from something of itself — because it comes to be from a pre-existing part — and also not from something of itself — because it comes to be from privation, which as nothing negates both part and subject according to our explanation of this expression in the definition of creation. From all this he finally concludes that we cannot escape contradiction, because at n. 16 "nothing" for us signifies privation — that is, the negation of form alone — while previously at n. 15 "nothing" signified for us the negation of every presupposed subject and of every part. But having negated the presupposed subject, it is impossible to understand privation; therefore it is impossible that "nothing" should signify privation if it signifies the negation of a subject.

In response: "nothing" can be taken in two ways — either generically, as comprising under itself both negation within a genus and negation outside a genus; or specifically, as properly denoting negation outside a genus, negating both part and subject. When at n. 15 we said that "nothing" in the definition of creation negates both part and presupposed subject, we were speaking of "nothing" taken specifically for negation outside a genus — which is placed as the terminus a quo of creation. When at n. 16 we call privation "nothing," it is taken generically, as what is common to negation within a genus and negation outside a genus. Given this distinction, all three of those consequences are cut off, as is plain — because all three rest on the assumption that privation is being called "nothing" by us in the specific sense, as it is used in the definition of creation — which is false, since it is taken only generically. And by this same distinction the alleged contradiction is most easily removed without evasion. And from this distinction it is further confirmed that privation can and must be called "nothing" as it is taken generically, because the subjective part properly bears the name of its genus: man is called an animal, whiteness is called a color, etc. And since "nothing" is what is common to negation within a genus and to negation outside a genus, privation can and must properly be called "nothing" in this sense.

Furthermore he presses at n. 85: either privation and nothing are convertible — so that coming to be from privation and coming to be from nothing are the same — or privation is more common, as a genus in relation to nothing as one species and something else as another species; or privation is less common, as a species or quasi-species contained under nothing. Not the first — nor the second — as we also concede. But not the third either, because then he argues thus: whatever comes to be from privation comes to be from nothing, but not conversely — according to this third option. But form comes to be from privation, as the musical from the non-musical; therefore form comes to be from nothing — which we deny. Likewise the composite would come to be from nothing — which Aristotle denies at 7 *Met.* 23 and 24.

In response: this argument is turned back against the opponent, as before. Form comes to be from privation, as the musical from the non-musical. Either therefore privation must be called nothing by him — in order to maintain that forms come to be from nothing — or forms do not come to be from nothing but from a pre-existing subject in which privation exists — which he denies. The argument is easily solved by the distinction given: whatever comes to be from privation comes to be from nothing taken generically — I concede; taken specifically — I deny. The minor is then conceded, and the consequence distinguished: therefore form comes to be from nothing taken generically — not specifically, as he maintains. Similarly the composite will come to be from nothing taken generically, not specifically. The three remaining arguments added in the same chapter at nn. 86 and 87 are of the same type and are dissolved by the distinction given.

From all of this sufficient answer is given to all the objections and impostures he heaps against us at *lib. 2, cap. 4*, where he says that we have not understood the second limitation of that proposition "nothing comes to be from nothing" — which he sets forth at *vestig. 1, cap. 4, n. 11*, and *1 Phys. 78*, and *12 Met. 8* — through the distinction of being by act and by potency. For we did not rightly grasp what it means to come to be from non-being in act, either according to the whole or according to part. He therefore falsely imputed to us that he had said that the composite can in this sense be called something coming to be from nothing, inasmuch as it comes to be from non-being in act — since he never dreamed of so palpable a falsehood in that *cap. 1 of vestig. 1*. Hence at *lib. 2 Defens., cap. 4, cit., n. 24, pag. 180*, he concludes with these words: "if you, my assailants, have read in the fourth chapter of my first *Vestigatio* that I asserted the composite comes to be from nothing, I was in error when I so spoke; yet it is true that I cannot find or see that any such thing is said in the cited chapter 4." He speaks with such audacity as to persuade the reader by his own boldness of our blindness and stupidity in reading that fourth chapter of his first *Vestigatio*. Let his words be produced for all to see, and let the fair reader judge whether at n. 11 he said that the composite can be called something coming to be from nothing inasmuch as it comes to be from non-being in act. His words are these: "The second limitation is placed at *1 Phys. 78* and *12 Met. 8*: for since being is distinguished by act and potency, from non-being in act but in-potency-being a being comes to be — in which passages Aristotle is speaking of the generation of the composite, not of the production of simple things — therefore the proposition is limited" — note this consequence — "because something comes to be from nothing in act." These are his words, faithfully reproduced. By these words, explaining with this limitation — drawn from the cited Aristotelian passages — that something comes to be from nothing in act, and since in those cited passages Aristotle speaks not of the production of simple things but of the generation of the composite — as Ferchius himself admits — it follows consequently that when he says something comes to be from nothing in act, he does not mean it of simple things but of the composite. Therefore it was not we who were blind or stupid in reading his *Vestigatio*, but he himself who was blind and stupid in writing it. Ferchius could, however, have here defended himself from this charge — which he himself calls an imposture — as he had done in the preceding chapter 3 at the end, where in retranscribing his own immediately preceding words — which are those just cited — he changed the word "nothing" to "non-being," using a ruse lest he be caught in a ruse, by writing: therefore the proposition is limited, because something comes to be from non-being in act. In this way he would have had an escape route; but by writing "from nothing in act" as it stands, all escape is definitively closed. From this imposture together with the other noted above at n. 109 — which are not of slight moment — the prudent reader can surmise that all the complaints Ferchius heaps against us throughout the entire second book — indeed throughout the entire work of his *Defensio* — are false, calumnious, and imposturous.

Article III: Whether Forms Come to Be through Inchoations Pre-existing in Matter

Ferchius, in order to obtain a greater occasion for indulging his passion for speaking ill of Scotus and the Scotists — not content with defending his own positions — wished also to defend positions belonging to others, which, even though he himself does not hold them, he gladly defends because they are directed against Scotus and the Scotists. He therefore devotes the entire first book to defending the seminary of forms posited by Contareni in his question on the origin of forms, in the course of which he poured out many harsh and abusive remarks against us and all Scotists. For it happened that in *disp. 5 de Gen., qu. 6*, while positing inchoations of forms and calling the seminary derived from that term "inchoators" and "seminarists," Ferchius at *lib. 1, cap. 4, nn. 30 and 31* reproaches us most bitterly for having dishonored with so contemptuous and ignominious a name the most weighty authors of that opinion. And since in the same *qu. 6 cit., n. 143*, we said that the opinion on inchoations of forms had long since been demolished from the ground up by our authors — citing Scotus at *2 d. 18, q. un.*; Bassolis *ibid.*; Canon. *2 Phys., qu. 1*; Ant. And. *lib. de tribus principiis, qu. 7* and *7 Met., qu. 11*; Zerb. *ibid., qu. 9*; Rubion. *2 dist. 22, qu. 3*; Fabro *theor. 26* and *7 Met., disput. 15*; Angest. *lib. 2 de formarum proprietatibus, pag. 17*; and others — Ferchius at *cap. 3* of the same first book responds from the outset by reproaching the entire School of the Subtilists: sufficient for your own judgment, not sufficient for the judgment of adversaries; to each his own is beautiful. But Scotus and the Scotists count as one, both because those who transcribe the same reasons of Scotus do little or nothing new, and because those who have bound themselves to one author will not speak from their own judgment but speak according to the will of that author. So, with such spite, does Ferchius speak of all Scotists. He adds: among those you cite, however, you falsely cite Zerbius, who at *7 Met., qu. 9, art. 2*, after reporting Scotus's opinion writes: "but Scotus was moved to so determine concerning seminal reasons in animate things only for the sake of an appearance, and those reasons themselves do not compel in generation but only for a preceding alteration, for the reasons adduced — which in truth conclude nothing, whatever his opinion may be," etc. — and immediately Zerbius dissolves Scotus's reasons. How beautifully does he agree with Scotus! says Ferchius — and how he judges the opinion of inchoation of forms demolished by Scotus and his followers. Finally, because among all the modes of positing a seminary of forms we say that Contareni's position is more unreasonable than the others — precisely because he posits this seminary as a certain spiritual essence concreted with matter and for the other reasons hinted at there — Ferchius at *cap. 4, n. 30* again sharply reproaches us for having dared to call the opinion of so great a man false and absurd and to be entirely eliminated from the Peripatetic school.

Although all these things pertain to impostures, insults, and abuses, yet because here too the Scotists and the entire School of the Subtilists are blamed, these things are not to be passed over entirely in silence. It is not new in schools for

those holding opinions to be sometimes called by those opinions and given names from them. Thus the Nominalists were so called because they denied universals as existing things, or real common natures, admitting only universals in signification and attributing community to words and names — as nearly all authors note in that question. And on the other side, those who conceded real natures and universals in existing things were called from their opinion "Realists." The Formalists were those who introduced formalities beyond things themselves. And Anaxagoras and other ancient philosophers who said that all forms lie hidden in matter and are successively manifested through various dispositions introduced on occasion by an external agent were called "Hiders," as Zerbius testifies at 7 *Met.*, *qu.* 9, §. *propter secundum*, where he says that not only Anaxagoras among the ancients was a hider of forms, but together with him was Empedocles the Sicilian, who was earlier than Anaxagoras. By the same title therefore — not by way of ridicule or mockery — the defenders of inchoations and of the seminary were called by us Inchoators and Seminarists; by which name, without hesitation, they were also called by Ferchius himself at *lib.* 2, *cap.* 11, near the end, in those words: "what comes to be from no pre-existing part of itself comes to be from nothing, and according to the Inchoators is created." What shall I say of the great imposture and the malicious bitterness of this man toward his brethren and fellow disciples the Scotists, except the words spoken by the angel concerning Ishmael in *Gen.* 16:12: "This man shall be a wild ass of a man, his hand against everyone and everyone's hand against him, and he shall dwell over against all his brothers." How worthy the Scotists are, and in what esteem the entire School of the Subtilists is held, this same author — when of sound mind — amply demonstrated at one time in his *Life of Scotus*. I appeal from this calumny to him in that passage, when not in anger. If he, who has assessed his assailants — by which name, more appropriate to an armed camp than to a school, he calls us throughout that entire book — ungratefully turns the sword of his fury against the Scotists and against the common Master, without distinction of persons, he ought to have made war only on us; but let us pass over these things, as they pertain to taunts and insults.

As for the citation of Zerbius on our behalf: he himself now admits that Zerbius in this question was undecided, since he solves arguments for both sides and asserts that both are defensible. If therefore he stands for both sides, just as for that reason Ferchius cites him twice in the immediately following chapter at nn. 26 and 30 for the affirmative part of inchoations, so too we have equal license to cite him for the negative. The very words of Zerbius that Ferchius reports from *art.* 2, around the middle, after reporting Scotus's opinion — by which he persuaded himself that Zerbius firmly stands for inchoations of forms — are in truth beside the point. For the opinion that Zerbius reports from Scotus and then seems to abandon in dissolving its arguments is not about seminal reasons in matter with respect to all forms universally, but only in animate and living things, as is plain from the very words of Zerbius cited by Ferchius: "but Scotus was

moved to so determine concerning seminal reasons in animate things," etc. And therefore when he says that his arguments conclude nothing in truth, he is not speaking about the opinion denying inchoations of forms in matter altogether, but only about the opinion admitting them from a special reason in living things. Hence Ferchius was mistaken in understanding those words as being about the opinion denying a seminary in matter and about the arguments proving it — since Zerbius is not speaking about such an opinion there. Finally, we were not wrong to call Contareni's opinion false in this matter and to be eliminated from the Peripatetic school. For Contareni himself admits it is new in the Peripatetic school — or at least obsolete — at *cap. 9, in fine*; and at *cap. 11, ab initio* he says: "the foundation of our proposed position nearly all commentators strive to overturn"; and again at *cap. 12, ab initio*: "because the position we have maintained — or a similar one asserting the form of corporeity — is attacked by nearly all commentators." If therefore Contareni himself, as a man born with candor, candidly admits that his opinion is harsh and hard and obsolete, has very few followers, and is refuted by nearly all commentators and Peripatetics, Ferchius labors in vain to obtain some color of truth for that opinion by a long catalog of authors cited and reported with weighty words at *cap. 4*. And if we said similar things about that opinion, we deserve excuse — nor did we speak entirely against his will and in his despite. We admit as well that many weighty authors have taught inchoations of forms; but as will shortly be plain, not all of them defend them in the same way — they differ greatly — and among them we said Contareni's position is harder and less reasonable. Hence Ferchius again adduces our catalog of those authors to show the probability of Contareni's position; but the greater part of those authors taught inchoations of forms without however following Contareni's position — which he himself took up to defend in that first book.

But in order to explain and defend it more fully, at *cap. 8, n. 48*, he recounts six modes of depending on inchoations of forms as reported by Scotus at 7 *Met., qu. 12*. The fifth, in which the passive potency of matter is posited as the seminal reason, and the sixth, in which the principal agent is called the seminal reason, he rejects along with Scotus as improper; and the remaining four he refutes both individually and collectively. The first distinguishes the universal genus and subaltern and most specific species: in the first mode the form of the genus is concreated with matter from eternity, and this is the seminal reason, which does not come to be anew; in the second mode it comes to be anew in time. The second distinguishes in form one part concreated with matter — which is the seminal reason and does not come to be — and another part of the form that comes to be anew when the whole form is constituted from the former part and the new part. The third posits the form as pre-existing and not united to matter, but in generation becoming united to matter — and this is Contareni's mode, who posits the seminary of all forms as united from eternity to matter in some way, according to some special determinate degree; the other degrees lying hidden in

the seminary, he asserts, are not immediately united by information, but are united when matter has received sufficient dispositions from the natural agent. The fourth posits the form as pre-existing and united to matter in incomplete being, but as brought by the natural agent into complete being.

From this recounting of modes for seminal reasons it is clear, says Ferchius, that the seminal reason concreated with matter comes to be anew according to none of those modes. According to the third mode, as far as its essence is concerned, the form does not come to be anew — nor does it according to the fourth — but is united, that is, informing matter. That this is Contareni's position is shown by words of his taken from his question on the origin of forms, *cap. 10, p. 140*, where he said: "since therefore natural forms have real being, and since they themselves could not have been newly produced, it follows necessarily — speaking in the language of Aristotelian philosophy — that they have eternal being. But since they cannot always have their determined, perfect, and wholly actual being — given that their bodies, without which they cannot exist as to absolute and perfect being, do not always exist (from *12 Met. 17*) — it is therefore reasonably gathered that they have a being that is of itself confused, indeterminate, and as-yet-potential, such as we confess them to have while they lie hidden within that spiritual essence of matter always inhering, which is their own inchoation and seminary; in which seminary that form which appears anew in generation — not as produced from some distinct essence but as a degree emerging from that seminary essence and surpassing the remaining degrees — informs and determines the generated thing according to its own specific nature, just as previously another different degree was surpassing and dominant, while it lay hidden and dormant within that seminary essence." And at *pag. 143, linea 33* he again says: "before the generation of a horse, the form is present in matter — that is, the degree of being a dog as to the integrity of its essence, but not as to the totality of existence or the actual determination of the nature of the composite — namely the horse — which actuality of existence it does not acquire by any essential addition to itself, but only by the addition of the relation and conjunction of that degree with that matter." It is plain from this, as Ferchius applies it to Contareni's opinion, that the specific degree of the form of the horse was present in a confused manner in the seminary inhering in matter, but that specific degree standing by matter was not coupled by information with matter, and therefore did not constitute the horse. But it is coupled when the sufficient dispositions for the form of the horse have been introduced by the natural agent; then from the united matter and specific degree of form, matter acquires the specific being of the form of the horse and the specific denomination; and from these united constituents thus is made the substantial composite — as a substance newly made. For the composite, as the horse, comes to be from matter and form, but neither does form come to be at *7 Met. 26 and 27*.

Having explained and declared Contareni's opinion in this way: because it suffers both the common difficulties usually raised in general against inchoations of

forms and also special ones that we urged against it at *disp. 5 de Gen., q. 6*, Ferchius strives to respond — meeting the special ones first at *cap. 8 and 9* and the general ones at *cap. 11*. I shall therefore report and then reject each of his solutions from the doctrine of Scotus and the Scotists themselves, so that it is clear that not just anyone is able to resolve Scotistic arguments. I shall first report the arguments bearing in general against inchoations of forms along with Ferchius's solutions, and afterward those bearing specifically against Contareni's position.

First then, we argued against inchoations of forms in general at *disp. 2 Phys., qu. 7, art. 1, n. 138*: matter in generation passes from non-being of form to being of form, or from privation to form; therefore form does not precede in matter before generation — either according to itself as a whole or according to any part of its essence or existence. For privation and form are opposed as wholes, both as to essence and as to existence, and are impossible in matter according to any degree whatsoever. Ferchius responds at *lib. 1, cap. 11, n. 73* by denying the consequence, since matter can be said either to pass from non-being of form to being of form simply — and that he denies — or only in a certain respect, as to existing in matter or not existing in it — and that he concedes. But from this it does not follow that form did not exist beforehand simply, whether in the seminary of other forms or outside — as the rational soul. Hence there is a fallacy from "in a certain respect" to "simply" — that is, from existing-in to existing simply. If privation is not opposed to form in simple being but to form in a subject, consider four things: matter, being-under, form, being-in. Privation negates the matter's own being-under and being-informed, and consequently negates the being-in from form, i.e., the act of informing — and negates nothing else relating to form. For privation is not the negation of form simply, but of form in a subject at *4 Met. 5*. He says this solution is Zerbius's. Toward proving the consequence he distinguishes the first part of the assumed premise — privation and form are opposed as wholes: as to inclusion, because nothing included in one quidditative is included in the other — this he concedes; as to the conditions or dispositions of form — this he denies. He likewise denies the second part of the assumed premise — namely that privation and form are impossible in matter according to every degree whatsoever — because affirmation is the measure of negation, and so what is posited by affirmation in matter is removed by privation — not simply, but from matter. Sometimes the whole form both as to essence and as to being, both as to thing and as to mode, is absent from a subject; in that case privation negates the whole form from matter. But sometimes privation can be partly expelled and partly remain, just as form can be partly introduced into matter and partly not — as is plain in forms that admit of more and less, among the number of which he also says substantial forms are to be counted, following St. Bonaventure at *2 dist. 3* and *dist. 13, n. 30*. He adds many more things in the cited place, but the heart of the solution stands in what has been reported.

But Ferchius, in the first place, does not seem to have grasped the force of the argument — with due respect to him — when he says that in drawing that

consequence there is committed the fallacy from "in a certain respect" to "simply," that is, from "existing-in" to "existing simply." For the argument does not intend to prove that when matter passes from non-being of form to being of form, it passes to being of form simply — but only in a certain respect, namely as to being-under from its side and as to being-in from the side of form. And from this it deduces that form does not pre-exist in matter, either according to itself as a whole or according to any part of itself — whatever mode it may have had of existing simply outside matter, whether as is said of the rational soul or not. To grasp the force of the argument, I therefore use his own argument, which he was pressing against us in the same first book at *cap. 7, n. 54* to prove that form does not precede in the potency of matter before it is made: at *4 Phys. 23*, Aristotle enumerates modes of being in, one of which is the mode by which form is in matter when it is united to it by information. If therefore in generation matter passes from non-being of form to being of form — that is, to being under form — therefore it was not previously in matter, was not in the seminary of forms, but is then introduced so as to be in it; precisely because a form that is actually in matter cannot be received, since the recipient must be denuded of the nature of what is received. So he argued against us at the cited place. And so we now use his weapons against him defending with Contareni that forms precede in matter according to their whole simple being. Thus the force of the argument consists in this: if form according to its whole simple being is contained in the seminary of forms before generation, matter will not pass through generation from non-being under form to being under form — because through generation, just as form was in it according to its simple being, so too matter was already subject to it. Ferchius will perhaps deny, from the doctrine of Contareni already cited, that the form of a horse or of a dog is united to matter before the generation of the horse or the dog — for it is actually united through actual generation, and only then does it actually inform matter; before then the form was not in matter actually and according to distinct being, but only according to potential and confused being in the common seminary of forms.

But this evasion of Ferchius for Contareni is precluded by the same argument of Ferchius himself already reported — because at *4 Phys. 43*, Aristotle says that form is not said to be in matter except through informative union; therefore before generation either the form did not pre-exist in matter according to its simple being, or it was united to it by information — for Aristotle recognized no other mode of inexistence of form in matter according to its simple being. And every recipient must be denuded of the nature of what is received; therefore form was not present in matter either according to the whole or according to any part, neither according to the being of essence nor of existence. Also, if form was present in matter according to its whole and total simple being, then it was present according to its actual being — not merely its possible being — because the simple being of a thing is its actual being, not merely potential being. Furthermore, if that specific degree was standing by matter before the generation

of the horse, for example, and was not coupled with matter, and therefore did not constitute the horse: therefore all material forms would be *per se* subsisting — even accidental ones — because in this regard the same reasoning applies to substantial and accidental form alike. And this is the argument made by Scotus at *7 Met., q. 12* against that third mode of speaking — which he considers sufficiently refuted by this one absurdity alone, saying: "against the third mode of speaking it is not necessary to labor much, because it posits an accident without a subject — that is, without informing the subject — and a material form without perfecting matter, and many other things that could be inferred." Ferchius did not wish to smell out this Scotistic argument, which uniquely destroys Contareni's position — though its defender — but left the defense to his client. The client therefore, seeing himself abandoned without a guardian, strives to respond on his own behalf at *cap. 11*, around the middle, saying that those spiritual substances that do not inform matter indeed subsist *per se* — since they have their existence and determined actual nature from themselves — but that those formal degrees, because they cannot obtain a determined existence without matter, are on that account necessarily tied by connection to matter: so that whether according to the actual existence of determination — namely information — or according to the confused and indistinct inexistence of their essence, they are inseparably conjoined to it. Against this: if it is the case that such degrees are always inseparably conjoined to matter, then they were also united and coupled to matter before generation — which was denied before. For it implies a contradiction to say that the same thing in the same respect exists-in and does not exist-in.

Contareni responds there (Ferchius meanwhile staying silent about this) that there is a twofold inexistence of form: one taken broadly, commonly, and absolutely, by which even things that are conjoined to something in potential being are said to exist in it; in this signification it may be said that the degrees not actually informing exist in matter — although only according to their potential essence, that is, not according to their natures actually determining. But in another, stricter and more proper sense, inexistence of formal degrees is taken for the equal determination of the subject according to their own proper natures; in which sense it was rightly said that formal degrees do not always exist in matter. Against this: to block this escape it is necessary for Contareni to declare what he means by this confused and potential being which he says forms have in matter before generation. Either he means potential being that is commonly called objective — excluding actuality of being — and this he cannot assert, because he wants forms to have their being simply before generation in matter. But being simply and outside the intellect is not merely possible being, which is being in causes and being in a certain respect. Or he means potential being as excluding determined being — which seems more what Contareni intends, even from Ferchius's own explanation — because he says this determined being is had only through the actual union of form with matter: because then from such union the

determined nature of, say, the horse or the dog results. And neither does this satisfy, because union adds nothing intrinsic to form; but that specific degree has all its determination antecedently to the union. Either therefore before generation that degree was in matter or not. If the first, then it was in matter according to its actual being and according to a determined nature — because that degree is of itself determined through such a specific difference, not through union with matter. If the second, then it will be per se subsisting and outside matter — not within matter — and the principal argument of Scotus returns: for it implies contradiction to posit material forms perpetually inhering in a seminary of forms and afterward to assert that they are not united to it but are united in generation itself. For there appears to be no other way they can be in matter — either by information or by simple assistance. If they are in matter in the first way, substantial generation is entirely abolished, and nothing whatsoever comes to be anew — neither matter, nor form, nor composite. If they are not in matter in that mode but by simple assistance, then they will be per se subsisting — which Contareni likewise denies. We rightly said therefore at *disp. 5 de Gen.*, q. 6, that Contareni did indeed foresee the principal difficulties and did not dissemble them — as Ferchius did in the first book of the *Defensio* — but that the difficulties are still more evident than his solutions, which do not evacuate all arguments; and hence he needed Ferchius's guardianship. But as I see it, Ferchius deserts him in the hottest of the battle.

Furthermore, Ferchius's response to the proof of the consequence does not hold either — when he denies that privation and form are impossible according to every degree, because privation can be partly expelled and partly not, if the form to be introduced admits of more and less. For in the first place he here assumes in this solution that substance admits of more and less — which Contareni denies — and rightly so, at *cap. 11, pag. 114*, responding to the argument that from his opinion it would follow that substantial forms are intensified and remitted, where he denies this consequence. It is therefore not defending Contareni but attacking him. And when he adduces the authority of St. Bonaventure for this, I might say to him — as he is accustomed to say to us — that in philosophy one must adduce the authority of Aristotle, not of others. Aristotle manifestly taught the opposite: namely that substance is not intensified, nor remitted, nor admits of more and less at *cap. de subst.* and 8 *Met.*, *cap. 10*. And when he says below in the same chapter at n. 77 that many Scotists agree with the Seraphic and Subtle Doctor that substantial form admits of more and less: I respond that it is false that the Subtle Doctor taught this opinion — for he rather taught the opposite, as I said at *disp. 5 de Gen. et cor.*, *qu. 5, art. 2*, and above at *disp. 10, qu. 11, concl. 2*. And if some Scotists hold that substance admits of more and less, they do not mean that it admits of more and less by way of intensification and remission — as in the manner of an accidental form, e.g., heat or whiteness, which is now more intense, now less — but rather that it admits of more and less indivisibly and all at once, so that once introduced it is not successively intensified or remitted but always remains the

same until it is corrupted. And this is what Fabro defends at *theor.* 55; and the Doctor indicated this mode at 8 *Met.*, *qu.* 3 as one that could be defended, and perhaps St. Bonaventure understands substance to admit of more and less in this sense — not that it admits of intensification and remission successively as accidents do, since Aristotle taught the opposite in several places and reason is repugnant, as was said in its proper place.

But even admitting that the substantial form were intensified and remitted, still it could never be said — and it is entirely repugnant — that privation and form coexist even for an instant of time. For then contradictory things would follow about the same thing, with respect to the same thing, and at the same moment of time: that form is in the subject and is not in the subject. What Ferchius says in confirmation of the opposite — that with two received degrees of whiteness there stands the privation of the two degrees yet to be received — is certainly true, but does not prove that form stands alongside its own privation. Who does not see that, while water is being heated and the first or second degree of heat is introduced, with those degrees there stands the privation of the third and fourth? Who doubts this? Since therefore in the argument it is said that form and privation are impossible, the discourse is about form and privation compared according to the same degree; because if comparison is made according to different degrees — as, e.g., the privation of the third degree with two degrees already existing in the subject — they are not thereby said to coexist as privation and form, but rather the privation of one degree as coexisting with the preceding degree. Since therefore matter in generation passes totally from non-being of form to being of form, from this the argument deduces that form does not pre-exist in matter, either according to itself as a whole or according to any part of itself. Moreover, even Ferchius himself in this same *cap.* 11, *n.* 78 admits that the argument drawn from the partition of form according to different degrees of intension does not work against St. Bonaventure and Contareni, who posit the whole essence of form as pre-existing in the seminary and according to all its degrees, and as wholly extracted according to specific actual being. Therefore it is equally futile for him to have recourse to this partition of form to solve our argument — because neither St. Bonaventure nor Contareni admit such partition in the inchoation of form, and according to them no new part of form is expected to be introduced by the agent; but only the union of the whole pre-existing form in matter with matter is needed, obtained by the work of an external agent through preceding dispositions.

Second, the argument was drawn from Bassolis at 2 *d.* 18, *qu.* *un.*: not only are form and privation simultaneously impossible in matter, but even forms themselves are mutually incompatible in the same subject — neither according to themselves as wholes, nor according to any parts of themselves, neither according to the being of essence nor of existence — because the essences of forms themselves are what mutually conflict, and in every part of a form the essence of that form is included. Ferchius responds by denying Bassolis's

statement. First, as to substantial forms: substantial forms are not contrary to one another nor impossible by reason of themselves, but by reason of the contrary dispositions they require in order to be in complete act. Then as to accidental forms in intensive and complete being: some accidental forms are contrary, but this notwithstanding, none are impossible in potential and incomplete being; nor even in complete and actual but remiss being — especially, he says, according to us, who posit that two contraries can coexist in the very same matter. This response, as to the first part, was also that of Contareni himself at *cap. 11 cit.*, *pag. 148*, near the end.

Against the first part of the solution I object, because the contrariety and impossibility of forms can be found not only between things that are mutually opposed, but also between disparate things — as the Doctor teaches at *1 d. 11, qu. 2*, on filiation and passive spiration — and as we together with him at *disp. 9 log., q. 1*, on opposites, teach. Opposites properly so called are those that fight against each other in a special way and fight in such a way that they do not equally fight against a third — as heat conflicts with cold in a way it does not conflict with others, such as sound or sweetness. Disparates, however, are those that so conflict with each other that they equally and indifferently conflict with any other whatsoever in the same way; and these are of two kinds: some that have only formal impossibility — because one cannot be the other, as whiteness and sweetness; others that have also subjective impossibility — because they cannot be in the same subject even if they are not contraries or opposites, as two substantial forms. For these latter, even with any accident whatsoever set aside, cannot be in the same matter — at least naturally speaking — because then the same thing constituted from them would be at once and simultaneously in several essential species; therefore several substantial forms can be impossible and mutually conflict — not indeed oppositely and contrarily, but even disparately — antecedently to dispositions. And this is precisely because the contrariety of the dispositions they require has its origin from such intrinsic impossibility of theirs: for they require such contrary dispositions because they are of such a nature, whence they are commonly said to be contrary to each other at least virtually — and this virtual contrariety suffices that they cannot naturally be simultaneously in matter. Nor does the other part of the solution stand, regarding accidental forms. For in potential being, no forms are impossible in the same subject — because their formal impossibility and repugnance derives from their actual entity; hence so long as they are considered in possible being, no impossibility belongs to them in that state, since such a state abstracts from actuality of being. But when they are in actual and remiss being, they can coexist — since as such they are not reckoned contrary. Nor do we say that two contraries can simultaneously exist naturally in the same subject, but only by God's absolute power — as was said at *disp. 1, qu. 5, artic.*

Third, it was pressed that there would be infinite forms in matter in act — because if all precede according to something of themselves, and since possible forms are

infinite synkategorematically, there would be an infinity of imperfect and incomplete forms. Ferchius responds first that this does not consistently follow from us, because at *disp. 5 de Gen., q. 7, art. 2, n. 172* we hold that if all substantial forms were in matter in incomplete being, infinity would not follow. Then, in the same *disp., q. 7, art. 2, n. 172*, it is not inconvenient for us if a synkategorematic infinity is given in actual things; hence it will be much less inconvenient if it is given in imperfect and incomplete forms under a potential mode. And absolutely speaking, the consequence does not hold — because according to St. Bonaventure, God concreated from the beginning specific seminal reasons in matter in finite multitude; and the multiplication of individuals — given a beginning and an end of the world — will be finite; and therefore the consequence does not hold. So also Contareni posits a finite number of specific degrees lying hidden in the seminary, because substantial species cannot be infinite according to Aristotle. And for having individuals in indefinite number, it is not necessary to posit individual seminal reasons for each individual — for the specific degree of form, from its conjunction with this matter, produces one individual; from conjunction with another matter, another individual; and again from another and another conjunction of the same specific degree — even with the same portion of matter — another and still another individual arises.

But the first charge is gratuitously and falsely laid against us, for our words there are these: "nor does another argument prove it well, because that opinion does not say that forms at the dissolution of the composite are again submerged in matter and so to speak concealed in its bosom and hidden there until they are again brought out by an external agent, as the Anaxagorists asserted and the defenders of inchoations seem to agree; rather, it teaches that forms are torn from matter and, so to speak, preserved at a distance in themselves and through themselves. Granting therefore that opinion — namely concerning the separability of every form — this infinity of forms in matter does not follow, but rather in themselves." By these words it is plain that, given that opinion of the separability and perpetuity of forms, we do not say that infinity does not follow — but that it does not follow in matter but rather in themselves. We therefore affirm that infinity follows, though not in matter. It is therefore false what is here charged against us. What he ascribes to us in another place regarding synkategorematic infinity as not being repugnant even in actual things is indeed true — but not all concede it; indeed very many deny it, and especially among the defenders of inchoations; and therefore the argument presses them *ad hominem*. What he says from St. Bonaventure, that the specific seminal reasons in matter are finite and therefore infinity does not follow in these, plainly given that hypothesis our consequence does not hold — yet it still follows in individuals, since the world according to the Philosopher is to be everlasting; and since this question is treated within Peripatetic bounds, as Ferchius and Contareni profess from the outset at *cap. 9*, I do not see how he now leaps outside the chorus — especially since he frequently urges this same point against us as no venial error.

Nor does Contareni avoid this inconvenience happily enough when at *pag. 145*, near the end, he says that not so many individual degrees pre-exist in the seminary as there can be individuals produced in any species — because the same specific degree conjoined with different and different matter can within the same species successively constitute different individuals. From this it follows that the same individual once corrupted could return again — for it could happen that after many centuries the same specific degree, through dispositions of the same kind, is joined to the same numerical portion of matter. But if the same essential parts return, it is necessarily also the same numerical whole that returns. Contareni, most learned, strove to dissolve this knot as well — though judging it sufficiently entangled — by denying the consequence, because the essence of any composite thing consists not merely in the simple essence of its essential parts but also in such a determinate essential union of them, which comes about through a determinate concurrence of several accidents. Since therefore some formal degree and the matter that once constituted some determinate composite cannot again be united according to the very same disposition in every respect, it follows from the diversity of that essential union that they can no longer constitute that same composite. But it is extensively proved at *disp. 5 Phys., q. 12, art. 2* that union is not of the essence of the composite but only a condition absolutely necessarily required for the constitution of the whole. And the Doctor at *4 d. 42, q. 1, ad ultimum* probably holds that the composite can return the same even if the same union of parts does not return — provided the same parts return. For as the Doctor there notes, if the same parts return, it is plausible that the same union also returns numerically — for its numerical identity does not seem to depend on place, time, or other extrinsic accidents. And although that prior union may have been interrupted, this does not prevent it, because what was interrupted can return the same numerically — and not only what is absolute but also a relation, if its extremes return the same numerically. And this union is a predicamental relation that comes from outside, as has often been said — or at least a transcendental one. See Bassolis at *2 d. 18* impugning this statement, against the third mode.

Fourth, the argument was drawn from Scotus at *2 d. 18*, by turning back the foundation of the inchoatists, which was this: if form does not precede in matter according to any inchoation whatsoever, then form is created and comes to be from nothing. The Doctor turns this back thus: that part of form that is newly produced did not precede in matter — because it is generated anew; therefore it comes to be from nothing of itself, because the part or inchoation that preceded is distinct from it; therefore that part is still created. Ferchius responds that for those who posit one part of form as the inchoation and another part as newly produced, Zerbius and Suessanus responded sufficiently. But against St. Bonaventure and Contareni, who posit the whole essence of form as pre-existing in the seminary according to potential being and as wholly extracted according to specific actual being, this argument carries no heat. For it presupposes that

form in actual and complete being comes to be according to part from form that is incomplete according to part. But according to the Seraphic Doctor, the particle "from" in the eduction of form from the seminary does not denote a part but consubstantiality, in the way a rose is said to come from a globe.

But against this: first he had already admitted also in substantial form parts of intension, so that it pre-existed in matter according to one degree and not according to another. Next, although the argument in truth directly concludes against those who posit form as pre-existing in matter according to one part and as newly produced according to another, yet as it is framed by Scotus at 7 *Met.*, q. 12, it militates against all opinions alike — whether form is posited as pre-existing according to part or according to the whole, or according to the being of essence or of existence. For given whatever pre-existents, either there is something new that had no pre-existing whatsoever, or there is not. If there is, then whatever pre-exists is posited in vain to avoid creation — because something however small exists and is not from anything of itself. If there is not, then there is no generation — because then everything would be in everything, and no entity however perfect would be new. Since therefore Contareni does not deny the novelty of generation — indeed he says that through it new coupling of the degree with matter and new determination and actuality of existence are acquired — the argument proceeds concerning precisely this new completion, actuation, and union: since they come to be from nothing of themselves, they must be said to be created or to come to be from nothing. Nor should one say that these things are not properly produced because they have the account of a mode, and a mode is not per se producible — because in truth this solution consists more in words and in a way of speaking than in reality. For this determination, this union, was not there before and afterward is; therefore it was made. And since it was made from nothing of itself, it will be created. And so it is plain that the Inchoators do not avoid creation unless they entirely deny generation anew together with the Anaxagorists.

What he said — that according to St. Bonaventure the particle "from" in the eduction of form from the seminary does not denote a part but consubstantiality, in the way a rose is said to come from a globe: whatever may be said about this consubstantiality, which I do not wish to contradict out of reverence for so great a Doctor — it is certain that, as it is explained by Ferchius, it does little to evade the argument reported. For with all this consubstantiality the form would be said to come to be from nothing, as he himself explains above at *cap. 10, n. 70*. Moreover, since Ferchius is here for his purpose bound to defend Contareni's position from its own principles and not from alien ones — since he is not speaking from Contareni's principles — Contareni himself responds to this argument per se at *cap. 11, pag. 142*, from the beginning, and openly concedes that in generation no form is generated that did not pre-exist; but that some essential degree of that spiritual substance — which was lying dormant and hidden before — is aroused by the dispositions and, as it surpasses the other degrees, is drawn out, so that a new generation results. Nor does it follow from this that no new

generation is given even if form does not come to be anew — for it is not form that comes to be and is generated at *7 Met. 26 and 27* and *lib. 8, tex. 8*, but the composite. Hence since through the permutation of those degrees the subject receives a diverse species, denomination, definition, and substantial being, the composite itself will rightly be said to be generated and essentially changed — and this transmutation differs from other accidents in that in those no permutation of any essential degree occurs, but only of some accident.

But against this: because the composite, according to Contareni himself in his disputation on the distinction of parts from the whole, is not a substance distinct from the united and component parts; since therefore neither matter nor form is generated, it follows that no substantial generation is given — because no terminus of it is given. You will say with him at *cap. 4*: the form in matter is generated, from *7 Met. 26*, inasmuch as it is introduced and essentially connected with matter, from which the composite is constituted. Against: from this it follows that only the union is newly obtained through generation; but union is an accident — since it is a relation, as even Ferchius himself concedes at *lib. 2, n. 26*. Therefore that generation will not be substantial but accidental, since it does not terminate to a new substance that receives being anew and comes to be simply — for form's coming to be in matter is not coming to be simply, but coming to be in this. Contareni responds at *cap. 4 cit.*: union — like every relation — can be considered in two ways: either formally, for that very relation of union abstracted; and so it is indeed a pure relation and accident. Or it is considered subjectively or fundamentally; and then it is false that union is always an accident or simple relation. For the essential union that is grounded in the essential relation and conjunction of parts is not an accident but something essential — which essential is not something superadded to the parts conjoined and actually composing the whole.

But the physical union between matter and form is not a substance formally and entitatively but an accident, as I proved extensively at *disp. 5 Phys., q. 9*. For it is not called substantial because taken formally and entitatively it imports substance or a substantial mode — but just as an action productive of a substantial terminus is entitatively an accident yet is called substantial from the produced terminus which is substance — so union is called substantial because it is between substances under substantial accounts, as the Doctor teaches at *3 d. 7, q. 1, D*. If therefore no substantial form comes to be anew in substantial generation, and no composite as a substance distinct from matter and form, but only their union, it follows that substantial generation is not given — and every generation is accidental. Finally, given this position — that only the composite is newly produced and in no way form — whatever is posited as preceding in matter should not be called an inchoation of forms; because according to this way of speaking form comes to be neither as a whole nor according to part, but it should rather be called an inchoation of composites. And thus Aureolus holds at *2 d. 18, qu. un., art. 1*, who denies that forms come to be anew in any way simply.

Fifth, the same foundation of avoiding creation was turned back from *Canon. 2 Phys., q. 1*: for either the degree and part of the actual form that they say precedes in matter is produced or not produced. Not the second — as is plain. If the first: then it is produced either from nothing of itself or from something; if from the second, an infinite regress will ensue; if from the first, they do not avoid creation — to avoid which these inchoations of forms were devised. Ferchius responds that this retortion of the Canon also presupposes in the specific degree of form — both inchoate and consummated — a part and a part, which hypothesis he himself with Contareni does not hold. But nor does it conclude against the Seminarists who hold it — because the production of form in the seminary is from nothing by God; and the authors do not avoid creation with respect to God first producing the essences of forms, nor do they intend to avoid it. They intend to avoid it with respect to the agent, so that in natural generation it does not make form from nothing but from something — not as a part, as the composite is made, but from a whole that is consubstantial, so that the secondary agent does not grant a multitude of formal entity but only perfection. Against: I repeat what I said above — if he himself does not hold that hypothesis of the partibility of form, why did he found his response on that partibility in assigning several degrees and parts of intension, not only in accidental but also in substantial form? He now says, now denies — all things are permitted to him. This retortion of the Canon is therefore founded on the retortion of the Doctor made in the preceding argument, and concludes well against Inchoators who admit the partibility of form — proving that creation is not avoided by them even with respect to the secondary agent. For one asks why the first part of form concreated with matter from nothing by God is said to be made from nothing; they will respond that it is because it was made from no part of itself that preceded. But from this very thing it is inferred that just as for this reason that first part of form concreated with matter by God is said to be made from nothing — because from no part of itself that preceded — so by the same reasoning the other part of form produced by the natural agent is made from nothing, because this posterior part is distinct from that prior one and that one is not a part of this one — though both are parts of the whole and complete form. Therefore creation's difficulty is still incurred even with respect to the natural agent; and hence I said that the retortion of the Canon is founded on the retortion of the Doctor.

Sixth and finally, we argued against the mode of speaking of those Seminarists who posited for the inchoation of forms in matter a certain not actual but merely possible being of those forms in matter as preceding. For either by this possible being of forms is meant subjective possible being — and this is not some being of form but of matter, as of the preceding subject from which form comes to be, and in this sense it coincides with the common opinion; or it means objective possible being of forms — but this cannot be called an inchoation of form in matter that precedes, because such possible being is from the active potency of the efficient

cause, inasmuch as it can be the terminus of that cause's action from *Scot. d. 12, q. 1*, and not in the passive potency of matter.

Ferchius responds that the possible being that is the seminal reason is neither subjective — because it is not the entity of the subject — nor objective — because it is not the entity of the efficient cause — but is formal possible being, since form is first in potency and afterward extracted by the efficient cause from potency to act. This possibility is grounded in the essence of form existing outside nothing, outside the mind, and outside causes — existing, he says, but under the mode of possibility and incompleteness — and this possibility is toward complete actuality. However, two relations follow in the same possibly existing essence of form: one toward the efficient cause, by which form can be extracted to perfect act — such as an external natural cause is, and the seminal reason itself as a partial internal efficient cause; the other toward matter, which it can inform actually according to perfect being. Hence according to these two relations it can be called both objective possible being in relation to the efficient cause, and subjective possible being in relation to the patient — though this second is said less properly, for it should rather be called informative possible being, since form can inform and not be subjected; while matter is subjective possible being, which can be subjected. From this it is plain that this last argument contains the fallacy of consequence from an insufficient enumeration — because beyond subjective and objective possible being there is formal possible being, which Zerbius declared at *7 Metaph., q. 9*, distinguishing the formally formable from the formally formed.

It was not necessary for Ferchius to solve this argument for the defense of Contareni and inchoations of forms, because as we said in *q. 6, disp. 2 Phys., n. 137*, the opinion against which that last argument is directed — attributed to Bacon at *2 d. 18, q. un., art. 2* and *quodl. 1, q. 6, art. 2* — does not properly posit inchoations of forms, because it posits nothing real and actual of form as preceding in matter, but only pure possible being, which in generation they say is afterward converted into actual being of the same form. But whatever may be said about this: it is certain that if we had given that response and introduced this formal possible being beyond subjective and objective possible being — without any express Aristotelian text, but from Zerbius's authority alone — Ferchius would have said to us a thousand times: nothing from Aristotle, nothing from Aristotle; no author besides Aristotle carries authority with me; to cite Scotus or other authors for me is to beg the question; show me the text and then I will believe you. All these things of his and similar sayings I now repeat against him. For when I treated of objective possible being — which he notes in the margin is ridiculed by Aquarius at *7 Met., dilucid. 11* — at *disp. 6 Metaph., q. 2*, I grounded it with both arguments and Aristotelian authorities, which can be seen there. So likewise here Ferchius — who professes to speak in Aristotle's language — should have done the same: showing this newly introduced formal possible being in Aristotle, so that we might believe him and not rely only on Zerbius's testimony. I had hoped for many and innumerable Aristotelian passages to be produced by this man in defense of the

Seminary of Contareni — but none have been heard so far; though many things have been heard that manifestly go against Aristotle — such as substance admitting of more and less by intensification and remission. But since he could not prove this formal possible being from Aristotle's testimony, he should have proved it at least by argument or some reasonable declaration — yet he has not done that either. For if we are to believe Bassolis at 2 d. 18, qu. un., §. *Contra tertium modum*, this formal possible being as explained implies a contradiction. To say that it is some positive entity outside the intellect and yet has no actuality proper to itself is contradictory — for act and potency sufficiently divide being, and they divide it such that every being outside the intellect is necessarily a being in act, and what is not a being in act is not a positive entity outside the intellect. Nothing positive is in act unless it has its own actuality. Therefore, etc. Moreover, either the essence of form in which such possibility is grounded exists or does not exist. If it does not exist, then it will be objective possible being. If it does exist, as he says, then it cannot bear a relation toward the efficient cause by which it is extracted to perfect act — because the efficient cause does not extract anything from potency to act except from either subjective or objective potency: in the first mode the agent leads matter to formal and specific act and grants multitude, namely formal entity; in the second mode it extracts to act a non-existing form and a composite and whatever objective possible, granting the act of existence. Moreover, this "existing but under the mode of possibility and incompleteness — a possibility of something existing toward complete actuality" — is proper to matter, as gathered from Aristotle whenever he speaks of matter. Therefore it is entirely unreasonably attributed to form. Furthermore, that form through the relation toward matter, which it can inform, can be called subjective possible being is entirely against reason — as he himself admits — because form can inform and not be subjected; and matter is subjective possible being because it can be subjected. Yet knowing this mode of speaking to be erroneous, he still uses it below at *lib. 2, cap. 5, n. 26*, where he says form has subjective potency in relation to matter, inasmuch as it can inform it. Let therefore this formal possible being introduced without reason and stabilized by no Aristotelian authority depart. Finally, the claim that the seminal reason acts together with the external agent for its own completion, as an internal partial cause, seems impossible — because nothing can produce itself, as was said in the *Physics*.

Special Arguments against the Same Position

We refuted inchoations of forms in general at *disp. 2 Phys., q. 3*, but at *disp. de Gen., q. 6*, we attacked Contareni's position itself with two especially special reasons — reasons by which we also said that position is rendered more unreasonable and less intelligible than the others. The first reason is that inchoations of forms are usually posited by the Seminarists as certain beginnings of the making of forms by the natural agent, lest they be said to come to be from nothing. Since therefore Contareni posits form as being produced in no way through generation — but only excited so that it surpasses the other degrees — he uselessly posits a seminary

of forms, because from such a position the end for which it was devised is not achieved. If he says that such a seminary as posited by him serves — not indeed so that forms may be drawn out of it and newly made as from a part or in another mode excluding creation — but so that all forms may be fostered in its bosom and lie there dormant, so to speak, as Contareni says, until through preceding dispositions they are called forth and excited by the natural agent: we replied there that from such a metaphorical way of speaking it should rather be called a bed of forms than a seminary — since forms are in no way newly produced, but in it now lie hidden, now appear, now are excited, now lie dormant. Ferchius at *lib. 1, cap. 8* traduces our argument in many ways. After framing it according to his own pleasure he says first: it is false that other Inchoators readily admit that substantial forms are newly produced; because from the four modes of positing inchoations of forms reported by him at n. XII from Scotus at 7 *Metaph., qu. 12*, it is plain that the seminal reason concreated with matter comes to be anew according to none of those modes. Second: it is false that Contareni posited the seminary of forms for no end — for although he does not concede forms to be newly produced from it, he concedes other ends, which he there enumerates as seven. Third: it is false that the other opinions posited the seminary for this end — that forms might newly come to be from it — because the third mode reported by Scotus asserts that forms are newly united, not newly made; and the fourth mode holds that form does not come to be anew as to thing, but as to mode of being. Finally, he says that we have mockingly taken the metaphors adduced by Contareni of sleep and excitation, and therefrom as a joke called the seminary posited by him a bed — which however could be asserted without joking, because the same hidden thing can be declared by different examples and metaphors; hence from various functions it can be called a seminary, a bosom, a hiding place, a storehouse, a treasury, and finally even a bed — in which forms sleep from eternity and are in time excited by the natural agent to a kind of wakefulness and natural operation.

This, however, is not a truthful but an imposturous traduction. As to the first: it is imputed to us that, though we said other Inchoators posited forms as newly produced, we also added that they always admitted something of form as preceding, from which form might be said newly to come to be and not from nothing; and we never said that the seminal reason concreated with matter comes to be anew according to any of the reported modes. For if it was concreated with matter itself, it cannot come to be anew from the natural agent — unless it now acts what it already is. But we said that another part of form or mode is newly produced by the natural agent — not the seminal reason itself preceding in matter. As to the second: it is also imputed to us that we said Contareni posited that seminary without any end whatsoever — whereas we said it was not for the end for which it was instituted by others. For others posited it so that forms might newly come to be from it without the danger of creation — and these two things differ greatly. We asserted the second, not the first, as he charges against us in the

argument he frames in our name at his pleasure. And it is false that the other modes reported by Scotus did not admit some production of form — either as to thing, as the first two, or as to mode of being, as the fourth. The third indeed does not posit form as produced anew in any way, but only its union or coupling with matter; but this is Contareni's mode, as Ferchius himself admits — and therefore it is not to be enumerated among other modes different from Contareni's. Finally, if he here admits and defends the metaphors of Contareni about sleep and excitation of forms, if he considers it philosophically stated that forms sleep throughout the whole eternity in the seminary and are afterward in time by the natural agent aroused — so to speak — to wakefulness and operation: he deals too harshly with us below at *lib. 3, pag. 298, cap. 7, n. 42*, where he reproaches us that in order to declare the materiality of forms — to distinguish them from the intellective soul — we say that they are forms which by their very nature are in their being, coming to be, and preservation submerged and bound to matter. For these words, he says — "submerged" and "bound" — are metaphors to be rejected from disputation. Let the fair reader judge whether Ferchius, who with such indulgence allows Contareni the metaphor of sleep and wakefulness in forms, can without scruple allow us another metaphor of immersion and binding to matter. Oh how passion blinds the mind and prevents it from seeing the truth.

The second reason why this position is more unreasonable than others was that all other Inchoators of forms posited this seminary as something corporeal and material — as Avicenna posited the form of corporeity; whereas Contareni posits this seminary as a certain spiritual essence concreated with matter and perpetually inhering in it — something unheard of from the beginning of time. He is therefore bound to explain why this seminary of forms should be something spiritual rather than corporeal. For whether it serves for forms to be drawn out of it, or for them to be fostered in its bosom, it seemed plain that for this function a corporeal essence would have greater proportion than a spiritual one — since the forms themselves are material and corporeal. He is also bound to explain how this spiritual essence inheres in and exists in matter — whether as an informing form, as the rational soul is said to be in the body, or rather as an assisting form; and whatever is said, it is a pure and mere fiction.

Ferchius responds at *lib. 1, cap. 9*: even certain forms existing in matter and a body are called spirits; for the word "spirit," according to St. Augustine at *lib. de cognitione verae vitae, tom. 9, n. 183*, has six significations, one of which is that the soul of brutes is called spirit — as at *Gen. 6*: "I will destroy all flesh in which the spirit of life is"; and at *Eccl. 3*: "who knows whether the spirit of man ascends upward and the spirit of beasts descends downward?" And at *13 de Civitate Dei, cap. 24*, Augustine recalls from Holy Scripture the spirit of man, the spirit of cattle, the corporeal spirit as wind. There is therefore no necessity in theology to understand by the name "spiritual substance" an intellectual substance — as God, Angel, rational soul. And in the philosophy of Aristotle the name "spirit" is never found used for a spiritual and incorporeal substance, but always signifies some subtle,

mobile, very quickly moving body — for which he adduces certain passages from Aristotle in which spirit and spiritual form, constituting spirit, is not to be understood as some angel or demon, but as a certain substance and form existing in a body, which however gives corporeal being. For since there are different grades of forms, the grade of corporeity is given by the form of corporeity; but the grade of fire, or of gold, or of blood, or of a plant are not given by the form of corporeity — for this reason the essence of the seminary is called spiritual, because as such it does not give corporeal being but is indifferent to corporeal being, to being of fire, to being of gold, and the rest. He also said that the seminary's essence is spiritual in order to avoid difficulties that follow the opinion of Avicenna — set out by him at *cap. 9, p. 336* — where he also explains why this seminary should be spiritual rather than corporeal. He adds at n. 65 that in our argument we confuse similarity with proportion: the corporeal and the corporeal have greater similarity, not greater proportion. The extremes of similarity agree in the same quality and are the same; the extremes of proportion are frequently very dissimilar and diverse — for proportion holds between cause and caused, potency and object, matter and form, mover and mobile, terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, God and creature. And Scotus at *1 d. 3, qu. 3, C* says that proportion requires dissimilarity of the proportioned things — as is commonly said in every proportion — as is plain from matter and form, part and whole, cause and caused, and other proportionals. Consider the rational soul and the human body: these have per se proportion for constituting a man, and yet the soul is spiritual and informs a body, is unextended in an extended subject, incorruptible and immortal in mortal and corruptible flesh. Proportion therefore holds between forms and the matter from which they are drawn — not similarity. Finally, in order to respond to the last part of the argument, he says that Contareni also sufficiently explained whether this spiritual essence is with respect to matter an informing or an assisting form — for according to him that spiritual essence informs matter immediately through one degree, while the other degrees lying hidden in it inhere in matter through the mediating essence.

But against this: I prove that we were not without foundation in understanding by a spiritual essence in Contareni a substance incorporeal and immaterial. For the rule is among philosophers and theologians — accepted by Ferchius at *vestig. 1, cap. 17, n. 49* — that when some word is used absolutely, it stands for its famous and proper meaning. But so it is that the name "spirit," though it has various meanings, has as its first and principal meaning that it signifies something incorporeal, immaterial, and unextended. Therefore since Contareni uses the expression "spiritual essence" absolutely in the cited question — and without any declaration, as can be seen there — it was rightly taken by us in its principal meaning: namely for an immaterial and incorporeal form. The major is plain; the minor is proved from that same place of St. Augustine's *lib. de cognitione verae vitae*, which the respondent cites. For there the name "spirit" has six meanings: first the supreme Spirit of all is called God — as in *John 4*: "God is spirit"; second, angels

are called spirits — as in *Psalm 104*: "he makes his angels spirits"; third, the rational soul — as in *Psalm 146*: "his spirit goes forth, and he returns to his earth"; fourth, the life of brutes — as in *Eccl. 3*: "who knows whether the spirit of beasts," etc.; fifth, winds — as in *Psalm 148*: "the spirit of storms"; sixth, air. It is now plain therefore that in the three first modes — which are the more principal ones — "spirit" signifies an immaterial and incorporeal substance. Therefore the word "spirit" or "spiritual," used absolutely, should stand for something incorporeal and immaterial; and there is necessity in theology to understand by a substance named spiritual an intellectual substance — an angel or rational soul — because these are the principal meanings of that name. Since therefore Contareni calls the form of the seminary "spiritual essence" absolutely and without any limitation or declaration, it is to be understood in its principal meaning, by the rule just given, as an incorporeal and immaterial form. In confirmation: Contareni called the form of the seminary "spiritual" precisely in order to exclude the form of corporeity introduced by Avicenna as the seminary. Therefore "spiritual" is taken by Contareni as excluding the corporeal and extended — or at least it should be so taken, if not from his intention, at least from his mode of speaking. Moreover, although Aristotle regularly uses the name "spirit" to signify some subtle, mobile, very quickly moving body, the word "spiritual" derived from it is never applied by him to things mixed with matter — as St. Bonaventure noted at *2 d. 3, art. 1, q. 2*, in the body of the question immediately before the solution of the objections, where he says that the Philosopher says that there is no one matter of spiritual and corporeal things; and he added in the margin that Aristotle never used this name "spiritual" where matter is found. Therefore Contareni did not call a material form of the seminary "spiritual" according to Aristotle's idiom. Furthermore, although the form of the seminary posited by Contareni not only gives corporeal being — as Avicenna's form of corporeity did — but also gives the being of fire, of iron, of a plant, etc., and is indifferent to all these — it does not seem apparent why for this reason it can be called a spiritual essence or form even in Aristotle's parlance, who by spirit understands some subtle, mobile, very quickly moving body.

What he adds concerning the difference between similarity and proportion — which he says we ignored — was declared by us before he declared it to us: at *disp. 7 Phys., q. 6, art. 5*, from n. 132, explaining what proportion between cause and effect ought to be; and at *disp. 6 de Anim., q. 7, art. 1, n. 207*, explaining that between potency and object similarity in being is not necessary but proportion of mover to mobile suffices — for which we cited the Doctor there at *4 d. 45, qu. 2, A*. And before Ferchius cited us at *1 d. 3, q. 3, C* to know that difference, we had seen it not only in that passage but also at *q. 1 prol. X.*, and *2 d. 3, q. 9*, and *d. 12, qu. 1, I. and 3*, and *3 d. 1, qu. 1, ad 2 prin.*, and *4 d. 1, q. 1, §. Ratio secunda*, and *4 d. 49, q. 11*, and *quol. 12 and 14*, and elsewhere frequently — since nothing is more frequently encountered in Scotus than this distinction between similarity and proportion. But what he charges us with here I fear may rebound upon him: that he has not

well grasped the distinction between them. For although it is true that proportion requires dissimilarity between its extremes in certain conditions, it does not require it in all conditions. Indeed if they had no agreement whatsoever, they could not ground any proportion between themselves — hence it is said that between being and non-being no proportion falls. For the same reason the Doctor says at 4 d. 1, qu. 1 that a point is disproportionable to a line, because they do not agree in quantity. Nor does the proportion of cause to caused, of mover to mobile, exclude similarity in being — because a univocal cause and a univocal effect agree in being and in mode of being, since they are of the same species; and the same thing can move itself, yet is not dissimilar to itself in being. Therefore when the Doctor at 1 d. 3, q. 3, C says that proportion requires dissimilarity of the proportioned things, this is not to be understood absolutely — as Ferchius seems to want — but only that they should be dissimilar in those conditions in which they are compared to each other in the account of cause and effect, mover and mobile, because between those accounts there is necessarily dissimilarity, as Lichetus and Bargius excellently explain there. Hence proportion is perfectly maintained even if they agree in other respects. Therefore even though corporeal and material forms agree with matter in materiality, they are still proportioned in the account of act and potency. Hence it is not absolutely true — as the doctrine that Ferchius delivers about the distinction between proportion and similarity, if he wants proportion to necessarily exclude similarity in being — the doctrine he delivers is not absolutely true. Indeed, St. Bonaventure at 2 d. 19, art. 1, qu. 1, by the sixth argument, proves that the soul is immortal from the proportion between potency and object in this sense: because the truth of its object is incorruptible — therefore so too is the soul. Furthermore, it is still false that between forms drawn out and the matter from which they are drawn there is proportion without similarity. For although there need not be similarity in specific being, there must be similarity insofar as both are corporeal and extended. For if form is spiritual and impartible, it can indeed be proportioned to matter in the account of act and potency receptive and receptible; but not in the account of form or drawn-out effect, and in the account of cause from which it is drawn. For as the Doctor notes at 4 d. 1, qu. 5, §. *contra istam opinionem*, and St. Bonaventure at 2 d. 18, art. 2, qu. 2, before the resolution of the question: no spiritual form has such proportion with matter that it can be drawn from it — though it has proportion so that it can be introduced and received into it. For this reason Aristotle said at 2 de Gen. anim., cap. 3 that the intellective soul comes from outside. Therefore the seminary of forms, from which material forms must be drawn out, though in other specific aspects it can and must be dissimilar from them, must however agree with them in materiality and corporeity — because a corporeal form cannot be drawn out from a spiritual seminary, nor a spiritual form from a corporeal one. So that the seminary may be a fit storehouse from which forms are drawn out, it must be corporeal like the drawable forms themselves, not incorporeal and spiritual. And therefore there will not be the due proportion for eduction — as Ferchius says — if the seminary "from which" is spiritual and the drawn-out form is corporeal.

Furthermore, not only from the need for the materiality of form must that seminary from which it is drawn out be corporeal and material, but also from the need of the material agent drawing it out — as Bassolis rightly noted at *2 d. 18, qu. un., §. contra tertium modum*. For if such a seminary were posited as something spiritual, a corporeal agent would be unable to reach it through its action, and so such a seminary would contribute nothing to the generation of forms and would be posited uselessly.

Finally, since Ferchius says that Contareni at *qu. de origine formarum, cap. 9* sufficiently explains why this seminary of forms should be posited as something spiritual rather than corporeal, and whether this spiritual seminary essence is an informing or an assisting form: I confess that upon repeated diligent reading of that chapter I could not detect this explanation. Indeed from that chapter I gather the opposite of what Ferchius says. For when we ask how this spiritual essence inheres and exists in matter — whether as an informing form or rather as an assisting one — he responds there at n. 66 that according to Contareni, through one degree it immediately informs matter, while the other degrees lying hidden in it inhere in matter through the mediating essence. Yet in chapter nine Contareni openly denies that that spiritual essence informs matter — neither as to the grade of corporeity, as Avicenna said, nor as to any other act — because the peripatetic laws do not permit any informing form to be inseparable from matter, as he says he proved in his question on the simplicity of the heavens. Also, if there were some form perpetually inhering in matter by information, then no resolution of any composite would take place down to prime matter, but only down to such a composite — which is against Aristotle at *1 Physic. 82*, where matter is defined as the primary subject from which, as something already present, things come to be, and into which they are ultimately resolved. Also, by asserting this, the argument of Aristotle by which from the middle of change he discovered prime matter would be rendered nugatory and vain: for if in no change resolution down to prime matter took place but only down to such a composite, the reasoning to prime matter could never at any time have been known from these forms. By these and similar reasons Contareni in that chapter disproves the form of corporeity posited by Avicenna as the seminary of forms — none of which indicate any reason why the seminary form should rather be posited as spiritual than as corporeal; nor do they indicate that Contareni wants his own seminary spiritual form — through one degree — to immediately inform matter, as Ferchius attributes to him. Rather the opposite: for if he admitted such a form perpetually informing matter in this way, the same inconveniences would follow against his own spiritual form as he infers against the form of corporeity of Avicenna. Below at *cap. 11, pag. 143*, near the end, he does not want either that spiritual essence or the degrees lying hidden in it to be per se subsisting forms — because that, he says, belongs only to spiritual substances not informing matter. Therefore in truth Contareni did not explain why this seminary of forms should be posited as spiritual rather than corporeal, nor whether this spiritual essence is

an informing or an assisting form — because in chapter nine he seems to deny it is informing, and in chapter eleven he seems to deny it is subsisting.

A third argument still for impugning Contareni's position is deduced from the absurdities that follow from it. For if that spiritual essence posited as the seminary of forms concreated with matter informs matter perpetually through one degree — as Ferchius attributes to Contareni — then besides the fact that it cannot be explained what composite that is and what being matter receives from the seminary form according to that degree, there still follow those inconveniences that Contareni was inferring against Avicenna's form of corporeity: namely that there would be some form inseparable from matter, and resolution down to matter would never take place. Nor does it avail to say that this absurdity does not follow because of a generic, indeterminate, and confused degree — because Avicenna could respond in the same way about his form of corporeity. It would also follow that all forms of fire, water, iron, stone, etc. are of the same essence — because all of them would agree in that seminary form and would all be identified in it, and so would differ only as to degrees within the same essence and species, and therefore would differ only accidentally — because more and less within the same species produces only accidental difference. Nor does it avail what Contareni says — that they would still differ according to essential degrees — because since all those determinate degrees are of the same essence, as he concedes at *cap. 9, in fine*, and at *cap. 10, pag. 140*, from the beginning — where he wants there to be not so many diverse essences as various degrees of the same essence — such diversity plainly cannot be other than accidental and within the same essential species. In confirmation: at *cap. 11, pag. 142* he concedes that the forms of a dog and a horse, as they lie hidden in that spiritual seminary essence, not only are not essentially distinguished from it, but do not even have essences actually distinct among themselves. But if you say that those degrees are then actually and essentially distinguished from one another when they receive determination and completion from the generator — as he himself seems to suggest there — this is immediately rejected by what he teaches in the same chapter at *pag. 143*, around the middle, where he says that form or the degree of a horse does not receive determination and completion through any essential addition to itself, but only through the addition of the relation and conjunction with matter. If therefore in generation no essential difference is added, just as before generation those degrees were not essentially distinct from one another, so neither are they after generation — but only accidentally, by reason of diverse dispositions. Moreover, if the difference between those degrees were truly essential, then that spiritual essence would not consist in an indivisible — which Aristotle opposes at 8 *Metaph.*, *cap. 10*: "essences are like numbers." Nor does Contareni's solution avail — that Aristotle speaks there of determined and specific degrees; for the doctrine he there delivers, and the reason by which he proves it, holds generally of all essences — whether specific or generic — as one attentive

to it will see. For he speaks not only of disparate essences but also of subordinated ones.

The fourth and final reason is that, as we said from the beginning of this question on the origin of forms, the same difficulty runs equally for the origin of substantial and accidental forms. For if I do not admit a seminary, it follows that substantial form is created by the natural agent — because it would come to be from nothing of itself, since the subject is nothing of itself. The same likewise follows for accidental form; and therefore either a seminary and inchoation must also be posited for accidental forms — just as it is posited for substantial ones — or, by whatever reason it is not necessary with respect to accidentals to avoid creation, it will likewise not be necessary with respect to substantials. And indeed this argument proceeds directly in general against all inchoatists; but it can be deduced specially against Contareni. For since he wants everything to come to be from something constitutively — as we shall see presently in examining his foundation — and did not see such a principle from which a substantial form, being simple, could be constituted, he believed them to have been concreated with matter from eternity. Therefore the same must likewise be said of accidental form, since it too is a simple form. Or by whatever reason the new production of an accidental form is admitted without the danger of creation — or by the help of some principle from which it is constitutively made — the same must also be asserted of substantial form.

Nor should Contareni say at *cap. 11, in fine* that accidents are of such vile and slender entity that their origin is not to be investigated as strictly as the origin of substantial forms. For accidents are more evidently made anew and perish before our eyes, and therefore it is principally of accidents that it must be asked how they come to be anew without the danger of creation and without some principle or subject from which they are constitutively made as an intrinsic part of themselves. Contareni responds there that no accidents come to be from nothing, because they are produced by emanation from substances — just as substances themselves have the first origin of their substantial essence from the first being, namely God, so they can in turn produce accidents by emanation, as beings of a lesser order. Against: when fire produces heat in my hand, it either creates and produces it from nothing — which Contareni also concedes is not the case — or produces it from something, namely from the subject, and not as a constitutive principle as such — since it is a simple form. In the same way, the same can and must be said of substantial form. Nor will his proposition be true — which he assumes as the unique foundation of his position — that for production from something a subject is required as a constitutive part of the thing produced. If he says that creation of accidents is avoided precisely because they are newly made by natural agents: apart from the fact that this does not suffice — because a material cause is required to concur simultaneously with the natural agent — yet even granting this, the same can likewise be said of substantial forms, except for the rational soul: that they can be immediately produced anew by the natural

agent without any creation, because in this regard the same reasoning holds for the production of a substantial and an accidental form, as I have often said.

The foundation of Contareni, which he lays for his position at the cited *qu.*, *cap.* 10, we reported thus: nothing can come to be produced by a natural agent without some constitutive subject of that thing concurring as an intrinsic part of it. For in this sense Aristotle always taught that whatever comes to be from something comes to be and not from nothing — as is plain at *1 de Gen.* 17, *7 Met.* 22, *1 Phys.* 33, 34, and 75. Since therefore forms do not have that from which they can be subjectively constituted, it must be concluded that they are ingenerable and incorruptible — otherwise they would be said to come to be from nothing. Nor is this avoided by saying it suffices that a subject precede in which the form to be produced is received — not at all, for Aristotle at *1 Phys.* 82, proving the necessity of matter in the production of whatever things, lest they be said to come to be from nothing, says: "for if something comes to be, something must underlie it from which it comes to be." By these words the necessity of some subject seems to be signified from which the thing comes to be constitutively — for if Aristotle had wanted to determine that that subject should concur merely as receptive, he would surely not have said that a subject is required "from which it comes to be," but rather "in which it comes to be."

We respond to this argument at *disp.* 5 *cit. de Gen.*, *qu.* 10, *n.* 143 that that major is false and has never been sufficiently proved: namely that it is necessary, lest a thing be said to be created or to come to be from nothing, for it to come to be from something as from a part. Ferchius at *lib.* 1, *cap.* 4 says that here we pass with sophistical caution from the side of the arguer to the side of the respondent. I do not see what reason he has for saying this — for immediately before the cited *n.* 143, we adduce Contareni's foundation, and immediately under that *n.* 143 we respond to it. We do not take up the task of impugning inchoations of forms but presuppose them to have been sufficiently impugned by Scotus at *2 dist.* 18 and other Scotists, as can be seen there. Hence this is a pure imposture. But at *cap.* 2, *n.* 15 he says the argument of Contareni is not faithfully reported by us. First, in the major: Contareni proposes from the side of the subject only substance: no substance can be produced essentially by a natural agent — while you extended it to every entity, saying: nothing can come to be from a natural agent; you also omit the particle "essentially," which is necessary, since the essence of forms is posited as having been from eternity, and what is denied is not their coming to be according to total existence or according to the mode of act, whether perfect or determined. Second, in the predicate of the major: Contareni says "without some constitutive subject of it concurring," while you add the adulterous particle "as an intrinsic part of it" — subject and part differ, as above at *n.* 2. You entirely violate Contareni's conclusion: Contareni concludes that for this reason substantial forms cannot be essentially produced by a natural agent; you conclude that forms are ingenerable and incorruptible. Perhaps in order to covertly suggest that Contareni's argument is not in proper form, since its conclusion contains a

predicate placed in neither of the premises. He adds at n. 16 that Contareni's anticipated response is not faithfully reported by us either: you write that Aristotle at *1 Phys.* 82, proving the necessity of matter in whatever production, — Contareni says that the text at *1 Phys.* 82 proves, the Philosopher there proving the eternity of matter from the fact that if it had ever been produced, that would have been done from another matter; Contareni proving eternity says — while you write necessity for eternity. Necessity and eternity differ. In truth, Aristotle at *1 Phys.* 82 proves the necessity of matter in whatever generation and corruption — so that beyond the two contraries a subject may be posited to which they can be subject, and from which subject together with form the composite can be constituted. But you transferred what was done at *tex.* 52 to 82 — ascribing to Contareni a false citation when he cites correctly. So Ferchius there, with his customary arrogance.

But I evidently show that Contareni's foundation is faithfully reported, just as the anticipated response. For there the discussion was about the origin not of just any form but of substantial forms; therefore, speaking in the subject matter where we were — about inchoations of substantial forms — our proposition "nothing can come to be from a natural agent, etc." is entirely equivalent to Contareni's proposition. For there the discourse was only about essential production and about the production of a substance — for when water becomes warm, this is not called an essential production, nor is a substance said to be produced. Nor did we add an adulterous particle to that major when we said "as an intrinsic part of it" — indeed this was necessary to explain what it is to be a constitutive subject of something, as distinguished from being another thing or a form that it receives in itself, but which it does not constitute intrinsically. Nor is the opposite deduced from what Ferchius has above at n. 2 — for there he speaks thus: to exclude production from nothing, Contareni requires that a thing come to be from a subject constitutively; Ferchius requires that a thing come to be from a part, whether that part be a subject — as matter — or a form. Therefore the account of a part also belongs to a constitutive subject according to him; and although being a part is more extensive than being a constitutive subject — since form is a part, yet not a constitutive subject — still the account of a part belongs to the constitutive subject, and matter is the constitutive subjective part of the natural composite. Hence it was not spuriously added, but necessary for Contareni's meaning. It is also false that the conclusion deduced by us differs from Contareni's conclusion and that the argument as framed by us is not in proper form — having in the conclusion a predicate placed in neither premise. For the major is: nothing can come to be from a natural agent without some constitutive subject of it concurring — which is equivalent to: nothing is generable by a natural agent without some constitutive subject, etc. The minor is: but forms do not have that from which they can be subjectively constituted. The conclusion follows: therefore they are ingenerable by a natural agent and consequently also incorruptible. Although therefore Contareni's argument is somewhat altered in

words — so as to be more briefly reduced — the meaning is entirely the same, and no necessary word is lacking.

As for the imposture of the unfaithful reporting of the same author's anticipated response: I want no other defender against it than Ferchius himself, who at *vestig. 1, cap. 17, n. 49 and 50*, reporting the arguments of Pererius and Piccolomini, has as the first this: Aristotle and the peripatetics think it evidently demonstrated that the eternity of prime matter is proved at *1 Phys. 82*, because if it had ever been produced, it would have had to be produced from some subject — so that before matter there would be another matter, and thus things would proceed in infinite. Ferchius responds there that Aristotle proves matter to be ingenerable and incorruptible in the way composites are generated and corrupted — not that it is eternal. And at n. 50 he has these words: "I am surprised that men otherwise learned assert the eternity of matter at that *tex. 82, 1 Phys.* — since in the text matter is not said to be eternal." If therefore it is true — as Contareni says, according to Ferchius — that the eternity of matter is proved by that *tex. 82*: now Ferchius himself is caught lying, and thoughtlessly marvels at Pererius and Piccolomini for saying this. But we faithfully report Contareni's anticipated response — and hence in his *Defensio* Ferchius attacks Contareni, he does not defend him. These are the formal words of Contareni at *cap. 10*: "Nor let anyone say that from thence only the necessity of some subject can be gathered in which the thing to be produced is received, but not the necessity of some principle from which the thing itself is constitutively made. For this escape is closed by the text at *tex. 82* of the same *1 Phys.*, where the Philosopher proving the eternity of matter from the fact that if it had ever been produced, that would have been done from another matter — uses these words: 'for if something comes to be, something must first underlie from which, as present, it comes to be.' By these words the necessity of some subject from which a thing comes to be constitutively seems expressly to be signified — for if Aristotle had wanted to determine that that subject should concur only as receptive, he would surely not have said that a subject is required 'from which it comes to be' but rather 'in which it comes to be.'" So Contareni there. From these words it is plain that his entire intent in this anticipation was to show from that *tex. 82* that in the making of any thing whatsoever a matter must intervene — not only as a subject "in which" form and change occur, but also as that "from which" the thing made is intrinsically constituted. Hence he is not concerned there with the eternity of matter but with the necessity of some subject from which a thing is made constitutively — and he intends to deduce such necessity from Aristotle's *tex. 82 cit.*, while proving the necessity of matter as a constitutive principle of the thing made. Therefore although we placed necessity in Contareni — who in this concern is not preoccupied with the eternity of matter but with the necessity by way of an intrinsic constitutive principle — it is plain from his words that we do so faithfully.

Contareni himself however shows, while wanting such necessity even as a constitutive principle to be proved at *tex. 52*, not at *tex. 82*, that Contareni openly

says such necessity is proved at *tex.* 82 in those words: "for if something comes to be, something must first underlie from which it comes to be" — and most truthfully does Contareni assert this, just as most falsely does Ferchius deny it. For *tex.* 52 indeed proves the necessity of matter as a principle in which form or privation is received, and thus as the common subject of contraries; but not as a principle from which, together with form, the composite is constituted — as Ferchius erroneously supposes. For of matter in the account of such a principle there is not a word at *tex.* 52 — but only as the subject of contraries, in which account it is a principle in coming to be, not in completed being; a principle of change, not of the composite. But the necessity of matter as a principle from which a thing comes to be and is constituted is shown only at *tex.* 82 — as Contareni excellently shows, since he plainly finds not enough fidelity of advocacy in his cause through Ferchius, as instead of defending he attacks him — denying that at *tex.* 82 Aristotle shows the necessity of matter in the account of a constitutive principle, which is what Contareni asserts.

But let us return to Contareni's argument and let it be proposed in the very same way it is proposed by him, so that Ferchius may have no complaint: no substance can be essentially produced by a natural agent without some constitutive subject concurring; but the forms of natural things, which are substances, do not have that from which they can be subjectively constituted; therefore they cannot be essentially produced by a natural agent. And for the proof of the major, the Aristotelian testimonies already adduced in our report of the argument are to be repeated. I still respond in the same manner as above — so that it may be plain that the argument does not have greater force under Contareni's own words than under ours — by denying the major if taken absolutely, since it is only verified in the making of composites and not of every substance. As for Aristotle's passages and especially from *tex.* 82, 1 *Phys.*, by which Contareni intends to prove that whatever comes to be comes to be from something as the constitutive subject of the thing made: I respond from Ferchius himself as his advocate, at *vestig.* 1, *cap.* 17, *nn.* 49 and 50, that when Aristotle says in that text: "for if something comes to be, something must first underlie from which, as present, it comes to be" — this Aristotelian proposition is precisely about that very coming-to-be that belongs to composites, which come to be from a first underlying subject; and therefore the conclusion of Aristotle also is precisely about the very coming-to-be of composites — so that nothing more may be gathered in the conclusion than what was sown in the premises. He does not speak of coming-to-be in common, taken simply and absolutely — in which sense it can also belong to form. Thus the special coming-to-be that is from a pre-existing part is attributed to the composite and equally removed from form and from matter; the common coming-to-be — whether from a pre-existing part in the manner of a subject or not from a part — without doubt belongs to form.

Second, Ferchius argues at *lib.* 1, *cap.* 2 in favor of Contareni by proving that substantial forms are neither truly produced nor truly corrupted — but only per

accidens — and he contends to prove this from Scotus and Aristotle, in order to show that we, holding the opposite, are neither Scotists nor Aristotelians. Not Scotists, because Scotus at 2 *d.* 17, *q.* 1, *A, B, C* posits the whole as produced per se, forms as produced per accidens — not by the form's own production but by the production of the whole. The whole is produced per se and form is produced per accidens by the production of the whole, the whole being produced first in order of nature and form afterward toward the production of the whole, so that the coming-to-be of the whole is the way and reason for the being of form. And by this, according to Scotus, Aristotle avoids the creation of the soul — because just as the form of heaven is not created — according to the Philosophers — in that the form of heaven was not first the terminus of creation before the heaven, so neither in the production of the rational soul does God's action terminate in the first instant of nature to the being of the soul. Rather God's action in the first instant of nature terminates to the being of the whole man, and in the second instant terminates per accidens to the being of the human soul. Theologians however hold the opposite: that God's action in the first instant of nature terminates to the rational soul, and in the second to the union of soul with body and to the production of the whole. For this reason Theologians posit that the intellective soul is created; Aristotle denies it. Scotus agrees with this fully at 4 *d.* 45, *q.* 2, *M*, teaching that according to Aristotle the rational soul is not created — since it is not produced by a prior and proper production before the whole man is produced, but is produced by the same production of the whole man. The same Scotus teaches at 1 *d.* 3, *qu.* 6, *X, Y* — both in substantial and in accidental generation — namely that the whole is generated and corrupted per se, form per accidens; and hence form is not said to be produced, nor is it the terminus of production; only the composite is produced. Note the word "only" — the composite is produced and it is generated and corrupted; but those Scotists who contradict Scotus in this are not Scotists — such are the assailants, who say that substantial forms are truly produced and truly corrupted.

In response: if Ferchius had read our disputations attentively — not with eyes wandering, as the saying goes — he would have seen all these things, each and every passage, already cited long since by us at *disp.* 2 *Phys.*, *q.* 7, *art.* 2, *nn.* 145 and 146 and *disp.* 5 *de Gen.*, *n.* 15 and *n.* 143. He would have seen that those passages are falsely and wrongly understood by him; he would have seen how Aristotle — according to Scotus — does not avoid creation in the way he says, nor do Theologians posit the soul as created for the reason he gives. He would finally have seen that every substantial form — not only truly and properly — but also per se is produced, with a production proper to it and distinct from the production of the composite. And a sound understanding would have been given to the passages of Aristotle and Scotus when they say that only the composite is produced per se and form per accidens — all of which we declare there at length, not from our own head, but from the observation of Lichetus at 2 *d.* 17, *q.* 1 and Trombetta at 12 *Met.*, *q.* 5, who as most faithful Scotists understood Scotus better

than Ferchius did. See all of this there at length, lest what has been said already be repeated. Only one passage he cites that we did not allege — at *1 d. 3, q. 6, X, Y* — where he says Scotus teaches both in substantial and in accidental generation that the whole is generated and corrupted per se, form per accidens. But it is false that the Doctor says this there. For who would say that a per accidens whole is generated per se, given that it is not a per se unity? Indeed the Doctor expressly teaches the opposite there: that a being in a certain respect and per accidens cannot be the per se terminus of generation. He only says there that since form — which is the terminus of change — does not have being properly but only that by which the composite has being, so it is not said to be produced nor to be the terminus of production, but only the composite is — whether that composite is a per se being or a per accidens being. Note that he does not say a per accidens being is generated per se — as Ferchius charges him. Note also that he does not say form has no being simply and absolutely taken — as excluding non-being — for in that sense both form and matter have their own proper entity distinct from the entity of the composite. Rather he says form does not have being properly — since it is that by which the composite has being — that is, it does not have being that is proper, solitary, as Sampsonius explains at *5 Phys., qu. 1*, and even Scotus himself at *quol. 9* from the beginning — where he concludes that form does not have being per se in this sense: being per se, i.e., solitary and per se subsisting in this sense. Hence he concludes that just as it does not have being properly and per se — in the sense of solitary and per se subsisting — so neither is it produced per se, in the sense that per se production is the acquisition of such per se being. But just as it has non-being simply — as it recedes from non-being — so it also has its own per se production, which is the acquisition of such being, as Trombetta says at the cited place. And in this sense St. Bonaventure at *2 dist. 7, par. 2, artic. 1, qu. 1, ad argumenta* seems also to explain it. Indeed in this sense form is produced before the composite — as Lichetus cit. notes — because since form is the cause of the composite, it is certainly necessary that it first have being in the nature of things before the composite itself. Hence it entirely implies a contradiction when Ferchius says as if from the mind of Scotus that the whole is produced first in order of nature and form afterward toward the production of the whole, so that the coming-to-be of the whole is the way and reason for the being of form — for rather things are the other way: that the production of form is the way toward the production of the whole, since first in order of nature form is understood to be drawn from matter or to be received and introduced into it, before the composite is understood to be produced — since the whole is not produced and does not coalesce except from united parts. And when the whole is said to be the first terminus of generation, all explain that it is first in the primacy of intention of totality and adequation — as I said at *disp. 5 de Gen., n. 15* — not in primacy of execution.

Furthermore, even granting what Ferchius contends — that form is in no way produced per se and with a proper production, but only toward the production

of the whole — it still does not follow that it cannot be said to be truly produced. For this it suffices that it be produced toward the production of something else; since truly and really being produced is more extensive than being produced per se and with a proper production. For just as forms — both substantial and accidental — truly and really exist in the nature of things, so they must be termini of some production — whether proper or of another thing to which they follow. Otherwise they would be unproduced entities. But Ferchius objects at n. 12: what is per accidens is not truly, from *6 Met., summ., cap. 1*. But forms universally are produced per accidens and corrupted per accidens, as Scotus teaches in the school of Aristotle. Therefore they are not truly produced. This argument does not seem to be in proper form — for the terms change in the major and minor, and there is a transition from being to being-produced. Yet it is easily answered from the declaration already given: in what sense form is said to be produced per accidens — in which sense also it can be explained that Aristotle, when he says that what is per accidens is not truly, did not mean to deny that forms — both substantial and accidental — truly and really exist in the nature of things — or that they are nothing or pure beings of reason. Who would say something so mad? And yet this is what would follow from Ferchius's understanding. Rather, forms are said to be per accidens because they are not per se in the third mode of per se being — as per se subsisting entities — but are in another and with another. But furthermore, that proposition in those terms I do not find in Aristotle at the cited place, or elsewhere; yet if it is found there or elsewhere, it must be understood according to the sense of another proposition he has at *1 Phys. 27 and 30*, where he says that what is truly does not happen to anything — which according to the common expositors is commonly interpreted as meaning: what truly and per se subsists — as substance — is not an accident of another. And if by truly being he means being per se and subsisting, then truly being belongs only to composites and supposits.

Finally, from this doctrine of Scotus and the Scotists, certain quibbles turned against us by Ferchius at *lib. 1, cap. 6* are resolved. For since we said at *disp. 5 de Gen., q. 6* that properly speaking it belongs to composites to come to be, from *1 Phys. 64* and *7 Met. 26 and 27* and *8 Met. 8* — because it comes to be from something else as from a part, and is what comes to be and not that by which another comes to be, of which it is a part — while form does not come to be but rather comes-to-be-in, i.e., comes to be in another: Ferchius at the cited place says first that we drew those texts from his source at *vestig. 1, nn. 49 and 50*. Second, that we violated the first and last citation — because Aristotle does not teach in those texts that form comes to be in matter or comes-to-be-in; nor that we consider Aristotle's text. He finally deduces from this that form does not come to be simply but in another, does not come to be as to being but only as to being-in — and so is essentially ingenerable, as Contareni said; the opposite of which is what we thought we were proving from this — but could not prove except by arguing from "in a certain respect" to "simply" in this way: form comes to be in another and with

another, therefore form comes to be. These are words of spite, not of truth. We already cited this text at *disp. 2 Phys., q. 7, art. 2* before his *Vestigationes* were printed. And indeed it is remarkable the genius of this man: if we find some Scotistic proposition in him and say that we took it from Scotus, he denies it — but says that he drew from the same source from which Scotus drew, at *lib. 3, pag. 332*. And when we cite texts that are the most well-worn and common, read everywhere by all, he claims they were drawn from him. All things are permitted to him; nothing to us. We violated neither the first nor the last text — for we did not say that in those texts it is specifically taught that form comes to be in matter or comes-to-be-in, but after citing all those texts together to prove that only the composite properly comes to be, we say: form does not properly come to be, but rather comes-to-be-in, as Aristotle shows in the same place. These are our words at the cited *disp. de Gen.* Hence the word "same place" should refer to *tex. 26 and 27 of Met.* — where this is found — not to the others, where it is not found. But Ferchius wanted to refer the word "same place" to texts where it is not found, in order to have an occasion for calumny. What he says about not rightly considering Aristotle's text rebounds on him — who at *1 Phys. 82*, defending Contareni, affirms that the eternity of matter is there asserted and proved, yet at *vestig. 1*, refuting Pererius and Piccolomini, denies it — as is plain from what was said above at n. 138. How accurately he himself considers Aristotle's texts is plain from what was said above at nn. 81 and 82.

That from Aristotle's saying that form does not come to be properly but the composite, while form rather comes-to-be-in, it is not well deduced that form in no way simply and absolutely comes to be — this is the express doctrine not only of Scotus and Scotists at the cited places, but also of St. Bonaventure at *2 d. 7, par. 2, art. 2, q. 1, de rationibus seminalibus*. For when he had argued for the opposite side that form is not produced by the natural agent — because it belongs to the composite alone to come to be, from the cited Aristotle — he responds that just as the Philosopher says, properly speaking form is not generated but the composite is; for when form is produced it is not produced in itself nor per se but as-in-matter, and so it makes the composite, and to it generation terminates. Nevertheless natural generation or production has the composite as its primary terminus for the sake of form; and therefore the same St. Bonaventure at *2 d. 1, art. 1, q. 1*, not far from the beginning, says that if forms were not produced, nothing whatsoever would be produced. Therefore it is not well deduced — from form coming to be in matter, not per se and in itself as the composite does — that it in no way comes to be, but is ingenerable, as Contareni and Ferchius were deducing. Moreover, even Ferchius himself does not admit such an argument at *vestig. 1, cap. 17, n. 50*, where indeed he says that from this argument is inferred the ridiculous conclusion that form is eternal. Hence he responds there that properly coming-to-be and being-corrupted belongs to composites, and that in this way matter and form do not exist — but form comes to be in another way, namely through coming-to-be in common. Thus the special coming-to-be —

which is from a pre-existing part — is attributed to the composite and equally removed from form and from matter; the common coming-to-be — whether from a pre-existing part in the manner of a subject or not — without doubt belongs to form. So Ferchius. Therefore by his own account this consequence is not valid: form comes to be in matter, nor does it come to be from matter as from a part — therefore it in no way comes to be. For it can come to be through common coming-to-be, though not through special coming-to-be from something else as from a part — since this is proper to composites. And indeed if this argument were valid, it would no less prove about substantial form than about accidental form — since neither comes to be per se and in itself, but in another. Therefore it could be inferred that it does not come to be simply and as to being, but only in a certain respect and as to being-in. Hence it is plain that those objections of Ferchius are mere quibbles. That argument from "in a certain respect" to "simply" — form comes to be in another, therefore form comes to be — was not constructed by us but by him, so that he might have material for calumny and mockery. We at the cited *disp. 5, q. 6* only said that from the fact that form does not come to be properly as the composite does, or that it comes to be in matter, it is not well deduced that it in no way comes to be — but is ingenerable, as Contareni was claiming. Rather, it only follows that it cannot come to be except dependently on a subject in which it comes to be and is preserved, and cannot newly acquire being except through being-in. Not however that it acquires only being-in and has simply pre-had being.

Third, Ferchius argues for Contareni at *cap. 5, n. 4*: principles do not come to be from each other; form and matter are principles; therefore form does not come to be from matter — nor from the composite — because that from which something comes to be is presupposed in order of nature or duration to what comes from it. But form does not presuppose the composite in order of nature or duration — for the principle would be prior to what is principiated, contrary to *5 Met.* Therefore form does not come to be from the composite. Nor does it come to be from another form according to *12 Div. tex. 12* and *7 Met. 32*. Therefore form does not come to be from form. Since therefore it does not come to be from any accident, it must be said either to come to be from nothing — as Ferchius wants — or to be ingenerable and everlasting — as Contareni wants.

In response: this argument contradicts the preceding one reported at n. 140, where he wanted from Aristotle and Scotus that the coming-to-be and being of the whole precedes in order of nature the coming-to-be and being of the parts — which is here denied. But whatever may be said about this, I say briefly: form comes to be from matter — not indeed as from a part, but as from a subject from whose potency it is drawn out and on which it depends in its being in the genus of material cause. And that this is Aristotle's idiom has been shown sufficiently in the preceding article — which need not be repeated here. How the statement "principles do not come to be from each other" is to be understood was already said at *disp. 1 Phys., q. 1*: it is to be understood in the same genus of principiating

— for in a diverse genus there is no obstacle that one can come to be from another. For in that way form — beyond controversy — comes to be from privation as from a terminus a quo.

Fourth, he contends at *cap. 10* that the opinion of inchoations of forms was expressly held by St. Augustine at *3 de Trinit., cap. 7 and 8*, where he teaches that certain hidden seeds of all things that come forth before our eyes lie latent in the elements of the world, through which those things that were hidden advance into the open. This authority is also adduced by the Master at *d. 7, par. 2*. But to this authority an answer was already given at *disp. 2 Phys., q. 7, art. 1, n. 139*: by seminal reasons Augustine understands the faculties and powers of natural active and passive causes — from whose mutual application various effects arise. And by this he explained that the Magi and demons did not create animals in Egypt by their own power, but by applying active things to passive brought them forth. So this authority is expounded by St. Thomas at *p. 1, q. 115, art. 2* and by Scotus at *2 d. 18, q. un., L*. In support of this exposition, Amicus at *Phys., tr. 6, q. 3, dub. 1, art. 2* cites Durandus at *2 d. 18, q. 2*; Hervaeus *ibid., q. un., art. 3*; Aegidius at *2 d. 8*; Capreolus at *1 d. 42, q. un., art. 3*; and Henricus at *quol. 4, q. 14*. And finally Zerbius himself — whom Ferchius cites in his favor at *7 Met., q. 9*, near the end, while solving the arguments of the Seminarists — expressly says that Augustine's authority does not contradict our position if it is properly heard. From this it is plain that the fraternal correction made to us by Ferchius at *lib. 1, cap. 10* from the beginning was entirely superfluous — where he says that we should have paid reverence and honor to this opinion at least for this reason: that St. Augustine is a saint — if only our great modesty had not stood in the way.

Finally, he reinforces this opinion with the authority of St. Bonaventure at *2 d. 7, q. 10* and *d. 18, art. 1, q. 3*, where the Seraphic Doctor expressly teaches this position — which he therefore says we ought also to have defended, as teachers of the Seraphic College. Hence for this great offense he inveighs against us at *lib. 1, cap. 4, n. 32*: Sixtus V, of happy memory, in the diploma by which he declared St. Bonaventure worthy to be placed among the primary Doctors of the Church, twice affirms that he had established the Seraphic College in the City for the purpose of teaching and propagating St. Bonaventure's doctrine for the benefit of the Church. You, the assailants, were co-opted into that College, consumed ecclesiastical funds for your own use, carried off from there a crown of doctorate along with active voice within the religious order and passive eligibility for dignities within and outside the order. You usurp the ecclesiastical benefice and office for which it was given — and you not only fail to propagate the Seraphic doctrine but confute, overthrow, and disparage it. Great ingratitude is thus rendered for great benefits. And again he repeats the same bitterness below at *cap. 9, n. 62*, saying: and you who, in order to hear St. Bonaventure's doctrine by the institution of Sixtus V of holy memory, have obtained Seraphic and ecclesiastical honors, consumed the Church's money, devoured the bread of St. Bonaventure — do you so ignominiously tear apart the doctrine of the supreme Doctor of the

Church and of our Order? If you do not hear him, the fault is yours — who have turned aside from your due duty. So Ferchius there, with his customary arrogance and imperial authority.

I respond again by repeating that Gospel saying: "Physician, heal thyself — first cast the beam from your own eye," etc. Here the proverb is well applied: the pot calling the kettle black. Although it is true that Bachelors, while residing in the Seraphic College, are bound by the command of Sixtus V to hear St. Bonaventure's doctrine and Regents for the time to teach it — out of reverence for so great a Doctor, under whose auspices that College was erected — yet outside that College, in whatever other gymnasia and colleges of our Seraphic Order, both from immemorial custom of the order and from the prescription of various Pontifical Constitutions — and especially the Urbanine ones at *cap. 5 of the Rule, tit. 4, de lite ratiis fratrum Scholasticorum* — the doctrine of Scotus the Subtle Doctor is read and heard. And if in some point the express mind of Scotus is not found in St. Bonaventure the Seraphic Doctor, or in Alexander of Hales the Irrefragable Doctor, the resolution must be drawn from the prescription of the Urbanine Constitution at the cited place. This is what we did precisely in composing our Philosophy: we teach and profess Scotus's position where we have his mind expressed; if it is not expressed, we take the supplement from St. Bonaventure or Alesinus — as can be seen at *disp. 10 Phys., q. 2, art. 2* and *disp. 11, q. 6, n. 98* and elsewhere. Nor do I know of any place where we ever defended an opinion rejected by St. Bonaventure as altogether improbable and condemned by him as erroneous — as Ferchius does, who at *vestig. 6* defends the circulation of rational souls on the hypothesis of the world's eternity with Aristotle, to avoid their actual infinity; and defends it even more fiercely throughout the entire *lib. 4 Defens.* — which position St. Bonaventure expressly condemns as a most terrible error not only in theology but also in Aristotelian philosophy, at *2 d. 1, art. 1, q. 2*. For there — in the arguments for the opposite, from the fifth way — he proves from this that the world was not in fact produced from eternity, because now there would be infinitely many rational souls in act — since they are incorruptible. And anticipating a certain response he says: "If you say to this that there is circulation in souls, or that one soul is in all men: the first is error in philosophy — because as the Philosopher holds, the proper act is in the proper matter; therefore a soul that was the perfection of one cannot be the perfection of another, even according to the Philosopher." And immediately in the resolution of the question at the end, before the solution of the arguments for the opposite, he again adds: "to avoid actual infinity it was necessary to posit either the corruption of the rational soul, or its unity, or its circulation — and so to remove beatitude. From this error and evil has its beginning and most terrible end." Now it is clear that Ferchius holds a position in Aristotelian philosophy — on the supposition of the world's eternity — which the Seraphic Doctor in the same philosophical tradition reproves and condemns as a most terrible error. And therefore it is he himself who truly tears apart, overthrows, and disparages the Seraphic doctrine — and renders great

ingratitude for the great benefit received in the Seraphic College, of which he too was an alumnus. The same circulation of souls he condemns as error and a dream in philosophy also at *2 dist. 18, art. 2, qu. 2*, in the body of the question.

But let us examine further which of us diverges more from the Seraphic doctrine in this very controversy we are treating about the origin of forms. There are three positions in this matter. The first is St. Bonaventure's: that forms are drawn out from the seminary of forms concreated from the beginning with matter. The second is that of St. Thomas, Scotus, and others: that they are drawn out from the simple passive potency of matter without any prior seminary or inchoation of them. The last and final one is that of Ferchius — who cites the Philosopher for it (I add no other author, because I see no other author among the scholastic Doctors cited for this position — indeed not even the Philosopher himself) — that all forms are produced from nothing by the natural agent. Among these three positions on the origin of forms, the Seraphic Doctor approves and endorses the first; he does not explicitly reprove the second — which we follow — as improbable and erroneous; but he thoroughly reproves the third. For at *2 d. 7, q. 10* — as he himself cites — in the body of the question he determines that the natural agent draws out and produces substantial forms — not indeed from nothing but from the pre-existing seminary of forms in matter — because the natural agent cannot produce anything from nothing, as he had already proved above at *d. 1, art. 1, q. 1*, at the end. And this he again teaches at *2 d. 18, art. 1, qu. 3*, in the body of the question — where he admits seminal reasons in matter as necessary for the production of forms by the natural agent, because from matter form comes to be or is drawn out by the operation of nature, which does not produce anything from nothing. And therefore (he says) it is reasonably posited that the seminal reason is the essence of the form to be produced, differing from it according to complete and incomplete being — or according to being in potency and being in act. It is therefore plain that even in this very question on the origin of forms, Ferchius diverges more from the Seraphic doctrine than we do — since he holds a position manifestly reprobated by St. Bonaventure. And yet he so audaciously and sharply charges us with deviating from the doctrine of the holy Doctor — and for no other reason, as we have often insisted, except that he thinks all things permitted to him and nothing to us.

Article IV: How Material Forms Come to Be through Eduction from the Potency of Matter, and their Difference from the Rational Soul

Since therefore material forms do not come to be from nothing — as was proved — nor from the seminary of forms in which they would have preceded according to some proper actual being, whether total or partial — as is plain from what was said in Article III — it remains to say that they come to be through eduction from the potency of matter, or through the necessary concurrence of the material cause: namely through both receiving and sustaining form. This concurrence, if rightly understood, prevents the material form from being said to be created —

as the rational soul is said to be created — since the rational soul is indeed received in the body when it comes to be, but is not sustained by it; and hence it is not said to come to be dependently on matter, nor to be preserved dependently on it. What it means for form to be drawn out or to have been drawn out from the potency of matter we declared by design at *disp. 2 Phys., q. 7, art. 2, n. 148*, where we say that form's being drawn out from the potency of matter is nothing other than its coming-to-be being necessarily a coming-to-be in matter, and its being necessarily a being in matter — such that if there is some form that indeed comes to be and is in matter yet which, as far as it is concerned, can absolutely come to be without matter, that form is not said to be drawn out. For necessarily its being and coming-to-be is not necessarily a being and coming-to-be in matter. In support of this explanation we there cited Scotus at *4 d. 1, q. 1, ante Hh.*, where he says: "by a material form I mean every form that by its own nature necessarily inclines naturally to be the act of matter — whether substantial or accidental." For the same explanation we also adduced Canon at *2 Phys., q. 1, art. 1*, where he says that for form to be drawn out from the potency of matter is nothing other than for form to depend in its being, coming to be, and preservation on matter itself; and from this it is said that form is drawn out and from within, not given from without — because necessarily its being is a being in matter, as in its proper subject. But if there is some form that can be without the composite and without matter, that form is said to be from without, because necessarily its being is not necessarily a being in matter. We also adduced Bassolis at *2 d. 18, q. un., art. 2, §. et ita dico*, who speaks in the same way. To these I now add Trombetta at *q. de immortal. animae, art. 2*. From this we afterward said at *disp. 5 de Gen. et cor., q. 2, art. 2, n. 68* that material forms are called such because by their very nature in their being, coming to be, and preservation they are so to speak submerged and bound to matter, so that by fatal necessity as soon as they are torn from it they perish — in which they are distinguished from the rational soul, which by reason of its immateriality comes to be and is preserved independently of matter; hence even while it informs the body, it subsists in its own manner, and for this reason when separated from the body it does not immediately perish but is preserved in separation.

Ferchius responds at *lib. 3, cap. 8* that this definition of eduction is stated from our own head — not proved from Aristotle — and is our singular one, which all others will deny. So go, he says at n. 46, and agree with others on the meaning of the word, and then prove such a meaning to us from Aristotle, and then we will listen. Second, he says the proof from Scotus at *4 d. 1, q. 1, Hh.* is not to the point — because there Scotus speaks of the material form and describes it, but makes no mention of eduction. Third, at *lib. 1, cap. 7, pag. 55, n. 53*, he says we wrongly — with the Moderns, who do not follow the imposition of terms by Aristotle — distinguish other forms from the rational soul by this: that all are drawn out from the potency of matter except the soul itself. Because rather things are the other way: that no other form is drawn out from matter except the intellective one;

which he again confirms at *lib. 2, cap. 12, pag. 226*, at the end of the chapter. Fourth, again at *lib. 3, cap. 7, n. 43, pag. 299*, he says we wrongly distinguish other forms from the rational soul because the soul is immaterial and the rest material — since the rational soul is material, both through the matter "in which" and through the matter "from which," and the title of immateriality given by us to the soul is not Scotus's but Aquinas's. Fifth, in the same chapter at n. 42, he says that to declare a material form through this — that it is submerged and bound to matter — is a Thomistic, not a Scotistic phraseology, and metaphors to be rejected from disputation. Finally, at *lib. 3, cap. 2, n. 11, pag. 269* and *cap. 7, n. 44, pag. 300*, he reproaches us for also having distinguished other forms from the rational soul by this — that other forms are entirely submerged in matter and wholly dependent on it in their being, coming to be, and preservation, whereas the intellective soul is not — because it is a form as if subsisting and independent of matter. For he says that is against Scotus at *quol. 9*, where he resolutely denies that the soul subsists — especially when it is in the body. So Ferchius argues at the cited place, with his customary arrogance, speaking there in his manner of dialogue — where it is difficult to discern whether he is speaking these things in response or rather arguing against us.

But whether these are solutions or objections, each of his six statements is easily refuted. As to the first — where he says that definition of the eduction of forms and the explanation through dependence and inherence of forms in matter is ours, invented from our own head, and that all others will deny it — he plainly contradicts what he had said before in the same *lib. 3, cap. 2, pag. 270, n. 12*, where he says that this doctrine on the eduction of forms through dependence and inherence of form is transcribed from the Thomists. Since therefore he tells us: go and agree with others on the meaning of the word, we can more reasonably retort: let him go and agree with himself — and then we will listen to him. But in both places he speaks wrongly — because that mode of explaining the eduction of forms through dependence on matter in the genus of material cause in their being, coming to be, and preservation is neither invented by us nor transcribed from the Thomists, but is common to all Peripatetics who deny that material forms come to be from nothing or are translated from a seminary of forms — as Suarez testifies at *disp. 15 Met., sect. 2, nn. 10 and 13*. And the Scotists especially speak in this way — as we showed there citing Canon and Bassolis; to whom can also be added Trombetta cit. and Tataretus at *1 Phys., qu. whether the principles of natural things are contraries, notab. 4*, where he says that for form to be drawn out from the potency of matter is to be produced by the agent from the potency of the subject in such a way that that form depends on that subject — such that it cannot be without the subject. And so the other Scotists speak everywhere. Hence Ferchius would have been better to say that this doctrine on the eduction of forms is transcribed from Scotus and the Scotists rather than from the Thomists.

Furthermore, this eduction of forms is certainly more proved from Aristotle than the production of them from nothing. For above in this very question, at *art. 2, n.*

82, it was plainly proved from Aristotle that material forms come to be from matter — not indeed as from a part (that belongs to the composite) but as from a subject in which they necessarily come to be and are sustained. I say proved: from *5 Metaph.*, *cap. 24* and *1 de Gen. anim.*, *cap. 18* — from which passages Ferchius himself was contending, not presenting them candidly, to prove the opposite. But where Aristotle ever even remotely suggested his alleged production of forms from nothing — Ferchius never shows: neither in *vestig. 1* nor in the entire book of the *Defensio*. He only asserts and repeatedly harps on the passage from the book on Xenophanes and Zeno — where Aristotle does not accept as universally true the common saying of the ancients "nothing comes to be from nothing." Since therefore this is true in composites — because they come to be from some pre-existing part of themselves — it remains that it is false in simple things; and since matter does not come to be from nothing — being ingenerable and incorruptible at *1 Phys.* 82 — it remains that this is only false in forms, because they truly do come to be from nothing — since from no pre-existing part of themselves. But that that passage militates against him I already showed above at *art. 2, n. 105* — even from his own confession at *vestig. 1, cap. 5*, where at n. 13 he openly admits that when Aristotle in the cited book said against the ancients that the proposition "nothing comes to be from nothing" is not universally true — because some things have truly been made from nothing — Ferchius admits, I say, that this statement of Aristotle does not extend to forms. For there Aristotle says that not many things have been made from what does not exist — by the authority of Hesiod indicating only prime matter and Love, or the Intelligences, as having been produced from nothing. Therefore by these things made from nothing Aristotle could not mean forms — says Ferchius — because then things made from nothing would be many and very many, as forms are, and not few, as Aristotle says. Therefore no passage remains in Aristotle from which Ferchius can show the production of forms from nothing. And hence our eduction of forms from the potency of matter is more grounded in Aristotle than their production from nothing.

But suppose further that our eduction of forms had nowhere been suggested by Aristotle — therefore it should not be received, and we should not be heard in the Peripatetic school for that reason? This consequence cannot be deduced without the fallacy of the consequent, even by Ferchius's own testimony at *vestig. 1, cap. 11, n. 30*. For when Pererius — adduced there by him — was proving that there is no creation or production of anything from nothing in philosophy, because nowhere did Aristotle even lightly suggest such a production from nothing: Ferchius severely reproaches Pererius for this mode of arguing — calling it arguing from negative authority and fallacious — and gives the following rule, which I also reported above at n. 88 in a similar context: what Aristotle affirms and denies, the Peripatetic is to affirm or deny; but if Aristotle neither affirms nor denies, the Peripatetic is not said to be affirming or denying without a fallacy of the consequent — since Aristotle does not touch many truths, and many things he wrote by common consent have not reached us. To reduce us to saying only what

was said, then, is to deprive us of truth and judgment. So Ferchius there. Just as therefore Pererius wrongly proves that there is no creation or production from nothing in philosophy because it is not proved by or suggested by Aristotle — by Ferchius's own testimony — so in our present case Ferchius himself wrongly objects in the opposite direction that the eduction of forms should not be received because it is not proved by or suggested by Aristotle. Or if he objects well against us here, then Pererius also argued well against his production from nothing; but Ferchius now wants to press his objection against us, because he thinks all things permitted to him — and nothing to others. In his mouth all is precious, in others' mouths the same is sordid.

The second solution or objection — that the proof adduced by us from Scotus at *4 d. 1, q. 1, Hh.* is not to the point — is easily rejected from Scotus's own argument. For although he does not there have the word "eduction," he expressly declares the making of material forms as distinguished from the intellective soul, and says that a material form is every one that by its own nature necessarily inclines naturally to be the act of matter — whether substantial or accidental — and every such form, he says there, by its very nature presupposes matter in which it comes to be, and is not so absolute from it that it can exist outside it. Then under *lit. Ii*, pursuing the same distinction of material from immaterial form, he argues thus: the material form depends in being on matter; therefore also in acting. And under *lit. KK* he repeats and again states this about matter, and the second conclusion is plain among the Philosophers who posited the order of secondary causes as absolutely necessary, so that a material form cannot be produced by any other agent unless matter concurs as a cause presupposed to the terminus of production. By these words he openly admits the material concurrence of matter in form by way of passive eduction. And finally, to distinguish the intellective soul from material forms, he adds: if you ask whether from what has been said the same can be had concerning the intellective soul — I respond, he says, that whatever the Philosophers may have thought about it — whether it is created or not — will be touched on in the distinction on the Resurrection. But from the preceding conclusions the proposed point about the soul is manifestly shown: for it cannot be created by an angel — plain from the first; nor by any created merely intellectual nature — plain from the same; nor by any corporeal substance, whether through a substantial or an accidental form — because the soul itself is nobler than any substantial or accidental form, and a less noble form is not the active principle for producing a nobler one. By these words the Doctor indicates that by material forms above he understood all accidental and substantial forms that depend on matter in their being, coming to be, and preservation; and since the Doctor there so describes the making of material form and the dependence on matter in being — which does not belong to the intellective soul — he plainly sufficiently circumscribes the eduction of material forms from the potency of matter, to distinguish them from the rational soul.

The third solution or objection is also easily excluded. It is true indeed that the Moderns commonly distinguish the rational soul from other material forms through this: that the soul itself is not drawn out from the potency of matter, as the others are. And Pererius especially speaks this way — whom I adduce because Ferchius also confirmed his own position from that author's authority in his Genesis commentary, that creation is not production from nothing, at *lib. 1 Defens.*, n. 9, pag. 17 and *lib. 2, cap. 2, n. 95*, and *lib. de materia et privatione, cap. 8*, in these words: "To these objections we can easily respond in this way: to the first — generation indeed has some similarity to creation, for the reason set out in the objection; but here is the difference: because what is created either requires no subject at all, or certainly one only as receiving, and not of such a kind that through its affections and dispositions what is to be created is produced; whereas what is generated necessarily requires matter as that in which it is received, sustained, and through whose dispositions and affections it is brought forth. And a form that is created is not of the same order as the matter in which it is received — as is plain in the rational soul and grace — while a form that comes to be through generation is of the same genus and order as its matter. But on this matter read Scotus at *2 d. 18, q. un.*, arguing acutely and learnedly. A form is not said to be introduced into matter — lest anyone falsely suppose the form to be produced per se from outside and adjoined to matter — but is said to be drawn out from matter, so that the form may be understood as produced cohering and indeed submerged in matter, through a change of it, inseparable from it in coming to be, being, and operation — the clearest proof of which is that through contrary affections and changes of matter it is not merely separated from matter — as in the case of the rational soul — but entirely perishes — as happens in all other physical forms." So Pererius — by which words, as is plain, he agrees with us and with Scotus in explaining the vocabulary of creation and eduction; and he is unjustly cited for himself by Ferchius.

Even more plainly does he speak to the proposed topic at *lib. cit., cap. 22, ad 6 dubitationem*, responding thus: "To the sixth: among Christian Philosophers and Theologians it is one thing to be a form of matter and another to be an altogether material form. For that is said to be a form of matter which gives being to matter and together with it makes one essential composite — something that is a specifically complete and absolute entity. But that is called a material form which is drawn out from the potency of matter, submerged in it, and inseparable from it. Hence the rational soul is called a form of matter, but is not properly called a material form. And so that what it means to be drawn out from the potency of matter may be more plainly understood, we shall set out five properties that all forms drawn out from the potency of matter have. The first is that such forms are produced by material agents through material actions and through material dispositions — that is, adhering and fixed in matter itself. The second is that such forms depend in coming-to-be on matter, i.e., cannot be brought into being except within matter and wholly coupled to it — for they are not produced per se

and from outside and adjoined to matter. The third is that they depend on matter in being — for outside the matter in which they were originally produced they can neither subsist *per se* nor exist in another matter for even a moment of time; but it is simply the same for them to be separated from their matter as to entirely perish. The fourth is that they depend on matter in their operations — from which it results that operations of forms of this kind are subjectively not in the form but in the whole composite. The fifth is that they depend on matter quiddatively — for which reason without it they cannot be either defined or perfectly understood. Therefore those forms that have the aforesaid five properties are to be called material and drawn out from the potency of matter." So Pererius — by which words, as seems to me, the vocabulary of eduction is sufficiently explained. Ferchius at *lib. 3, cap. 8, n. 45* says it is so obscure that it has not yet been sufficiently explained — whence he earnestly requests its explanation from us and from the Philosophers and Theologians of our class.

But this vocabulary of eduction is not invented by the Moderns, nor is that distinction — that the rational soul is not drawn out from the potency of matter while the rest are — but it is ancient among Peripatetics, especially Scotists and Thomists. Scotus indeed has the vocabulary of eduction more than once — as Ferchius himself admits — and declares it especially at *2 d. 12, q. 1, lit. G*, where he recalls a twofold extraction: one of the composite from objective potency, the other of form from the subjective potency of matter — in these words: "the second extraction is by the way in which the agent from the pre-existing potency of matter — which at the end of generation is a part of the composite — draws out form, which is the other part of the composite and which previously did not exist in act, nor in reality outside itself, as matter does," etc. And at *9 Met., q. 13, §. ad oppositum* he says that since every matter receives its own form, it would follow that matter of air relates in the same way to the form of fire and an organic body to the intellectual soul — and air to light — and it would be an empty statement that some forms are drawn out from the potency of matter, whether of the patient or not, and some are not; and it would be vain to ask which are and which are not — things that are contrary to common statements and contrary to the Philosopher, according to whom, as it seems, the intellect comes from outside. So Scotus — openly admitting that this distinction is Peripatetic and from the mind of the Philosopher at *2 de Gen. anim., cap. 3*, where he says the intellectual soul comes from outside. And again at *quol. 2* from the beginning he reports three articles condemned in the University of Paris, the third of which is: "that forms do not admit division except according to the division of matter — error, unless understood of forms drawn out from the potency of matter" — and immediately the Doctor adds: "therefore concerning forms not drawn out from the potency of matter to say this is error." And by this immaterial form not drawn out from the potency of matter he understands the intellectual soul — of which he is speaking there, as is plain from the following words. The Doctor therefore recognizes that the rational soul is an immaterial form and not drawn out from the potency of

matter — and this distinction is recognized by the entire University of Paris. Hence this is not the invention of the Moderns, nor is it alien to the mind of the Philosopher — and it would be rash to assert that the entire Sorbonic School did not understand him.

But wishing to test whether Ferchius himself ever admitted and approved this distinction between the intellective soul and other forms — that these are drawn out from the potency of matter, while the soul is not — I took his book of *Vestigationes*, looked in the index at the word "form," and found noted at *vestig.* 6, *n.* 113: "drawn out form, not drawn out." Seeking that cited place I see that from Ragusius there is adduced a repulsion to the first argument of Alexander in these words: "Ragusius at *disp.* 21, *cap.* 11 denies the major as concerning a form that comes from outside and is not drawn out from the potency of matter; he denies the minor as concerning a drawn-out form; for the soul, which is intellect, alone comes from outside according to Aristotle at *2 de Gen. anim.*, *cap.* 3." This response and the doctrine contained in it Ferchius approves — since he does not reject it but places it in the index of notable matters. Therefore that distinction between the rational soul and other forms is so well established and familiar among the better Peripatetics that Ferchius himself at one time approved it. What he says — that among all forms only the intellective soul is drawn out from the potency of matter — apart from being a badly sounding proposition, has no foundation whatsoever beyond Ferchius's wish to pervert terms in order to appear singular among all — as will be evident below.

The fourth solution or objection is also entirely gratuitous. For that distinction between the intellective soul and the other forms — that these are material, i.e., wholly dependent on matter in their being, coming to be, and preservation, while the soul is immaterial because not so dependent — is approved everywhere by Philosophers and Theologians. Hence Pererius as reported above at *n.* 152 said that among Christian Philosophers and Theologians it is one thing to be a form of matter and another to be an altogether material form; for that form is called material which is drawn out from the potency of matter and is submerged in and inseparable from it; from which he concludes that the rational soul can indeed be called a form of matter, but not properly a material form. And for this same reason Scotus himself at *quol.* from the beginning at the cited place calls the rational soul an immaterial form — because it is not drawn out from the potency of matter. Other forms he calls material because they are drawn out. So also at *4 d.* 1, *q.* 1, *Hh.* he calls material all those that depend on matter in coming to be and in being, while he excludes the rational soul from their number — because it does not so depend. So also he speaks at *8 Metaph.*, *q.* 1, *ad argumenta*, when he says that an accident is generable and corruptible — not indeed as a composite — but every material substantial form is called generable and corruptible. Indeed more expressly he teaches this at *quol.* 9 throughout, from which Ferchius intends to deduce the opposite as the Doctor's mind. For the Doctor at *lit. B* says: "from this it is also plain why the separated soul is not a person: for although it is not born

to inhere, and hence is a per se being in the second mode mentioned above — although it could also be a per se being in the first mode, that is, solitarily — not only by the power of an extrinsic cause, as an accident can be, or a material form, but by the power of its own nature left to itself — and this because it does not necessarily depend on matter in its own proper being, etc." By these words he calls every form that depends on matter in being a material form — from the number of which he excludes the intellective soul because it does not depend on matter; and hence according to him the soul should not be called a material form but an immaterial one. Then at *lit. C*, showing that the third argument does not conclude — which was adduced to prove that an angel cannot inform matter because it does not depend on matter — he says the argument does not prove, because it could be said that the angel can indeed be without matter and even in a more perfect way than the intellective soul, yet can be in matter; since even if depending on matter is a mark of imperfection — as is plain in the other inferior forms — it is not evident that being able to communicate one's actuality to matter is a mark of imperfection, especially when such communication can be without dependence. By these words the Doctor signifies that all inferior forms, except the intellective soul, are communicated to matter with dependence on it — as Gadius notes there — from which he concludes that forms communicating being to matter are in two different classes: some with dependence on matter, as the sensitive form and the form of corporeity; some without dependence on matter, as the soul, as Gadius explains there. And the same point — that the rational soul is not a material form while the others are — he teaches at *quol. 7, lit. P*.

Again at *lit. K*, after having said that when the whole perishes the soul still remains in its own being, he adds: "the other material forms do not remain in their own being when the whole perishes." And by materiality he therefore distinguishes the other forms of inferior order from the rational soul. And finally at *lit. H* he expressly declares why the soul should be called an immaterial form and in what sense it can be called material — for teaching what immateriality can be legitimately concluded from the immateriality of the soul's operations, he says: "from this medium therefore — namely from operation — there can be concluded such an immateriality of the soul itself: namely, separability from matter in being, but not that further immateriality which is impossibility of informing matter." By these words he signifies — as Gadius noted — that in a twofold sense the soul can be called immaterial: first, because it is separable from matter — inasmuch as it does not depend on it, as the other inferior and material forms do, as he said above — and in this sense he concedes it is immaterial; indeed it should be called such, to distinguish it from other inferior forms which are called material. Second, it could be called immaterial because it could not be the perfection of matter or inform matter — in which sense Intelligences are called abstract and immaterial forms; and so the Doctor denies the soul can be called immaterial, but rather says it can and should be called material in this sense, because it can inform matter and be the perfection of matter. Therefore

the title of immateriality is attributed to the rational soul — not only by Aquinas but also by Duns Scotus — so as to distinguish it from other inferior forms, which are called material forms.

Furthermore, Ragusius at *disp. 16 de formarum origine* brings this same doctrine as received by common consent in the Peripatetic school; hence at *cap. 2*, for the understanding of the question, he premises several observations conceded by all — and especially the third, that informing forms are twofold: some altogether material, others partly material and partly immaterial. Of the prior kind are all those forms that depend in being and preservation, as they say, on matter, and which cannot subsist at all without matter; of the posterior kind are those forms that are indeed produced in matter, yet in being and preservation do not depend on matter — indeed can sometimes subsist without matter. Of this kind are souls participating in reason, which are indeed produced in human bodies, yet not by the power of organs or of any affection; for this reason they do not depend on bodies but can subsist per se when freed from them.

But Ferchius himself also at one time delivered the same distinction of material and immaterial forms — i.e., dependent on or not dependent on matter — at *vestig. 1, n. 44, pag. 38*, asking why for the most part a subject is required in the making of a form from nothing of itself — since if all forms come to be from nothing as he believes, in the making of no form does a subject seem necessary. He responds that this necessity comes from the account of the thing made, not from the account of the affection: for when the thing made is by its nature suited to be in a subject — from whomever or however it is produced — it will be in the subject. As heat — whether produced equivocally by the sun, or univocally by heat, or naturally in air, or violently in water — is always produced in a subject, because its account is such that it is fit to inhere in a subject. But when the thing made is by its nature suited to exist per se and not in a subject, then the producer — however it may produce — will make the thing not in a subject. This distinction of forms, which is here delivered by Ferchius — of those by nature suited to be produced and to inhere in a subject, and those by nature suited to exist per se and independently of it — plainly coincides with the distinction commonly delivered of material and immaterial forms; for by material forms they understand forms of the first kind, and by immaterial forms those of the second kind — as is plain from their explanation.

The fifth objection or rather censure — that the declaration of the materiality of form through this: that it is submerged and bound to matter, is a Thomistic and not a Scotistic phraseology and is a metaphorical and figurative locution to be rejected from disputation — is easily refuted. Because by such a figurative locution is denoted the omnimoda dependence of material form on matter in its being, coming to be, and preservation, and the omnimoda inseparability from matter. Hence since Scotus and the Scotists also recognize such dependence in other forms on matter, they already agree in this doctrine and declaration with

the Thomists — whether they use the same phraseology in speaking or not; for this matters little. And it is false that in sciences and disputations it is sometimes not permitted to use metaphors — as Cartarius at *Phys., controuv. 1, super tex. 69* and *controuv. 3, super tex. 81* teaches, where he says Aristotle speaks of matter as desiring form — as a female desires a male, and the ugly desires the beautiful — which is without doubt a metaphorical and figurative locution. And no one should marvel, he says, if Aristotle sometimes used metaphors in explaining things themselves — as in the present case, explaining prime matter; and similarly at *lib. 3 de Anim.*, in teaching the nature of our intellect — because in the explanation of things most difficult of cognition it is fitting to use them, since metaphorical locutions are reduced to analogy, as Aristotle says at *1 Rhet.* And it is all the more permissible to use a metaphor when such cognition through metaphor does not transcend the proper limits of the art — and such is the cognition of prime matter and our intellect, which, though explained through metaphors or by analogy, do not exceed physical limits. So Cartarius there.

Indeed Ferchius himself used this very doctrine at one time at *lib. 1 Defens., cap. 8, n. 61, pag. 65*. For when Contareni was saying that forms from eternity lie dormant in the seminary of forms and lie hidden there until through dispositions they are excited by the natural agent to perfect existence and operation — and we at *disp. 5 de Gen., qu. 6* were arguing from that metaphor that that seminary should rather be called a bed of forms, in which forms lie dormant throughout the whole eternity and are called forth and excited in time by the natural agent — Ferchius there says that this metaphor is not to be ridiculed, because it is sometimes permitted to explain some hidden thing through metaphors and examples, and nothing prevents the seminary of forms posited by Contareni from being able to be called a bed — in which forms may be dormant from eternity, and in time be excited by the natural agent, so as to exercise as if a wakefulness and natural operation. If therefore in sciences it is sometimes permitted to use metaphors, and Contareni himself permits the metaphor of forms sleeping from eternity in matter and their wakefulness and excitation in time as legitimate — why is it forbidden to both of us to use the metaphors of immersion and binding to matter to declare the materiality of forms? Who does not see that the vocabulary of immersion and binding to matter has greater proportion to material forms than the vocabularies of sleep and wakefulness — which are proper to animate things — and yet Ferchius approves that metaphor while reproving the other from science. Furthermore, in that chapter 7 of *lib. 3*, where he at n. 42 reproaches us about this metaphor, immediately at n. 43 — to declare the imperfection of prime matter — he is called upon by the example of "dregs of substances." This locution is certainly not natural and proper but metaphorical and figurative, since "dregs" properly signifies the coarser part of liquids settling at the bottom of a vessel. Why therefore does he himself use metaphors in that very place where he forbids them to us? But what more? These very same metaphors — which he here says should be rejected from disputation — "submerged, bound to matter" — he himself more

than once used elsewhere. For at *vestig. 1, cap. 19, n. 62*, from the beginning, natural science is called by him "bound to matter"; and at *vestig. 6, lib. 1, pag. 254, col. 1, above n. 16*, the Physicist is called "bound to matter." If therefore he was permitted to use these very same metaphors — and in nearly the same context — why by all means will it not be permitted to us? Indeed I see nothing that Ferchius could reasonably respond to this, unless perhaps he says that many things are permitted to an old man that are not permitted to a young one. Finally, that a material form is the act submerged in matter is not a phraseology I have seen in Aquinas, but in Alexander of Hales at *7 Met., tex. 8, in fine*, and *12 Met. 14*.

The sixth and final solution or objection — that we wrongly distinguished the rational soul from other forms by independence from matter and subsistence, and against Scotus called the soul subsisting — since he resolutely denies it at *quol. 9*, especially when it is in the body — is either nothing or plainly calumnious. For the Doctor there does not absolutely deny that the soul is subsisting, nor do we absolutely assert it, as Ferchius charges against us at *disp. 5 de Gen., qu. 2, art. 2*. For we twice there called the rational soul a subsisting form: once at n. 65 and again at n. 68. And we never assert it absolutely but with a limitation. For at the first place we said it is a subsisting form in comparison to the other inferior forms, which wholly depend on matter in their being and coming to be, and hence are called forms by their very nature inhering in and allotted to matter; and since the rational soul does not so depend, it is rightly called by us and by others a subsisting form in this sense — inasmuch as it excludes the inherence and dependence on matter common to others. I reproduce our words at n. 65: "it is different for the soul: although it ceases to be in the body, it is because it is a per se subsisting form; hence just as in its inception — even though it comes to be in the body — it is not on that account said to be drawn out or generated, because it does not come to be dependently on the body but only with it, by reason of its own subsistence and independence, etc." Where it is plain that by subsistence we mean nothing other than the soul's independence from matter — which all who deal with the intellective soul must concede. Again at n. 68 we say that the rational soul is distinguished from other material forms by this: that by reason of its immateriality it comes to be and is preserved independently of matter; hence even while it informs the body, it subsists in its own manner. By which words we again say with a limitation — "in its own manner" — that the soul subsists in the body, inasmuch as in its being and preservation it does not depend on the body. But this limitation Ferchius fraudulently altered — so that we might seem to attribute to the soul subsistence in the body absolutely. For where we write at *disp. 5 cit., qu. 2, art. 2, n. 68, col. 2, linea 15*: "hence even while it informs the body, it subsists in its own manner" — he at *lib. 3, cap. 7, n. 44, pag. 300* thus reports and retranscribes our words: "hence even while it informs the body, it subsists in its own being" — removing the limiting particle placed by us "in its own manner" and putting in its place the absolute "in its own being." So candid is he in reporting our statements — he who everywhere calls us falsifiers of his. Yet wrongly so —

for we frequently abbreviate his statements and arguments, because we did not think each of his words contained a mystery; but we never falsified or changed them so as to completely pervert the meaning. Nor did we ever profess to report his every word and entire text verbatim, as he professes to do concerning ours. Hence in reporting our words and altering those words in which a mystery lies hidden — such as that particle "in its own manner" — he is voluntarily and deliberately shown to be a falsifier.

That in the explained sense — according to the Doctor's mind — the rational soul can be called a subsisting form: namely insofar as subsistence excludes inherence and dependence of form on matter in its being, the Doctor clearly taught at the same *quol. 9* — from which he himself intends to deduce the opposite. For at *lit. B* the Doctor says that the soul can be called a per se being not only in the second mode but also in the first mode — of three modes of being per se which he had immediately before premised at *lit. A* — because it can be separated from matter and exist per se with better right than an accident, because it has this from its own nature that it can be separated and exist in separation; whereas an accident does not. From which it is plain that it is false what Ferchius says: that as to that first mode of being per se or subsisting, the separated soul has no more than the separated accident. For the separated soul exists per se by its own nature, while the accident only by virtue of an extrinsic agent supplying the place of a subject. And therefore the separated soul can be said with better right to subsist per se than the separated accident — since the separated soul so exists by its own proper power, while the separated accident does not.

As to the third: the passage at *quol. 9, L* makes for us — for the Doctor there admits that in some sense subsistence can be attributed to the intellective soul, which cannot be attributed to the other material forms inseparable from matter.

As to the passage from *quol. 4, M*: it can first be conceded that neither to the soul united nor to the separated soul does the subsistence in the two acceptations there recalled belong — but in that acceptation which the Doctor explains at *quol. 9, B*: namely inasmuch as while conjoined to matter it does not so depend on it that it cannot be separated; and when separated it is said to subsist per se, i.e., to exist solitarily. And although it is not a supposit, because it is communicable, it nevertheless has the mode of a supposit — as the Doctor notes at *1 d. 12, q. 1, ad 2* and *4 d. 12, q. 3, ad 2*. And in this sense alone we too called the soul a subsisting form. Then it can be said that subsisting in the first mode accepted has two members — for it is taken either as excluding inherence, or as excluding being-in-another as a part in a whole. Although therefore the soul united cannot be called subsisting so as to exclude being-in-another as a part in a whole, still it can be called subsisting as excluding inherence — i.e., depending on matter in being, coming to be, and preservation — in which sense all material forms are said to inhere in matter. And at least the separated soul can be called subsisting in the first mode — because in that state it excludes both inherence and being-in-

another in the manner of a part, since it does not then constitute a whole but exists per se.

Second, Ferchius objects at *lib. 3, cap. 7, n. 43, pag. 299*, proving the rational soul to be a material form — both through the matter "in which" and through the matter "from which" — from Bonaventure at *2 d. 17, qu. 2* and from Scotus at *qu. 16 in lib. de Anima*. And he says that the title of immateriality given to the soul is not Scotus's but Aquinas's — for Scotus constructs this argument against Aquinas at *quol. 9*: "if it is objected that by the same reasoning one could conclude through the operation, then through the potency, that the intellective soul is immaterial — the conclusion however is false — that is, that it is not the perfection of matter, although according to some it is true of the immaterial, i.e., not composed of matter and form. Therefore the intellective soul is material, because it is the perfection of matter and because it is from matter according to Scotus — though according to some it is considered immaterial in this second mode." He there responds for Aquinas, but refutes that response with a double argument and leaves the objection as well-proving. He also proves the same there in the margin from Scotus at *4 dist. 1, q. 1, Gg.*, where under the name of material form he also comprehends the rational soul.

In response: the Doctor himself declares in what sense he says it is false that the intellective soul is immaterial — namely in the sense that it cannot be the perfection of matter. And in this sense we do not assert the soul to be an immaterial form — as an angel is — but we say it is immaterial in the sense the Doctor himself further declares at *lit. H*: because even though it informs matter, it does not depend on it in being — as the other inferior forms do — but can be separated from it and preserved in separation. The whole force of that fourth argument, and how from an immaterial operation the immateriality of some nature can be concluded, the Doctor declares at *lit. H* in these words: "from this medium therefore — namely from operation — there can be concluded such an immateriality of the soul's nature: namely, separability from matter in being, but not that further immateriality which is impossibility of informing matter." From these words it is plain that the Doctor concedes the soul is immaterial in the sense commonly intended — because it does not depend on matter and is separable from it — and he denies the soul is immaterial insofar as immaterial denotes impossibility of informing matter; in which sense no one asserts the soul to be an immaterial form except those who with Averroes make it an assisting form. Yet this mode of speaking — that a form is called material because it can be the perfection of matter — is not much in use; for according to the common mode of speaking a form is called material that depends on matter in its being, coming to be, and preservation. As the Doctor himself declared at *4 dist. 1, qu. 1, Hh.* Hence Pererius rightly said at the cited n. 152 that among Philosophers it is one thing to be a form of matter and another to be a material form — and hence the intellective soul is well called a form of matter, but not properly a material form. Although as to matter from which, St. Bonaventure believed it probable that the

soul is composite — and Scotus at *qu. 15 de Anim.* inclined that way — nevertheless in the *Sentences* — where he carries greater authority — he taught the opposite in several places, especially at *2 dist. 16, q. un., §. alia opinio, lit. F.* Indeed even in that very *quol. 9, lit. H* — where he says it does not include the matter of a part — he adds "corporeal" so as to abstract from the question of whether it at least has spiritual matter.

What Ferchius finally added in the margin — that the Doctor at *4 dist. 1, qu. 1, Gg.* under the name of a material form also comprehends the intellective soul — is shown to be plainly false from the Doctor's own argument there, as reported above at n. 151. For rather the Doctor there distinguishes the material form from the intellective soul under *lit. KK.* And St. Bonaventure himself at *2 dist. 18, art. 2, q. 1*, in the resolution of the question — although he composes the soul from matter and form — nevertheless calls it an immaterial form, as independent from the body.

Third, at *lib. 1, cap. 7, n. 53, pag. 55*, Ferchius proves that the soul is not well distinguished from other forms by this — that the others are drawn out from the potency of matter while the soul is not. For rather things are the other way: that the soul alone is drawn out from the potency of matter. This he proves by the following argument: since the distinction of the terms "to be drawn out" and "to be introduced" is grounded on the text of *2 de Gen. anim., cap.*; forms can be compared either to the efficient cause "from which" or to the matter "in which." Forms that come from an external agent into matter are said to be drawn out — "edu-ci" — i.e., led from outside; such is the soul alone. Other forms that do not come from outside but from an intrinsic agent are not said to be drawn out — since they do not come from outside. All forms in relation to the matter "in which" — come to be in it and are in it; hence all as to their coming to be in matter are said to be introduced — when the whole comes to be, when the whole is destroyed, the soul alone is drawn out from matter and the potency of matter, because it is drawn out outside of matter — since it is separable; the other forms are inseparable, hence cannot be without the whole and perish along with the perishing whole. For they are prior to the whole by reason, not by substance, from *13 Met., summ. 1, cap. 2*; hence no other form is drawn out from the potency of matter except the intellective one.

In response: this argument is more imperatorial than probatory, since the propositions are stated imperatively but not proved. Nor is it remarkable — since Ferchius himself openly admits that in this argument he speaks voluntarily and according to his own pleasure; hence since the other Philosophers and Theologians do not wish to submit to his command, they will deny his entire argument, as large as it is, from beginning to end. Especially that so badly sounding proposition: no other form is drawn out from matter except the intellective one — which Ferchius cannot maintain except by perverting terms and taking them in a sense contrary to all others, and with great impropriety. For

as Canon notes at *2 Phys., qu. 1, art. 1*: to be drawn out is to be led from within — not to be given from outside; and in this meaning Holy Scripture also uses this vocabulary at *2 Esdras 15*: "you drew water from the rock." And so too the common mode of speaking goes. Therefore forms that come from an external agent into matter are not to be called drawn out — i.e., led from outside — but are more properly called introduced — i.e., having been produced elsewhere and introduced into matter. And still less properly when a man is destroyed would the soul be said to be drawn out from matter — since the eduction of form among the Philosophers pertains to the generation of the whole, not to corruption. And there is great confusion in wanting to use the same vocabulary of eduction in the generation of a man and in its corruption — so that the soul is said to be drawn out both when a man is begotten (inasmuch as it is said to come from outside according to the first explanation, in generation) and when it is drawn out of matter into the outside in corruption according to the second. Indeed these two meanings of the eduction of the soul — in the generation and destruction of the whole — seem to be plainly mutually repugnant to each other: for in generation drawing-out of the soul is the same as being led from outside into the body; in the corruption of a man drawing-out of the soul is being led from within to the outside, i.e., from the body outside the body. All of which is plainly and voluntarily said and without any foundation whatsoever. That the rational soul is neither a material form nor drawn out from the potency of matter Trombetta proves at *q. de immortal. anim., art. 1, concl.*

Fourth: because at *disp. 5 cit. de Gen., qu. 2, art. 2, n. 65* we admit that grace is not created but rather drawn out from the potency of the soul — following what was said at *disp. 3 Phys., qu. 5, art. 2* on supernatural forms in general — Ferchius at *lib. 3 defens., cap. 2*, armed with many Scotistic authorities, attacks us, showing from the Doctor's mind that grace and other supernatural gifts are truly and properly created and annihilated. But he especially forces with a certain authority of Scotus at *3 dist. 11, qu. 1*, where he says that the angel, the soul, and grace are properly created, because they are produced from nothing by the first efficient cause. He therefore finally concludes that we are deserters from the school of Scotus to the school of Cajetan and Suarez.

In response: at the cited *disp. 3 Phys., qu. 5, art. 2* we adduced nearly all those authorities — and especially the one he considers most pressing at *3 dist. 11, qu. 1* — and therefore openly conceded there that Scotus inclined more to the opposite part, namely that grace is created. We also added that he so spoke not for some pressing reason which he never adduced, but lest he depart from the common mode of speaking of the Scriptures and Fathers — who say that grace is created or concreated in us by God. These authorities we also said can be explained of creation in the moral sense: namely that grace is said to be created from the fact that men are created according to it — i.e., constituted in new being from nothing, that is, not from merits, according to *Eph. 2*: "created in Christ Jesus for good works" — as St. Thomas explains at *par. 2, qu. 110, art. 2, ad 3*. Hence we finally

concluded there, near the end of the article, that whoever wants to maintain — with the more common and no less probable opinion — that grace and other supernatural gifts are created, should hold it for the authority of the Saints, the Scriptures, and the more ancient Scholastics — to whose authority the greatest weight is to be given — but not for any compelling reason. For in truth no such reason exists; rather the opposite is more pressing, insisting on the notion of eduction already assigned. Nor are there lacking noble Scotists — both among the more ancient and among the more recent — who agree with us. Among the more ancient, Mayronis clearly holds this at *3 dist. 1, qu. 5*, where from the beginning he speaks thus: "Here it is to be premised that in four ways something is said to be created by God: first, as by the universal cause alone — and in this way the soul is created by God, because God concurs with every secondary cause; second, as by a particular or partial cause — as the humanity of Christ, where God supplied the causality of the particular agent; third, as by the total cause, but in the genus of efficient cause only — as grace is totally and effectively created by God, but depends on the soul subjectively, as on a material cause in which; fourth, as the total cause is supplied because no other cause concurs — and in this way an angel is totally created by God, because it depends in its being as in its coming-to-be on God alone." There, as you see, he says grace is created — not because it is not truly drawn out from the potency of the subject and dependent on the soul in its being, coming to be, and preservation — but because in the genus of efficient cause it totally depends on God. Hence even according to this explanation the Scriptures and Fathers can be understood when they say that grace is created or given by God alone — since no other secondary cause concurs in its production in the genus of efficient cause, though some cause does concur in the genus of material cause, namely the soul.

Among the more recent, Poncius at *disp. 13 log., qu. 2, n. 21* and Gregorius Ruiz at *controv. 3 in quartum sententiar. Scoti, conclusione prima* — though in the second conclusion he also teaches the opposite as more probable — hold this as probable. There he proves it because grace depends on the soul in being and coming to be; therefore grace is drawn out from the potency of the soul. He proves the consequence: for a form to be drawn out from the potency of a subject is to depend on it in being and coming to be. Indeed Ferchius himself is also bound to assert the same — that grace and other supernatural gifts are drawn out from the potency of the soul, not created. For at *lib. 3, cap. 4* and *cap. 8, n. 46* he denies that substantial forms depend on matter in their being and coming to be — and says that this dependence belongs only to accidental forms by reason of the fact that accidents are what are by nature suited to inhere in a subject. Since therefore both grace and other supernatural gifts are accidental forms, they will depend on the soul in their being and coming to be, and consequently do not begin in the soul through creation but through eduction. Nor should one say that this is prevented by their being supernatural forms — for what essentially and per se belongs to a genus cannot be repugnant to a species. If therefore it essentially and per se

belongs to an accidental form as such to depend on a subject in its being and coming to be — as even Ferchius concedes — so too it per se belongs to supernatural forms which are its species — both natural and supernatural alike. Moreover, supernatural acts are not posited as created — indeed we are said to partly elicit them, as they say of beatific vision and fruition; therefore supernaturality does not prevent grace from being drawn out from the soul. What he finally says — that we are deserters from the school of Scotus to the school of Cajetan — we care little about, since it pertains to insults. Which of us is a deserter and rebel against Scotus and against the school of the Subtilists, the prudent reader can conjecture from the entire book of his *Defensio* — in which not only does he throughout hold opinions most alien to Scotus and the Scotists, but nowhere ceases to mock and insult them with all shamelessness set aside. Hence at *lib. 1, cap. 3*, from the beginning, he is not ashamed to call all Scotists mere transcribers doing little or nothing new; and even Scotus himself — his Master — he brands with the same mark at *lib. 3, pag. 341, n. 82*, saying everywhere that he does not receive Scotus and that Scotus's authority counts with him as much as with a Thomist. But let us dismiss these most odious things, vomited from rage and virulence against brethren — not drawn from truth. Finally, he proves extensively that the substantial form is not drawn out from the potency of matter nor depends on it in its being and coming to be, at *lib. 1, pag. 49, n. 46* and following, and again at *lib. 2, cap. 10*. All of which was solved above in this question, art. 2, n. 87, and in the definition, and there is no need to repeat it here.

Question V: On the Destruction or Perishing of Forms

Article I: Whether Every Physical Form is Corruptible

Every physical form — whether substantial or accidental, with the sole exception of the rational soul — is just as capable of being generated and truly beginning in matter as it is corruptible and capable of ceasing to exist in matter. This was established in *disp. 5 de gener., qu. 2, art. 2*, and is confirmed by experience itself in all the transmutations, both substantial and accidental, that occur daily. Nor does it constitute an objection to cite what is commonly drawn from Aristotle in *1 Phys.* and *7 Met.* and elsewhere — namely, that coming-to-be and passing-away belong properly to the composite, not to the form. For, as Suárez rightly noted in *disp. 15 Met., sect. 2*, this objection rests more in words and manner of speaking than in reality. In truth, a form previously did not exist and afterward does exist — therefore it has come to be. And after the corruption of the composite, it no longer exists (speaking of material forms), though it previously did — therefore it has truly ceased to be. When Aristotle in the cited passage says that coming-to-be belongs to composites and not to forms, he is plainly not speaking of coming-to-be taken in any sense whatsoever, but in a specific and particular sense that belongs to the composite alone, as all Metaphysicians commonly explain in *7 Metaph.*, in the question whether only the composite is generated per se.

Ferchius, however, in *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 2*, attempted by certain arguments grounded in Aristotle's text to prove that every substantial form, insofar as it is distinguished from an accidental form, is separable from matter, eternal, and incorruptible — though he did so in a disputative rather than assertive spirit. And because he left those arguments unanswered (for what reason I do not know — perhaps for the exercise of others), and because his own admonition in *vestig. 4, n. 46* called upon us to observe that it is not right to leave unanswered those things that contend against the truth, or to equivocate in judging the truth, we proceeded to refute them in the cited place *de gener. et corrupt.* And when we thought we had done him a service by following his own precept, he turned entirely to fury in *lib. 2 and 3 Defens.*, crying out and declaring with great noise that those arguments had not been answered by us and still retained their full force. He speaks thus in that third book, *pag. 271, n. 14*: "Since those who attack must be resisted at every point, I affirm that the universal proposition — every substantial form is separable — is false; but you are not sufficient with your arguments to prove it false, nor are your responses sufficient to defend the claim that it is not true. For I have so fortified it that you may boast but cannot bring about the ruin of that conclusion." So Ferchius speaks, with his customary arrogance; and thus he spends that entire third book defending a proposition which he himself admits to be false. He therefore devotes an entire book to defending falsehood — whether this befits a philosopher who seeks truth, we leave to the judgment of others.

Moreover, while he rightly said in the cited place, *vestig. 4, n. 46*, that it is not right to leave unanswered what contends against the truth, or to equivocate in judging the truth, he speaks badly afterward in *lib. 3 Defens., pag. 271, n. 14*, by saying that those who attack must be resisted at every point, even when they fight on behalf of the truth. For he freely admits there that we are attacking a false proposition and defending the truth. This, I say, is badly spoken — for one who fights on behalf of truth, both parties in the dispute ought to yield, not resist or contradict. What compels a genuine philosopher to enter into debate and stirs him is the desire to find truth, not rivalry, boasting, or the pleasure of contention. It is therefore apparent from those cited words that the motive driving that author into this defense was not a desire to inquire after truth, but sheer rivalry and the heat of contention, and mere indignation that we had attempted to answer his arguments, as if they had been discovered by his own independent effort — when in fact those arguments by which he sought to establish that proposition are entirely commonplace, drawn from the most well-worn texts of Aristotle, just as our replies are also common, drawn from the commentators on those texts: Scotus, Alensis, St. Thomas, and others.

Nor should that author take offense because we say his arguments are common to these sources — in the words he has in *lib. 3 Defens., pag. 263, n. 4*: "I understand your intention: you sought whether you could find those arguments in some other author, so as to show that they are not original. You were unable to do so this time, even by falsely attributing things to me — unable to show that those

arguments are not the fruit of my own labor, but were illuminated by divine light." He should not, I say, take offense at this, because we made no such inquiry at all. On the contrary, we gladly admitted in that place that they came from his own store. Yet since his words now compel me to undertake this inquiry, I will show that these are entirely commonplace arguments — with one or two exceptions that rest on a false interpretation of Aristotle's texts offered on his own authority. It is displeasing, however, that he says these arguments were produced by his own labor illuminated by divine light — for he himself admits in that same place, and particularly just below on *pag. 271, n. 14*, that the proposition "every substantial form is separable," to prove which he introduced these arguments, is false. If it is false, let him be ashamed to say that the arguments proving what is false were the fruit of his own labor illuminated by divine light — for God, who is the highest truth, does not illuminate anyone toward falsehood, nor does he concur in establishing what is false.

Since this author complains that his arguments were not faithfully reported by us, and that words necessary to constitute the force of the argument were omitted, I will here reproduce them more literally, including the more significant particles, as he himself wishes — so that it may thereby become apparent that those arguments gain no greater force from this, and that nothing germane to the force of the arguments was suppressed; and that what was omitted was left aside only for the sake of brevity, not in order to weaken his arguments. Nor indeed is any author required to transcribe word for word the arguments of his adversaries; it suffices to touch upon what is necessary while avoiding prolixity. Nor did we suppose that the individual words of those arguments contained any special mysteries — otherwise they would plainly have been transcribed in full. Let us now set out his arguments in order, together with our responses and the objections raised against them by Ferchius in *lib. 3 Defens.*

The First and Second Arguments

First, then, Ferchius argues in the cited place to prove that every substantial form is separable and everlasting. In *Arist. 5 Met., tex. 15*, where Aristotle teaches that the term "substance" is taken for form, he declares what kind of form the name of substance is used for, saying that substance is called "that which, when the whatness is present, is also separable — and such is the form and species of each thing." In *7 Metaph.*, matter, form, and the composite are compared so that we may recognize which of these is substance, and more truly substance. And Aristotle says: "From these speculations it follows that substance is matter — but this is impossible. For the separable, and the whatness, are thought to belong most properly to substance; and for this reason form, and what is composed of both, seems to be more truly substance than matter." If, then, form is substance and more truly substance than matter because it is separable, the conclusion we are arguing for is sufficiently established — for this difference between matter and form is universal, namely that form is more truly substance. Therefore the reason

for this difference — namely, separability — must also be universal, so that cause and effect may be in proportion. Finally, in *12 Metaph.* 26: "For act is form — if it be separable — that which is from both, etc." From these authorities I make four observations. First, in these passages Aristotle speaks of form in the most general and metaphysical manner, not of some most specific form. Second, since separability is also considered by the mathematician in rational terms, and since Aristotle here speaks in a metaphysical mode, a metaphysical separability seems to be intended — that is, separability in reality and by reason. Third, a difference is posited between matter and form, and separability is attributed more to form; surely matter in reason and in reality is separable from each individual form, and therefore every form will be separable in the same way. Fourth, in *12 Metaph.* and *5 Metaph.*, substantial and accidental form are distinguished, and the substantial is affirmed to be separable while the accidental is not. If you deny that accidental form is separable by reason and in a qualified sense, you are plainly denying mathematical abstraction. Therefore you must concede that every substantial form is separable in reality and simply, if you grant that accidental form is not separable in reality and simply.

The proof of the consequence is as follows: because the separability that is conceded to substantial form in the cited passages is precisely the one denied to accidental form.

Second, he argues from *7 Metaph.* 4 and *12 Metaph.* 7: we say there is a difference between substantial and accidental form in that no accident is separable while substance is separable. If this difference is universal and rightly assigned, it follows that every substance is separable. But substantial form is substance; therefore every substantial form is separable — namely, by that kind of separation which does not belong to accidental form. And that kind is real separability, since rational separability is common to both substance and accident, and substance and accident are not distinguished by a separability that is common to both.

To both of these arguments together a response was given in *disp. 5 de Gen., qu. 2, art. 2, n. 69*. In the passages cited by Aristotle — especially in the second argument — he does not posit a difference between substantial form and accidental form such that the former is separable from matter and the latter is not, but rather posits a difference between substance on the one side and accident on the other, in this sense: that substance exists per se and is separable from accidents, whereas accidents have no being per se and cannot be separated from substance. This is how all commentators explain the matter, especially Scotus in his exposition of those texts and in *quol. 2* from the beginning — and the text speaks for itself. But from the fact that substance is separable from accidents and not vice versa, we frankly do not see how it can rightly be inferred that every substantial form is separable from matter. For it should rather be inferred that it is separable from its accidents. And it is in this sense that Aristotle speaks in other passages when he says that substance is separable — he means that substance is, of itself, separable

from accidents, and not that the substantial form is separable from matter. In those passages one must also note that this predicate "separable" is said principally of the composite and of primary substance insofar as it subsists per se, and of form only in a participative sense — insofar, namely, as form participates more in the actuality of the composite than matter does, as the Doctor says in *quodl.* 9, *M.* Finally, if Aristotle in the cited passages or elsewhere teaches that substantial form is separable in the sense intended by the arguer, that proposition must be taken indefinitely, not universally — just as the proposition in *1 Phys.* that "first principles are contraries" is taken — and this in order that Aristotle not contradict himself, since in *2 de Gen. animal.*, *cap. 3* he says that the sensitive and vegetative souls are inseparable, and only the intellect is separable; and in *8 Met. 3* and *6 Met. 1 and 2*, as Ferchius himself testifies in *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 6 and 7*, Aristotle openly teaches that not every substantial form is separable.

Since we first addressed the second argument, Ferchius in *lib. 3, cap. 9, n. 49* attacks our solution to it first, resolving the second argument into two syllogisms, and then says that we respond neither to the middle term, nor to the predicate, nor to the subject of the conclusion, nor to the matter, nor to the form. "But they say," he claims, "that the conclusion is a separability of substance from accident — they speak truly, but not to the point. For it is one thing to ask what is separable from what, which is contained in no term of the syllogism, and another to ask what kind of separability is concluded and to whom it belongs — and it is to this that they have not responded. Therefore they are not responding to the argument but to their own imagination."

This attack consists entirely of words and threats, in which he moreover contradicts himself. For he first concedes that it is true that what we say follows from the argument — namely, a separability of substance from accident — and immediately afterward says that what is concluded is not what is separable from what, but only what kind of separability it is and to whom it belongs. Furthermore, the conclusion which he set out to prove from the beginning of the chapter is this: that every substantial form is separable from matter in reality and by reason. And he begins to prove this through the first argument, by which he shows not only what kind of separability belongs to substantial form, but also from what it is separable — namely from matter, as he himself acknowledges afterward in *n. 50*. If, therefore, the second argument is directed at proving the same conclusion that he began to establish with the first argument, then it must prove not only what kind of separability belongs to form and to whom, but also from what it is separable — namely from matter. Otherwise the second argument will either prove nothing or prove insufficiently, because to prove the proposed conclusion it is not enough to show that substantial form is separable in reality and by reason — it must also be proved that it is separable in this way from matter. But this is not proved by the force of that second argument, because by it only separability from accidents is proved — for it is of that separability alone that Aristotle speaks in those texts, as even Ferchius himself admits.

Confirmation: because Aristotle in those texts proves not only what kind of separability belongs to substance taken universally — namely, of reality and reason — but also shows from what it is thus separable, namely from accidents. Therefore by the force of those texts Ferchius cannot show only the mode of separability of form — that is, in reality and by reason — but must also show what is separated from what, that is, from what it is separable in this way. Otherwise the argument would not even be drawn from the intention of the text, nor would it sufficiently prove the intended proposition — namely the assumed conclusion that every substantial form is separable from matter in reality and by reason. In that conclusion, as is apparent, both the mode of separability and the what-from-what must be proved simultaneously and at once. Therefore either his attack is not to the point, or his second argument does not prove what was intended — for it will prove only the mode of separability of substantial form, but not from what it is thus separable.

But even less to the point is the amazement he expresses at our words. When in the second section we say that we do not see how from the proved separability the separation of matter from form is inferred — it would be astonishing if we could see this in the second argument, since it was not written there by me. I did not write that consequence. Anyone can look at the printed *Vestigiones* and read them. So Ferchius plays — but the play falls back on him. For it is more astonishing that he saw us ascribing to that argument the inference of a separation of matter from form, since the discussion here is not of the separability of matter from form, but conversely of form from matter. And we say that from the separability of substance from accidents we do not see how it can rightly be inferred that every substantial form is separable from matter — for it should rather be inferred that it is separable from its accidents. These are our words, faithfully reproduced even by him — and this is the consequence we say cannot rightly be inferred by force of that argument, namely the separation of form from matter, not the separation of matter from form as he claims. We therefore saw and considered the consequence intended by him in his argument; it is he who did not see what stands written in our solution.

Furthermore, because we apply to the passages cited in the first argument the same solution given to the passages adduced in the second — namely, that Aristotle means that substance, insofar as it is of itself, is separable from accidents — Ferchius in *n. 50* attacks this gloss by showing that in the passages cited in the first argument the comparison is not between substance and accidents, but precisely between the substances themselves, and that by this especially form is distinguished from matter and the composite, since form is separable from matter and the composite — a separability which cannot belong to matter in the nature of potency, because potency is not separable from the act that measures it, as is written in the case of relational things concerning sensation and knowledge. Nor does it belong to the composite either, since the composite cannot be separated from its parts. If Aristotle were speaking of separability with

respect to accidents, he would not by such separability rightly distinguish form from matter and the composite — for such separability is common to the three substances: matter, form, and the composite. It is not proper to act itself. He establishes all this by weighing the three texts cited in the first argument.

The first authority from *7 Metaph. 15* (though it is found in *5 Metaph.*, not 7): "It thus happens that substance is spoken of in two ways: the ultimate subject, which is not predicated of anything else; and that which, when the whatness is present, is also separable — and such is the form and species of each thing." The two things signified by the term "substance" are: one, the ultimate subject, which in *7 Metaph. 7* is divided into matter, form, and the composite; the other, one of these three — namely form, which has two conditions, quiddity and separability, and when compared to the remaining two substances (matter and the composite) is distinguished from them by separability and by whatness.

The second authority from *7 Metaph. 8*: "From these speculations it follows that substance is matter — but this is impossible, for the separable and the whatness are thought to belong most properly to substance, and for this reason form and what is composed of both seems to be more truly substance than matter." It is clear from the text that only the three substances are being compared with each other, with no word said about accident. And Aristotle proves through quiddity and separability that form is more truly substance than matter. If he were speaking of separability from accidents, this would be common to all three substances being compared, and not proper to form — and therefore would prove nothing. Furthermore, quiddity belongs to form alone, in its relation to matter which it specifies and to the composite which it constitutes. Therefore separability too belongs to form alone, in relation to the composite, without which it can exist of itself — just as what is prior in reality can exist without what is posterior. Therefore form likewise has separability from matter.

The third authority from *12 Metaph. 26* similarly posits form as separable in comparison to the substances, not to accident, and this falls under the same headings: "For act is form, if it be separable — that which is from both; privation is, as darkness, or as sick; but potency is matter, for this is what can become both." Act is compared to potency and the composite; the comparison is among substances, as is clear. And act is said to be form if it is separable — whereby separability is attributed to act alone and not to the composite, because the composite cannot be separated from its parts; nor to matter in the nature of potency, because potency is not separable from the act that measures it. If separability with respect to accidents were meant, it would be common to all three substances and not proper to act itself.

Concerning this exposition of the three texts by Ferchius, I will say what he himself says of ours: it is an unarmed exposition, his own words — supported by no authority, no argument, and produced from his own head. And primarily this his exposition contradicts what he has in forming the first argument in *vestig. 6*,

lib. 1, cap. 2. For there he says that in those texts the comparison is made only among substances, with not a word said about accidents. But in the fourth observation there he says that in *12 Met.* and *5 Met.*, substantial and accidental form are distinguished, and the substantial is affirmed to be separable while the accidental is not. Therefore, by his own admission, in those texts the comparison is not made only among substances with regard to separability, but also between substance and accident.

Furthermore, here he says that the separability spoken of in these texts is proper to form and does not belong to matter or the composite — indeed, that form is distinguished from them by this very separability. But in the third observation there, he says that in those texts a difference is posited between matter and form, and separability is attributed more to form, since matter in reality and by reason is separable from individual forms. Therefore every form will in like manner be separable. By these words Ferchius plainly concedes that the separability spoken of in those texts is indeed common to matter and form, but belongs more to form, and by this form is distinguished from matter.

Again, here he denies that separability from form belongs to matter, because potency is not separable from the act that measures it. But in that same third observation he manifestly concedes that matter in reality and by reason is separable from individual forms.

But furthermore I show that this exposition is not in accordance with the intention of the text. For in the first passage — namely *5 Metaph. 15* — either he speaks of separability as it is common to all substance, or in a sense far different from that which Ferchius devises. And I prove this not by expounding that text from my own head, as he does, but with Alensis and Scotus. For Alensis expounds it as follows: Aristotle there reduces all modes of substance to two. In one way, substance is said to be as the ultimate subject — that is, primary substance, since the whole resolution of the category rests in it. In another way, substance is said of whatever is such that through it something is a being, and through which it is separable and distinct from another — and what is thus called substance is form and the species of each thing. For each thing is a being through form, since form is the reason for being, and each thing is also distinguished from everything else through form — since the same thing that is the principle of being is the principle of distinguishing. For it is through the same form by which a human is a human that a human is not a donkey. So Alensis, from whose exposition it is apparent that separability is taken by Aristotle, on this reading, in a sense far different from what Ferchius intends — for form is called separable insofar as what is constituted through it is separated and distinguished from anything else. And with this exposition the exposition of Scotus also agrees, who says on the same text that Aristotle there reduces all the aforesaid modes of substance to two: in one mode, substance is that according to which it is called the ultimate subject — that is, primary substance, which is subjected in such a way that it is not further

predicated of another, and which is "this something" existing as it were per se and separable, that is, distinct from all others. In another mode, what is called substance in a second sense is the form and species of each thing. So Scotus, in agreement with Alensis, differing only in this — that he attributes separability to substance in the first signification, as primary substance, and not to form. Hence, even if Ferchius contends that separability here is not taken as distinction or distinguishability, as Alensis and Scotus expound it, but in the sense he pretends, he still does not have what he wants — because such separability is attributed to substance in the first signification, that is, as the ultimate subject. And since *7 Met.* 7 divides this into matter, form, and the composite, the talk here will not be of a separability from matter that is proper to form, but of a separability common to the three substances — which is separability from accident. Nor should Ferchius retreat to his customary evasion of saying that this is not Scotus's exposition but one transcribed from Antonius Andreas by Aquinas, for it is rather transcribed from Alensis. And even if that exposition were conceded not to be Scotus's but Antonius Andreas's, this is sufficient to make it preferable to his — because, just as he says that one Aristotle is worth more than ten Majorones in *lib. 3, pag. 327, n. 69*, so I say that one Aragonius is worth more than a thousand, indeed a hundred thousand, Ferchiuses.

In the second passage — namely *7 Met. 8* — it is also sufficiently clear from the very words of the context that Aristotle there is not speaking of some separability proper to form, but of one common at least to form and the composite. For through "separable" and "whatness" — what is thought to belong most properly to substance — he proves that form and the composite are more truly substance than matter. But so that this not seem to be an exposition from my own head, let Alensis and Scotus be heard. Alensis says: "In this part, since he had proved according to the opinion of others that matter was most truly substance, he here shows that this is not true, but that the composite and form are more truly substance than matter. And his reasoning is as follows: it belongs to the nature of substance to be separable and to be this something subsisting in itself; but this belongs more to the composite and to form than to matter; therefore they are more truly substance than matter." So Alensis, with whom Scotus in agreement expounds the same text: "He argues against the stated opinions, showing that matter is not most truly substance — by this reasoning: of the nature of substance there seem to be two marks, namely that it be separable from others and that it be this something. But matter is not such; therefore matter is not most truly substance." So Scotus. From these it appears that here the discussion is about separability as common to all substance, and that by it form and the composite are proved to be more truly substances, because such separability belongs more to form and the composite than to matter — as Ferchius himself concedes in *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 2* in forming the first argument in the third observation.

From this the argument by which Ferchius was trying to prove here that the discussion is about a separability proper to form is easily dissolved. He argued

thus: Aristotle proves form to be more truly substance than matter through quiddity and separability; if he were speaking of separability from accidents, this is common to the three substances being compared and not proper to form — and therefore would prove nothing. But the assumption is false, because as is clear from the express words of the text, it is not form alone that is proved to be more truly substance than matter, but also the composite: "for the separable and the whatness are thought to belong most properly to substance, and for this reason form and that which is from both seems to be more truly substance than matter." Although Aristotle speaks of separability as it is common to the three substances being compared, he still rightly concludes that form and the composite are more truly substances, because they are more separable and are "this something" more than matter — as Ferchius himself was saying in *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 2* in forming the first argument in the third observation.

In the third passage from *12 Metaph. 26*, there is likewise no discussion of a separability proper to form — because separability is attributed there to form and composite alike: "For act is form, if it be separable — that which is from both." And so both form and the composite are separable acts. He therefore speaks of that separability which is common to all substance, by which substance as a genus is distinguished from accident. Of this separability he had spoken in the immediately preceding *tex. 25*: "And since some things are separable and others are not, those are substance." Indeed, if we are again willing to attend to the Scotist and Alensian exposition, in none of these senses does Aristotle speak of the separability of act — but in the sense of the Platonists, as can be seen in those authors. And finally, even if he were speaking of the separability of form in Ferchius's sense, nothing certain can be deduced from it, because he speaks conditionally: "For act is form, if it be separable."

From all this it is therefore established that when Aristotle says that form is separable, he must be understood either as speaking of separability from accidents, which is common to all substance, or certainly in a sense different from that which Ferchius fabricated from his own head without the support of argument or of any authority.

The Third and Fourth Arguments

Third, Ferchius argues principally in *8 Met. 8*, in a most forceful manner, while Aristotle is discussing the substance that is form: "It is necessary," he says, "that this be either eternal, or that it has been destroyed without being corrupted, and made without being generated. It has been shown and declared elsewhere that no one makes form, nor is it generated, but this comes to be, and what is from both." In this authority, observe the first part, in which the Philosopher draws the following disjunction: it is necessary that substantial form either be eternal, or that it be something made without being generated and corrupted without being corrupted. But the second part of this disjunction is simply false — namely that

something is made without coming-to-be and corrupted without passing-away. Therefore the first part is true, which says that every substantial form is eternal.

One could respond that this disjunction is not exhaustive — for first, form is not eternal; second, it is not generated without generation; but third, the truth is that form is generated, but by generation. Against this Aristotle insists in the second part, saying it has been shown elsewhere that no one makes form, and that form does not come to be. He says rightly, for he demonstrated this in *7 Met.* from 26 to 32, as I shall say shortly. Therefore the composite comes to be, while form does not come to be — unless it comes to be without coming-to-be and is corrupted without passing-away.

Fourth, he argues that Aristotle in *12 Met.* 12 and in *7 Met.* 26, 27, 32 demonstrates that matter and form do not come to be. For if form comes to be, and everything that comes to be comes to be from matter and form, then form will come to be from another form and matter from another matter, and so on to infinity. So the Philosopher — from which gather that form comes to be only per accidens. If therefore the accidents that accompany form come to be, form will be said to come to be; if they do not come to be, it will not be said to come to be.

Since by a similar or the same argument it was concluded in *1 Phys.* 82 that matter is not generable or corruptible, a great many infer from this that matter is perennial even if composites arise and perish. It is equally right to affirm the same of form — that it is perennial — since the same ungenerability was concluded for both, and by the same demonstration.

In response: first, these two arguments are not original or proper but entirely common. For the first argument, whose force consists in this — that only the composite comes to be and form does not come to be — is brought forward by all Metaphysicians in *7 Met.* in the question whether only the composite is generated primarily and per se, where they also declare in what sense Aristotle in the cited place is to be understood when he says that the composite comes to be and not the form. It is also brought forward by Pererius in *lib. 6 de forma, cap. 3*, in that doubt whether all physical forms are generable and corruptible, in these words: "But someone will say that Aristotle in *7 Met.* and *12* affirms that neither matter nor form is generated, but only the whole composite — and therefore no form is generable." And he responds that by those words Aristotle meant to signify that form is not generated per se and separately from matter, but that it is generated in matter — which is nothing other than the composite itself being generated. The same argument is also used by St. Bonaventure in *2 d. 7, a. 2, q. 1*, to prove that form is not produced by nature — and he responds in the same way.

The other argument too is brought forward in just those terms by all Metaphysicians in the aforesaid question, and through it they prove not indeed that form is simply ungenerable and incorruptible as Ferchius does, but that it is not generated or corrupted per se and primarily — because everything that is

generated in this way is generated from matter as from a part of itself, but form does not have matter as a part of itself. See Scotus, Antonius Andreas, Soncinas, and others in that question.

To both of these arguments, since they nearly coincide with each other, we gave nearly the same response in *disp. 5 de gener., qu. 2, art. 2, n. 70 and 71*: that Aristotle in those passages does not deny absolutely that form comes to be, but denies that it comes to be in the way the composite does — namely per se and primarily, and as something existing and subsisting per se. For what comes to be in this way comes to be from matter and form — and therefore by this reasoning the absolute and unqualified ungenerability of form in every sense is not concluded, but only ungenerability per se, of the kind that belongs to the composite.

Ferchius attacks this solution: first, because in our account of the third argument we omitted a large part of the text from 8 *Met.*, *tex. 8*, by which our response is refuted. Then in *n. 61*, because when the verb "comes to be" is predicated as a second predicate, it signifies coming-to-be simply; when as a third predicate, it signifies coming to be as such-and-such, or so much, or otherwise, depending on what the third addition requires. But in 12 *Met. 12*, the text places "comes to be" as a second predicate after the statement that neither matter nor form comes to be. Therefore form does not come to be simply according to its own proper being, but comes to be in a qualified sense in another — namely through its accident which comes to be in another.

Ferchius has many more things in defense of this third and fourth argument and in attack on our solution — and particularly in defense of the third he makes several observations concerning *tex. 8* from *lib. 8 Met.* — which I neither care to transcribe here nor attack, because our solution to this and the other texts is approved and indeed given by him elsewhere — namely in *vestig. 1, cap. 17, n. 50*. Hence either his solution is not good, not efficacious, and of no moment — or his attack on it is of no moment.

And so in the cited place, *vestig. 1, cap. 17, n. 49*, Pererius and Piccolomini argue, according to Ferchius, that there is no creation in Aristotle, because Aristotle and the Peripatetics think it evidently demonstrated in 1 *Phys. 82* that prime matter is eternal — since if it had ever been produced, it would have had to be produced from some subject, so that before prime matter there would be another matter, and so on to infinity. Ferchius, responding to this argument in *n. 50*, rebukes these authors for having said that the eternity of matter is asserted in 1 *Phys. 82* (in which he plainly contradicts himself, conceding the same thing as Contarini in *lib. 1 Defens., cap. 2*, at the end, *n. 16*, as I noted above in *n. 138*) in these words: "I am amazed that men otherwise learned should say from *tex. 82 of 1 Phys.* that the eternity of matter is asserted, when the text does not call matter eternal — and rightly so, because by the same reasoning every form would be said to be eternal. Since in 7 *divin. 32* the coming-to-be of form is denied just as the coming-to-be of matter is denied. For a bronze sphere comes to be, but not sphere or bronze —

bronze always being required to pre-exist together with form, etc. And in the same *7 tex. 26 and 27* he extended this reasoning proving that neither matter nor form comes to be, so as not to concede infinite regress. He does the same in *12 Met. 12*, and with the same proposition: everything that comes to be comes from some subject and something comes to be — which is true of the composite. And most clearly in *8 Met.* concerning form, he says: it is necessary that this be either eternal, or that it has been destroyed without being corrupted, and made without being generated; it has been shown and declared elsewhere that no one makes form, nor is it generated, but this comes to be, and what is from both."

"If therefore these Peripatetics," says Ferchius, "suppose that from the negation of coming-to-be and perishing the eternity is rightly inferred, then since Aristotle in so many passages denies that form comes to be or perishes, the consequence is that every form is eternal — which is absurd. Therefore one must say with Aristotle that form comes to be without coming-to-be, and is corrupted without passing-away; for properly speaking, coming-to-be and passing-away belong to composites. In this way matter and form do not come to be — but in another way form comes to be, namely through coming-to-be in general, through which coming-to-be matter also comes to be. Certainly Aristotle for the same reason denied that matter and form come to be — so that if they come to be from something, an infinite regress would not follow. Thus special coming-to-be, which is from a pre-existing part, is attributed to the composite; but it is equally removed from form and from matter. Common coming-to-be — whether from a pre-existing part or not — doubtless belongs to form, and we judge that matter comes to be in the same way." So Ferchius there.

Now compare this argument of Ferchius with the third and fourth of those twelve which he writes in *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 2*, and you will see that the reasoning is entirely the same, drawn from the same texts, to infer the same absurd conclusion (as he himself calls it) — that every form is eternal. If then this consequence, that every form is eternal, is absurd by his own admission, those two arguments — the third and fourth — will also be absurd and not so efficacious as he later exaggerates in *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 2* and *lib. 3 Defens., cap. 9* — unless perhaps they are very pressing in *vestig. 6* but not in *vestig. 1*, by virtue of the change of location.

Compare also his response to these arguments in *vestig. 1, n. 50* with our response reported above, and you will see that they are the same in substance. Therefore if his solution is good, ours is too — unless perhaps it is good and precious in his mouth, but not in ours. And if he, in citing the authority from *8 Met., tex. 8*, did not omit the part of the text by which his own response could be refuted, neither did we commit this fault — but we cited as much as was necessary for the force of the argument, since we report the entire and complete text just as he himself reports it in *vestig. 1, n. 50*. Therefore when he also attacks our solution by proving that form does not simply come to be according to its own proper being, he is attacking his own solution too — given in *vestig. 1, n. 50* to the same argument —

in which he also concedes that form truly comes to be simply according to its own being, through common coming-to-be, though not through special coming-to-be which is proper to composites. Therefore in attacking our solution he is destroying his own as well, with which ours coincides. This makes apparent what we have said repeatedly — that Ferchius does not care if he contradicts himself, so long as he can attack us.

Nevertheless, to speak the truth, he neither attacks his own solution well nor destroys ours — if the doctrine by which he responds to a certain reply of Piccolomini in the cited place, *vestig. 1, cap. 17, n. 49*, is true. For Ferchius says there that Aristotle denied that matter comes to be in *1 Phys. 82* insofar as coming-to-be is proper to composites — namely from a pre-existing part — whereas common coming-to-be is not positioned in the reasoning. But against this, as he argues on behalf of Piccolomini, Aristotle's reasoning, by which he proves that matter does not come to be, would then have been guilty of the fallacy of the consequent — for from the fact that matter cannot be properly generated or corrupted, he would simply and absolutely infer that it is not generated or does not perish.

Ferchius responds that there is no fallacy here: when a word is uttered absolutely, it stands for its famous and proper signification. Therefore when Aristotle infers that matter is ungenerable and incorruptible, he infers this absolutely and without any fallacy.

From this his own doctrine his attack on our solution — and indeed on his own — is undermined. For when the verb "comes to be" is uttered absolutely and predicated as a second predicate, it stands for its famous and proper signification — which is the coming-to-be that belongs to the composite in the manner of a subsisting and self-standing thing. And therefore when in *12 Met. 12* it is said that "neither matter nor form comes to be," what is removed from form is not common and absolutely taken coming-to-be, but the special coming-to-be that is proper to the composite — which is the common response and exposition of that text, as well as of the others to the same effect from *6 Met. 25 and 27*.

The Fifth Argument

Fifth, he argues in the same *cap. 9, n. 8*: in *1 de anim., tex. 12 and 13* it is taught that if form has a proper operation in which it does not share with what has a body, then form can be separated from matter. But every substantial form has a proper operation in which matter does not share — since in *2 de ortu et interitu 53* it is said that it is proper to matter to suffer and receive, while acting belongs to the power of another, namely form. And in *1 Met., sum 2, cap. 2*, it is most openly taught that matter cannot transform itself. Therefore form acts, while matter in no way acts — and therefore does not share in form's proper operation. But because this argument did not seem sufficiently formal, Ferchius reduces it to formal shape in *lib. 3 Defens., cap. 9, n. 62*, for a reason I will explain shortly.

In response: neither is this argument new or produced by his own labor — it was long foreseen and turned back by others. First by St. Bonaventure in *2 dist. 19, art. 1, qu. 2*, where he asks whether any soul, even the brute soul, was immortal by its original condition, and argues for the negative part as follows: no form is separable from the body unless it has a proper operation apart from the body; but no brute spirit is of this kind; therefore, etc. The major is manifest from the Philosopher in *1 de anim.* Then the same argument is also retorted by Pererius in the already cited place: if material forms were to subsist outside of matter, would they do anything? If nothing, they would be idle. If something, either that action would be a physical motion — but no physical motion can exist without matter — or it would not. Therefore neither would those forms be physical. And so Ferchius took the motivation of the argument from St. Bonaventure and added a true major of his own, together with a false minor which he proved by a very well-worn authority from *2 de ortu et interitu 53* — that it is proper to matter to suffer, and to form to act — though it does little to the point.

To this argument we respond briefly in *disp. 5 de gen., n. 72*: it proves more than its author wishes. For it proves not only that accidental form as well is separable, since it too has in this sense a proper operation in which it does not share with matter — for heat in water does not share in heating with that water — but it also proves that a material form once separated would not be idle but would carry out its proper operation, the opposite of which the same author teaches in that same chapter. We therefore say that all material forms share in their operations with matter — because since they are extended, they cannot operate in an unextended manner, and they do not have such a mode except in matter. Hence even if it is proper to form to act, it is nonetheless not in proximate potency to act except when it is in matter.

Ferchius attacks this solution: first, he denies that his argument concludes that accidental form also is separable and has a proper operation in which it does not share with matter — because from the foundations posited in *cap. 2 of vestig. 6*, accident is an instrument of substantial form in acting. Therefore in every action of an accident, as of an instrument, the substantial form or the composite is the principal agent. But when substantial form acts, prime matter is not the principal agent with respect to the action elicited by the substantial form. Nor is the ratio the same for substantial and accidental form, because accident receives being and acting from its matter in which it is found (*7 Met. 2*: accidents are of being, etc.), while substantial form gives being to matter itself, though it does not communicate acting to it — since matter gives neither being nor acting to substantial form. To the proof that water does not share in the action of heat, he says we are begging the question — because heat received in matter is not an instrument of the form of water but of the form of fire previously existing in matter. He concedes, however, that it follows from this that a separated form would not be idle, and denies that he taught the opposite in that *cap. 2 of vestig. 6*. Finally, as to our solution in itself, he says that his argument states that form does

not share its proper operation with matter. But extension is not prime matter but a certain accident and instrument of the operating form — and therefore nothing to the point. Also, a principal cause shares its operation with an instrumental cause — it does not follow that it therefore shares its operation with matter itself. Furthermore, to share one's proper operation with matter would be for matter to be a cooperating instrument of form, as feet cooperate with the motive power in walking (*2 de gen. animal., cap. 3*) and the pupil cooperates with sight in producing sensation (*2 de anim. 9*). This is clear from *1 de anim. 12 and 13*. "But you," he says, "instead of its cooperating instrumentally, wish that the operation is communicated to matter because form operates in matter. Does not the rational soul also operate in matter by understanding and willing? Does it therefore communicate these operations to the body and to matter? Certainly not. What you say about proximate potency is not to the point — we are discussing the communication of the operation of form to matter; you are discussing the condition constituting the operative principle in proximate potency."

But in the first place, he wrongly denies that accidental form has a proper operation with respect to which it stands as principal agent simply and absolutely speaking. For as the Doctor notes in *4 d. 12, q. 3*: "I say, therefore, that although in respect of the generative action of substance an accident can concur only as an instrument of substance by disposing toward the terminus of the principal agent, nevertheless in respect of the productive action of another accident it is the principal agent, not an instrumental one, and acts by its own power, not by the power of the substance." As the Doctor declares in the cited place, lit. C, concerning that common authority from *2 de anim. 50* — that heat is an instrument of the soul — he says that in nutrition there are two actions and two principles of acting: with respect to the preceding alteration the principle of acting is heat; with respect to the induction of the form of flesh the principle is the soul or the form of flesh. And the first agent is called an instrument with respect to the second, not properly through the subordination of one power to another, but of one effect to another — so that it would more properly be called a disposing agent than an instrumental one. And this has been sufficiently proved in the cited *disp. Phys.*, so that Ferchius cannot say in his accustomed manner that we beg the question also in this point — namely that an accident can be a principal agent in the production of another accident, in which consists the force of the retortion of that argument.

And in this sense we say that heat existing in water heats the hand as a principal agent, not as an instrument of the form of fire by which it was produced — because that fire may be absent or destroyed, so that in heating the hand it is not the instrument of the form of fire nor of the form of water, but a principal agent, as the Doctor clearly shows in the cited place. Hence the retortion of the argument still stands in its force, since in truth the accidental form is a principal agent having a proper operation proceeding sufficiently from its own power in

the production of another accident — for that effect does not in truth exceed such productive power.

Whether Ferchius said in *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 2* that a separated substantial form would be idle in such a state, or whether we rather imposed this on him — anyone can verify by reading what he has at the end of that chapter, where he speaks as follows: "If you resist, saying that forms would be idle — lacking their proper accidents and unable to act or suffer — they would therefore be in vain. One can respond that what is in vain must be conceded for the whole species but need not be denied for some individual. For there is always some form of any species in perfect act — but no individual form is in vain. For if it never came to perfect act, it would be in vain. It is sufficient if at an opportune time it operates at least once — just as the argumentative faculty, after the living being reaches perfect stature, no longer acts, and yet is not in vain." By these words Ferchius plainly concedes that a separated substantial form would be idle and would do nothing — though it is not in vain, because it operated once at an opportune time when it had its proper accidents. From this I do not see on what ground he denies having asserted this in that chapter.

The attack on our solution, however, consists in this: it is false that the communication of form with matter in its proper operation occurs only if matter is a cooperating instrument of form — as feet cooperate with the motive power in walking, and the pupil with sight in producing sensation. This is indeed one mode by which the operation of form is communicated to a body as instrument — and this communication prevents the separability of form if it necessarily operates through determined organs of the body. But there are other modes of communication of form's operations with matter that prevent its separability. Hence commentators commonly, on the cited texts *12 and 13 of 1 de anim.*, note that a form can share in its operation with matter in three or four ways, any one of which is sufficient to prevent separability.

First: an operation is communicated to the body as to an instrument, and this is the operation exercised by the soul in a determined part of the body through a bodily organ — as sight, hearing, etc.

Second: an operation is called common not because it is exercised through an organ, but because it presupposes an operation performed through an organ — and in this way understanding in us in our present state can be said to be a common operation in this mode, because it presupposes the operation of the phantasy, which is an organic power.

Third: an operation is called common when it belongs to the whole in such a way that it pertains not only to some part and organ but to the entire living being and in all its parts — as nourishing, growing, etc. And thus in non-living things also, an operation is called common and not proper to form — because the operation belongs primarily to the whole and not to the form: as ignition, for this operation

belongs per se and adequately to the whole fire as the principal and adequate agent, and not to the form of fire itself.

Fourth and finally: an operation is called common and not proper to form when the proximate and adequate recipient of the operation is not form alone but what is constituted of matter and form — in which way any sensitive operation is said to be primarily of the composite of matter and form as of the proper recipient. For the soul itself is not the immediate recipient of vision with respect to the organ, which is composite of soul and a determined bodily part — as is clear from the beginning of *de sensu et sensato*. And therefore the separated soul cannot sense, because it lacks the proximate recipient of sensation which is the organ, as the Doctor noted in *quol. 9, lit. G and H*.

Hence Trombeta in *quaest. de immortal. anim., art. 1, concl. 6*, proving the immortality and separability of the soul from *tex. 1 de anim.*, says that understanding is the soul's proper operation because it does not communicate it to the body — for understanding is not received in the body but in the intellect alone, and it does not elicit that operation through the body as an organic power. Therefore form is not said precisely to communicate its operation to matter as to an instrumental cause — as the soul communicates the sensitive operation to the body — but also because the operation is said to belong adequately to the whole as its adequately active principle, and also sometimes as its recipient if the action is immanent. And thus because every operation of a material form, as extended and corporeal, belongs adequately to the whole composite — as ignition belongs to fire — therefore no material form is said to have a proper operation, but is said to share with matter in operating. For just as it necessarily depends on matter in being, so also in operating — as the Doctor notes in *4 dist. 1, q. 1, lit. hh. and ii*.

Moreover, this is the meaning properly intended by Aristotle in the cited *1 de anim. 12*. He says: "There is a difficulty as to whether the passions of the soul are all common to what has soul, or whether some are proper to the soul itself." By "what has soul" he does not mean matter, but the whole composite — so that those operations are called common which necessarily belong to the whole conjunct. Hence if form has some operation that necessarily belongs to the whole conjunct, it will not be separable. And since this is the case for every material form — since its operation necessarily belongs to the whole composite — it follows that every such form is inseparable.

Hence even if the argument is formulated as he reformulates it in *lib. 3, cap. 9, n. 62*, it still does not press. For the major premise he assumes — "whatever form has a proper work in which it does not share with the matter that has it, that form can be separated from matter, according to *1 de anim. 12 and 13*" — is not rightly gathered from these texts. For as I said, Aristotle by "what has soul" does not mean matter but the whole composite. Nor is form said to share its operation with matter only if it communicates its operation to matter as to an instrumental cause. Rather it is sufficiently said to share its operation when its operation

necessarily belongs to the whole composite and cannot, owing to its extension, be exercised except in matter. And in this sense the minor premise is false — "but every substantial form has a proper work in which it does not share with prime matter." And finally, his proof is also false: that it is proper to matter to suffer and to form to act proves only that form does not share its operation with matter in the sense of communicating it to it as to an instrumental cause — but does not prove that form cannot be said to share in the other sense already explained, insofar as, just as it depends on matter in being, so also in operating. In this sense even the soul in understanding in the body cannot be said to share in that operation with matter, because although in our present state it understands in the body, it does not do so dependently on the body, neither as on a principle that elicits understanding nor on one that receives it.

Ferchius deliberately forms this fifth argument in *lib. 3 Defens., cap. 9, n. 62* in a different way from how he had previously formed it in *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 2* — speaking here both in the major and in the minor only of prime matter and not of body, as he had done previously. For if he had used the term "body," his attack would not have been to the point — since it consists entirely in this, that form cannot communicate its operation to matter as to an instrument. This, though perhaps true of prime matter, is not true of organized matter — since the soul as principal cause communicates to a part of the body the power of operating, or its operation, which it uses as an instrument in exercising its sensation: as feet are used for walking, and the pupil for vision, etc. And therefore, so that his attack might have force, he deliberately, in *lib. 3, n. 62*, exchanged the word "body" that he had put in the argument in *vestig. 6, n. 8* for "prime matter."

The Sixth Argument

Sixth, Ferchius argues: one contrary cannot receive or affect another (*1 Phys. 51* and *12 Met. 6* and *2 de gen. et corrup. 5*). The corruptible and the incorruptible are contraries (*18 Met., c. ult.*). Therefore if matter is incorruptible and form corruptible, one contrary would receive another, and two contraries would remain together. So he formulates this sixth argument in *lib. 3, n. 54*.

This argument too is touched upon by Metaphysicians in *10 Met., q. 3 and ult.*, where they debate whether the corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus and well explain in what sense contraries are so called. It is also touched upon by some commentators on *1 Phys.* in the question whether all principles are contraries — proving this contrariety to be found also between matter and form, because one is corruptible and the other incorruptible. Finally it is adduced by the Averroists to prove that the rational soul is not an informing form, as can be seen in Faber, *theor. 67, cap. 1*.

In response: this argument proves more than its author wishes, in *disp. 5 de gen., n. 73*. For it would prove in the same way that the rational soul cannot be received in the body as in a subject, since the body is corruptible; nor that light and motion

can be in the heavens; nor that intellects and volitions can be in angels; nor that certain accidents can be in matter — all of which are incorruptible forms received in incorruptible subjects. One must therefore say that the corruptible and the incorruptible are not properly speaking contraries, as Zerbo notes in *10 Metaph.*, q. ult., ad 1 princ. — which is especially true if they are said to differ in logical genus, because contraries properly so taken agree in genus and differ in species, as their definition makes clear. They are called contraries insofar as they are greatly diverse and have in some way opposed reasons, and differ according to power and impotence, as Alensis and Scotus explain there. In this sense act and potency would be said to be opposed and contrary — and yet one is received in the other. The argument therefore equivocates concerning contraries taken strictly and rigorously.

Ferchius, in *lib. 3, cap. 9, n. 64*, first responds to the sequence of inconveniences in these words: "I say you have willingly forgotten what was posited in *cap. 2*: that substantial forms and substantial composites are incorruptible according to their purely substantial being, and corruptible according to their accidental being. Therefore, unless you beg the question, the soul as a substantial form is in material substance as something incorruptible in an incorruptible subject." Second, he says that "I said that substantial form is in an incorruptible subject — I did not say that it is received. For even though substantial form is separable and does not need matter for its being — indeed it rather contains, terminates, and perfects matter, giving it its being — nevertheless since substantial form has nothing driving it away, no substantial form is separated from matter of itself, but only per accidens. Therefore neither is it received in matter except per accidens."

Third, he says: "You who hold the opinion that the rational soul is mortal — according to Aristotle — are most pressed by this argument. For according to you, the form of corporeity and the rational soul are corruptible in incorruptible matter. I therefore infer against you that one contrary is received per se in another that is contrary to it, and two contraries remain together at the same time. Your remaining instances should recall to you one proposition: contraries are under the same predicament. What is in one predicament does not have contrariety with what is in another. In the elementary textbooks you could have learned this in *tract. 3*: contraries are those which, placed under the same genus, are maximally distant from each other. And Aristotle affirmed this in the *Praedicamenta* on quality, in *10 Met. 14, 1 de Gen. 50 and 51*. The generable and the ungenerable in the same genus of substance are therefore contraries — so too the corruptible and the incorruptible. But a corruptible accident and an incorruptible substance are not in the same predicament — therefore accident and substance are not contraries, and the instances are not to the point."

He then rejects our solution to the argument, because the major — "one contrary cannot receive or affect another" — holds also for contraries taken broadly, since Aristotle speaks of these in *1 Phys. 41 and 43, 50, 51, and 56* where he takes

contraries as privatively opposed and says that one does not affect the other, nor does one receive the other. Hence even if the corruptible and incorruptible were only broadly contraries, it still rightly follows that one is not received in the other. He further adds that it is false that these are not truly and per se contraries — for, he says, the corruptible and incorruptible are in the same genus, which you were unwilling to read in *10 Metaph., c. ult.* They are per se contraries, not per accidents, because they are under the same genus and under different species, and they are not in the same thing because of the determination of an internal nature. "But out of reverence for the three Doctors you cited, I pass over this; I have only shown that your solution does not solve, and that you assume that the corruptible and incorruptible are not under the same genus — which is against the text."

But I show that Ferchius does not well escape the inconveniences drawn from his argument, and that those three assertions of his are false. For in *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 2, n. 4* he said that substantial forms are incorruptible according to their substantial being — but he did not say this of substantial composites. Nor do those who posit co-eternal sketches in matter say this. For even though they posit that form precedes in matter according to its total or partial being, they hold that upon the arrival of dispositions, form is newly united to matter and the composite is thereby substantially newly generated — and not only according to accidental being, as is clear from what was said in the preceding question, *art. 3*. Therefore it is rather he who has forgotten what he said there, not us.

Furthermore, he falsely denies having said that form is received in the subject, and falsely affirms that he said that substantial form is in the subject — for in this his sixth argument, as formulated both in *vestig. 6, cap. 2, n. 9* and in *lib. 3, cap. 9, n. 64*, he consistently uses the verb "received" and "to receive," and from the fact that form is received in matter which is incorruptible he contends that form too is incorruptible — for otherwise one contrary would be received in another.

The third assertion is also false — and a sheer imposition — that we hold the rational soul to be simply and absolutely mortal according to Aristotle, as is evident from *disp. 1 de Anim., q. 10*. The book is printed and can be consulted.

We taught that contraries are under the same predicament not only in *disp. 9 Log., qu. 1, art. 1* — where we treated this ex professo — but also in that very solution of his argument which he himself verbatim reports in *n. 65*, where we say that contraries properly speaking agree in genus and differ in species, as their definition makes clear. There was therefore no need for him to send us by way of mockery and contempt to learn this in *tract. 4 Summul.* — rather he himself needs to learn not to contradict himself so frequently in nearly the same page. For here under *n. 65* he says that the generable and the ungenerable in the genus of substance are properly contraries, and in *n. 67* in the seventh argument immediately following, he says that nothing is contrary to substance — which is a manifest contradiction. But he cares little about contradicting himself, so long as he can contradict us by fair means or foul.

The attack on our solution is also frivolous. For it is false that the major assumed in the argument — that one contrary cannot receive another — is verified for all contraries even taken broadly. Although it is verified for some taken in this way, as for privatively opposed contraries (about which Aristotle speaks in *1 Phys.*, cited place), it is not verified for all. Hence Aquarius on *qu. 8 of Ferrariensis* holds that matter and form too are principles contrary to each other, because they have certain conditions in opposition — for they are opposed as act and potency, perfect and imperfect, base and beautiful, etc. He says, however, that it does not conflict with those having such contrariety to exist simultaneously and for one to be received in another — but only for those having positive or privative contrariety.

It also remains false that the corruptible and incorruptible are per se and properly contraries. For then in the genus of substance there would be contrariety — which he himself denies even in this very position, as will be clear from the following argument. Also because he could have learned from the tract on opposites in *Summul.*, *cap. 3* — to which he referred us — that the principal condition of contraries is that, placed under the same genus, they should be found alternately in the same susceptible subject, mutually driving each other out. This cannot belong to matter and form, since matter is the subject of form. Hence even if one is corruptible and the other incorruptible, they are not to be reckoned as properly contraries. It is also false that we assume in the argument that the corruptible and incorruptible are not under the same genus — for we taught the opposite long ago ex professo in *disp. 7 Log.*, *qu. 1, art. 1*, when we placed Angels in the predicament of substance along with other corruptible substances.

Our response is this: one must say that the corruptible and the incorruptible are not properly speaking contraries, as Zerbo notes in *10 Met.*, *qu. ult., in sol. ad 1 princ.* — which is especially true if they are said to differ in logical genus, etc. We add this because of Zerbo, who says in the cited place that the corruptible and incorruptible do not divide any genus, so as to be immediately under the same genus, but immediately divide being itself, which is not a genus. And as is apparent, our statement is conditional: "if they are said to differ in logical genus." But it is Ferchius's familiar practice to attribute to us absolutely what we say conditionally — as will immediately become apparent from the following argument.

As for his claim that he could prove the corruptible and incorruptible to be properly and per se contraries, but refrains from doing so out of reverence for the three Doctors we cited — when I read this, I could not help bursting into laughter. Anyone can see throughout the entire book of the *Defensio* how much reverence this man bears toward Scotus his teacher, page by page.

The Seventh Argument

Seventh, he argues in *vestig.* 6, n. 10 and *lib.* 3 *Defens.*, n. 67: everything that is corrupted has a contrary (*1 de Caelo* 20, *1 de Gen.* 52 and *1 de Gen.* 49). Substantial form has no contrary — for from the chapter on substance, nothing is contrary to substance. Therefore substantial form is not corrupted.

If it is said that the accident connected with the substance perishes, and that with its perishing the substantial form perishes — against this he insists: the contrary accident that prevails is contrary to the contrary accidents that dispose, not to the substantial form. For one thing has one contrary, by *1 de Caelo* and *10 Metaph.* 14. Therefore when the accident perishes, the substantial form will not perish. Second, because substance is more powerful than accident — therefore a contrary accident cannot prevail in attacking substance.

In response: neither is this argument recent or produced by his own labor — it is so well-worn that it is commonly proposed to beginners in the predicament of substance against that property of substance which holds that it has no contrary. Under these terms it is adduced by Tatar. in *cap. de subst.*, q. 2: "Whatever is corrupted is corrupted by its contrary — therefore substance has a contrary, or it follows that it is incorruptible." The same is adduced by Antonius Andreas and other Metaphysicians in *10 Met.*, q. *penult.* — and there is no beginner who does not know its solution. It is also adduced in just these terms by Zabarella in *lib.* 2 *de materia*, cap. 8, to prove the incorruptibility of quantity in matter, thus arguing in the third argument: "If quantity were to perish, it would have a contrary — for everything that perishes is destroyed by its contrary. But quantity has no contrary — therefore it cannot perish."

To this argument a response was given in *disp.* 5, *cit.*, n. 74: material forms are corruptible because, in order to inform matter, they require certain dispositions, and when these are lost they can no longer be preserved in it. And since outside of matter they cannot subsist — for they depend on matter for their being, no differently than light depends on a luminous body in the genus of efficient cause — therefore outside of it they immediately perish.

And for this reason Tatar. in *cap. de subst.*, q. 2, *ad q.* admits a virtual contrariety among substantial forms by reason of the contrary dispositions they demand. And Antonius Andreas in *10 Met.*, q. 5 and Faber in the same place, *disp.* 8, admit contrariety — if not taken in all rigor — insofar as it suffices for one to be said impossible with another in the same subject. And this impossibility is certainly sufficient for one to be said to destroy the other. In this sense everything that is corrupted is corrupted by its contrary — not always, however, by a contrary taken rigorously. Indeed Mayron in *passus 16 in Praedicam.* admits a true contrariety between substantial forms — which would doubtless be a more daring assertion than their incorruptibility. In reply to the objection: substantial form is

driven from matter not by a fighting accident, except dispositively, but by another substantial form impossible with it — as we declared in *disp. 7 Phys., q. 6, art. 2*.

Ferchius attempts to overthrow this solution in *lib. 3, cap. 9, n. 67*, and imposes three things on us unjustly. First, he charges us with contradiction, because in our response to the first and second arguments we conceded that substance is separable from accidents, and now we say the opposite — that substantial form and consequently the substantial composite cannot exist without accidents. Second, he imposes on us that we say form depends on matter in the genus of efficient cause, like light from a luminous body. Third, that here we concede true and formal contrariety among substantial forms, which we denied above in *disp. 1 de Gen., q. 2*, against Cremonini.

These three things, I say, are falsely imposed on us. In our response to the first and second arguments we did not say absolutely that substance is separable from accidents in any manner whatsoever and from any agent whatsoever — but insofar as it is of itself, by virtue of the natural priority it has over accidents. By virtue of this priority it is not repugnant to substance, of itself, to be separated from any accident whatsoever — as the Doctor explains in *2 dist. 3, q. 4, D. and quol. 2, infra B*. Because natural priority implies that what is prior can exist without what is posterior, without contradiction, from *5 Met., cap. de priori*. Yet this is still consistent with substance according to the course of nature requiring certain determinate dispositions in matter, without which it cannot be preserved in it.

This doctrine was further explained by us in the same response a little below in these words: "To the other three objections a single solution suffices — to prove that this holds by the absolute power of God, but not according to the common course of nature, according to which experience shows that any substance demands certain accidents proper to it for its conservation, on which it depends in its being by what they call dependence a posteriori, as by a concomitant condition — as fire depends on heat, and water on cold, etc." From these words it is plain that this contradiction is completely gratuitously imposed on us.

The second claim — that we here say form depends on matter in the genus of efficient cause, like light from a luminous body — who does not see that this is a sheer calumny? We say that light depends on the luminous body in the genus of efficient cause — not that form depends on matter in the same way. What we say is that form depends on matter in its own genus — namely that of material cause — as light from a luminous body: with the proportion maintained. And we adduced this example to explain more clearly the necessary dependence of material form on matter — because there are certain effects that depend on a second efficient cause only in their coming-to-be, not in their conservation, as a house depends on the builder, and heat produced in the hand by fire (which is conserved in it for some time even when fire is absent). But light continuously depends on the luminous body both in its coming-to-be and in its conservation, so that when the luminous body is removed, the light immediately vanishes.

Preserving the proportion of both types of causality — material and efficient — we say that form depends on matter in its own genus just as light depends on the luminous body in its own, so that when the luminous body is removed the light immediately vanishes. Thus no one who understands our response can err — unless willfully. Hence Ferchius had no motivation for that dreadful invective: "What a monster! Am I reduced to this misery — that I should read and transcribe such foul falsehoods? Matter, whose proper function is to suffer, is for you an efficient cause!" Whether matter is for us an efficient cause can be seen in *disp. 2 Phys., q. 8, art. 3*. Ferchius himself, in *lib. 1 Defens.*, did not shrink from activity in matter for the sketches of forms.

The third imposition — that here, with Mayron, we attribute to substance a formal and true contrariety which we denied above in *disp. 2, q. 2* — is also a sheer imposition. See *disp. 7, q. 1, art. 3* in the explanation of the fourth property of substance, where we say that Mayron erred in *passus 16* by positing true contrariety in substances. Our statement is not absolute but conditional: "Indeed Mayron in *praedic., passus 16*, admits a true contrariety between substantial forms — which would doubtless be more properly asserted than their incorruptibility." Note: "more properly asserted" — not "asserted." That is: of these two propositions — "substantial form has a contrary," and "substantial form is incorruptible" — the first would more properly be asserted than the second, as the Doctor hints in *quol. 9, infra K*. But neither is to be asserted absolutely, because it neither has a contrary nor is incorruptible. This consequence is similar to another that he draws in *lib. 4 Defens.*, as we will say in the following article — because when we sometimes say by way of exaggeration in *disp. 5, q. 7, art. 2, n. 172*, to overthrow his theory of the circulation of souls, that the transmigration of souls is more absurd, or at least equally absurd, as mortality itself — he immediately makes us Alexandreans and assertors of the mortality of the soul. This is to speak conditionally and by comparison, not simply and absolutely. I have already said above that the volume on the Soul has been in print for many years — anyone can see in *disp. 1, q. 10* what we think about the immortality of the soul even in Aristotle's account.

But Ferchius would like to impose his own patent contradictions on us — for in this very matter of contrariety in the predicament of substance he is in plain conflict with himself. For under *n. 45* in the preceding argument he defends the position that the generable and ungenerable, the corruptible and incorruptible, are properly and truly contraries in the genus of substance. But now in the seventh argument, *n. 47*, he says that in the predicament of substance there is no contrariety. He is therefore caught contradicting himself in this matter — not us.

The Eighth Argument

Eighth, he argues in *vestig. 6, n. 11*: matter is never destroyed by contraries because it is contrary to none. But neither is form contrary to anything — therefore form will never be destroyed. Again: every composite, insofar as it is substantial, will always exist — at least in an imperfect and inchoate being. For what is indifferent

to receiving both opposites is opposed to neither and is harmed by neither of the opposites. But any substance together with its mutation is receptive of contraries — therefore it differs from both received contraries and is harmed by neither.

If you say that form perishes when the connected accident perishes, since every form demands certain accidents that, when lost, form ceases with them — against this he insists: form indeed requires certain accidents for its complete actuality and per accidens. But per se it does not require them, since substance is separable (7 *Met.* 4). Second: every absolute thing, prior essentially and independent of what is posterior, can exist without the posterior — and such is substance compared to any accident whatsoever. Third: for the destruction of what is less necessary, what is more necessary is not destroyed. But substantial form is more necessary, accidental form less so — since accident depends in being on substance, not vice versa. Fourth: what is essentially prior cannot require for its being what is essentially posterior — for otherwise there would be no cause that preceded its effect in time, which is contrary both to experience and to the Philosopher in 2 *Post.* 58.

In response: this argument differs little or nothing from the preceding one, and therefore a response was given in *disp. 5 de gen., n. 74*, through the same solution — that material forms are corruptible, as are material composites, because in order to inform matter they require certain dispositions, without which both form and the composite composed of it must also be lacking. To those three objections a single solution was given: to prove that this holds by the absolute power of God, or by logical power — which precisely states the non-implication of contradiction — but not by physical power, which regards a natural agent and the common course of nature, according to which experience shows that any substance demands certain accidents proper to it for its conservation, on which it depends in its being by what they call dependence a posteriori as by a concomitant condition — which is better and more accurately called the natural coexistence of its naturally consequent proper accidents, as was said in *disp. 3 Phys., q. 3, art. 1, n. 43*. Thus fire depends on heat, water on cold, the Sun on light, etc. Hence by those reasonings we said that the Doctor in 2 *dist. 12, qu. 2*, against St. Thomas, proves that matter can by the absolute power of God exist without any form whatsoever — and these are therefore less advisedly brought forward as proving the separation of substance from accidents according to the common course of nature.

That substantial form regularly determines certain accidents for itself in a certain grade for the conservation of itself — without which, when they are lacking, it necessarily ceases to be — experience itself teaches, and the Doctor teaches in 4 *d. 12, q. 3, R.*

But because Ferchius desires that each individual point be answered separately in *lib. 3, n. 72*: to the first — where he says that substance or substantial form demands no accident for its substantial being, but only for its complete actuality

and per accidens — this assumption is denied for the reasons just given. To the proof from 7 *Met.* 4, where Aristotle says that substance is separable or can be separated from any accident whatsoever: this must be understood of logical, not physical, potency — as Trombeta notes in 7 *Met.*, *qu.* 3, and this is the explanation of Scotus in *quol.* 2, *infra B.* and 4 *d.* 1, *qu.* 1, *KK.* and 2 *d.* 3, *q.* 4, *D.* and 7 *Met.*, *qu.* 2 — namely that substance is separable from any accident whatsoever, not in the sense that this can be brought about by a natural agent, but because of itself there is no contradiction in being able to exist prior in duration to the accident. This passage will be explained *ex professo* in the following question.

To the second, likewise, the assumption must be said not always to be verified with respect to physical potency, but only logical — according to which the absolute power of God is considered. Though Aristotle did not know this, he did know logical potency itself in 5 *Met.*, *cap. de potentia*, *tex.* 17, which consists in the non-repugnance of a thing. Otherwise by the same reasoning it would be proved that matter can naturally exist without any form.

To the third, the Doctor says in 1 *d.* 30, *qu.* 2, *S.*, *ad 2 questionem*, that the major is verified universally for what is necessary of and from itself — but not always for what is necessary from another. For since the necessity of the latter is not the highest, it can sometimes have some connection with what is less necessary, and when the latter fails, the more necessary also fails. Thus a passion is less necessary than its quiddity — for the quiddity is necessary in the first mode of saying *per se*, and the passion in the second — and yet when the passion is destroyed, the quiddity too is destroyed, owing to the necessary connection between them. Thus in our case, substantial form in its substantial being has a necessary connection with accidental disposition in a certain and determined degree — not as with something that is pre-required or co-required for its being, but with what necessarily follows from its being. Of this mode of necessity the Doctor speaks in *quol.* 8, *lit.* *S.* and 7 *Met.*, *q.* 2 a little before the solution of the arguments. And therefore this is not a true and proper dependence — for such dependence occurs in what is posterior with respect to what is prior, not *vice versa*.

To the fourth: I distinguish the assumption. What is essentially prior does not require what is posterior as something pre-required or co-required for its being — I concede. As something that necessarily follows — I deny. For this reason, although some cause precedes its effect in time, some causes have their effect coeval with them, and precede it only by nature — as the Sun precedes light, fire precedes heat, etc. Thus in our case, substantial form demands the disposition necessary for it — which necessarily follows from it.

Ferchius also unjustly complains of us for having said that some of the aforesaid propositions were taken from Scotus, saying: "If I had taken any proposition from Scotus, I would not have done so because it is Scotus's, but because I drew it from the same source from which Scotus drew it — namely Aristotle. For those propositions were current in the Peripatetic school before the birth of Scotus and

the Scotists." Is he perhaps ashamed to have learned these propositions from Scotus? Plainly I prefer to read them in Scotus rather than in Aristotle — for Scotus for the most part grounds and confirms them by valid reasoning, which Aristotle does not. But consider the marvelous character of this man — who disdains to draw from a common Teacher, and yet repeatedly objects to us, when we cite any Aristotelian authority however well-worn, that it was taken from his own source, drawn from his own ten-question booklet — as if it were a great sea of Peripatetic doctrine, and as if those authorities did not exist in other books before Ferchius's birth. So a little below in this same *cap. 9, lib. 3, pag. 342*, when we cite that most commonplace proposition in the Peripatetic school from *9 Met., priora generatione sunt posteriora perfectione, tex. 15* — which Scotus frequently recalls in *1 d. q. 2, O. and quol. 12, R.* and elsewhere — he says it does not come from our own store, nor from Aristotle or Scotus, but from the great sea of his *Vestigationes, vestig. 10, n. 69*. As if for our improvement we need to rely more on his *Vestigationes* than on Scotus and Aristotle — as if that proposition does not exist in other books, and as if we had not frequently cited it in our Logic and Physics, which were printed before his *Vestigationes*.

Ferchius also unjustly complains that we did not report the principal solution of this argument as his own, but rather cited it without attribution. "But why," he says, "do you say 'in response' and not 'Ferchius responds'? Perhaps because nothing you like you wish to acknowledge as mine?" This is the language of a troubled spirit. We did not report that solution as his own because in truth it is not his own, but common to all in response to this very argument. And what is common to all may not be appropriated and called one's own. Whether we approve and receive what he says well and what pleases us, the reader can see in *disp. 6 de anim., qu. 8, art. 2*, where we approve and accept several of his statements — and do so precisely because in that question he fights on Scotus's side. From this anyone can gather that we have not attacked him in other matters out of envy or the heat of contention, but because what he said conflicted with Scotus or with the truth — which we trace in our philosophy, with Scotus as guide and teacher, whose worthy disciples we wish we were.

The Ninth and Tenth Arguments

Ninth, he argues in *vestig. 6, n. 12* and again in *lib. 3 Defens., n. 75*: prime matter is eternal — therefore every substantial form is also eternal. The consequence is proved: what draws nearer to divine being participates more in it. But divine being is living being that is best and everlasting (*12 Met. 39*). Form, from *1 Phys. 81*, is a divine and desirable good; matter is in need of that divine being and desires it — namely form. Therefore form participates more in everlasting being itself than matter does.

Second: what has the character of the end intended by every sub-celestial agent is more present in that agent that desires it, or in the internal effect produced by the same agent. But from *2 de anim. 34 and 37*: everything acts so as to participate

in being always and in the divine, and for this reason they do whatever they do according to nature. Therefore active form in the agent desires being always itself, and communicates being always to the effect itself — therefore form is everlasting.

Third: what is closer and more similar to the more perfect is better, by *3 Top., locus 32 and 33*. But form is nearer to God and to the end intended by all agents — which is eternity — therefore form is more properly to be posited as eternal than matter. Otherwise matter would participate more in the intended end than form would, if matter were numerically always the same while form were not always the same.

Tenth, he argues at the same places: in *3 Top., locus primus*, what is more lasting and stable is better. And from Aristotle in *2 de gen. anim.*, to be is better than not to be, and to live is better than not to live. Therefore to be always is better than to always be — and no one, all else being equal, would not prefer to live a thousand years rather than to live one day with the ephemeral fish of *1 de hist. animal., cap. 5*, or with the birds of the Hipani river from *5 de hist. animal., cap. 19*.

In response: this ninth argument too, along with the tenth which is as it were its confirmation, is commonly adduced by all in *1 Phys.* in the question whether matter is ungenerable and incorruptible — for if it were such, they say, it would be more perfect and nobler than form, which is corruptible. And it is also brought forward more expressly in just these terms by St. Bonaventure in *2 d. 7, part. 2, art. 2, qu. 1*, intending by this argument to prove that form is not produced by nature. This is the second argument from the beginning of the question: "The nobler principle is form rather than matter, and it more properly has something divine — therefore, since nature cannot achieve less, because it cannot achieve the production of matter (which indeed belongs to creation alone), much more would it seem to follow for form." Hence the response which the Seraphic Doctor gives to this could also be applied here, since these coincide with it. Nevertheless, in *disp. 5 de gen., n. 75*, we said that both arguments together had been answered abundantly in *disp. 2 Phys., qu. 8, art. 2*, at the end — where the question is whether matter is ungenerable and incorruptible, and the same argument is commonly raised in opposition: that from this it would follow that matter is nobler than form and than the composite, or that form too is incorruptible. There we responded by denying the consequence — both because nobility simply speaking is considered from a more perfect grade of nature, not from some special condition of it, and because greater or lesser duration does not universally in these lower things entail greater or lesser perfection. For as the Doctor teaches in *1 d. 2, qu. 2, S., ostensis igitur*, and from *2 d. 1, qu. 2*, out of Aristotle's *1 Ethic., cap. 6*: what lasts ten years is not more perfect than what lasts a day. And finally, when two things have two perfections of different kinds, that one is considered simply nobler which has the perfection of a higher order — following Scotus's rule in *1 q. 8, qu. 1, ad 1*, which he more fully explains in *4 d. 12, q. 2, S.*: "Here there are two opinions."

In our case, matter has incorruptibility while form and the composite have actuality — and the latter is a perfection of a higher order than the former. Therefore the composite and form are simply nobler than matter. So we respond there, and we mention the composite as well — because the argument in truth proves no less that the composite ought to be everlasting and incorruptible than that form ought to be, since the composite is more perfect than form, both including all its perfection and adding something further. This is proved from Aristotle and from reason in *disp. 8 Phys., qu. 2, art. 2, n. 36* — although this too Ferchius dares to deny in *lib. 3, pag. 341, n. 82*, saying that the whole is perhaps (his conscience stings him enough to deny so evident a truth) simply more imperfect than form, and only in a qualified sense more perfect.

Since, however, in the cited *disp. de gener., n. 75* we did not reproduce this entire response (so as not to repeat the same things, but referring the reader to *disp. 2 Phys., qu. 8, art. 2*), but said briefly that the Topical passage must be understood when all else is equal — which is not the case here — Ferchius in *lib. 3 Defens., cap. 9, n. 76* says that we respond to the tenth argument but suppress the ninth, and that we do not respond well to the tenth either, because we do not show in what respect there is parity or disparity between matter and form in the possession of eternal being itself. And the cited passages of Scotus, he says, he saw before we had learned our ABCs. But it is an imposition that we suppress the ninth argument — rather, we refer the reader for its solution to *disp. 2 Phys., qu. 8, art. 2*, at the end, where this argument had been solved by us before this author transcribed it from others in *vestig. 6, cap. 2, lib. 1*. Hence from the solution given there in *disp. 2 Phys.*, I respond to the same argument as it is constructed here — denying the consequence. To the proof "what draws nearer to divine being participates more in it, etc.": I have already said that one must respond from the golden rule given by Scotus in *1 d. 8, q. 1, ad 1* and *4 d. 12, q. 2, lit. E.*, where he responds to a similar argument proving that quantity is more perfect than quality — because what is nearer to the more perfect is simply more perfect; quantity is simply nearer to substance than quality; but substance is the most perfect of beings — therefore quantity is more perfect than quality.

He responds: "If in the first perfect there concur at the same time many perfections, of whatever kind they be, something may perhaps be nearer to it according to one perfection and not according to another. For example: God is simply necessarily being, and this necessity is in him a simply perfect perfection. Therefore the more necessarily something exists, the nearer it will be to God — and in this way the heavens are nearer to God than any corruptible thing. But beyond this, God is an intellectual nature simply perfectly — and to this, with respect to this aspect, a purely intellectual creature draws nearer, even though finite, such as is the angelic nature. And after this, the nature of our intellect, though not purely intellectual; then the sensitive nature, which draws nearer to the intellectual than the non-sensitive. In this order then a fly is nearer to God than the heavens. Therefore from the first order it could be inferred that the

heavens are nearer to God and consequently more perfect than the fly; but from the second order, that the fly is more perfect than the heavens — and so opposites follow. I say therefore that when in the first perfect there concur perfections that are qualitatively distinct or disparate, that thing is simply more perfect which is nearer to it according to what has the character of the more perfect — just as according to the Philosopher in *3 Topic.*, it does not follow that the ape is better than the horse, though it is more like a human, because it is not more like a human in conditions that are simply nobler. But the nobler condition simply in the first is intellectuality rather than necessity of being in that mode — understanding the distinction where it is present — and therefore a human is simply nobler than the heavens. Nor should you be surprised that such a different ordering is assigned with respect to the first according to different perfections, since each perfection can be the principle of one natural hierarchy — or, to speak with the Philosophers, of one golden chain. And thus according to different perfections simply present in the first, participated in by different things in an orderly way, different golden chains can be discerned."

"To our case," he finally infers, "I say that in substance, as it is first among beings, there is a twofold order of priority: one consists in being subject to others, which implies receiving others and being perfected by them; the other is that of intensive actuality. And the second perfection is simply greater than the first, because the first belongs to what is potential — or at least requires that what it belongs to be potential. Quantity, however, is nearer to substance according to the first reason, because it is more immediate according to the character of the receptive. But quality is nearer according to the other — for quality is the principle of acting, not so quantity. And in this respect its lesser actuality is apparent." So the Doctor in the cited place.

From this we briefly said in response to the argument in *disp. 2 Phys., cit.*: matter indeed has incorruptibility and eternity, and in this draws nearer to divine being than form does. But form has actuality — which is a perfection of a higher order than incorruptibility. And therefore simply and absolutely speaking, form still draws nearer to divine being than matter does. This is especially to be said because even if form were granted to be eternal and perennial, matter would not desire it by reason of such a perfection — namely perennality — since it already has that of itself. But by reason of actuality and specificity. And therefore when in *1 Phys. 81* form is called a divine and desirable good, this must be understood of the perfection conveyed by actuality, not by eternity — as the Philosopher himself also wished to indicate when he said that matter desires form as the base desires the beautiful. For such beauty of form comes from actuality, not from eternity — since eternity also belongs to matter.

To the first confirmation: if it concluded well, it would prove not only the eternity of substantial form but of accidental form as well — for this too desires its own conservation, and acts so as to participate in being always and in the divine. And

thus it would prove the eternity of any being whatsoever, and of any composite both substantial and accidental — which even Ferchius does not concede from his position. From the fact, therefore, that any being whatsoever desires being always and its own conservation from 2 *de anim.* 24, it is not without fallacy deduced that any form whatsoever is actually everlasting. Rather, it should be deduced that it desires to be always, and to be everlasting, insofar as it is of itself — as does any other being whatsoever. And in this sense Aristotle speaks in 2 *de anim.*, *tex.* 34, saying: "For the most natural of the works that living things perform — those that are complete, neither deformed, nor having spontaneous generation — is to make something like themselves: animal makes animal, plant makes plant, so as to participate in the always and divine insofar as they can. For all things desire this, and for this reason they do whatever they do according to nature." But in *tex.* 37 there is not a word about this matter — and therefore he falsely cites *tex.* 37 for this, and wholly abuses *tex.* 34.

To the other confirmation from 3 *Top.*: the response is evident from Scotus himself in the cited 4 *d.* 12, *qu.* 2 — where he also discusses the cited passage.

To the tenth argument from the same 3 *Top.*, *locus primus* — that what is more lasting and stable is better — the response is evident from the same doctrine: it holds all else being equal, but in our case all else is not equal, because matter is potential being while form is actual — and this actuality is a perfection of a higher order than perennality. This parity and disparity Ferchius would have seen had he consulted Scotus in the passage to which we referred the reader for the solution.

Furthermore, to this proposition from 3 *Topic.*, *loc.* 1 — "what is more lasting and stable is better" — I oppose another proposition from 1 *Mor. Nichom.*, *cap.* 6, where Aristotle says: "But not because something is eternal is it therefore more good — for white that lasts longer is no whiter than that which lasts only a day." For this reason I said above that greater or lesser duration does not universally in these lower things entail greater or lesser perfection — unless all else is equal.

See also Scotus in 4 *d.* 49, *q.* 2, *ad princ.*, where he well explains that proposition from 3 *Top.*, how it is not simply true but only all else being equal.

To this same argument Pererius also responds in *lib.* 6 *de forma*, *cap.* 4, saying that something can be ungenerable in two ways: either because of its perfection it is above generation, as intelligences are; or because of its imperfection it is below generation as nearly nothing — as prime matter, which was not made incorruptible for its own sake but for the sake of forms, so that it might provide a fixed seat and dwelling for forms that come and go. And what is commonly said — that the incorruptible is nobler than the corruptible — is indeed true for those that are of the same order and kind: if both are matter, or both are forms, or both are composite substances. Otherwise the quantity of the heavens, which is incorruptible, would be nobler than the form of a horse, which is corruptible. So

Pererius — whose solution I cited not because it is better than Scotus's, but so that it may be apparent that this argument is not one produced by his own recent labor, but is full-grown, or rather decrepit.

As for what Ferchius says with his customary arrogance and magisteriality — that he saw those cited passages of Scotus before we had learned our ABCs — we concede it all, since he is elderly and advanced in years, indeed rather worn out with old age, while we are nearly half his age. But we deny the consequence that he implicitly intends to draw from this, from Aristotle's doctrine recently adduced from *1 Mor., cap. 6*, where he teaches that what has lasted many years is not more perfect than what has lasted only one year or one day.

This span of our life, with God's favor, we have not spent entirely in slumbering, in writing frivolous and useless things, or in composing eight or ten questions. Rather, with unwearied labor we worked through the entire Logic, Philosophy, and Metaphysics of Scotus — a work distributed in seven volumes — in which, if we do not cite Aristotle's text on every single line, as he professes in his *Vestigationes* (something he very frequently reproaches us for — that we cite Scotus more than Aristotle), the reason is not that the history of Aristotle's texts is unknown to us. It is rather that the purpose of our work was not to investigate Aristotle's meaning alone, but to write true philosophy in itself and according to Scotus's principles — grounded more in reason than in bare and thin authority, as we declared in the prefatory epistle in the first edition of the Physics volume. And our purpose was to respond to the more Recent Adversaries, who care little or nothing for Aristotle's authority but rely on reason alone — and therefore against them one must argue more with arguments than with a frequent hail of Aristotle's texts, which they do not accept without reason. Hence he too would be more welcome if, when he cites Aristotle's texts, he would also add reasoning from Aristotle himself, and not bare authority — following Aristotle's decree in *8 Phys. 15*: no opinion is to be rejected without reason.

However, Ferchius attempts to attack this response drawn from the Scotist source in the cited place, in these words: "Let a twofold actuality be considered — actuality of being, and being itself or actual existence; and actuality of informing, as form is the informing act of matter. The first actuality is of such dignity that it enters into the quiddity of God — indeed if we believe Scotus in *quol. 6*, the very life of God, which is placed in the definition of eternity by Boethius, is actual existence. Therefore actual existence is a simply perfect perfection, and likewise eternity is a simply perfect perfection. And both are placed in the definition or quasi-definition of God by Aristotle. The second actuality — of informing — is not a simply perfect perfection, but necessarily has annexed the imperfection of a part, and such actuality is repugnant to God. Therefore in the actuality of being, matter and form agree. If, then, matter has the actuality of being forever and form does not, matter more closely approaches God in divine being, in the being of the end, in participation in God — by subtlety."

"Add that matter by your account is independent of every secondary cause, even of form. But form depends on a second efficient cause for its being; it depends on matter according to you — and not vice versa; it depends on accidents a posteriori, as you hold. Therefore even in the reason of independence, matter draws nearer to God, on whom the heavens and nature depend (*12 Met. 28*)."

"Finally, these two arguments of mine rest on being always — and these two are in the very quiddity of God. One, the being, belongs to matter and form; the other, always, is a matter of controversy — they are put on a par in being. But the desired end of every secondary agent is being always — that is, the end contains both conditions. These are in matter; if they are also in form, I rightly conclude what I proposed. But if they are not in form, the absurdities listed in the arguments follow — and you have not removed them."

In response: easily, from the Scotist doctrine adduced in *4 d. 12, q. 2, F.*, where he teaches that although the actuality of being belongs to both quantity and quality, nevertheless the actuality of quality is far more perfect than that of quantity. And the second is a simply greater perfection than the first — because the first belongs to what is potential, or at least requires that what it belongs to be potential; quality is also the principle of acting, not so quantity, and in this respect its lesser actuality is apparent.

Similarly in our case: although the actuality of being belongs to both matter and form, nevertheless the actuality that belongs to form — even prescinding from the actuality of informing — is far more perfect than that which belongs to matter. For the actuality of form is determinate and specific, not mixed with subjective potency, and is a principle of acting — which is not the case with the actuality of matter. Therefore even if the actuality of always-being were to belong to matter but not to form, it does not follow that matter participates more in divine being — which is pure act — than form does. Form will still be something more perfect and more divine, for the reason drawn from Scotus in the cited place and *1 d. 8, qu. 1, ad 1*. Such a mode of actuality belongs to form not by reason of informing and insofar as it is part of the composite, but according to its essential character — which consists in this: that it is that by which something is such-and-such specifically and determinately, as the Doctor teaches in *1 dist. 8, qu. 4, X*.

To the second: it was sufficiently declared above in *n. 91* that independence in these lower things does not always argue greater perfection in what is independent than in what is dependent — unless all else is equal. Otherwise by reason of independence one would conclude not only that matter is more perfect than form, but even than the composite itself — which was shown there from Scotus in many places, which I do not wish to repeat here, just as he himself repeats this argument on nearly every page. This argument is also adduced and solved by Pererius in *lib. 6 de forma, cap. 4, cit., q. 1*: although the existence of form depends on the existence of matter — insofar as material form cannot be or

operate outside of matter — yet the existence of form is still more excellent than that of matter. For the former is specific and determinate, while the latter is only entitative and indeterminate, and is determinable and perfectible by the former. And in this respect the existence of form excels the existence of matter — not because the existence of form is perpetual and independent of matter, as Ferchius holds. He also falsely says in this second argument that we posit matter as altogether independent of form — for we admit that matter depends on form both in its intrinsic and essential being in the genus of final cause (*2 Phys.* 23), since matter exists for form and not vice versa; and in its extrinsic, adventitious, specific, and determinate substantial being which it receives from form in the genus of extrinsic formal cause — in the way a white wall, as such, is said to depend on whiteness.

To the last: it is denied that the two elements included in "being always" are included in the quiddity of God. For being is indeed of the quiddity of God — but eternity is an intrinsic mode, not a quidditative predicate, from *quod.* 6 throughout. It is also denied that matter and form are on a par in being or in existence itself — for even prescinding from sempiternity and independence, the existence of form or the being of form, which is specific and determined, is far more perfect in its entire genus of existence than the being of matter, which is purely entitative and determinable. And from this it is finally denied that, with sempiternity excluded from form, the absurdities enumerated in the arguments follow.

The Eleventh Argument

Eleventh, he argues in *vestig.* 6, n. 14 and *lib.* 4 *Defens.*, n. 77: if substantial form approaches and withdraws from matter without the arising and perishing of matter — but with the arising and perishing of the form itself — then accidental and substantial form are one and the same in reality and by reason, and differ only in name. The consequence is proved from Aristotle and Porphyry. Porphyry says: "Accident is that which is present to and absent from the subject without the corruption of the subject." Aristotle in *1 Topic.*, cap. 4: "Accident is that which happens to be in and not to be in the same thing." But if substantial form begins and ceases to be, it plainly is present to and absent from its subject without the corruption of the subject — that is, of matter. It plainly happens that form is in and not in the same subject — and therefore the entire definition applies also to that form which is nominally called substantial.

For what some say — that the subject of accident must be in actuality simply speaking in prior act, and therefore substantial form is first received in matter before accidental form — this is stated arbitrarily. For that condition is not placed in the definitions of accident, and moreover prime matter is called a subject in *1 Phys.* 82 and *1 de gen.* 24, and is therefore properly accepted by the name of subject.

And furthermore, that escape is exposed to two difficulties. First: because the soul of the body presupposes the organic form of the body, the soul will not be a substantial form — for it comes and goes from a subject that exists in act according to a substantial form. Second: matter is related to the agent by a real relation — for every real passive is really related to the real active (*3 Phys. 3* and *5 Met. 20*). But matter is in passive potency and actually suffers from the agent introducing the form. Matter is also the subject of generation, which is the way to form (*2 Phys. 14*). Therefore that relation of passive potency, passion, and the mutation itself are real accidents that are immediately received in matter. Therefore it is not of the nature of accident, as such, to presuppose matter under substantial form — but this is a condition of a certain accident that there is no need to enquire into now.

In response: this argument too is well-worn, and is commonly adduced by all Metaphysicians in the question how accident and substance differ from each other — as can be seen in the preceding question, *qu. 1*, where the authors treating this are cited. And also by all Physicists in *1 Phys.* when they deal with the difference between substantial and accidental form — as we too dealt with it there in *disp. 2, q. 1, art. 1, n. 5, ad 2*, and *art. 3, ad 2, n. 26*, but more fully ex professo in *disp. 5, qu. 11, art. 1* — which Ferchius ignored, because where *art. 1* should be cited the error gives *art. 3*, which does not exist in that question. And it is found in just these terms in Scotus in *q. 15 praedic.* — on whether the parts of substance are substances — in the arguments for the negative part, in these words: "Form is not substance, because it is in a subject, and because it is present and absent apart from the corruption of the subject, as is evident in substantial transmutation." It is also found in Tatar, *lib. 2 de anima, qu. 1, art. 1, §. primo sciendum*, where he raises the doubt whether every soul is called a substance and argues for the negative: because it is common to every substance not to be in a subject; but the soul is in a subject — namely in the body — etc. Also because the soul can be present and absent from the subject, that is the body, apart from the corruption of the subject, that is the body's corruption — etc.

To this argument a response was given in *disp. 5 de gener., n. 75* that the question had been abundantly answered in the cited places in Physics, where the difference of substantial from accidental form is richly assigned — and that it was dealt with still more exactly in the preceding question, *qu. 1*. And we said that the argument does not even then conclude what was intended — for even if the whole argument is conceded, the difference of substantial from accidental form cannot be assigned by him either. For if he says that the difference consists in this — that accidental form, when it is severed from the subject, immediately perishes, but not so substantial form — he does not satisfy, because we will also say, as he objects to others, that this is stated arbitrarily and is not a condition placed in the definition of accident. And therefore the entire definition applies to substantial form as well, even if it be posited as separable and incorruptible.

Ferchius in *lib. 3 Defens.*, *n. 77* would not look at the difference placed by us from Scotus in *disp. 5 Phys.*, *q. 11, art. 1* — because for the first article of that question the third was cited by mistake, since the copyist or printer took the third for the first numeral figure. And he only reports the passage from *disp. 2 Phys.*, *q. 1, art. 1, ad 1 and 2*, where we touch upon this doubt in passing and say it is to be examined more fully below — namely in *disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1*. Hence he says we fled from the solution of the argument — when in fact it was solved there by assigning the true difference between substantial and accidental form, before he printed his ten *Vestigationes*. Rather it is he who evaded the attack by ignoring that passage — a difference which was explained still more exactly in the preceding question, *qu. 1* throughout. So that beyond what was said there, nothing need be added here.

As for what we added — that the argument does not even conclude its intended point if the whole is conceded — he responds in *n. 78* with these words: "You have repeatedly tried by arguing against me to extract from me a solution to the arguments — but in vain. I will not solve them. I say therefore that I posit no condition in the Aristotelian definition of Accident. For Aristotle writes in *cap. 2 antepredic.*: 'By being in a subject I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist apart from what it is in, as a certain grammatical knowledge is in the subject of the soul.' Of these conditions, two — being in a subject and not being a part of the subject — belong to every form. But accidental form cannot exist without the subject: if separated from the subject it necessarily perishes. Therefore if I have described accident as coming without the arising of the subject and with its own arising, and going without the perishing of the subject but with its own perishing — in this second part I explained the particle 'inhering in a subject' and added no new condition. And Porphyry must be believed to have understood the same by the words 'absent' and 'present' as Aristotle understood by 'inhere' and 'not inhere.'"

"One can also weigh the particle 'happens' for the main purpose of the argument. Since accidental form happens to inhere and not to inhere — therefore, by the contrary, substantial form does not happen to inhere and not to inhere, but necessarily inheres in the subject and never does not inhere. Therefore it is separable — because by this it is distinguished from accident: accidental form cannot exist without the subject, substantial form can."

This response is more that of a Sophist wishing to deceive than of a true and genuine philosopher tracing truth. For in this third book, *pag. 271, n. 4*, he admits that the proposition "every substantial form is separable" is false — even in Aristotle's view — from *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 6 and 7*. Since then in *vestig. 4, n. 46* he said it was not right to leave unanswered what contends against truth, or to equivocate in judging truth — if he saw that these twelve arguments proving that false proposition had not been sufficiently answered by us, he was obliged in this third book, having shown the insufficiency of our solutions, to add his own true solutions and not allow the reader to equivocate in judging truth. Therefore when

here he stubbornly says "I will not solve" and tenaciously strives to prop up and establish that falsehood, he has performed neither the duty of a good theologian nor of a genuine philosopher.

But to speak the truth, I do not think anyone could extract a solution to these arguments from him — for since they are entirely common and well-worn, as has been shown, anyone even moderately instructed can dissolve them on his own, since they prove nothing at all. And in particular this eleventh argument — which is derived from the difference of substantial and accidental form — does not press at all, even by Ferchius's own testimony. For in *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 6 and 7* he proves that according to Aristotle's view, substantial form cannot be universally distinguished from accidental form by the fact that the substantial is really separable from matter while the accidental is not really but only rationally separable — because in *8 Met., tex. 3* and *6 Met., tex. 1 and 2*, Aristotle says that of substantial forms, some are really separable from matter (namely the intellectual soul), and some are inseparable (namely other material forms). If this is not a true and legitimate difference of substantial from accidental form, this eleventh argument — grounded in such a difference — presses nothing.

Moreover, the instance made by us still holds: that even with the whole of this argument conceded, it is not avoided that the definition of accident does not apply in full to substantial form itself — because that condition of his by which he distinguishes one from the other (namely that accidental form comes without the arising of the subject, with its own arising, and goes without the perishing of the subject, with its own perishing) is not placed in the definition of accident as given either by Porphyry or by Aristotle.

For Porphyry says: accident is that which is present and absent from the subject apart from the corruption of the subject — where, as is evident, he makes no mention of the corruption of form, which he surely would have taken care to add and should have added, if by it accidental form were properly distinguished from substantial. Aristotle says: accident is that which happens to be in and not to be in the same thing — where likewise no mention is made of the arising of accidental form when it comes to the subject, nor of its perishing when it goes. Nor does the passage cited from *cap. 2 antepreedic.* help Ferchius: "By being in a subject I mean what is in something, not as a part, and which cannot exist without what it is in" — as if Aristotle intended by this to indicate that inhering in the subject, which is proper to accident, consists in being so attached to the subject that it cannot exist without the subject apart from its own perishing — and by this is distinguished from the inherence of substantial form.

This, I say, does not help — because being so tied to the subject that a separated form cannot exist outside of it is common to both accidental and material substantial form, from Aristotle in *8 Met. 3* and *6 Met. 1 and 2*, as Ferchius himself testifies in the cited place, *vestig. 6, lib. 1, cap. 6 and 7*. Also because with respect to being in a subject as such, Aristotle puts substantial and accidental form on a par

in 4 *Phys.* 23, enumerating modes of being in, saying: "further, as health is in hot and cold things, and in general form is in matter" — where, as is apparent, he speaks in the same way about substantial and accidental form with respect to being in a subject. Also because in that same passage cited by him from *cap. 2 antepredic.*, it is false that Aristotle distinguishes accidental from substantial form by the fact that the accidental is so in a subject that it cannot exist without it, while not so the substantial. Rather he distinguishes by this: that accident is not a part of any per se one composite — while substantial form is. This he indicates by the words "not as a part" — for form in the character of a part is referred to the composite, not to the subject. And thus he means to indicate that accident is not a part of a per se one composite — not of the subject, as Ferchius explains it. For who is ignorant that form is not a part of the subject it informs? This explanation is drawn from what Aristotle has a little below in the *cap. de substantia* near the middle, where he says: "But let not the parts of substance that are so in a whole as if in a subject disturb us, lest we be compelled to confess that they are not substances — for the things that are in a subject were not said to be in something as parts in it." Here, as is apparent, he distinguishes substantial form from accidental by the fact that it inheres in a whole per se, as its part — not so what is in a subject, namely accidents.

Neither does the other weighing of the particle "happens" serve the purpose — since that contingency placed by Aristotle in the definition of accident must be referred rather to the subject, to which it happens to have or not have the form. For accidental form on its part does not contingently inhere in the subject, but necessarily — since it cannot exist outside it, as even he himself admits. But given this explanation, that entire definition applies equally to substantial form as to accidental form — since it is just as contingent for matter to have or not have this or that substantial form as it is contingent for a subject to have or not have this or that accidental form. Indeed, that reasoning of his seems contradictory: he says that substantial form does not happen to inhere or not inhere, but necessarily inheres in the subject. For just above he attributed to accidental form the property of necessarily inhering, because it cannot exist without the subject — and by this he distinguished it from substantial form. How then can he immediately after, without manifest contradiction, attribute such necessity of inherence to the subject to substantial form and deny it to accidental form? How also can he from the fact that substantial form necessarily inheres in the subject and never does not inhere (for these are his formal words) deduce this consequence: "therefore it is separable"? For from that antecedent it seemed to me one should rather infer: "therefore it is not separable" — for a form that necessarily inheres in the subject and cannot exist without the subject is called inseparable, because it cannot exist separately from the subject per se, but only in the subject.

Finally, note that this entire eleventh argument was here reported in full as it stands in *vestig. 6, n. 14* — including those two difficulties by which he said the solution he reported and attacked in the course of arguing is refuted. For in *lib. 3*

Defens., n. 77 he says that in *disp. 5 de gener. 75* we studiously omitted them and did not respond to them. It is indeed true that we studiously omitted them and did not respond to them in that place — and the reason is that those two difficulties did not pertain to us. For those difficulties are adduced by him to attack the response he himself reported in the course of arguing — namely, that some say the subject of accident must be in actuality simply in prior act, and therefore substantial form is first received in matter before accidental form. We do not accept this solution; nor is this the difference we posit between substantial and accidental form. Indeed we ourselves rejected it in *disp. 5 Phys.*, q. 11, art. 1, n. 128 and also in the preceding question, *qu. 1*, as a manner of speaking common to the Thomists. And therefore there was no need to respond to those two difficulties, which did not press our solution at all.

It is nevertheless true that the Thomists too are little or not at all pressed by those two difficulties. For to the first — concerning the rational soul presupposing in matter the form of corporeity — they will immediately deny the assumption as a manifest begging of the question. For that is precisely why they do not admit that the form of corporeity precedes the soul in matter — because then the soul would come to a being in act, and so the soul would not be a substantial form but an accidental one. To the other — concerning generation and the other respects immediately founded in matter — they will respond easily and well: when they say that accidental form presupposes substantial form in matter, they are not speaking of just any accidental form, but of perfect and complete accidental form — which they hold to be only absolute accident, namely quantity and quality. And therefore those two difficulties are easily disregarded by the Thomists.

The Twelfth and Final Argument

Twelfth and final: he argues thus in *vestig. 6, lib. 1, n. 15*: the perfect is prior to the imperfect, according to *1 de Caelo, tex. 10* — a proposition by which the Prince of the Peripatetics proves that circular motion is prior in nature to straight motion, and that natural motion is prior to what is against nature. Consider matter and the informing form: form is certainly more perfect and more the perfection — for it is the entelechy (literally, the actuality or completion). Therefore form is prior and more ancient than matter in the nature of things. If therefore matter does not know the beginning or ending of its existence, neither will form undergo a beginning or perishing.

We reported this argument somewhat briefly in *disp. 5 de gen.*, n. 76 for the sake of brevity: the perfect is prior to the imperfect also in time (*1 de Caelo 10*). Form is more perfect and more ancient than matter in the nature of things. If therefore matter does not know the beginning of its existence, much more will form undergo neither beginning nor perishing.

In response: this argument too is well-worn and commonplace. It is indeed adduced by all Metaphysicians in *7 Metaph.* in the question whether form is prior

to matter and to the composite — where they declare that it is prior by priority of perfection, not of origin or duration. And Pererius also responds to this same argument in *lib. 6 de forma, cap. 4, qu. 2*. But we in the cited *disp. de gener., n. 76* said that this argument also proves more than is right, as it is constructed by Ferchius. For if matter is eternal and form is more ancient than matter and prior not only in perfection but also in duration, then surely it will be more than eternal — and before eternity. Already, therefore, in *disp. 1 de Caelo, qu. 5*, from the beginning, against the same author, to whom that proposition is very familiar, we said it must be taken not universally but indefinitely — and particularly in our case it cannot be true, because rather matter precedes form in priority of origin, as the Doctor teaches in *2 dist. 12, qu. 1 and 2*, from St. Augustine. In what sense form is prior to matter, see the Doctor in *7 Met., qu. 6*, and Antonius Andreas and Zerbo there.

In addition, from that major taken absolutely one can equally well infer that the composite also precedes in time both matter and form — since it is more perfect than both.

See what consequences follow from certain propositions that Aristotle stated indefinitely, and which these babblers accept as most universal. As if all of Aristotle's propositions were universally true! Surely he stated another proposition in *9 Metaph. 15* diametrically opposed to this one: "the prior in generation are the posterior in perfection" — how then can both be universally true?

This irrational manner of philosophizing of certain people traces its origin to this: that they trust too simply and crudely in bare Aristotelian authority and prove their claims by authorities alone. How unworthy this is of a philosopher, we said in *disp. 1, qu. 1, art. 1*.

This is our response to the twelfth argument in the cited place.

Ferchius in *lib. 3 Defens., n. 79* complains vehemently about what he claims is a false report of his argument by us, and comparing it with the one as he himself constructs it in *vestig. 6, n. 15*, he fabricates four distortions on our part. "The first fallacy," he says, "is that I faithfully cited the text, in which the particle 'also in time' does not appear — which you have spuriously and unfaithfully inserted. The second is that you left out the adjoining following particle — for in a demonstration propositions are universal; but Aristotle, as I wrote, uses this proposition in a demonstration proving that circular motion is prior in nature to straight motion, and that natural motion is prior to what is against nature, and finally that there is a fifth body prior to the elements. It follows that that proposition is universal: 'every perfect thing is prior in nature to the imperfect.' You carefully omitted this particle because it refutes your response — for you contend that that proposition is indefinite. Third fallacy: because I write 'consider matter and the informing form — form is certainly more perfect, and more the perfection, for it is the entelechy' — this is my minor with its proof, known to

Peripatetics from 2 *de anim.* 2, 6, and 7. But you in place of the minor set down the conclusion in the minor thus: 'form is more perfect and more ancient than matter in the nature of things.' After both propositions the conclusion follows in my vestigations thus: 'therefore form is prior and more ancient than matter in the nature of things.' Fourth fallacy: I subsume a conditional in the twelfth argument — 'if therefore matter does not know the beginning or ending of its existence, neither will form undergo beginning or perishing, whether it is separated or otherwise, since it has been sufficiently and abundantly shown to be separable.' But you in the antecedent omitted the particle about perishing, namely 'ending' — and contrary to the rules of grammatical construction wrote 'much more will form undergo neither beginning nor perishing,' where there is a solecism, since the comparative particle 'much more' is placed without its term of comparison. In this way you wished to expose my grammatical incompetence to the reader."

These four are not fallacies of ours but impostures of his. Beginning from the first: it is true that in 1 *de Caelo* 12, Aristotle does not place that proposition "the perfect is prior to the imperfect" with the particle "also in time." Yet with this particle it is placed in 8 *Phys.* 75 — which passage with such a particle is cited also by Ferchius himself in *vestig.* 1, *cap.* 9, *n.* 12 and *lib.* 2 *Defens.*, *pag.* 240. Therefore, since it is the same proposition — which is found in 1 *de Caelo* 12 and 8 *Phys.* 75 — and is brought forward to prove the same conclusion (namely that circular motion is prior to straight), even though 1 *de Caelo* 12 does not express the particle "prior in time," it must be understood — lest the proposition be defective here or there. And therefore it was no sin or catastrophe to add that particle "prior in time."

Moreover, we added it lest we expose to the reader the logical incompetence of the arguer — (although he says the opposite) and lest his argument be found fallacious: for in the conclusion he gathers what he had not sown in the premises. For Ferchius concludes: "therefore form is prior and more ancient than matter in the nature of things" — which conclusion cannot be deduced without fallacy unless the particle "prior in time" is added to or understood in the major "the perfect is prior to the imperfect." For antiquity states temporal priority, as is clear. Therefore if in the major such priority is not understood, but only priority of nature, how does he in the conclusion conclude temporal priority of duration of form with respect to matter? Therefore there is no fallacy in his argument as reported by us — the fallacy is in his argument as he constructed it, when he omitted that particle "prior in time." Hence we are blamed for a good deed — he imposes a fallacy on us when we concealed his fallacy from the reader in reporting his argument.

"The second fallacy," he says, "is that we carefully leave out the particle 'prior in nature' — as refuting our response, in which we say that proposition is indefinite, whereas with that particle added it is universal: 'every perfect thing is prior in nature to the imperfect.'"

I admit that it is so placed by Aristotle in the cited *1 de Caelo 12*. But certainly Ferchius himself does not report it with this particle either, but absolutely: "the perfect is prior to the imperfect." Therefore if we distorted the proposition by adding the particle "prior in time," he also distorted it — since he did not place the particle "prior in nature." If we sinned by excess, he sinned by defect.

Also because, as I said, this proposition is brought forward in *8 Phys. 75* and *1 de Caelo 12* to prove demonstratively the priority of circular motion over straight motion. If therefore the particle "prior in time" added to the proposition makes it not universally true but only indefinitely true, then Aristotle in *8 Met. 75* assumes the proposition with that particle and will not thereby demonstrate — nor will his proposition be universal, but indefinite.

Also because below in *n. 83, pag. 343* he concedes that proposition "the perfect is prior to the imperfect in time" — taken absolutely without the particle "prior in nature" — is universal.

Also finally, because it is false that the particle "prior in nature" was removed from that proposition by us. For as the Doctor notes in *quol. 4*, and with him the Formalists among us teach, in temporal priority is included natural priority — and what precedes another in time also precedes it in nature. For temporal priority, as the greater, entails natural priority as the lesser. And the amplifying particle "also in time" sufficiently indicates that it was not our intention to omit entirely the priority of nature — rather we presupposed it as included in temporal priority.

"The third fallacy," he says, "is that what he made a conclusion we make a minor." This is indeed so — in order to conceal the fallacy of the argument as he constructed it. For arguing as he argues: "the perfect is prior to the imperfect; consider matter and the informing form — form is certainly more perfect and more the perfection, for it is the entelechy; therefore form is prior and more ancient than matter in the nature of things" — it is plainly apparent that in the conclusion, on the side of the predicate or major extreme, there is placed a particle that was in neither the major nor the minor: namely "more ancient." This fallacy does not occur when the argument is formed from our report as follows: "the perfect is prior to the imperfect also in time, *1 de Caelo 12*; form is more perfect and more ancient than matter; if therefore matter does not know the beginning of its existence, etc." And although in place of the minor we placed his conclusion — reducing the argument to shorter form — no prejudice was thereby done to it. For that was not the final conclusion — hence the argument still retains its entire force in that form, if it has any.

"The fourth fallacy" is also falsely imposed — because in the conclusion we drew, since both particles (beginning and perishing) are placed when speaking of form, both must also be understood with respect to matter from which the conclusion about form is drawn. Hence implicitly, with the absence of a beginning in matter,

the absence of perishing is also understood — especially since according to Aristotle in *1 de Caelo, tex. 126* (from which Ferchius himself draws), from the fact that something has no beginning it follows also that it does not undergo perishing. For if it is ungenerable he says it is also incorruptible, and if generable it must be corruptible. Also because absolutely speaking and in the force of the argument, only beginning — both on the part of matter and on the part of form — should be placed, not perishing — since in the entire first argument no mention is made except of duration from the antecedent side, to which beginning pertains, and not duration from the subsequent side, to which perishing pertains. And in the final conclusion that comparative particle was entirely necessary — namely "much more" — and cannot be silently omitted without a fallacy of the consequent. For in the whole preceding argument, in each proposition and also in the conclusion, a comparison with excellence on the part of form in perfection and duration with respect to matter is placed — as is apparent to anyone looking at it. Therefore so that no fallacy be committed, the comparative language in the subsumed conclusion must persevere between matter and form with respect to perfection and duration, so that it be concluded: "if therefore matter does not know a beginning or perishing, much more will form undergo neither beginning nor perishing" — add: "because it is more perfect and more ancient than matter." Hence it is false that in the subsumed conclusion the comparative particle "much more" is placed without its term of comparison — for the term of comparison in that conclusion is the very same that was the term in the comparison held in the premises and in the entire preceding discourse. From first to last it is thus apparent that not only did we not distort or disrupt his argument, but that we reduced it to a better and fallacy-free form — which immunity the argument does not enjoy as he constructed it.

As for our claim that the proposition "the perfect is prior to the imperfect in nature and in time" is not to be taken universally but indefinitely, and in particular cannot be true in our case — because rather matter precedes form in priority of origin, as the Doctor teaches in *2 d. 12, qu. 1*, from St. Augustine — he responds that the Augustinian term accepted by the Subtle Doctor must be considered in Theology and has no place in Aristotle's Philosophy. Scotus, Aragonius, and Zerbo are disciples of Aristotle — if they deny the teaching of their teacher, they are bad disciples and should be expelled from the school. If they are with Aristotle, they will confess that the perfect is prior to the imperfect in the order of nature.

And below in *n. 83* he shows that this proposition is universal — because a direct syllogism in the first figure, if the major is not universal, contains a fallacy of the consequent and is not in the proper mode. But Aristotle makes such a syllogism in the first figure: "the perfect in nature is prior to the imperfect; the circle is perfect and the straight line is not; therefore the circle is prior in nature to the straight line." "If the major is universal, I have proved what I wanted, and you wrongly call it indefinite. If it is not universal, you are imposing on Aristotle a fallacy of the consequent."

But I truly fear that it is rather Ferchius who is to be expelled from Aristotle's school than Scotus with his disciples — when he denies a truth so apparent as this: that matter precedes form in nature and in origin. Which even he himself sometimes admitted and proved from Aristotle himself, as can be seen in *vestig. 1, cap. 13, n. 40*, where he has these words: "Matter is per se prior in nature and in generation to form — which is taught in *2 de partibus animal., cap. 2* — and by this he proves there that form is not the reason for producing matter similar to that on which it depends" (note: the dependence of form on matter is conceded here — which is perpetually denied throughout the entire *Defens.*) "because nothing per se posterior in time or in natural origin can be the efficient cause of its prior. But matter is prior according to natural origin and also according to time with respect to form, by *2 de partibus anim., cap. 1*. Therefore no natural form can be the efficient cause of matter or bring it to perish." So Ferchius argues there. From this most patent contradiction the reader will be able to judge who more deserves to be expelled from the Peripatetic school and hissed off — the renegade Ferchius, or Scotus with his most subtle disciples.

When in *n. 83* he then sets about proving that proposition to be universally true — "every perfect thing is prior in nature to the imperfect" — I fully expected him to confirm it by induction, which is the true method of proving the universal truth of a proposition through the truth of the particulars contained under it, from *1 Topic., cap. 10*. But it was a vain hope. For he proves it because Aristotle's syllogism by which he proves circular motion to be prior in nature to straight motion is in the first figure. What a most truthful and indubitable thing this is, which I am accustomed to say about these textual and historical witnesses to Aristotle — that they know how to prove no proposition by reason, but only by Aristotle's testimony. So we will no longer be Peripatetics but Pythagoreans — among whom, as is reported, the proof of no proposition was anything other than this: "The Master said."

Yet Ferchius below in *n. 84* says: "If Aristotle had spoken without reason, the Aristotelians would follow him without reason. But neither before nor after Aristotle has any Philosopher been found as well armed with reason as Aristotle himself. Therefore to cite Aristotle is to cite reason." Let everything be conceded. If therefore Aristotle never spoke without reason, propositions are not to be proved by Aristotle's testimony alone but by the reason Aristotle adduced. And so in our case, if Ferchius wanted to prove from Aristotle that the proposition "every perfect thing is prior in nature to the imperfect" is universally true, he should have adduced the reason by which Aristotle proves it — not prove it because the syllogism in which Aristotle takes that proposition as a major is in the first figure, and therefore it must be universal. Yet he proves all his propositions by authority alone, never by reason, or very rarely.

To the absurdities we were deducing from the proposition "the perfect is prior to the imperfect also in time" — namely that form would be more than eternal and

before eternity, since it is more perfect than matter which is eternal; and that the composite too would precede in time its parts, since it is more perfect than either — he responds under *n.* 82: "These absurdities follow from the corruption you introduced into Aristotle's proposition — for you said 'also in time,' not Aristotle, not I." Since it is not we alone but Aristotle himself in *8 Phys.* 75 and Ferchius himself in the places cited there who said "the perfect is prior to the imperfect also in time" — even though he now denies this in order to escape the absurdities — "as for parts and the whole, that is a more lengthy discussion for the purpose at hand."

He cites Scotus in *quodl.* 9, *H.*, who taught that form is prior and more truly being than matter and the composite with respect to principality and independence. And in *theor.* 20, *princ., concl.* 5: "Further, if the whole is two parts, then two parts are more than the whole (*10 Nicom., cap.* 2): a good together with another is more desirable than alone, and in this sense the whole is more perfect — provided both parts are good and perfect, as Aristotle says in *6 Topic.* But form is good and perfection, while matter is in need of the good and imperfect. Hence it is doubtful whether the two together should be said to be more perfect and better than form alone. But if the whole is different from its parts, perhaps the whole is simply more imperfect than form, and only in a qualified sense more perfect — for the whole is really caused by form, essentially dependent, naturally posterior to form itself, has in itself the defect of primary unity, of perfect implicitness, of specific quiddity — and it begs actuality from form. For these defects it is repugnant to the whole to be prior to matter or form. For form it is not repugnant — indeed it is independent, prior, and more truly being than matter, and than the whole. Therefore from the major of *1 de Caelo* 2 what is rightly concluded for form is not concluded for the whole."

This response, however, is entirely frivolous and irrational. For it was shown above in *n.* 197 that the particle "prior in time" was not inserted by us into that proposition "the perfect is prior to the imperfect," but was placed by Aristotle in *8 Phys.* 75 and also by Ferchius himself in the places cited there. Therefore not only we, but also Aristotle and Ferchius himself said that the perfect is prior to the imperfect also in time — even though he now denies this in order to escape the absurdities. Moreover, under *n.* 83 he not only concedes this proposition to be true, but wants it to be universal even taken absolutely without the remembered particle "prior in nature" (about which earlier under *n.* 79 he was so anxious — because without it, he said, that proposition was not universally true, and therefore we had distorted it by suppressing the particle). Hence he there erects the demonstration made by Aristotle in *8 Phys.* 75 to show that circular motion is prior to straight motion also in time: "the perfect is prior to the imperfect in time; circular motion is perfect; straight motion is imperfect; therefore circular motion is prior to straight motion in time." And immediately after, in *n.* 84, he proves that proposition to be universally true — because from *9 Metaph.* 17, act always precedes potency also in time, and so the perfect is always prior to the imperfect

also in time. Therefore this proposition, even with that particle "prior in time," is by his own admission not spurious or adulterated but genuinely Aristotle's — and therefore he does not escape the absurdities drawn from it, if he contends it is universally true.

What he says about the whole and its parts to escape the absurdity that the whole would precede its parts in time if the perfect precedes the imperfect in time — all this is false and has been answered above.

Scotus in *quol. 9, infra lit. H.* has exactly the opposite: he indeed says form is more truly being than the composite with respect to principality and independence — but he says that the composite is still prior and greater than form with respect to perfection, and in this sense explains the passage he had brought forward in opposition from 7 *Met., tex. 7* in the old version: "if form is more truly being than matter, it will be the same with respect to the composite for the same reason" — that is, with respect to principality and independence. This too must not be understood absolutely in every genus of cause, but in the genus of final cause, which is the noblest among the rest — for in this sense matter depends on form, not vice versa (2 *Phys. 23*), as I explained above in *n. 101*. And thus also the Doctor must be explained when he has the same proposition in *theor. 20, princ., concl. 5* — lest he contradict himself in 8 *Met., qu. 2, ad 2 princ.*, where he concedes that composite substance is more perfect than its parts. Indeed, according to the version now in use, Aristotle manifestly teaches in 7 *Metaph.* that the composite is more truly being than either matter or form — for the text stands thus: "if form is prior to matter and more truly being, then what is from both will also be prior for the same reason."

Another response of his — that the whole is more perfect when the parts are good and perfect, following the limit in 6 *Topic.*, but that while form is good and perfect, matter is in need of the good and imperfect — is not Ferchius's response but Pererius's and Zimara's. I rejected it in its proper place in *disp. 8 Phys., q. 2, art. 2, n. 36*, because matter has a determinate perfective degree in beings by which it is at a distance from the highest being. For matter is substance — since it is an intrinsic principle of the substantial composite; and it is more perfect than any accident; and any accident in its genus states some perfection; and finally it is essentially being. Therefore it includes at least the primary goodness of being — which is either a passion of being or an intrinsic mode from which goodness or passion flows. Finally, about this entire response and the citation from *lib. 6 Topic.*, I will say what he himself said in responding to a certain argument of Pererius in *vestig. 1, cap. 17, n. 53*: "Much is said, little is proved — a vague citation of texts through entire books brings little utility to the reader and little credibility to the author. For who is the man who would be willing to read an entire book for the sake of consulting one authority?" How sharp and severe Ferchius is toward others while permitting himself everything!

The final solution — in which he concedes that the composite is simply more imperfect than form — is more absurd than the others. For the opposite was shown in *disp. Phys. 8, cit., n. 36*: because Aristotle in the *cap. de substantia* says that primary substance — by which he understands the composite and being per se subsisting, placed directly in the predicament — is most truly substance; and also because what includes all the perfection of another and beyond this adds another further perfection is simply more perfect than that other. But the composite is such with respect to form — for above form it adds the entitative perfection of matter and also the proper third entity which Ferchius admits in this third solution. The reason by which he proves and confirms this solution — that the whole is simply more imperfect than form because it is caused by form, essentially dependent, naturally posterior to form itself, etc. — proves equally that it is more imperfect than matter. And it was already answered above in *n. 91* at length from Scotus in many places, insofar as the causality and dependence of the whole on its parts is concerned.

As for posteriority: from it rather the opposite should be inferred — because things that are posterior in generation are usually prior in perfection, from *9 Met. 15*. And finally, although form is the act giving specific being to the composite, it is nevertheless an act in something — and such actuality has an annexed imperfection of a part, by Ferchius himself in the same *lib. 3, n. 76* in the defense of the tenth argument. But the composite is a subsisting act — and that actuality is far more perfect than the actuality of informing.

Finally, to the other proposition we adduced from *9 Met. 15* — "the prior in generation are the posterior in perfection" — as opposed to "the perfect is prior to the imperfect in time," to show that this proposition is not to be taken universally but indefinitely: he responds first that the noting of this proposition does not come from our own store but was noted by us from his own *vestig. 10, n. 69*. Then in *n. 84* he says the proposition is not found in *9 Metaphysicorum, tex. 15* as stated, but as follows: "What is later in generation, in form and substance is prior — as a man is to a boy." But we are inverting the proposition — as if inverting propositions were of no consequence. He says finally: whoever would know its sense, let him have read *tex. 13* which precedes — "in the same generated thing in number, potency precedes in time; but simply speaking, act is prior to potency and the perfect to the imperfect, as the generator to the generated." And the conclusion follows in *tex. 17*: "And as we have said, time-wise act always precedes, one before another, up to what belongs to the first mover." "Note the particle 'always' — for it seems to him universal, not indefinite. "Draw the same from *12 Met. 40*, from *14 Met., cap. 4*, from *3 de Anim. 19 and 27*. Scotus is with Aristotle — for in *quol. 13, C.* he cites from *9 Met. 13, tex.* as follows: 'act is prior to potency not only in time and in reason, but also in substance.' Scotus places this proposition as a major in a syllogism — therefore he places it as universal."

That we inverted that proposition is a sheer imposition — for it is found thus in other authors, is reported thus by the Doctor in *1 d. 5, q. 2, lit. O.* and *quol. 13*, as cited above, *lit. R.*, and is finally found also in his own store in the cited place, *vestig. 10, n. 69*. But all this is mockery and sport. Meanwhile I do not see what he responds to the instance. The instance is that the proposition "the perfect is prior to the imperfect" is not to be taken universally but indefinitely — because the opposite proposition is found in *9 Met. 15*: "the prior in generation are the posterior in perfection." The response is that that proposition is universally true — which he proves from the same *9 Met., tex. 17* and from Scotus in *quol. 13*: because act is simply prior to potency also in time. This is plainly not responding but begging the question — for what our instance contends is precisely that that proposition is not universally true, since in generable things what is temporally posterior is perfection-wise prior.

But because from those same texts he draws nature's procedure from the imperfect to the perfect, I show that the proposition "act is prior to potency" in Aristotle — speaking of temporal priority — is not universally true. After treating act and potency in themselves in *tex. 13* and the following texts, the Philosopher compares them to each other with respect to priority and posteriority. He says: "Of every such thing (namely potency) act is prior in reason and in substance; in time it is in one way prior, in another way not." By these last words he indicates that that proposition — with respect to temporal priority — is not universally true. The Philosopher then proceeds to declare these three modes of priority of act over potency. He proves in the same text that act is absolutely prior in reason — that is, in notion and definition — because potency is more known and defined through act than vice versa. For the possible is called possible because it can have act — and so the character of the possible is taken from the nature of act. Hence we say there is a power of building because one can have the act of building, and a speculative power because one can speculate.

He then speaks of temporal priority and says that in the same number potency precedes act — for matter was previously in potency to man before man existed in act, and seed is prior to grain, and the visual power to the one seeing. But in different numbers, act precedes potency — for the generator is prior to the generated. For man in potency becomes man in act, and the musical in potency becomes musical in act — always through something that is first moved, that is by some first mover reducing a being in potency to act. And the mover, that is the agent, is already a being in act. Thus Scotus and Alensis expound this text. Finally, in *tex. 15*, he speaks of another mode of priority — which pertains to priority of perfection. He says that act is absolutely prior to potency also in substance, because "what is later in generation, in form and substance, are prior — as a man is to a boy, and a human to seed." This Alensis explains as follows: because in the motion of nature what is prior in intention is posterior in execution, and since nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, the perfect things are prior in intention but posterior in generation. And everything imperfect as such states

potentiality with respect to the perfect, while the perfect states act. And therefore just as the perfect precedes the imperfect in intention and in nobility, so act precedes potency — and this is what Aristotle says: it is manifest that act is prior to potency in substance and species. For in things that have generation, those that are later in species, substance, and intention are prior in generation — and vice versa, those that are later in generation are prior in species and perfection. Thus Alensis.

Hence finally, *tex. 17*, summing up the aforesaid, he concludes that act is prior to potency in substance — that is in perfection — and in reason — that is in definition — and also in time, just as was said. For always one act is pre-assumed or pre-required before another — according to which act the agent is in act — and this up to that act which belongs to the first mover. From this it is apparent that when he says "act always precedes in time," he does not intend to introduce a universal priority of time in act over potency — for he excluded such universality above in *tex. 13* when he said that sometimes act is prior in time to potency and sometimes not. Rather the word "always" refers to the sense in which he declared act always to precede potency — namely in different numbers, because one is always before another up to the one belonging to the first mover. For in the same number potency precedes act in time. And if that proposition "act precedes potency in time" were universally true in Ferchius's sense, then it would be true not only in different numbers, as Aristotle says, but also in the same number — which however Aristotle himself denies. And in Aristotle's sense Scotus takes that proposition in the cited *quol. 13, lit. C*.

It is therefore established that act is simply and absolutely prior to potency with respect to priority of definition and perfection — but not of time. As was also said in *disp. 6 Met., qu. 5*. And Pererius in *lib. 6, cap. 4* also explains in this sense that form is prior to matter in the order of perfection and intention, but not in the order of duration.

Ferchius complains near the end of *lib. 3 Defens.* that we touch upon certain Peripatetics as trusting too much in the authority of Aristotle — and in the one in whose words he takes his revenge, he himself unleashes his venomous pen against the innocent and most blameless Teacher Scotus. But slanders do not ascend to Heaven.

Article II: Whether a Form Once Corrupted or Separated from Matter Can Naturally Return to Inform the Same Matter

Ferchius, in *vestig. 6, lib. 6, cap. 10 and 14*, in order to escape the argument about the infinity of rational souls drawn from the asserted immortality of the soul and from the presupposed eternity of the world according to Aristotle's account, admitted a circulation of souls into human bodies — so that the same soul, once separated from the body, can naturally, or according to the common course of nature, return and indeed actually does return in the course of ages to inform the

same human body — if not numerically the same, at least one that is specifically the same.

This circulation of souls and their return into human bodies — whether numerically the same or only specifically the same, as he professes — we widely attacked and refuted in *disp. 5 de gener., q. 7, art. 2*: as impious in the Catholic faith, as erroneous, fictitious, and fabulous in true philosophy, and finally as having no foundation in Aristotle.

Hence Ferchius spends the entire *lib. 4 Defens.* in defense of this circulation — complaining that we have blackened it by calling it a fable and fiction, which neither St. Augustine nor Scotus did. So he speaks in *lib. 4, cap. 2, n. 10*. And because we showed its impiety with Scotus in *4 d. 43, qu. 3, §. hic sciendum*, and with St. Augustine in *12 de Civit. Dei, cap. 13*, as the Doctor reports — by certain passages of Scripture, especially *Ps. 11*: "the wicked walk round about" — which St. Augustine explains as referring to the Philosophers who make souls circulate — and by the argument from beatitude: because on this theory of circulation there would be no true beatitude, since the blessed soul would have to return to the miseries it previously had. And so while it is blessed, it either believes it will never return — and is blessed by a false opinion, which is not true beatitude — or it believes it will return, and then it fears, and consequently is not blessed.

Ferchius responds under the same *n. 10*: that St. Augustine and Scotus write in Theology and proceed from revealed principles — namely in supernatural science comparing spiritual things to spiritual things. But we in natural philosophy, which proceeds from naturally known things, adduce authorities and arguments that are not naturally known — and thereby beg the question by proceeding from unknowns. And thus below in *n. 2* he dissolves the Augustinian argument drawn from beatitude, saying it proceeds from things known supernaturally — since the perpetuity of beatitude is not naturally known. Therefore arguing thus — "the soul is blessed, therefore it is perpetually blessed" — involves, he says, the fallacy of figure of speech, changing "what kind" into "when."

But Ferchius refuses to grasp the point we have so often inculcated — which we declared in the prefatory epistle to the Reader in the first edition of the Physics volume: that it is not our undertaking to expound pure and pagan Aristotelian philosophy, but philosophy in itself and true Christian philosophy, which should serve Theology — with Aristotle's errors eliminated. And since this is the case, from our very first undertaking we are obliged to refute in philosophy those opinions that are contrary to our Theology, not only from natural principles but from revealed ones as well.

Furthermore, the argument of St. Augustine — if well weighed — proceeds not only from the condition of the perpetuity of beatitude, but also from the very character of beatitude in itself. For it is of the character of beatitude to exclude

unhappiness and misery, to which it is directly opposed — at least for the time during which the soul is posited as blessed. For happy is he who never becomes miserable (*1 Ethic., cap. 10*), where Aristotle seems also to require perpetuity for felicity. And this would not be excluded on this theory of the circulation of souls — because either the blessed soul would believe itself never going to return (as Augustine argues), and would be blessed by a false opinion, which would not be true beatitude; or it believes it will return, and then it fears — and consequently it is not blessed even so. This is Augustine's argument — not that sophistical one to which Ferchius attempts to reduce Augustine's argument.

Nor should Ferchius complain of us for having blackened this circulation of his with the titles of fiction and fable — for the Seraphic Doctor St. Bonaventure, whose teaching he himself professes, condemned it with a far more severe censure and verdict in *2 d. 1, art. 1, qu. 1*, in the fifth proposition. For proving there that the world has not been from eternity — since there would now be infinitely many rational souls, as these are incorruptible forms — he anticipates Ferchius's response in this way: "If you say in response to this that there is a circulation of souls, or that one soul is in all humans — the first is an error in philosophy, because as the Philosopher wishes, the proper act is in proper matter; therefore a soul that is the perfection of one cannot be the perfection of another, even according to the Philosopher." By these last words he also closes off another escape of Ferchius — when he says this circulation can be defended according to Aristotle. For St. Bonaventure says this is an error even in Aristotle's philosophy. And a little below at the end of the resolution of the question he again repeats: "To avoid an actual infinity it was necessary to posit either the corruption of the rational soul, or its unity, or its circulation — and thus to remove beatitude. Hence this error, *malum habet initium, pessimum finem*." The Seraphic Doctor therefore determines that this opinion about the circulation of souls is not only erroneous in the Catholic faith and in true Christian philosophy, but also in Aristotle's philosophy — so that all escape might be blocked to the impious Circulators for defending this error. He also refutes it again in *2 d. 18, art. 2, qu. 2*, where he calls it not only an error but a dream in philosophy.

The same censure against this opinion is also passed by Alphonsus de Castro in *adversus haereses, verbo Anima, haeresi octava*. After refuting it by natural reason as well, he calls it a "poet's fiction" — as if one imitating Plato says that when souls are poured into another body, they forget what went before. And he finally concludes: "from which it is plainly shown that this teaching is alien not only to the Catholic faith but also to true philosophy." And thus also speaks the *Triumphus catholicae veritatis adversus omnes haereses* — published by the most learned Fr. Ambrosius a Mediolano de Rufconibus de Cumis, Cassinensian Monk, reporting the acts of the Albigensians and Albanensians — heresy eight. Therefore it was not without great basis that we called this opinion a fiction and a fable — and Tatar. in *4 d. 43, qu. 2* calls it foolish.

Let us now see how Ferchius responds to the arguments by which we refuted this error in *disp. 5 de gen., qu. 7, art. 2*.

The First Argument Defended

The first argument begins there at *n. 168*. Whether this circulation is admitted in any animable bodies indiscriminately, or only in human ones — as Ferchius holds according to Aristotle's mind, presupposing the eternity of the world — these Circulators are compelled to admit the return of souls to the same bodies even numerically, after various informings of other bodies. For why, after many centuries, could it not happen that the same matter is again informed by the same soul? And so they fall into the opinion attributed to the Platonists — that in the course of ages, after the completion of the circulation of the eighth sphere, all the same effects will return that there were before. And thus we say that the arguments made against the Platonists in *n. 167* of the same passage proceed absolutely against the circulation of souls, whether in numerically the same body or in one specifically the same — and all the absurdities introduced against them follow. Especially the one that all free acts of our will would be abolished — for if all the same effects are going to return with the return of the same celestial circulation, then it would be necessary to fall into the same sins in this age that were committed in the preceding one. And it would not be free for anyone to marry or remain celibate — since he would be compelled to return to the same civil state in this age that he had in the past.

Ferchius in *lib. 4* responds to this argument in multiple ways. First, in *cap. 1*, he says we falsely attribute to the Platonists this opinion about the return of the same effects in number after the completion of the circulation of the eighth sphere, and that it is false that this is reported by St. Augustine in *12 de Civit. Dei, cap. 13*, and St. Jerome in *cap. 1 Eccl.* Then in *cap. 2, n. 14*, he says the argument drawn from the absurdity that all free acts would be abolished — taken from Scotus — does not conclude. For many Catholics hold that in a free act necessity is compatible with freedom — since those who posit all free acts as eternally predeterminately foreknown, with physical premotion in the will or without it, consequently posit that in the composite sense acts are necessarily elicited. For an act is never elicited in the divided sense — yet with this necessity they hold liberty. He finally denies that it can ever happen that the same soul returns to inform the same matter numerically, and assigns the reason in *cap. 2, n. 13* from the same Scotus in *4 d. 43, qu. 3, C.*: because through free action, matter can be diverted from the state in which it previously was, and through such action can be divided and dispersed. (Note that in our text an error crept in — where "per actionem naturalem" appears, but in truth the Doctor means "per actionem liberam" — "through free action" — about which he had just been speaking, so that reading "naturalem" gives a sense entirely opposite. But this was not our error — we transcribed the entire argument from Scotus, which is found under *lit. C*. But the typesetter, finding the word "tamen" not sufficiently clear in its first letter, took "talem" as

"naturalem" in abbreviated form.) He also adds that prime matter is infinitely divisible — for when a magnitude is divided, the subject too is divided. Since therefore there are infinitely proportional parts in matter, and infinitely many divisions and conjunctions are possible in it — and consequently infinitely many gatherings and dispersions of any part with any other — and since infinity is impossible to traverse, therefore since a part is separated from a part by infinite dispersions, it is not possible that all the same parts that compose a matter numerically commensurate with one soul should again be gathered.

But in the first place, in *disp. 5, qu. 7* we absolutely did not say that the opinion about the return of the same effects in number after many ages is Platonic, nor that it is reported as such by St. Augustine and Jerome in the cited places. But we said that this opinion is commonly attributed to the Platonists by authors — for these are our formal words from the beginning of the question: "The first extreme opinion, which is commonly attributed to the Platonists, etc." And so it is in truth — commentators on Scotus commonly attribute it there in *4 dist. 43, qu. 3* from the beginning. And Tatar. in that place, not far from the beginning, testifies that this was the true opinion of Plato. Pererius in *lib. 6 de forma, cap. 24, Aversa, q. 37 suae phil., sect. 9*, and others everywhere — Toletus also, and Báñez in *2 de gen., qu. ult.* — say that this opinion is commonly attributed to Plato, though many of his followers do not admit it as Plato's view — especially Iamblichus. Therefore we did not err in saying this opinion is commonly attributed to the Platonists.

Nor did we cite St. Augustine and Jerome and Ficino and Alcinous as witnesses that this was Plato's opinion — but as reporters of that opinion which we said is attributed to Plato. For in this question and in others, our intention was never to attack those who hold opinions but the opinions themselves, whoever held them.

It is true, however, that although St. Augustine in *12 de Civit. Dei, cap. 13* does not report that opinion as Plato's, he seems to report it thus in *lib. 22 de Civit. Dei, cap. 27* — where, comparing the opinions of Plato and Porphyry about the rational soul, he speaks thus: "Each of them said certain things which, if they could have communicated with each other, they might perhaps have become Christians. Plato said that souls cannot exist forever without bodies — for this reason he said that even the souls of the wise would return to bodies after a long time. But Porphyry said that a soul thoroughly purified, once it returns to the Father, will never return to these evils of the world." "Let Porphyry say with Plato therefore that they will return to bodies; let Plato say with Porphyry that they will not return to evils; and they will agree that souls return to bodies in which they suffer no evils — and these will be none other than those which God has promised, who will make blessed souls eternally happy with their eternal flesh." So St. Augustine there — from which it is plainly clear that in his account Plato held this opinion, which is commonly attributed to him. This is also cited for Plato by Mayron in *4 dist. 46, qu. 2* and by St. Bonaventure in *2 dist. 18, art. 2, q. 2*, in the body of the question.

The response he gives to Scotus's argument derived from our freedom — that given this position it does not conclude, because many Catholics hold that necessity is compatible with freedom in a free act — is entirely beside the point. For the necessity that Catholics say is compatible with freedom is the necessity of the consequent and from the supposition of a divine decree — not the necessity of the consequent itself. But from the aforesaid position, the same acts of our will would return from the return of the same celestial circulation and stellar aspect. Since they would return by virtue of a natural cause, such necessity would not only be of the consequent but of the consequent itself — for such is the necessity of an effect depending on a natural cause, which entirely destroys freedom.

The reason he adduces in *n. 13* in response to our query — why the same matter numerically cannot be informed by the same soul after many centuries — because through free action matter can be diverted and dispersed — is frivolous. For just as through the action of a free agent matter can be diverted from the same position and dispersed, so too it can through the action of the same agent be gathered together again when dispersed and reduced to the same position. And by that reason the Doctor does not intend to prove that it is naturally impossible for the same matter to return under the same form numerically — as Ferchius seems to intend in responding to our query — but only to prove that this will not necessarily happen by the force of celestial circulation, as the opinion attributed to the Platonists held.

As for what he said about the divisibility of matter into infinite parts — from which he deduced that the same portion of matter can never naturally be restored — this is refuted from Scotus in *4 d. 43, qu. 2, §. Quantum ad istum articulum*: because the same part of matter remains despite the division of matter. Therefore in that part the same form would be re-introduced that was there before — if the return of the same form is not impeded for any other reason than the otherness of matter. And the newly generated thing would be partly numerically the same as what preceded, partly different — because for that part of matter that remains the same, the generated thing would be the same as the one previously corrupted. Similarly, the same matter can naturally be preserved entirely without division — as fire enclosed in a flask is converted into air, and conversely all that air is converted into fire. Here there is no dispersion of matter. Hence the Doctor concludes that by this division and also this dispersion of matter, the return of the same composite numerically is not well avoided — if the return of the same form numerically is conceded naturally, as Ferchius concedes.

Also because if infinitely many segregations and congregations of matter's parts are possible, then also infinitely many times — given the eternity of the world according to their position — the same effects must numerically return in this universe. And therefore it does not seem impossible that at some time there occurs a congregation of the same material particles that were once gathered, so as to be able to pass under the same form.

Seeing therefore that this does not answer the argument, Ferchius below in the same *lib. 4, n. 18* — to respond more foundationally — accepts our own solution, which we anticipated in *disp. 5, cit., art. 2, n. 168* in these words: "Nor let Ferchius say that the soul always returns to a new body — because while the same matter can return (since it is not corrupted but remains the same in what is generated and corrupted), the same form of the mixture that constitutes the body cannot return, because this is corrupted."

This solution of ours, I say, Ferchius gladly accepted, amplified, and explained in *n. 18, 19, 20, 21* — where, having laid this foundation as if discovered by himself and not foreseen by us, he thus addresses us: "Turn yourself into whatever face, into whatever wind you like — you cannot destroy it. A rabid dog can bite a thrown stone but cannot break it." By these rabid words he shows himself to be a rabid dog rather than us. But he unjustly arrogates to himself a solution that we ourselves supplied — and although he contends in *cap. 3, n. 23* that he also gave this solution in *vestig. 6*, since it is very long and distributed in two books, he should have cited the place by chapters or numbers. A vague citation, as he himself says in *vestig. 1, cap. 17, n. 53*, through entire books brings little utility to the reader and little credibility to the author. In *vestig. 6* he treats this circulation ex professo in two places — *lib. 2, cap. 10 and 14* — and nowhere in these places could I find this solution he so boasts of. Hence it is plain that he saw this in us, liked it, and appropriated it.

But this solution too, though far better than the preceding one, is refuted. First, because it rests on the point about the form of corporeity posited in living things beyond the soul — which is no less controversial than the point at hand. Also because Ferchius did not prove, as he should have done to establish this solution, that the form of the mixture is not naturally separable as numerically the same — except through one authority from Aristotle in *2 de gen., cap. ult.*: "what is corrupted according to substance does not return the same in number but in species." But Scotus in *4 d. 43, qu. 2, §. Quantum ad istum articulum* shows that this need not be understood universally and of every effect completely, but only for the most part. Indeed in the same place, *§. De 2. articulo*, he says it is possible for nature to reduce the same mixed body, supposing the third opinion in the preceding article — which he proves: because whenever the entire same matter is approximated to the same agent without impediments, the same thing can be reproduced. And not only to the same agent in number, but to the same in species — because species identity in the agent equals numerical identity. The proof: if at this moment this fire generates from that wood this fire, and if at the same moment another fire were approximated to the same wood, it would generate the same fire. But it is impossible for all the matter from which that body was formed to be again under the form of seed and menstrual fluid in another womb in a natural generation, as is proved through the saying of Gregory in *moral. 4* and posited in *lib. 2, dist. 20, q. 2*. Therefore in another womb the same minimal body would then be formed.

Also because even if we concede in fact that neither all nor any effects return the same in number according to the common course of nature — nevertheless no intrinsic impossibility can be assigned, either on the part of the effects that could be reproduced or on the part of the causes. But only an extrinsic impediment — as we extensively prove with Scotus in *q. cit.*, *art. 2*, *n. 173*. And Ferchius himself agrees in *lib. 4*, *n. 13* — when giving the cause why the same effect cannot return, he says: "It has been rightly ordained that the same should not be restored but something new produced — so that no least something, nothing from the infinite individual effects possible from the same cause, should participate from act." Therefore it does not absolutely and intrinsically imply contradiction for the same form of mixture to return by virtue of natural causes in the same matter — but only by an extrinsic decree of the Author of nature. For if he makes the same soul return in the course of ages, no convincing reason can be given why he would not also permit the same form of mixture to return under the same matter.

Finally, if this solution is valid, it does not bother us — it will be our glory. And that it is solid, and that Ferchius deigned to borrow it from us, is clear.

The Second Argument Defended

The second argument against the circulation of souls is posited by us in *disp. 5*, *cit.*, *q. 7*, *art. 2*, *n. 168*: because the arguments made against the Platonists in *n. 167* absolutely impugn the circulation of souls — whether into the same bodies in number or in species. For in this way true beatitude of the soul is abolished, as is clear from Augustine's argument reported against the Platonists. For the soul would have to return to miseries, whether in the same body in number or in species — it matters little. This argument we sufficiently fortified above and defended against his solutions in *n. 208* at the beginning of the article.

And because this author often tends to escape by saying that he asserts this in Aristotle's account, presupposing the eternity of the world — but not according to the truth — we closed off this escape in the same place. For more candid philosophers defend the immortality of the soul according to Aristotle's mind, so that in the state of separation the soul may be blessed. But this it cannot attain if it is posited as immortal and separable with the obligation of always returning to bodies. And therefore it matters nothing to posit the soul immortal and separable in this way — or absolutely mortal. For what good is this immortality that places the soul in no better state than mortality itself?

Indeed it was entirely unnecessary that Ferchius attacked and refuted the Alexandreans — assertors of the mortality of the soul — so lengthily, if he was willing to attribute to the soul such a mean and servile immortality. For ultimately he cedes to them by destroying another state of the soul in which it properly receives the rewards of good actions and suffers penalties for bad ones. Hence it would have been better had he agreed with them in the mortality of the soul rather than with the Pythagoreans in its return to bodies — for the circulation of

souls even into human bodies alone is more fabulous than mortality itself. And certainly from philosophy we have more forceful arguments, and from Aristotle more passages, for the mortality of the soul than for its circulation. So there.

Since truth begets hatred, this discourse of ours wounded Ferchius's heart and drove him into such fury that in *lib. 4, n. 27* he dares — setting aside all modesty — not only to rage against us but to rave against all Scotists and against Scotus himself their teacher, in these words: "So it is as you say — let truth conquer. More candid philosophers are those who, presupposing the eternity of the world, defend the immortality of the soul according to Aristotle's mind. But your subtle Doctor Scotus, according to Aristotle, defends the soul to be mortal because of the eternity of motion. So John Bassolis, Peter Tatar, Philip Faventinus — and so also you, who hold the rational soul to be mortal. Therefore Scotus and the Scotists, dipped in Epicurus's mud, are excluded from the more candid philosophers and included among the darker ones. May it profit you."

So Ferchius speaks — most unjustly and most falsely — against Scotus and the Scotists. He inculcates this calumny against Scotus not once but several times above in *lib. 3 Defens., cap. 1, n. 5*: "Your Doctor Scotus in *4 dist. 43, q. 2* sets out these two propositions: first, 'the rational soul is immortal' — and for it he brings forward authorities and arguments from others and dissolves them. Second, 'the rational soul is mortal' — from himself he brings forward authorities and arguments for this, but does not solve them." From which he infers in *n. 6* that Scotus abandoned the defense of Catholic truth, because he was unwilling to defend the truth "the soul is immortal" by refusing to solve the arguments he brought forward against it.

Even below in the same *lib. 3, cap. 6*, he inculcates the same calumny more vehemently. For in *n. 30* he says: "A certain Alexandrean — namely your Doctor — solved all the arguments for this negative proposition 'the soul is not mortal,' and was unwilling to solve any arguments for this affirmative, 'the soul is mortal.'" And in *n. 32*: "Scotus in *4 d. 43, qu. 2* sets out these two propositions: 'the rational soul is not mortal' — which is true; and 'the rational soul is mortal' — which is false. He solved all authorities and arguments for the true falsehood with the utmost diligence up to the last one; the authorities and arguments for the falsehood he was in no way willing to solve." And under the same number a little below: "I say that Scotus should have solved, both by philosophical law and by theological law, the arguments for the negative. And since he has not done so, he has performed neither the duty of a good philosopher nor of a good theologian. For he did what was contrary to the end intended by a theologian and philosopher — he did not solve what he should have solved; he did not defend what he should have defended; he did not prove what he should have proved; what he should not have proved, he proved."

Then in the same chapter, *n. 33*: "Hence two evils followed, first among the Doctors who, noticing that Scotus had written against the Catholic faith in such a

way — destroying the arguments for truth, constructing arguments against truth, and leaving them constructed, while at the end pronouncing four good words for the reader to pacify him, such as 'from these it appears how great thanks are to be rendered to the mercy of the Creator,' etc." — and with many more contumelies against the most pious Doctor and his most ungrateful disciple he proceeds there.

And below in *n.* 37 he says: "This falsehood, which Scotus left proved, is capital." And at the end of the chapter he pours out all his venom: "I say Scotus acted badly, because against the truth of the Catholic faith he proved heresy — and left the proofs unsolved."

Not content with having so immortally defamed the most pious Doctor by calling him an Alexandrian and a slayer of the rational soul throughout *lib.* 3 in the cited places, he again in *lib.* 4, *n.* 27 returns to his blasphemous speech against the Teacher — calling him an Epicurean and dipped in Epicurus's mud, excluded from the more candid philosophers. And below in *n.* 36 he says Scotus proved falsehood by falsehood — namely by falsifying two texts of Aristotle in 4 *dist.* 43, *qu.* 2, *supra* I. and *infra* K. And because he frequently throws this calumny at us as well, he adds by way of supreme contempt: "You will certainly be imitators of your teacher in reporting authorities."

I wished to reproduce all these insults and slanders against the most subtle Doctor word for word — so that all future ages may know the insolent and rash audacity of a disciple against a Master: of Astyanax against Hector, and of the smallest mouse against the Indian elephant. I use his own words, which he has at the end of the first book exaggerating our own fertility against other authors: "I am weary of having read and written this — whoever wants to read more and to the point of nausea, let him read Ferchius's book and will find such slanders hurled against Scotus as the bitterest enemies of Scotus and rivals of his glory never dared to say."

I simply do not know what mad fury drove this man into so many insults and slanders against the most pious teacher — whom he otherwise so extolled above other Doctors in purity of life, integrity of doctrine, and piety, both in his life and in his Apology for him. "Woe to those who call good evil and evil good," says the Prophet.

From this monstrous and most enormous imposition I will vindicate Scotus and his disciples — first from Ferchius himself, then from the resolution of Scotus himself in that question on the immortality of the soul in 4 *dist.* 43, *qu.* 2.

Ferchius in *vestig.* 6, *lib.* 2, *cap.* 6 says that on this matter in Aristotle's account three Peripatetic views prevail. The first — more common — is that the soul is immortal. The second, that it is mortal — which in *cap.* 7 he says is that of the Alexandrians, who say Aristotle assertively held the mortality of the rational soul. The third finally makes Aristotle doubtful — with this, however, that he more inclined to immortality and taught it more expressly by many authorities —

though he had certain other principles that recalled his mind to doubt and suspended it. And he says this is the opinion of Scotus and the Scotists — faithfully and most truthfully. Indeed in the same *cap. 6, n. 95* he contends that Scotus in *quol. 21, Q.* held Aristotle to have been not doubtful and ambiguous on the immortality of the soul, but certain and without any hesitation.

If therefore according to his report such is the opinion of Scotus and the Scotists — and he completely distinguished it from the Alexandrian view of those who assertively held the mortality of the soul in Aristotle — with what conscience, with what face did he dare afterward throughout *lib. 3 and 4 Defens.* to call Scotus with his followers Alexandrians, Epicureans, slayers of souls, assertors of mortality?

And especially us — who in the proper question on this matter in *disp. 1 de anim., qu. 10, n. 133*, for the resolution of the question established the following conclusion about Scotus's mind: "The immortality of the rational soul is known by faith and in our present state, although it can be proved by very efficacious arguments, cannot nevertheless be shown by a true and rigorous demonstration. Aristotle, while having acknowledged this truth, did not teach it so clearly and undoubtedly — but with some apprehension toward the opposite." Then in *n. 134* we prove from the beginning that Aristotle acknowledged this truth from many of his passages — and finally at the end of the same number we conclude that while Aristotle from certain of his principles had some apprehension toward the opposite, those very passages can be reduced to a good sense given his customary obscurity of expression, and that he inclined more toward immortality — because he expressly asserted immortality, though he did not demonstrate it, whereas he nowhere expressly asserted mortality, but only a certain mortality follows from certain principles and propositions. And thus precisely do the other Scotists speak, following Scotus.

Therefore most unjustly and most falsely are Scotus and the Scotists counted by Ferchius among the Alexandrians and Epicureans. Does Scotus hold with the Alexandrians that the agent intellect is God, so as to defend the mortality of the soul?

But let us see briefly Scotus's own procedure in *4 d. 43, qu. 2*, where Ferchius says Scotus teaches the mortality of the soul as an Alexandrian. Scotus in that question asks whether through natural reason it can be known that the general resurrection of humans is to take place. He responds in the body of the question that from three propositions the proposed question can be concluded. And if all three were known by natural reason, we would have what was proposed. These are: first, that the rational soul is the specific form of the human; second, that the soul is incorruptible — from which it follows that the specific form of the human is incorruptible. A third is added: that the specific form of the human will not remain perpetually outside the body.

From this the first falsehood of Ferchius is already apparent — when he says that Scotus there proposes these two propositions: "the rational soul is immortal" and "the rational soul is mortal." For in the response to the question he proposes the three propositions just cited — not the two alleged by Ferchius.

Then he proceeds to investigate the truth of each. He says the first is known not only from faith but also from natural reason. Concerning the second proposition he begins investigating under *lit. H.*, and for the affirmative part — namely that the rational soul is immortal — he adduces various authorities of Aristotle and arguments. For the negative part, however, he adduces only two authorities from Aristotle. The first is from 7 *Metaphysicorum*, *cap. ult.*, where he holds that all parts that can remain separated from a whole are material parts — and beyond such parts it is necessary to posit in the whole some form by which the whole is what it is, which cannot remain separated from the material part when the whole does not remain. Therefore if it was conceded that the rational soul is the form of the human, he does not posit it as remaining separated from matter when the whole does not remain. Furthermore, there seems to be a principle in him that what begins to be ceases to be — whence in 1 *de Caelo* against Plato he seems to hold it impossible that something has begun and is perpetual and incorruptible; and in 3 *Physicorum*, in the chapter on the infinite: "of what there is a beginning, there is an end."

Having proposed authorities and arguments in this way for both parts, under *lit. I.* he resolves the question about the second proposition — whether it is naturally known. He says: "It can be said that although there are probable arguments for proving that second proposition, they are not nevertheless demonstrative, nor necessary. And what is adduced for it according to the first way of authorities of philosophers can be solved in two ways. One way: because it is doubtful what the Philosopher thought about this — for he speaks variously in different places and had diverse principles, from some of which one opposite seems to follow, from others another. Hence it is probable that in that conclusion he was always doubtful, and now inclined more to one part, now to another, depending on what material he was treating that was more consonant with one part than the other. There is also another more real response: because not all things said by Philosophers, even assertively, were proved by them through necessary natural reason. Rather they frequently had only certain probable persuasions, or the common opinion of preceding Philosophers. Hence sometimes Philosophers acquiesce because of their probable persuasions, sometimes because of the assertions of their predecessors beyond necessary reason. And that response would suffice for all the authorities — even if they were express — that they do not conclude the proposed point." So the Doctor.

By this second response he concedes that Aristotle assertively held the immortality of the soul — but not through a natural necessary reason, rigorously demonstrative, such that it could not in some way be resolved. And therefore he

afterward solves the authorities and arguments that had been adduced for immortality — not to show that Aristotle was doubtful on this matter or held the mortality of the soul, but to show that he did not prove the asserted immortality by a wholly necessary and demonstrative reason.

From this it is established that Scotus is called an Alexandrian by Ferchius through the height of calumny — for Scotus himself concedes that Aristotle assertively and expressly held and taught the immortality of the soul (though he did not prove it by rigorous demonstration). And this directly contradicts the Alexandrians who deny it. Therefore Scotus is to be counted among the more candid philosophers — not among the Epicureans.

Then in §. *de tertia propositione* he descends to examine the third proposition, and finally under *lit. T.* — responding to the main question — says: "I say therefore that of those three propositions from which the argument for resurrection is formed in a certain way a priori (because they are taken from the form of the human to be resurrected) the first is naturally known; but the other two are not sufficiently known by natural reason, though there are certain probable persuasions for them — for the second, several more probable ones, and therefore the Philosopher seems to have felt it more expressly; for the third, fewer. Consequently the conclusion following from these is not sufficiently known by natural reason through that way."

Hence he concludes finally under *lit. X.* — and also at the end of the question — that the second proposition about the immortality of the soul is not held through natural reason that demonstratively necessitates to assent, but through faith and the Gospel — Christ saying: "do not fear those who kill the body, for they cannot kill the soul." Which he also proves by the authority of St. Augustine in *13 de Trin., cap. 9*, where he teaches this openly in these words: "For those who sought to find these things by human argumentation — only the few endowed with great genius, abounding in leisure and educated in the most subtle doctrines — could with difficulty attain to investigating the immortality of the soul alone. But this faith promises that the entire human being is to be immortal — he who consists of soul and body, and for this reason truly blessed — not by human argumentation but by divine authority."

From what has been said it is thus apparent why Scotus did not explicitly solve those two authorities he adduced for the mortality of the soul — and they are of little moment, as Ferchius himself admits, since they proceed from common principles, not from proper ones. About these he raised so many quarrels, as if the Doctor had become a heretic or a heresiarch by not solving them. So he is not ashamed to speak about the most pious Teacher in *lib. 3, n. 5*.

Regarding Aristotle's sense, Scotus says under §. *potest dici*: we can proceed in two ways. We can say that he was doubtful — for he speaks variously in different places and had diverse principles, from some of which mortality seems to follow and

from others immortality. Then more really and more to the Philosopher's intention it can be said that he assertively held immortality — not however through wholly demonstrative arguments, but only through very probable ones. Because not all things said by Philosophers even assertively were proved by them through necessary natural reason.

Proceeding in Aristotle's sense the first way — to show that Aristotle was doubtful on both sides — surely, as Ferchius argues, the arguments should be resolved for both sides, or for neither. But proceeding in the second way, it was in no way necessary to dissolve those authorities adduced for the mortality of the soul. For on this view it is conceded that Aristotle assertively held the immortality of the soul and by very probable arguments — though not demonstrative ones. Against this asserted claim, those common principles that seem opposed provide no prejudice — because although proceeding from those common principles the immortality of the soul is not concluded but rather mortality, from other proper principles it is sufficiently and very probably deduced.

Yet following this second way, the Doctor was still obliged to solve the arguments adduced for the immortality of the soul — not to show that they conclude nothing, since this would make Aristotle incline more to mortality than to immortality, but to show that they do not conclude necessarily and demonstratively.

If Ferchius insists that even following this second way, Scotus should have solved and explained those two authorities adduced by him for the mortality of the soul — to show that Aristotle assertively and not ambiguously held the immortality of the soul — I respond: Scotus also sufficiently did this under *lit. L.*, explaining the authority adduced from *12 Met. 16* for immortality in these words: "Regarding what is from *12 Met.*, it is said that Aristotle posits it under doubt and says 'perhaps' — not 'perhaps' for this: that the intellect remains afterward. And it follows: 'for everything impossible perhaps' — where he doubts whether it is possible for every soul to remain after the composite. If therefore he expressly asserts (it can be said) — though it was not proved by necessary reason but persuaded by probable arguments — well." By these words the Doctor holds that Aristotle not doubtfully but assertively said the intellect remains after the corruption of the composite — by which he sufficiently satisfies implicitly the authority he had brought forward in opposition from *7 Met., c. ult.*, where he seems to have said universally that form cannot remain separated when the whole does not remain. For afterward in *12 Met. 16 and 17* he expressly excepts the intellect, which he says remains after the dissolution of the composite. And by the same authority he also implicitly satisfied the other principle deduced from *1 de Caelo* — that what begins to be ceases to be. For in the same passage *12 Met. 16* he expressly excepts the intellect from this universal principle — which begins with the composite (that is, with the human) but does not end with it; indeed it remains after it. Since therefore the Doctor holds in *tex. 16 and 17 of 12 Met.* that Aristotle not doubtfully

but assertively and expressly taught that the soul remains after the death of the human, by this very fact he signifies that those two opposing principles were finally there limited by Aristotle and excepted in the intellect.

We can also respond differently to this complaint of Ferchius from the most learned Raguseo in *disp. 34, cap. 19*. He followed exactly the two ways explained from Scotus of interpreting Aristotle's mind — for when he was young, he says, he followed that opinion which was most approved by certain very learned men well exercised in Peripatetic philosophy: that Aristotle in this difficulty always hesitated and was doubtful. Afterwards, with the progress of time and the matter more maturely considered, he came to the view (which is the other way hinted at by Scotus) that Aristotle at first indeed hesitated about this matter — but having most diligently considered the matter, he judged the human soul to be entirely immortal. Yet since he most openly recognized that this truth about the immortality of the soul was quite opposed to the principles of his philosophy, rather than be forced again to found philosophy on other principles, he preferred that his students be doubtful and uncertain about his opinion in the matter that pertained to it. Hence he concludes that if we consider only the principles of Aristotle's philosophy, we cannot posit the immortality of the soul by any argument. But if we carefully attend to what he wrote about the soul, we necessarily must confess it to be immortal.

So the Doctor, following the second way, admits that Aristotle assertively and expressly held and taught the immortality of the soul — though on the other hand he had certain principles of his philosophy not sufficiently consonant with such a teaching. And these are especially those he mentions in those two authorities brought forward in opposition. Nor was Scotus obliged to reconcile these principles of Aristotle with such a teaching — since even Aristotle himself did not reconcile them, but always concealed the difficulty arising from such principles. With this it still stands that for this reason Scotus was not an Alexandrian — for he did not deny that immortality was known to Aristotle and assertively affirmed by him expressly. Whether he consistently followed his own principles, Scotus left to the reader's judgment — by setting out those principles of his philosophy that seem to conflict with it. And the arguments adduced for immortality he dissolved, as I have said repeatedly, not to show that Aristotle was doubtful or inclined to mortality, but to show that those arguments were not wholly necessary demonstrations. And note that Scotus never said that the soul is mortal according to philosophy or according to Aristotle — but only that its immortality cannot be shown by rigorous demonstration.

What Ferchius was finally saying in *lib. 4, n. 36* — that Scotus in *4 d. 43, qu. 2, K.* falsified *tex. 66 of 1 de anim.*: because in Greek and Latin Aristotle has "the intellect itself to understand and the intellect itself to speculate fails when some other interior thing is corrupted — and this understanding is accidental, which at one time is and at another is not." But Scotus has: "the intellect is corrupted in us when

some interior thing is corrupted" — this, I say, is all a manifest calumny and most hateful impertinence toward the Teacher. For it can happen that the Doctor used another older version different from the one we use — as Raguseo testifies in *disp.* 21, *cit.*, *cap.* 6, near the middle in the margin, that there exist less faithful versions of those texts 65 and 66. Indeed St. Bonaventure used the same version at that time in 2 *dist.* 18, *art.* 2, *qu.* 1 — in the body of the question, reporting the Commentator's opinion — and in 8 *d.* 19, *art.* 1, *q.* 1 in the third argument from the beginning. And in the Oxonian text he speaks differently than in the Reportata.

Also because it is not entirely certain whether Aristotle by "to understand itself" means the very act of understanding as such — which is an accident — for he speaks of that understanding which ceases when some other interior thing is corrupted. But this endures — whereas understanding as a second act ceases and ends even when that interior something is still present, because we do not always understand, and the intellection passes while that interior thing remains.

And in the text from 7 *Met.* final, the Doctor reproduced not the words but the sense — and it is false that the force of the argument drawn from it consists in those two particles. For in the Reportata he brings forward the same argument or authority for the mortality of the soul without those particles, arguing thus: "In 7 *Met.* at the end, Aristotle declares that the parts remaining after the dissolution were only material in the composite, as is evident from flesh; and that the form is other than either part. And therefore if the rational soul is the form of the body, it followed to say that it does not remain after the corruption of the composite — since whatever can remain after division is a material part according to him." It is therefore apparent that the force of the argument consists without those particles. And how candid Ferchius is in reporting Aristotle's texts can be inferred from what was said above in *n.* 82.

The Third Argument Defended

The third argument against the circulation of souls we drew in *disp.* 5 *de gen.*, *n.* 169 from the fact that Ferchius says in *vestig.* 6, *lib.* 2, *cap.* 10 and 14 — where he proves it — that Aristotle indeed disapproves the transition of souls into any body of any species in 1 *de anim.* 53, but does not disapprove it for human bodies of a determined species. But nowhere does he affirm it either, we add. So that he can no more assert this according to Aristotle's mind than we can deny it.

Nor let him say this is gathered from 2 *de gen.*, *cap.* ult., where Aristotle posits a circle in generable things in specific identity for the perpetual conservation of the whole. In perpetual things he posits a circle in numerical identity — and therefore, because human bodies are corruptible, they return the same only in species, not in number. But because rational souls are everlasting, they will return the same in number according to the circle. Which he also confirms from 4 *de gen. anim.*, *cap.* ult., where Aristotle says that the birth of animals is governed by

the celestial circuit — namely so that sub-celestial things may imitate celestial circulation.

But Aristotle certainly thought nothing less in those cited passages than asserting the circulation of rational souls. For in the first passage, by the things that recur the same in number in the celestial circuit, he understands the celestial orbs — as all commentators explain, especially Scotus in *4 dist. 42, qu. 1, ad 3 princ.* And this is clear from the context itself — for they revolve in a circle so that the same ones in number return to the same point, because their circulation is by local motion, not by generation and corruption. But if the soul were to return to bodies in a circle, surely such circulation would take place not only through local motion but through a true substantial mutation — as generation is. In the other passage Aristotle intends only to show that the circulation in corruptibles in specific identity through generation depends on the circulation of the celestial orbs — especially the Sun and Moon — accomplished through local motion in numerical identity. Otherwise it would prove also the motion and circulation of the souls of brutes, since he speaks there of the birth and death of any animal whatsoever.

Ferchius responds in *lib. 4, cap. 4, n. 41 and 44* that he did not adduce those two texts to conclude that the rational soul in a body generated with specific identity returns circularly in numerical identity — but only to show that in general and specifically the generations of all sub-celestial things and animals are accomplished through circulation.

Then in *n. 30* he says that in *tex. 51, 52, 53 of 1 de Anim.*, Aristotle does not touch at all on the migration or return of souls — but only on the entrance. For whether the soul is put first, second, or tenth in a body, it always requires a body of a determined species — not of just any kind. But the return to bodies — whether of another or the same species — he does not deny; he affirms it for bodies of the same species. Hence in *1 de Anim. 65* Aristotle expressly taught that the visual power that was in the eye of an old man could see if it received the eye of a young man. Therefore from matter, from what suffers, from an instrument of one species, it can migrate to another matter, suffering subject, and instrument of the same species in number. But what is said under an impossible hypothesis about sense is affirmed there without hypothesis about the intellect — which, when the body grows old, uncorrupted migrates to a young body.

But whether by those two texts in *vestig. 6, lib. 2, cap. 14* he was contending to prove the circulation of souls from body to body of the same species in numerical identity — and whether this was his conclusion drawn from them — can be gathered from what he has there in his first assertion, where he speaks thus: "The circle is posited by Aristotle in generable things universally for their perpetual conservation, from *lib. 2 de gen. et corrup., cap. ult.* Specifically in *4 de gen. anim., cap. ult.* the Philosopher asserted that the births of animals are governed by the celestial circuit — namely so that sub-celestial things may imitate celestial circulation. Furthermore, what is perpetual returns the same in number; what is

perishable returns the same in species. Therefore, since human bodies are corruptible, the same bodies return in species, not in number. Since rational souls are everlasting, they will return the same in number according to the circle." This is the conclusion he draws from the entire discourse — in which he plainly speaks of the circulation of souls into bodies in numerical identity.

As for his claim in the second place that in *tex. 51, 52, 53* Aristotle does not touch at all on the migration or return of souls but only on the entrance — this is indeed true. But in this he plainly contradicts himself. For in *vestig. 6, lib. 2, cap. 10, n. 226* and *cap. 14, n. 144*, he openly says that Aristotle there disapproves the migration of souls into any body — as of a brute or a plant. Hence, since he does not there disapprove migration into bodies of the same species (which he also should have rejected if it displeased him), he deduces that such migration is according to Aristotle's mind. In this response, then, he entirely destroys his own argumentation and contradicts himself.

Finally, that Aristotle in *1 de Anim. 65* taught the migration of the intellect from an aging body to a young one — in that text I do not see such a teaching. And no one doubts that if Aristotle spoke so expressly on this point, as Ferchius boasts, he would have adduced such an authority in *vestig. 6, lib. 2, cap. 14*, where with all sails and oars he strives to establish this migration according to Aristotle's mind. But as is apparent, not a word is said there about such migration. I here reproduce the entire *tex. 65* in full: "The intellect seems to be ingrafted, being a kind of substance, and not to be corrupted. For it would most likely be corrupted by the weakness of old age. But now this happens as in the case of the organs of sense. For if an old man were to receive such an eye of a young man, he would see as a young man would. So old age is not because the soul suffers anything, but rather because what it is in suffers, as in cases of drunkenness and disease." Here, as is plain, there is absolutely no mention of any such migration of the intellect from body to body — but only a conditional mention of sense from an impossible hypothesis: that if an old man were to receive the eye of a young man, he would see as a young man. And by this example from the impossible hypothesis, Aristotle certainly did not wish to declare and affirm without hypothesis a migration of the sensitive power from body to body — and then, on top of this, a migration of the intellect from an aging body to a young one, as Ferchius says. Rather, as all commentators explain there, he wished to declare that just as the weakness of old age in the visual power does not flow back into the power of the soul in itself, but only through the organ to which it is bound — so it does not in any way touch the incorporeal power of which there is no organ at all, such as the intellect. Otherwise Ferchius has other cavils in the cited place against this third argument, which I gladly pass over — since they display more wordplay and biting than truth.

The Fourth Argument Defended

The fourth argument directly impugning the circulation of souls is found in *disp. 5, cit., n. 170*, and is the argument of Aristotle in *1 Post., tex. 4* by which he rejected the Platonic circulation. For there against Plato he inferred that our knowing would be a kind of recollection of things we had known in another age. This argument equally convinces whether the soul is said to return to the same body in number or in species. For habits and intelligible species are received and conserved in the soul — not in the whole conjunct — and since there is no reason why in the state of separation it should no longer retain them (since they do not depend on organs and have permanent being unlike acts, nor is any contrary opposed to them), consequently when it again returns to inform a body, it will supply species for recognizing objects previously known — whether in another body or in the same. Hence the argument against Plato proceeds not because he posited the soul returning to the same body, but absolutely because he posited it returning to a body again — whether the same in number or in species. And therefore the circulation of souls is impugned however it is posited. And this is the argument the Doctor brings forward in *4 d. 43, qu. 3, lit. C.*, for which he cites Aristotle in *1 Post., tex. 4*, where he argues against Plato who said that our learning was nothing but recollection — as he again says in *quol. 13, R.*

Ferchius in *lib. 4, cap. 5* first says that this argument, which we produce as Aristotelian, contains many things against Aristotle. The first particle he says is against Aristotle is this: "for habits and intelligible species are received and conserved in the soul — not in the whole conjunct." He proves this to be against Aristotle because the objects of memory and reminiscence are phantasms and are in the phantasy — and so they are in the whole conjunct. And in the book on memory and reminiscence, the knowledge of these memorabilia is located in the primary sensitive. "Moreover, memory, being of intelligibles, is not without phantasm — and therefore will belong per accidens to the intellective, but per se to the primary sensitive. When the per se subject of the species of memorabilia and of the acts and habits of remembering perishes, the species and habit that are in the subject per accidens also perish. Therefore if there are habits or species of memorabilia in the intellect, these are corrupted when the conjunct is corrupted, and the species of memorabilia existing in the conjunct perish." And below in *cap. 2 and ult.* he also indicates that reminiscence and memory of the sensitive part are, together with the body, of the whole conjunct — and per accidens of the intellective itself.

This attack in the first place is not to the point — for in the designated particle our discussion is about spiritual habits and intelligible species, not about sensible ones, about which the attack proceeds. Although sensible and phantastic species are in the whole conjunct, intelligible ones are nevertheless in the intellective power alone, from Aristotle in *3 de Anima, tex. 6*, where he says the soul is the place of intelligible species — not however all of it, that is according to all its powers, but only according to the intellective power, as commentators commonly explain there.

Concerning this the Doctor notes in *3 dist. 3, q. 6, N.* that intelligible species are far better conserved in the intellect than sensible ones in the organ of sensitive memory — because the latter can be corrupted at least by injury and indisposition of the organ in which they are grounded, but not the former. Both because they are immaterial; and because they have no contrary; and because they are imprinted in the intellect which never fades. For this reason the Doctor says there that Aristotle advisedly called the intellect not a subject but a place of species — because it has the chief property of place, which is to conserve the located. Indeed in *4 d. 45, qu. 1 and 3* he declares that species are imprinted so indelibly in the intellect that they even remain after death — as was said in *disp. 6 de Anima, q. 4, art. 1, n. 76.*

Hence the consequence drawn by Ferchius is false — that intelligible species in the intellect are corrupted when the conjunct is corrupted and the species of memorabilia existing in the conjunct perish. For species can fail in the sensitive part through injury to the organ without failing in the intellective — since such injury does not touch the intellective. Nor does Aristotle teach the opposite in the cited book on memory and reminiscence. He only teaches that the intellective power in our present state cannot use its conserved species for remembering without a phantasm — owing to the necessary connection of powers.

Nor did Aristotle intend there to deny intellectual memory beyond sensitive memory. Rather he expressly admits it there, as the Doctor notes in *4 d. 45, q. 3, §. de secundo* — for he says that we remember certain intelligibles, such as that a triangle has three angles, and this because one has learned and speculated. And although he says there that the memory of intelligibles is not without phantasm, it is not for this reason to be denied that memory is in the intellect — just as it is not denied that understanding is in the intellect, even though according to him there and in *3 de anim. 30 and 39* we never understand without phantasm in our present state owing to the connection of powers.

Because in our present state intellectual memory depends on sensitive memory and not vice versa — and sensitive memory is as the root of intellectual memory — Aristotle there attributes more to sensitive memory and in some way raises it above intellectual memory. And for the same reason he says memory per se belongs to the primary sensitive, and per accidens to the intellective part. Aristotle speaks thus not because he intends to deny true memory in the intellective part — but because no recollection pertains to the intellect in our present state as primary and radically sufficient, as the Doctor explains there under *lit. K.*

And this interpretation — beyond having no small foundation in Aristotle — agrees with our Theology, which teaches that separated souls remember past things. Hence in *Luke 16*, that rich man remembered his brothers and Abraham remembered Lazarus — without the ministry of sensitive memory. And therefore the most excellent Doctor so explains Aristotle's philosophy as to rather establish than destroy our Theology. But Ferchius so explains it as to destroy it — when he

denies that in the separated soul there remain the species and habits acquired in the state of conjunction. See the Doctor in the cited 4 d. 45, qu. 3, §. *de secundo*, where not only does he explain but also retort the authorities adduced by Ferchius from the book on *memory and reminiscence* for the destruction of intellectual memory — authorities commonly adduced by all who deny intellectual memory according to Aristotle.

Then under the same n. 52 — to show that neither species nor habits are conserved in the separated soul — he says: forms are destroyed in two ways: either by a positively destroying cause (in which way ignorance and a vicious habit destroy knowledge; virtue destroys a vicious habit); or by the cessation of the influencing or conserving cause (in which way the act of seeing or understanding ceases when actual influx in the cause ceases; the species in an exterior sense ceases when the object is absent; and in this way he also says knowledge can be destroyed by forgetting — for just as from acts a habit is generated and conserved, so through non-act over a long time it is lost). And there is the example of light, which fails when the luminous body is absent.

Moreover, he says there in the margin that we are driven by truth in *lib. de Gen., cap. 277, col. 1* to teach that accidents that have no contrary are corrupted by the cessation of the conserving influx.

Finally, he says that beyond these destructions of forms there is another per accidens — as Aristotle said a little before. Therefore whether intentional species have a contrary or not, they are destroyed — either by per accidens destruction through the destruction of the subject, or by the cessation of the conserving cause. Habits, however, are destroyed both per se and per accidens — and by the negation of the contrary and by the negation of what conserves them. Hence he finally concludes that in our argument there is a paralogism of the consequent from an insufficient enumeration of the causes of corruption or cessation.

But concerning the permanence of intelligible species this was already treated abundantly in its proper place in *disp. 6 de anim., qu. 4, art. 1* — which should have been presupposed here. For they are not corrupted per se — since they have no contrary. Not per accidens at the corruption of the subject — since they are imprinted in an incorruptible subject. They do not cease through the cessation of an influencing or conserving cause — since they do not have being in becoming like a successive being, as acts do; nor do they necessarily depend on an efficient cause in their coming-to-be and conservation, as was said in *disp. 6, cit., de anima, n. 76*.

And when in *disp. 5 de gen., q. 4, n. 104* we say that accidents not having a contrary are corrupted by the cessation of conserving influx — the discussion there was about light in air, intentional species in a medium, and other accidents that necessarily depend on efficient causes in their coming-to-be and conservation. Intelligible species are not of this kind.

Through that mode of per accidens destruction reported by Aristotle in *lib. de long. and brev. vitae, cap. 2*, he intended to indicate only the destruction of species in the intellect from the destruction of those in the phantasy — not simply, but in a qualified sense — namely with respect to operation. For in our present state, although the intellect retains the intelligible species even when the phantastic is destroyed, it cannot nevertheless go into act owing to the connection of powers. In this way the Doctor explains in *4 dist. 43, qu. 1, ad 2 princ.* the text from *1 de anim. 66* according to the old version — "the intellect is corrupted when some interior thing is corrupted" — that is, it is impeded with respect to operation, and is thus considered quasi corrupted, not that it is simply corrupted.

As for the cessation of habits: this was treated ex professo in *disp. 3 de anim., qu. 6*, where it was said that habits are corrupted per accidens at the destruction of the subject, and also per se by contrary acts without the destruction of the subject — but never truly and properly by the mere cessation of acts taken alone, except insofar as cessation from acts is a cause, in most cases, of the eliciting of opposing acts. Hence it is false that Ferchius here says that habits are properly destroyed solely by the cessation of acts.

Again under the same *n. 53*, he brings forward a response he had given in *vestig. 6, lib. 2, n. 146* from Aristotle in *3 de anim. 20*, where Aristotle says: "but we do not remember, because the passive intellect is corruptible, and without it nothing is understood." "This therefore," he says, "is the reason why we do not remember what the soul knew in another body — because reminiscence and memory are not without imagination, and the intellect understands nothing of what pertains to reminiscence without imagination. The imagination that is the passive intellect of preceding humans is corrupted; and without that preceding imagination, the intellect — which is the immortal and eternal and impassible in us — cannot understand anything that can be remembered. Thus it is affirmed in *1 de anim. 65* that when the intellective habens is corrupted, it does not remember nor love — since those operations or passions were not of the intellect but of the common habens."

This response is refuted by us in *disp. 5, cit.* under the same *n. 170*: because Aristotle's text is not adduced to the point. For Aristotle there does not raise the difficulty why we do not remember what the soul knew in another body — but why, if the intellect is separable from the body, we do not remember after death what we knew when conjoined. And he says we do not remember owing to the defect of the imaginative, which serves for reminiscence. But this Aristotelian doctrine cannot be applied to the present question. For the difficulty presses about the soul not in the state of separation but newly conjoined to a body — why it does not remember what it knew in another body. In that state surely imagination is not lacking, so that it might use its ministry to employ species long since acquired in another body. But to say that for this use the imaginative of another body would be required and not that of the present body — as Ferchius

intimates — is stated arbitrarily. For Aristotle says in *1 de anim.* 65 that if an old man were to receive the eye of a young man, he would see as a young man. Therefore if for the operation of the sensitive power — which is more bound to its organs in its operations than the intellective — another organ sufficed, provided it was conjoined to it, much more in our case must it be said of the rational soul that the imaginative of the body newly informed suffices for it to exercise any operation dependent on it that it could exercise in another body — and that there is no need for the imaginative of that body.

Ferchius responds to these things in *lib. 4, n. 55*: first, that we poorly explain the text *20 of 3 de anim.* — about the dead man and the separated intellect. For Piccolomini argues on that text as follows: of the conjoined intellect it is true that it understands nothing without the corruptible passive intellect; of the separated intellect it is false. But Aristotle speaks of that incorruptible intellect which understands nothing without the corruptible passive intellect. Therefore he does not speak of the separated intellect but of the conjoined. Now the separated intellect is of the dead man, the conjoined of the living. Aristotle therefore speaks of living humans, not of the dead, when he says "we do not remember." He also proves this by weighing the words of the text: "Note the subject: 'we.' Note the predicate: 'we remember.' On the part of the subject, Aristotle speaks about himself and his own — these were living people with conjoined intellects. On the part of the predicate he proves the same from *1 de anim.* 66, where reminiscing is said to belong not to the intellect but to the whole conjunct."

But the common exposition of almost all Interpreters of that text from *Arist. tex.* 25 is that Aristotle there speaks of the separated intellect and after death. I will report those who are at hand, planning to report others if I had them, since this is the common exposition of both ancient and more recent Peripatetics.

Themistius expounds it thus in *lib. 3 de anima, cap. 28*, comparing this text with comment *tex. 66 of 1 de anim.* — where when Aristotle says the intellect does not remember, he clearly speaks of the separated intellect and of the human after death. He says: "and for this reason, with this destroyed, neither does it remember nor love. For those were not of it, but of the common — which indeed has been destroyed." By these words Themistius says those things respond in that *tex. 20 of 3 de anim.*: "we do not remember — and for this reason, on account of the occasion, because this is impassible. But the intellect that is called passive is abolished — and without this it understands nothing."

Thus also the most eminent Cardinal Oregius — who was once my most cherished Maecenas — explained this text about the human after death and about the separated intellect in his most learned *Dispute on the Immortality of the Soul*, pag. 112, from the Greek. I do not know therefore on what ground Ferchius pretends to deduce from that *tex. 66 of 1 de anim.* that in this corresponding *tex. 20 of 3 de anim.* the discussion is about the conjoined intellect and the living human — when from there the entire opposite is deduced. For from the fact that reminiscing

belongs not to the separated intellect but to the whole conjunct — as is there stated — it follows that "not remembering," which is the subject in *tex. 20, 3 de anim.*, belongs to the separated intellect and to the dead human.

And for this reason Raguseo in *disp. 21 de animae immortal., cap. 8*, toward the end, explains this *tex. 20* in the same way — that it speaks of the dead human. For it is clear that while we are alive we do remember, and it would be false to say of us living absolutely that we do not remember. Therefore after death (he says) only the intellect remains, always understanding and never remembering — as if Aristotle wishes to teach that the separated intellect uses the acquired species in a continual act of understanding without ever recalling. By these words Raguseo transmits that intelligible species acquired here are conserved in the separated intellect.

Therefore it is not a monstrosity among Peripatetics, nor a transgression in Aristotle's account. Thus also Contareni expounds it in *qu. de immortal. animae, cap. 2, ratione 13*. Trombeta in the same place, *art. 1, concl. 6*, at the end. St. Thomas in *3 de anim., cap. 20*. Aversa, Coimbra, Cajetanus, Thiennus, in this text. Apollinaris there, and others everywhere.

Therefore in that text the discussion is about the separated intellect — and this is gathered both from the prior part of the text and from the posterior. For in the prior part it speaks thus: "the separate, however, is only this — what it truly is — and this alone is immortal and perpetual." In the posterior part: "but we do not remember — because this is impossible." By these words it is sufficiently clear that he is not speaking of the living — for who is so mad as to say that reminiscence does not belong to us in this state? He therefore speaks of the state of separation. How this is to be understood the Doctor explains in *4 d. 45, qu. ult.*, at the end: that after death we do not remember insofar as sensitive or cogitative memory does not remain — which Aristotle there calls the passive intellect owing to its proximity to the true and proper intellect. And when he says that in such a state we do not remember, this is not to be understood of all reminiscence whatsoever — for he also says without that passive intellect nothing is understood there. And yet it is certain that the separated intellect understands — otherwise it would not be immortal, since in the state of separation it could not have its proper operation. But just as he means to say that the soul cannot understand in the way it uses in the body — namely by recurring to phantasms — so he means to say that it does not remember in the way we remember in this state through dependence on sensitive memory.

Thus also the Doctor explains Aristotle's book on memory and reminiscence in *4 d. 45, qu. 3, §. de secundo*: although he says there that the memory of intelligibles is not without phantasm, it is not for this reason to be denied that memory is in the intellect — just as it is not denied that understanding is in the intellect, even though according to him there we do not understand without phantasm. Hence St. Thomas in the exposition of this text says that understanding is in some way

equivocal in the state of conjunction and separation owing to the different mode of understanding. And thus also Coimbra expound this text: not all recollection is lost when the body expires, but only that which occurs through the intervention of imagination.

Contareni also gives this exposition in *qu. de immortal. animae, cap. 7, ad 8*. And when Ferchius was saying that if in that *tex. 20* Aristotle were speaking of the separated soul, he should have said in the singular number "the soul does not remember" — not in the plural "we do not remember": to this Cajetan's ponderations and exposition — from which Ferchius especially founded his exposition — are responded to in three ways by Capredoni in *de Theologia Arist., lib. 1, cap. 10*.

First, from the teaching of St. Thomas in *1 p., qu. 75, art. 4, ad 1*: the human is taken there for the soul. And in this way Aristotle took it here — since according to him in *9 Ethic.*, what is in each thing the principal seems most of all to be that thing, as what the Rector of the State does, the State is said to do. Since therefore the rational soul is what is most principal in the human, the rational soul is taken for the human — and hence Aristotle could say, having discussion of the soul: "we humans remember."

Second, Capredoni responds that Aristotle's teaching in *1 de anim. 64* is that it is more convenient to say that the human learns or understands through the soul, than that the soul itself learns or understands. And in like manner we are more aptly said to remember through the soul than the soul to remember. Therefore Aristotle, to teach the doctrine consonant with speaking about the soul after death, said "we do not remember" — that is, we humans who are after death according to our principal part, namely according to the rational soul, do not remember.

Third and finally, Capredoni says Aristotle said "we do not remember" — because he was speaking about reminiscence, the subject of which is the whole human composite and not the soul alone. And to explain this he says "we do not remember" — though he notes in the same book *1, cit., cap. 39, ad 1* that when Aristotle here and in *1 de anim. 63* says that after death reminiscence does not occur, he is speaking of reminiscence belonging to the sensitive part — not of memory pertaining to the intellect. This memory he says is found in the separated soul, and he holds that habits and species acquired here are conserved in it according to Aristotle's mind — in *cap. 38 and 39*. And he responds to all that Ferchius adduces in opposition.

And it must also be noted that this most learned Thomist singularly professes the doctrine of Aristotle there — and what Aristotle himself thought about the soul and other separated substances — and therefore called that book the Theology of Aristotle. I add this so that Ferchius does not say, as he is wont, that we go outside the Peripatetic school and outside the point.

Then further he says in *n. 41* that even if it were admitted that the soul informing a new body retains species acquired in another body, the present imaginative does not suffice for it to use those previously acquired species with its ministry — as we were saying. For a phantasm and actual consideration of the phantasm itself in the imagination is required for the intellect to be able to use acquired knowledge.

But we closed off this escape above through a parity taken from *tex. 65 of 1 de anim.* concerning visual power — that if an old man received the eye of a young man, he would see as a young man.

But because the point of difficulty depends on the causality of the phantasm and the mode of concurring with intellection, this response is more promptly broken down from what is commonly said: the intellect does not depend on phantasms in the second motion as essentially as in the first — in which it receives a com-principle of effecting the act of understanding. For this reason Aristotle said in *3 de anim. 8* and *8 Phys. 32* that the intellect no longer needs another mover to understand once it has acquired the impressed species. The Doctor receives and approves this teaching in *1 dist. 3, ad 1 princ.* and also in *4 d. 45, qu. 1, ad 1 princ.* — where explaining that authority from *3 de anim. 39*: "Phantasms are to the intellect as sensibles are to sense — therefore just as sense cannot have any sensation unless moved by a sensible, so neither can the intellect any intellection unless moved by a phantasm." He responds that this authority must be understood regarding the acquisition of species and this first and of first species, but not regarding use. And the reason is that the intellect can use a form previously acquired even though those things are not present that were previously necessary for acquiring that form. Not so sense (speaking of external sense) — for it cannot use some previously acquired form, because it is not conservative of a previously received species for later operating.

Thus in our case: once it is conceded that species acquired by the soul in the old body are conserved in it, it can use them in the new body — even if that same prior phantasy is not present by virtue of which it acquired them. And through them it can know the quiddities previously habitually known, and recognize objects previously known — since those are no longer necessary for recognizing such objects, since with respect to those objects the intellect is in the position of a second motion. Raguseo also subscribes to this doctrine in *disp. 21, cap. 11, ad 2 Alexandraeon* — where proving that the separated soul can have its proper operation, using the species here acquired independently of phantasms, he says one must note that phantasms do not necessarily concur to the intellection itself, but are required only in the first for the derivation of the intelligible species. But when the intelligible object is present to the intellect in its species, the intellect can then erupt into the act of understanding without any assistance of phantasms. "The soul therefore" (he says) "separated from the body, although it no longer has any commerce with phantasms, has nevertheless many intelligible species by

which it can excellently exercise its function of understanding." By the same reasoning therefore in our case, if the soul returns to a new body with those species, it will be able to recognize again and reconsider the objects shining in those species without the aid of phantasms.

Moreover, Alphonsus de Castro in *adversus haeresim, lib. 2, tit. Anima, haer. 8* — against this heresy of the transmigration of souls — twists the same argument about the memory of past things and vindicates the solution brought forward by Ferchius by the case of St. Paul reported in *2 Corinth. 12*. For being rapt to the third heaven, he saw the mysteries of God which it is not lawful for a human to speak. In this rapture, although Paul himself is doubtful whether his soul was in the body or outside the body, what is certain is that the soul at that time used none of the bodily senses — but was itself alone, without any assistance of the body, in that contemplation of mysteries. For bodily senses would in no way avail for contemplating those mysteries. And yet afterward he remembered what he saw. If therefore he remembers this — which was seen for so brief a time outside the body — when he returned to the body, much more would the soul remember those things in which it had been dwelling for so many periods of time, living in another body. St. Bonaventure finally urges the same argument against the circulation of souls in *2 dist. 18, art. 2, qu. 2*, in the body of the question.

The Fifth Argument Defended

The fifth argument was in *disp. 5, cit., n. 271*: even if the argument adduced by Ferchius in the preceding were sufficient for forgetting what was done in another body — why does the soul not remember, in the assumed new body, what was done at least outside the body in the immediately preceding state of separation?

Ferchius responds in *vestig. 6, lib. 2, n. 147*: because the possible intellect is born into the body like a tablet on which nothing is written (*3 de anim. 14*). And by just proportion of matter — for matter does not receive a new form without the old ones being cast aside, so that it approaches naked to naked — so the intellect about to approach the body is stripped of the accidents of the opposite state — namely of separation. The order of this state of conjunction also requires this — because of the order of cognitive powers in acting as in being. In being, matter is for form, the body for the soul. In acting, the action of the body is for the action of the soul, and the action of the sensitive form is for the action of the intellective. Since this is so, it is necessary that intellections and habits of the separated soul be erased in the reiterated conjunction — lest the soul, occupied with objects brought with it, refuse the natural service.

But in the cited place we refuted this response: first, because the text of Aristotle does not serve the purpose. For Aristotle there said the possible intellect is born into the body like a tablet on which nothing is written — because he supposed it was being born in the body for the first time, not that it had preceded in another

state. For if he had supposed this, he surely would not have said it approaches stripped of every species.

Ferchius beats back this attack in *lib. 4, cap. 7, n. 57*: because Aristotle speaks of nakedness in the text — "it must be thus, as in a tablet on which nothing is written in act, which indeed happens in the intellect." He speaks therefore of nakedness from all species — about whether the intellect is born in the body first, second, or tenth, nothing in Aristotle's text. Therefore he says we compose new texts to deceive him.

Then he says it is simply false in Aristotle that the intellect then first comes to be — because in *2 de gen. anim., cap. 3*, only the intellect is before the body and approaches from outside. And in *1 de anim. 65*: the intellect seems to be ingrafted as a kind of existing substance and not to be corrupted. Therefore it is a kind of existing substance before the body — and is not born with the body but only ingrafted. Again in *1 de anim. 84*: "for the intellective — it is most reasonable that this be most ancient and have dominion according to nature." If it is most ancient and prior in nature to the elements, how can it come to be when it is ingrafted into a new body? He therefore concludes it is false that Aristotle in that text supposed the intellect then to be first ingrafted and to come to be — rather it had preceded in another state. And this is proposed by us but not proved.

But we erred regarding that *tex. 14 of 3 de anim.* by using the word "ingrafted" — which is not in the text. Plainly Ferchius himself was the cause of our error — for in *vestig. 6, lib. 2, n. 147*, responding to the query why the soul does not remember things done outside the body, he responds: "because the possible intellect is ingrafted in the body like a tablet on which nothing is written, *3 de anim. 14*." If therefore nothing about being ingrafted is in the text, why does he mention that word when reporting that text? He therefore composes new texts — not us.

Nevertheless our exposition of that text is entirely true: that from the beginning the intellect is born in the body like a tablet on which nothing is written — because Aristotle supposes or intends that it did not precede in another state, but is then first ingrafted and comes to be in the body. This is gathered from the context itself — because if it had preceded in another state with other intellections and habits that it then exercised, in the reiterated union with the body it would not be said to be ingrafted like a tablet on which nothing has been written, but like a tablet on which something was indeed written but was afterward erased.

Furthermore, in that text, as Apollinaris and other Expositors note, he solves a certain difficulty previously raised — saying that passivity is taken in multiple ways. One way is passivity taken properly, which occurs with the casting aside of a contrary — as heating. The other is taken broadly, through which only an acquisition or only a loss of a quality occurs. And consequently, regarding the difficulty, he says that the intellect when it understands is not acted on by intelligibles with a corrupting passivity but only a perfecting one. For the intellect

is in potency toward intelligibles before it understands them, and is nothing of them in act except when it actually understands — and from the fact that it receives intellection from the intelligible, no contrary disposition is necessarily cast aside, as happens in a blank tablet on which nothing is written. For it is in potency for every writing, and when a new writing is produced in it, no contrary disposition is therefore cast aside. But this would not happen otherwise if the intellect had preceded in another state with intellections and habits and other accidents opposing and impossible with the state of conjunction. For in order to be able to understand in the body, those contrary dispositions would need to be cast aside from the intellect — as Ferchius himself affirms, since the accidents in the state of separation and in the state of conjunction are opposed and impede each other.

Finally, as Coimbra notes in this text and Cajetanus in *3 de anim., cap. 2*, concerning the agent intellect: this passage is against Plato, who in the *Meno*, the *Phaedo*, and other places taught that our minds — before descending into these perishable and mortal bodies — had in themselves the notions of all things imprinted. But through the contagion of the body and the insolence of a kind of foul prison, they fell into forgetfulness of superior intelligence — though they remember by learning, and all our discipline is a kind of recollection. And Coimbra says: "we refuted this error ex professo at the beginning of *lib. 1 Post.* where Aristotle mentions it." From which note two things are to be gathered against Ferchius: one is that Aristotle in this text truly teaches the intellect to be ingrafted in the body entirely for the first time, such that it did not precede in another state before the body — because he speaks against the Platonists who said thus. The other is that Aristotle himself remembers this error in *1 Post., cap. 1* — which Ferchius was denying above in *lib. 4, n. 48*. St. Thomas has the same in *2 contra gentes, cap. 93*.

Then it is false that Ferchius says the rational soul pre-exists the body — rather, it comes to be simultaneously with the body according to Aristotle, even if it is true that it does not cease with it. For Aristotle most expressly taught this in *12 Met., tex. 16 and 17* — where, having discussion of the inception of forms, he distinguishes two kinds of forms. Some are moving forms — as the Intelligences — and these, he says, exist before the generation of individual things. But others are forms that have the character of formal cause and constitute the composite — and these, he says, do not exist before the composite is constituted through them. And under this second kind of forms Aristotle also comprehends the rational soul. For then asking in *tex. 17* which of the forms of the second kind can survive after the dissolution of the composite, he says this can happen in some — and specifies this to be the rational soul. I here reproduce both texts so that their clarity may be apparent.

"The moving causes therefore, I say, pre-exist; but those that are as reason are simultaneous. For when a human is healthy, then health is also. And the form of

the bronze sphere is simultaneous with the bronze sphere. But whether something remains afterward must be considered — for in some there is no obstacle: as if the soul be such — not all, but the intellect. For perhaps it is impossible for all." Here Alensis — with whom Scotus agrees — expounds, saying: "Note that the opinion of the Philosopher briefly is this: that it is of the essence of any form that it begin to be together with the formed composite. But nevertheless some form is such that it can have being after the composite substance — as is the intellect. For although the sensitive powers that are bound to organs do not have being after the composite substance, nevertheless the intellective form has being." Here the clear text and the clearer exposition of Alensis — whom Ferchius not once in the *Defens.* calls a sublime Metaphysical expositor. Hence I do not know on what basis Ferchius pretends in *vestig. 6, lib. 2, n. 146* to prove the opposite from this text — that the soul pre-exists the body. For he says: "the same thing is to say in *12 Metaph. 17* that the soul remains afterward, and that it is before." But Aristotle expressly teaches that the soul remains afterward the body — and does not pre-exist it. And Scotus in *4 d. 43, qu. 2, M.* says that in Aristotle's principles the soul receives being anew — since he does not posit it as having perpetually preceded without the body, nor previously in another body.

The passages he adduces in opposition are either false or poorly understood. For in *2 de gen. anim., cap. 3*, Aristotle indeed says that only the intellect approaches from outside and does not arise from the foamy and thick seed — as do the sensitive and vegetative, which are drawn from the potency of matter. But he by no means expresses that it pre-exists before the body. For the words of the text are: "it remains therefore that the mind alone approaches from outside, and that it alone is divine — for nothing bodily has communion with its activity." In these words, as is apparent, there is absolutely no mention of the mind's pre-existence before the body — but it is only said to approach from outside, not from within from the potency of matter. Whether it had previously pre-existed or is then actually produced in the body from outside by God — neither is stated.

The other passage from *1 de anim. 65* — "the intellect seems to be ingrafted as a kind of existing substance" — is wholly wrested when Ferchius infers: "therefore it is a kind of existing substance before the body, and is not born with the body but only ingrafted." For rather from that phrase it is deduced that the mind is born and produced — and not from outside or before the body, but in the body. For this is what "ingrafted" means — to be born in another, to come to be in another. He adds, however, that it is ingrafted as a kind of existing substance — lest anyone should suspect it is born and made in matter as other substantial forms, which are made in matter and dependently on it. And these are therefore called material and inhering forms, not existing per se. Of which text the Cardinal Oregius in the cited *qu., ad 5*, gives an excellent exposition. And to argue thus — "the intellect is ingrafted as a kind of existing substance; therefore it is an existing substance before the body" — is a manifest fallacy of the consequent: as if one said: "Peter exists; therefore he exists before Paul who is his father."

The other passage finally from 2 *de anim.* 82 is not adduced to the point — because there the discussion is not of temporal priority but of natural priority and dignity. This is gathered from the words immediately preceding: "But the soul is something more excellent and superior — it is more impossible even for the intellect." Hence "most ancient" there signifies the priority of excellence and dignity of the soul over other inferior forms — as the word "dominion" indicates.

Second, we further attacked that response of Ferchius to the main argument given in *vestig.* 6, *lib.* 2, *n.* 147 in *disp.* 5 *de gen.*, *n.* 171: because the ratio he adduces from the proportion of form to matter does not convince. For matter must be stripped of the old forms in order to receive a new one — because the old ones were opposed to the new one and impeded its approach. But it does not seem that the soul must in like manner strip off the species or habits it had in the state of separation — because these accidents do not impede its conjunction with the body.

Ferchius insists in *lib.* 4, *n.* 78 that in this attack or response we beg the question when we say it does not seem necessary for the separated soul to strip off the intellections and species of that state in its reunion with the body — because these accidents do not impede its conjunction with the body. This, he says, was what we needed to prove, not propose. For the accidents of the state of separation and conjunction are opposed — and therefore when the separated soul is reunited, it must set aside the accidents of that state. For the conjoined intellect is bound to the senses in receiving objects and their knowledge; the separated is free from the senses and cannot receive anything from them.

But it is false that we here beg the question and are deficient in proof. For in our solution we deny his parity drawn from matter and form — because matter must indeed be stripped of old forms in order to receive a new one, since the old ones were opposed to the new and impeded its approach. In the same way we deny that the accidents of the separated soul impede its conjunction with the body. And therefore when we responded and denied this, we were not obliged to do more — but it was incumbent on him to prove the parity and such opposition (which he then proves below) to satisfy his obligation.

But he does not prove it sufficiently — for not all accidents that belong to the soul in the state of conjunction are opposed to all that belong to it in the state of separation, and vice versa. For just as it can retain species acquired here in another state (which Aristotle did not obscurely signify in 1 *Ethic.*, *cap.* 11, where he holds that deceased souls know many things that are here — namely the prosperous successes or misfortunes of friends, which does not seem to be better accomplished than through species of friends brought from here) — so also if the soul can again return to the body, it can bring with it species or habits it had in the prior state. For the species of one object does not conflict with that of another — even if one were infused and the other acquired. And an intellection of some object is always of the same kind whether elicited by the soul conjoined or

separated. Hence those states are opposed only in the mode of knowing and acquiring species through dependence or independence from the senses — not at all in the acquired species themselves and intellections, since all are spiritual and specified in the same way by their objects in each state.

But again in *n.* 79 he contends to prove that the accidents of the separated soul — namely acts, species, and habits — must be erased so that it can again be conjoined with the body. For nature neither overflows in superfluities nor falls short in necessities. If the conjoined soul understands objects and habits pertaining to the state of separation, it will then be impeded from the intellection of objects pertaining to the state of conjunction (*2 Topic., loc. 33*: "it does not happen to think many things at once"). Therefore it is superfluous to bring with it the objects of separation — for this is to bring impediments.

Second: the rational soul in the body understands nothing without the ministry of the body and the senses (*3 de anim. 30, 39*). Therefore it will not understand the objects of separation — since these are intelligible and not through sense. Nor can it be said that they are understood without the service of the senses — because these modes of understanding through sense are impossible.

Third: if the intellect were to bring with it the objects of separation, it would always occupy itself with such objects — which are of themselves more intelligible and toward which it is more inclined (*1 Met. 1*) than toward sensibles — and the following argument also falls into the same point.

Finally, he deduces another argument from *3 de anim. 61*, which in sum consists in this: that nature, for the better good both of the soul and of the body and of the whole composite, establishes that the intellect existing in the body knows nothing except through the service of the body and the senses — a service it would not regard if it could know better objects without this service and attain a greater felicity in their knowledge. For one who has the end does not seek means to acquiring the end.

In response: to all these things easily, given the doctrine just reported from Scotus in *n.* 233 — which many among the Peripatetics hold, and especially Raguseo there cited, and Costantini in *de triplici statu animae rationalis, disp. 5, sect. 8*, Cardinals Toletus in *1 de anim., tex. 12* and Oregius in the cited question, *ad 4*. Namely: that the intellect even in the state of conjunction does not need phantasms except in the first motion — that is, in the acquisition of species and the first intellection made through them. But in the second motion, it does not always need them — but can use previously acquired species without recourse to phantasms. For this Bargius in *1 dist. 3, qu. 6, §. Ad aliud de Philosopho* adduces two very express Scotist authorities — one in *4 dist. 45, qu. 1, ad 1 princ.* already cited above, the other in *1 dist. 3, qu. 4*, in the body of the question.

Therefore to the first: the sequela of the antecedent is denied — namely that if the separated soul brings with it the objects of separation, it would be impeded

from the intellection of objects pertaining to the state of conjunction. To the proof from *2 Topic., loc. 33*, that it does not happen to think many things at once — whatever be the sense of this proposition (about which I said in *disp. 6 de anim., qu. 9*) — I say that even if it cannot understand both objects simultaneously, it suffices that it can understand them successively and disjointly, one after the other.

To the second: the assumption is verified especially in the first motion — but not always in the second. Hence, with species of objects of separation compared by the intellect and retained in the new state of conjunction, it will be able to use them without the aid of phantasms. And with respect to their consideration, it will be as in the second motion. Therefore the consequence is denied. To the proof: I say that although in the state of separation the mode of understanding through sense or through dependence on senses cannot occur — since in such a state the soul is deprived of all sense — yet in the state of conjunction the mode of understanding independently of the senses does not conflict, not simply and absolutely and with respect to any object whatsoever (for in that case it would be proper only to the state of separation or the separated soul), but in the second motion and with respect to objects whose species were previously compared in the state of separation. For if they had been compared in the state of conjunction, at least mediately through the body would the intellection depend on the senses.

To the third: from the teaching of Scotus in *2 d. 42, qu. 4, §. respondeo* — that by the command of the will the intellect can be diverted from the consideration of a stronger object to move toward the contemplation of a weaker. This also in fact commonly happens now. Nor does that profuse argument with its confirmation contain greater mystery.

To the last: I say that the very same argument is brought forward by the Doctor — or at least a very similar one — in *4 dist. 41, qu. 2* from the beginning to prove that the separated soul cannot acquire knowledge of something previously unknown. For then the intellect would futilely be united to the body. The proof of the consequence: it is united not for the perfection of the body — for form is not for matter but vice versa (*2 Phys.*) — therefore it is united for its own perfection to acquire — so that through the use of the senses in the body it may acquire knowledge. But this would be futile if when separated it could acquire it without the use of senses.

The Doctor responds in *lit. F., ad 1 princ.*: it does not follow that the soul is futilely united to the body. For even if the reason for that union were for the soul's perfection — so that it might acquire its perfection from such a union — it does not follow that the union is futile if the end can be acquired by another way. For if something is ordered to an end, it is not done futilely even if the end can be acquired another way — as if health can be acquired through washing and through drinking, washing is not done futilely. And if health can be had through drinking, so too if knowledge can be acquired through the use of the senses and

through another mode by the separated soul, the union is not futile — since the union is itself a convenient way of acquiring knowledge.

Otherwise more to the point: the union of the soul to the body is not finally for the perfection of the body, nor for the perfection of the soul alone, but for the perfection of the whole consisting of these parts. And therefore even if no perfection could accrue to this or that part that could not be had without such union, the union would still not be futile — because the greater perfection of the whole, which is principally intended by nature, could not be had except in that way. So the Doctor there — from whose doctrine the proposed argument is sufficiently solved from the hypothesis that the separated soul is reunited to the body retaining the habits and species it had in the state of separation.

Finally St. Bonaventure in *2 d. 18, art. 2, qu. 2*, in the resolution of the question, says it is a dream — this circulation of souls — and that when they depart from the body they forget the evils they had in the body, and when they again approach they forget those previously known.

The Sixth Argument Defended

The sixth argument against the circulation of souls was made in *disp. 5, cit., de gen., qu. 7, art. 2, n. 172*: because many vicious habits generated in the will in the state of conjunction will remain in it in the state of separation, and can be conserved in it for as long as it is reunited in its turn to a new body. And so this human will be inclined to the same vices to which another human constituted from the preceding body was inclined — by the vicious habits inhering in the soul.

Ferchius in *cap. 8, lib. 4* first notes that in this argument we are caught in a self-refutation — for above in the first argument we wanted that the human constituted from the same intellect with the preceding corrupted body, and the human constituted from the same intellect with the newly born body, be the same human in number. Now, convinced by truth, we say they would be different, numerically other. But this is a sheer calumny — for we never said that the soul that this year departs from this body, if after many years it returns to another numerically distinct body, constitutes the same numerically human being — as if the identity of form alone suffices for the unity and numerical identity of the composite without the identity of matter. Rather in the first argument we said that those who admit the circulation of souls into numerically different bodies of the same species are also compelled to concede the Platonic circulation attributed to Plato into the numerically same body. For just as we naturally see the same matter passing to different forms — why after many centuries could it not happen that the same matter is again informed by the same soul, if souls continually return in circular order to inform bodies? Therefore there is no self-refutation in this argument — except the one he fabricates and attributes to us.

Then he denies the assumption — because no habit, whether good or bad, departs from the body together with the departing intellective soul. Rather when the body

perishes, they perish. For the state of conjunction and the state of separation are opposed states in the rational soul — opposed states have opposed conditions and affections. Therefore when the soul passes from one state to another, it lays aside all the accidents of the preceding state and proceeds naked to the opposite state, so as alternately to perform the operations befitting this or that state.

Also because loving, hating, are not operations of the intellect but of the composite — which when destroyed, the intellect cannot love or hate (*1 de anim.* 66). It cannot grieve or rejoice, be angry or fear (*1 de anim.* 63). It cannot be sorrowful, think, learn, remember (*1 de anim.* 64). Finally to say these things of the rational soul is as if we said the soul weaves or builds.

Finally from our argument he draws an inconvenience: since the rational soul is born into the body and through the body undergoes many vicious inclinations of concupiscence and irascibility owing to the struggle of the sensual appetite against reason and of the body against the soul — therefore God should never infuse a soul into a body, lest through the body and sense it be inclined to those vices.

But Ferchius has not yet sufficiently proved that at the death of the human all species imprinted here and all habits are erased from the intellect — neither by reason nor from Aristotle. For that reason drawn from the opposition of states was already dissolved above in *n.* 237: because the states of separation and conjunction are not opposed in the objects themselves understood and the reasons of knowing — which are intelligible species — but in the mode of knowing, or in the mode of using them. For in the state of conjunction we use them dependently on phantasms; in the state of separation independently. Though even in the state of conjunction in some way the use of them can be had independently of the senses from what was said in *n.* 233 — in the second motion.

Nor has he sufficiently proved from Aristotle — for those two passages adduced by him from *lib. de longit. and brevit. vitae, cap. 2* and the *cap. de qualitate* in the Praedicaments — in which Aristotle seems to teach that habits existing in the intellect are corrupted at the corruption of those in the senses — were already explained above in *n.* 228 and 229 from what was said in the proper place in *disp. 3 de anim., qu. 6*, at the end, and *disp. 8, qu. 1, art. 1, n. 15*. Moreover, Aristotle gathers the opposite, as Scotus notes in *1 dist. 3, qu. 6, N.*, from *2 and 3 de anim., tex. 6* — where he calls the mind the place of species: because it is conservative of them. And Raguseo in *disp. 20, cap. 8*, from *tex. 20 of 3 de anim.* — where he says Aristotle teaches that after death we do not remember what was done in this life — not because the species here acquired are erased at the very death of the human, but because with the species already acquired the soul is occupied in a continual act of understanding. Hence it is not so much recalling as continually understanding through them.

And Aristotle seems to have signified the same in *1 Ethic., cap. 11* — where he holds that deceased souls know the prosperous successes or misfortunes of friends. This is a manifest sign that in the separated soul there remained the species and images of friends.

Moreover, in that very place cited in opposition — *lib. de longit. and brevit. vitae, cap. 2* — when Aristotle says that when the animal is destroyed, knowledge is destroyed, he plainly does not seem to speak of the scientific habit inhering in the soul, but of another existing in the animal itself or in its phantasy, which corresponds to the scientific one. For he speaks in the same way of the corruption of knowledge and of health — which would not be well said if by knowledge he meant the scientific habit inhering in the soul. Indeed there he seems to distinguish knowledge that is in the animal and says that at its perishing it is corrupted "from" knowledge — that is, from what is in the soul. For he speaks thus: "When animals are corrupted, both knowledge and health perish — those that are in the animals." And immediately he adds: "Therefore whoever reasons about the soul from these — if knowledge is not by nature, but as knowledge in the soul, so the soul in the body, there will certainly be another corruption of it beyond the corruption by which it is corrupted when the body is corrupted. And therefore since it does not seem to be such, it will otherwise be related to the communion of the body." And St. Thomas in his exposition of this text says Aristotle there does not speak of the intellective soul — because he says it is corruptible. Hence this authority either favors us or at least does not oppose us.

Finally, that the separated soul brings with it species here elicited from phantasms, and also understands through them in the state of separation, is also held by Contareni — to whom Ferchius defers so much — in *qu. de immortalitat. animae, cap. 7, ad 8*, where he also approves the teaching of Scotus about the separated soul and about Angels in this matter regarding the mode of knowing through species — and embraces it. The same is also held by Capredoni in *de Theologia Aristot., lib. 1, cap. 38 and 39* — who holds that according to Aristotle's mind both habits and species acquired here remain in the separated soul. And he says that in death knowledge is corrupted as regards what relates to sense — but not to the intellect.

What is adduced from *tex. 63 and 64 of 1 de anim.* is not faithfully enough cited. For in *tex. 63* it is not stated that the soul cannot grieve, rejoice, be angry, or fear — but rather this is in *tex. 64*, where Aristotle does not even speak absolutely but dubiously with the particle "perhaps." Indeed those contexts also need to be explained by Ferchius himself — since they seem to take from the soul any proper operation entirely and attribute all operations, even those we call inorganic, indifferently to the composite and to what has soul. For he speaks indifferently there about sensitive and intellective actions, organic and inorganic — and says all are of the composite and of what has soul: to be angry, to be sorrowful, to learn, to think, etc. This excludes also the common response that Aristotle there speaks

of organic operations that belong to the whole conjunct as the principle both active and receptive — for he speaks also of learning and understanding, which do not so belong to the whole habens.

Therefore from Scotus in *4 dist. 45, qu. 1, E.*: the form of any whole that is not by nature fit to exist per se can have some proper operation that the whole cannot have as the whole's. But conversely: of that whole whose specific form is by nature fit to exist per se, there can be no perfect operation that cannot be the form's. Because a most perfect operation cannot be present except according to the most perfect form — and it cannot be according to the most perfect form and one possible to exist per se unless it can be present to it per se. For what it is per se, it can receive per se — "if it is per se, I concede that it can receive per se." Therefore (says the Doctor) intellection is the proper operation of the whole human — but according to the most perfect form in it, as according to the proper reason of operating. And not only this — but because this form is separable, it so inheres according to it that it can be the form's. And therefore it so belongs to the whole that it can belong to the part — though as long as it is in the whole, the denomination of the action is not attributed immediately to it, but to the suppositum of which it is a part, since actions are said to belong to supposita (*1 Metaph.* in the proem), as the Doctor declares in *1 dist. 12, qu. 1, ad 2 princ.* and *4 dist. 12, qu. 3, ad 2 princ.* This exposition of Scotus is also received and approved by Contareni in the cited *qu. de immortal. animae, cap. 7, ad 8.*

There is still, however, a difference between organic actions — as seeing — and inorganic — as understanding. The former are attributed to the suppositum precisely as to the last denominated, not also as to its immediate active and receptive. The latter truly both ways. And therefore they can by no means be called proper operations of the form itself — but they are necessarily of the whole habens.

Finally, the argument he deduces to an inconvenience from our argument is nothing — for our argument deduces the inconvenience from this hypothesis: that the human newly constituted through the same soul returning to the state of conjunction would be inclined to the same vices to which another human constituted from the preceding body was inclined — from the vicious habits inhering in the soul. Not from the fact that he would be inclined to vices and evil inclinations contracted from a new body.

The Final Argument Defended

Finally, we attacked the circulation of souls in *disp., cit., de gen., n. 168 and n. 272*: because a more foul absurdity — or at least an equally foul one — no less pernicious to our faith, is the circulation of souls than mortality itself. Thus we said in *n. 272*. Also because from philosophy we also have more forceful arguments, and from Aristotle more and more manifest passages, for the mortality of the soul than for its circulation. Thus we said in *n. 168*.

The first argument proceeds absolutely and according to the truth of our Catholic faith; the second proceeds in Aristotle's way.

Ferchius in *lib. 4, pag. 422, cap. 1* very unfaithfully reports this our discourse in order to calumniate it as heretical and little in accord with our faith. For where we say "we also have from philosophy more forceful arguments, from Aristotle more and more manifest passages for the mortality of the soul than for its circulation" — omitting the comparison, he transcribes our proposition as if stated absolutely thus: "we have from philosophy more forceful arguments for the mortality of the soul." Which proposition we never asserted — but the opposite. For in *disp. 1 de anim., qu. 1, cap. de animae immortalitate, n. 182* we have these words: "From all these it is gathered how the opinion of immortality is naturally more evident — because it has more evident arguments for itself, the chief of which are the last four." Therefore we did not say that from philosophy more forceful arguments are had for the mortality of the soul absolutely speaking, nor with a comparison to immortality — but precisely with a comparison to the circulation of souls, as is apparent from our proposition already cited from *n. 168* at the end.

And again: when we said that from philosophy more forceful arguments are had for the mortality of the soul than for circulation — we are not speaking of philosophy in itself (which is true philosophy, as Ferchius imposes on us in the same chapter) — but of Aristotle's philosophy. Because in that paragraph where we have that proposition under *n. 168*, we are disputing with Ferchius about circulation in Aristotle's account — as is apparent from those words: "Nor let Ferchius say that he holds this in Aristotle's account, presupposing the eternity of the world — but not according to the truth." To close off this escape we immediately add: "For more candid philosophers defend the immortality of the soul according to Aristotle's mind," etc. We end that period with those words: "namely, from philosophy, from Aristotle we have more and more manifest passages for the mortality of the soul than for its circulation." These last words were added to declare the philosophy of which the discussion is in that proposition — namely Aristotle's philosophy, not to hint at the opposite (as Ferchius understood it in order to calumniate us). Also because below in *n. 172*, wishing to distinguish philosophy in itself from Aristotle's philosophy, we call the latter Peripatetic and the former true philosophy in these words: "These therefore and other absurdities follow in true philosophy, and also in the Peripatetic, from the circulation of souls."

Therefore by "philosophy" in the discourse made in *n. 168* we mean Aristotle's philosophy — of which the discussion was there. And we make two comparisons: first we compare immortality with mortality and say more candid philosophers defend the immortality of the soul according to Aristotle's mind. Then we compare mortality with circulation and say that from philosophy and Aristotle more arguments and passages are found for mortality than for circulation. Which we now again assert — for for mortality there are more authorities and arguments

drawn from Aristotle — as is apparent from the authors defending it according to Aristotle's mind. But for circulation not even one text can be adduced, as is clear from what was said in *n.* 224.

Then under *n.* 172, comparing mortality again with circulation, we say: "We hold this a more foul absurdity, or at least an equally foul one — and no less pernicious to our faith than mortality itself." Ferchius in *lib.* 4, *par.* 433, *cap.* 1, from the beginning, thus transcribes our proposition: "this we hold a more foul absurdity, or at least equally foul, more pernicious to our faith than mortality itself." Where, as you see, he fraudulently changes the equalizing particle "no less pernicious" to an excessive one "more pernicious." And a little below under the same excessive phrase he again repeats our proposition thus: "a third thing namely asserted by us is that immortality with the transmigration of souls is more pernicious than mortality itself with respect to the Catholic faith." In which proposition beyond the indicated fraud of the excessive particle, he makes us assert not only that circulation but also immortality itself conjoined to it is more pernicious than mortality — which was far from us ever having asserted. Because with respect to being more or less or equally pernicious, we never compared mortality with immortality — whether taken by itself or conjoined to circulation. But we precisely compared mortality with circulation itself. And there is a great difference in my mind between these two propositions: "Circulation is more pernicious, or equally pernicious, as mortality itself"; "Immortality with circulation is more pernicious than mortality itself." For the predicate "more pernicious or equally pernicious" in the first proposition is affirmed of circulation precisely; in the second it is affirmed not only of circulation but also of immortality itself — if not taken by itself, at least conjoined to circulation.

Upon this imposition Ferchius then institutes an entire Dispute to know whether the mortality of the rational soul is more pernicious to the Catholic faith, or immortality with return to human bodies only. And in *cap.* 2 of that Dispute he proves that mortality is far more pernicious than immortality with return — from the Lateran Council under Leo X, *sess.* 8, where as a most pernicious error the mortality of the soul is condemned: since it not only truly, per se, essentially is the form of the human body, but is immortal, and for the multitude of bodies into which it is infused is individually multiplicable, multiplied, and to be multiplied. This is manifestly clear from the Gospel — with the Lord saying: "they cannot kill the soul." Elsewhere: "he who hates his soul in this world, keeps it for eternal life." With eternal rewards and eternal punishments promised for merit of life to those to be judged. Here mortality of the soul is expressly condemned — but the return of souls to human bodies is neither in this Council nor in others found condemned. Therefore the mortality of the soul is more pernicious than immortality with return.

In response: first, by denying the minor. For the *Triumphus Catholicae veritatis* cited above — in the eighth heresy of the Albigenians and Albanensians — reports that

the universal Church in the Lateran Council under Pope Alexander III and Frederick, Emperor of the Romans, celebrated in the year of salvation 1179 on March 5, with 300 and more Fathers — over whom the Supreme Pontiff Alexander III presided — condemned this assertion along with the other errors of the Albigensians. Moreover in the same Lateran Council under Leo X cited by Ferchius, and in the same decree, this heresy is not obscurely condemned under two heads. For not only does the Council decree that the soul is immortal in the above-cited decree — but also that it is multiplicable, multiplied, and to be multiplied for the multitude of bodies. By this it signals that the same soul does not successively constitute multiple humans — as the Circulators assert. It also decrees that punishments and rewards for souls departing hence correspond to them eternally and perpetually — which is not compatible with circulation, which posits that souls return to bodies repeatedly and infinitely at fixed periods. Therefore in the same decree together with mortality, circulation is condemned — which even Ferchius could not deny in the cited *disp.*, *cap.* 4, at the end.

Furthermore: even conceding the whole argument, nothing is rightly concluded against us. For we did not say that circulation is more pernicious to the Catholic faith than mortality itself — but that it is no less pernicious. Nor did we in the title of perniciousness compare mortality with immortality — either taken per se or conjoined to circulation — but precisely with circulation itself. And we said precisely that it is an equally foul absurdity, no less pernicious to our faith than mortality itself. We used the same phrase also in *disp.* 1 *de anim.*, *qu.* 10, *de animae immortalitate*, *n.* 158: "Certainly it is less absurd to attribute to Aristotle this hesitation than the circulation of souls — since this circulation is equally impious as the mortality of the soul."

Indeed when we also said this, we certainly did not speak absolutely — but by way of a certain exaggeration. As the Doctor notes in 2 *dist.* 33, *qu.* *un.*, *ad primum*, according to the Philosopher in 2 *Ethic.*, *cap.* *ult.*: just as in morals to reach the middle it is somewhat advisable to proceed a little beyond the middle toward the extreme — so frequently the Saints in extinguishing heresies that were springing up against them spoke excessively, wishing to decline toward the other extreme. And so great weight must be given to against which heretics the Saints were speaking — as Augustine against Arius seems almost to decline toward Sabellius and vice versa; similarly against Pelagius to decline toward Arius and vice versa.

With this caution Ferchius excuses himself in *lib.* 3, *cap.* 6, *n.* 30, why he did not solve the arguments he himself made for the separability of every substantial form universally. He says: "For I saw many Alexandreans inclined to this evil — that they believed the rational soul to be mortal and inseparable, founded in the universal negative 'no form is separable.' So that I might bring the minds of Peripatetics to this truth — 'some substantial form is simply separable and incorruptible' — I inclined toward the contrary extreme, and showed with all my powers that every substantial form is ungenerable, incorruptible, and separable

— so that the mind of the reader, weighed down on that side, might more easily approach the intended truth: namely, to hold with Aristotle that some form is separable." We also assume this same excuse for ourselves — no less valid for us than for him. For we saw that certain people, while defending the immortality of the soul, held at the same time the error that the same soul returns in the succession of ages to inform various bodies — which is opposed both to truth and to Aristotle. So that we might bring the minds of these Peripatetics to the truth — that there is no circulation of souls — we inclined toward the contrary extreme and said the circulation of souls is a more foul absurdity, or at least an equally foul one, no less pernicious to our faith than mortality itself. Which was said, I say, by exaggeration and as it were by excess — so that the mind of the reader, weighed down on that side, might more easily approach the intended truth: to deny circulation according to the truth and also according to Aristotle. Which circulation Faber in *adversus Atheos, disp. 1, cap. 12, n. 261* attributes to Pythagoreans and Platonists and says it was never admitted by Aristotle.

Finally, in *cap. 4* of that Dispute, *pag. 452*, he imposes on us again that we exhort readers to embrace the Alexandrian opinion in these words: "But my offenders exhort others to the Alexandrian opinion, saying it would have been better to agree with the Alexandrians in the absolute mortality of the soul." This too is a sheer imposition. For in *n. 168* we say that more candid philosophers according to Aristotle's mind defend the immortality of the soul — so that it may be blessed in the state of separation. Therefore if Ferchius wanted it to return infinitely to the miseries of this world, he was giving his hand to the Alexandrians to destroy another state of the soul in which it properly receives the rewards of good actions and suffers penalties for evil ones. Hence it would have been better to agree with them in the mortality of the soul than with the Pythagoreans in its return to bodies — for the circulation of souls even in human bodies alone is more fabulous than mortality itself. And certainly from philosophy, from Aristotle, we have more and more manifest passages for the mortality of the soul than for its circulation.

And again below in *n. 172* we conclude in these words: "We resolutely say that in Aristotle's account it is better to hold the mortality of the soul than to assert immortality with so absurd an appendage as the transmigration of souls — for this we hold a more foul absurdity, or at least an equally foul one, no less pernicious to our faith than mortality itself."

From both of these passages it is clear that the discussion is always about the immortality of the soul in Aristotle's account — not about philosophy in itself. It is also clear that absolutely speaking we assert that according to the more candid philosophers and Aristotle's mind the immortality of the soul must be defended. And finally: with a comparison made between mortality and circulation, we say that in Aristotle more authorities and arguments are found for mortality than for circulation — because for the former many are reported by the Alexandrians; but

for the latter not one is adduced by the Circulators, as is clear from what was said. And therefore we were saying from hypothesis: of these two errors — if one of them had to be defended in Aristotle's account — it is better to hold mortality with Aristotle (as I not once hesitatingly suggested) than circulation, never even dreamed of by him. But absolutely speaking, immortality of the soul must be held in his account — which he more expressly signified and not once most openly confessed, though he did not prove it by necessary reason. This is the opinion of Scotus in 4 d. 43, qu. 2.

From this impugning of the last argument it is sufficiently apparent that in the entire volume of Ferchius's *Defensio* the last things correspond to the first. With insults and impostures it began; through them it grew; and in them it ends. With these removed from the volume — since both for defense and especially for formation from nothing it was mainly labored — it resolves into nothing. And what has been said here suffices as a response to the teaching that, scattered among insults and slanders throughout that book, I was barely able to collect. To insults and slanders I confess myself unequal and unable to respond — and even if I were able, I would still not respond. For both the dignity of my religious state and the pursuit of philosophy restrain me.

But so that the fair reader may be a judge in this cause, I append at the end of this response what the most learned Raguseo elegantly said in *disp. 23, cap. 20* about the temerity and arrogance of certain hearers and authors. Of them he says: "I truly cannot but vehemently deplore the temerity and empty arrogance of those who, driven by no argument whatsoever, and leaning on no foundations whatsoever, but by faith alone placed in someone, freely pronounce as most true whatever either was written by that author or can in some way be exercised by him."

Of these he says: "I am accustomed to call these the disturbers of the sciences and obscurers of truth — and not without reason. For these, by a charming manner of speaking about things they discuss, first attract the minds of the multitude to goodwill. When they then become famous by reputation among rich men and common people, they pronounce whatever they wish by their own judgment — they commend some authors, condemn others; they exhibit themselves as censors of the sayings and opinions of others — as if they alone, because they are called cultivators of recondite letters, are constituted judges of all things and honorary arbiters. The common people and the young, with no argument at all adduced, with all discrimination removed, follow what is true and false equally — which they afterward communicate to others as most firm and constant, as if they had received them from the very mouth of truth. What more? These know-it-alls reached such boldness and became so puffed up by the applause of the multitude that they are not ashamed to openly correct the opinions of even the gravest Doctors in any science whatsoever — of whose teachings they would be the most incompetent students."

Question VI. On the Order of Accident to Substance

Aristotle, in 6 *Met.*, *tex.* 4, comparing substance with accidents, attributes to substance a threefold primacy over accidents — namely, primacy of definition, of knowledge, and of time — expressing this in the words: substance is first among all things in account, in knowledge, and in time. All three of these primacies are explained at length by the Doctor in 7 *Met.*, *qu.* 1, 2, 3, and 4, where Antonius Andreas, Zerb., Faber, and others on the Metaphysics treat the matter. I shall handle this question briefly in this single article, since it presents no great difficulty.

Regarding the first primacy of substance over accident — namely, primacy of account — the commentators agree that Aristotle understood by this the primacy of definition, taking "account" (*ratio*) in the sense of "definition," as is Aristotle's customary usage, and this is clearly gathered from the proof he offers. He argues that substance is prior to accident in this respect because accident is defined through substance, but not the reverse. To understand this properly, one should recall what was said in *disp.* 1 *Log.*, *q.* 4, *art.* 2, from the beginning: two kinds of definition are commonly distinguished. The first is a purely quidditative definition, consisting solely of genus and difference; this is proper to substance. The second is a definition given with an addition — that is, one which, beyond genus and difference, requires something extraneous to be added, so that the thing may be perfectly and exactly understood by reference to it. In this second manner accidents are said to be defined through substance, as is explained in 7 *Metaph.*, 15, 16, 17. For just as an accident is not called being simply and absolutely, but being-of-a-being, in the mode explained above in Question 1, so too it must be defined not by a definition simply so called, but by a definition given with an addition. Things must be defined as they are; and the reason why substance must appear in the definition of accident as an addition is indicated by the Doctor in 4 *dist.* 12, *q.* 1, *L.*: every accident has the character of an inhering form, and of such a form no perfect concept can be had — one that would satisfy the intellect — without the subject in which it inheres. A perfect concept of an inhering form cannot satisfy the intellect unless that to which it belongs and in which it inheres is understood along with it. Since, therefore, a definition expresses perfectly the concept of the thing defined, however many essential features of the form were expressed without mentioning that of which it is the form, and even if its quiddity were indicated, the concept would still not be a perfect one satisfying the intellect, and hence not a definitive one. This is the necessity of defining accident through substance.

If you object: then there is equally a necessity to define a substantial form with an addition, just as in the case of accident. The response is that in both cases there is a necessity, as the Doctor states. This is made clear by the Philosopher, who defines the soul in 2 *De Anima*, where he immediately posits the body as that which the soul perfects, or the whole composite of which it is a part, and adds

nothing pertaining to the essence of the soul itself — only that it is an act, which signifies the relation of the soul to that of which it is the form. Nevertheless, the addition is not the same in both cases. In the definition of a substantial form, something is added that makes a per se unity with that form, or of which the form is per se a part — which I say in order to account for the different manner of speaking, namely that a form is defined either through the whole or through matter. But in the definition of an accidental form, something is added with which it does not make a per se unity, and of which it is not per se a part.

You might say: a definition is a complete expression explaining the essence and quiddity of a thing; therefore, whatever pertains to explaining the essence and quiddity of a thing is not an addition but something essential. The consequence is denied. For although whatever pertains to the essence of a thing cannot be something added but must be something essential, that which pertains to explaining the essence can be something added and beyond the essence itself — because the essence of a thing can be explained not only through quidditative predicates but also through things that necessarily follow upon the essence, such as in the present case the transcendental order (*ordo transcendentalis*) which a form bears to matter, and an accident to its subject.

Regarding the other primacy — namely, of knowledge — the Doctor notes in 7 *Met.*, q. 3, as does Antonius Andreas with him, that the claim that substance is prior in knowledge to accident can be understood in two ways: either as primacy of origin and generation, or as primacy of perfection. When Aristotle says that substance is prior to accident in knowledge, he does not mean priority of origin, for in that sense — at least in our present condition and with respect to our knowledge — the situation is rather the reverse: accident is prior in knowledge to substance. This accords with what Aristotle taught in 1 *De Anima*, tex. 11: accidents contribute greatly to knowing what a thing is. The argument runs thus: that which, by way of origin, leads us from its cognition into the cognition of something else, is prior in cognition to that other thing. But in our present condition it is through the cognition of accident that we arrive at the cognition of substance, not the other way around. Therefore, and so forth. The minor premise is proved: because in our present condition all our cognition takes its origin from sense, and therefore the intellect can know nothing that has not in some way been in the senses; but what is in the senses is the species of an accident, since the objects of the external senses are accidents, as is evident. Therefore, and so forth. In this way the Doctor proves that accident is prior to substance in cognition by way of origin, in 1 d. 3, q. 3, K, and d. 22, q. 1, a matter I treated at length in *disp.* 6 *De Anima*, q. 6, art. 2.

Aristotle therefore speaks of primacy of perfection, and intends that substance is prior in cognition to accident with respect to perfection, insofar as substance is more perfectly knowable than accident. It is more perfectly knowable because it has a more perfect quiddity (*quod quid est*), which is expressly gathered from

Aristotle's own text, where he says: we think we know a thing most fully when we know what it is — what a man is, or what fire is — rather than its quality, quantity, or location. The Doctor notes, however, in the cited *q. 3* at the end, that although substance is more perfectly knowable in an absolute sense, accident can nonetheless be known more perfectly by us according to the proportion of its own knowability. These two claims are not contradictory — just as, for example, the species of a somewhat faint white thing represents that white thing to me more fully than the species of the sun represents the sun to an eagle's eye, and I see the white thing better in proportion to its visibility than the eagle sees the sun in proportion to the sun's visibility, even though the sun is absolutely a more perfectly visible thing than the white. Therefore, says the Doctor, it is not contradictory that substance is absolutely in itself more perfectly intelligible — and also more intelligible to us, if we could cognize it in our present condition under its proper quidditative concept — while accident is nonetheless more perfectly knowable by us according to the proportion of its own knowability.

It is commonly objected that supernatural accidents — such as the light of glory, grace, charity, and the like — are prior to substance in cognition even by primacy of perfection, because they are more perfect in their entity than substance is, since they belong to the supernatural order. The response is to deny the assumption. For although supernatural accidents are more perfect than substance in the moral order, in the order of being (*in genere entis*) every substance, however small, surpasses all accidents, even supernatural ones, as Scotus teaches in *3 dist. 13, q. 1*, toward the third principal argument.

Alensis agrees with this interpretation in *7 Met., tex. 4 and 5*, in the fifth minor question, whether substance is prior to accident in knowledge. He writes: it must be said that to be prior in knowledge can be understood in two ways. In one way, as it were passively, such that what is called prior in knowledge is that upon which our knowledge bears first — so that what is cognized first is called prior in knowledge. In another way, it can be understood as prior in knowledge actively, as it were — that is, what is called prior in knowledge is not what is cognized first by us, but what, when it is cognized, produces greater knowledge of the thing than something else does. In the first sense, accident can be prior in knowledge to substance itself, and by a certain priority of time, because our knowledge bears upon accident before it bears upon substance. In the second sense, substance is prior in knowledge to accident, because if, regarding the same thing, both the substance and the accident of that thing are known, we have greater knowledge of the thing itself through its substance than through its accident. So prior in knowledge, in this sense, does not mean prior in knowledge in time, but rather more worthy or nobler in knowledge. And this is how the Philosopher understands it here, since he says that if regarding the same thing we know what it is and what quality it has, we have greater cognition through the what than through the which quality — for everything stands in relation to knowledge as it stands in relation to being, as stated in *4 Met.* at the beginning. So Alensis.

Regarding the priority of time, which Aristotle also attributes to substance in relation to accident, there is greater difficulty. For substance never at any time existed without accidents; from the very beginning substance came accompanied by accidents. Moreover, substance is not prior to an accident that is its proper passion (*propria passio*), for substance is never found, and cannot be found, without its proper passion. Finally, if substance is prior in time to every accident, then it would be prior to time itself, since time is a certain kind of accident — and so time would be before time.

To explain this difficulty, various positions have been advanced. I shall briefly touch on the principal ones here, as drawn from Scotus in *7 Met.*, *q. 2*, so that the better one may be chosen.

The first interpretation is that of the Commentator in *7 Metaph.*, *tex. comm. 4*, where he distinguishes between separable and inseparable accident, and says the following. If substance is compared to a separable accident, then every substance — whether simple or composite — can be said to be prior in time to its accidents, because some of them it actually precedes in time, and if it does not precede some of them in time, at least it can of itself be separated from them. But if substance is compared to an inseparable accident, then this priority is not verified for a composite substance, but only for matter. For matter, being ingenerable and incorruptible, precedes in time every proper accident of the composite substance that follows upon a form newly arriving — for example, fire is not prior in time to heat, yet the matter of fire is prior in time to the heat that follows upon the form of fire. This interpretation is rejected in multiple ways by Scotus in the cited location. And although, with respect to its first part, it can be reduced to a sound sense, as will appear below when Scotus's interpretation is set out, yet with respect to its second part it is neither true in itself nor in accord with Aristotle's intention. It is not true in itself, because if we are speaking of matter as informed by some substantial form, it is not prior in time to accidents that follow upon the form under which it is presupposed to exist; and matter as it precedes such a form is accompanied by indeterminate quantity, which in the Commentator's opinion is coeval with it; therefore in no state does it precede accidents. Nor is it in accord with Aristotle's intention, for Aristotle attributes this threefold primacy to the same substance — primacy of time, of cognition, and of definition — but the substance enjoying this threefold primacy over accidents is not prime matter but complete substance, since matter is rather wholly obscure and is known only by analogy to form. Therefore, and so forth.

The second interpretation is that of Alensis in the cited location, for which Thomas Aquinas is also cited. According to this, substance is said to be prior in time to accidents because it is possible to give — and indeed in fact is given — some substance entirely without accident, namely God. Hence, for any substance as such, it is not repugnant to precede every accident in time and to exist without any accident. Because, therefore, not every substance exists under accident, while

every accident does exist in substance, substance is said to be prior in time to accident itself. This interpretation is also hinted at by the Commentator in the cited location. But this too is rejected by Scotus in the cited location. For although it can in itself present some appearance of truth, it is entirely alien to the Philosopher's intention, because the Philosopher in such a comparison of substance to accident is not speaking of any individual substance but of substance in itself. Moreover, he speaks of substance as it is in a genus — which God is not, for he divides being into substance, quantity, quality, and the other categories, and intends to show that the category of substance precedes every category of accident. Furthermore, he is not speaking of one substance in comparison with accidents of another, since a substance is said to be separable only with respect to its own accidents, which are in it. Finally, even if he were speaking in that way, it would still be false — given the eternity of the world — that God in duration precedes the accidents of other substances, for under that supposition they would be coeternal with God.

The third interpretation is that of Zimara in *theor.* 9 and Zabarella in *lib. 2 De Materia, cap. 8*. They say that this priority of time belongs to substance with respect to separable accidents, while with respect to inseparable accidents substance is only prior by nature. Hence they say that when Aristotle states that substance precedes accident in account, knowledge, time, and nature, this should not be understood conjunctively — as if every substance must precede every accident in all four modes — but disjunctively, so that it precedes either in time, or in nature, and so forth. But this interpretation too is neither true nor in accord with the Philosopher's intention. First, because the word "nature" does not appear in most codices, whether Greek or Latin. Second, because Aristotle attributes that primacy to substance absolutely in relation to every accident; for he says "substance is first among all things in account, knowledge, and time, and nature" — and the text reads conjunctively, not disjunctively. Third, because the difficulty still presses regarding substance in relation to separable accidents, since even though such an accident can be separated from substance, substance is never found without all such accidents, which seems necessary if substance is to be said to precede every such accident in duration.

The fourth and therefore preferred interpretation is Scotus's, in the cited *Met., q. 2, §*. Ideo dicitur sic, where he says the following. When substance is said to be prior to every accident, "time" is not taken as it is defined in *4 Physic.* — for the primacy of time is itself proper to substance insofar as it is substance; but time is the measure only of motion and rest and of the things that are in motion and rest, whereas substance as such is not something of that kind but abstracts from motion and rest. Nor is time here taken to mean any duration or any extrinsic successive measure other than the essence of the thing — for that would raise its own question, since substance could then precede such a measure, given that it is an accident of substance. What Aristotle here calls one thing prior in time to another is rather this: that which can, as far as it itself is concerned, exist

separately from the other, while the other cannot exist without it. In this sense substance is said to be prior to every accident, because as far as substance itself is concerned it can exist without every accident by reason of its independence. The Doctor gathers this interpretation from Aristotle's own text, where Aristotle proves the temporal primacy of substance over every other accident precisely through such separability: "for none of the others is separable, but this alone is." From this the Doctor further deduces that the priority of time, as here taken by the Philosopher, coincides with the priority of nature that he defined in *5 Met.*, 16, where he said: "some things according to nature are such that the things they attend upon can exist without them, but not conversely." One sees that Aristotle speaks there of priority of nature in exactly the same manner as he speaks here in *7 Met.* of priority of time. And the reason is that here he is not speaking of an actual precedence in time — which is genuine and proper temporal priority, in the way that Adam preceded us who now live — but of an aptitudinal precedence in time, which coincides with the priority of nature in being as defined in *5 Met.*, *tex.* 16. For nothing, says the Doctor, is prior in nature in this sense without also being prior in time — namely, aptitudinally. He confirms the same interpretation in *2 d.* 3, *u4D*, saying that everything which is prior in nature to something else is also prior in duration in this mode — that is, as far as it itself is concerned, it is not contradictorily repugnant to it to be able to be prior in duration to its posterior. For universally, priority of nature in the sense of *5 Met.*, *cap.* *De priori* includes in the prior the ability to exist without the posterior without contradiction. He explains it likewise in *4 dist.* 1, *q.* 1, *KK*, saying that substance according to its entire genus precedes every accident in definition, knowledge, and time — that is, in separability as far as it itself is concerned. He speaks finally in the same vein in *quol.* 2, *lit.* B.

In order to explain how this priority of time, so understood, can belong to substance both with respect to separable and with respect to inseparable accidents, the Doctor says that one thing can precede another in time in the sense already explained in two ways: either because it does not depend upon the other, or because it is not the necessary cause of the other. This is proved by the opposite: if one thing cannot be separated from another, this is either because it depends upon it or because it is the necessary cause of it. The Doctor then says that substance with respect to separable accidents is prior in both ways — for it neither depends upon them nor is their necessary cause — while with respect to inseparable accidents it is prior in only one way, namely that it does not depend upon them, but not in the other, since it is the necessary cause of them. For a subject is the necessary cause of its proper passion; and by reason of this intrinsic necessity it cannot be separated from it, even though in another respect it could be separated — namely, by reason of independence.

It can still be said, however — and this is more in accord with Aristotle's intention — that when Aristotle said that substance is prior in time to every accident, he was not speaking of inseparable accidents such as proper passions, but of separable

accidents, which exist in the other categories. This is clearly gathered from the text itself, for he says that substance is prior to all the other categories because none of them is separable from substance, whereas substance itself is separable from them. Now, a proper passion (*passio*) of substance, according to our principles, does not belong to the category of accident but to the category of its own subject, with which it is identified — at least by eduction (*per educitionem*).

That Aristotle by priority of time did not mean an actual precedence in duration — which is the proper and principal meaning of the word — but only the priority of nature in being, explained not through one actually existing without the other but through the ability to exist as far as itself is concerned, is clearly gathered from Aristotle's own progression. For he enumerates four modes of priority in which substance precedes accident: in definition, knowledge, time, and nature. He says: "substance is first among all things in account, knowledge, time, and nature." Yet thereafter he proves only a threefold priority — of definition, knowledge, and time — conflating the priority of time with the priority of nature, and adding no further argument to establish a priority of nature distinct from that by which he proved priority of time. This is a clear sign that he took the priority of time as coinciding with the priority of nature in being — the priority that consists in the separability of the prior from the posterior, namely aptitudinal priority in duration. For in this sense it coincides with the priority of nature in being.

This was also the interpretation of Alexander of Aphrodisias in 7 *Metaph.*, *tex.* 4, where he says that substance is actually prior in time to many of its accidents, and universally prior in aptitude. This is received by Schainus in the same location, Fonseca in 7 *Metaph.*, *cap.* 1, *q.* 2, *sect.* 1, Suarez in *disp.* 38, 28 *Metaph.*, *sect.* 1 at the end, Aversa in *q.* 21 *Philip.*, *sect.* 9 at the close, and many others. On the basis of this interpretation it is clear what is to be said in reply to the difficulties raised above at n. 251 against this priority — for they press upon the priority of time properly understood as the actual precedence in duration of one thing before another.

Against this interpretation, however, some Thomists argue as follows. This interpretation confuses priority of time with priority of nature, which consists in the independence and separability of the prior from the posterior, as stated in 5 *Met.*, 16. Yet Aristotle, as is plain from the cited text, distinguishes priority of time from priority of nature. Furthermore, this would create a redundancy in the Philosopher's language, and the particle "time" would be superfluous if he intended only to signify the priority of nature and not priority of duration properly so called. Faber, in 7 *Met.*, *q.* 4, *cap.* 2, denies that priority of nature is well explained through the separability of the prior from the posterior, since it rather implies inseparability. Hence he denies that priority of nature is being explained by Aristotle in 5 *Met.*, *tex.* 16 — for there Aristotle is not explaining the proper priority of nature, but rather what is called the priority by which the consequentia

subsistendi (*the entailment of existence*) is not convertible; whereas the priority of nature properly so called he explains in the Postpredicaments, in the chapter on priority, where he says that what is prior in nature to something else is what stands to it in a convertible entailment of existence, yet one thing is the cause of the other. This is illustrated by the example of a passion and its subject: from the existence of being there follows the existence of unity, and from the existence of unity there follows the existence of being, yet being is the cause of unity, and in this causality consists priority of nature. From this — says Faber — it follows that what is prior in nature cannot be separated from the other; rather, inseparability of one from the other is what characterizes the things between which there is priority of nature alone, as is clear in the case of subject and passion. But the priority of time that Aristotle posits in the text, and that Scotus expounded, is such that what is said to be prior in time to something else is separable from it as far as itself is concerned. Faber thus concedes that Aristotle here is speaking of priority of time, not of nature, but adds that he is speaking of aptitudinal priority of time, not of actual priority, which is priority of time properly so called — and by this distinction, he says, all difficulties are resolved.

But this response is entirely contrary to the intention of both Scotus and Aristotle. Scotus, in all the cited locations, explained the priority of time that the Philosopher attributed to substance over accidents in 7 *Met.*, *tex.* 4 as priority of nature in being — the priority he defined through the separability of the prior from the posterior in 5 *Met.*, 16 — and he expressly states that such separability entails this natural primacy of substance over accident. Nor is it inconvenient for priority of time, so understood, to coincide with this priority of nature, since this priority of nature is for understanding as well as for existing, and the priority of time in question is not actual but aptitudinal. Hence such aptitudinal priority of time coincides with priority of nature in being, which is customarily explained through the said separability. Aristotle likewise, in the cited location, took aptitudinal priority of time in the sense of priority of nature — both because he defined it in the same manner in which he had defined priority of nature in being in 5 *Met.*, 16, and because he did not prove by a different argument the priority of time and the priority of nature of substance over accident, but by one and the same argument — namely, separability. And reasonably so, because even though actual priority of time differs from priority of nature, yet aptitudinal priority of time does not differ from it but entirely coincides with priority of nature in being, which is explained through such separability. Furthermore, it is false, as Faber claims, that this priority of separability and of the entailment of existence is not a true priority of nature, and that priority of nature consists precisely in causal priority, as he deduces from the Postpredicaments on priority. For although causal priority is a certain true and principal mode of priority of nature — whereby a cause is said to be prior in nature to its effect — there are still other modes of priority and natural presupposition even among things of which one is not posited as cause or quasi-cause of the other. For example, the intellective

power in the soul is said to be naturally prior to the volitional, though the latter is not caused by the former. Likewise, privation is said to precede form in matter by nature; the non-being of a creature precedes its being by order of nature; and so on — among which there is no causality. Therefore, priority of nature does not consist precisely in causal priority. And although Aristotle, in the *Postpredicaments*, chapter on priority, called this causal priority "priority according to nature" and distinguished it from priority according to non-convertible entailment, nonetheless in *5 Met.*, 16 and *7 Met.*, 4 he also called the latter "priority of nature" — as distinguished from the priority of time properly so called, according to which one thing is said to actually exist prior to another in some duration. Therefore, not one but several modes of priority of nature must be assigned, as I have in fact assigned them in *disp. 9 Log.*, *q. 2, art. 1*, lest confusion arise from the different senses in which priority of nature is discussed. From this it also follows that one must equally deny Faber's claim that inseparability of the prior from the posterior, rather than separability, belongs to priority of nature — as is apparent in the case of subject and passion. For although this might hold in the case of priority of nature in understanding (*intelligendi*), it does not hold in the case of priority of nature in being (*essendi*), which rather consists in such separability. In reply to the Thomists' argument as proposed, therefore, it must be said that Aristotle here does not confuse priority of time properly so called — which consists in the actual precedence in duration of one thing before another — with priority of nature in being, but rather confuses only aptitudinal priority of time, which is not proper temporal priority but rather priority of nature in existing. And it is false that Aristotle in *7 Met.*, 4 distinguishes priority of time from priority of nature, for he does not prove each primacy of substance by a different argument but by one and the same — namely, the separability of the prior from the posterior without any contradiction arising from within. Hence the particle "time" is not superfluous or redundant, nor is the particle "nature," but each is explanatory of the other. The word "nature" is added lest the priority of time be taken properly as actual precedence in duration; and the word "time" is added lest the priority of nature be taken as mere natural presupposition — what is called priority of nature in understanding (*intelligendi*), which excludes all separability.

Question VII. Whether a Corporeal Accident Can Be Received in an Incorporeal Subject, and Conversely, an Incorporeal One in a Corporeal Subject

All agree that this is naturally impossible, and the Doctor expressly denies it in *4 dist. 1, q. 5, §. Contra istam opinionem*, and in *2 dist. 12, q. 2, C*, and in *quol. 14, B, §. Ad intellectum quaestionis*, and in *qu. 19, V*; as does Bonaventure in *2 dist. 18, art. 2, q. 2*, before the resolution of the question. That a corporeal and material accident cannot be received in a spiritual and incorporeal subject is proved as follows: such a form has several extensive parts, of which one naturally tends to exist outside another — for the discussion here is of parts of extension, not of intensity, which

can be gathered together even in an indivisible subject. Therefore, a corporeal form cannot by connaturalness be placed in a spiritual and indivisible subject, because in that case the plurality and separateness of such parts would not attain the end intended and established by nature. That, conversely, a spiritual accident cannot naturally be received and received as subject in a corporeal subject is argued by the Doctor in the cited *4 dist. 1, q. 5, §. Contra opinionem istam*: such a form would either be there indivisibly — that is, whole in the whole and whole in each part — or whole in the whole and part in part. Not in the first manner, because among all the forms perfecting matter only the intellective soul is posited as such. Not in the second manner, because then it would be extended accidentally in its subject, which is contrary to the nature of a spiritual form. You might say: the rational soul, although it is a spiritual form, is nonetheless naturally received and subject in a material and corporeal subject; therefore the same can be said of a spiritually accidental form. The objection is answered: because, as the Doctor said, this belongs especially to the rational soul, since it exists in the body through simple information (*per simplicem informationem*), not through inherence or dependence upon it. But an accidental form cannot exist in its subject naturally without depending upon it, since it is a form that by its very nature depends upon a subject in becoming and in conservation. Hence, if it were posited to exist in an extended subject, it would be whole in the whole and whole in each part — as the soul is — and not part in part, since it has no parts; and so it would depend essentially in its being, becoming, and conservation upon the whole subject and simultaneously upon each individual part of the subject totally and essentially. Thus it would essentially depend upon several total causes — which is, at least naturally, repugnant, as was stated in *disp. 8 Phys., q. 3, art. 3*.

The greater difficulty concerns the absolute power of God and the supernatural order — whether this could come about supernaturally. On this point, Poncius in *disp. 13 Log., q. 2, concl. 3* holds the affirmative position along with certain more recent authors. The opposite, however, is more probable, and especially so in the Doctor's judgment, because in the cited locations he is not speaking merely in a general way and according to the common course of nature, but also about the absolute power of God. In *4 dist. 1, q. 5, §. Contra opinionem istam*, he speaks of the Sacraments and rejects a certain supernatural and spiritual power in them posited by God — which that opinion maintained occurred not naturally but supernaturally and beyond the order of things. He likewise speaks in *4 dist. 12, q. 2, §. Hic sunt, litt. C*, where the question is whether, just as in the Sacrament of the Eucharist quantity remains without a subject, so too a quality could remain without a subject. A certain opinion denied this, arguing that if whiteness existed without quantity it would be spiritual, and thus there would be no repugnance against its inhering in a spirit, so that a spirit could be white. The Doctor responds under *litt. C, ad 4*: "this has no plausibility, for just as a stone cannot be wise — because it has no capacity whatsoever as a receiver of wisdom — so an angel cannot be white, because it is in no way susceptible to that form, whether that

form were posited as divisible or not" — and note the phrase "in no way," added to preclude all escape. He then continues: "there are now two reasons why it cannot be white: one is the extension in the form itself and the non-extension of the angel; the other reason is that this form is this form and the angel is the angel — and this second reason is the essential reason for the impossibility, while the first is not, for it is as it were a secondary and consequential reason, so that even if it were removed the first would remain." By this he indicates that the impossibility is implied by the formal character of the form and the subject respectively, and hence cannot occur even by the absolute power of God. He speaks finally in the same vein in *quodl. 19, lit. V*, where he says that whiteness is repugnant to an angel in the same way that an alien personation is repugnant to the divine nature — hence he posits in the angel not only a negation of act and aptitude for receiving whiteness in itself, but also a positive repugnance, just as in the divine nature he posits repugnance to an alien personation. It is therefore settled in the Doctor's view that even by the absolute power of God it is repugnant that a spiritual accident exist in a corporeal subject or a corporeal accident in a spiritual subject. He expresses this even more explicitly in *4 d. 44, q. 2, §. Aliter dicitur*, where he considers the repugnance of the receiver for what is received — even with regard to the absolute power of God — to be the same whether whiteness be received in an angel or wisdom in a stone. He speaks of absolute power, since the question there is how the infernal fire torments evil spirits. The same is gathered from *1 d. 8, q. 1, §. Tertia conclusio*, where he proves from this that God is neither material nor quantified, because he is not capable of receiving any material accident.

As for the first part — that a corporeal accident cannot, even by the absolute power of God, be received in an incorporeal and spiritual subject, such as whiteness or heat in an angel or soul, or quantity — it is proved as follows: in such a case the angel would receive the denominations of those forms, and hence would be called white, warm, and so on. But the angel is utterly incapable of such denominations; therefore also of the forms from which those denominations are derived. The consequence is plain, because the very fact that a subject is incapable of a given formal denomination is sufficient to argue its incapacity for the form — since it is capable of a form only insofar as it receives from it a corresponding denomination. This argument also proves the conclusion with regard to the other part: that a spiritual accident — such as intellection or wisdom — cannot be received in a corporeal subject, for example a stone. For then the stone would be called wise and intelligent, which is a denomination of which the stone is utterly incapable. From this it follows immediately that it is also incapable of the form that would denominate it as such.

Poncius responds in *app. apolog., n. 241*, saying that quantity, whiteness, and so on can be received in an angel, and similarly wisdom in a stone, without the angel being called quantified and white or the stone being called wise. His reason is that quantity and whiteness denominate a subject as quantified and white only when

they are in it in an extended mode — and they would not be posited in the angel in that mode, since the angel is indivisible. Nor similarly would wisdom denominate a stone as wise, because wisdom can only denominate as wise a power that is able to act wisely.

Against this: the same argument recurs. If the angel cannot receive such denominations, then neither can it receive the forms from which those denominations are derived. The consequence is proved as follows: the primary formal effect of a form — which consists in its denomination — is most formally produced by the mere reception of the form in the subject. Hence for a subject to be formally quantified or otherwise qualified is nothing other than to have quantity or quality, as Aristotle teaches in the *Predicaments*, chapter on having, and the author of the *Six Principles* in the same chapter, where they say that to say that something has whiteness or length is nothing other than for it to be white or long; and Scotus likewise teaches this in *1 dist. 3, q. 7, §. Ad auctoritatem, litt. Y*: to have a quality is to be such. Therefore, by the very fact that the angel has whiteness and quantity — whether it has them in an extended or non-extended mode — it would be called white and quantified. Furthermore, it is false that whiteness can only denominate a subject in which it is found in an extended mode, because whiteness exists indivisibly in a point of quantity and still denominates that point as white. Therefore, if it can be received in an angel, it can consequently denominate the angel as white. Moreover, if it were conceded that whiteness cannot give the denomination of white except to a subject in which it is posited in an extended mode, from this it should rather be concluded that it cannot be received in the angel at all — since a form is united to a subject only in order to denominate it as such; and if it cannot denominate a subject except one in which it exists in an extended mode, it follows that it cannot be received in a subject in which it cannot be united in an extended mode, since for a form to be united to a subject just is to denominate the subject as such.

Poncius responds in *app. apolog., n. 242* that a subject can be capable of a form from which it does not receive every denomination that that form is capable of giving, and offers the example of an irrational nature, which is capable of the hypostatic union to a divine person, yet is not capable of the denomination of "person," which personhood naturally gives through the hypostatic union to it. He pursues this analogy at length, concluding that whiteness can exist in some subject without denominating it white, and wisdom without denominating it wise. Hence in n. 244 he finally says that the formal effect of whiteness is twofold: one consists in the formal communication of whiteness itself with respect to its entity alone; the other consists in the communication of whiteness in an extended mode. The first effect whiteness must communicate to whatever subject it is in, whether corporeal or incorporeal — otherwise a contradiction would follow. The second, however, it need not communicate, and thus it would be in the angel in that manner. To the second objection he says I speak against all the philosophers, who say that whiteness is extensively divisible throughout itself and all its parts and is

received in an extended subject, and that no one posits any part of it as received in a point of quantity. He therefore denies the antecedent, namely that whiteness is found indivisibly in a point of quantity.

But in the first place, that example of the hypostatic union is not to the point. For the Doctor says in *3 dist. 2, q. 1, sub D*, that to be personated is not a denomination derived from the hypostatic union as such, but from the nature assumed — if it is intellectual it is said to be personated, if irrational it is said only to be suppositized. But in the present case, to be white or to be warm are formal denominations derived precisely from the form and not from the subject. Hence it is wrongly inferred, as in n. 243, that a form can be in some subject without giving to it every denomination it might give to another subject. This is false, because the denomination that a form by its own nature is apt to confer is indifferently communicated to whatever subject it is in. Equally inept is the distinction of the twofold formal effect of whiteness — for the formal effect of whiteness, and of any other form, is explained by Aristotle in the cited place precisely by the fact that the subject has such a form, not by its having it in this or that mode. First, because the fact that whiteness is in a subject in an extended mode is not due to whiteness itself but to quantity, upon which it rests and by whose extension it is extended; therefore such a mode does not pertain intrinsically to its formal effect, which must be considered precisely from itself. Second, because extension is not properly required in order to give the denomination of whiteness — since whiteness existing in a point of quantity denominates that point as white just as it denominates a part — but rather in order to be able to perform the operation of dispersing vision. Nor is the antecedent rightly denied in response to the second objection. For I did not say that the whole of whiteness, or a part of it, is in a point of quantity, but rather a point of whiteness. Hence I said that whiteness is found indivisibly in a point of quantity, from which manner of speaking Poncius could well have gathered that I was not speaking of the whole of whiteness or a part of whiteness, but of a point of whiteness corresponding to a point of quantity — what is called punctual whiteness (*albedo punctualis*). He objects that it is quite wrong to call a point of whiteness "whiteness," for just as a point of quantity is not called quantity and does not make anything quantified, so neither should a point of whiteness be called whiteness or be able to make anything white. But this objection is trivial, for although a point of quantity is not called quantity absolutely, it is nonetheless called punctual quantity, and whiteness existing in a point of quantity is likewise called punctual whiteness, to distinguish it from extended whiteness existing in the parts of quantity. And although a point does not make a subject quantified — since to be quantified is to be extended and divisible, which is repugnant to a point — nonetheless to be white or to be warm can belong to an indivisible of extension. The Doctor posits this in *2 dist. 2, q. 9*, holding that an indivisible of extension can be the subject of alteration and intensification. Thus punctual whiteness or heat can produce this denomination; and certainly if a whole surface

is white, not only its parts are called white by the parts of whiteness, but its indivisibles too are white by the indivisibles of whiteness. If Poncius denies this, he denies it badly, and speaks against all the philosophers.

Hence Poncius, in the cited location in the Logic, concedes that in such a case an angel would be denominated white, warm, quantified, and so on, but says that it cannot be called quantified unless by "quantified" we understand "having quantity." For if by "quantified" we understood a subject constituted as such, it would not be quantified. Against this: a form of the same kind, wherever it is posited in a subject, always confers a formal effect of the same kind. Therefore, if whiteness or quantity were posited in an angel as in a subject informed by them, they would confer the same denomination — or a denomination of the same kind — as they now confer upon the bodies in which they inhere. But quantity existing in a material substance renders it formally impenetrable, and whiteness renders it formally dispersive of vision. Therefore these forms, if posited in an angel, would have to denominate it in the same manner, so that in that case the angel would be formally impenetrable and dispersive of vision — which is impossible, since by its very nature it is penetrable by any substance and of itself indivisible. And the same must be said conversely, if a spiritual accident were posited in a corporeal subject — wisdom in a stone, for example, and so on. And although with respect to intellection or love one might evade the argument by saying the stone would not be called intelligent or loving — since such vital denominations do not consist in the simple and pure reception of a vital form or act in a subject, but in an operation that consists in a certain vital tendency toward an intellected and loved object, as was explained in the book *De Anima* — nonetheless, if we take spiritual forms or accidents whose denominations are had sufficiently through their union to a subject, the argument concludes for these without any evasion whatsoever.

The other part of the conclusion — that a spiritual accident cannot be received in a corporeal subject — can still be proved by a special argument already hinted at above by Scotus in *4 dist. 1, q. 5, B*: either such an accidental form would be whole in the whole and whole in each part, as the rational soul is in the body — but this cannot be, since it would simultaneously depend essentially upon several total causes in the genus of material cause, namely upon those parts, each of which would sustain it totally; and this is impossible, as was said in *disp. 8 Phys., q. 3, art. 2*. Or it would be whole in the whole and part in part — but then it would not be spiritual but material, since extension is incompatible with spirituality. And this argument is adduced by Scotus in the cited location as absolutely proving — even by the absolute power of God — that a spiritual accident cannot be received in a corporeal subject, not only in an extended mode but even in a non-extended mode, as is sufficiently clear from Scotus's own argumentation, which refutes both horns of the dilemma by the one argument.

Poncius responds in the cited location that this argument proves only hypothetically — namely, on the supposition that a spiritual form were posited in a corporeal subject in such a way that it would depend totally on each of its parts in being, in the genus of material cause. He concedes that, under this supposition and given Scotus's principle denying that the same effect can depend upon several total and adequate causes in the same order, it would be impossible for the same spiritual accident to be posited in a corporeal subject. But, he adds, this is not the only way, nor one without alternatives, in which an accidental and spiritual form can be conceived as posited in an extended and corporeal subject. For although such a form by its nature depends upon a subject in being and conservation, this is not so necessarily that God could not produce it without such dependence. Given this, God can unite it to a subject in such a way that it does not depend upon it — in the manner in which the rational soul is said to be in the body, for God in producing or conserving things is not bound to conform to their connaturally determined mode of existence. Furthermore, even if an accident necessarily had to depend upon its subject, it could still be posited in several parts of the subject in such a way that it depended upon all of them and each of them — not totally but partially — so that if any part of this total subject were to perish, that form would also perish, unless God supplied that partial influence in the genus of efficient cause. Finally, God could place that spiritual form in a corporeal subject in such a way that it depended totally and adequately upon some one part of the whole for its being and conservation, but not upon the remaining parts either totally or partially. By these three modes, then, Poncius contends that a spiritual accident can be placed in a corporeal subject without any contradiction whatsoever, and this is also his principal foundation for defending the opposite of our conclusion.

Against this: first, there are those who hold that the mode of union of an accidental form with matter cannot be prescribed independently from sustentation, and that posited union of matter with such a form, dependence on the part of the form and sustentation on the part of matter are immediately understood. If, therefore, in an accident no two really distinct modes are distinguished — one of simple information and another of inherence, which is dependence upon a subject — but it is said to inform and depend by one and the same mode, then the first mode of placing a spiritual accident in a corporeal subject will be entirely impossible. Nor will the supposed analogy with the rational soul be valid, since in it there is simple reception and information without sustentation and dependence upon matter, because it is not naturally apt to depend upon it. For if it were a form naturally so apt to depend, it could not be received in matter without simultaneously and at once depending upon it. Therefore, in the present case, since every accidental form — even a spiritual one — is by nature apt to depend upon its subject, it cannot be placed in it without at once depending upon it. And by this the third mode is also excluded, in which it was said that a spiritual accident could be placed in a corporeal subject in such a

way that it depends in being and conservation upon one part alone and not upon the rest. For if it informs the remaining parts as well, it will also depend upon them — if the information of such a form cannot be prescribed independently from dependence and sustentation. Nor does the other assigned mode of placing a spiritual accident indivisibly in an extended subject — such that it depends only partially upon each individual part — appear reasonable. For it is not apparent in the first place how the material concurrence of those parts can be so modulated that a part which by nature is apt to sustain the whole accident totally should then concur only partially and inadequately; for although this might perhaps be admitted in the case of efficient causation, in the case of material causation it cannot easily be explained. Furthermore, by the very fact that such a form is whole in the whole and whole in each part, it is already whole in one part independently of the other; and there is no apparent reason why, once the form ceases in one part, its information in the other parts should also cease. If it is said that it must cease in the others because it depends partially and inadequately upon each and adequately upon all together, this will be a begging of the question — for it is precisely this that is being contested, namely that it cannot depend upon each part only partially, since it is a form whole not only in the whole but also in each of its parts. Therefore, once the dependence of the form upon the subject is admitted, and also that it exists indivisibly in each of its parts, it will also depend upon each of them totally and adequately. And by this the objection to this point raised by Poncius in *app. apolog.*, n. 227 is refuted.

Finally, when the Doctor proves from this that a spiritual accident cannot be received totally in the whole and totally in each part of a material subject — because this belongs only to the rational soul — he supposes that the accident is posited in the subject according to the connaturally appropriate mode of its information, which is to inform by inherence and dependently upon the subject, and indeed totally and adequately depending upon that in which it wholly resides. Given this supposition, he argues that this is impossible: for either the same effect must depend upon several total causes totally and adequately, or the accident must be in its subject independently of it in the genus of material cause — which is said to belong among all forms to the rational soul alone. For other forms by their very nature depend upon the subject they inform, in their being and conservation, whether they are placed in that subject by a natural agent or immediately by God. In this sense, therefore, and only in this sense, did the Doctor say that if a spiritual accident were placed in a corporeal subject, indivisibly in each of its parts, the same effect would depend adequately, simultaneously, and at once upon several total causes. For if other miracles were multiplied and it were supposed that such an accident is posited in a subject by way of simple union not having the character of sustentation, I admit that the argument would not hold; and given such a supposition, the Doctor would plainly not have denied from this consideration alone that a spiritual accident can be placed by God in a corporeal subject. Yet even so, the repugnance remains from

another consideration — hinted at in proving the other part of the conclusion — namely, from the incapacity for the denomination of a spiritual accidental form in a material subject, as was deduced in the preceding argument.

Question VIII. Whether One Numerically Individual Accident Can Be in Several Subjects Simultaneously; and Whether Several Such Accidents Can Be in One Subject

This question, as its title indicates, has two parts. Regarding the first part, it does not arise from the natural order, since it is certain among all that the same numerically individual accident cannot inform more than one adequate subject simultaneously — let alone successively — since then the same accident would migrate from subject to subject, which is naturally impossible. The question therefore arises for this part with respect to the absolute power of God: can one numerically individual accident inhere in several subjects really and with equal immediacy? And although Poncius holds the affirmative in *disp. 13* cited, *q. 3*, in accordance with what he had said in the previous question — that a spiritual accident, as he had established there, can be in several parts of the same extended subject; therefore, likewise, one and the same numerically individual accident can be in several distinct subjects not united to each other, since no greater repugnance is seen here than there — nonetheless Scotus expressly taught the opposite, negative position in *3 d. 1, q. 2, §. Contra hoc*, where, wishing to prove that the same nature cannot be assumed by several divine persons simultaneously, since such a nature would be infinite, he argues as follows: just as a substantial form that were to substantially perfect several supposita would be actually unlimited, so too an accident consequent upon them that were to accidentally perfect those same supposita would be unlimited. For example, just as a soul is unlimited with respect to perfecting several substantial parts of the body, so knowledge is an unlimited accident with respect to several parts of the body. Therefore, just as the divine essence, because it is essentially the nature of three supposita, is infinite as it were as their essential nature, so too a human nature would be infinite — albeit as it were as an adventitious nature — for several supposita. Confirmation: it appears equally impossible for one accident to be in two subjects as for one substantial form to be in two matters. Therefore, if infinity necessarily follows from one substantial form's being in several matters, infinity necessarily follows from one accident's being in many. So the Doctor in the cited location.

I wished to set out this entire argument of Scotus in full, so that it would be plainly apparent that he expressly taught the negative side of the question — and how wrongly Poncius in the cited location says that Scotus did not absolutely deny that the same accident can be in several subjects simultaneously, nor did he absolutely say that infinity of the accidental form follows from this, but only spoke conditionally in the following manner: if infinity necessarily follows in a substantial form from its being in several matters, infinity necessarily follows

from one accident being in many. It is true that he speaks in this way in the confirmation; but in the principal argument — which Poncius omitted — now cited, he does not speak conditionally but absolutely. For he argues: just as a substantial form that substantially perfected several supposita would be actually unlimited, so too an accident that accidentally perfected those same supposita would be unlimited. Hence, given this principal argument, when in the confirmation he deduces "therefore, if infinity necessarily follows in a substantial form..." — this cannot be called conditional speech but rather absolute; for it is as if he were saying: if infinity necessarily follows in a substantial form, as has now been proved, then likewise in an accidental one. Therefore he absolutely holds that no form — whether substantial or accidental — can simultaneously inform several adequate subjects, because then such a form would be of infinite perfection.

How infinity would follow from this was proved at length from an argument hinted at by Scotus and excellently developed by Lichetus in *disp. 5 Phys., q. 7, art. 2, n. 77*: the more unlimited a form is with respect to perfecting more perfectible things, the more perfect it is in itself. This is why we argue that the intellective soul is the most perfect among all forms — because one and the same soul simultaneously perfects all parts of the composite; and if the same soul could simultaneously perfect several bodies, it would be judged even more perfect. Therefore, if the same numerically individual form could inform more and more adequate matters infinitely — which would have to be said if one were to admit that it can simultaneously inform three or four, since there would be no greater reason to stop at three or four than to extend to infinitely many — that form would be of infinite perfection.

Since more recent authors endeavor to undermine this argument by appealing to the analogy of matter — which by the power of God can be subjected to several forms simultaneously — and of a body that can be replicated in several places without it following that they thereby have infinite perfection, I excluded this analogy together with Lichetus in the cited location. For a body with respect to several places bears itself passively and has no exercise of power in acquiring them, nor does it confer any perfection upon them. Likewise, matter's being subjected to several forms would argue no greater perfection in it but rather greater imperfection, since such subjectability bespeaks passivity. But a form's informing matter bespaks perfection, because it imports an actuating of matter; and this power of actuating and perfecting belongs to the form from within and from its own nature. Hence the more unlimited it is of itself with respect to perfecting more perfectible things, the more perfect it is. Moreover, information occurs through the exercise of informative power in the genus of formal cause — not so the replication of a body in several places or matter's being under several forms, for in all these cases the body and matter bear themselves purely passively. This solution has its foundation in *Scot. 3 d. 14, q. 2* at the end, and *4 d. 10, q. 2, R.*

Against this solution Poncius objected in several ways in *disp. 4 Phys., n. 66*. First, that a body does not bear itself merely passively but also exercises a repletive power, just as well as a form exercises an informative power. Second, that a body would bear itself merely passively with respect to several places insofar as it has being in them formally from several *ubi* produced by God alone — but equally, a form would have being in several matters through several unions produced by God alone. Third, that if it is of greater perfection in a form to inform several matters, so too it would be of greater perfection in matter to be informed by several forms; and if a form cannot inform several matters without the exercise of a new informative power, likewise matter cannot be informed by several forms — especially ones educed — without the exercise of a new sustentative power. Finally, that the argument at most would conclude in the case where a form could extend to informing infinitely many matters, but not merely four or ten.

To all of these I responded explicitly or implicitly, drawing on the doctrine of Scotus and Lichetus in the cited location, before they were raised by Poncius — since the same objections had been raised by Ruvio, Murcia, and others, as is seen there at n. 81 and 84, in both the first and second printing of the physical volume. To the first objection, then, from the doctrine set out there, the assumption is denied. For as Scotus teaches in *quod. 11, N*, for a body to fill a place is to make the sides of the container distant. This can be understood in two ways, says the Doctor: either effectively — and in that sense the agent by stretching side from side makes them distant — or quasi-formally, in which sense the medium or the body enclosed is said to make the sides of the container distant. From this it is clear that the repletive power (*virtus repletiva*) in a body is not active. The reason is: first, because as the same Doctor teaches in *4 d. 10, q. 2, lit. L*, the body makes the sides of the container distant through its quantity, and quantity is not an active form. Second, as the same Doctor teaches, repletion signifies nothing but the presence of a contained body with respect to the container, whereas information, beyond the mere presence of the form in matter, also signifies the exercise of informative power in the genus of formal cause — something that the mere presence of a body in a place does not signify. Third, because a form is the perfection of matter, whereas a body is not the perfection of a place. Hence from the fact that a form can perfect more and more adequate matters, infinity can well be deduced; but not so from the fact that God can place a body in several places.

To the second objection, it was said there at n. 78 at the end that even if a form were replicated in several matters, it would not inform them by virtue of simple replication alone — as a body is said to be in several places precisely by reason of such replication — but through a true exercise of informative power and formal causality. This causality is not exercised by a body when it is placed in several places, as is shown by the fact that to inform a matter of three palms requires a greater informative power in the form than to inform matter of one palm — which is why the soul is said to be more perfect than other forms, since one and the same soul can inform the many parts of the same body.

To the third objection, the first analogy was denied in the same place, drawing on *Scot. 3 dist. 14, q. 2* at the end, where he says that infinite extensive reach toward certain things — namely, toward receiving forms — does not conclude to an infinite entity in the receiver, as is clear from matter: if it were receptive of infinitely many forms, this would rather conclude to imperfection. The other analogy — regarding the sustentative power of matter, that it would have to be increased if it simultaneously received several educed forms — even if conceded, counts for little, since this sustentative power is always a passive potency, which by its whole genus bespeaks imperfection; hence from its increase in matter there follows no greater perfection in it, according to Scotus's doctrine as cited.

To the fourth objection I said in the cited location at n. 82 that for the same reason that the same form could simultaneously inform three or four matters, it could also inform infinitely many — in the manner in which the Doctor deduces in *3 dist. 1, q. 2, §. Contra hoc obiicitur*: for the same reason that a nature could be in two persons, it could equally be in infinitely many. Moreover, if the form were determined to, say, four or six palmar matters, beyond which it could not inform any others, then all those taken together would constitute the adequate matter for such a form, and each individually would be inadequate; hence it could no longer be maintained that it can be elevated to inform several adequate ones. Poncius reassails these solutions in *app. apolog., n. 20*, repeating the same arguments rather than forming new ones. He says: if a form did not inform several matters by virtue of simple replication but through a true exercise of informative power, then equally a body would not fill different places by virtue of replication but through the exercise of repletive power. Further: even if sustentative power bespaks imperfection, this very imperfection has some perfection annexed to it, by reason of which to sustain more would be of greater perfection than to sustain fewer — just as from this it can be gathered that prime matter is more perfect than quantity, because it can receive and sustain a substantial form that quantity cannot sustain. Further: informative power bespaks the imperfection of an incomplete being; therefore, if notwithstanding this it is of greater perfection in a form to inform several matters, then equally, notwithstanding that sustentative power bespaks imperfection, it would be of greater perfection to sustain more than fewer. Finally, he attacks the solution to the fourth objection, saying that the consequence — that if the same form can inform two or three matters it can inform infinitely many — cannot be drawn except through great carelessness or ignorance; and those who admit that consequence do so because they think it does not follow that a form is more perfect the more matters it has informed. He also refutes another solution to the same argument: that even if matter were determined to a fixed number of forms, that fixed number would not be the adequate matter in the sense intended by the question — since by "adequate matter" in this question is meant matter that can make a per se unity with the form, such as one complete organic body with respect to a soul, or one matter numerically distinct from another with respect to the form of fire or water. But

the total number of all the matters that a soul could inform would not be adequate matter in this sense, since each individual matter would be adequate; and consequently a form informing several of them would be informing several adequate ones in the sense of the question. He also says that the location of *Scot. 3 d. 14, q. 2* at the end, upon which our entire solution was founded, does not favor us — for Scotus speaks of perfection not involving imperfection by its formal concept, which is the perfection in an efficient cause (and this is what the Doctor is discussing there), and not of perfection involving imperfection by its formal concept, such as the perfection that matter has insofar as it is sustentative.

But neither are these objections much more pressing than the preceding ones, nor are they very different from them. To the first: I already assigned with Lichetus above a notable disparity between the replication of a form in several matters and a body in several places, and between the informative power on the part of the form and the repletive power of the place on the part of the body; and the objector was bound to prove this analogy, not merely assert it. He always asserted it, never proved it — at least as far as I have seen. And indeed, since a form is the act and perfection of matter and is more perfect the more parts of matter it simultaneously informs, whereas a body is in no way the perfection of a place to which it is present, nor is it more perfect because God places it in several places — since all of this accrues to it from without — this assumed analogy between a body in several places and a form in several matters can never be sufficiently proved to the degree required in the present case. To the second: first, it can be absolutely denied that sustentative power bespaks any perfection, insofar as it pertains to the genus of material cause — since, as such, it cannot be prescribed independently of passivity and receptibility, it can bespeak no perfection. Hence it is that God can in no way supply such sustentative power in the genus of material cause, but only in the genus of efficient cause. This is why the Doctor says in *1 dist. 8, q. 3, §. Teneo opinionem meam*, that the character of substanting (*ratio substandi*) accidents in substance bespeaks imperfection, and hence that the name "substance" (*substantia*), in the sense in which it is said from *substando* (standing under), cannot be attributed to God — only in the sense in which it is said from *subsistendo* (subsisting). According to this doctrine one must further deny what Poncius assumes — that to sustain more is of greater perfection than to sustain fewer. For, other things being equal, a substance that substands fewer accidents is judged more perfect than one that substands more, since it is judged more actual and more removed from potentiality. Hence the assumed analogy between the informative power of a form and the sustentative power of matter does not hold. Nor does it hold even granting what the objector intends — namely, that sustentative power bespaks some perfection annexed to that imperfection — because, as the Doctor notes in *4 d. 12, q. 2, F*, if one makes a comparison between actuative power, which is on the side of the form, and sustentative power, which is on the side of matter, the former is far greater in perfection than the latter. For actuativity is a perfection simply speaking, by its

genus including no imperfection from its concept, and hence can belong to the first being — not so sustentatively, since this by its character belongs to what is potential, or at least requires that to which it belongs to be potential. Hence from the fact that matter is subjected to forms in infinitely many instances there can never follow infinite perfection in it, since infinity is not apt to follow except upon a perfection simply speaking which by its concept includes no imperfection; but it can well follow from a form's being in several matters, actualizing them simultaneously, for the opposite reason — that actuativity is a perfection including no imperfection from its genus.

To the third objection: from the same doctrine the response is that the actuative power of a form bespaks imperfection of an incomplete being only per accidens, not from its genus — as Scotus excellently explained in *1 d. 8, q. 4, X*, where he says that a form in creatures has something of imperfection — namely, that it is a form informing something and is part of a composite — but also has something that is not of imperfection but follows upon it according to its essential or formal character, namely that it is that by which something is such. For example, wisdom in us is an accident — this is of imperfection — but that it is that by which something is wise is not of imperfection but of the essential character of wisdom. By these words the Doctor shows that the actuative power of a form does not include in its formal character the fact that it is a part and the imperfection of an incomplete being, but only per accidens. Therefore the consequence is denied: that it would also be of greater perfection in matter to sustain more, notwithstanding the imperfection of sustentation — just as, notwithstanding the imperfection of information, it is greater perfection in a form to inform more matters. The consequence is denied for the reason given: because the actuative power of a form is a perfection simply speaking, not including imperfection from its genus. Hence the imperfection of information and of being a part — which is annexed to it — does not impede the argument for its infinity, since such imperfection is only per accidens connected with the actuative power it has. But the sustentative power of matter is either an imperfection simply and absolutely speaking, or at least it has imperfection necessarily and per se connected with it from its genus. Therefore it cannot be deduced that it is more perfect the more it sustains; or alternatively, if it is not more perfect the more forms it sustains, neither will a form be more perfect for informing more matters — which is what the objector intends to deduce.

To the fourth objection: Poncius wrongly says that that consequence cannot be drawn without great carelessness and ignorance. For, as I said in the argument, the Doctor himself draws exactly the same, or a completely similar, consequence in the cited *3 d. 1, q. 2, §. Contra hoc obiicitur*, where he argues: since the divine essence is concluded to be infinite from the fact that it can be the selfsame in three persons, this nature would be infinite if it could be in several persons — and the consequence is proved, because for the same reason it could be in two persons it could be in infinitely many. The Doctor proceeds in this manner in the cited

place; and in confirmation of his manner of argument, Lichetus and Aretinus note with him that he frequently draws a similar consequence elsewhere: in *1 d. 2, p. 1, q. 3*, he argues that if there could be several Gods, then infinitely many; in *dist. 2, p. 2, q. 4*, he argues that if there could be several Sons in the divine, then infinitely many; in *quol. 2*, he likewise argues that if there can be several productions of the same kind in the divine, there can be infinitely many, unless a determination to a fixed number is apparent. Therefore it is with great carelessness — God forbid that I say ignorance — that Poncius said that this consequence cannot be drawn except through great carelessness or ignorance, since this mode of argument is most familiar to Scotus. It can be used in the present case and in similar ones, unless a determination to a fixed number is apparent — which determination Poncius has not yet made apparent.

His attack on our other solution to the fourth argument plainly shows that the objector did not grasp our solution, or rather did not wish to grasp it. The solution consists in this: if a form is supposed to be determined to a fixed number of matters, beyond which it cannot simultaneously inform others, this determination would belong to it either from the nature of the thing — as, for example, this soul is determined by its nature to informing a body of ten palms — or by something newly superadded to it by God, by which its informative power is augmented. And in either case, it follows that the aggregate of those matters is the adequate perfectible for such a form, so determined by its nature or elevated by God and considered under such elevation; and each individual palmar matter, for example, is an inadequate perfectible — as a forearm (*brachium*) is said to be an inadequate perfectible of the soul. And it matters little whether one palmar matter is continuous with another or discontinuous, for this purpose. For continuity or discontinuity does not determine whether a forearm is or is not an adequate perfectible of the soul: a forearm, even though it is the remainder of a continuous body, is not on that account called an adequate perfectible of the soul, but is always inadequate — whether it is continuous or divided — and continuity only makes it such that the soul can proximately inform it. Therefore, if a soul is once posited as sufficient and determined to inform ten palmar matters, then each taken individually — whether continuous or discontinuous — will be an inadequate perfectible for such a form, since through none of them is the entire informative power of the form exhausted. Finally, the explanation Poncius offers for the location *Scot. 3 dist. 14, q. 2* at the end, even if admitted, does not harm us — for whether he speaks of perfection not involving imperfection or otherwise, it is sufficient for us that Scotus teaches there that infinite extensive reach toward forms to be received does not conclude to infinite entity in the receiver. Moreover, since matter, insofar as it is sustentative, bespaks a perfection involving imperfection from its concept — as he himself concedes there — it follows that matter would not be simply more perfect for sustaining more forms. This does not follow for a form, however, since the form in the character of actuant bespaks a perfection removed from all imperfection from its

formal character. Therefore, if the form can inform infinitely more matters, infinity of perfection is well deduced in it, not so in matter. Hence, however that authority is explained, it is always for us, and it splendidly undermines the analogy assumed by the adversaries between the informative power of a form and the sustentative power of matter.

Secondly, this same assertion is proved principally from Scotus in the cited location, by a special argument concerning forms that depend upon matter: in that case, one and the same form would depend upon several total and adequate causes in the genus of material cause — which is repugnant, as Poncius himself concedes. I treated this argument at length in *disp. 5 Phys., q. 7, art. 2*, proving that the same substantial form cannot simultaneously and at once inform several adequate matters. Poncius says this does not prevent a form from being posited in several subjects, unless it depends totally and adequately upon each of those several subjects; nor, he says, is this necessary — for it can come about that it depends upon each of them only partially and inadequately, or not at all, with God supplying the functions of those subjects in the genus of efficient cause in the interim. But whether this is well said, and especially whether it accords with the mind of Scotus, has already been addressed above at n. 262 and 263. For an exact resolution of this question one should consult what I said in the parallel question about substantial form in *disp. 5 cit. Phys., q. 7, art. 2*, since whatever was said there about substantial form must be said here equally about accidental form.

Regarding the other part of the question — namely, whether several numerically distinct accidents can be in the same subject — there are three positions. The first is that of the Thomists, who deny this absolutely, even by the absolute power of God. Some of them defend this so tenaciously that they not only deny that several numerically distinct accidents can be found simultaneously in the same subject, but also deny they can be found successively — holding that what is always reproduced in the same subject is one numerically identical accident that had previously perished, for example the same heat, the same light, the same *ubi*, indeed the same local motion, if performed over the same space. Hence when water is reduced to its former coldness, they say it acquires the same numerically individual coldness it had lost, since the same accident is always reproduced. And indeed, given the supposition that an accident is individuated by its subject — as the common Thomist view holds — this would have to be said, since whatever accident were posited in it would have the same individuating principle and hence be the same individual accident. So Suarez reports in *disp. 5 Met., sec. 9, n. 1*. Thomists commonly, however, concede that several numerically distinct accidents can be in the same subject successively, and locate the repugnance only in their being simultaneous, as can be seen in Blasius a Conc., *disp. 4 Met., q. 3*, where for this position he cites Fland., *5 Met., q. 9, art. 7*; Socin., *7 Met., q. 4*; Cajet., *3 p. q. 35, art. 5*; Capreol., *1 dist. 9, q. 2, art. 3*; Salm., *tr. de princ. individ., disp. 2, dub. 3*.

Another position equally denies that it can ever happen naturally that two numerically distinct accidents of the same species are found in the same subject, yet proceeds with a distinction regarding the absolute power of God: accidents incapable of intensification God can multiply numerically in the same subject, but not those that are capable of intensification — especially through homogeneous degrees — because God cannot impede their intensive union, through which they become one numerically individual accident. So Pasq., *tom. 3 Met., disp. 42*, and certain others.

The third and final position is that of Scotus in *3 d. 8, q. un., §. Contra istam rationem*, and in *5 Metaph., q. 7*, where he not only denies that this is repugnant with respect to the absolute power of God, but also concedes that it happens naturally in certain accidents — especially relative ones — given their real distinction from the foundation, which the Thomists grant. Scotus is followed by the Scotists there, along with Ant. And., *5 Met., q. 8*; Tromb., *q. 7*; Faber, *disp. 12*; and at length and exactly by Aureol., *1 d. 7, q. 2, art. 1*; Suarez, *disp. 5 cit., sec. 8*; and very many others. Scotus proves this from the opposite of the Thomist foundation: he holds that accidents are not primarily individuated by their subject but by their own ultimate reality, as is established from what was said above in *disp. 10, q. 8*. Since, therefore, accidents have within themselves that by which they are individuated and are numerically distinct per se, and since moreover they are posterior to the subject in which they inhere, there will be no repugnance in their being several in the same subject — since with the unity of what is prior the multiplicity of what is posterior is compatible. Therefore, no repugnance arises from the side of their individuation. Nor does any repugnance arise from the capacity of the subject, since a subject having potentiality for several forms of the same species is unlimited with respect to them; but what is unlimited for some things does not lose its capacity for others merely because it actually has some of them. Therefore, even if a subject has one accident, it can also receive another — at least from a supernatural agent. Hence no repugnance is to be found from the side of the subject. By the same reasoning it was proved in *disp. 5 Phys., q. 4, art. 2* that several substantially disparate forms — distinct not only numerically but also specifically — can be conjoined in the same matter by the absolute power of God. Confirmation: what is unlimited for certain things need not be multiplied with them; but a subject of accidents is unlimited for several accidents of the same kind, since at least it receives several successively, as the sounder part of the Thomists concede. Therefore, it need not be multiplied with them, and hence there is absolutely no repugnance in several numerically distinct accidents being placed in the same subject. The various Thomist responses to this argument can be refuted from what was said above in *disp. 10, q. 8*, since they all rest on the premise that the numerical unity of an accident depends upon the numerical unity of the subject — which, besides seeming to beg the question in the cited location, was refuted there at length.

Furthermore, the Doctor proves principally, even from experience, that several numerically distinct accidents do in fact exist in the same subject. Several phantasmal species (*species phantasticae*), numerically distinct, are found in the same organ of the imagination. Likewise several visible species, numerically distinct, exist in the same part of the medium. Likewise several relations of the same species — for example, several paternities in the same man toward several sons — all of which must necessarily be multiplied numerically in the same subject, as the Doctor proves at length in the cited location. In response to this argument, Cajetan offers three solutions in the cited location. One is that the several species are in the same organ, but not in the same part, but in different parts — since, being intentional, they seem to be saved in a point, as is clear from those who see many things through a very small aperture. Another is that the species or form coming upon another form of the same species unites with it and becomes one numerically individual form with it — though more intense — just as light generated in the same diaphanous medium by a second candle becomes the same numerically individual light as the first, not another numerically distinct light. Thirdly and finally, he denies that the intentional species of Peter and Paul are numerically distinct, because it is one thing to consider objects in their real being and another to consider them in their sensible and representative — or presentable — being. For although in the first sense Peter and Paul differ only numerically, in the second they differ specifically, since those species have between them some difference by which they differ in species from one another: one represents one white thing, and another represents another white thing, and on account of this different representation they are of different species. This solution is commonly received by the Thomists, such as the Salmanticenses, Blasius a Conc. in the cited location, Pasq., *disp.* 42 *cit.*, *sec.* 2, *n.* 15, and many others. Yet Faber rightly says that this solution is also wrongly attributed to Suarez, for in *sec.* 18 *cit.*, *n.* 16 he expressly says that the visible species of Peter and Paul agree in their specific character and differ only numerically, and that the dissimilarity in representing numerically diverse objects is greater than numerical — materially only, not formally — and remains within the sphere of the same species. Finally, regarding several paternities in the same father toward several sons, the Thomists commonly say that several terms of the same kind can be reached by one and the same numerically individual relation.

This last solution — that one and the same numerically individual relation suffices for several — especially adequate — terms, was extensively rejected in *disp.* 8 *Log.*, *q.* 6, *art.* 2, where all the individual modes by which the Thomists have to this point attempted to explain this are refuted. It remains therefore to refute what is said about intentional species. The first solution is excluded by Scotus himself, because the organ of the eye or of imagination cannot be divided into so many minimal parts as could per se be informed by as many visible or imaginable species as can simultaneously be in the whole organ. Given its small quantity, it would quickly be filled with species and could receive no others. Moreover, the

organ can only be divided into sensible parts, and these are necessarily quantified; therefore not so many of them can be assigned as there are species received in it — and hence they must be compenetrated in the same part. He argues likewise in *5 Met.*, *q. 7, n. 4* about several species in the medium: suppose only one white thing — say, an egg — is present; its species will be in the whole illuminated medium to the extent of its power. Suppose another white thing is present; its species will be in the same part as the species of the other white thing. Either that other thing will not be seen by a well-disposed eye — which is against sense experience — or it will be seen, in which case there are two distinct species in the same part.

The second solution was likewise rejected in *disp. 5 De Anima, q. 2, art. 2, n. 34*: if in the same medium the species of two whitenesses existed, they would not coalesce into one more perfect species, and the reason is that it is impossible for a more intense species to make one see simultaneously and distinctly a more and a less intense white; but the eye sees through species those two whites distinctly, even if one is intense and the other faint. Therefore it does not see through one more intense species, but through two entirely distinct ones. Furthermore, in that case the eye would not see, as it in fact does, two objects or two whitenesses — one more intense and one less — but only one whiteness more intense than either of those two, since just as there is one species there would be only one object represented; and it would represent falsely, since there is no white in reality as intense in being as that species is in representing. This was also refuted there in what was said about light: if two luminous sources somewhat distant from each other were applied to the same medium in which there stood a column or other opaque body, these two luminous sources would cast two opposite shadows, as experience shows. Therefore, each produces a distinct light. The consequence is proved because shadow is a privation of light; therefore if there are two privations, there are two lights, not one more intense one. This I pursue further there together with *Scot. cit. 5 Met.*, *q. 7*. Furthermore, even if one were to concede that the light of the second candle becomes the same numerically individual but more intense light as the light of the first candle, it still would not follow that one representatively distinct species becomes numerically the same as another arriving species — since, representing numerically distinct objects, they cannot become one numerically individual species.

The third and final response — that the species representatively of this white and of that white differ from one another in species and essentially — was attacked above in *disp. 10, q. 11*, and is rejected by the same Doctor in the cited *d. 8, q. un.*, because both express and impressed species are distinguished by their objects, considered under their representative being. Therefore, if the objects they represent are numerically distinct and fall under the same specific character, being numerically diverse only, the representatively distinct species would in no way differ from each other in species, but only numerically. And whatever dissimilarity there may be in representing, it will at most be material and as it

were accidental, not essential and specific. Confirmation from what was said in the cited location: it does not seem possible for things to differ in species that do not receive something specifically distinct — but the sensible species of this white and that white are such that they respect nothing specifically distinct either in real being or in representative being, but only numerically. Therefore they differ from each other only numerically. Pasq. objects in *disp. 42 cit., sec. 2, n. 15* that although this and that white differ only individually, they are nevertheless so diverse that the representative species of one cannot in any way represent the other. Hence, since "to represent" belongs to species not by reason of their individuation but by reason of their essence, and since these species differ from each other in representative being — because what one represents cannot be represented by the other — they consequently differ in essence. He also confirms this: two intentional species of two individuals differ more from each other than do two species of the same individual, yet the latter differ numerically. Therefore the former differ more than numerically, and consequently in species. But to these and similar points enough has been said above in *disp. 10, q. 11*, which must necessarily be consulted there for the refutation of this third solution, and need not be repeated here. Finally, even if it were conceded that such intentional species differed in species from one another, several paternities in the same father toward different sons, or several similarities in the same white thing, can differ from one another only numerically. Nor can it in any way be imagined that these relative accidents differ from one another in species. Therefore, at least in the case of these accidents, the argument will press.

Blasius a Conc. endeavors to prove the opposite in the cited location with this argument: a subject is of itself incapable of simultaneously receiving two accidents of the same species and differing only numerically, and nothing can be added to it — even by absolute power — by which it would be rendered capable of receiving them simultaneously. Therefore, this can occur neither naturally nor supernaturally. The consequence is evident; the assumption is proved as to its first part: if the subject were of itself capable, it could connaturally receive them — for whenever a passive potency is given in the order of nature, naturally apt to receive some act, there must be an active potency capable of reducing such passive potency to act. The second part is proved: it cannot receive them except through the nature and proper power of its entity, for it does not otherwise receive accidents than by exhibiting its own entity. Therefore, if the entity of the subject is of itself insufficient and incapable of receiving two accidents differing only numerically, it will remain always in that insufficiency and incapacity. Confirmation: if the potency that is in a subject for receiving accidents differing only numerically is not determined and limited to receiving only one simultaneously and for the same instant, it will no more be determined to receiving two than four, six, a hundred, a thousand, or infinitely many — and thus the subject will have potency to receive simultaneously infinitely many numerically distinct accidents, and its potency will be actually infinite. For the

active potency of God is said to be actually infinite because, as far as it itself is concerned, it can extend itself to infinitely many effects.

The response is that this argument destroys obediential potency in things, or at least confuses obediential with natural potency, by denying what does not belong to a thing naturally can belong to it through divine power. And if it were valid, it would equally prove that a quality cannot be intensified to infinity by divine power, nor the same body placed in several places simultaneously, nor two bodies in the same place — since, if a quality were of itself capable of such intensification, it could connaturally receive it; and similarly, if the same body were of itself capable of being in several places or of coexisting in the same place with another body, it could connaturally be in that state. And if it cannot naturally be so, then neither supernaturally — for it cannot be placed in several places or in the same place simultaneously with another body except through the exhibition of its own entity. The same instancing could apply in many other cases. Therefore, as was said in response to a similar argument in *disp. 11 Phys., q. 8, n. 130*, natural potency must be distinguished from obediential potency in things — not entitatively, but with respect to the agent. And it must be said that many things can belong to them by reason of obediential potency that do not belong to them by reason of natural potency, because through obediential potency they are related to an unlimited agent, whereas through natural potency they are related to a limited agent. Nor are these potencies mutually repugnant, since they are one potency related to different things. Nor do things that belong to a thing by virtue of obediential potency thereby repugnant to or contrary to its nature, merely because they do not belong to it according to natural potency — for natural potency is not so called as if the nature of the thing thereby absolutely and unconditionally requires and demands it, but because it so requires in relation to a natural agent; absolutely speaking, however, it is indifferent to this or that. Hence, things that belong to a thing by virtue of obediential potency are said to be above the nature of the thing, not contrary to its nature. And so in the present case, by virtue of natural potency and in relation to a natural agent, the subject is determined — at least with respect to certain accidents — to receiving only one accident of the same species, not several simultaneously; yet by virtue of obediential potency and in relation to a supernatural agent it can receive several simultaneously. From this it does not follow that this plurality is repugnant to the nature of the subject, since potency is not called natural because the nature of the thing thereby absolutely demands it, but because it so demands as it is subject to the action of a natural agent. Nor does the confirmation rightly conclude; for if the argument were valid, it would equally prove that a subject cannot simultaneously receive several specifically distinct accidents — which is against experience. And the consequence is proved in the same manner: since it will be no more determined to receiving two, three, etc., than thousands and infinitely many, its potency will be actually infinite. The consequence must therefore be denied — because, as the Doctor notes in *3 d. 14, q. 2* at the end, infinite extensive reach for certain things — such as for forms to

be received — does not conclude to infinite entity or power in the receiver, as is clear from matter, if it were receptive of infinitely many forms; indeed it rather concludes to imperfection. But infinite extensive reach for certain things — such as for effects simultaneously causal — does conclude to extensive infinity, since such plurality concludes to greater perfection in that which extends itself to more things, not so in the case of what receives. Furthermore, several numerically distinct accidents are indeed possible, yet not actually infinite in a categorical and absolute sense, but only syncategorematically — that is, finite in an indefinitely extendable sense (*finita in infinitum*).

Now, since the authors of the third position concede that several numerically distinct accidents can naturally be found in the same subject, there remains the difficulty of specifying which ones. Certain Thomists distinguish between complete and incomplete accidents — calling intentional species "incomplete" — and concede that these latter can be numerically multiplied in the same subject, convinced by the argument made above about species, while denying this of the rest, namely the complete ones. So especially Javellus, *5 Met.*, *q. 16*, among others, who in various ways explain why these later intentional accidents are called incomplete and not the others.

Others draw a different distinction: some accidents are proper — that is, intrinsically emanating from the subject — and of these they say that several numerically distinct ones cannot be in the same subject; others are extrinsic and adventitious, commonly called common accidents, and of these they say they can be simultaneously present. For this Jand., *5 Met.*, *q. 36*, is cited. Others draw yet another distinction: some accidents have an intensive latitude and can be intensified by addition of part to part; others lack this intensive latitude. The latter, they say, can be numerically multiplied in the same subject simultaneously, not so the former — since the former cannot be gathered together in the same subject without constituting one numerically individual accident. And this is what the Doctor indicated in *3 d. 8, q. un., B*. Others again concede this only for intentional accidents, and for real relative and absolute ones not educed from the potency of matter, and finally for educed ones if they are not educed through motion; and they deny it only for real absolute accidents educed through motion from the potency of matter. So the Doctor indicated in *5 Met.*, *q. 7*, whom Ant. And. and other Scotist Metaphysicians follow there, *q. 8*, and Aret., *d. 8, q. un., art. 2* — where I confess I do not fully understand what they mean by accidents not educed from the potency of matter, unless this is explained as Faber explains it: some are said not to be educed because they are not educed through motion and with a prior objective alteration arising from the nature of the subject. In this sense the sensible species are not educed from the potency of matter, nor is light in the medium, because these forms are not introduced with an alteration that expels something from the subject — even though, absolutely speaking, they must be called educed, since in the manner in which they come to be they depend

upon matter in their becoming and conservation, as Tromb. also very aptly noted in *9 De Immortalitate Animae, art. 2, §. Pro responsione ad haec argumenta*.

Others finally draw yet another distinction among numerically distinct accidents. Some differ numerically only in such a way that, apart from their distinction in entity, they have a certain similarity and agreement in all other respects — namely in the function or office for which they are destined and in whatever relation they bear — such as two heats, two whitenesses, and the like. Others are such that, although they agree in specific character and differ only numerically under it, they nonetheless do not have as great a similarity between them but differ either in function or in relation — which is as it were a certain material diversity — such as, for example, two visible species of different individuals (for if they were of the same individual, they behave as accidents of the first kind), and likewise two relations of paternity, and so on. Given this preliminary distinction, they say that accidents of the first kind cannot naturally be multiplied in the same subject, but those of the second kind can — which, besides being confirmed by experience, is further supported by a solid argument drawn both from the end and from the efficient cause. From the end: because the multiplication of accidents of the first kind would be superfluous and idle, not so the multiplication of accidents of the second kind, by reason of their different functions and different relations. From the efficient cause: when accidents are entirely similar, no agent intends per se either their plurality or the introduction of another in a subject that already has one entirely similar — since the agent intends only to render the patient like itself, which is achieved by one such form alone. But when accidents are not entirely similar, this reasoning ceases, and the subject needs a greater assimilation; hence the agent pursues it. For example, even though the medium, having received the species of Peter, is intentionally like Peter, it is not sufficiently like Paul — and hence there remains in Paul the power to introduce a species by which that medium is rendered like Paul. And so for the others. This is how Suarez explained the matter in *disp. 5 cit., sec. 8, n. 16* — an explanation he without doubt derived from Scotus in *3 d. 8, q. un.*, since the Doctor, proving there that two accidents differing only numerically are not repugnant to being in the same subject, argues a fortiori from the fact that several are sometimes in fact in the same subject, and gives examples only of accidents of the second kind — namely, of phantasmal species and of relations. Indeed, when he raises the objection against himself — why then cannot the same quantity be naturally disposed and altered so as to simultaneously have several qualities of the same kind? — he addresses only accidents of the first kind. Hence Faber rightly said in the cited location that Suarez's manner of speaking entirely coincides with Scotus's position.

Pasq. objects in *disp. 42 cit., sec. 4* at the end: even granting the above distinction between accidents that have the same function and those that have different ones, this does not sufficiently prove that several numerically distinct accidents can be found in the same subject — especially naturally — because accidents of this kind,

having different functions, differ in species, not merely numerically; for they exercise their different functions by reason of their proper being, and this cannot be by reason of their individual proper being alone, since all things that have different individuation would also exercise different functions. It is therefore required that they exercise them by reason of some being that differs in more than individuation — and a diversity above individual diversity imports essential diversity. But this difficulty, as I said, was resolved above in *disp. 10, q. 11*, where it was also said that not every difference somehow greater than numerical difference is thereby specific. For example, male and female differ more from each other than do two males or two females differing only numerically.

Question IX. On Supernatural Accidents and Forms

It is a persistent misfortune — if I may so put it — that the works in which Poncius attacks or responds to me do not reach my hands until the very end, or even after the completion, of composition or printing. He attacked some of my physical theses in his physical volume, and I only became aware of this when the later printing was already hurrying toward the end of the physical volume — as the printer warned the reader in the prefatory epistle — which is why I was unable in that volume to satisfy his objections as fully as I would have wished, but only through certain additions opportunely inserted in appropriate places and hastily composed so as not to keep the press idle. The same has happened now: as the printing of the latter part of the *Metaphysics* was nearing its end, the *Apologetic Appendix* came to my hands — in which Poncius responds to those additions — and not without my astonishment, seeing a booklet printed in Rome in 1645. I greatly regretted that it was not sent to me earlier by friends; for just as when the *Defense of Ferchius* first appeared I responded without delay, I would have done the same with Poncius, whom I esteem by no means inferior to the former. Yet lest I be seen as either avoiding the contest or disdaining it, in these last three questions I wished to touch on certain relevant points, reserving the rest for a more opportune occasion — that is, when the volume *De Generatione et Corruptione* is reprinted, which has great affinity with the physical volume.

Since, therefore, in *disp. 3 Phys., q. 5, art. 2* I established as probable that not only supernatural acts but also habits are educed from the potency of their subject — though not as the mind of the Doctor, whom I said there was manifestly inclined to the opposite view — and since Poncius himself also considers that view probable, he nonetheless wished to refute the arguments by which this problem was established in the cited location. Let us examine whether he succeeded.

The first argument by which it was proved there is this: every accidental form, since it is apt to inhere in a subject, is also naturally apt to be made and conserved dependently upon it. Therefore, since supernatural habits are accidental forms, they must be made dependently upon a subject, and consequently not created. So Poncius reports our argument — though I believe that through an error he placed "created" in the conclusion instead of "educed"; otherwise the conclusion

would be neither our own nor correctly deduced from the antecedents. The error is so obvious that I immediately consulted the errata list, but did not find it noted there. So that the argument may be ours, let "created" be read as "educated." Poncius responds briefly that in this argument the principle is plainly begged in the antecedent — as is denied by all Thomists and Scotists who hold that grace is created. But since the antecedent contains two parts, he should have explained whether the principle is begged in both or only in one, and which that one is. The first part of the antecedent is: every accidental form is naturally apt to inhere in a subject. This part, I believe, is denied by neither Thomist nor Scotist. The other part — which they will perhaps deny — is: it is also naturally apt to be made and conserved dependently upon it. But this second part follows immediately from the first. For if a form is naturally apt to inhere in a subject, it immediately follows that the mode of its coming to be involves dependence upon the subject — just as conversely, by the very fact that a form is naturally apt to subsist per se or to exist independently of a subject, it immediately follows that the mode of its coming to be involves independence of the subject, as is commonly said of the rational soul. Therefore, just as one could validly argue that the rational soul is a form naturally apt to subsist per se and not to inhere in another as in a subject, and hence is naturally apt to be made and conserved independently of it, so equally valid is the converse: every accidental form is apt to inhere in a subject; therefore, it is naturally apt to be made and conserved dependently upon it. The principle is therefore not begged in that antecedent — since the first part is conceded by all, and the second part follows immediately from the first.

The second argument was as follows: the reason why the rational soul is said to be created and not educed from the body — even though at no instant, even of nature, is it prior to the body, since the existence of a thing is not measured by an instant of nature — is that it is naturally apt per se to subsist. Therefore, since supernatural habits are not forms naturally apt to subsist per se, if they are in a subject in the first instant in which they come to be, they are plainly reduced from it — for this is what it means for a form to be educed from the potency of matter: not to be produced in itself prior to being in a subject, if the form is naturally apt to inhere. In this argument Poncius first notes at n. 180 several deficiencies. First, that the rational soul is not at any instant of nature prior to itself than to the body — this seems contrary to all who hold its creation, and who for this reason assert that two actions intervene in its production: one by which it is produced (prior), and another (posterior) by which it is united to the body. But this cannot occur without the soul first having being before it is in the body — not by priority of time, but of nature. He also says this is the doctrine we teach in *disp. 3 Phys., n. 67*, on forms that are themselves educed, in whose education we admit two actions — one by which they are produced as to their substance, another as to the mode of sustentation — of which the first is indifferent to the sustentative action being posited or not, which cannot stand without a priority of nature of the prior action — at least a priority from which the entailment of existence (*subsistendi*

consequentia) is not convertible. Moreover, Scotus himself, in *1 d. 17, q. 6, n. 5*, expressly affirms that at the same temporal instant in which grace is created, it is infused into the soul, but at a different instant of nature — for prior in nature is charity created before it is infused into the soul. The same is said in *4 d. 1, q. 1, n. 26, §. Secunda conclusio*, where in proving his conclusion he uses this major: a form that is created is prior naturally to the efficient cause than to informing matter — for if it is not prior naturally, then it does not receive being from a cause except by that action by which it informs the subject, and that is not creation. He then ridicules our argument for that doctrine — namely, that the soul cannot be prior in nature because the existence of a thing is not measured by an instant of nature. If this were valid, he says, it would follow not only that the doctrine of Scotus just cited about the precedence of a created form over its inhering or informing is false, but also that matter itself cannot precede in nature an educed form, and hence cannot be its cause.

But to all of this we responded in *disp. 2, q. 7, art. 2, n. 144, 145, 146*, citing these and other locations of the Doctor before they were raised as objections by Poncius. There we well explained in what sense it is to be understood that a form which is created is naturally prior to the efficient cause before informing matter — at n. 146 — and in what sense the rational soul is said, from *Scot. 4 d. 43, q. 2*, to be produced by one action and united by another, and that at some instant of nature it is produced in itself before being united to matter, as he says there in *§. Potest dici*, and in *2 d. 17, q. 1*. For it should not be understood as if at some sign of nature the soul first exists in itself before existing in the body, since this cannot be asserted. First, because the production and existence of a thing is not measured by instants of nature but of time, as I explained in *disp. 9 Log., q. 2, art. 1*. Second, because from what I said there, explaining the various priorities of nature, no priority of nature is explained by the fact that one thing exists at some prior sign in which the posterior does not exist — not even priority of nature in being (*naturae essendi*), but rather by the ability of the one to exist, as far as itself is concerned, at some sign in which the other does not exist, according to the explanation given by Aristotle in *5 Met., 16* of priority of nature: those are said to be prior in nature that can be without others but not the reverse. For if priority were explained by actual precedence in existence, and not merely potential precedence, then such priority would not be priority of nature but of duration, as was explained above in *q. 6, n. 253* and following. Hence when Scotus says the rational soul is prior in itself to being produced at some sign of nature before being in the body, he speaks in the sense he teaches in *4 d. 1, q. 1*: because the soul is not naturally apt to depend upon matter in its coming to be, even if it comes to be altogether in the first instant in matter, it is nonetheless prior in nature in saying its order to the efficient cause than to matter, because it is a form that is totally contained in the active power of the agent and in no way in the passive power of the subject. And this is so of the rational soul. Moreover, since the rational soul is produced in a body by God but independently of it in the genus

of material cause — since matter exercises no material influence upon the soul as it does upon other material forms — for this reason the soul is rightly said to be naturally prior to being produced in itself than to being in the body, since priority of nature is often explained through such independence. With this explanation properly understood, the doctrine taught by Scotus in the aforementioned places — about the precedence of a created form over its inhering or informing — still well stands. For by the very fact that it is created, it comes to be independently of the subject as a cause; nor does the inconvenience follow that the objector inferred against us — namely, that matter itself cannot precede in nature an educed form and hence cannot be its cause. For, in order for matter to be said to precede in nature an educed form, it is not at all necessary that matter exist at some instant of nature in which the form does not exist. As I said, neither the existence of a thing is measured by an instant of nature, nor is priority of nature explained by one thing existing at some prior sign in which the other does not, but by one thing being able — as far as itself is concerned — to exist without the other, if it is priority of nature in being. Hence, since matter is such that, as far as itself is concerned, it can exist without an educed form, it is always said to precede that form in nature, even if such an educed form were coeval with it in existence.

Nor do we have in *disp. 3 Phys., n. 67* the doctrine about educed forms that the objector reports. On the contrary, what we say there is rather the opposite: in response to the second objection we say that the rational soul is not said to be conserved dependently upon matter because its union with matter is not sustentation — whereas the union of other forms is sustentation, and hence they are conserved dependently upon it. If such doctrine is at times suggested elsewhere by us, it is not in the manner reported by the objector but as explained by us in the cited *disp. 2, n. 146*, where we say that the rational soul is produced by one action and united by another, because the prior action does not simply and necessarily depend upon the second from the intrinsic character of the soul — for it could be produced in itself and not be united. The other forms, on the contrary, even if produced and united by distinct actions, yet the prior action depends upon the second if they are produced in accordance with their connaturally determined mode: for they are so constituted by nature as to be produced in such a way that the same agent by producing unites, and by uniting produces. This is why we say they are produced and united by one and the same action. Such is our doctrine there.

Poncius then responds at n. 181 to the argument in itself and says it proceeds as if someone were to argue thus: the Antichrist is said to be future because God revealed this; therefore, since God did not reveal that Francis will be future, we ought to say he revealed that he will not be future. And he says that even if by "therefore" the sole and precise cause is understood, it still commits the same fallacy in the case of the Antichrist: it could be that the sole and precise reason why the Antichrist is said to be future is that God said so, yet the inference does not hold. Therefore, he directly denies the consequence, because even if that were

the sole reason for which the soul is said to be created, and that reason did not apply to habits, it would not follow that habits are not created — for there could be another reason applying to them by virtue of which they are created; and if such a reason also applied to the soul, the antecedent in the precise sense would be false.

This solution sufficiently shows that the objector either did not grasp, or rather deliberately chose not to grasp, the force of the argument — which is founded upon the very notion of eduction and of an eductible form, as even he himself concedes in this very response to the third addition at n. 175, where he says: "Indeed, I myself say that eduction consists in coming to be with dependence, as upon a cause" — which is the very essence of eduction, as we explained in *disp. 2 Phys., q. 1, art. 2* throughout, as he himself was compelled to admit in *disp. 4 Phys., n. 27*. Since, therefore, according to both him and us the nature of eduction consists in coming to be with dependence upon a subject as a materially influencing cause, and an eductible form is one that is naturally apt to be made and conserved in a subject with such dependence, our argument proceeds thus: the reason why the rational soul is said to be created and not educed from the body is that it is naturally apt to subsist per se — hence, wherever it is produced in the body, it is always produced independently of it, and regards the body only as a merely receiving subject, not as a subject from which. This is our antecedent, which, as is evident, is founded upon the notion of eduction and of the eductible form, consisting in the form's coming to be with dependence upon a subject as a cause. Hence, since the soul does not come to be dependently from the body in this manner — because it is naturally apt to subsist per se — we infer that it is not educed from the body, even if it is produced in the body, but is created. And from this — because supernatural habits are not forms naturally apt to subsist per se but to inhere — we infer that if they are produced in a subject, they are produced dependently upon the subject; since such dependence is required by their inhering nature — for this is what it means for a form to be educed from the potency of matter: not to be produced in itself prior to being in the subject, if it is a form naturally apt to inhere. Poncius, however, studiously did not report our antecedent in full, but truncated it thus: "the rational soul is said to be created because it is naturally apt to subsist per se" — in order to attack us for arguing from an insufficient, non-precise, and non-adequate cause of creation, since any form, even an eductible one, can be created by God if it were produced outside the subject and independently of it, or without the subject's concurrence in the genus of material cause. But we do not argue in this way; rather, we say the soul is created and not educed from the body because it is naturally apt to subsist per se and because it is produced independently of it — and this other cause of creation, which can also apply to other material forms if they were produced by God outside the subject even though they are not naturally apt to subsist, Poncius suppressed, so that he could calumniate the argument and refute it more easily.

Finally, having refuted the argument, he also attacks the last words in our consequent, which are: "for this is what it is for a form to be educed from the potency of matter: not to be produced in itself prior to being in the subject, if it is a form naturally apt to inhere." To these words Poncius adds: if they speak of temporal priority, this is false and to assert it here is to beg the principle; if they speak of priority of nature, this too is false given their own doctrine — that a created form is not naturally prior to its production than to its inherence. But I have already explained in what sense we deny that a created form, for example the soul, is prior to itself at some sign of nature before being in a subject, and in what sense this must be conceded — namely, because it comes to be independently of the subject as from a cause; and hence by reason of such independence it is said to be naturally prior in its order to the efficient cause than to matter, and thus is said to be produced in itself prior to being in the subject. Not, however, because it truly exists at some sign of nature in which it does not exist in the subject — since the existence of a thing is not measured by instants of nature but of time. And because supernatural habits, just like every accidental form universally, are not produced in themselves prior in this sense to being in the subject — since they are produced dependently upon the subject in accordance with the requirement of their inhering nature — we argue from this that their production in the subject is not creation, as the soul's production is, but education. For when a form is naturally apt to inhere, if it is in a subject, it also comes to be dependently upon it in the genus of material cause, and hence is said to be educed and not created.

The third argument was to the same effect: if grace were posited as created in one instant and then infused into the soul, even if in becoming it did not depend upon the subject, it would nonetheless depend upon it in conservation — since it is not a subsistent form like the soul. And thus its ceasing to exist would be corruption, not annihilation, because it ceases to exist in the subject upon which it depended in conservation. From this it then follows that it must also begin to exist through education, if it ceases through corruption. Poncius responds at n. 182: if they speak of an instant of nature, such that grace, if created for one instant of nature and then infused for another instant of nature, would be created in the first temporal instant in which those two instants of nature are included, then it could be conserved for subsequent instants creatively without dependence upon a subject — notwithstanding that it is not a subsistent form — because just as this would not impede its creation in the first instant in the supposed case, neither could it impede conservation without dependence upon a subject. And thus it would not have to cease through corruption but through annihilation. But if they speak of an instant of time, such that grace were created in an instant of time outside the subject and then placed in the subject after a temporal posterior — then here too it must be denied that it would have to be conserved by the subject dependently, and this is not proved by the fact that it is not a subsistent form.

We speak in the argument of an instant of time, not of nature, because as has been said repeatedly, the production and existence of a thing is not measured by an instant of nature but of time. And it is false that, in the supposed case, in the subsequent time when grace is placed in the subject — that is, the soul — it would not be conserved dependently upon it. For since it is an accidental form and hence apt to inhere, as soon as it is placed in the subject it inheres in it, and consequently depends upon it dependently in its being and conservation — for this is what it is for a form to inhere in a subject: to inform it with dependence upon it in its being and conservation. Hence, because it is not a form naturally apt to subsist per se but to inhere, by the very fact that it is placed in the subject it depends in its conservation upon the subject, so much so that it cannot by its own nature exist outside it. Confirmation: if in the Sacrament of the Eucharist the substance of bread were newly reproduced by God under its accidents — even though prior to such reproduction those accidents are conserved by God through a creative influx, because independently of a subject — in the case of reproduction they would thenceforth be conserved through an educive influx, because dependently upon a subject, in accordance with their connaturally determined mode. And the only reason is that they are forms by their very nature inhering, not subsisting as the soul. Therefore, the same must be said of grace: when placed in the soul, it is conserved dependently by it — since the same reason runs in both directions as regards this point. Or if this is denied of grace, it can equally be denied of the Eucharistic accidents in the supposed case of the reproduction of substance under them — which, as far as I know, no one denies. As for his claim that just as the fact of not being a subsistent form would not impede grace's creation in the first instant in the supposed case, so neither would it impede conservation without dependence upon a subject: I say that just as this does not impede its creation in the first instant, so neither would it impede conservation for the subsequent time creatively, if just as in the first instant it was produced outside the subject, so too it continued to exist outside the subject thereafter. But just as it would impede its creation in the first instant if it were produced in the subject at that point, so too in the subsequent time it would impede creative conservation, if it is placed in the subject thereafter. For from the very fact that it is not naturally apt to subsist per se but to inhere, it connaturally requires to be made and conserved in a subject; hence by the very fact that it is in a subject — whether made or conserved there — it must be considered as being made and conserved dependently upon it. For it is made and conserved in accordance with its natural mode of requiring. And it is altogether gratuitous and without foundation to say that an accidental form created outside the subject, if afterwards placed in the subject, is still conserved by creative influx and not rather by educive influx and dependence upon it. For by the same reasoning one might say conversely that the Eucharistic accidents are conserved by educive influx, since from the beginning, when they were in the bread before consecration, they were so conserved dependently upon a subject.

The fourth argument was this: Scotus in *4 d. 1, q. 1, Hh. Secunda conclusio* calls every form "material" — that is, educed from matter or eductible — which by its nature is naturally inclined to be the act of matter in such a way that by its own nature it cannot otherwise exist. But this character belongs to supernatural habits; therefore they are not created. Poncius responds at n. 183 that this explanation of ours of that location is not according to the mind of Scotus but is rather against him — namely, "such that by its own nature it cannot otherwise exist." For if Scotus understood this, he would contradict himself. Hence, he says, the sense of those words is: every form is material — that is, naturally eductible from a subject — which by its own nature is inclined to be the act of matter with dependence upon it. But this character does not apply to supernatural habits, in the view of those who say they are created.

But plainly the sense of Scotus's words in his explanation of material and eductible form is what we gave, and our sense is not different from the one Poncius himself assigns. For when we say that a material form is one that necessarily by its nature is naturally inclined to be the act of matter in such a way that by its own nature it cannot otherwise exist — that is, except in matter — we mean that it is the act of matter with dependence upon it, as he explains it himself, because from such dependence arises the necessity of so existing in matter. And if such dependence were absent, the form would not have the total necessity of always existing in a subject, as is clear from the rational soul. But when he adds that this character does not apply to supernatural ones, in that argument we showed the opposite from Scotus in the cited location — because by that definition of a material or eductible form, Scotus in that location excludes only the rational soul, which is not inclined with such necessity to be the act of matter, since by its own nature and excluding miracle it can exist outside it. Hence besides the rational soul, Scotus comprehends under that description every form, whether substantial or accidental, as is clear from the context itself.

The fifth argument is that supernatural acts are educed from the potency of the subject and are not created; therefore the same can be said of habits, since no argument can be adduced about habits that is not equally applicable to acts. Poncius responds by denying the consequence with its proof, saying there is one disparity that makes this applicable to acts but not to habits — and it is an obvious and evident one: our potency concurs with its own proper power together with the habit in producing acts, and therefore, since it cannot attain the term of creation, the acts must be educed. A supernatural habit, on the other hand, is produced not by our potency even partially, but by God alone; and therefore for this reason it should not be educed.

I admit that this disparity between acts and habits is obvious and evident; but since it does not press very strongly in the present context, the Scotists I cited in the second article adduce other disparities between acts and habits and pay little attention to this one, however obvious and evident. And indeed this disparity

counts for little or nothing in the matter at hand. For it is not because God immediately produces supernatural habits without the intervention of any secondary efficient cause that he is said to create them — since in the view of many the vegetative and sensitive soul is immediately produced by God without the participation of any secondary efficient cause, yet they are not created but are said to be immediately educed by God from the potency of matter. First, because the concurrence of a secondary material cause excludes the character of education from the production of a form, not the concurrence of a secondary efficient cause. Second, because this fact — that no created efficient cause concurs with God in producing supernatural habits, but they are produced by God alone — is compatible with their not being created but educed, if God himself immediately produces them in the soul and dependently upon it. Third, because theologians commonly admit certain supernatural acts wrought immediately by God in us, as seems to be gathered from the *Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 5*, on God's touching of the heart, and so on — and they appear to admit these too as educed from the potency of the soul, immediately by God, and not as created. Therefore, the creation or education of a form is not posited or removed by the concurrence of a secondary efficient cause or its absence, but by the concurrence of a material cause or its absence. It is not therefore from this that acts are said to be educed and habits not — because a secondary efficient cause concurs with God in producing the former but not the latter — but from the fact that in producing acts a material cause concurs with God, while it does not in producing habits. But if habits also came to be dependently upon it, they too would have to be said to be educed and not created, as we consider probable.

Finally, this disparity cannot be adduced without a manifest begging of the question. For if, from the education of supernatural acts, one also argues the education of habits, and the parity is denied because our potency concurs with its proper power in producing acts and, since it cannot attain the term of creation, they must be educed — whereas supernatural habits are not produced by our potency because they are created — if, I say, one responds in this way, there is a plain manifest begging of the question: for the very thing under debate is adduced as the reason for the disparity.

Poncius then objects that we did not resolve the argument he advanced for the creation of grace in the supplement he made to *q. 6, dist. 17* of the first book, and that we defend a position entirely contrary to Scotus, and that we did not well satisfy the texts of the Doctor that speak plainly in the opposite direction, and that consequently four arguments which he raised against our explanation of education remain whole and unresolved. I respond: we had not yet seen that argument, nor did the supplement come to our hands; nor was it necessary, since he need not have labored so hard to show that education of supernatural habits is not the mind of the Doctor — for this we freely admit in *disp. 3 cit., n. 77*. We said, however, that the Doctor held this view rather on the authority of the Saints and of Scripture than on the basis of any compelling argument, and that the opposite view can be

defended as highly probable by the authority of earlier scholastics as well, to whom great deference is due. We nonetheless maintained the opposite view within the bounds of probability alone; and we judged we were entitled to do this, both because certain Scotists — both among the ancients and the more recent ones — have done the same, as I said above at n. —, and because the Doctor himself never appears to have established the creation of supernatural habits; he rather seems to have held it only on the basis of the more common opinion, not as something he thought must be affirmed on the strength of a well-founded argument.

Whether the four arguments he raised in *disp. 4, n. 24* against our explanation of eduction in *disp. 2 Phys., q. 7, art. 2, n. 148* remain unresolved is now to be examined. There we say that for a form to be educed, or to be an educed form, from the potency of matter is formally nothing other than for its coming to be to be necessarily a coming to be in matter, and for its being to be necessarily a being in matter — so that, if there is some form that certainly comes to be and comes to be in matter, yet absolutely, as far as its own nature is concerned, can come to be and be without matter, such a form is not said to be educed, because its being is not necessarily a being in matter. This explanation we gathered there from *Scot. 4 d. 1, q. 1, §. Secunda conclusio*, and proved it because, on this explanation, it is aptly conveyed that for the notion of eduction it is not sufficient that matter concur receptively, but that the sustentative concurrence is also required — so that eduction of a form formally imports the form's dependence upon the subject in which it is received and sustained, as upon a cause from which it depends in the genus of material cause. For by that necessary making and existing of a material form in matter, the form's dependence upon matter as upon a cause is well indicated — just as conversely, where we do not see such necessity, as in the rational soul, we do not infer such dependence in the form. This explanation of eduction Poncius himself embraces, both in *disp. 4 Phys. cit.* and in *app. apolog. §. Tertia additio, n. 175*, in the words cited above: "Indeed, I myself say that eduction consists in coming to be with dependence upon a subject as upon a cause" — whence he himself admits in the cited *disp., n. 27* that perhaps he disputes with us only about words.

First, then, he argued against the assigned explanation of eduction that the rational soul has its coming to be in matter in such a way that it would be a miracle if it were produced outside matter, yet it is not educed. Therefore eduction does not consist in the form's coming to be necessarily in matter. This was responded to in *disp. 2 cit., q. 7, art. 2*, at the end, from what was said in that article: in what sense the rational soul naturally comes to be in matter — namely, that it requires matter not as a true cause of its existence but as a concomitant condition of its natural state. We argue this from the fact that after the death of the body the soul is still conserved without miracle, whereas a material form is not. Hence it would be a greater miracle for a material form to come to be outside matter than for the rational soul to come to be outside the body, because the latter does not have so

great a necessity of matter — requiring it only as a concomitant condition, not as a cause — for its existence. Poncius rejects this solution at *app.*, n. 175, because it does not remove the force of the objection — since it does not show that it is sufficient for eduction that something necessarily come to be in a subject in any manner whatever, which is the intent of the objection. It does, admittedly, well show that, if eduction is not necessarily coming to be in a subject in any manner, but coming to be with dependence upon a subject, then the example of the soul does not tell against this. But that, he says, is not what I adduced that example against — namely, not against merely coming to be in a subject necessarily and naturally, but against coming to be with dependence. "Indeed, I myself say that eduction consists in coming to be with dependence as upon a cause." If therefore by "coming to be in a subject" Mastrius and Bellutus understand "coming to be with dependence," they certainly should have stated this when treating its explanation; and I add that although here, on account of this example of the soul, they seem to admit dependence of an educed form in its coming to be upon the subject from which it is educed — since they say a material form requires matter as a true cause of its existence — this nevertheless seems contrary to their principle in *disp.* 3, n. 67, §. *Hac argumenta*, where, responding to certain of my objections, they say it must necessarily be conceded that there are two actions of the educating or conserving cause of the form from the subject: one by which the very entity of the form is conserved, another by which its union to the subject is conserved. For here they seem to deny the dependence of the form as to its entity upon the subject, even though it depends as to its union. Hence they do not seem to admit any other dependence of an educed form upon the subject than such as the soul has — since the soul too depends as to its union. He also adds that the indication from which we gather that a material form requires a subject as a cause — namely, that after the body's death the soul is conserved without miracle, while a material form is not — is poor evidence. For grace cannot be conserved without miracle outside a subject, yet in the common view of Scotists, it does not require the subject as a cause, since it is created.

But I show that the solution offered entirely removes the force of the objection. He himself admits it is removed if the solution shows that to be educed is not necessarily to come to be in any manner whatsoever in matter or subject, but to come to be with dependence upon it — and he admits that against this the example of the soul does not proceed, since even though the soul comes to be in a subject, it does not come to be with dependence upon the subject as upon a cause. But through the solution offered this whole point is shown, as is clear to anyone who reads it, especially in our own presentation. Therefore, it truly removes the force of the objection. And in that same n. 148, in the very explanation of eduction, we well and plainly explained the dependence of an educible form upon the subject as upon a cause in the genus of material cause. For we said that through that necessary making and conserving of a material form in a subject, in accordance with the requirement of its nature, the form's

dependence upon the subject as upon a cause from which it depends is aptly indicated — so much so that there was no need for Poncius to desire this expression from us, since we teach it even more explicitly in *disp. 5 Phys., q. 4, art. 1*. And again in the very same n. 148, in the explanation of eduction itself, we say that by it the concurrence of matter is aptly explained as not merely attaining the union of the form but also the very existence of the form itself, and that matter is required not only as a concomitant condition of the form's connaturally determined state — as the body is with respect to the rational soul — but also as a true cause in the first instant in which it comes to be. Hence it is false that, on account of the example of the soul adduced in his argument, we afterwards admitted dependence of the educed form as to its coming to be upon the subject. Nor do we say the opposite in *disp. 3, n. 67* — for we do not deny there the dependence of the form as to its entity upon the subject; we only say that the action by which the entity of the form itself is conserved by God and the action by which its union to the subject is conserved must be distinguished, and that from the power of the former the entity of the form is conserved absolutely prescinding from the subject — since that influx of God terminates at the entity of the form alone and is indifferent to conserving it whether in the subject or outside the subject — and that it is determined to be conserved in the subject only by virtue of the latter action, since this terminates at the union by which the form is formally said to inhere in the subject. By this doctrine what was said in *disp. 2, n. 148* is in no way revoked — that in the eduction of a form, matter concurs and its concurrence must attain not only the union of the form but also the very entity of the form. Finally, what he adds — that this is poor evidence, since grace cannot be conserved without miracle outside a subject yet does not require the subject as a cause — I say rather that from this it must be deduced that grace is not created but educed, in accordance with the connaturally determined mode in which other accidental forms require to be produced; and this is one of the principal reasons that moved us to assert, as probable, the eduction of supernatural forms. For since they come to be in a subject and exist therein with as great a necessity as other accidental forms come to be and exist therein, this necessity will equally argue equal dependence upon the subject in all.

Secondly, he argued that although a material form requires to be made and conserved in matter, it nonetheless does not so necessarily have its coming to be in matter that it could not, as far as its own nature is concerned, come to be and be conserved without matter. We responded to this by denying it, since it directly repugns the nature of a material form to come to be or be conserved outside matter. Poncius refutes this solution at *app., n. 176*, with a great initial apparatus. He says it cannot be maintained in the principles of philosophy, or of Scotus, or of faith. According to true philosophy and Scotus everywhere, every absolute thing having no necessary connection with another absolute thing can, by absolute power, be conserved and produced without it — not even according to the principles of faith, from which it is established that the Eucharistic accidents

are conserved without a subject. Therefore, it cannot be held, consistently with this principle of faith, that a material form, as far as its own nature is concerned, cannot be produced and conserved without a subject, and that to be so conserved is contrary to its nature. Hence this proposition of Mastrius, he says, merits a censure not merely philosophical but theological — unless he can defend himself by saying that when he says it is contrary to the nature of a material form, as far as its own nature is concerned, to be conserved and produced without a subject, he means that it is contrary to its nature to be produced or conserved connaturally so. This is exactly how I understand it, and how others generally speak. Hence it was certainly not necessary to stir up so great a storm of philosophers and theologians against my response, which I believe cannot bear any other sense than the one he himself finally acknowledged, and which he says is true and common doctrine. But not being able to censure the matter itself, he contends at least that the manner of speaking is most improper — for it is not at all proper to say, he argues, "it cannot, as far as its own nature is concerned, be produced outside a subject" and "it does not and cannot require to be so produced by nature" are the same thing. Furthermore, he adds, if he speaks in this sense, he does not respond to my objection, since I objected that it did not require to be in the subject in such a way that it could not be outside it as far as its own nature is concerned — and I understood this in the proper sense, namely that it is not repugnant to it, by absolute power, to be placed outside the subject. But this is a plainly most inept and improper manner of speaking — to say that what is not repugnant to things by the absolute power of God and can belong to them through obediential potency belongs to them from their own nature. For in that sense one could say that it belongs to fire from its own nature not to heat, or to a heavy body not to descend, since by the absolute power of God these agents can be impeded from these connaturally determined actions. Furthermore, it is truly the same thing to say "an accident, as far as its own nature and condition are concerned, cannot be produced outside a subject" and "it does not by its nature require to be so produced" — in so far as the phrase "as far as its own nature is concerned" signifies its natural requirement. Therefore, if in his argument, when he says a material form does not so necessarily have its coming to be in matter that it cannot, as far as its own nature is concerned, come to be and be conserved without matter — he understands this as meaning it is not repugnant to it by absolute power to be placed outside the subject, as he himself explains — then plainly he could not speak more improperly, since what belongs to things by the absolute power of God is not said to belong to them from their own nature, but rather above, or beyond, their nature — if not contrary to their nature. Granted, therefore, this impropriety of expression, the assumption in the argument certainly need not be denied, but the consequence deduced from it — since in order for a form to be said to be educed, it is not an obstacle that it can by God's power come to be and be conserved without a subject through miracle; what would be an obstacle is if it could so exist apart from miracle, as is the case with the rational soul, which upon the death of the body does not perish but is still conserved separately without it

through no miracle. For a form that is so naturally apt to exist per se apart from miracle, even if it is in a subject, must be considered as not depending upon it in its being as upon a cause.

Thirdly, he argued that even though a material form requires to be made and conserved in matter, yet if it were not actually depending upon matter in coming to be, it would not be educed; and similarly, even though the rational soul can connaturally be made and conserved without dependence upon matter, if it did depend upon matter it would be educed. Therefore the explanation is wrong that says what is educed is a form that comes to be in matter and connaturally requires not to be and not to be conserved without matter. We responded in *disp. 2 Phys. cit.* that if a material form did not come to be with dependence upon matter, it would certainly not come to be through education — yet by its own nature it would still require to be so made; for we do not posit actual education as consisting in such a requirement but in the actual dependence of the form upon matter arising from such a requirement. Poncius rejects this solution at *app., n. 177*, saying it is strange that they did not see this response excluded by the other part of the objection, which he believes they did not touch because they could not. For he says in the objection that if the rational soul were produced dependently upon a subject, it would be educed — yet it would not have dependence arising from a requirement of dependence. Therefore, education is poorly explained as consisting in dependence arising from a requirement of dependence.

I admit that we omitted the solution to the other part of the objection — not because we could not assign it, but because we judged it unnecessary, since any reader can see that what is proposed in it manifestly implies a contradiction — namely, that the rational soul could come to be with dependence upon matter. For if it were educed from the body, then it would no longer be an immaterial form but a material one, since then it would be entirely derived from the entire body and part from part. Therefore, just as it implies for an immaterial form to become material, so too it implies for the rational soul to be educed from the body and to come to be dependently upon matter. And this is why we neglected to respond to the other part of that objection.

You may say: if a material form can come to be independently of matter and through creation — as we concede in the first part of the objection — why cannot, conversely, an immaterial form come to be through education and dependence upon matter, as is said in the other part of the objection? The response is gathered from what was just said: because conceding the first, no inconvenience follows — for example, that a material form becomes immaterial. For even if produced through creation, it still retains the requirement to be made and conserved with dependence upon a subject, and hence remains in the line of material forms. But conceding the second, the inconvenience just stated follows: that an immaterial form becomes material, in the manner deduced.

Fourthly, he objected that supernatural habits require to be produced and conserved in a subject, such that it would be a miracle if they were conserved without a subject — yet they are not educed, since in the common view of Scotists they are created. We also responded to this in the cited location, saying it is for this reason that supernatural habits are more connaturally produced through creation than through education. Poncius refutes this solution at *app.*, n. 179, adducing and responding to each of the arguments by which the education of supernatural habits was established. These arguments we have defended, and his solutions attacked, in this very question.

Other responses that Poncius offers in the cited *app. apolog.* to our physical additions I would gladly have adduced and refuted here, had the opportunity of place been available. But since they concern various philosophical matters which cannot conveniently be brought together here, it seemed better to me to reserve them for more opportune occasions — and especially for the reprinting, to be had as soon as possible, of the volume *De Generatione et Corruptione*, where many things will fall opportunely.

Meanwhile, not all of that author's responses to our physical additions require refutation. For in some cases, having seen that we touched the truth precisely, he does not dare to contradict, but reduces the controversy to a question of words and defends himself with Burlesque arms by taking refuge in the distinction between the broad and narrow acceptation of terms. The careful reader can verify this in the response to the very first of our additions, which is found in the cited *app. apolog.*, n. 164. For in that addition I proved against him that for a physical mutation to take place — according to the mind of Aristotle and Scotus — it is required that privation precede the form in matter in duration (*duratione*), and that it does not suffice for privation to precede merely in nature, and especially not negatively, as he had been maintaining. He responds that on this point there is between us no question except one of words — for it is as we say, if physical mutation is taken properly and strictly; whereas when he denied this to be necessary, he took mutation not strictly but broadly. So he responds to our foundations there at n. 166.

Here, however, I cannot conceal what he says at n. 164, where, in presenting my view, he says I teach that privation, in the case where generation would occur without a temporal precedence of privation — so to speak — ought to precede the form in nature, but not positively — as if privation for some sign of nature precedes the form in matter — but negatively, in that it truly would have preceded. But neither do I propose this doctrine, nor can it be well proposed by anyone, since it involves a manifest contradiction. For it contains that privation precedes the form in nature, and yet that this does not happen as if privation preceded for some sign of nature. Since to precede in nature is nothing other than to precede for a sign of nature, it is manifestly contradictory that it precedes in nature and yet does not precede for any sign of nature. I, however, taught that it

precedes negatively in nature and for a sign of nature — not that it precedes positively in nature or at any sign of nature. So Poncius. But plainly that doctrine and that explanation of positive and negative — or privative — priority of nature, as asserted by us in the cited addition, was proposed without any contradiction by the Doctor more than once in the cited locations: in *2 d. 1, q. 2, §. Respondeo*, and in *3 d. 3, q. 1, lit. E*. And as that negative priority of nature is explained by the Doctor himself, it is plain that it involves no contradiction. Indeed, this very doctrine and under these very terms seems to be proposed by Poncius himself in *disp. de privat., n. 3* and following — for when he says that mutation is a transition of a subject from not-being-such to being-such, and therefore privation truly precedes the form in time, he says this should be understood not of a not-being-such that preceded in the subject, but of one that would have preceded if the form had not been introduced. Therefore this explanation of negative priority of nature is proposed not only by Scotus but also by this very author — who hence wrongly condemns this explanation as implying contradiction.

Question X. On Relative Accidents

That no natural relation precedes its term, and indeed that it is manifestly possible for a relation — especially an actual one, which follows upon the extremes as actually posited — to destroy its own term, was shown not only in *disp. 8 Log.* but also in *disp. 5 Phys., q. 2*, both according to Scotus's doctrine and according to the truth of the matter itself.

The opposite, however, is held by Poncius in *app. apol., n. 33*, where, drawing on what he said elsewhere in *disp. 17 Log., n. 42*, he claims that the action by which a created agent produces a term is a relation by its nature preceding the term that is produced. He says he received this doctrine from infancy from the best Scotists he ever saw — not verbal and textual ones, for whom only the bark of Scotus is known, not its spirit or life, but real and solid ones, who were diligent in penetrating the marrow of his reasons. And because we assert the opposite even of the relation of causality itself in *disp. 5 cit., q. 2*, he contends in the cited location to dissolve and undermine our proofs adduced there.

The first proof of the said doctrine about relations in general, and also about the relation of causality itself, was from *Scot. in 2 d., q. 2, E*, where he says that our imagination misleads us when we think the relation of causality intervenes as a kind of way between cause and effect — for in reality it follows, just as universally no relation is posited unless the extremes are posited. He also has this more clearly in *1 dist. 35, q. un., L*, where he says: "every actual relation's term is something actually being in any whatsoever instant of nature in which the cause is referred to the effect; then there is actual being in the term; but that absolute thing which terminates can be without the respect toward it; therefore it is simultaneous with that respect in such a way that it is naturally prior to it." The same is read in *1 d. 43, q. un., C*: "there is no respect prior on the part of the cause than on the part of the caused; rather, from the cause itself under its absolute

character there is the caused itself under its absolute character, and thereafter, thirdly, the respect follows," and so on. The same is also read in *1 d. 30, q. 2, Q*: "every created agent is such that, posited some effect through it, upon it as upon a foundation and upon the product as upon a term, the relation of them follows; and the reason why an actual relation follows is only that this is this and that is that — just as the reason why, when whiteness and whiteness are posited, a real actual relation such as similarity follows, is only this whiteness, that whiteness," and so on. The same is found in *1 d. 30, q. 2, sub G*, where, proving that even mutual relations do not terminate except upon an absolute thing, and having proved this for paternity and filiation, he says: "for from this it follows only that these two absolutes are proper to those two relations — and this is true; indeed both absolutes are prior to each relation, since each relation requires not only its foundation but also its term." And he speaks of priority of nature, as is clear from his argumentation — for from the fact that mutual relations are simultaneous in nature, he infers that both absolutes are prior to each relation. The same he also teaches in *4 d. 12, q. 1, D*, and *quol. 11*, and elsewhere frequently, where universally of every relation he teaches that it does not arise unless the extremes are actually posited, and gives the example even in the respects of action and production.

And indeed all Scotists without exception understand these locations of Scotus as the words themselves sound — with one or another of lesser distinction excepted — and especially his great commentators Lichetus, Bargius, Tataretus, and others, whom I judge without doubt to have penetrated the sense of the Doctor in this and other matters far better than the Scotists mentioned by Poncius under suppressed names. I would gladly have heard their names — for their suppression produces a vehement suspicion that those Scotists are verbal and fictitious, not real and solid, as he himself says. But at n. 34 he says these authorities do not suffice for a lucid proof of our assertion, as is shown, he says, by his explanation — which is most common among the leading Scotists of this age who have not committed their works to print. But if this excellent explanation of his is such that it alone can satisfy so many and seemingly so clear testimonies of Scotus in the opposite direction, he should have set it out so that it could be considered. To corroborate it by citing leading Scotists of this age who have not published is vain, since anyone could cite similar authors with suppressed names for their own positions even if those authors did not exist. As for myself, in favor of my position I adduced all Scotists who have published — both old and more recent — with one or two exceptions. But if he says his explanation is the one he gave in *disp. 17 Log., n. 21*, which he did not wish to repeat here, I say that I too have refuted it at length in *disp. 6 Met., q. 1, art. 5*, which I equally do not wish to repeat here.

Secondly, it was proved there that the opposite doctrine — that a relation precedes its term in nature — destroys the essence of relation, since its nature is to be a relation between two extremes. Therefore, unless the extremes exist, this relation will not exist — just as there cannot be a union unless there are united parts, and if one extreme is lacking the union vanishes. Poncius derides this

argument and responds by denying that through this doctrine the nature of relation is destroyed, and draws a distinction in the consequent: "unless they are prior in nature" — he denies the consequence; "unless they exist for the very temporal instant required by the relation according to its nature" — he concedes the consequence. To the example of union he says, first, that some union does not presuppose both extremes in nature — as is clear from the union that is the causality of matter with respect to an educed form — and that even though, when either extreme is lacking, the union would cease, it does not follow from this that there is a presupposition of the extremes in nature; it is enough that there be a necessary simultaneity of time. He says, second, that other unions, which do presuppose the extremes, have this because they themselves, by their own nature, are not presupposed as conditions for the production of either extreme — whence it is not the same that must be said of these as of other unions and relations, which by their own nature are presupposed as productive causalities of the extremes.

But this response seems far more worthy of derision than the argument itself, since it involves several things that are false and surprising. For if the essence of a relation consists in being a relation between two extremes — and actual ones, if it is an actual relation — then not only for every temporal instant, but for every sign of nature as well, the relation will demand those two extremes. For it requires for every sign of nature too that it have what belongs to it intrinsically and essentially. Therefore, just as a man is a rational animal not only for every temporal instant but also for every sign of nature, so too a relation is between two extremes not only for every temporal instant but also for every sign of nature. And if at some sign of nature the relation is not understood to be between two extremes, it will then not be a relation but something absolute. Furthermore, term and foundation, as relatives, are not only simultaneous in time but also in nature — which simultaneity of relatives the Doctor explains in *1 dist. 28, q. 2, F* as mutually entailing each other in existence. Therefore, the foundation together with the relation cannot naturally precede the term. And this holds of every relation, since this doctrine is given for relation in general. Furthermore, a relation is commonly posited — especially by Scotists — as caused by the extremes, speaking principally of a relation necessarily following upon the extremes. For this relation has no other cause than the extremes, as the Doctor notes in *1 dist. 17, q. 2, §. Quantum ad istum articulum*. Since, therefore, a cause must at least naturally precede its effect — even if they are simultaneous in time — it is necessary that the extremes be naturally prior to the relation itself. From this it finally follows that it altogether implies what he says at the end of the solution — that there are certain relations which by their own nature are presupposed as productive causalities of the extremes. For if it is true, as is commonly said, that relations are caused by the extremes, it is so far from being the case that a relation should precede the extremes as their causality, that rather the opposite entirely holds — namely, that the extremes must precede the relation as its concauses —

otherwise there will be circularity in the causality of relations and their extremes. As for his claim that this is clear from the union that is the causality of matter with respect to an educed form, this may be apparent in the school of more recent authors, for whom that doctrine is common — but not in the school of Scotists, among whom it is entirely false, as I showed in *disp. 5 Phys., q. 4, art. 1*.

Thirdly, it was proved there because it is repugnant for a relation to be given that does not terminate at something — it is repugnant for a relative to exist without a correlative. Therefore, there is no conceivable relation that naturally precedes its term in the foundation. For at that sign the relation would be understood to exist, yet its term would not be understood — which is only understood at a later sign — and the foundation would be understood at the same sign to be in relative being without a correlative, which is not conceived except at a later sign; yet relatives are simultaneous in nature. Poncius responds, first, that this argument militates against divine paternity preceding its term and filiation in origin — and since it does not prove against that precedence, it will prove nothing in the present case. He responds, second, by distinguishing the antecedent: "it is repugnant for a relation to be given that is not ordered to a term existing for every sign of nature or origin in which the relation is understood, and it is repugnant for a relative to exist without a correlative existing for every instant of nature and origin in which the relative exists" — he denies the antecedent; "it is repugnant for a relation to be given without a term for every instant of time, and a relative without a correlative existing for the same temporal instant" — he concedes this; and also for the same instant of nature, such that one does not precede the other for any instant of nature *in which (in quo)*, even though it precedes for an instant of nature *from which (a quo)*. He also distinguishes the consequent: "there is no conceivable relation that precedes its term in nature for the instant *in which* it passes" — he denies the consequence; "for the instant *a quo*" — he denies the consequence; and he denies that it is inconvenient for a relation to be understood for a sign of nature *in quo* in which the term is not understood, and a relative for an instant *a quo* in which the correlative is not understood.

But none of these solutions stands. Not the first, since there is a difference between speaking of priority of nature and speaking of priority of origin — for priority of origin is compatible with simultaneity of nature, as I demonstrated at length in *disp. 9 Log., q., art. 1 and 2*, from *Scot. 1 dist. 28, q. 3, F* and *4 dist. 13, q. 1, §.*, where he says that although paternity is simultaneous in nature with filiation, and the Father simultaneous in nature with the Son, it still stands that the Father is prior in origin to the Son. For although relatives are simultaneous in nature — in the sense that simultaneity means they cannot be without each other — this is compatible with priority of origin, which says nothing other than "from which another is," as he also teaches in *quod. 4, §. Contra istam rationem*, and in *1 dist. 10, q. un.* at the end. Therefore our argument does not militate against divine paternity, since that precedes its term in origin, not in nature — for our argument speaks precisely of priority of nature and contends to exclude this from all relatives. And

just as it concludes in the case of created things, so likewise in the case of divine ones — because even in the divine case, Father and Son are simultaneous in nature, and between them there is no priority of nature but only of origin, in that the Son is from the Father.

The distinction applied in the second solution is also dissolved from what was said in the refutation of the solution to the preceding argument, where it was shown that among relatives, as such, simultaneity of time does not suffice but simultaneity of nature is also required — as Aristotle teaches in the chapter *De ad aliquid*, where he says relatives are simultaneous in nature. Against this property of relatives the second solution directly militates. Poncius, noticing this, finally adds a third solution, in which he concedes that relatives are simultaneous even in the same instant of nature *in quo*, yet one relative can precede the other by priority of nature *a quo*, and likewise a relation can precede its term in nature — namely, by priority of nature *a quo*.

But neither does this other response suffice — indeed, it very incautiously confuses priority of nature with priority of origin. For only priority of origin, properly speaking, is explained by the order *from which* another is, and is distinguished from priority of nature and can exist without it, as is clear in cause and effect — which are said to be simultaneous in nature as relatives, yet the cause is prior in origin to the effect, since it is *from which* another is. Conversely, priority of nature without this order *from which* another is — such as the priority of simple presupposition without any causality — also exists. Moreover, instants of nature are said to be instants *in which*, not *from which*, not in the sense that in one there is something prior in which the posterior does not exist — as we will say, otherwise they would be instants of duration *in which* — but insofar as in one instant something is presupposed to exist without the posterior being necessarily presupposed. This cannot occur in relatives, which are simultaneous not only in natural existence but also in natural understanding, as the Doctor notes in *1 dist. 2, q. 2, §. De primo*. All of which has been explained at length in the cited *disp. 9 Log., q. 2*.

Fourthly, at n. 41, he attacks us for having said in *disp. 5 Phys. cit., n. 12* that the relation of causality and action — by which an efficient cause is denominated as causing — is not extrinsically advening but intrinsically so. He says that we say this against all principles: for it is certain that the action which is the causality of the efficient cause pertains to the category of action, and consequently is an extrinsically advening relation, not a relation of the category of *ad aliquid* (*toward something*), to which intrinsically advening relations belong.

But again, what he calls certain about the action that is the causality of an efficient cause — namely, that it pertains to the category of action — if perhaps it is certain in the school of more recent authors, it is not at all certain in the school of Scotists. For as I said in *disp. cit. Phys., n. 12*, Scot. in *4 dist. 13, q. 1, G and H* — which location Poncius pointedly ignored — expressly distinguishes action of the genus of

relation, which is productive of a term and effect, from action of the genus of action, which is not productive of a term but is precisely transmutative of a subject, so that its term is not some effect produced by it but some subject transmuted by it. Hence when fire heats water, the action of the category of action does not have as its term the heat produced in it, but rather the water transmuted by the heat. Nor must one action be confused with the other. The first is of the genus of relation and intrinsically advening; the second is of the genus of action and extrinsically advening. The Doctor proves this there with the following reasoning: that respect is called intrinsically advening which necessarily follows upon the extremes from the mere positing of the extremes themselves. But as soon as an absolute in the cause is followed by an absolute in the effect, there follows in both extremes — and especially in created things — a relation of product to producer and conversely, from *Scot. 1 dist. 39, G*, and *dist. 35, L*, and *d. 43, C*, and *2 dist. 1, q. 2, E*. Therefore, it is an intrinsically advening respect. Because, however — as I said in *disp. 7 Phys., q. 2* — an efficient cause respects two terms: the effect or product, and the subject transmuted by it; if the causality of an efficient cause is considered as respecting a subject, it can certainly be said to import an extrinsically advening relation. But since it is not adequately expressed by such a habitude — since it even more principally imports a habitude toward the produced effect — it is absolutely wrongly posited as importing an extrinsically advening relation. On this one may again consult what I discussed against this author in this matter in *disp. 6 Met., q. 1, art. 5*. Also, because causality simply and absolutely stated imports the active or passive dependence of cause and effect, by which the cause gives being and the effect receives being — which dependence necessarily follows upon the extremes as posited in being, and hence is to be reckoned among intrinsically advening relations.

Finally, under the same n. 41, he says it is false that we said in the cited location that the relations of paternity and filiation are acknowledged by all Scotists as intrinsically advening — whereas they are rather extrinsically advening, and especially in the view he embraces, which posits them as the action and causality itself. But he plainly wrongly denies this. Let one consult the Master of Formalities together with all the Formalists in their division of being into absolute and respective, for when they divide the respective into a respect intrinsically and one extrinsically advening, they say an intrinsically advening relation is one that is necessarily posited when the foundation and term are posited, and they give the example of paternity, filiation, similarity, and so on. Tatar., *cap. de ad aliquid, q. 1, dub. 1, art. 2*, speaks in the same way, as do the other Parisian Scotists; and so finally speak all other Scotists — so much so that besides Poncius I have seen no Scotist denying this.

He then urges at n. 42 the principal foundation of more recent authors who hold that causality is prior to the effect and not posterior. There is some influence of the cause upon the effect, which is necessarily presupposed for the positing of the effect and for the resultance of whatever relation that follows in the effect toward

the cause — whether as the ratio of founding or as a sine qua non condition. But that influence is distinct from cause and effect; and granted this, it is causality by which the cause is denominated as causing in second act — for it has all that is required for this. Therefore, causality of the cause does not follow upon the effect. The antecedent is proved *ad hominem* — because, he says, one does not admit such a denomination prior to the resultance of the relation — and in itself, because at the sign at which the effect is from the cause, there follows a relation in the effect; there is something on the part of the cause or the effect, or both, by reason of which that respect follows in the effect toward the cause, which would not be there if that respect did not follow. For it is impossible that any respect should necessarily follow upon extremes for some instant and not for others, unless there is something for that instant — for which it follows — that would not be for the other instants — for which it does not follow. But whatever that is, it will give some accidental denomination to the cause — a denomination without which it could be. Therefore, the cause for that instant from which the effect proceeds has some accidental denomination which does not come from a posterior respect. The argument having been proposed, he says he could find in our writings no solution applicable to it, and asks that if we ever wish to resolve it, we do so in form, so it may be understood and it may be seen whether we say anything to the purpose.

The response: before I respond in form, it must first be examined whether this argument is in form. For as formulated by him it seems to me to consist of more than three terms, as is clear to anyone considering the minor — where it is assumed that the influence is distinct from the cause and effect, and further that it is causality itself, and thence finally it is concluded that causality of the cause does not follow upon the effect. In this, as is plain, the entire minor extremity is not placed under it; and since the argument is in the third figure, where the middle is the subject in both, it is not easy to see to which mode of that figure it belongs, since it consists of two particular affirmatives. But whatever the case may be about this, I now respond in form by denying both major and minor together with their proofs — for neither is well proved. The major is not, since the major is: "there is some influence of the cause upon the effect which is necessarily presupposed for the positing of the effect and for the resultance of whatever relation follows in the effect toward the cause." But this is not concluded in the proof of the major — which the objector called the antecedent, as if the argument were an enthymeme and not rather a complete syllogism composed of three propositions — but rather this is concluded: "therefore there must be something beyond those entities by reason of which that relation follows." This plainly, as is evident, is not that major to be proved — in which it was assumed that there must be admitted some influence preceding the positing of the effect — but in the proof of the major it is concluded that such influence must be something beyond the entities of cause and effect, by reason of which the relation follows. But nor is even this rightly concluded, since the enthymeme assumed in proof of the major

was: "the entity of cause and effect as to their absolute being can be simultaneously existing in reality — as when God alone produces an effect without the relation following that is causality — therefore there must be something beyond those entities by reason of which that relation follows." Either I do not perceive the force of this consequence, or it is entirely viciously deduced — for rather the opposite should be deduced. For if it is assumed in the antecedent that there can be effect and cause in reality without that posterior relation that is causality following, how from this is deduced that an influence must be something beyond those entities by reason of which that relation follows? Indeed, since God cannot produce anything with an influence, if he produces an effect without any posterior relation following that is causality, it should rather be deduced either that the influence is not something beyond the entities of cause and effect, or at least that it is not something by reason of which that relation follows. For the same reason, the minor too is not rightly proved as to its first part — namely, that this influence is really or modally distinct from the cause and effect. For if the entity of cause and effect can exist in reality without that influence — as is plain from God as producing — it should rather be deduced from this that no such influence distinct from cause and effect is necessary, but that it is some mode really identical to one or the other, and that absolutely an effect can be produced without a middle influence really or modally distinct.

As far as I was able to conjecture, the force of the argument — if it has any — can consist in this: since in created things such a relation does follow in the effect toward the cause, as even Scotists of the opposite opinion concede, something prior must be admitted in the cause that is as it were the ratio of founding such a relation, or at least a *sine qua non* condition — and this can be nothing other than a prior influence in the cause toward the positing of the effect. Otherwise there would be no greater reason why such a relation should follow in the effect when produced by a created cause, than when produced by God alone. But even understood in this sense, the argument proves nothing — or proves equally of God and a created cause. For God too does not produce an effect without an influence; and if this influence were the ratio of founding the consequent relation, such a relation would have to be in the cause, not in the effect — since a relation is founded in that in which the ratio of founding is. In response to the argument as such, it must be said that whether the effect proceeds from a created cause or immediately from God, an absolute in the cause is always immediately followed by an absolute in the effect, as the Doctor says in *2 d. 1, q. 2, ad 1 princ.*, and in the effect there always follows a relation toward the cause — which is the passive causality itself, or dependence of the effect upon the cause. This holds with only this difference: that dependence upon the first cause is identified with the effect itself, since it is most essential to it, as the Doctor says in *4 d. 12, q. 1, ad 2 princ.*, whereas dependence upon a secondary cause is not. And the reason why in the effect there always follows such a relation of dependence is not something prior in the cause as ratio of founding or *sine qua non* condition — as the argument

assumes — but precisely the positing of the cause itself and the immediate following of the effect upon it. For between these two extremes as posited in being, the relation of the effect toward the cause follows necessarily and universally, since it is intrinsically advening — without any new and distinct entity that would be a ratio of founding. And also the relation in the cause toward the effect follows, if the cause is capable of relation, as the Doctor says in the cited location; and if something else in the cause is necessary, founding such a relation, nothing else can be posited — as the Doctor intimates in *2 d. 1, q. 2, ad 2 princ.* — except the order to what is necessarily presupposed for acting and to other concauses, by reason of which the cause is said to be in proximate potency to producing the effect and to founding the actual relation of causality, where before it was only in remote potency. And I could not observe any other mystery in this argument — all of which has been explained at length in the cited *disp. 5, q. 2.*

Then Poncius urges still another argument at n. 35 and 40, by the force of which he thinks he not only overthrows our assertion — that causality consists in a respect of cause toward effect that is also posterior to the effect — but also all the proofs by which we contended to establish it. The argument is as follows: a cause has some denomination when the effect will be from it — which denomination is not had from a respect that follows upon the effect and through which the cause is understood to sufficiently cause and the effect to be produced. Therefore, whatever respect is consequent is superfluous, or at least that is not the influence of the cause but that from which the said denomination is taken. The antecedent is proved *ad hominem*, because he says one does not admit such a denomination prior to the resultance of the relation. And in itself: because at the sign at which the effect is from the cause, there follows a relation in the effect; there is something on the part of the cause or the effect or both by reason of which that respect follows in the effect toward the cause, which would not be there if that respect did not follow. For it is impossible that any respect necessarily follow upon extremes for some instant that would not follow for others, unless there is something for that instant for which it follows that would not be for the other instants for which it does not follow. But whatever that is, it will give some accidental denomination to the cause — one without which it could be. Therefore, for that instant from which the effect proceeds, the cause has some accidental denomination which does not come from a posterior respect.

The response is to deny the assumption: because at one and the same temporal instant in which the cause is denominated as causing and operating, such denomination of the cause is taken either intrinsically from the respect of active causality inhering in it, if it is capable of relation, or extrinsically from the passive causality itself, or dependence of the effect toward the cause — as in the case of the first cause, which is not capable of relation. For from an absolute in the cause, an absolute in the effect does not first precede in time before the aforesaid relations follow; but all these things are had at the same temporal instant in which the cause is said to be operating and producing the effect. Hence from those

relations precisely such denominations are had, and I never conceded in the cited location that such denominations are had in the cause and effect antecedently to those relations — as the objector claims — since the operation of the cause is not measured and attended by an instant of nature but by an instant of time, as is the existence of the effect. To the proof of the antecedent I say, as with the preceding argument, that either nothing whatsoever precedes in the cause or in the effect, or in both together, that would be the reason for the sequence of that relation — but this immediately follows upon both extremes as posited in being. Just as similarly in this white thing and that white thing nothing prior is posited for a similarity to arise between them, beyond the whitenesses themselves as posited in reality — for such is the nature of every intrinsically advening relation: it follows precisely upon the entities of the extremes as posited in act, without any other prior entity really distinct from them. And for whatever instant the cause and effect are posited, for that instant too the relation necessarily follows. Or, if something new in the cause is necessary for such a relation to follow, nothing else can be posited — as I just said — except the order to what is necessarily presupposed for acting and to other concauses, by reason of which a cause is said to be in proximate potency to producing the effect and to founding the actual relation of causality, where before it was only in remote potency. But from this order and habitude the cause is not denominated as actually operating and producing the effect, but only as being in proximate potency to acting and operating — where before it was not, but only in remote potency. Hence it always stands that the actual and formal denomination of cause and effect cannot be derived except from the relations that follow upon the positing of the effect, which immediately follows upon the absolute power of the cause.

Disputation XIII: On Spiritual Substances — God and the Intelligences

The consideration of abstract substances, insofar as they are knowable by the natural light of reason, was deferred by Aristotle in *de anima*, bk. 3, sect. 36, to First Philosophy, in the following words: whether it is possible to understand anything of what is separated, while oneself existing not separated from magnitude, or whether this is not to be considered, belongs to later inquiry. Accordingly, Aristotle treats these matters in *Metaphysics*, bk. 12. It has been stated in *disp. 1, Metaphys., q. 1, nn. 10–11* that the Intelligences belong to our Metaphysics with respect to proper concepts derived from common ones, and to Metaphysics in itself with respect to proper concepts derived from proper ones; whereas the proper reasons, derived from what is proper to God himself, belong to supernaturally revealed Theology. The treatment of God and the Intelligences with respect to the aforementioned concepts pertaining to Metaphysics, and of their attributes as naturally knowable, was intended for this final Disputation — as I had promised at the end of the physical volume, in the treatment of the First Mover. However, because knowledge of these substances, if confined within the limits of natural light alone, is exceedingly weak and meager — as Aristotle says in *Metaphysics*, bk. 2, text 1, that the eyes of bats stand in relation to the light of day as our intellect stands in relation to those things that are most manifest of all — it has seemed more prudent to reserve the entire treatment for Sacred Theology, and also to prevent this second volume of the Metaphysics from growing excessively large and exceeding the first in bulk. For this reason, we shall here pursue only in summary fashion the existence and nature of these noble substances, reserving everything pertaining to their essence and attributes for more exact treatment in Theology.

Question I: Whether the existence of God can be demonstrated by natural reason, and in what manner

In order to refute and utterly uproot the most impious and brutish error of the Atheists, who denied the existence of God so that they might live without him, all theologians and metaphysicians alike raise the present question, either at the close of their Metaphysics or at the opening of their Theology. The discussion does not concern God under the precise formal notion of Deity as such — for under that concept he is not knowable to us by the natural light, but only by the supernatural light of faith — but rather concerns God insofar as he is signified and conceived under the name of infinite and independent being, first uncaused cause. These are called proper concepts of God derived from common ones, and they are possible and attainable for us by the natural light and in our present state. The sense of the question is therefore this: whether it can be demonstrated by natural reason that there exists in the nature of things one first uncaused and

infinite being, independent of all others, upon which all other beings depend as upon their first principle.

All metaphysicians and theologians, with one or two exceptions, affirm that it can be demonstrated by natural reason that God exists. The contrary opinion, usually attributed to Rabbi Moses and to Peter of Ailly, is judged by some to be rash, by others erroneous, as may be seen in *pt. 1, q. 2, art. 2*; for a discussion of this censure, see *Smisinchius, tract. 1, disp. 1, q. 4*. And indeed, that even apart from divine revelation natural reason dictates that God exists is expressly gathered from Sacred Scripture, which says that the Creator is known from creatures — by way of a natural inference from effects to cause. So it is stated in *Psalms 18*: "The heavens declare the glory of God"; and in *Wisdom 13*: "From the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen so as to be known." Hence the Apostle in *Romans 1* reproves the folly of philosophers and pagans who, though compelled by the creatures to know God, nevertheless did not glorify him as God: "the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also and divinity."

Although nearly all the scholastics agree, as I have said, that the existence of God can be demonstrated by the natural light, they equally acknowledge that it cannot be demonstrated strictly by a demonstration *propter quid* and *a priori*. The reason is indicated by the Doctor in *1, dist. 2, q. 1*: the singular essence existing by its very nature is not known by us distinctly in itself, insofar as it is signified by the name of God, but only confusedly from creatures, insofar as it is confusedly signified by the name of infinite being. Therefore the middle term by which the existence of infinite being could be demonstrated *a priori* is entirely unknown to us, and for that reason only a demonstration *a posteriori* remains possible. This is confirmed, because *a priori* demonstration requires that the demonstrator possess a definitive concept of the subject; but in our present state we do not possess a definitive concept of Deity, since we conceive it only under an attributive mode or an intrinsic mode. Therefore its existence cannot properly be demonstrated by us *a priori*, but only *a posteriori*. There are, however, various paths by which this truth may be pursued *a posteriori* — not all of which are equally effective — which are indicated by St. Thomas in *pt. 1, q. 2, art. 3*, and by his commentators, and by Aristotle in *Physics*, bk. 8, chh. 4, 8, 10, and 11, and in *Metaphysics*, bk. 12.

The first argument that presents itself is the familiar one drawn from motion, set out in ch. 3: since whatever is moved is moved by another, and that mover must itself be moved, and so on by yet another, and since it is not permissible to proceed to infinity — for in that case there would be no first mover that moves the rest while itself unmoved — it is necessary to arrive at some first unmoved mover, which is God. But I have already shown that this path drawn from motion is not sufficient to establish the existence of a First Mover, in the last disputation

of the *Physics*, *q. 8, art. 3*, following Scotus in *q. 3, prol. 5* and *1, dist. 2, q. 1* throughout; these should be consulted there and need not be repeated here.

The second argument is drawn from degrees of perfection: since among created things there exist greater and lesser degrees of goodness, truth, and nobility, there must be something that is supremely good — which serves as the measure of goodness, truth, and nobility for all the rest — and that accordingly is supremely and infinitely being, most true, most noble, and therefore the cause of all other beings. This is God the Lord Most High.

Yet this argument too does not seem sufficiently compelling, nor do its inferences follow legitimately. For among discrete quantities there are greater and lesser numbers, yet no infinite number is given, nor any greatest number beyond which a greater cannot exist. Similarly in continuous quantity there are greater and lesser bodies, yet none of infinite magnitude, nor any greatest beyond which a greater cannot exist. Nor is it satisfactory when Valentia argues that for this argument to be effective it suffices that whenever greater and lesser exist on the part of reality, there must also exist a maximum among those things that actually exist — as is evident in bodies, among all of which there is a greatest that does not actually exceed any other, namely the outermost heaven. For from this one would equally and legitimately infer only that among those things which are more and less being there exists some being than which no greater actually exists — and this would be God. This does not satisfy, I say, because God must be not merely greater than all actually existing beings, but also greater than all possible beings. Therefore, from the fact that there exists a being that is greatest and most perfect among all actually existing beings, it does not follow that it is God, unless it is also proved that it is greatest among all possible beings. Furthermore, even from this it does not follow well that the first and most perfect being is the cause of all the rest: for man is the most perfect of all animals, yet he is not the cause of the other animals; and the highest Angel is the most perfect of created spirits, yet it is not the cause of the lower spirits; and in the genus of accidents there are similar instances that can be raised.

The third argument, which the Doctor employs in *loc. cit.*, *1, dist. 2, q. 1, § quantum ad primum articulum*, is drawn from the nature of effects and the subordination of efficient causes. It can be set out either as we did in *disp. 15, Physics, q. 8, art. 3, n. 106*, or more briefly in the following way. It is evident that many things in this world have been produced — that is, they have received existence after non-existence. Either these things produced themselves, which is impossible, because nothing produces itself, as has been shown in *disp. 8, Physics, q. 2, art. 1*; or they were produced by another, and of this other one again asks whether it was produced by itself or by something else. Since an infinite regress in the order of producers and effects cannot be admitted, it is necessary to assign one first uncaused and unproduced cause of all things, which is the cause of the others

both as efficient and as final cause — since these types of causality involve no imperfection, as material and formal causality do, but rather connote perfection.

This argument, if carefully examined, sufficiently establishes the conclusion and rests upon two naturally known principles. The first is that nothing produces itself, but whatever is produced must be produced by another. The truth of this principle has been sufficiently demonstrated in *loc. cit. in Physics*, because the producer is prior at least by nature to what is produced, and real and actual existence in the cause is required for the exercise of the act of production. Therefore, if the same thing were really to produce itself, it would be both prior and posterior by nature to itself, and simultaneously existing and non-existing — existing and pre-existing insofar as it is the producer, and non-existing and posterior insofar as it is the product, since when it is produced it passes from non-existence to existence. Thus contradictory predicates would be verified of the same thing. The other principle is that in the order of producers an infinite regress is impossible, especially in essentially ordered causes. This is drawn from *Aristotle, Metaphysics*, bk. 2, text 2, and is proved in multiple ways by the Doctor in *loc. cit.*. The more evident proof, however, which can be gathered from his statements, is as follows.

If in subordinated causes such an infinite regress were given, then the entire collection of those causes — in the way that a syncategorematically infinite multitude can be collected — would be both dependent and independent, which are contradictories. This consequence is proved from Smisinchius: the collection would be dependent, because no member of that collection is said to be anything other than dependent; therefore the entire collection is dependent, since what is denied distributively of all the parts of a collection is also denied of the whole collection, the collection being nothing over and above all the parts taken distributively. Yet it would also be independent, for neither outside that collection is there any cause upon which the collection depends — since by hypothesis it is the collection of all causes — nor within the collection is there any cause upon which the collection adequately depends, for in that case the whole would depend adequately upon one of its own parts. Therefore an infinite regress in such an order of producers is impossible, and one must necessarily arrive at some first uncaused and unproduced being, which is the principle of the others both as efficient cause and as final cause, since such types of causality involve no imperfection — as material and formal causality do — but rather perfection.

The Doctor confirms this entire argument in *loc. cit., lit. K*: because efficiency as such necessarily implies no imperfection, it can exist in something without imperfection; but if in nothing does efficiency exist without dependence upon something prior, then in nothing does it exist without imperfection. Therefore independent efficiency can belong to some nature, and that nature will be simply first. Therefore simply first efficiency is possible. And if such a first efficient cause

is possible, it will also actually exist, since as the first being and a being that exists of itself, not from another, it will consequently be necessarily existing.

Bassolius in *1, d. 2, q. 1* attempted to dissolve this argument by admitting an infinite regress even in essentially ordered causes, holding therefore that the totality of caused things is not some one thing — since it must be understood as essentially dependent upon a single extrinsic cause standing outside that totality — because each part of it is caused not by itself but by another, and that by yet another, and so on to infinity. But in order to close off this evasion, I have proved the absurdity of that infinite regress in a somewhat different way than is usually done: namely, that the entire collection of causes would be both dependent and independent; dependent because none of its members is posited as first, and independent because no extrinsic cause is posited upon which the entire collection depends. I confess, however, that this evasion is not sufficiently foreclosed by that dilemma of Smisinchius; for Bassolius would say that the entire collection of causes is dependent, not because the whole depends upon some first cause extrinsic to the whole collection, but because distributively one cause depends upon another more perfect one, and that one upon a yet more perfect one, and so to infinity — and what is affirmed distributively of all the parts of the collection is affirmed of the entire collection. Thus Rubion also responds in *1, dict. 2, q. 1*.

But someone will press, following Scotus in *loc. cit., lit. K*, to close off this evasion: the higher the cause, the more perfect it is in causing; therefore a cause infinitely higher will be infinitely more perfect, and thus of infinite perfection in causing, and consequently not causing in the power of another — since any cause that causes in the power of another causes imperfectly, being dependent upon another in its causing. Yet neither does this rejoinder succeed, nor does this mode of argument hold in the case of a syncategorematically infinite multitude, as I have said in *disp. 9, Physics, q. 2, art. 2, n. 35*: in such a collection no ultimate or supreme member is given — otherwise it would not be syncategorematically infinite. Moreover, the rejoinder proceeds as though it were necessary to arrive at some cause of infinite perfection infinitely distant from the other inferior causes, which is a false assumption. For supposing an infinite regress in causes, one could never arrive at any cause of infinite perfection infinitely distant from inferior ones; one could only arrive at a more and more perfect cause without end, one that is at any given point only finitely — though unendingly — distant from the inferior ones.

Therefore among the five proofs adduced by the Doctor in *1, dist. 2, q. 1, lit. K* against an infinite regress in essentially ordered causes, I consider the fifth and last to be the most valid — namely, that efficiency as such necessarily implies no imperfection, and therefore must be posited in something without imperfection, and that will be the first efficient cause existing of itself. By this fifth argument, the aforementioned evasion of Bassolius is sufficiently foreclosed, though he also endeavors to dissolve it. For a fuller treatment of the Doctor's demonstration, see

Suarez, disp. 39, Metaphys., sect. 2, nn. 20 ff., where it is set out and developed with great elegance.

The fourth argument is, as it were, a confirmation of the preceding, and is drawn from the possible and the necessary: since contingent things can either be or not be, there must be admitted some necessary being through which things that are merely possible come to exist. This necessary being must be the cause of its own necessity, or possess necessary existence of itself, and must be uncaused by another — otherwise we would be involved in an infinite regress.

But perhaps it will be replied, as it was to the preceding argument, that each individual contingent thing, in being reduced from possibility to act, was so reduced by another individual that existed, and that one by yet another, and so on to infinity, so that there is no need to have recourse to any being to which necessary existence of itself belongs, by which the other contingent beings are reduced from potency to act.

This evasion is at once closed off, however, because it is of the very essence of a contingent being that it can both be and not be: it can be when it does not yet exist, and it can not be when it actually exists. If therefore the entire collection of contingent beings were in fact non-existent, these contingent things could be brought from potency to act — either by themselves or by something else that is not contingent. If by the latter, the conclusion is obtained. The former cannot be said, because, as has been proved above, nothing can bring itself from non-existence to existence, and everything that is produced must be produced by something really distinct from it; and also because, by the hypothesis, those contingent beings would not exist and would consequently be nothing in themselves.

One will say again that each contingent being distributively has been reduced from possibility to act by another individual that existed, and that individual by yet another, and so on to infinity. Against this: although this reply might in some way be applied to the preceding argument, where the entire collection of causes and caused things was said to be dependent not because the whole depends upon some one cause extrinsic to the whole collection, but because one cause within the collection depends upon another, and that upon yet another more perfect one to infinity — nevertheless this reply cannot be applied to the present argument about the entire collection of contingent beings. For not only does each individual contingent being require to be produced by another, but the entire collection does as well, because the entire collection by its essential nature intrinsically and of itself requires to be reduced from potency to the act of existing by some being to which necessary actual existence belongs of itself. This is proved as follows: the entire collection can not-be and can be brought from non-existence to existence, and this by some being entirely outside that collection; but that being will be a necessary being, existing of itself and independently. Therefore this fourth argument, as here developed, seems to me still more effective than the third; for

the third argument is considerably weakened by the replies of Bassolius, whereas this one is not in the least, and indeed can receive strong confirmation from it.

The fifth argument, clearest of all, is drawn from the admirable order and interconnection of the parts of this universe, and from its governance. Since all natural things, even those entirely devoid of cognition, act for an end — and yet cannot direct themselves toward it, though they never miss it — it is necessary that there be some supreme intelligence that directs them all to their end. This argument is frequently suggested to us by Sacred Scripture, which says in *Wisdom 13*: "From the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen so as to be known"; and in *Proverbs 3*: "The Lord by wisdom founded the earth; he established the heavens by understanding; the depths were broken open, and the clouds drop dew." And *Psalms 18*: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the work of his hands." By this path the holy Fathers also proceeded, attributing the beautiful order of creation which we behold, and the wonderful providence over all things, to one Maker and Governor. Thus Justin, questioned in *q. 61* of his questions to the Gentiles about the proof for God's existence, answers from the creation, constitution, and stability of existing things. Dionysius in *ch. 7 of De divinis nominibus* says that God is known from the most orderly disposition of creatures. Eusebius in *Praeparatio Evangelica*, bk. 7, ch. 2: just as a house cannot come to be without a craftsman, or a garment without a weaver, so neither can this universe be without its author. Lactantius in *bk. 1 of De falsa religione*, *ch. 2*: there is no one so unlearned, of such savage manners, that raising his eyes to heaven he does not perceive some providence from the very greatness, motion, disposition, constancy, usefulness, beauty, and moderation of things. Gregory of Nazianzus speaks similarly in *Oration 2 on Theology*, and so too Chrysostom in *Homily 9 to the People of Antioch*, where, explaining *Psalms 18*, he says: "How do the heavens declare the glory of God? They have no voice, they have no mouth, they have no tongue — how then do they declare it?" He answers: "by their very appearance. For when you see the beauty, the greatness, the height, the position, the form pervading so vast a body, as if hearing a voice, and learning by gazing, you worship him who created so beautiful and wonderful a body. Heaven is silent, but its appearance sends forth a voice clearer than a trumpet, teaching us through our eyes, not through our ears" — for the sense of sight is by nature more certain and manifest than hearing. All this and more Chrysostom has with great elegance, perfectly to our purpose.

By the same argument, as one most ready to hand, the philosophers too proceeded to persuade that there is one first being and one first cause upon which all other things depend in their existence. Thus Cicero in *De natura deorum*, bk. 2, says: when we see something moving by some mechanism — a sphere, and a great many other things — we do not doubt that these are works of reason; surely we must doubt even less that the impulse of the heavens, which we see moving and turning with such wonderful speed most steadily, accomplishing the annual changes for the supreme welfare and preservation of all things, takes place not

only by reason but by an excellent and divine reason. And in Cicero at the same book, Velleius dissolves Cotta's doubt about the existence of this first being by a similar argument, confirming that existence: "For what can be so plain and evident, when we look up to the sky and observe the heavenly bodies, as that there is some supreme mind by which all these things are governed?" For if it were otherwise, Ennius could not have said with universal assent: "Look upon this shining height which all men call Jove" — as the ruler of all things, governing everything by his nod. Plato in the *Symposium* said that from the beauty of created things one suddenly glimpses a certain beauty of the divine nature. And Aristotle finally, in *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, ch. 2, asks: how will there be order if there is not something eternal, separate, and permanent? This he clarifies in ch. 10 with the example of a household, a family, and an army — none of which can exist without a leader and ruler. Let the reader also consult Hurtado, *disp. 20, Metaphysics, sect. 1*, where this argument is pursued graphically and with the greatest elegance, with such grace and energy of expression that it can instruct and effectively persuade even the most uncultivated and unfeeling person about this dogma, most important of all. And whoever desires still more may consult our Father Faber in the work against the impious Atheists, *disp. 1*, where he writes on this matter most abundantly and learnedly.

Objections are now resolved.

In opposition, it is first commonly objected that if God existed, all evil would be removed from the world, because he would have to be infinite goodness excluding all evil. Since, however, so many evils and so many sins exist in the world, it seems that God does not exist. The major premise is proved as follows: if one contrary were actually infinite in reality, nothing contrary to it would exist in nature; therefore if some good were actually infinite, as God would be if he existed, there would be no evil in the universe. This is confirmed: an infinite body admits no other body alongside it; therefore neither does infinite being admit another being alongside it. The proof of this consequence is, first, that just as dimension is incompatible with dimension, so actuality seems incompatible with actuality; and second, that just as if there were another body besides the infinite body, it would together with it constitute something greater than the infinite, so if there were another being besides infinite being, it would constitute something greater than the infinite.

The Doctor responds in *loc. cit.* that an infinitely active cause does not by natural necessity exclude from itself anything that is contrary to it — whether formally contrary, that is, contrary to what belongs to it essentially, or virtually contrary, that is, contrary to something in the nature of its effect, which it contains virtually — for in either way it would prevent whatever is incompatible with its effect, as was argued above. God, however, acts freely and voluntarily with respect to everything outside himself, and for this reason he permits evil; and he also permits it for the greater manifestation of his goodness, so that he might draw

good out of evil, as Augustine says. One might ask: did not the philosophers who held that God acts by natural necessity also allow that there is some evil in the universe? The Doctor responds that the philosophers were deceived in this matter even according to the natural light. To the confirmation, the consequence is denied along with its proofs. To the first proof, the Doctor says that there is no analogous incompatibility between dimensions in occupying place and between beings in existing: one entity does not so fill up the whole nature of entity as to exclude another entity from coexisting with it. This must be understood not in terms of local occupation, but in terms of essential measure. One dimension fills the same place to the full limit of its capacity, and for that reason another thing filling that place cannot coexist with it — though something not filling that place could coexist with it. Similarly, one entity can coexist with another, just as, with respect to place, another body not filling the place could coexist with a body that does fill it. Similarly, to the other proof, the Doctor denies the parallel: because an infinite body, if coexisting with another, would form a whole greater than either — since the dimensions of the other body would be additional to the dimensions of the infinite body and of the same kind as them, making the whole not greater on account of the diversity of dimensions, yet still not greater because an infinite dimension cannot be exceeded — whereas here the entire quantity of infinite perfection admits no addition in the nature of such a quantity from the coexistence of something finite according to such a quantity.

In the second objection, it is argued following *Aristotle, Metaphysics*, bk. 8, text 10, that forms stand in relation to one another as numbers do; but in numbers, ascending by perfection, there is no first term, because numbers admit an infinite regress. Therefore the same holds for forms. Furthermore, if such a first being existed, it would either exist of itself or from another; not the latter, for then it would not be first; if of itself, then either effectively — which is impossible, because nothing produces itself — or finally — but this too is impossible, for just as nothing produces itself, so nothing is its own end; nor, finally, materially or formally, because then it would have to be produced by some efficient cause introducing form into matter. Lastly, if there were such a first agent and first cause of all things, it would either act necessarily and naturally — in which case nothing in the universe would be contingent — or contingently — in which case nothing would be necessary. Both consequences are false.

In response to the first point: Aristotle by that proposition truly did not intend to introduce an analogy between species and numbers of the kind supposed in the argument, as has been said in *disp. 8, n. 178*. Even granting that analogy, nothing follows from the argument and the assumed parallel other than this: just as in numbers ascending one never arrives at the most perfect, because the infinite cannot be traversed, so likewise — given the infinite distance in perfection between God and creatures — by ascending through possible species one would never arrive at God. To the second point: the first being is said to exist of itself effectively, not positively — as though it produced itself — but privatively, in the

sense that it is not caused by another. To the third: the first cause is a free agent *ad extra*, and acts outside itself contingently; hence in the entire universe of created things nothing is simply necessary, but all things are simply contingent and capable of non-existence — except for the first being.

In the third objection, it is argued that God can be invincibly ignored, which would not be the case if his existence were attainable by the natural light. This is proved: *Psalm 13* says "the fool has said in his heart, there is no God"; and *Exodus 5* has Pharaoh saying he does not know God. Furthermore, if such ignorance were impossible, it would not be credible that so many idolaters existed who worshipped false gods in place of the true one. Finally, Molina in this same question reports, from the accounts of many, having heard that the inhabitants of Brazil worshipped no God before being instructed by the Portuguese.

In response: the assumption is denied. Otherwise the pagan philosophers who worshipped idols would have been excusable, which is the opposite of what the Apostle asserts in *Romans 1*. Hence Damascene in *De fide orthodoxa*, bk. 1, ch. 1, says: "The knowledge of God is implanted in all by nature." And in ch. 3: "No rational being can be ignorant of being as being." And St. Gregory in *bk. 27 of the Moralia*, ch. 3: "Every man, by the very fact that he is created rational, ought by reason to gather that he who created him is God." As for the first proof, it must be said that the ignorance of the fool and of Pharaoh was vincible and altogether culpable, since they were not lacking the means to know God, but their malice blinded them. The same must be said regarding the ancient worshippers of idols and the inhabitants of Brazil — provided that Molina's account is credible.

The fourth and final objection is raised by certain scholastics, who argue that the existence of God cannot be known by natural reason but only by faith. First, because *Hebrews 11* says: "He who comes to God must believe that he exists" — therefore the existence of God is known only by faith, not by the natural light. Hence the Fathers not infrequently indicate that God cannot be known without a higher light of divine revelation. Thus Augustine in *De civitate Dei*, ch. 7, speaking of the philosophers, says: "those who discovered some great things about God were aided by divine grace in what they found, and went astray in what they pursued by merely human means." Nor does it avail to reply, as some do following St. Thomas in 2–2, q. 1, art. 7, that St. Paul and the Fathers speak of God as supernatural Author and rewarder in that order, and not of God as considered within the order of nature. For Damascene in *De fide orthodoxa*, bk. 1, ch. 2, says: "it is impossible to say or even to conceive anything at all of God, beyond what has been divinely revealed and explained in the sacred oracles of the Old and New Testament" — and he speaks there of God as conceived as uncreated, eternal, free from all change and mutation, simple, without composition or body, good, just, the architect of all things, and so on. This is the consideration of God in the order of nature. Furthermore, Scripture itself, in *Wisdom 13 and 14*, expressly denies that God can be known from creatures by natural reasoning — and says that creatures

are more likely to lead us into error than to knowledge of God. For it says that creatures were made for hatred of God and for a snare to the souls of men and a trap to the feet of those who lack wisdom; and that therefore those in whom there is no knowledge of God could not from the things that appear to be good understand him who is, nor by attending to his works recognize who was the craftsman — but instead took for gods fire, or wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the mighty water, or the sun and moon, the governors of the world. Finally, concerning the same object there cannot be both science and faith; but that God exists is an article of faith; therefore it cannot be known demonstratively, neither a priori nor a posteriori.

In response: St. Paul in the cited passage is truly speaking of God as supernatural Author, as is clear from the context itself; and the holy Fathers regularly speak in the same sense. If any of them sometimes speak of God also as Author of nature, they intended only to indicate that we can by the natural light acquire a knowledge of God in our present state without the danger of many errors — particularly as to what he is and concerning his attributes — as experience shows in the case of the philosophers, who, though they acknowledged the existence of one God, went seriously astray in explaining his nature and essence. To the second point, it must be said that creatures only per accidens became a snare for the souls of men — namely on account of the foolishness of their hearts, as Scripture itself explains in the same passage, saying "to the feet of the unwise"; for if they wisely use the natural light, from the contemplation of this wonderful mass of the universe they can philosophize correctly about no few truths concerning God. To the final objection, this is not a special difficulty peculiar to this matter but is common to all those things that are said to be both believed and demonstrated. The brief answer is drawn from what was said in the last disputation of Logic: that in the same intellect the habit of faith and the habit of science can simultaneously remain, both habitually and actually, concerning the same object and at the same time — whether or not the acts of those habits can be simultaneous has been treated there. Let these remarks suffice for this question in the present context; it will be treated more fully in Theology. The many other arguments — or rather delirious ravings — of the Atheists are refuted with utmost precision by Father Faber in *loc. cit.*, *disp. 1*.

Question II: In what manner God is naturally knowable by the intellect of the wayfarer as to what he is

The Doctor treats this most fully and precisely in *1, dist. 3, q. 1*. For a brief resolution insofar as the metaphysician is concerned, it must be noted, following the Doctor in the same place, that there are three kinds of concepts that can be formed of God. Some are common to God and creatures — such as that he is a substance, an intellectual life, a spirit, and so on. Others are proper concepts derived from common ones — such as that God is infinite being, supremely good,

supremely wise, supremely just, and so on. Others finally are proper concepts derived from proper ones — such as that he is one and triune, and so on.

With this noted, it must be said with the Doctor in *loc. cit.* that by the natural light alone — guided solely by natural reason — one can have of God not only concepts of the first kind, but also of the second kind, though not of the third — namely, concepts proper from proper ones. The assertion is proved as to all its parts. It is proved as to the first part, because we conceive God under the notion of being, substance, and intellectual life; and in these concepts God agrees with creatures not merely analogically but also univocally — namely in predicates said in quid of both God and creature, as is clear from *disp. 2, Metaphys.* throughout. These concepts we acquire guided by the natural light, as is clear from what was said there.

As to the second part, the Doctor proves in *ibid.*, § *quarto dico* that we can arrive at many concepts that are proper to God and do not belong to creatures — such as the concepts of all simple perfections in the highest degree. The most perfect concept, in which we know God as in a kind of description most perfectly, is the concept of all simple perfections in the highest degree. Yet the more perfect and simpler concept possible for us, the Doctor says, is the concept of simply infinite being. For this concept is simpler than the concept of good being, or true being, or any similar concept, because "infinite" is not as it were an attribute or property of being or of that of which it is said, but expresses the intrinsic mode of that entity. Thus when I say "infinite being," I have not a concept as it were per accidens composed of subject and property, but a per se concept of the subject at a certain degree of perfection — namely infinity — just as intense whiteness does not express a per accidens concept as "visible whiteness" does; rather, intensity expresses the intrinsic degree of whiteness in itself. Thus the simplicity of this concept, namely "infinite being," is evident. These and similar proper concepts of God derived from common ones, then, we can have of God through the way of natural reasoning.

How these concepts can be obtained by the way of natural reasoning is explained by the Doctor in *loc. cit.*, 1, *dist. 3, q. 1*, § *quinto dico*: they can be formed by abstractions made by our intellect by means of species received from creatures. For whether the more universal and the less universal are known by the same species of the less universal, or each has its own proper intelligible species, at least that which can impress or cause the species of the less universal in the intellect can also cause the species of whatever is more universal. Thus creatures, which impress their own proper species in the intellect, can also impress the species of transcendentals, which belong to them and to God in common. And then the intellect by its own power can use many species simultaneously to conceive together those things whose species they are — for example, the species of the good, the species of the supreme, the species of act — to conceive the supreme good and the most actual. This appears plausible by an argument from the lesser,

since the imagination can use the species of different sensible things to imagine a composite of those different things, as is evident in imagining a golden mountain.

Finally, as to the third part, the Doctor's conclusion is found in *loc. cit.*, § *tertio dico*, where he says that God is not naturally known by the wayfarer in particular and properly — that is, under the notion of this singular essence as this essence and in itself. He proves this because God, under the notion of the knowable as such, is a voluntary and natural object only with respect to his own intellect, and therefore cannot be naturally known by any created intellect under the notion of this singular essence as this. Furthermore, no essence naturally knowable by us sufficiently manifests this singular essence as this — neither by a likeness of univocation nor of imitation. Univocation obtains only in general notions; imitation is also deficient because it is imperfect, since creatures imperfectly imitate the divine essence. Therefore God, as this essence and under a concept proper from proper ones, cannot be naturally attained by the created intellect.

It remains therefore that God can be known by us through the way of natural reasoning as to what he is through common concepts and through proper concepts derived from common ones. Three ways of naturally knowing God are traditionally assigned, following St. Dionysius. The first is the way of causality, by which we proceed from things as effects to the first efficient cause of all — and by this way we attain more what God is than what he is. The second is called the way of remotion, by which we remove from God whatever belongs to imperfection in creatures — and by this way we know more what God is not than what he is. The third is called the way of eminence, by which we attribute to God — who eminently contains all things — whatever perfection is found in created things; and this is the better and more direct way for investigating what can be said of God, as the Doctor teaches in *loc. cit.*

Against this, the Doctor adduces in *loc. cit.* certain arguments to prove that God cannot be attained by the intellect of the wayfarer as to what he is in any respect. First, from *De anima*, bk. 3, sects. 30 and 39: phantasms stand to the intellect as sensible things stand to sense; therefore the intellect understands nothing of which it cannot apprehend phantasms through the senses; but God has no phantasm; therefore the intellect cannot know him. Second, as Aristotle says in *Metaphysics*, bk. 2, text 1, our intellect stands in relation to those things most manifest in nature as the eyes of owls do to the light of day; therefore it is as impossible for us to know God as it is for an owl to gaze upon the sun. Third, the infinite as infinite is unknown, as stated in *Physics*, bk. 1, and *Metaphysics*, bk. 2; therefore our intellect cannot attain God under the notion of infinite being. And finally, Gregory commenting on Ezekiel says: however much our mind has progressed in the contemplation of God, it attains not to what God himself is, but to what is beneath him.

The Doctor responds in § *ad argumenta principalia* as follows. To the first argument: the proposition of Aristotle must be understood especially of the first motion by which the intellect is moved to the acquisition of species, and not always of the second motion by which it is moved to the act of knowing through species already acquired. Moreover, as was said a little above, although God has no proper phantasm formally, he is nonetheless known virtually through the phantasm of creatures in the manner explained. To the second: the eye of the owl has only intuitive and natural knowledge; and with respect to these two conditions, Aristotle's authority can be interpreted as affirming an impossibility, since just as it is impossible for that eye to consider its object naturally and intuitively, so for our intellect it is impossible to know God naturally and intuitively. To the third: although the created intellect cannot naturally attain infinitely many objects simultaneously — for that would imply infinite power in it — it can nonetheless attain an intensively infinite object, because an intellection of such an infinite does not entail the infinity of the act; for the act need not have the same mode as the object, since an act that is finite in character can be directed toward an object that is infinite — unless it were a comprehensive act, which I concede we do not have and cannot have with respect to an infinite object; see 3, *dist. 14, q. 2, lit. F*. To the last argument: the concept that can be naturally formed of God by us is said by Gregory to be beneath God, because it is more imperfect and inferior than the proper concept of God drawn from his own proper attributes — so that the sense is: when we conceive God from creatures, we never attain the singular and proper concept of God himself as this essence, but only a concept far inferior to it. Let these remarks suffice for this question; more exact knowledge is reserved for Theology.

Question III: Whether it can be proved by natural reason that, besides God, there exist other spiritual substances in the universe

By such spiritual substances we understand certain complete intellectual natures that are so distinct and immaterial that they lack the corporeal mass we observe in material substances. The question does not concern their possibility; for the possibility of such a nature cannot be denied, since what is said to be by its very nature repugnant is that which includes contradictories in its concept, or predicates that mutually destroy each other — such as that an accident should be a substance, or God a creature. But in the concept of a spiritual substance as just explained, no such repugnance of predicates is found: spirituality is not repugnant to substance as such; intellectuality is not repugnant to it, since God is a spiritual and incorporeal substance; it is not repugnant to created substance as such, since the rational soul is a created spiritual substance; nor is it repugnant to complete substance as such, since God is such a complete substance. All these predicates can therefore be combined to constitute one nature that is created, intellectual, and complete — and this will be an Angel.

The question therefore concerns the matter of fact: whether it can be proved by natural reason that such complete intellectual spiritual substances actually exist in the nature of things. There are three opinions. The first holds that this can be proved by natural reason, at least a posteriori, drawn from several effects accessible to us that cannot be referred to any other cause than demons or angels. So holds Faber in his entire *opusculum adversus Atheos*, *disp. 1*. The second holds that it can be known not only by a posteriori reasoning but also a priori. So Suarez in *disp. 35, Metaphys., sect. 1*. The third denies both and asserts that the existence of these substances can be established only from the principles of faith. So Vulpes with many others in *tom. 1, pt. 2, disp. 8, art. 1*.

It must be said first that the actual existence of these spiritual substances is not sufficiently demonstrated by natural reason a priori. This conclusion is proved by examining and resolving the arguments by which Suarez attempts to demonstrate the contrary a priori. These arguments are all reported and rejected by Vulpes in *loc. cit.*

First, Vulpes reports from Suarez the following argument purporting to prove a priori that angels exist: there is no repugnance on the part of the thing, nor is there any deficiency in power on the part of the first cause; therefore it is evident that there exist created substances that are entirely immaterial and subsisting. The antecedent is proved: there is no repugnance in a substance being simultaneously created and immaterial, since the predicate "immaterial" does not exceed the limits of a creature; therefore such a substance can be created. And he responds that the inference is defective, since from possibility actuality is not rightly inferred, unless the cause not only possesses infinite power to overcome every obstacle but also acts naturally to the extent of its power. Furthermore, Vulpes reports this argument and the following one from Suarez less than faithfully, since Suarez does not adduce these arguments to prove the actual existence of immaterial substances, but only to show their possibility — that is, their non-repugnance. For Suarez says at the end of n. 2: it is one thing to ask or prove that these substances are possible, and another to show that they actually exist. The former depends solely upon divine power without repugnance on the part of the thing; the latter, besides power, requires the divine will, which is more difficult to establish, since that will's decree is free, whereas the faculty or power is necessary. Hence in n. 3 he posits his first conclusion in these words: I say first that it can be demonstrated by reason that created immaterial or spiritual substances are possible. And afterward in n. 5 he posits his second conclusion in these words: I say second that by natural reason it can be sufficiently shown that there exist in the universe certain created substances entirely immaterial. The first conclusion he proves by the argument reported by Vulpes, with the same antecedent — because there is no repugnance on the part of the thing, nor on the part of the efficient cause — but not with the same consequent; for Suarez infers: therefore it is evident that such an effect is possible, which is what the conclusion

to be proved states. Vulpes, however, infers: therefore it is evident that there exist created substances that are entirely immaterial and subsisting.

Second, Vulpes reports from Suarez another argument a priori for the existence of angels: it seems more possible that an immaterial substance should exist than a material one; the latter actually exists; therefore the former must also necessarily exist. The major is proved: an efficient cause always tends to assimilate its effect to itself; therefore the more the effect resembles the cause, the more apt it is to be produced by it; God is the first cause of all things and is a spiritual substance; therefore it is more possible and more fitting that from him should proceed immaterial effects rather than material ones. Vulpes then reduces this argument to an absurdity, because from it one would infer that there exists a created spiritual substance of infinite perfection, adequately similar to God by a univocal similarity in numerical degree — which is erroneous. Hence he again says that the assumption of the major infers only the possibility of such an effect, not its actuality, since God, being a free agent, acts precisely as he wills. This second argument too, however, Vulpes does not report faithfully from Suarez; for Suarez adduces it in *sect. 1, cit., n. 3* not to prove the actual existence of angels but their possibility alone, as may be seen there. Moreover, the reduction that Vulpes makes regarding the actual existence of angels, Suarez had already anticipated regarding the possibility — which alone was in question in that argument — in these words: "You will say that by this reasoning it would be proved that a substance of infinite perfection is most possible, since it would be most similar to God. I reply by denying the inference; for such a substance cannot be an effect similar to God, because it cannot be an effect — for by the very fact of being an effect it is in essence most unlike God, of whose nature it is to not be an effect; likewise, if it is an effect, it is dependent, and if dependent, it is not infinite by essence, since this infinity requires being by essence. Therefore so great a similarity to God — or rather an equality with God — is repugnant to the nature of an effect. But a similarity in the sole nature of immaterial substance is not repugnant to the nature of an effect; and therefore, given divine omnipotence, it is rightly concluded that such an effect is most possible." So says Suarez, from which it is sufficiently clear that Suarez in the aforesaid argument is speaking of possibility, not of the actual existence of angels, and that he had already anticipated the boast made by Vulpes.

Vulpes also reports in n. 8 another argument from Suarez for the same purpose, by which he infers a posteriori from the actual existence of the intellectual soul the a posteriori possibility of a complete immaterial substance. He reports this argument faithfully and says that it does not address the point, because it proves not the fact under discussion here, but only the possibility — which is also what he should have said more correctly of the two preceding arguments, had he reported them faithfully.

Third, Suarez in *loc. cit.*, n. 5, directly proves that there actually exist separated immaterial substances, following St. Thomas in *pt. 1, q. 50, art. 1*: for the perfection of the universe it was fitting that there should be in it this grade of immaterial substances; but God founded the universe as perfect; therefore such substances exist in it. The major is proved: it belongs to the perfection of an effect to be perfectly similar to its cause; therefore the perfection of the universe requires that it be similar to God as much as possible. Since God is an immaterial and intellectual substance, it belongs to the perfection of the universe that in it there be immaterial and intellectual substances, by reason of which it is similar to God in this degree. The minor is proved: first, because from a perfect and supremely good cause, which envies nothing and is most powerful and cannot be impeded by anyone, no effect could proceed that was not perfect; second, because in founding the universe God intended both the communication of his goodness and the manifestation of his perfection. This argument does not well establish its conclusion, because since God is a free agent *ad extra*, he is not bound to the production of the most perfect effects. Hence, according to the theologians, he could have produced the universe far more perfect than it actually is. Therefore, although angels bear a greater similarity to God than any other creature, he could nonetheless in his freedom choose not to produce them, content with human perfection alone at that level of intellectuality that is immaterial on the side of the soul. Moreover, the angels actually produced are not the most similar to God in perfection, and he could certainly produce others still more similar to himself — though he will never actually do so. The argument therefore does not sufficiently establish the fact.

Fourth, it is argued for the same conclusion: by the natural light, predicamental substance is divided into corporeal and spiritual; but purely corporeal and material substance exists; therefore by parity of reasoning purely incorporeal and spiritual substance must also exist; and such a substance cannot be God, since by reason of his infinity he is placed outside the categories. Vulpes rightly refutes this argument in *loc. cit.*, first because the argument shows only possibility, not actuality; second because there are those who locate God within the categories; and third, finally, because he denies that it is naturally known that predicamental substance is divided in that manner — for it would more properly be said that transcendental substance is so divided, so that this division would correspond to the division of being into finite and infinite, created and uncreated.

It must be said second that the existence of these spiritual substances can be proved by natural reason through a posteriori reasoning from effects — with considerable probability, though not with complete necessity. The conclusion is proved in the same way as the preceding one, by examining and evaluating the two arguments by which the existence of Intelligences in the universe is usually proved a posteriori.

The first argument is Aristotle's, who in *Physics*, bk. 8, and *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, from text 42 onward, deduced their existence from the motion and revolution of the heavens. For this motion cannot originate from the heavens themselves, but comes from an external mover — as has been proved from Aristotle in *disp. 2, De Caelo, q. 4, art. 3, conclusion 1*. But this mover cannot be corporeal and material, as was deduced there in conclusion 2. Therefore it will be immaterial and incorporeal, and thus each heaven will be moved by its own proper Intelligence. But since this intelligence cannot be the first Intelligence — because as will be established in the following question, the first Intelligence being of infinite power would move in non-time, as was proved in *art. 4* of the same place — it remains that each heaven is moved by its own proper assisting Intelligence.

Although this argument may have some probability within Aristotle's principles, it does not necessarily conclude from naturally known premises — indeed, it even assumes some falsehoods, even if we remain within the limits of the natural light. For even though it is in fact true, both according to Aristotle and according to the truth, that the heavens are moved by an external mover and not from within — as was said in *disp. 2 of De Caelo, n. 137* — nonetheless it was added immediately at n. 140 that no compelling and necessarily demonstrating reason can be assigned for this, and that it would not involve repugnance for the heavens to move themselves, given that the treasures of God's wisdom and omnipotence are infinite. Furthermore, even if it were demonstrated that the heavens must necessarily be set in motion by an external mover, it would not necessarily follow that this mover must be distinct from the First — since just as God immediately produced the entire universe, so also it can be said, without any reduction or dishonor, that he immediately moves the heavens, just as it is held without dishonor that he immediately concurs in all the actions of secondary causes. Nor is it well deduced that their motion would be instantaneous, for even though the first mover is of infinite power, it nonetheless acts freely *ad extra*, not necessarily — even according to the principles of the natural light — and thus, from its freedom, it can immediately move the heaven successively and in time. Finally, even if it were granted that each heaven has its own proper and immediate mover distinct from God, it is not necessarily proved that these movers must be incorporeal and immaterial; for why could they not move the heavens even if they were corporeal? If you say that such a body would grow weary from the unceasing revolution, the consequence is easily denied: since the heavens are neither heavy nor light, they are moved with less resistance than a feather is by the winds — indeed, with no resistance at all, as Hurtado notes in *disp. 12, Metaphysics, sect. 2*. And if we suppose an inanimate body incapable of fatigue, it would have an innate power of revolving the heavens, as a magnet has of attracting iron and amber has of attracting straws — without any labor. And if you further urge that from this would follow the interpenetration of that moving body with the heaven — since the heavens are contiguous and no body can intervene between them without interpenetration — again the consequence is denied. For

either there would be but one corporeal mover existing on the outer surface of the outermost heaven, or, if each heaven has its own proper mover, God could incorporate it within the sphere moved, concealing it as it were within it, as the sun and the other stars are said to be embedded within their spheres.

The other argument, more evident and appearing to prove conclusively the existence of demons and angels, is drawn from the marvelous effects of magicians and demoniacs: such as breaking chains, smashing doors, being carried through the air, speaking in foreign tongues, foreseeing and divining hidden matters, announcing future events, and so on — as is evident from the history of Exodus in the case of the magicians of Pharaoh, from the responses of idols among the pagans, and in the case of that Simon Magus who flew aloft by demonic power to show that he was God, not the one whom St. Peter preached. Of these prodigies and quasi-miracles, Faber gives a long catalogue from ancient histories in his *opusculum adversus Atheos, disp. 1, ch. 6*. And we observe in demoniacs some rustic person speaking a foreign language that he never learned and never heard spoken by anyone in his presence, and also reasoning about the most hidden matters — effects that cannot be reduced to any natural cause known to us, but seem entirely to be attributed to demons and Intelligences.

There are, however, those who attempt to elude even this argument — or rather to deny that it is not merely very probable but even most evident — by claiming that the cause of these marvelous effects is the celestial bodies, not demons. But this evasion is excellently refuted by Faber in *loc. cit., disp. 1, ch. 7*. Others contend that the aforesaid marvelous effects proceed from the strong imagination of human beings. But these too are excellently refuted by Faber in the same place, *ch. 8*. Others have said that these works occur from the properties of nature — such as from some peculiar constitution of man, or from black bile, or from qualities of the soil — all of which the same most learned Father marvelously rebuts in *loc. cit., ch. 10*. I do not here reproduce his refutations, to avoid excessive length, and also because they are treated with such elegance and learning by him that they deserve to be read in his own words — and without any tedium, since they are beautiful and fascinating.

It remains therefore that these marvelous prodigies can be reduced only to some separated and immaterial substance, imperceptible to our senses, as their true and proper cause; and this will be either God, or a separated soul, or some demon. God cannot be such a cause, since the works of magicians are for the most part directed to evil ends and are evil and pernicious. The flight of Simon Magus, for example, could in no way have had God as its cause — not even permissively — since God would in that case have been a false witness and would have specially favored a lie in order to deceive, which is impious to think. Nor can it be a separated soul, because — as Hurtado and some others hold — a separated soul cannot by its nature without a miracle move a body unless united to it, as experience shows: the soul does not move except through the body united to it,

because it is not an assisting form but an informing one. Moreover, in its actions it depends upon the body, for it is proper to an assisting form to move bodies without being united to them, not to an informing form. And God does not concur miraculously but only permissively with demonic illusions.

But I taught the opposite of this as far more probable in *disp. 8, Physics, q. 3, nn. 32 and 34*: namely, that a separated soul can, like an angel, move other bodies and impress impulse upon them. Hence this proof is not compelling, since those marvelous and very swift motions could be referred to the soul's non-organic motive power, which I have said it can possess and exercise outside the body, following Scotus in *4, dist. 10, q. 7*, as stated there in n. 28. Those various foreign languages and the reasoning about hidden matters in an unlearned person can also be referred to some separated soul that either brought along such species from this life into the state of separation, or received them infused from God immediately after separation. For this reason I said in this second conclusion that there can be adduced for it a certain a posteriori argument that is highly probable, though not absolutely conclusive of the existence of demons, since such effects can be attributed to separated souls.

Nevertheless, because it is perhaps no less difficult to investigate by natural reason the immortality of the soul and the state of its separation — if anyone were moved by the force of this second argument to concede the existence of separated souls, which are incomplete spiritual substances — he can also without great inconvenience equally concede the existence of other complete spiritual substances. On this matter one may consult Daniel Sennert in *tom. 2 of his Practical Medicine, bk. 6, pt. 9*, where he admits illnesses induced by fascination, incantation, and sorcery through the assistance of a demon, because they are difficult to reduce to natural causes.

Question IV: Whether it can be shown by natural reason that God is of infinite power, following Aristotle, and that the other Intelligences have been produced by him

As to the first part of the question, there are two opinions. The first is affirmative, held by Scotus in *2, dist. q. 2* and in *Quodlibet 7, in the solution to the first principal point*, and in the *Treatise on the First Principle*, and by St. Thomas in *pt. 1, q. 25, art. 2*, and consequently by all Scotists and Thomists — Cajetan in *De infinitate Dei*, Soncinas in *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, q. 41, Javellus in the same book, q. 20, Capreolus in *De theologia Aristotelis*, bk. 3, Toletus in *Physics*, bk. 8, q. 8, Coimbricenses in *Physics*, bk. 8, ch. 10, q. 3, Suarez in *disp. 39, Metaphys., q. 2*, Faber in *theor. 54*, Vulpes in *tom. 2, pt. 1, disp. 42, art. 3*, Contarini in *disp. 15, ch. 6*, Bonetus in *De theologia naturali*, bk. 7, ch. 7, Henry of Ghent in *pt. 1, art. 35, q. 6*, Aegidius in *1, dist. 43, q. 1*, Albert in *Physics*, bk. 8, tract. 4, ch. 1, Alexander of Hales in *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, text 41, Saxius in *tom. 2, Catastasis, disp. 1, q. 1*, and many others throughout. The other opinion, negative, belongs to the Nominalists — Ockham in *Quodlibet 7, qq. 22 and 23*,

Armandus in 1, *dist.* 42, q. 3, art. 1, Baccone in 1, *dist.* 43, 44, 45, Piccolomini in *De motoribus coelorum*, ch. 33, Zabarella in *Physics*, bk. 8, in the commentary on texts 78 and 79, Bonamicus in *De motu*, bk. 10, ch. 20, Ragusaeus in *disp.* 10 of the *Peripatetica*, who says that God's infinite power cannot be proved even by natural reason and that infinity of power of the First Mover is held by faith alone.

It must nonetheless be said that it can be proved by natural reason that God is of infinite power in acting, as well as from Aristotle. The conclusion is that of Scotus in *loc. cit.* and is proved by an a priori argument: for it is naturally known that God is formally infinite being with respect to entitative perfection, since he is being by essence, existing of himself and entirely independent of another; therefore it will also be naturally known a priori that God has infinite causative power. For a being with infinite and unlimited existence cannot have finite and limited power. The antecedent is clear from what was said in q. 1. The Doctor proves the consequence in *Quodlibet* 7, lit. Y: what possesses entity of itself possesses of itself the active power that follows upon it; and what possesses something of itself possesses it in the full plenitude that can belong to it — for nothing is possessed in a limited way in some being unless it is possessed from some agent that determines it to a certain degree. For if one being were to have the plenitude of entity of itself, and another being were not to have such plenitude of itself but only a thoroughly limited entity, there would be no reason why the former should have more plenitude of entity than the latter — it would seem to be a matter of chance, which cannot obtain in things that exist of themselves. Therefore, from the fact that God possesses entity and power of himself, it follows that he possesses them with full plenitude, and consequently as formally and intensively infinite. By the same argument Suarez also proved a priori in *Metaphysics*, *disp.* 30, sect. 2, n. 22 the entitative infinity of God — from which the infinity of power follows: what is being by participation can be limited either by the will of the one giving only so much perfection and no more, or by the capacity of the recipient; but what is being by essence can be limited by nothing, because just as it has no cause upon which it depends, so it has no principle by which it is limited. Since God is being by essence, and since his perfection can be limited by nothing, it follows that it is infinite.

Ragusaeus responds in *disp.* 10, ch. 14 that the divine perfection is limited by no external principle, but by itself: just as God exists of himself, so he has of himself that degree of perfection which befits the first being — and this degree is the highest among all beings, though not infinite. This solution is easily rejected. First, no reason can be given, as the Doctor argued, why God would have determined and limited himself in this way. Second, given any degree of perfection whatever in any being, it does not involve a contradiction for a more perfect being to exist — if that degree is finite; therefore it does involve a contradiction for God to have a determinate finite degree of perfection, because God, as Anselm says, is of such formal nature that a greater than him cannot be conceived. Third, either this highest being — such as God would be supposed to be by that hypothesis — would

be capable of greater perfection, or incapable of it: if incapable, then it is something finite and limited both positively and permissively; but if capable of greater perfection, it remains to be asked why it has been determined of itself to this many degrees of perfection and no more. Fourth, limitation is a kind of privation and deficiency, which is repugnant to the first being on account of its supreme perfection; whence it follows that the first being cannot be supremely perfect unless it is posited as formally infinite. Fifth, in that case no repugnance could be assigned as to why another God should not be possible — for it is usually shown that two infinities are repugnant, as Scotus proves in *Quodlibet* 5; but two finites do not involve repugnance, even if both are supposed to be supreme, because as the Doctor notes in 3, *dist.* 13, *q.* 1, to the positively supreme it is repugnant to have anything greater than itself, but not repugnant to have an equal. Sixth and finally, Ragusaeus himself in *disp.* 10, *ch.* on the fourth argument of Scotus concedes, on the hypothesis that God is a finite being, however most eminent above all other beings, that absolutely speaking something more perfect than God is possible as finite being, though not as most eminent being in the composite sense. But this directly conflicts with the very notion of God, who according to the natural light must by his formal nature be so perfect that nothing more perfect than him can be conceived. Therefore the natural light itself sufficiently indicates that God must be an infinite being in entity and consequently also in power, as Bonetus deduces in *loc. cit.*, § *de primo motore*: just as a thing stands in relation to entity, so also in relation to power. Let the reader consult the Doctor in 1, *dist.* 2, *q.* 2, § *ofonsis igitur*, where he proves in four ways from natural principles the infinity of God in entity and power; and also Alexander of Hales in *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, text 41, who proves it also from the mode of action: because God produces from nothing, which is an act of infinite power.

Furthermore, the Doctor in *Quodlibet* 7, *ad 1 princ.* proves that this is also the mind of Aristotle from *Physics*, bk. 8, texts 78 and 79, and *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, text 41. In these passages Aristotle proves that the First Mover is indivisible and impartible and has no magnitude whatsoever — and this because it has infinite power, which can be found neither in a finite magnitude nor in an infinite one, since the latter does not exist. He proves that it has intensively infinite power because it moves for infinite time. So he expressly argues in *Physics*, bk. 8, but still more clearly in *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, text 41, in these words: "that there is therefore some eternal, immobile substance, separated from sensible things, is clear from what has been said. It has also been shown that this substance cannot possibly have any magnitude, but is impartible and indivisible; for it moves for infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power; and since every magnitude is either finite or infinite, it cannot for this reason have finite magnitude, nor infinite magnitude, since there is no infinite magnitude at all." From this the common solution of the adversaries is rejected — their claim that Aristotle is there speaking only of infinite power of the First Mover with respect to duration, and that he uses this as a premise to prove that the First Mover lacks magnitude. Ragusaeus endeavors to

show in *ch.* 8 from Aristotle's own argument that this is the case. It is rejected, I say, because when Aristotle from this proves that the First Mover is not in magnitude, because it has infinite power — he is plainly speaking of that infinity to which being in magnitude is repugnant. But to infinity with respect to duration, being in magnitude is not repugnant: for the heaven, as Aristotle says, has infinite power with respect to duration — since it is indestructible and will communicate its power to these lower things through infinite time — yet it is in magnitude. Therefore Aristotle is speaking of intensive infinity of power, not of duration; otherwise the argument would not conclude. This is confirmed from Aristotle's own reasoning in *Physics*, bk. 8, text 78. Wishing to prove that the First Mover lacks magnitude because it is of infinite power, he takes as a middle term the proposition that it is impossible for anything finite to move for infinite time. The question then is: when he says that nothing finite can move for infinite time, is he speaking of finiteness of power with respect to duration, or with respect to intensity? The former cannot be said, because then Aristotle's proposition would be absurd — for the sense would be that something that endures for only a finite time cannot move a body through infinite time. Therefore he is speaking there of finiteness and infinity of power with respect to intensity. The same is gathered from the other argument at text 79, where again he proves that the First Mover is devoid of all magnitude: if infinite power, such as that of the First Mover, were in a magnitude, it would move in non-time, and so on. Again the question is how Aristotle takes the infinity of power in this assumption: if he is speaking of intensive infinity, the conclusion is obtained; but if of infinity with respect to duration, the assumption would again be false, since the power of acting upon these lower things in the heaven is of infinite duration according to Aristotle, and yet it does not act upon them instantaneously — heating and generating in a moment. Therefore Aristotle is speaking of the infinity of power with respect to intensity; and this he takes as the middle term for proving that the First Mover is devoid of all magnitude. The infinity with respect to duration on the part of the motion he takes as the middle term for inducing infinity with respect to intensity in the mover — because nothing finite can move for infinite time.

But you will say that from intensity of infinity in the aforesaid sense on the part of motion, infinite power with respect to intensity in the mover does not seem well deduced, since the power of moving for infinite time belongs also to the other Intelligences, which are not for that reason considered to be of infinite vigor. Alexander of Hales in *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, text 41, responds to this difficulty: moving through infinite time can be of two kinds — either in one's own power, or in the power of another; what moves in the first way is of infinite power, and what moves in the second way need not be of infinite power. We see that, according to the opinion of the Philosopher, the heaven moves these lower things for infinite time, and yet is not for that reason of infinite power — because it moves in the power of another. So says Alexander, and Scotus agrees with him there in his commentary on the same text, and in *Quodlibet* 7, *lit.* Y.

Yet against this solution the Doctor subtly presses in the same place: if Aristotle's inference holds in this sense — namely, because it moves for infinite time of itself and not in the power of another — then the inference would appear inept, since the same consequence would be equally deduced if it were moving with finite motion but of itself. He responds, however: I grant that the main force lies in this — that the First Mover moves of itself; yet the argument about infinite motion has some evidentiary weight, since according to Aristotle the first motion is first in being infinite, and thus that motion is more proper to the First Mover. But the primacy of motion is a proper middle term for the present purpose, if the antecedent is understood as: it moves with infinite motion through the first infinity — that is, an infinity not derived from the infinity of another's motion, but from the power of that mover alone. Yet since Aristotle did not explicitly state that phrase "of itself," the Doctor says at *lit. X*: I therefore grant, given that conclusion, that Aristotle either sufficiently proved his intention or did not — but he understood the infinity of power as intensive; and it is indeed plausible that Aristotle implied that phrase, since he was speaking of the First Mover, which moves of itself.

Ragusaesus presses again at *cit., n. 11*: even granting that the First Mover moves of itself, it does not yet follow well from this that it is of infinite power, but only that it is the most perfect of all movers and surpasses all others in perfection. Against this, Scotus shows in *lit. Y* that it follows well that the power of the First Mover is intensively infinite, because what possesses active power of itself possesses entity of itself; and what possesses something of itself possesses it in the full plenitude that can belong to it — for nothing is possessed in a limited way in some being unless it is possessed from some agent determining it to a certain degree. Therefore from the fact that the First Mover moves of itself, it follows well that it is of intensively infinite power.

In opposition, Ragusaesus argues in *disp. 10, cit., ch. 10*, proving that infinite power of the First Mover cannot be accommodated to Aristotle's philosophical principles — and that moreover this same infinite power entirely overturns all philosophy. First, in *De Caelo*, bk. 1, text 76, Aristotle expressly denies that God can create several worlds, which is incompatible with infinite power. Second, in *De Caelo*, bk. 2, text 35, he teaches that the motion of the first heaven is of determinate velocity, because the First Mover has a determinate power in moving — yet the heaven could move much faster if the First Mover were of infinite power. Third, because in *Physics*, bk. 1, with the agreement of all philosophers, he affirms that nothing comes from nothing — which he would not have asserted if he had posited the First Mover as of infinite power, since in that case something could indeed be made from nothing. Fourth, according to the same Aristotle there is no return from privation to possession; but if the infinity of the First Mover were admitted, one would also have to concede the resurrection of the dead according to his doctrine. Fifth, Aristotle would also be compelled to concede that prime matter can exist without form, and accidents without a subject — for all these

things can be brought about by an agent of infinite power. Finally, given this admission, he would also be compelled to admit that God either does nothing at all, or produces every effect as infinite — since what acts by natural necessity, as Scotus holds that God acts according to Aristotle's position, acts with full effort and endeavors to produce an effect similar to itself.

In response, and for the resolution, it must be noted from Scotus in *Quodlibet* 7, *cit.*, § *de consequentia autem*, that when the Doctor says Aristotle knew God to be of infinite power, by "infinite power" he does not mean omnipotence in the sense in which theologians commonly take it — that is, infinite active power of producing anything whatsoever immediately and without secondary causes. Such omnipotence and infinity of power Aristotle did not know, because he posited a necessary connection of causes — so that according to him it is impossible for primary causes to act without secondary ones, or for the absolutely primary cause to act without a secondary cause. And this, the Doctor says, is the reason why Aristotle did not concede that matter can exist without form, as treated in 2, *dist.* 12, *q.* 2, *lit.* F, nor accidents without a subject or subject without accidents, in 4, *dist.* 12, *q.* 1, *sub lit.* E. Thus by "infinite power" Aristotle understood an active power intrinsically infinite in producing anything whatsoever, yet necessarily tied to the concurrence of secondary causes.

From this the objections of Ragusaeus are easily answered. To the first: it must be said following Scotus in 2, *dist.* 3, *q.* 7 *in fine* that according to Aristotle, other worlds cannot be produced by God even if he is of infinite power — because the world as actually produced consists of the totality of matter, not only actual but also potential, so that the impossibility must be considered not on God's side but on the side of the thing, since nothing new could be produced in the immobile and sempiternal things, insofar as they are immobile and sempiternal. And because the theologians do not agree with him in this proposition — that every sempiternal body consists of the entire actual and potential matter of its species — there is no reason to agree with him in the conclusion. To the second: Aristotle there says indeed that the motion of the first heaven is of determinate velocity, but in no way says this is because of the determinate power of the First Mover in moving; rather, it is on account of the requirements of the effects to be produced by the heaven in these lower things. Hence by reason of itself the heaven could certainly move more swiftly — since the First Mover is of infinite power in moving — but by reason of the effects it cannot, since it must use secondary causes and act through them on account of the necessary connection it has with them through the imperfection of the effects.

To the third: when Aristotle, agreeing with the Ancient philosophers, said that nothing comes from nothing, he was speaking in the order of natural agents and secondary causes; for he concedes that some things were made from eternity from nothing by the first cause. And indeed he acknowledged eternal creation, as will be clear below. Wherefore, if infinite power is required for creation — that is,

for making something from nothing — as the more common opinion holds, the argument is turned against the opponent. To the fourth: the consequence is denied, since according to the Philosopher, God cannot act without secondary causes in his operation, and acts according to their requirements; so if forms once corrupted, or joined to matter, cannot by their own nature return to inform the same matter again, neither can they return through the power of God — which is necessarily bound to secondary causes. To the fifth: the consequence is likewise denied, for the same reason: because of the essential order of secondary causes with the first, necessarily required according to the Philosopher, the first cause cannot produce the effect of a secondary cause without that secondary cause itself. Hence, since prime matter concurs as material cause to the eduction of form, and subject to the eduction of accidents — and sometimes even in the genus of efficient cause — it follows that according to Aristotle neither through God's power can there be matter without form, or subject without accident, or conversely, as the Doctor has taught in *loc. cit.*

To the last objection: the impossibility of God's producing an infinite effect *ad extra*, even if according to Aristotle he were posited as acting by natural necessity, plainly cannot be resolved into a limitation of divine power, but must rather be attributed to the repugnance of the creature itself — which cannot be produced as infinite, since by the very fact of being from another it is finite and limited, as Scotus teaches in *1, dist. 43, lit. B*. Yet Alexander of Hales adds in *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, text 41, on this same question, that the power of an agent must be measured not only by what is made or by the action, but also by the mode of acting. Even if therefore everything made and created by this power is finite, nonetheless the mode of acting — which is from nothing — cannot belong to anything other than infinite power.

But the Doctor still subtly presses in *1, dist. 2, q. 2 in fine*: if Aristotle posited God as of infinite power, and together with this posited him as acting naturally *ad extra*, he would act in non-time. The Doctor responds there: he frankly grants that these two positions are not sufficiently coherent in the Philosopher's own system; and therefore below in *dist. 8, q. 5* he says that Aristotle truly concealed contradictions when on the one hand he posited God as of infinite power and acting necessarily *ad extra*, and on the other posited him as acting successively and contingency as existing in things — for from the first position it follows evidently that God acts *ad extra* in non-time and that all contingency is removed from things. This difficulty does not press upon the theologians or Peripatetics who hold that God is a free agent *ad extra*: for even if they say that God is of infinite power, it does not follow that he acts in non-time, since just as it is in his power to act or not to act, so also it is in his power to act in time or to act in non-time. Many other arguments against our assertion — that this was not Aristotle's mind — are adduced and resolved by Faber in *theor. 54, ch. 3*; and yet other arguments for the opposing opinion are dissolved by Bargius in *1, dist. 2, q. 2 in fine*, to whom, as fellow Scotists, I refer the reader.

As for the other part of the question — concerning the production of the other Intelligences by God — Scotus in *Quodlibet* 7, § *sed quia* says two things: first, that such production and causation of the other Intelligences by the First is naturally demonstrable; and second, that Aristotle himself conceded this.

He proves the first point as follows: there cannot be two intellectual natures that are both simply infinite; but every intellectual nature, if it exists of itself — that is, if it is uncaused — is itself simply infinite; therefore there cannot be several intellectual natures that are simply uncaused. The first is uncaused — otherwise it would not be first; therefore every other intellectual nature is caused. He proved the major at length in 1, *dist.* 2, *q.* 1; he proves the minor in the same place, because what has existence of itself has it with all plenitude and without any limitation whatsoever, as was deduced above.

That such a causation of the Intelligences by the First was conceded by Aristotle the Doctor proves in *loc. cit.*, *Quodlibet*, § *secundum scilicet quod*, from various statements of Aristotle, as was proved in detail in *disp.* 6, *Metaphys.*, *q.* 6 *de causis necessariorum*, *art.* 1. Moreover, under *lit. Hh* of the same place, he also explains the mode of this production as understood by Aristotle, which Faber further clarifies in *theor.* 56, *de causatione Intelligentiarum*, *ch.* 3, drawing upon Averroes and Zimara in *theor.* 12. Contarini also approves this in *disp. de productione universi a Deo*, *ch.* 4. And because Avicenna seems to have explained the mode of production of the Intelligences even more fully than Aristotle, the Doctor adds that this was also the explicit intention of Avicenna in *Metaphysics*, bk. 9, *ch.* 4: that every Intelligence is caused by the First — and perhaps in this he not only does not contradict Aristotle but clarifies what Aristotle left unexplained concerning the mode and order of production. If it is said that Aristotle posited every Intelligence as produced immediately by the First, then Avicenna, with respect to the order he introduces, contradicts Aristotle; but on the point that the Intelligence is produced, there is agreement. And concerning the mode of that causation, sufficient understanding can be had from Avicenna's intention: he did not posit it as through motion and mutation, or with any novelty, but held that the entire being of an Intelligence always was from the First, and in diversity of essence — just as we hold that the Son always is from the Father in the same essence. And just as according to Aristotle there is sempiternal light in those transparent bodies which never fall under the shadow of any body — that is, bodies capable of casting shadow in the universe — and yet that perpetual light in the illuminated bodies would be posited as effectively from the Sun; for that light would not be said to be formally from itself, because then it would not be of the same nature as the light in the part that is sometimes not illuminated. For that light, since it is new, is certainly caused by the Sun; and what is caused is not of the same nature as what is from itself. So too must it be said proportionally regarding the production of the Intelligences from the first efficient.

Against this assertion regarding the production of the Intelligences by God, many objections are commonly raised, which have already been resolved in *disp. 6, Metaphys., cit., q. 6, art. 1, from n. 122*. Only one difficulty raised there was not fully resolved but was deferred to this place. The difficulty was this: if the Intelligences had been produced from eternity immediately by God, together with the heavens and prime matter, this could only have been through creation — since they are simple substances — but Aristotle did not admit creation, because he always said that nothing comes from nothing. Therefore, for the full resolution of this difficulty, we must see here briefly whether Aristotle truly admitted some creation — at least an eternal one — of necessary beings.

That creation was entirely unknown to Aristotle is held by numerous Peripatetics: Henry of Ghent in *Quodlibet 8, q. 9*, Gregory in *2, dist. 1, q. 1*, Jandun in *Metaphysics*, bk. 2, q. 5, Aureolus in *4, proem. q., art. 1*, Marsilius in *2, q. 1, art. 1*. These have been stubbornly followed by Piccolomini in *De Creatione* and Pererius in *Physics*, bk. 5, ch. 7, where he assembles many authorities and arguments from Aristotle for this purpose. First, because in *Physics*, bk. 1, texts 33 and 34, Aristotle commends the common decree of all the Ancients that nothing can come from nothing. Second, nothing can be made from simply non-being, *Physics*, bk. 1, text 75. Third, not just anything comes from just anything, but each thing from its opposite, which is either a contrary or a privation, *Physics*, bk. 1, text 43. Fourth, in *Metaphysics*, bk. 7, text 22, he says that everything that is made is made from something. Fifth, Aristotle never in the *Physics* or in the *Metaphysics* defines an efficient cause except as that from which the principle of motion arises, and never indicated this mode of effecting by creation without motion and mutation. Sixth, in *Metaphysics*, bk. 5, text 17, he defines active power through passive power, saying that it is the principle of changing another as other; and for him there can be no agent without a patient, nor action without passion and a subject — all of which is contrary to creation, in which we see an agent without a patient and active power without passive. Seventh, in *Physics*, bk. 1, text 82, he proves that prime matter was not produced, because it would have had to be produced from another prior matter, which is absurd; therefore he knew no production other than from matter. Similarly in bk. 8 he proves the eternity of time and motion from the fact that if these were made, they would have been made by motion and time. Eighth, in *De Caelo*, bk. 1, he refutes Plato, who said that the heaven was born from some principle but would never perish, because what begins to be has been made from matter and is therefore corruptible. From all this Pererius concludes that nothing can be found or conceived more contrary to the opinion of Aristotle and Peripatetic doctrine than creation.

The opposite opinion, which is more common and more probable, holds that eternal creation at least was never expressly denied by Aristotle, and that on the contrary he not obscurely intimated it in certain passages. This is the view of Averroes in *Metaphysics*, bk. 2, com. 4, and bk. 12, com. 44, and in *De substantia Orbis*, ch. 2, and likewise Aphrodisias in the same place; Scotus in *2, dist. 1, q. 3* and

Quodlibet 7; St. Thomas in *Physics*, bk. 8, *lect.* 2; Durandus in 1, *dist.* 35, n. 3, n. 7; Richard in 2, *dist.* 1, *art.* 3, q. 2; Major in the same place, q. 2; Argentinas in 2, *dist.* 1, q. 1, *art.* 3; Thomists generally, such as Cajetan in *De ente et essentia*, q. 10, Soncinas in *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, qq. 15 and 16, Javellus in the same place, q. 5, Soto in *Physics*, bk. 8, q. 2, Bannes in *pt.* 1, q. 44, *art.* 1, *ad* 7, Molina in q. 45, *art.* 1 *in fine*, Suarez in *Metaphysics*, *disp.* 20, *sect.* 2, n. 26, Toletus in *Physics*, bk. 8, q. 6, Coimbricenses in the same place, *ch.* 2, q. 2, *art.* 2, Contarini in *disp. de productione universi a Deo*, *ch.* 8, Capreolus in *De theologia Aristotelis*, bk. 3, *ch.* 139; and Scotists as well, such as Faber in *theor.* 56, *ch.* 4, Ferchius in *vestigia* 1 and 2 — where he also admits a new and temporal creation as the mind of Aristotle, in which he has clearly gone too far, as was said in *disp. 1 de Caelo*, q. 5 *ab initio* — Saxius in *tom.* 2, *Catastasis*, *disp.* 1, q. 3, and many others.

This opinion is sufficiently established from what was said in *disp.* 6, *Metaphys.*, q. 6, *art.* 1, where it was settled as the mind of the Philosopher that eternal things were produced from eternity by God through simple emanation, without motion and mutation — which nonetheless is creation and production from nothing, with nothing preceding the thing itself except in the negative order of nature, not the positive order, as was explained there. But beyond what was said there, this can also be proved from *Physics*, bk. 8, text 15 near the end, where Aristotle reproves Democritus for not wanting to inquire into the principle of sempiternal things — that is, for having said that eternal things which always exist have no cause from which they were made; and Aristotle shows that eternity does not prevent eternal things from having a cause. He proves this by the example of the triangle, which has three angles equal to two right angles — this was true from eternity, and yet it also had a cause from eternity. When he adds there that "of principles that are perpetual there is no further cause," he is speaking of complex and demonstrable principles.

But the passage clearest of all that one could desire on this difficulty is found in the book *De mundo ad Alexandrum*, *ch.* 6, where Aristotle expresses the dependence of all things on God in the genus of efficient cause through creation, in these words: "an ancient tradition, established among men, holds that all things were constituted and conjoined both from God and through God," and so on. Some also prove this from the rational soul: in *De generatione animalium*, bk. 2, *ch.* 3, Aristotle said that the soul comes "from without" — that is, it is not educed from the potency of matter — and consequently is made through creation. But Scotus does not approve this argument in 4, *dist.* 43, q. 2, *lit.* M: although according to Aristotle the production of the rational soul is not an eduction — since in its coming to be it does not depend on matter as something that must necessarily pre-exist in its making — yet neither is it a properly called creation, because there is no posited action of God upon the soul prior to its union with matter; and consequently it does not come about by a proper action from which the soul receives existence before being united to matter. The Doctor therefore says that

God's action upon the soul holds a kind of middle place between eduction and creation properly so called. On this see *disp. 1, de anima, q. 10, n. 156*.

To the authorities adduced in opposition, the solution is easy. To the first: it has already been said in *disp. 6, q. 6, art. 1, n. 122* that that proposition "nothing comes from nothing" is received by Aristotle as universally true with respect to a natural agent of finite power, and also with respect to a supernatural agent when it produces things through generation in the manner of a natural agent and through motion or mutation — but not when it produces through simple emanation without the intervention of generation, motion, or mutation. In this way the Intelligences were immediately produced from eternity coeternal with God, according to Aristotle. To the three subsequent authorities: these speak of productions customary to a natural agent through generation, motion, and mutation; but especially in *Physics*, bk. 1, text 75, and *Metaphysics*, bk. 7, Aristotle speaks specifically of the production of composites, not of simple things, and says that these cannot be made from nothing but must necessarily be from something as a part. To the fifth and sixth: it has already been said above in *disp. 6, cit., q. 6, n. 123* that Aristotle in *Metaphysics*, bk. 9, text 1, expressly conceded active power and efficiency without motion — as is explained there by the commentators, and especially by Alexander of Hales, commenting on what the Philosopher says there: "power extends further than what is said only according to motion." Aristotle regularly defines the efficient cause through motion in the physical manner, because this mode of acting is proper to natural agents and is therefore more familiar and known to us. And it is in this same sense that he says every efficient agent — that is, acting through motion and mutation — has a corresponding passive subject in every action. To the seventh: it has also been said in *disp. 6, n. 122* that Aristotle there does not prove that matter is simply unproduced, but only that it is not generated and is not generable — for generation is production from a pre-existing subject — and from this he concludes that matter cannot be made by a natural agent, which can make nothing except by generating. He does not, however, conclude in any way that it cannot be or has not been made by God, who through the infinity of his power can found things by a mode other than generation. Similarly it was said in *loc. cit., n. 125* that Aristotle in *Physics*, bk. 8, argues *ad hominem* against the Ancients, who said that motion and time were made, and that the world itself was generated in time, and yet acknowledged no mode of making other than through motion and time — against whom he argues, as it were, from their own concessions. To the last objection: the argument against Plato also is *ad hominem*, since Plato said the heaven was of elemental nature, made from matter; from which, since matter is the principle of corruption, Aristotle rightly concludes, from Plato's own concessions, that the heaven will one day be corrupted.

But you will press further: for Aristotle, "ungenerated" and "eternal" are convertible terms, as stated in *De Caelo*, bk. 1, text 125; but the world in Aristotle's view is eternal; therefore it is ungenerated. Furthermore, given creation, the

argument collapses by which in *Physics*, bk. 8, and *Metaphysics*, bk. 12, Aristotle proves that the mobile and motion are eternal — for otherwise, he says, the mobile would have been made through motion and motion through motion.

In response: although for Aristotle "eternal" and "ungenerated" are convertible — that is, not generated by true and proper generation, which is from a subject — yet "eternal" and "unproduced" are not convertible, since in *Physics*, bk. 8, text 15, he teaches that there is no repugnance for eternal things, even as eternal, to have a principle and cause of their entity, though not of their duration. And for this reason he reproved Democritus for universally refusing to inquire into the principle of sempiternal things. Moreover, if "eternal" and "unproduced" were convertible for Aristotle, he would not have labored so in *Physics*, bk. 8, to show the eternity of the world — as I noted in *disp. 6, n. 125* — since he could have argued simply and directly: everything unproduced is eternal, the world is unproduced, therefore eternal. Since he did not use this obvious argument, he not obscurely signified that for him "eternal" and "unproduced" are not convertible. To the other objection: it has already been said above that Aristotle in *Physics*, bk. 8, argues *ad hominem* from the position of the Ancients, who acknowledged only production through motion and from matter — against whom he presses as follows: motion cannot be made through motion, otherwise in the making of motions there would be an infinite regress; but according to you, whatever is made is made through motion; therefore motion was not made; therefore it is eternal — for they too admitted that what was not made is eternal.

Finally, the argument is pressed as follows: Aristotle knew only what can be shown by natural reason; but the possibility of creation cannot be shown by natural reason — indeed, the opposite seems rather to be the case; therefore, etc. The minor is proved in multiple ways. First, it involves a contradiction for there to be a production of something that is only in active potency and not in passive potency — just as conversely it involves a contradiction for there to be a production of something that is only in passive potency and not in active potency. But this would follow if creation were possible. Second, in creation being as being would be producible, since creation is the production of a thing according to its entire reality; but this cannot be said, for in that case God himself could be the terminus of creation. Third and finally, nothing cannot be converted into something, for one opposite cannot be changed into another opposite — but this would follow if creation were possible, as Aureolus proves at length in *4, proem. q., art. 1*. Therefore, etc.

In response: the minor is denied along with its proofs. As for the first proof, although it is the opinion of many theologians that it cannot be demonstrated that any thing has been or can be made through creation, the opposite is more probable and is the mind of the Doctor in *2, dist. 1, q. 2, ubi § Respondeo*, where he proves as follows that the possibility of creation is not repugnant to God: God can immediately cause and produce something; therefore he can create and make

something from nothing. Indeed the antecedent is manifest, because God is the first efficient cause from 2, *dist. 1*, bk. 1; if he can make nothing immediately, then neither can he make anything mediately — since he is the first efficient cause — and so he would produce no effect. The consequence is proved: if he can produce something, then what he produces does not have necessary formal existence of itself, and has existence from a cause; therefore it has existence after non-existence in the understanding of that member; and it is also produced immediately with nothing else presupposed, because if it presupposed something else, that something else would be an effect of him, as is clear from *dist. 8* of bk. 1; therefore it would not be immediately produced by him. We have therefore — concludes the Doctor — from the first antecedent to this consequence, that the First produces something in the order of nature from non-being to being, with nothing presupposed. According to this understanding, therefore, he creates; and this argument, the Doctor says, seems to be intimated by Avicenna in *Metaphysics*, bk. 6, *ch. 2*. Moreover, it seems that not only the possibility of creation but even its actual existence can be shown by the natural light — at least concerning prime matter. For since prime matter is most imperfect, it is easily understood that it does not exist of itself — since to exist of itself is the most perfect of all perfections. But it cannot exist from another through generation, since generation presupposes a pre-existing subject. Therefore it must exist through creation. Hence Pererius, in *Physics*, bk. 5, *ch. 7*, though he stubbornly maintains that creation was unknown to Aristotle, nonetheless admits that it can be shown by the natural light — for which he adduces eight arguments that may be found in his text. On this see also Suarez in *Metaphysics*, *disp. 20, sect. 2*.

Therefore in response to the proposed argument, the minor is to be denied together with its proofs. To the first, the major is denied as to its first part, along with the parallel assumed in the proof: for passive potency essentially implies an order to active potency, so that it is altogether impossible for a subject to which passive potency belongs to be actualized without an agent having the power to bring it to act. But active potency considered universally does not necessarily have regard for passive potency — that is, for a subject or patient upon which to act — but only for an effect; and hence a thing can be produced from nothing. To the second, the inference of the major is denied: because being as such does not express a subjective reality capable of production, distinct from the reality of this or that being, but expresses an inadequate concept, as is clear from *disp. 2*. Therefore only finite being is producible; infinite being, which is found in God, is unproducible; and the concept of being abstracted from both prescribes from both — that is, from the producible and the unproducible. To the third, the minor is denied: when it is said that something is made from nothing in creation, this must not be understood as if nothing were converted into something, or as if nothing were the matter from which the being is made — for this would be altogether repugnant. Thus the preposition "from" does not denote the relation of a material cause, but the relation of an order that is customarily found between

a terminus from which and a terminus to which, as Scotus explains in 2, *dist. 1, q. 2*, § *Respondeo*, following Anselm in *Monologion*, *ch. 8*: the sense being that what was nothing in real act begins to be something through the action of another — in which no repugnance appears. And if it is preferred to understand the particle "from" according to the relation of a material cause, then it must be given a negative rather than positive exposition from the same Anselm: just as someone is said to speak of nothing, that is of no thing — for in this sense what is created is said to be made from nothing, that is, from no pre-existing thing that has with respect to it either the character of a subject or of a constitutive part. Thus the particle "from" in the definition of creation can be taken in two ways: either as expressing an order of one after another — that is, of prior and posterior — so that the categorical sense is "from nothing at all something is made," meaning "after nothing something is made," as day is said to be made from night, meaning after night; or as excluding something really pre-existing as a cause of the thing to be made, whether as matter or as form. Therefore in creation what was nothing can become being, not through the conversion of nothing into being — as Aureolus contends — but because after nothing being is made, as day is said to be made from night. Those who wish to see the arguments of Aureolus resolved one by one may consult Capreolus in *De theologia Aristotelis*, bk. 3, *chh. 141, 142*, and following, where he treats this matter most precisely. And these and many other arguments he resolves there — arguments which I here omit since they properly pertain to the theological treatment of Creation; as do also many other things belonging to this disputation concerning God and the Intelligences, which are more conveniently treated in Theology in their proper treatises. And here let the final hand be placed upon this metaphysical work, for the glory of God.

THE END.