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QUESTION I. In what consists the formal nature of Habitual Sin.

I SUPPOSE first, that something physical remains in the sinful person after the act of actual sin has passed, according to Scotus, 4, distinction 14, question 1, section 6. Because it is universally true that from the repetition of the act of stealing, for example, a habit is generated, which is a facility for similar acts, and therefore the sinner accustomed to it, after he has been justified, remains inclined to steal. And in this there is no controversy.

But it should be noted first: that the aforesaid doctrine is true not only of mortal sin, but also of venial sin: because the same reason applies to both. Secondly, that from frequently repeated sin of omission, a vicious habit is not generated, if the omission formally, or precisely taken, is considered: because a habit is a positive quality (as the common opinion holds against Durandus) which cannot be produced by the mere absence of an act, such as is omission. But if the sin of omission is taken for the reflective acts, by which we almost always will the omission, a habit will be generated: because since it is universally true that an acquired habit is generated from the repetition of acts, at least natural ones, it does not appear why the act, which is the cause of the omission, should not generate a habit or vicious disposition.

2 I suppose secondly: From this kind of physically sinful habit, a person is not said to be habitually a sinner according to Scotus in the same place. And this is the common opinion. For to an adult, who worthily receives the sacrament of Baptism, all sins are remitted, and yet the perverse habits to which he was accustomed are not immediately taken away from him: as is evident from experience, therefore from the aforesaid habits a person is not or is not called a sinner. Only Gregory in 2, distinction 30, question 2, affirmed the opposite, who first objected St. Augustine in the book on the perfection of justice saying: A vicious habit is a quality according to which the mind is evil. But it is answered that a vicious habit is called by Augustine evil and making the mind evil not formally, but causally: in the sense in which the Council of Trent, session 5, declares that concupiscence or the tinder is called sin by the Apostle; not because it is sin truly and properly, but because it is from sin and inclines to sin. Secondly, he said that just as from the habit of chastity a person is formally called habitually chaste, so similarly from a vicious and sinful habit he will be called a sinner, but it is answered by denying the consequence, for from the acceptance of terms and the agreement of Theologians and Fathers, habitual sin is not taken for a physical habit, but for habitual moral malice.

It is, however, certain with all Catholics, that after the act of sin, whether of commission or omission, has passed, something remains in the soul, from which, by way of habit, a person is truly and properly called a sinner. This sin is signified by various names in the sacred writings: it is called filth and stain of the soul, which is caused in it from metaphorical contact, or love of a base and prohibited object:

according to that of Leviticus 11:17, "whoever touches their carcasses will be polluted and will be unclean until evening," that is, until penance: for just as a clean body is said to contract a stain when from contact with a filthy body it loses its brightness and splendor, so the soul contracts a spiritual stain by inordinately adhering to a creature: for by this it loses the brightness of grace.

3 I suppose thirdly: That although in fact after the intrinsic and extrinsic transient act there also remains in the soul a certain habitual injustice, which is the privation of grace, a person is not called a sinner from that: otherwise one who had committed two thousand sins, and one who had committed one, would be equally sinners intensively and extensively, supposing that before they sinned, they had equal grace. And in this also there is no controversy. For I think no Thomist has so far constituted the formal reason of habitual sin in the privation of grace precisely taken. But if some affirm this, see the objections in Scotus 2, distinction 37, from section 3, which our Philip Faber excellently expounds in the additions to 4 of Scotus, treatise on Penance, disputation 10, chapter 1. Therefore, all Thomists add something either as a material connotation, or as something formal following the privation of grace. For the decision of which:

4 Let the first conclusion be: Although the privation of grace by ordinary law is simultaneously with the stain or habitual mortal sin; That, however, is totally and adequately independent of it. It is proved, because in the state of pure nature there could have been habitual mortal sin; but then the privation of grace would have been impossible, therefore, etc. Whence it is clear that the privation of grace, which in fact is found simultaneously with habitual sin, is entirely accidental and merely accompanying with respect to the aforesaid stain, if we attend to its essence.

You will say with Valencia and other Thomists: In the state of pure nature, sin would be of a different nature than it is now: For then it would only have been destructive in the genus of moral cause (as we Scotists say) of the grace and natural benevolence of God toward us, or joining us with Him as a natural end; But now it is destructive of supernatural grace, or joining us with Him as a supernatural end: therefore, the mortal sin of that and this state are not of the same nature. It is answered with our Iribarne in distinction 14, disputation 1, section 6, §1, by distinguishing the consequent, they are not of the same nature, if mortal sin is taken for the foundation, or dignity, which it has from itself and from its nature, I deny the consequence (for as such in whatever state it would be of the same nature: since always and by its own nature it would have the dignity or foundation, so that God would deservedly bind His pact or decree to it, by which He decrees to destroy grace at its position, or friendship of both the natural and supernatural order: Adultery, for example, by its nature has whence it can found formal demerit of grace both supernatural and natural, which a jocular word does not have.) It is not of the same nature, insofar as it is subject to the divine pact, I concede the consequence: For thus the sin of pure nature and the sin of this nature would be of a different nature: because then it

would only have conjoined the pact or decree of destroying only natural friendship; but now it has the decree of destroying friendship both natural and supernatural.

5 Second conclusion: Habitual mortal sin does not consist fundamentally in the privation of grace and formally in the act of sin itself morally persevering. This conclusion as to the former part follows from the preceding. It is against Vasquez, Granados, Montesinos and others. For whom:

You will object first: By the very fact that a person would sin mortally in the state of pure nature, he would truly be said to be deprived of grace, therefore such sin at least as a foundation includes the privation of grace, the antecedent is proved: because such sin cannot be taken away without supernatural grace. It is answered by denying the antecedent, for then a person would be said to be denied supernatural grace. To the proof I say, mortal sin committed in the state of pure nature in no way needs supernatural grace for its destruction, but would be removed by any form which would be called the natural friendship of God, or by the extrinsic condonation of God.

You will object secondly: Just as grace or charity is the life of the soul, so the privation of grace is the death of the soul, from which privation sin is called mortal, therefore the stain or habitual mortal sin necessarily includes the privation of grace, at least as a foundation. It is answered, that it is so in fact, but not possibly. Therefore, since in fact God has ordained man to the supernatural end; and has also decreed, at the position of mortal sin to exclude grace, and vice versa; mortal sin can be called such, because it takes away supernatural grace. Essentially, however, it has to render the subject, in which it is, worthy of God's hatred and to be stripped of every gratuitous gift; whether natural or supernatural. And in this dignity consists essentially, sin being mortal, or (more properly speaking) deadly: whence it is inferred, that the privation of grace is not the very stain or habitual sin, but its effect, just as the privation of original justice is only the effect of original sin.

You will say: That although the privation of grace is an effect of actual mortal sin, it is not, however, an effect of habitual sin. It is answered: that the privation of grace as to its first being is caused by actual sin; but as to being conserved it is caused by habitual sin. And hence it is clear in what sense these propositions are true: The privation of grace is sin; Sin is the privation of grace. For neither is true in the formal sense, but in the causal sense; And the former makes this sense: The privation of grace is the effect of sin, but the latter makes this: Sin causes the privation of grace.

6 You will object thirdly with Montesinos, (who with Pesantius differs from the aforesaid authors, in that he affirms that the formal aspect of habitual sin is the privation of grace, but the foundation is the past act not retracted:) The stain or habitual sin is formally excluded by justification or the infusion of grace, but the privation of grace is formally excluded by justifying grace, therefore the privation of grace is the stain. It is answered by distinguishing the "formally" placed in the major: formally, that is, as by a form from the nature of things impossible with sin, I

deny; formally, that is, as by a form, to which in fact God has bound His pact of destroying mortal sin at its position, I concede. Therefore, conceding the minor, I deny the consequence: because the privation of grace and grace itself are impossible not from a pact, but from the nature of things.

You will object fourthly with the same Montesinos: by the privation of grace one is said to be an enemy of God, hateful, etc., just as by grace one is said to be joined to God, similar to Him, etc., therefore the privation of grace is that by which the soul is rendered stained, an enemy, etc. It is answered, that the formal privation of grace by itself does not render a person hateful, etc., even fundamentally, that is, worthy that God should break friendship with him or pursue him with the affect of hatred, in which formally consists enmity, and through which he is formally rendered an enemy; but only insofar as it is an effect of mortal sin. Whence if God, with no previous mortal sin, were to destroy the habitual grace of some just person (in which there is no repugnance), such privation of grace would not only not render the person formally an enemy, hateful, etc., but would not even in any way argue that such a person is fundamentally an enemy, as the privation of grace in fact argues.

You will say: Therefore in such privation, as it connotes fundamental enmity or actual sin not yet remitted, formally consists the stain. It is answered by denying the consequence: for with no propriety or truth can it be said that some effect, even as it connotes its cause, is the cause. You will insist: By this it is concluded that the privation of grace, even as it connotes actual sin, cannot be called actual sin, but it is not concluded that it cannot be, or be called habitual sin. It is answered by denying the antecedent: for just as the privation of grace as to its first being, even as it connotes actual sin, cannot be called actual sin, because it is the effect of actual sin; so that same privation (as to continuation or conservation) even as it connotes habitual sin, cannot be, or be called the very sin or stain; as it is indeed its effect. And these things concerning the opinion of the Thomists.

Among Scotists it is for the most part commonly received as the opinion of Scotus: that the constitutive of a sinner after the act of sin has passed (Which is the stain, or habitual sin) is the liability to punishment, that is, ordination to eternal punishment, which is only a relation of reason in the sinful person, from the fact that God has assigned him to eternal punishment from the instant when he sinned. In this understanding of Scotus many Scotists agree, whom our Felix cites and follows in chapter 18, difficulty 2. Among them is Philip Faber above, chapter 2. Who adds: that such habitual sin is indeed the ordination to eternal punishment, but that it is not sufficient, unless the privation of grace is added as a partial form necessarily required. This opinion is branded with impious censure by Vasquez, disputation 139, chapter 2, and Lorca, disputation 50, from which Faber and Felix cited, with the rest of the Scotists, vindicate Scotus; indeed even among outsiders, Oviedo the Jesuit of Complutum, tract 6, controversy 8, point 4, number 36, Valencia, Salas and many others.

Scotus Vindicated from the Calumny of Vasquez & Lorca

The aforementioned authors Vasquez and Lorca say that the opinion of Scotus was condemned by Pius V and Gregory XIII among certain propositions of Michael Baius, of which the 56th was: "In sin there is nothing but the act and the liability, and when the act passes, nothing remains except the liability." But to begin with this, I argue against them with evident reason: An error that has been condemned cannot be approved or admitted by the Church as a probable opinion, nor permitted to be defended publicly as such; but the opinion assigned to Scotus is approved or admitted by the Church as a probable opinion, and it not only permits, but assists, where it is publicly defended, therefore the meaning expressed by Scotus is not the condemned error of Baius. Let Vasquez and Lorca tell me, do they think that the Holy Church and the Tribunal of the Inquisition permit many learned men, Priests and Religious to firmly adhere to and hold a condemned error, and to teach it publicly; or do they think that neither the Church nor the Inquisition permits this? If the first: Then it follows that Vasquez and Lorca think that the Church tolerates Catholic men whom it knows to be comprehended in a condemned error. If the second: Then neither the subtle Doctor nor the Scotists asserting their opinion about the constitutive of habitual sin coincide with the error of Baius. Let them confess that they have spoken from folly: for in Proverbs 10 it is said: "He who utters contumely is a fool."

Then I show what liability properly is, so that the great distance between the sense in which Baius places liability, and in which Scotus establishes it, may be clear: For Calepinus on the word "reatus" notes that in our Spanish idiom it signifies two things, both fault and obligation to punishment: For thus he says: "Reatus in Spanish means fault, obligation to punishment." Therefore since Baius only took liability as it sounds like mere obligation to punishment, without signifying any habitual stain, and thus he said that by virtue of penance no stain is remitted, but only the obligation to punishment is relaxed; deservedly this sense is condemned by the Pontiffs. But since Scotus, Durandus and other Catholic Doctors, certainly skilled in the Latin language, take liability as it signifies both, they are immune from censure. And because it is my duty only to defend the subtle Doctor, hear him in 2, distinction 28, number 7, where he has these things speaking of actual sin: "Sin in one way can be taken for the deformed elicited act, speaking of the sin of commission." And immediately about habitual sin he adds: "In another way for the stain which remains after the elicited act, etc." Behold, Scotus acknowledges a stain. Then Baius asserted that neither in justification is grace infused, nor in sin is it lost; but Scotus says that habitual sin, besides the privation of grace, says nothing more than liability. Behold, Scotus catholically asserts that in sin justifying grace is lost, which Baius denied, and for which he was condemned for positing only liability.

8 And lest we rely on the authority of Scholastics alone, I will also find a foundation in Scripture, the Fathers and the Church for calling habitual sin liability. Exodus 32:12: "Therefore the Lord struck the people for the liability of the calf, which Aaron

had made." There Jerome and Abulensis: "He took liability for fault." And immediately: "But it is called the liability of the calf, that is, the fault which they committed by making the calf." Likewise Deuteronomy 21:8: "And the liability of blood shall be taken away from them." That is (say Jerome and our Lyra), "the fault which you committed by unjustly shedding blood shall be taken away." Likewise the Church calls habitual sin liability: for in a certain collect of the Mass which is the secret in that prayer "God our refuge, etc." it is thus said: "grant, O merciful God, that this saving oblation may both unceasingly free us from our own liabilities, etc."

From the Fathers let Augustine suffice, tome 7, book 1 on marriages, chapter 26: "This is not to have sin, not to be liable of sin: for if anyone, for example, has committed adultery, even if thenceforth he never does it, he is liable of adultery, until the liability itself is remitted by indulgence." And at the end of the chapter: "but how do they remain, that is, sins, if they are past: Unless what has passed in act, remains in liability." But what it is to remain in liability, the same Augustine explains by pondering those words of Psalm 31: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered: For God to see sins, is to impute them to punishment, but to turn His face away from sins, this is not to reserve them for punishment." All of which are also expressed in Innocent III, C. Majores on Baptism, and in Dionysius 4 on divine names. And lest the Jesuit Fathers say that this word liability anciently signified habitual fault, but no longer does so among the moderns, let them read the most recent book published among them, namely Naxera chapter 17 on verse 8, Joshua chapter 34, expounding two texts of sacred scripture, he posits that the chains by which a sinner is held are liabilities, that is, habitual sins, as he supposes, in the whole paragraph. In this sense properly Councils, Fathers, Pontiffs, Jurists, and Theologians call those from whom the stain of habitual fault has not been taken away liable. Let Vasquez and Lorca now see how by condemning Scotus, they condemn Scripture, the Fathers, and the Pontiffs.

The True Opinion, and That of Scotus, Is Proposed

But for the true understanding of the opinion of Scotus, it is necessary first to propose the letters and texts in which he speaks assertively about this. In 4, distinction 14, question 1, section 6, he says: "That there is nothing real, absolute or relative, in anyone when every act of sin ceases, from which he is called a sinner, as someone is called after the transient act: because if something left behind by the act is said to remain, that is not formally sin: because it can stand in the justified as a vicious habit remains in the justified." And a little later: "There is therefore not there any absolute or relative positive or privative from which he is called a sinner from the time of cessation until penance, but only a certain relation of reason, insofar as it is the object of the intellect and will of God: because after he has committed [sin], God's will ordains him to the punishment corresponding to the sin." And in number 7: "From this follows a corollary, that there is nothing else after the act of sin, when the offense, stain, and liability cease, except this relation of reason, namely,

ordination to punishment." Cavellus in a scholium to these words, thus explains the mind of the Doctor: "[he means that] nothing intermediate is given between the act of sin and the obligation to punishment, by which one is called a sinner; however, he does not say that that relation to punishment is habitual sin, but the past act itself remaining virtually." Which he demonstrates: for Scotus in distinction 21, question 1, number 8, says: "According to the Saints, the remission of fault is distinguished from the remission of punishment." And he adduces many other things, from which he seems to intend that, according to Scotus, habitual sin in no way consists in the deputation to punishment, but only in the sinful action virtually remaining.

I do not acquiesce to this understanding of Scotus: for besides the fact that it manifestly departs from him, I briefly prove that the virtually remaining act can in no way constitute habitual sin. Because I suppose that I have this decree to steal today, and tomorrow I retract this will due to a merely natural motive, or by attrition alone: truly habitual sin remains, and yet that virtual volition of stealing does not remain, for it was retracted: therefore habitual sin is not formally the virtual permanence of the past act.

10 Let the third conclusion and Resolution of the Question be therefore: The moral stain or habitual sin consists formally in the moral permanence of the past sinful act composed with or connoting or rather signifying liability, which is the ordination of the sinner to suffer punishment. But the moral permanence of the past depraved act is the moral permanence of the absence of due rectitude. This is the opinion of Scotus, and thus Hicheus understands him in the commentary to the aforesaid distinction 14, Pilosus disputation 130, article 6. For what this author says about theological permanence according to divine laws is nothing else in reality, except the deputation of the sinner to the punishment due to sin according to the same laws. So also Bassolis 4, distinction 14, question 2, § "as for the present."

Therefore, the absence of due rectitude, which physically passed away, but morally perseveres, as it is composed with the deputation to punishment, namely a certain relation of reason, in which Scotus placed liability, this whole conjunction I call habitual sin. Whence since that absence is nothing real, absolute or relative, and newly there is only in the sinner a relation of reason, which is the deputation of the man or Angel, who sinned, to eternal punishment, excellently Scotus cited asserted that nothing new is produced from actual sin for the constitution of habitual sin, except liability. Nor does it hinder that Scotus calls liability habitual sin: for by this word is explained everything that enters into the constitution of habitual sin: for both the moral permanence of the past act and the obligation or deputation of the sinner to eternal punishment are explained: as I noted above from Calepinus. Which is not so explicitly and adequately declared by moral permanence.

11 Scotus proves the conclusion with a double reason; which I thus expound: Let us posit that Peter has six degrees of merit, but John two. Likewise let us suppose that God by virtue of merit neither intensifies the habit of grace of Peter, nor of John,

when the meritorious acts of both pass away. By this the merit of Peter is distinguished from the merit of John: because by Divine acceptance the merit of Peter ordains, giving right to six degrees of glory, but the merit of John only to two, therefore when the act of sin passes away nothing new remains in the sinner except ordination to punishment. The consequence is proved: merits and demerits as contradictorily or contrarily opposed uniformly relate to their terms: the first antecedent is supposed in Trent, session 6, chapter 16, on the fruit of justification. Thus, for merit to be ordained to glory, when the act has passed, is only a respect of reason; and merit as habitual expresses the meritorious act itself passed away physically, but morally remaining, composed with that ordination to glory, therefore sin as habitual expresses the past act as lacking due rectitude, persevering morally, composed with or connoting ordination to punishment. The second reason is an example: Let us grant that Peter wills and intends to kill the King, when this will passes away, nothing else is left in Peter, except the subjection and ordination of Peter to undergo the punishment corresponding to the crime, therefore similarly in our case.

Curiel responds, question 87, article 1, doubt 2, §5, that without any ordination to punishment, offense to the King would remain in Peter, by this alone because the violation of the law is imputed to Peter. But against this: for if merit were not ordained to reward, it would not be merit, therefore while past fault is not ordained to punishment, sin does not remain, therefore setting aside ordination from that will of Peter, that will or intention does not remain a sin against the King. And thus Curiel himself, *ibid.*, § "I say thirdly," says that the obligation to punishment or liability follows simply necessarily to the sin itself, given the law. Secondly he responds differently: that the King does not remit fault, but only exacts payment of punishment, and thus there is no parity. But it still stands: for let us grant that the offense to the King is of those things which the King can forgive according to the stain. Again the King just as in the external forum he exacts payment of punishment, so in the internal forum he remits fault.

12 But for a greater proof of the conclusion and truth of the doctrine, it is necessary that we explain what that moral permanence of sin is, which we said consists in the absence of due rectitude composed with liability. Where it must be supposed that this which is to have sinned precisely taken is not sufficient for moral permanence: because even after retraction and remission or the position of whatever other, it remains, and yet sin is not said to morally persevere. We therefore compose it with sin, that it may be said to morally remain. For explanation therefore the doctrine should be noted, which is commonly taught in the treatise on human acts and which Oviedo has there, controversy 1, point 6, from number 110, related from Suarez and many others: namely that virtual intention arising from formal [intention] physically past remains, as long as the principal effect produced by formal intention remains: For example: Yesterday I decided to celebrate Mass, today I celebrate without any new intention, the intention, which I had yesterday, has persevered virtually until

today, because until today the negation of retraction has lasted, which is the principal effect arising from that formal intention, which I had yesterday. Scotus clearly insinuates this doctrine in 4, distinction 6, question 6, number 2, where speaking of martyrs absorbed in the immensity of punishments he says: "While the passion lasted, the intention always lasted virtually." And a little later speaking of the permanence of intention, or of the past act, he says: "But I understand, that this act descends without any contrary motion of the will intervening." Behold the absence of retraction. Virtual permanence therefore consists in the past act composed with the existence of retraction, which is the principal effect caused by that formal intention.

In the same way I explain the moral permanence of sin, or of the past sinful act, saying: Such an act remains morally, while the moral effect, which begins to proceed from it, remains; And since the principal effect, which begins to proceed morally from the absence of due rectitude, is that liability to punishment posited with Scotus. Hence the moral permanence of the absence of due rectitude lasts as long as the liability lasts. Thus the difference between moral and virtual permanence is clear: for the latter lasts, while the formal intention is not retracted; but the former, even if it is retracted, will last, while the liability remains, which is the effect principally arising. There are thousands of examples of this, let these suffice. The first in a vow: I vow to fast, that will to fast remains morally in me, while the obligation to abstain remains, and it remains, even if I retract the will by which I vowed, until the obligation is relaxed; And if the obligation is relaxed, for example, by the Pontiff, although I do not retract the will by which I vowed, the will to fast does not remain morally, although it remains virtually. Something similar happens in the will of the Prince to establish laws, when the dispensation does not fall under his dominion; And also in the will to contract marriage: for the consents remain morally, although virtually, on account of retraction they do not remain: for many married people retract their consent, and yet the marriage always perseveres morally valid.

13 You will say: This opinion of ours seems in reality to coincide with others, which are now commonly taught by more recent authors: Lugo on Penance, disputation 7, section 5, and others: namely that the moral permanence of sin consists, if it connotes non-retraction, non-satisfaction, non-remission or non-condonation. What therefore have we newly added? For the response, in which the difficulty will be adequately explained, and it will be clear, that our opinion is truer than the others. I suppose, that at least by Divine power, sin can not be morally imputed to punishment, but rather entirely condoned, although in no way retracted: as with Scotus in 4, distinction 14, question 2, hold Suarez, disputation 9 on Penance, section 2, Vasquez in chapter 2, disputation 207, chapter 3, Lorca, disputation 37 on grace, § "about the second," Curiel, question 113, article 3, doubt 2, § 2, Oviedo, tract 8 on justification, controversy 2, point 9, where they teach, that any sin can be divinely remitted, without a movement of penance being given on the part of the sinner.

From which I thus argue: Because whiteness can be given expelled from a subject, without it being expelled by blackness, it is well deduced; whiteness is not formally something expelled by blackness, or the negation of blackness, therefore because habitual sin can be given expelled from a subject, without retraction or satisfaction being given (which is the same as far as this is concerned) it is well concluded, habitual sin is not formally the non-retraction of the act, or the act not retracted, or not satisfied. And it is further confirmed: For God can not condone sin, even if a man satisfies, or retracts his previous will especially in the opinion denying proper justice between God and creatures, which our Theodore Smising defends as sufficiently probable, in *On the One God*, disputation on the virtues in God.

Again from what has been said it is clear, that the moral permanence of sin differs from the past act connoting non-retraction, because the latter only expresses virtual permanence: although both permanences agree in this, that both are of the past act, whether positive or interpretative (Which I posit because of the sin of omission, which although it is not a positive past act, it is interpretative) nevertheless they differ in the effect, with which they compose the concrete: for virtual permanence signifies as an effect, the absence of retraction, which is accidental to moral permanence, as we said; but the latter signifies liability, or deputation to punishment. And this argument also holds for satisfaction. From which the two prior parts of the objection have been satisfied. And it is clear, how habitual sin, which is a depraved act morally remaining cannot be constituted from itself, as past connoting non-retraction, or non-satisfaction.

14 But there is a great difficulty about it, as non-remitted, or non-condoned: because in reality it seems to be the same as itself as past connoting, or composed with liability, that is, actually deputed to punishment, which is our opinion. But nevertheless it is Answered: It is in no way the same. And the reason a priori is: because it is prior in sin to be deputed to the punishment due, and hence to be constituted in the being of habitual through liability, than to be non-remitted, or non-condoned, therefore through that prior it is constituted in the being of such, not truly through this posterior, although it can be said, that as a proper passion it follows the prior. The antecedent is proved: because since in the principles of Scotus the justification of the impious is not from the mere absence of form into form, that is, from non-just into just; but true movement in the genus of morals from a quasi-contrary form into form, that is, from unjust into just, as he indicates in 4, distinction 16, question 2, in distinction from the justification of the soul of Christ, of the Mother of God, of the Angels, and of humans in the state of innocence, in which there was transition only from non-just into just; Hence it is, that when a sinner passes from non-remitted sin into remitted (we prescind in the present from the infusion of grace and we investigate precisely the mode, by which he formally passes from sinner into non-sinner, as could happen in the state of pure nature; indeed into just, and friend, which certainly without the infusion of grace he could obtain), the transition is from the positively non-remitted, which most formally is to be deputed,

into the remitted, or condoned: therefore since it is prior in sin to be deputed to punishment, than to be non-remitted, or non-condoned, it must be constituted in its formal being through being deputed, rather than through being non-remitted, or non-condoned. Which is illustrated by this example. When movement to whiteness happens in a wall, not when the wall passes from non-white into white, but when it passes from black into white, then blackness is supposed adequately constituted, before the concept of the absence of whiteness is considered, therefore similarly when a man passes from unjust to just, it is prior to consider in the concept of unjust to be deputed to punishment, than not to be condoned, or punishment remitted to him.

It is clear therefore from what has been said, that the stain or habitual sin consists formally in the moral permanence of the past sinful act composed, or connoting, or rather signifying, not indeed its non-retraction, or non-satisfaction; nor even non-remission, or non-condonation; but signifying formally liability, as this signifies ordination, or deputation to punishment to be suffered. Whence also our assumption is verified; namely that our opinion is truer than the others, with which we coincide neither in reality, nor in voice; But we have explained the mind of Scotus accurately, and faithfully according to our understanding.

The Arguments to the Contrary Are Solved.

You will object first against our conclusion: This causal statement is true: because someone is a sinner, he is ordained to punishment; but the phrase "because he is a sinner" signifies habitual sin, therefore this is prior to ordination to punishment, therefore that deputation, or passive ordination does not enter into the constitutive of habitual sin. And it is confirmed, because worthiness for punishment is founded in fault, therefore fault is prior to worthiness for punishment, therefore as liability is worthiness for punishment, fault is supposed adequately constituted before liability. I respond by turning the argument back: In any opinion this causal statement is true; because someone is a sinner, the past act is not retracted, not remitted, not satisfied; likewise because someone is a sinner, he is deprived of grace, and the past act remains morally, therefore habitual sin consists in none of these. Behold in everyone's opinion the authors are bound to the solution of this argument. To which I Respond thus in form: let the causal statement pass, I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent: therefore habitual sin taken inadequately is prior to ordination to punishment, I concede: according to its adequate concept, I deny: for although this causal statement is true: Because Peter is, he exists, and yet it does not follow that existence does not enter into the being of Peter as outside causes, constituting Peter in being outside causes; so similarly in our case: for such causal statements are through identical propositions, although not through formal ones. And by this the confirmation is also satisfied.

16 You will object secondly: Who posits the connotatum posits the whole entity of the thing: for example, who posits white as the term of another whiteness, posits similarity. And who posits the absence of an alien supposit, makes nature subsist: therefore if God posits liability in sin, which liability is more than a connotatum, God would posit sin as formally habitual: therefore the stain would be attributed to God. I respond that just as actual sin is constituted adequately from the physical entity of the act, to which God concurs with an identified and immediate concurrence, and from moral malice, which in the more common opinion the Divine concurrence does not reach, on account of which absolutely this concrete actual sin is not attributed to God, nor is it said absolutely, that God posits actual sin. So similarly although liability, which with malice morally remaining constitutes habitual sin, depends on the Divine will and simultaneously on the creature, which malice in the genus of morals is not from God, therefore neither is habitual malice attributed to God, nor can He be called the cause of habitual sin. Whence just as with distinction it is said God is the cause of sin, with sin taken for the material etc. So it could be said: God is the cause of habitual sin, as it is taken for liability signifying deputation to punishment, but not for malice morally remaining. Whence in form, I distinguish the antecedent. Who posits the connotatum posits the whole entity of the thing, when it is repugnant that causality be attributed to that which the thing says formally or principally; Or (better) if he causes, he does not cause in the sense, in which it would be imputed to him; I deny. When it would happen otherwise I concede. Therefore since formal malice cannot be attributed to God, either because He does not cause it; or (better) if He causes it, this is only by general concurrence, about which there is no controversy with heretics, nor is it the sense excluded by Trent, session 6, canon 6. Therefore neither can habitual sin be said to be from God: according to that of Augustine book 83, questions, question 3, "No one becomes worse with God as author." Then what at most is concluded from this argument, is, that habitual sin is posited by God as habitual, in which concept of habitualness no deformity or formal malice is involved. For this was caused by man, and it stands through him, that it remains morally.

You will object thirdly: Sin as habitual is in the damned, but in these there is no liability, therefore this does not enter into the constitution of habitual sin. The minor is proved: liability is no less the right of demanding punishment, than merit is the right of demanding glory; but the Blessed do not have the right which they had as wayfarers, therefore neither do the damned have the right to punishment, which they had as wayfarers, therefore neither does the same liability remain in the damned, and hence, since the same habitual sin remains numerically, this will not be constituted by liability. I respond by denying the minor. To the proof I say, liability in a rigorous sense signifies the demand, right, or obligation to punishment. Whence just as the demand or right of merit to glory is not varied by this, that glory is possessed or to be possessed, but glory itself is only what is varied; so only punishment is what is varied in the damned, not however liability: for the obligation always remains. Whence to the proof, conceding the major I deny the minor.

17 You will object fourthly: By virtue of the sacrament of penance all habitual sin is remitted: according to that to Romans 8: "There is now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus"; but the obligation to punishment is not remitted, but is only commuted from liability to eternal punishment into temporal obligation, therefore sin as habitual is not constituted by liability. I respond: That commutation is the remission of eternal punishment, and thus already everything that habitual sin says is remitted. For which Note first: An error is often committed here, or an improper way of speaking is used in the acceptance of these names: for what God punishes, and condones or remits, is actual sin: But what He takes away, removes, destroys and washes, is habitual sin, which is the stain. Note secondly: That liability is considered in two ways, either as conjoined and collated with the permanence of the absence of due rectitude (which is its proper signification: as signifying both, as is clear from Calepinus,) or as separated, which is improperly taken by some, in which way it does not constitute habitual sin; Just as the physical entity of the act, either is considered, as conjoined with the absence of due rectitude, and thus it enters into the constitution of sin as actual; or as separated, and in this way it does not constitute it. From which you will understand two things: first: that although deputation to eternal punishment would remain, with the stain deleted by virtue of the sacrament of penance, still it could not be said, that habitual sin remains: because the conjunction of deputation with the permanence of fault would not remain: Just as although a separated soul remains, it does not constitute a man. Second, that although in the souls of purgatory the obligation of suffering temporal punishment remains, venial sin as habitual does not remain: because moral permanence has already been deleted, and thus the conjunction of deputation with it is dissolved; and therefore it ceases to be liability, which, as we have said up to now, signifies both simultaneously. Because of this I judge that the opinion of Oviedo, treatise 6, controversy 8, point 4, asserting: that the past act connotes the obligation of satisfying, coincides with ours: because while deputation to punishment lasts, it is necessary that the obligation of satisfying, and suffering punishment lasts, at least by ordinary power, according to which by the very fact that a man satisfies by virtue of a sacrament or by another way, God ceases to depute him to punishment.

You will object fifthly: Mortal sin can never pass into venial from the most common opinion; but if liability enters into the constitution of sin as habitual, mortal would pass into venial, therefore liability cannot enter, etc. the minor is proved: By virtue of contrition or the sacrament of penance terminated at mortal sin, the obligation to eternal punishment passes into temporal punishment, therefore now mortal would pass into venial. I respond: This argument has force against Baius and against those positing habitual sin in liability alone, but against us it has no force since we do not posit obligation to punishment singly, to constitute habitual sin; but we say liability composed with the remaining stain constitutes it: Whence since only obligation or punishment is what passes, but not the stain, because this as we have

said, is entirely washed away or destroyed, hence it is that mortal never passes into venial.

You will object Sixthly: The effect of a thing cannot be composed with the thing itself for the constitution of a concrete; but liability is the effect of the stain of sin morally remaining, therefore it cannot be composed with the stain for the constitution of habitual sin. I respond by distinguishing the major: the effect of a thing cannot be composed with the thing for the constitution of a concrete in the physical line, let it pass, or I omit. In the moral line: I deny: For the will, by which I vowed yesterday, is the cause of the obligation, which I have today, and yet the obligation composed with that will morally remaining constitutes a vow. So in our case.

You will object seventhly: In the instant in which someone sins, he has the obligation of suffering punishment, but in that instant there is no habitual sin, therefore the obligation of suffering punishment does not enter into the constitution of habitual sin. I respond by distinguishing the major. In the instant in which someone sins, he is obliged to suffer punishment, with liability composed with the moral permanence of the past act: I deny: composed with the first being of the present act, I concede. Whence the difference of sin as actual and as habitual is already deduced, as is verified in virtual intention: for this as distinct from actual, says nothing more, than to become actual, and to be conserved in the principal effect, which is the absence of retraction, as virtual.

For a complete notice of the truth and understanding of our opinion. Note first: the relation in which we said from Scotus liability consists, is not a real respect, but of reason which arises from the demand of the moral permanence of past fault, or the absence of due rectitude, and the active deputation of God to so much punishment according to the rectitude of Divine justice; And it should be called an intrinsic denomination, because it is not fictitious; And its foundation is, that man has sinned, and that God according to His justice should thus judge. Nor do I see, what about the thing itself can be doubted, unless by industry someone wishes to render it obscure, by investigating it too much: as Lugo above, number 45, well notes. Note secondly, it is compatible, that although one relation is not more intense than another in itself, or by reason of itself, nevertheless one habitual sin is greater than another, although both consist in the aforesaid relation: for the extremes between which liability is concerned admit more, and less in the genus of morals. (And it is common doctrine in Metaphysics, treatise on Relation, where it is said: two white extremes, for example, are more similar, if they are such in equal degrees, than if they are in unequal ones;) nevertheless when the foundation, and term of relations in no way admit more, and less, neither do the relations themselves admit them. But, since moral stain, which is the foundation of the relation, in which liability consists, in the genus of morals admits more, and less, and similarly punishment which is the terminus ad quem of the relation, hence liability is also said to be greater or lesser, attending to the gravity of the stain, and the degrees of punishment. Thus it is well verified, that one habitual sin is greater than another: Which is also proved from

trite Metaphysics in the susceptibility of more, and less, which in absences we daily assign by reason of forms. Therefore in the treatise on the Four Last Things it is said: the punishment of loss, which is the absence of beatitude is greater in one damned, than in another.

19 But against the aforesaid doctrine you will object finally: Liability through me arises in the man, who has sinned, formally by this because the Divine will ordains him to punishment corresponding according to right justice to sin, so that that ordination or passive deputation is the formal constitutive of liability, therefore God causes habitual sin. The consequence is proved: Because the eye, for example, causes vision, which extrinsically denominates the object seen, the eye is the cause of that extrinsic denomination, therefore God causes active ordination to punishment, from which deputation or ordination man is extrinsically denominated, and liability is constituted, God will be the cause of habitual sin. To this argument you have the response above, Objection two: According to which I confess, that God is the cause of liability, as it precisely signifies deputation to punishment, but not as it also signifies past fault morally remaining, which is the obligation to punishment, as from man; therefore He is not the cause of habitual sin: for when it is explained through liability, a double concept is considerable, one, which has its origin from man, another which is from God, the former is the concept of fault, but the latter of deputation to punishment, according to the assignment of Calepinus above. Nor does it hinder, that someone says, liability properly, does not signify anything except obligation to punishment: Because even in that a double concept could be distinguished, namely of obligation to punishment, as it has its origin from man from his fault, and such is caused precisely by man; and of obligation to punishment as from God deputizing, or ordaining from His justice, and such indeed is from God alone.

You will press: Who causes the constitutive of a thing, causes the whole thing; Through me the constitutive of habitual sin is liability, therefore with me assigning God to cause this liability, I should confess Him to cause habitual sin. I respond: liability can be considered in two ways, either as the effect, or punishment of habitual sin, in which way I confess it is caused by God: for punishment is the effect of fault: And in this way who will deny that the absence of grace is also caused by God. Or liability is considered, as it signifies the application of the moral permanence of the absence of due rectitude to it, in this way it is not attributed to God absolutely: How? because the application of the absence of due rectitude to the physical entity of the act, which is actual sin, is not attributed to God absolutely, and properly, it is false that actual sin is attributed to God. In form to the argument, I deny the major: For let us give this case: God alone causes a soul, and in no way concurs to the union with the body: Behold the cause of the formal constitutive of the thing, and yet that man constituted from it, and a body, is not attributed to God as cause: because he does not concur to the application: In this impossible case apply to ours in the present.

20 You will inquire first: Whether Habitual Sin can be said to be the effect of actual sin? Cardinal Lugo above, number 66, distinguishing actual sin from habitual, that as part, this as whole, says, that just as an Angel as conserved, is the effect of itself, as produced, so sin, as habitual, is the effect of sin as actual.

It does not please: because according to our principles to be, and to be conserved are the same. And it should be philosophized in the same way in this point, just as in virtual intention: But Scotus in 2, distinction 6, p. 6, number 2, does not posit this to be the effect of actual intention, although that other requisite, as virtual intention is constituted, is the effect of actual intention, as we said above: And the reason is: because virtual intention is the aggregate of past intention, and the absence of retraction. Whence although the absence of retraction is the effect of actual intention, nevertheless this whole virtual intention will not be its effect. So similarly although liability is the effect of sin, as actual, nevertheless because moral permanence is not the effect, but the sin itself as actual conserved in such an effect, sin as habitual, as indeed because it is an aggregate, cannot be said to be the effect of sin as actual.

21 You will inquire secondly: Whether God can condone habitual fault, leaving liability to punishment in the sinner? For the Response Note: That liability to punishment can be taken in two ways, either as it is the effect of actual sin, which composed, or connoting moral permanence constitutes habitual sin: And in this way by condoning fault, liability is always remitted: The reason for which is, because liability and stain depend mutually on each other in their conservation, so that liability as from a cause depends in being conserved on the stain, and this as from an effect on liability: Just as virtual intention, and non-retraction depend mutually on each other in their being conserved, so that the permanence of past intention depends as from an effect on non-retraction, and non-retraction as from a cause on the permanence of past intention. Or liability can be taken as it says the commutation of the debt of punishment, in which way daily God condones fault, not by remitting punishment, but by commuting it. This doctrine is exemplified in a vow, whose obligation is commuted, and then although that earlier obligation arising from the will of vowing is remitted, nevertheless another distinct obligation remains; And thus liability in the prior way respects punitive justice, but in the posterior way mercy.

According to this doctrine it is Responded: That not even by absolute power could God condone fault without remitting liability, nor vice versa: for these are so connected, that one follows from the other. Therefore in the case in which God would conserve grace with mortal sin, the man having that grace would remain with liability to punishment; Similarly speak in the case, in which God would remit punishment, without condoning fault: for always from the stain the sinner would be ordained to punishment: just as although God would not reward a man, who had merit of condignity, nevertheless the man would always remain with right to the reward. And it should be attentively Noted: that it is one thing to remit punishment,

another liability to punishment, for that indeed follows from this; However it is the same to remit fault, and liability to punishment. Thus the saying of Scotus is saved, 4, distinction 21, question 1, namely: "According to the Saints the remission of fault and the remission of punishment are distinguished"; however the remission of fault is not distinguished from the remission of liability. This doctrine, if it is subtly ruminated, is undoubtedly most true: But there remains for the exact notice of all the things which we have said in this whole question, to examine the following doubt.

22 You will inquire thirdly: Whether Sin can be remitted by absolute power without any physical mutation of the sinner? Which indeed is understood of habitual sin, or of the stain left behind from past sin: for it is certain that actual sin, or actually enduring sin cannot be remitted without retraction of the sinner: For it is Chimerical to say: that God can remit sin, and that man permanently remains actually with the voluntary, and formal affect of such sin. I respond therefore affirmatively. And it is the common opinion, and Scotus holds it in 1, distinction 17, question 2, number 29, and 2, distinction 28, number 7, and 4, distinction 1, question 6, numbers 4 and 7, and distinction 14, question 1, and distinction 16, question 2. Alexander [of Hales], Bonaventure, the Nominalists. Medina codex on Penance, treatise 1, questions 7 and 12, and many others cited by our Felix, treatise on grace, chapter 8, difficulty 13. It is against some, of whom some require the infusion of habitual grace; But others an act of retraction on the part of the sinner; Others finally some physical mutation, whether in this, or in that genus. The foundation of our assertion depends for the greater part on the things said in this whole question, where we have sufficiently explained the formal constitutive of habitual sin: For since it is adequately saved, both setting aside the privation of grace, and retraction or any other act on the part of the sinner, having precisely posited the moral permanence of past fault, connoting, or having for its effect deputation to punishment. Hence only by the act of God condoning fault is sin altogether remitted, and habitual sin taken away, setting aside whatever other: For if God ceases to depute the sinner to punishment, past fault also ceases to remain morally, and hence it is altogether taken away, or sin is remitted.

It is proved first against the prior authors requiring the infusion of grace: Cajetan, Valencia, and others: Between men who before were enemies, true reconciliation is given, and offense is truly remitted, without any quality produced in either one, therefore much better could this be done by God: Many other things which favor, and prove this part of our assertion are had above in the beginning of the question. It is proved secondly against those asserting that an act of retraction is necessarily required: Such an act could only be required for the remission of fault as a disposition; but God can pretermitt whatever disposition especially in the genus of morals, therefore also remit sin without previous retraction. And it is confirmed, because it is certain, that God can not condone fault, with any retraction posited on the part of the sinner, therefore also He could condone with it not posited. The

consequence is clear: because if it were an essentially required disposition, just as it should precede for the position of the form, so at its position the form should necessarily follow, but this is not true, therefore neither is that. And from these it is clear, that absolutely no other act is required on the part of the sinner: For since habitual sin from what has been said consists in deputation to punishment, composed, or connoted by the moral permanence of past fault, which whole is then taken away, when God ceases to depute the sinner to punishment: hence it can be by absolute power altogether taken away, and sin remitted without any act, or any physical mutation on the part of the sinner, but only moral. It is indeed true, that by ordinary power many things should be posited on the part of the sinner for the remission of his fault, but because God in this case would pretermitt whatever law posited in fact, therefore it is not remarkable, that with that taken away, in which habitual sin essentially consists, the rest are pretermitted, namely the act of retraction, and the infusion of grace, which only from ordinary law accompany the remission of fault: From which you have, that it is one thing to inquire, In what does habitual sin consist, but another, what are the things which in fact accompany it?

23 But against this you will object first: Sin cannot be deleted from the soul unless from unclean it becomes clean; but this cannot happen except through some mutation of the soul, by means of some positive absolute form, [because there is no motion per se to a relation from 5 Physics,] therefore by means of sanctifying grace. I respond by distinguishing. Because for remitting sin, fault or offense it is indeed necessary, that the soul, to which it is remitted, is changed from fault to non-fault (which mutation they call negative, because it has for its terminus ad quem non-being of fault;) yet it is not necessary that it be changed from fault to something positively opposed with fault, sin, or offense. Therefore if God remitted sin without the infusion of sanctifying grace or another positive gift, but by the mere condonation of offense, the soul would be called negatively clean, namely because it would be verified of it, that it was without uncleanness; it would not however be called positively clean, because it could not be verified of it, that it had positive cleanness.

You will object secondly: In sin, deformity is opposed to grace, as privation is opposed to a habit, but privation cannot be taken away except by the positing of the opposite habit, therefore sin cannot be taken away except by the positing of grace: the major is from St. Augustine saying (according to Scotus in 4, distinction 1, question 6, number 3) that fault and grace are opposed like darkness and light in the air. I respond by denying the major: For sin is not the privation of grace, nor does it have any physical opposition with it, as we have already said above, and is commonly held in the way of Scotus in the treatise on Charity and on grace; Augustine, however, only intends that in fact, and by Divine ordination, always at the positing of mortal sin in the soul there follows the exclusion of sanctifying grace, and conversely, at the positing of grace there follows the destruction of mortal sin; just as at the positing of light in the air there follows the destruction of darkness, and

conversely; However, he does not mean that just as the opposition found between darkness and light is privative and physical, so also is the opposition found between sin and grace. For it is known per se that a habit is only privatively opposed with its absence, and consequently that sanctifying grace is only opposed with the absence of grace.

You will say: That habitual mortal sin is the absence of the habit of sanctifying grace. But against this: because if God had created man in a state of pure nature, not infusing in him sanctifying grace, and otherwise that man did not sin, he would indeed have the absence of grace without habitual mortal sin, therefore this is something distinct from the absence of sanctifying grace.

You will object thirdly: Fault cannot be deleted, unless the disorder is taken away: but this cannot be taken away except through grace, therefore neither can fault. The major is proved first: because habitual fault is nothing other than the sin itself, or actual disorder morally persevering. Second: Because given that habitual mortal fault is something distinct from disorder, while this is not taken away, punishment can be inflicted because of it, therefore because fault was not dismissed, for punishment cannot be inflicted without fault. I respond from Scotus in the same place, number 7, by denying the minor. And the reason for me is: that since habitual sin is not something physically affecting the sinful soul, but something moral, as is clear from what has been said, it can be taken away by another opposed morality, namely by this, that that soul terminates the act, by which God would remit fault: just as from a debtor the debt, or obligation of paying, is taken away, by this only that the creditor remits the debt to him: whence it is clear: To solve the argument we must abstain from examining the truth of the major proposition, as well as of those things which are assumed in its proof.

You will object fourthly: If fault is dismissed, divine offense is dismissed, therefore the sinner is reconciled to God, and consequently becomes acceptable to God; but this cannot happen without the infusion of grace, therefore without this mortal sin cannot be remitted. And it is confirmed because if he does not remain an enemy, he remains a friend. I respond by distinguishing the consequent of the enthymeme: Because in the case in which He would take away mortal sin without the infusion of grace, the sinner would be reconciled to God negatively (namely because he will remain without fault and offense, and consequently not an enemy) not however positively: because he will not be accepted to the friendship of God through the infusion of grace, indeed not even through extrinsic acceptance (as I suppose) and consequently he will not remain positively a friend. Whence it is clear to the confirmation: For there is a middle between positively a friend, and positively an enemy, namely to abstract from both: just as between positively white, or black, there is a middle, namely a subject without whiteness, and blackness. For by this reason if God had created man, and had not infused sanctifying grace in him, and otherwise that man did not sin mortally, he would not be positively a friend, nor

positively an enemy. And the same must be said in the present case in which God would remit mortal fault without the infusion of sanctifying grace.

24 You will object fifthly: As long as sin is voluntary it is irremissible; but until it is retracted it is voluntary, therefore if it is not retracted, it cannot be remitted by God. I respond: that if this were true, neither through the infusion of grace alone, unless an act of retraction also accompanied it, could sin be deleted and remitted. Which Suarez excellently proves, and pursues in book 7 on Grace, chapter 23, number 10. Whence those who hold the contrary opinion speak more consistently, if they require both. But the minor must be denied for once the act has passed, only the denomination of the past act remains, namely that it was voluntary; however it does not remain actually, or virtually voluntary: For this necessarily requires some consideration, and actual will, which virtually contains another, which indeed in the present is not found: for by the very fact that someone ceases from actual sin, that sin itself begins to be not voluntary: although it cannot be called involuntary, until it is retracted. Indeed as Suarez well notes in the same place, sin once voluntary, can never become involuntary elicitive, but at most objectively, insofar as it can be the object of subsequent displeasure. But then that objective denomination received from the act, although by ordinary power it constitutes a disposition for the remission of fault, nevertheless not so essential, that God by absolute power cannot preterm it.

You will object Sixthly: Habitual stain in part consists in aversion from God, and conversion to the creature; but this is not taken away except through a contrary act, namely retraction, therefore such is necessarily required. The minor is proved: for such a stain is an extrinsic denomination which is founded in the past act, therefore if that act is not taken away through retraction, neither can such a stain be taken away. I respond by denying the antecedent, for as is clear from what has been said in this whole question, when the act of sin has passed, in which indeed that actual aversion from God is imbibed, there only remains in the sinner the reason of injury, on account of which he is worthy of God's hatred, and remains obliged to punishment: All of which is taken away by the will of God condoning the offense. Likewise if retraction were required, as the opponents say, as formally opposed with the aversion entering into the formal reason of the stain, it would follow, that something of sin is formally taken away by an act of man, and sometimes a natural one, if the retraction were natural. Which is against Scripture attributing to God alone the perfect and integral remission of fault.

25 You will object seventhly: A man cannot pass from the state of stain to the state of cleanness, and the absence of sin without the mutation of some person; but not through the mutation of God, therefore of the sinner himself, therefore for sin to be taken away some real mutation in him is required. And it is confirmed: because sin cannot be remitted by God, unless He lays aside hatred, and begins to love, what He had held in hatred; but this love must be terminated at an object truly, and not only apparently good, therefore it is necessary that he who was evil, becomes good,

which cannot be understood without mutation. I respond: That since when the act of sin has passed nothing physical remains in man, but only something moral, sin can excellently be taken away by God through moral mutation alone in man: for just as a man by remitting to another an offense, or debt makes it so that the one who before was an offender to him, or a debtor, now is not, without any physical mutation of him to whom the remission is made: So God could do; with this intervening difference, that man to remit to another, has a new act of the will, by which he is changed, but God without mutation can from eternity have a decree, or determination of the will for such a time: For whatever the human will can rightly will through many acts, and their mutation, the divine will can in a more excellent way will from eternity by a most simple act, with a respect, or free termination (whatever that is) to different times. And there can be an example in the case in which God would remit to someone the obligation of a vow, where without any physical mutation he would be made from a debtor, and obliged to a non-debtor, and non-obliged.

You will say with Vasquez: It is necessary that God reveal to man that will of His; but then physical mutation would be given on the part of man, namely an act of cognition. But against this: That revelation does not take away the debt, but supposes it taken away: For the mutation of revelation is not made through the will of remitting, but through a new act of the will in our way of understanding, and hence by standing precisely in the prior act, that is had without the mutation of God or man; Nor is that revelation per se necessary, for the debt to be taken away, for God is able to do this by Himself, not awaiting the consent or acceptance of man. That revelation therefore is not per se necessary for this, but only so that man from an erroneous conscience does not still think himself a debtor. Likewise if this same thing is conceded in our case, it is the very thing which our opinion intends, namely that for remitting sin the divine will is sufficient without the physical mutation of the sinner, by which sin is formally destroyed; although some revelation or new notice is required, by which it is clear to man, that he is free from the bond of sin, so that from an erroneous conscience he does not still think himself to be in sin. Nor would such a revelation be necessary, if we imagine, that the sinner had fallen into perpetual insanity, and God wished to remit sin to him without granting him any other intrinsic grace: because then neither would he be capable of revelation, nor would it be useful for any moral effect.

To the confirmation I Respond from what has been said: God can lay aside hatred, even if He does not confer some quality, or action on him. As for that "He begins to love" it must be distinguished: because not only is the will of conferring good love, but also of taking away some evil because to lack evil is counted among goods, which can deservedly be loved and desired. Therefore for God to remit sin, it is necessary that He love: nevertheless by absolute power it is not necessary that He love positively, but it is sufficient that He love by taking away evil, and in this way He loves in our case, whence it is not directed to an apparent object, but to a truly good

object and proportionate to such love, that is, to an object truly lacking that evil, although it does not have special positive goodness; And this is the moral mutation, which happens in such an object, while from a sinner he becomes a non-sinner.