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## **QUESTION XVI. What is Sin, And How Does it Depend on the Law?**

MANY acceptations of this name Sin, as also of Evil and Vice, are adduced by authors. Which, although worthy of knowledge, yet not needing disputation, can be seen in these authors, and in our Philip Faber in the additions to 4, Treatise on Penance, disputation 1, from number 2, and disputation 3, number 23.

1 The first part of the Question can be explained in two senses. The first is, What is sin? or What is the definition of Sin? The second: In what does the nature of malice or Sin consist? Whether in something positive, or in some privation, either of due rectitude in being, or of grace, or of some other form? About this there is a celebrated controversy among Scholastics. Concerning the first, very many definitions have been devised by the Sacred Doctors. St. Thomas mentions some in 1.2, question 71, article 6. But the Scholastics gather many more in 2, distinction 21, where Saint Bonaventure collects up to twenty. Among all, however, the definition of Augustine in book 22 against Faustus, chapter 27, is celebrated, which Scotus explains well in 2, distinction 35: "Sin is a word or deed or desire against the law of God," and it is admitted by all Theologians as clear and exact. And deservedly so because sin, since it is a concrete name, says two things, one for the material, which is placed as if in place of the genus, namely word, deed, or desire, and another for the formal, namely against the law of God, where Scotus notes there, number 11, that word or deed is the remote material, but desire the proximate material. The reason for which is: because desire expresses the interior act of the will, in which imputability is proximately founded; but word or deed express exterior acts, which arise imperatively from the will.

But for a further declaration of the definition. It should be noted, that to embrace also the sin of omission, it should be explained thus: Deed or non-deed, desire or non-desire, etc. For example, Not to love God, when the precept is pressing. Likewise, "against the law" should be understood either formally and explicitly, or virtually and implicitly: Whence although to eat meat on Friday is not against the law of God explicitly and formally, it is nevertheless implicitly and virtually, insofar as God commands that we obey Prelates, Hebrews 13: "Obey your superiors and be subject to them."

You will say first: Venial sin is not against the law of God, but beside the law of God, therefore the aforesaid definition does not suit it. I respond: although it is not against the end of the law, namely Charity, it is nevertheless a light transgression of the law. Or better say, it is indeed against, but not against a law whose observance is necessary for the preservation of charity and the attainment of eternal life. Whence I deny the consequence; But about this I will speak expressly in Question 19, from number 3.

You will say secondly: Sins which are prohibited because they are evil: such as hatred of God and lying, are sins before any law, therefore this definition does not suit

them. I respond: The solution of this will be assigned in the latter part of the Question.

You will say thirdly: By the phrase "against the law of God," which we said is placed for the formal in sin, something positive is signified: for contraries are positive entities, the opposite of which seems commonly accepted in the way of Scotus: Because of these, the second sense of the Question needs to be explained (meanwhile I Respond: Privation and habit are sometimes called contraries by Aristotle in 5, Metaphysics, chapter 10.)

For the explication of which it should be noted: That, because in any sin, at least mortal, whether of commission or omission, there intervenes first the act itself, whether formal or interpretative, and this indeed free, which is called sin. Secondly, privation or negation of virtuous rectitude. Thirdly, deformity to the law by which it is prohibited, and to the dictate of reason which proposes that it should not be elicited, and to rational nature, for which it is indecent to elicit it. Fourthly, privation of sanctifying grace and consequently of friendship with God. Fifthly, diminution of the habit of virtue, if it preceded, therefore the talents of the Doctors are greatly vexed, and they had occasion deservedly for various ways of speaking, which you may see in our Felix, tome 1, Tentative, treatise on Goodness and Malice, chapter 2, difficulty 5, and in Oviedo in 1.2, treatise 4, controversy 5. But the knot of the difficulty is: In what does the formal reason, or formal of sin, or sin formally consist? For the solution of which:

**The Formal Reason of Sin consists in the absence of due rectitude.**

Let our Conclusion be: The formal reason of sin consists in the absence of rectitude due to be in the act. For its explanation Note: That just as the goodness or moral rectitude of an act from Scotus, quodlibet 18, number 3, consists in the aggregate of many things, which right reason judges should be fitting to it in its act; So moral malice or sin formally consists in the reason opposed to it, which does not seem to be other than the absence or privation of its goodness: But the goodness of an act is lacking due to the defect of any of those things by which it is aggregated: because evil is from any defect, therefore moral malice or sin consists in the absence of any of the requisites for goodness. And to speak more expressly and clearly: It consists in the absence of conformity with the rule, law, or precept insinuated or proposed by the dictate of reason. Where Note, the dictate of reason is sometimes taken as if it takes the place of the natural law, about which in the latter part of the Question; but sometimes it serves only as a condition because unless the law is proposed and known, it does not oblige, nor is operating against it sin.

Our conclusion is expressly held by Scotus in 2, distinction 37, number 3. The disciples generally follow. And from outsiders Master Lorca, Becanus, Montesinos and others have it. St. Thomas also has it expressly in 1.2, question 18, article 1, where he says: "That a human act is evil insofar as something of the fullness of being is lacking to it." And in Question 71, article 6: "A human act is sin, insofar as it lacks due

commensuration." It is proved first by the authorities of the Holy Fathers, see in Lorca, disputation 25, and Vasquez, disputation 95, chapter 4. Nor is the Response of our Poncius saying valid: The Fathers for the greater part when they treat of sin, do so against the Manicheans, who thought sin to be some substance or nature, and not an accident of a deficient nature, namely the will. Which he collects from Augustine, book 2 on the morals of the Manicheans.

It is not, I say, valid: Because at least in the time of St. Dionysius this heresy had not arisen and yet in chapter 4 on Divine Names he says: "Sin is not something existing or inexistent," that is, neither substance nor accident, "but is the privation of good." Likewise Damascene in 2 on Faith, chapter 4: "Sin is nothing other than the privation and absence of good, just as darkness is the lack of light." Nor does Poncius confirm his response there saying: The Fathers speak of sin without the addition of "formally" or an equivalent term; but sin as such and absolutely said does not only express privation but also a positive act, therefore the Fathers do not exclude from sin the nature of a positive act. But this animadversion, in my judgment, rather favors our exposition: because if the Fathers, not being ignorant that both are contained in sin, teach that it is privation as the principal significate, indicating namely the formal, they insinuate our assertion. Nor is the expression of the term "formally" required among the Holy Fathers: otherwise we could never use the sentences of the Holy Fathers to prove Theological truths: For this term and other similar ones are only adduced and were invented by Scholastic Theologians: See Suarez, disputation 11, Metaphysics, section 1, number 3, who for this assertion cites Basil, Ambrose, Fulgentius and others.

3 The Conclusion is proved first: Either there is given a univocal reason of sin for the sin of commission and omission or there is not given? If the first, therefore since the formal reason of malice in omission is absence, so in commission. If the second, therefore either they agree equivocally, and this is not so, otherwise one of them would not be sin except in name alone; or analogically; And if this: Besides the fact that it is probable that there are no middle analogies between univocals and equivocals; I thus argue: Therefore Peter and Paul do not agree analogically in the reason of man, because the same properties in species arising in Peter by reason of the rational we see arise in Paul by reason of the same rational. But the same properties that we find in the sin of commission by reason of malice we see in the sin of omission: for one no less than the other deprives of beatitude, turns away from God, etc. Therefore they have equal effects by reason of malice. Nor should our Felix above, number 23, be heard arguing against Cornejus and proving this assumption from the fact that it would follow that God is not less offended, and the law violated by the sin of omission than of commission, and thus God is as offended by the omission of love as by hatred of Himself: because the precept of the love of God is different from the precept of not having hatred of Him, for one is affirmative, the other negative. And speaking absolutely, sometimes the violation of an affirmative

precept is more serious than of a negative; and conversely. About which you have some things above in question 12, number 41.

The conclusion is proved secondly and a priori: With the absence of due rectitude understood and setting aside whatever else, sin is understood to be, therefore it consists formally in such absence; the antecedent is proved. Therefore with animal and rational understood, man is understood, because animal and rational are the root and origin of all properties, which are attributed to man; but the absence of due rectitude is the origin of all properties which are attributed to sin, therefore with that absence understood, sin is understood, the minor is proved, therefore sin is the offense of God, turns away from God, deprives of grace and similar things, because the act should have been conformable to the obliging law, and is not, therefore from the absence of that due rectitude by reason of the law there arise in sin all properties.

You will say: Therefore the violation of the law constitutes sin. I respond by distinguishing the consequent: violation of the law actively, I deny, passively, I concede: For to violate the law can either be taken for the order which the act expresses to the law, and in this way beyond the violation of the law, debt in the creature is required; or the violation of the law is taken passively for the absence resulting in the act from the debt, by which one is bound to observe the law. And this is what formally constitutes sin. Whence you will understand, what is that positive, of which sin is the privation: For it is the debt of observing the law. And thus sin is a certain concrete expressing for the formal and in the direct the absence of the debt to which the will is bound (And this, if you wish, can be called passive violation) and in the oblique or for the material the active violation of the law.

4 You will object first with our Poncius in both his Philosophical and Theological Course, whose opinion is: (nor do I remember Scotus's) The formal of sin consists in the free act itself taken entitatively tending to a prohibited object known as such. Which opinion Oviedo above, point 7, holds in reality, although in words he seems afterwards to add something. He argues thus: A good act is not good per se primo from something following the entity; which he supposes from antecedents, therefore neither is an evil one per se primo such from something following its entity. And he Confirms first because if a good act were formally such from something following, it would be maximally from respect of conformity to nature or law or reason; but if this were so, an evil act should be such from respect of deformity, and hence would not be such from any privation following. He confirms secondly: for just as the privation of conformity follows an evil act, so the privation of deformity follows a good one, therefore if from that privation following an evil act has to be such, the same must be said of a good act; or if this, notwithstanding that such a privation follows it, is not such from that, the same must be said of an evil act. Which can be further urged from the fact that goodness and malice are differences of the human act, therefore just as good is constituted by conformity with the law, so also evil by deformity. I respond by denying the antecedent and the

consequence. To the first Confirmation I concede the major and deny the minor, the disparity of which is required in the second confirmation; Which I thus assign: In both acts there is found a relation through which it is first constituted in moral being and a privation following it, why therefore as in one, not in the other? etc. I say, that we assign the good act to be formally constituted by that, which is better in it, namely a positive reason, which is the relation of conformity, to which as a proper passion there follows the privation of contrary form, namely of disconformity, but we assign the evil act to be formally constituted by that which is worse in it, namely privation, whence although fundamentally it is evil from the relation of disconformity, it is not yet fully and formally understood as evil until the privation of conformity with the rule results, which is worse in it. To the last I distinguish the antecedent, they are essential differences constituting one per se, I deny, accidental differences constituting one per accident, I concede: For the free vital act is not related to goodness and malice as a genus to species, but as a subject to accidents: As in like manner we will say in Question 17, from number 1, about the nature of habit in common to the nature of virtue and vice. And thus just as contradictories in beings per accident only require the same subject, not however the same connotatum; So it is compatible, that goodness and malice are contradictories, and are not formally constituted in terms of the same term. And from this it is clear to the second argument there adduced by Poncius, indeed also to the third: Because God can cause neither the proximate foundation to which the privation of rectitude follows, namely the relation of disconformity. About which we have expressly disputed above in question 13, number 33.

5 You will object secondly with the same Poncius and others: That privation is either subjected in the power, or in the act; Neither can be said, therefore; Not the first: because it is false that the power, when it sins, has the privation of rectitude, which should be in it, more than when it acts indifferently: for it should not have rectitude then, except insofar as it should elicit a good act from the supposition, that it elicited any; But if it should do this, it could not elicit an indifferent act without sin, and thus it would not be indifferent, therefore: Nor also the second: because the act of hatred of God, for example, is incapable, and it is repugnant to it to have rectitude, therefore it does not have the privation of it: for privation is the absence of form in a subject apt to have it, therefore, etc. I respond by conceding the major as to the first part, about which I will touch on something below concerning the mind of Scotus. To the argument as to the second part it is commonly Responded and Felix Responds above: That although it is repugnant to hatred of God and other intrinsically evil acts according to their specific nature to have rectitude, they nevertheless have aptitude according to their generic nature: In the way that the Mole, to which only according to the generic nature of animal it is fitting to have sight, is said to be blind or deprived of sight. Against this solution Cornelius and others attack: Because no Philosopher ever said: that heat is due to water, although according to the generic nature of body it agrees univocally with fire, to which heat is due, therefore although according to the generic nature of the vital act, hatred of

God agrees with an act capable of rectitude, this is not sufficient for it to be said, that rectitude is due to that hatred of God itself. It is responded from certain principles in Metaphysics: To the individual, for example Peter, some predicates are due by reason of genus: for example to be sensible by reason of animal, others by reason of specific difference: for example to be risible by reason of rational, others finally by reason of individual difference, for example to have such a complexion. From this this difference is established, that predicates due by reason of genus are due to other species contained under the same genus. Whence since heat is not due to fire according to which it is a natural body, in which it agrees with water, but by reason of specific difference, according to which it differs from it, it is not surprising, that it is not due to water. Since truly rectitude is a predicate due to the vital act by reason of Vitality and freedom; in which hatred and love of God agree univocally, hence it is said to be deprived of rectitude.

But against this you will press: A predicate cannot be due to an individual by reason of genus, which is repugnant to it by reason of individual or specific difference: By the rule that what is fitting to the superior, is fitting to the inferior, therefore because rectitude is repugnant to hatred of God according to specific and individual reason, it can in no way be due according to generic reason. It is responded by distinguishing the antecedent: In predicates identified with genus, I concede; in those which are distinguished, I deny: In sins of nature there is an instance: So much is a man a monster having six fingers, as a man having due exigency: Now I ask: To a monster as a monster it is repugnant not to have that, by which it is a monster by reason of individual difference, and yet by reason of the specific nature of man from the exigency of rational animal it is due to it not to have except five fingers, therefore since rectitude is a predicate really distinct from vitality and freedom (otherwise if they were identified no free vital act could be evil) it will be able from the exigency of generic reason to be due to hatred of God, for example, rectitude, although it is repugnant by reason of individual difference: Thus it can be said, that rectitude is not repugnant, indeed is due to hatred of God taken specifically, although reduplicatively it is repugnant: just as to a monster specifically the rectitude of nature is due, to which reduplicatively as it is a monster, it is repugnant. And by this it is clear to the example of the puppy before the ninth day, which Poncius also adduces there: for specifically sight is due to it, although reduplicatively according to time, which also enters into individual difference, it is repugnant to it.

You will press: Therefore if rectitude is due only according to generic reason, which hatred of God does not have, it will not be sin specifically and individually: since it is only sin, insofar as rectitude is due to it, which it does not have. I respond by denying the supposition and the consequence: namely that sin is only sin according to that reason according to which rectitude is due: for sometimes there are predicates, which although they are fitting to the whole by reason of the part, nevertheless are said of the whole: For example the whole man is blind, although according to the part it is fitting not to be seeing.

These and many other difficulties this solution and way of responding to the aforesaid argument suffers; Nor of less moment is that which Poncius also touches on there about the indifferent act in the individual, which in the way of Scotus is commonly admitted: For this seems necessarily to be evil according to the aforesaid doctrine; But it can be said, that not even this hinders: because the obligation of providing rectitude, which is not in the case of the indifferent act, must be supposed. Therefore we must proceed by another way and respond to the argument.

To proceed more clearly on this matter, it should be noted: Malice is opposed to goodness in three ways, negatively, privatively, and contrarily, and this by reason of what is connoted, not of what is formally signified, insofar as the human act is first called evil negatively due to the bare absence of rectitude: as a Mole is called blind due to the mere negation of sight in a subject connoting no aptitude for the negated sight. Secondly it is called evil privatively, insofar as the negation of rectitude proximately connotes aptitude for the negated rectitude: as a man is called privatively blind due to the negation of sight connoting in the subject aptitude for it. Thirdly it is called evil contrarily, insofar as the absence of rectitude, besides the connoted ineptitude for the negated rectitude, further connotes a positive reason repugnant to it: as a Brute is called irrational contrarily due to a positive difference impossible with rationality.

The aforesaid doctrine is taken from Scotus from many places, and is explained by another similar one in 3, distinction 1, question 1, and distinction 7, question 2, about the incommunicability of person opposed to the communicability of nature. Where Scotus notes that incommunicable is said in three ways, first actually negatively, insofar as it is not actually communicated. Secondly aptitudinally privatively, insofar as it is not apt to be communicated. Thirdly potentially contrarily, insofar as it is further repugnant to it to be communicated. Hence he places a difference between Divine and created person and says: the former includes a triple negation of actual, aptitudinal, and potential communication; but the latter only a double one, namely of actual and aptitudinal communication. Scotus assumes the difference a priori from the material not from the formal significate of both, which is merely negative, namely the negation of communicability: insofar as namely this negation in one person, namely Divine, connotes a positive reason contrarily opposed to the communicability of nature; but in the other, namely created, not at all.

Thus in our case we discourse with the same: Evil contrarily differs from evil privatively or negatively only by reason of the material, not of the formal significate: for of both it is only the absence of rectitude; But in the former there is connoted a positive reason opposed contrarily to rectitude; but in the latter not at all. Evil contrarily is evil from the object: as is hatred of God, lying, etc., evil privatively is evil from circumstance alone: as the acts of theft, fornication, etc. This is called privatively evil, insofar as it is deprived of rectitude fitting to it by reason of the object; that contrarily evil, insofar as the absence of rectitude formally signified

connotes in the proximate subject a positive reason repugnant to rectitude, such as the positive tendency or conversion of the act to an ultimately unfitting object.

Hence Vasquez is excluded in disputation 95, who with many others thinks: Scotus in quodlibet 18, article 1, taught that malice is a positive relation of dissonance from right reason: for Scotus always posited malice in the bare absence of rectitude: Which is clear from 2, distinction 37, number 9, where he teaches that the conversion of the human act to an object or circumstance is only materially evil, insofar as the conversion to the opposite object of virtue with circumstances dictated by right reason is impossible with it. From this he judges that the difference between negatively, privatively and contrarily evil act is entirely taken from the connoted reason, not from the formal significate, so that the negation of goodness in the first is simple in genus connoting a bare subject, in the second the subject itself for receiving goodness, in the third finally a reason repugnant to goodness. Nor does it follow from this: that this positive reason of repugnance pertains to the formal of the sin of commission: for just as in 3, especially distinction 1, question 1, number 10, Scotus posits the concept of person as merely negative, although in the divine person it connotes a positive reason of repugnance to being communicated, not so in the created person; So we say the formal significate of malice is negative, although in intrinsically evil acts it connotes a positive reason of repugnance to having rectitude.

6 Now I Respond to the argument from the doctrine of Scotus taken from 4, distinction 26, question 1, number 4, where he first distinguishes morally good acts into good from the object (as is only to love God, insofar as God alone objectively is the ultimate good necessarily to be loved) and into good from circumstance: as are all human acts about a created object. Secondly by opposition he explains morally evil acts into evil from the object (as is hatred of God, evil of itself, whose object is repugnant to it) and into evil from circumstance, to which it is not repugnant from the object to be good. He holds this same doctrine in the place cited in 2, where he distinguishes acts of our will into acts capable of rectitude and incapable of rectitude, about the former he says, that man sins, when he does not give them rectitude, about the latter because he does not take precautions from them: But the words of Scotus are, "The will sins, when it does not give to its act proportional rectitude, if it is capable of rectitude, or rather because it does not take precautions against it, if it is not capable of rectitude." I respond therefore in hatred of God and other intrinsically and from the object evil acts and thus incapable of rectitude, such as hatred of God, blasphemy, lying, the absence of rectitude does not have the nature of privation: since it connotes a reason, to which it is repugnant to have rectitude, and thus such absence has the nature of negation; but in other acts evil from circumstance and not from object, absence has the nature of privation. Therefore in the conclusion I placed in the absence of rectitude, that I might embrace both acts.

You will say first: Scotus in the cited 4 calls hatred of God evil of itself insofar as the object of itself is repugnant to that act; then if positive rectitude is repugnant to it, it is positively evil of itself. I respond by denying the assumption: because Scotus calls hatred of God evil of itself materially due to formal repugnance to conformity with the law; Nor does it follow from this, that that positive reason of repugnance is formally evil: because the negation constitutive of something in being can be fitting to something in a different way by reason of what is connoted, namely actually, aptitudinally, and potentially: as we explained with Scotus about the merely negative constitutive of person. Whence it only follows, that the absence of rectitude in evil acts from circumstance alone is actual and aptitudinal only without repugnance, such as is the negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence in created person; But in evil acts from the object as hatred of God, infidelity, blasphemy, etc., that negation is also potential connoting in the subject a positive reason of repugnance.

You will say secondly: A non-human act also expresses repugnance to having rectitude: since indeed it is incapable of it, therefore it is morally evil, which no one has said. I respond, that it does not express the same repugnance, because not with the contradictorily opposed, as hatred of God with the suspension of itself, to which rectitude is due: just as light expresses repugnance to having the proper and due affections of darkness, which are the absence and negation of light. Whence since the suspension of a non-human act is not capable of moral rectitude, neither also is the non-human act itself said to be morally evil, because rectitude is not yet due to its contradictory.

7 You will inquire first: Whether the sinful absence of due rectitude is immediately in the second act, or in the will? That it is not in the will I judge altogether certain according to Scotus: for he says in 2 above, number 6, "Sin is the corruption of rectitude in the second act" and elsewhere he often repeats this. For which note, that if the absence itself is formally attended to as a form denominating the concrete which is sin, it is immediately in the second act; But if it is considered as it constitutes another distinct concrete, which I call a sinner, it is immediately in the will: Just as it is usually said in the books on the Soul, that vitality is immediately in the second act, if it is considered as it constitutes the exercise of life; But if it is considered as it constitutes the root of life, it is immediately in the vital power. And from this you will reconcile the opposed texts of Scotus, which Monte-Pilosus in disputation 127, the last article, inculcates too prolixly.

8 You will inquire secondly: In which act must there be the rectitude whose absence is called sin, in the sinful act itself, or in its opposite? Our Herrera in tome 2, disputation 29, question 2, and Cavellus in a certain scholium to the cited distinction 37, according to the opinion otherwise true to them, that the same act cannot pass from good to evil, absolutely think, that rectitude must be in the opposite act, which should have been elicited. But I with distinction Respond: for if the acts are not intrinsically evil, but only from circumstance, as homicide, theft and such like, rectitude should have been in those very acts. Which is clear from the authority of

Scotus adduced above number 6: "Sin is the corruption of rectitude in the second act": Likewise there in number 3, explaining, "What is the name of sin?" he says: "Sin is (whether against Divine or human law) because the sinner could be in accord with the law of the superior agent and be in discord; that act which is in the power of the one being in discord and through this voluntary, is not formally sin, because if that act were in accord with the superior rule, it would not be sin, therefore in that act the precise reason of sin is the privation of that accord." Where consider those words: "if that namely the act were in accord, etc., it would not be sin." But if the acts are intrinsically or from the object evil and thus incapable of rectitude, as hatred of God, blasphemy, lying, in these due rectitude is in the acts contradictorily opposed to them, such as are the negations or suspensions of them, namely of hatred, lying, blasphemy, not the contrary act of love, praise, and veracity: for hatred of God and the others aforementioned are against negative precepts, which are fulfilled through the negation of prohibited acts. Therefore it is false to say generally and absolutely: that sin is formally the absence of rectitude due to the opposite act, which should have been elicited.

You will say with Gabriel and other more ancient ones against the solution of the first Question: Sinful acts are not capable of moral rectitude, therefore the rectitude of which they are deprived, is due to the will. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: they are not capable in the composed sense, I concede; in the divided sense, I deny: Just as prime matter under one form is said to be deprived of the rest, insofar as it is apt to receive them, at least in the divided sense.

You will insist: The act of hatred of God according to its specific nature is not capable of rectitude, therefore at least in this and in other intrinsically evil acts the formal reason of sin will be the absence of rectitude due only to the will, not to its act. I respond according to what has been said: the due rectitude to be in the aforesaid acts from the will according to the law, must be given to the contradictorily opposed acts, namely to the actual suspension of them, not to itself. Whence it is always saved, that rectitude is due to the second act, either which is said, or which should have been elicited: namely the negation of the second act, which although it be pure omission, is truly the second act of the free will as to exercise.

You will say secondly with our Herrera against the solution of the second Question: No act of sin as such is, can any rectitude be fitting to, therefore it is not due to it, but to the opposite which should have been elicited: Which is clear in the blind man, whose privation of sight is the absence of vision due to the power to see, such as is the visual power in the one seeing; not truly the visual power determined to not seeing. I respond, the antecedent is true in the composed sense, as I said, not in the divided sense. Which also holds in the example, as is clear in the blind man enlightened by the Savior: for in him there was capacity together with the natural power to see. Therefore from Scotus the sight restored to him was of a supernatural form according to mode not according to substance.

You will insist. Lying is formally the absence of truth to be said, theft the retention of another's property; but the rectitude negated in these acts is not apt to be fitting to them, therefore in them sin is the absence of rectitude due to the opposite acts. I respond: about lying we have already spoken; about theft and other such like the assumption is false: because from the object it can be good: for if it is evil from circumstance alone, because terminated at a thing not his own, it could be good from changed circumstance, if that same thing were due to him in some way.

9 You will object thirdly principally against our conclusion: If sin is the absence of rectitude, let this be of a precept, which is fulfilled by pure omission, for example, "Do not lie," that I might fulfill this precept, it is sufficient, for me to elicit no positive act of lying, when the occasion presses; Then thus, let me elicit a positive act of lying, such an act is sin, because it is opposed to pure omission, by which the law of not lying is fulfilled, therefore either there is given an absence of an absence, or sin does not consist in absence. Felix responds above, number 30, that there is no inconvenience, indeed he proves both by examples and by reason a priori that there must be given an absence of negation. See him, because in my judgment he sufficiently satisfies the argument. I otherwise

Respond: over and above the omission of the prohibited act "Do not lie" and similarly for the rest of such like there is a relation of conformity with the precept and law: for this omission is truly morally good, just as, by eliciting an act conformable to the rule, that act is formally good through the relation of conformity with the law: thus by suspending or omitting a prohibited act conformably to the law, such omission is morally good through the relation of conformity with the law. Of this relation therefore, which is something positive, absence is the formal reason of the sin of commission. The same in a proportional way for sinful omission against an affirmative precept, for example, "Honor Parents": for in this physically taken there results a relation of disconformity with the law through which it is first constituted in the genus of moral evil, and to it there follows the privation of the relation of conformity with the law, through which it is constituted formally evil as we said above to Poncius. And this I judge necessarily to be acknowledged by all the asserters of our opinion: for therefore sin is said to be the absence of rectitude due to be in the act either formal or interpretative: Whence it is necessary to concede and assert this according to the words of the conclusion thus posited by all. Behold how in the sin both of omission and of commission its formal reason is always the absence of something positive, namely of the relation of conformity with the rule due to be in it or in its contradictory according to what was said above. Nor should you consider it absurd, that a relation, which is something positive, is founded above an absence or omission of an act, which is negative: because although a positive of greater entity than the absence itself is, such as is absolute positive entity cannot be founded above an absence or omission of an act, yet well a positive of lesser entity than the absence itself, such as is relative entity, which will clearly be evident if you diligently attend to, what relation is? And it is also evident since two privations are

similar: And Scotus in 2, distinction 1, question 5, a little before number 17, says: "relation has a small entity."

You will object fourthly. Privations are distinguished according to positive forms, of which they are absences, therefore if sin consists in absence, it follows, that there cannot be given many vices specifically distinct opposed to the same virtue, which all Philosophers and Theologians deny. The assumption is proved, because due rectitude is the virtue to which sin is opposed; but both prodigality and avarice which are specifically distinct sins, deprive of the same liberality, therefore they will not be specifically distinct. I respond, this argument is also against Vasquez, who places all force in it: for he himself often acknowledges, that the sin of omission consists in the privation of due rectitude. From which I thus argue: To the virtue of fortitude it pertains to flee dangers and to advance, when it is fitting, therefore not to flee and not to advance are not distinct, which if he denies this, the argument is of no moment. Therefore both to this instance and to the objection, I Respond, that the liberality to which avarice is opposed is a distinct species from the liberality, to which prodigality is opposed; And similarly Fortitude for advancing into dangers and for fleeing: for we know the specific distinction of habits from the specific distinction of things, to which they incline. Which doctrine I collect from Scotus in 3, distinction 36, number 24. And about this we have spoken above in Question 12, number 39. But let us grant the virtue is the same in species, still I deny, that sins are not distinguished: for according to Aristotle in 5 Physics, text 21, as Scotus notes in 4, distinction 43, question 1, number 8, at the end: "circular and straight motion to the same terminus in number differ in species from the diverse manner of attaining the terminus," therefore it stands well that to the same in species and number virtue diverse privations, which in a diverse way deprive of the perfection of virtue, are diverse in species sins. Therefore as Oviedo well notes in treatise 6, on Sins, controversy 1, point 6, number 163, "Against the same virtue there can be specifically diverse sins because of the diverse manner of harming it."

### **With All Law Removed There Would Be No Sin.**

As for the decision of the latter part of the question. It should be noted that law is commonly divided into natural, eternal, Divine and human. Eternal law is thus defined by St. Thomas in 1.2, question 39, article 1: "It is the reason of Divine Wisdom, by which it directs all things to their ends, disposing and ordering their actions and motions." Natural law is, "That which is prescribed by the dictate of right reason in things to be done and avoided." Divine law is, "A certain precept which God has brought to men, as the author of this law." Which is divided into written law, which He gave to Moses in the disposition of Angels, and into the law of Grace, which He gave through Himself, Hebrews 1:2: "In these last days He has spoken to us in His Son." Human Law is, "A precept of someone having power." And this is either Ecclesiastical or Civil, the former is with the Pontiff, the latter with the secular Prince.

And I suppose: that every sin in fact is against some law either prohibiting or commanding. Which can easily be proved by induction: for all sins are either against human law and consequently against Divine, from which all human power of making laws is derived; or they are against the positive law of God, or against the natural law of God. Where by law do not understand something by way of judging what is evil and sin; but law properly so-called, which is indeed an act in the legislator, which formally is of the will according to Scotus, although according to St. Thomas it is of the intellect. About which in the treatise on laws.

10 Let the second Conclusion be: It is so intrinsic to the nature of sin to be against some law, that with every law removed there would be no Sin. This opinion is more common than the opposite. Scotus holds it in 2, distinction 37, number 6, where explaining the authority of Augustine in book 1 on two souls: "Sin is the will of pursuing, or retaining, what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain," Scotus says: "This is said briefly: Sin is to will the forbidden, so that the will itself is there material, and for so much everything is imputed to the will, because everything is in its power, but the forbidden or prohibited is there formal." In reality and as to the truth of the conclusion, as will be clear from what is to be said, Monte Pilosus and all others, even from the Thomists, hold it, whom our Felix cites for the contrary opinion in chapter 1, difficulty 2. Faber in the additions to 4, treatise on Penance, disputation 1, chapter 6, although he defends it by another way. Lorca, Salas, and many others expressly hold it, whom he cites here in disputation 2, section 4, number 35.

The Conclusion is proved first from the Apostle to the Romans 4: "the law worketh wrath. For where there is no law, neither is there transgression," therefore from the Apostle, with no law existing, there would be no sin. You will say first: The Apostle only means, that with all law set aside there is no transgression, for sin is something distinct from transgression and superior to it. Whence the Gloss on this place: "The Apostle does not say: Where there is no law, there is no iniquity, But there is no transgression: for everyone transgressing the law is iniquitous, but not conversely; because they who have not received the law, can be called iniquitous, but they cannot be called transgressors." To which exposition seems consonant that of the same Apostle to the Romans 5: "Until the law sin was in the world, but it was not imputed, when the law was not."

But against this exposition stand the words of Psalm 118: "I have regarded all the sinners of the earth as transgressors." Which would be false, if every sin were not transgression. Which also St. Ambrose expressly acknowledges in sermon 16 on this place, Augustine in speech 25 on Psalm 118, and epistle 89, question 3, and book 16 on the city of God, chapter 27. Then from this explanation it follows: that the reason which the Apostle uses is ineffective. Which I thus show: what the Apostle intends is to prove that the written law of Moses works wrath, that is, punishment and vengeance, which that he might do, he renders the cause, namely that where there is no law, neither will there be transgression: that is, there will not be something

exciting God to wrath and to take vengeance; Then thus, if without the transgression of any law sin could be found, now without the transgression of law there would be given something worthy of wrath, and provoking God to punishment, therefore the reason of the Apostle to prove that the law works wrath is ineffective. The consequence with the minor is clear, and the minor is proved: because the liability to punishment intrinsically and necessarily follows sin: according to that to the Romans 1: "Tribulation and anguish upon the soul of every man that worketh evil." Since therefore with prohibition through law set aside, the liability to punishment does not follow, as is clear from the reason of the Apostle, it is consequent, that neither is sin found.

Nor do the words of the Gloss hinder: because they are to be understood according to the subject matter, namely that the Gentiles were not transgressors of the written law like the Jews, nor were they to be judged through that law; yet well they were transgressors of the natural law; Nor does the testimony to the Romans 9 hinder anything, because, as Ambrose and Origen interpret, it is understood of the imputation to be made from these, or as to fault: because before the written law the natural law was so abolished, that sins were known by very few; or as to punishment, either because there was no law commanding temporal punishment for fault, or because God rarely punished them with such punishment: as He did in the flood, Sodom, and Egypt.

Therefore you will say secondly with Vasquez in 1.12, disputation 97, chapter 4, number 12: that the Apostle does not speak universally in every matter, but in that only, which therefore was evil, because prohibited by the old law, and which before the law was not evil. And our Lyra favors this exposition on this place saying: That the words of the Apostle are true about those things, which were indifferent before the law: because such things are not evil except because prohibited, of which kind are ceremonials; But about others which were prohibited through the law, because they were evil according to themselves, the words of the Apostle are not to be understood absolutely but according to what, because their transgression was not so grave before the law as after the law, because of the greater knowledge of sin, which is the effect of the law: according to that to the Romans 4: "Through the law is the knowledge of sin. And I did not know sin, unless the law would say, etc." But it is clear that greater knowledge aggravates sin from that of Luke 12: "The servant who knew the will of his Lord and did not do it, will be beaten with many stripes, etc."

But against this interpretation stands the common consensus of the Holy Fathers, who although in those prior words "the law worketh wrath," they admit the discourse is about the Mosaic law alone; the latter, however, "where there is no law, neither is there transgression," they say, is to be understood universally about every law: as Jerome, Augustine, and Anselm explain. Which can also be convinced by this reason: for that latter proposition: "Where there is no law, neither is there transgression" is assumed by the Apostle as a more universal means to prove the prior prohibition, namely that the law now works wrath, therefore the latter

proposition cannot be understood of the Mosaic law alone, about which the former is understood. The consequence is evident and the antecedent: because if by the name of law in the latter proposition the law as it abstracts and comprehends all particular laws is not understood, but precisely and determinately as it signifies the Mosaic law, the sense of the Apostle would be ridiculous and unworthy of such a Doctor, because the sense would be: where there is no law of Moses, neither is there transgression of the Mosaic law. And it is Confirmed by many authorities of the holy Fathers which more recent authors adduce, see in them. For us it is sufficient Augustine in book 2 on the Merits and Remission of Sins, chapter 16 at the beginning: "For neither will there be sin, if it is not divinely commanded, that it not be." And in the book on free will, chapter 3 and following, when Evodius said some things are forbidden because they are evil; Augustine proves, nothing is evil, except because it is prohibited by eternal law.

11 The conclusion is now proved by reason: Sin is formally and essentially a moral evil or in the genus of morals; but moral evil consists formally in deviation from the rules of morals, therefore also sin. The consequence with the major is clear. The minor is proved: artificial evil consists in deviation from the rules of art, therefore also moral evil from the rules of morals; Then thus, but the rules of morals are laws and precepts whether of divine or natural right or of human right, therefore it is of the essence of sin that it be against some law.

You will say with Vasquez above: that moral malice does not consist in contrariety with rational nature, as it is rational antecedently to the actual dictate of reason, which either is the natural law itself or its promulgation. But against this, because antecedently to the dictate of reason an act cannot be sin, therefore, etc., the antecedent is proved: antecedently to such dictate the act cannot be human and free: for that it be such, it is necessary to proceed from the will with deliberation, in which the dictate of reason is included, therefore, etc.

You will respond: from this it is only convinced: that the dictate of reason and law is a condition precisely required, that an act be human and free, and also that it be evil and sinful: Its malice, however, does not consist formally in dissonance with that dictate and law, but in dissonance alone with rational nature. But against this because eating meat on Friday is dissonant to the dictate of reason and to the law prior in nature, than it is dissonant to rational nature; but by this that it is not precisely conformable to the dictate, it is formally a moral evil and sin, therefore its malice and nature of sin is taken in order to the dictate and not to nature, and thus the dictate and law is not a pure condition, but that in order to which moral malice is taken. The consequence is evident; for the formal effect cannot precede the form, the minor also is clear, because it implies to understand some human act to be contrary to the dictate of reason and not to be evil, the major, however, is proved: for the reason for which eating meat is unfitting to rational nature, is because it is dissonant to the dictate of reason, therefore it is opposed prior and more immediately to it, than to nature.

You will respond: all this is true of eating meat and other actions therefore evil and sins because prohibited; not truly of others, for example, lying, blasphemy, about which the difficulty proceeds, therefore prohibited, because evil: for with the dissonance, which they have with the dictate and law, either through the impossible or through our consideration, set aside, they are still dissonant to rational nature as such, which according to itself and antecedently to whatever dictate is inclined to saying the truth, etc.

But against this: Because who lies officiously, judging through the dictate of erroneous conscience that it is licit to lie thus, does not do anything unfitting to rational nature, as it is rational, therefore the whole reason of the unfittingness of lying to rational nature arises adequately from the dictate of reason, the consequence is clear and the antecedent is proved: because with such an erroneous dictate standing, that lie is not sin, therefore who thus lies, does nothing unfitting to rational nature as such: since only sin is dissentaneous to it. And it is Confirmed first: because if then he did not tell a lie, he would sin, as I suppose: because it is sin to act even against erroneous conscience, therefore, in the case he would do something unfitting to nature, therefore the adequate reason, why sin is against rational nature, is because it is contrary to the dictate of reason. It is confirmed secondly: Because at least this solution is false at least about sins which are against supernatural virtues, to which in the opinion of the adversaries rational nature according to itself is not naturally prone and inclined.

Before I propose arguments against our opinion, I cannot help but wonder at our Felix treatise on sins, chapter 1, difficulty 2, who also cites Curiel and others for himself; because Scotus in 3, distinction 37, number 6, said: that God cannot dispense in the precepts of the first table, which are to love God, not to have other Gods, and not to lie, they asserted according to Scotus, some things are intrinsically evil sins, with every prohibition set aside. To which meantime it could be Responded, before we expressly dispute about this in Responding to arguments: This consequent in no way follows from the assertion of Scotus: for when the matter of the law is common to the legislator, it is indispensable by such a legislator, and yet matter prohibited by such a positive law will not be evil with the law set aside, therefore since the matter of the triple precept of the first table equally comprehends God and creatures, the fact that God cannot dispense does not remove that those acts are sins only because prohibited. I have taken this doctrine from our Monte Pilosus, disputation 127, article 2, at the end, And it has a foundation in Scotus in the place recently cited, where he teaches: that that law can be dispensed, which depends on some circumstance, from which the act not observing the law becomes good, therefore in some law no circumstance makes a good act dissonant to the law, then such a law could not be dispensed. But if you say: therefore God is subject to some law. I respond by distinguishing: to a law given by Himself, I concede, given by a superior, I deny. You will insist: law is imposed by a superior; but God does not have a superior, therefore. I respond by distinguishing

the major, positive law I concede. Law co-eternal with the legislator, I deny: for although every positive law respects an inferior, and thus exacts rigorous obedience; a law comprehending the legislator, does not induce obedience in him, but conformity.

12 You will object first against the conclusion: that commonly received both from the Holy Fathers and Scholastic Theologians: Some things are evil because prohibited, like eating meat, but others prohibited because evil, like hatred of God, Theft, homicide, and adultery, therefore at least in these malice precedes prohibition. I respond with St. Thomas; that the phrase "prohibited because evil" should be understood about prohibition through positive law superadded to the natural and eternal law, not truly about prohibition made through the eternal or natural law itself: because before the prohibition of these there is no sin or moral evil.

But you will say: Hatred of God and lying are moral evils and sins even before the prohibition of eternal law, therefore they are prohibited through eternal law because evil, the antecedent is proved, because prior in reason than God prohibited hatred of God and lying, He judged them worthy of such prohibition, therefore He judged them to be morally evil and sinful: otherwise the judgment of God would be false. I respond by denying the antecedent. To the proof with the antecedent conceded I deny the consequence; Nor from this does it follow, that God falsely judged: because for that sign antecedent to prohibition He did not judge them to be evil and sins, but precisely judged them to be worthy to be prohibited.

But if you Insist: this worthiness of prohibition can be nothing else than moral malice, therefore if He judged them worthy of prohibition, He judged them to be morally evil. I respond by denying the antecedent: because antecedently to prohibition they are only evil and sins philosophically or in the genus of nature, not truly Theologically or in the genus of morals (You have these terms Philosophically and Theologically in Scotus, quodlibet 18, number 17, and St. Thomas, question 71, article 6, to the Fifth) For that worthiness of prohibition consists in the opposition and contrariety which hatred of God and lying have with divine attributes: for lying is opposed to divine veracity and hatred of God since it respects an object under some aspect of evil, is opposed to divine Goodness, to which every aspect of evil is repugnant; but opposition and contrariety of this kind to divine attributes can be found without moral malice. And there is a manifest instance in invincible speculative error; which is neither morally evil nor sin since it is inculpable, and yet is contrary to divine truth: In the same way therefore lying and hatred of God antecedently to prohibition through eternal law are judged contrary to divine truth and goodness, and yet they are not therefore judged sins or morally evil.

You will still press: If for that prior sign they neither are nor are judged morally evil, therefore in the following sign God can will them, which is absurd. The consequence is proved, because God can will whatever is not sin: for just as among actually

existing things He hates nothing except moral evil: according to that "You have hated nothing of those things which You have made," so similarly among possibles. I respond by denying the consequence, to the proof I deny: That God can love or will whatever is not sin: for it is sufficient that it be contrary to divine attributes; that it cannot be loved by Him: the reason for which is, that since the will of God is necessarily determined to loving His attributes, consequently also it is connaturally determined to not loving, whatever is directly contrary to them, although it be not sin. And hence it is that God cannot will falsity as it is falsity, although it be without fault, for this sole reason that it is contrary to divine truth, which is one of the divine attributes. To that of wisdom I say: it should be understood about things made by God, insofar as they are made by God, not truly according to the aspect by which they are not made by God, such as is falsity under the aspect of falsity.

You will say further: therefore at least God could in the posterior sign not prohibit lying and hatred of God, but have Himself merely negatively about them, neither approving nor reprobating. It is proved, because law is the free act of the legislator. I respond by distinguishing the consequent: if it is understood about prohibition through positive divine law to be handed over to men in time, I concede, because this was freely established by God and voluntarily handed over to Moses among the precepts of the decalogue; if it is understood about prohibition to be made through eternal law, I deny: because as I said, the divine will is necessarily determined to willing, that hatred of God and lying and other such like are morally evil and worthy of punishment: But if finally you Insist: this act of God, which is eternal law, both is about creatures ad extra, and is about some particular created good, therefore it cannot be necessary, but should be free, and consequently, could not be. The consequence is proved, because every act of God about creatures ad extra is free. I respond by denying the consequence, to the proof I say, that in two ways it can be understood, that an act of the Divine will is required for eternal law, by which God prohibited lying for example, in one way thus, that such an act is terminated at the existence of lying in the nature of things, and an act of this kind is not required for law, but rather God neither wills evils to be done, nor wills them not to be done, but with respect to them He is only permissive; In another way thus, that the act of God is a volition by which He wills lying to be evil and sin, whether it exists or does not exist, and this act is necessarily required for prohibitive law; And I say: that not every act of God which is terminated toward creatures is free; but that which is terminated at their futurition and existence. All of which is clear from the probable opinion in the treatise on the will of God saying, that God necessarily as to specification (And in my opinion also as to exercise) loves possible creatures. Where just as the necessity of this love arises from a double principle, both from the infinite rectitude of Divine power and from the goodness of possibles, which is necessary and not dependent on any act of the Divine will, from which it could be said that because He loves them, they are good, like future things; So the necessity of this act of hatred of God in eternal law about lying arises both from the infinite goodness of His power and from the contrariety which lying and other such like express with His attributes,

and which they have from themselves and from their essences, nor do they depend in this on any free act of the Divine will. Therefore the Divine will which is infinitely right and determined to loving His attributes, is also determined to having hatred and being displeased with anything contrary to them.

You will object secondly: Acts which are against the precepts of the decalogue cannot be licitly done even by the absolute power of God: because they are so intrinsically evil, that they cannot be made honest by any dispensation, therefore the malice of these acts does not depend on the prohibition of the law alone, but comes from their intrinsic principles. The consequence is clear: because since God can dispense in all His laws, He could take away the malice from acts of this kind, and consequently they could be licitly done. I respond according to what has been said, with the antecedent conceded. (If the discourse is about the precepts of the first table: for about the precepts of the second table Scotus thought otherwise, about which he should be seen in distinction 37, in 3, cited throughout, and we will expressly dispute below in the whole of Question 20.) And I distinguish the consequent: the moral malice of them does not depend essentially on positive law, by which the precepts of the decalogue written in stone tablets were given to the Jewish people, I concede the consequence; but nevertheless it depends on eternal and natural law, which is also included in positive law, and which (as has been said,) is neither free nor dispensable. But the reason why in the eternal law once necessarily given, dispensation cannot be made, is: because to dispense in it would be nothing other than to grant the faculty of licitly doing something, which with all things weighed and circumstances attended to would be illicit and base to do; but this besides the fact that it is repugnant to divine goodness, would also be to involve the natures of things and also manifest repugnance. But if someone should say: The absolute Power of God looses whatever laws, I respond from Scotus in 1, distinction 44, it should be understood about laws freely imposed by the will. Thus Monte Pilosus above, number 9.

13 You will object thirdly. If through the impossible there were no eternal law; Indeed even if there were no God and man would remain and lie, lying would be a moral evil and sin, therefore its malice does not consist in disconformity to the law. The antecedent is proved first: because lying by its nature is dissonant to rational nature as it is rational. Second because with prohibition posited through eternal law it is dissonant according to itself as is clear, therefore it was dissonant according to itself before such prohibition, the consequence is clear: because God cannot change the natures of things, therefore if lying according to itself were not dissonant to rational nature, it could not through the will and ordination of God be made dissonant according to itself. Some respond, in that case lying would be and would not be sin: because from the impossible anything follows; but this solution displeases: because from the impossible which does not involve contradiction in what is added or in terms, anything does not follow, but one determinate thing: For example, from the supposition that God does not exist, it does not follow that the world is and the

world is not, but one determinately, namely that the world is not, thus similarly from this impossible that God or law does not exist, it does not follow that sin is and is not, but only one, namely that sin is not.

Others respond. Lying in that case would be evil and sin because although then it would not be against eternal law, it would nevertheless be against the dictate of reason of the rational creature, which in that case would have the nature of created natural law. But neither does this solution please, if it is understood in the case where God or His eternal law would not exist either in itself or in some participation of itself. And the reason is, because with eternal law lacking in itself or in some participation of itself, natural human reason cannot have the force of law and rule dictating what should or should not be done, therefore through order to human reason alone no reason of malice could be taken. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved, because natural human reason is essentially a second rule subordinated to the first rule, which is eternal law itself, therefore just as with the first cause lacking in whatever genus the second cause in the same genus necessarily fails (And this is certain in the way of Scotus denying a free effect from a second cause, in the case where freedom would be lacking in the first) so similarly with the first rule simply lacking, which is eternal law, also the nature of the second rule would necessarily fail. Whence although we admit this impossible, that with no dictate of reason existing in God, there would be a dictate of reason in the rational creature, still this dictate of created reason would not have the nature of rule and natural law. From which our Monte Pilosus is rejected in disputation 127, article 2, number 7, where supposing the contrary, he says that lying would be a moral evil, because it is against the created intellect regulating. Nor is it valid if you say: In this case it would have the nature of the first rule: because it is an implication in what is added: since by the very fact that it is something outside God, who is the first rule and first cause, it implies that it is the first rule and first cause. Because of this I refuted in the Philosophical course Arriaga saying: that there can be given divinely a creature independent of God, on which all others would depend: for this implies because of the real identity found between the relation of dependence on God and the absolute entity of the creature.

I respond therefore: In the case posited, if there were no law neither divine nor human, lying would not be moral evil nor sin, it would nevertheless be natural evil: in the way in which a monster is called a sin of nature. And from this it is clear to both proofs of the antecedent, for it would be antecedently to prohibition through eternal law dissonant according to itself to rational nature, not indeed with dissonance in the genus of morals: because this supposes law and the dictate of reason which is a rule, but with dissonance in the genus of nature, because of which God judged, that lying is worthy, to be prohibited to man. For whose more exact understanding: Note, that just as man as he is man, and is distinguished from the Brute can be perfected by his operations in a double genus, namely of nature and of morals. He can also be badly affected by the same in the same double genus: for the

human intellect, for example, which is well disposed in the genus of nature, when it attains truth, and badly in the same genus, when it falls into error. In the same way it is well disposed in the genus of morals, when by election and command of the will it assents to the true, and badly, when it assents to the false. From this the truth of our solution is now manifestly clear. Or it could be said, that just as in the supposed case, that God would not exist, there would be a dictate of created reason, this also would have the nature of a rule, but of a rule of a different nature, than is not. Therefore although then there would be sin, nevertheless not of the same nature, as it now is, for the privation of due rectitude would be varied from the variation of prohibiting laws: since the right of positing laws would then be diverse. But if you say: Lying would then be deprived of the same rectitude: for just as now it is to go against the mind, so then it would be, therefore it would be of the same nature. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: it would be deprived of the same philosophical rectitude, I concede, moral or in the genus of morals, I deny: For this is taken through order to law, which since it is diverse, also constitutes a diverse order; But this order to law is as if the genus of sin. Whence just as in Physics it is usually said: That if God in a supposed case would make the rational with another lowest genus, which would not be animal, man constituted from that genus and the rational, would be of another species, and would not be a lowest species: Thus it can be said in our case; In the opinion of Arriaga, however, it would be of the same nature: because that the legislator would be God or Angel or man is materially related. But note: that in every aforesaid solution law is always present that sin may be present.

14 You will object fourthly with our Felix, where above, number 4, the knowledge of simple intelligence is presupposed in God in the order of reason or nature to the will and eternal law as is clear; but lying as moral evil and sin, is presupposed to the knowledge of simple intelligence, therefore it is also presupposed to the will and eternal law. The consequence is evident, the minor is proved, because lying as moral evil and as sin is known by God through the knowledge of simple intelligence, therefore as such it is presupposed to it: this consequence is clear: because the knowledge of simple intelligence is not the cause of its object, but rather presupposes it, and thus lying is not therefore evil even in possible being, because it is known to be evil, but rather conversely it is therefore known to be evil because it is evil. I respond; that since eternal law is per se required for the malice of sin, it implies that the malice of sin is known by God even in our way of understanding prior in reason, than eternal law itself is known, at least in that genus of cognition; by which malice is known. And thus if the moral malice of lying is known by God as actually existing through the knowledge of vision, it is necessary that simultaneously the law itself, to which such malice is contrary, is known as actually existing. And if malice is known under the aspect of possible through the knowledge of simple intelligence, prior in the order of reason than eternal law is understood as actually existing, it is necessary that through the same knowledge of simple intelligence eternal law itself is known as possible. Whence to the argument in form with the

major conceded understood about eternal law as actually existing, I distinguish the consequent, if it is understood about eternal law as actually existing, I concede: for in order that moral malice be precisely possible, it is not required that prohibitive law be actually existing, but it is sufficient that it be possible in the same way, if it is understood about eternal law considered as possible, I deny: because without the possibility of prohibitive law the possibility of sin cannot be understood, just as neither the existence of sin without the existence of law. And against Felix himself ad hominem I thus argue: This author where above, difficulty 3, number 2, supposes: that one should philosophize about sin as about merit or about an act proceeding from grace, therefore just as a good act is not formally such and meritorious, until it respects the will of God accepting (nor virtuous unless it respects the dictate of prudence as a rule); thus an evil act will not be such formally and demeritorious, until it respects a prohibiting law, therefore since God would know acts of love and hatred of Himself, for example, before every act of His will, He would only know them as opposites, one good and the other evil in the philosophical genus or of nature, not in the genus of morals and Theologically.

You will say: Therefore this causal statement is true: If there were no law, there would be no moral evil nor sin. Some Theologians perhaps scrupulously censure this, but I think without fear according to what has been said, the consequence should be conceded: About which hear master Curiel in 1. 2. question 71, article 6, doubt 2, § 3, at the end, where he has these words. ["Nor should it be conceded, that then hatred of God would turn away from God morally: because it would only turn away naturally; just as falsity from the first truth, nor would it lack due rectitude, because there would be no law by reason of which it would be due to it, nor would it be an injury of God: because although it would be contrary to the divine will, it would not be contrary to His law."]

### **Every Sin is Against Nature, Reason, and Against God, and is an Offense to Him.**

Third conclusion: Every sin is against nature, against God, and against reason. This is common. See authors and places of Scotus in Felix above, chapter 1, difficulties 3 and 4. And it is proved: What is dissonant to reason is against intellectual nature; Sin is dissonant to reason, therefore it is against nature. The minor is proved. Sin impedes nature from attaining its proper end; but what impedes the possession of the end of nature is an object dissonant to reason, therefore such is sin. The major is certain, and the minor is proved, an impediment by which art cannot attain the end intended by it is against the rules of art, against art, and against the artificer, therefore a moral impediment such as sin, by which nature is impeded from attaining its end, will be against God the artificer of nature, against reason which is the rule, and against nature itself. The antecedent is proved: for an impediment by which art cannot attain its end does violence to art: for just as what impedes a stone from reaching its center, because it does violence, is against the nature of the stone,

so in our case. From which Scotus proves in 3, distinction 33, numbers 4 and 5, that it is natural both for the sensitive appetite and for the will to obey reason.

You will say: In Genesis 8 it is said: "The senses and thought of man are prone to evil." And in Wisdom 2: "Their malice is natural to them." And it is of faith that the tinder inclines nature to sin, therefore evil rather than good is an object consonant with our nature. I respond, in free agents it can happen accidentally that what is done with violence to the elicited appetite is per se consonant with the natural appetite. This seems to be taught by Scotus in 2, distinction 6, question 2, number 8 (which he also touches on in 3, distinction 15, number 14) where he distinguishes our affection (treating of the freedom of Angels) into affection of advantage and affection of justice. And he deduces it from that in Romans 8: "For they that are according to the flesh, mind the things that are of the flesh; but they that are according to the Spirit, mind the things that are of the Spirit." It is indeed true: sins are consonant, conforming, and natural to the elicited appetite accidentally from the affection of advantage, but not per se from the affection of justice, for in this way they are dissonant.

You will press: Our will, because it is free, is indifferent to good and evil, therefore just as prime matter because it is indifferent to this or that form, neither per se nor accidentally is it subject to violence, nor is this or that form against its inclination, so is free will; And consequently evil will not be against nature rather than good. I respond by assigning a disparity: for prime matter is incapable of habits inclining it; And thus it cannot be rendered even accidentally more inclined to this than to that; but since the will is capable of habits, it can accidentally be inclined to that which is violent and dissonant to it. In this way Paul said to the Romans 7: "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin." Consider the word "captivating": For captivity is dissonant to nature. Thus understand Trent, session 5, canon 5, saying that our nature inclines to sin from the tinder: for it is not understood to be inclined per se, but accidentally. Or it could be said to be inclined to sin materially, namely to the delectable. Which is also true of the appetite not only after original sin, but also in pure nature, as Scotus notes in 2, distinction 29, number 3. But from this it does not follow that it is not simply and per se against nature: because it is against the principal power of man, namely reason.

16 But how sin, which is against God, is an offense? It can be explained in two ways. First: Whether sin by that by which it is formally against reason, is against God. Second: Whether it is of the intrinsic nature of sin to be against God and His offense. Concerning the first, I respond negatively, and it is deduced from Scotus in 4, distinction 14, question 3, number 2, where he distinguishes a double rule against which sin is, one existing in reason, another in God, therefore since relations having really distinct terms are distinguished, for sin to be against God and against reason will be through really distinct respects, therefore neither by that by which it is formally against reason, is it against God. It is indeed true that everything which is

against reason is against God (And in this a response is given to the second) at least implicitly and virtually: for according to what has been said above about the subordination of our reason in the nature of a rule to the eternal law existing in God, it is impossible to operate against reason, which in fact is, without simultaneously at least implicitly and virtually being also an operation against eternal law, and thus being an offense against God the legislator. Nor can this be denied by authors, who agree with us in asserting that there would be no sin with all law removed: because since sin is formally the absence of rectitude due according to law or according to what is prescribed by law, although proximately and immediately its nature is taken in order to regulable rectitude, which it deprives, nevertheless mediately it is taken in order to the legislator himself, in order to whom is also immediately taken the nature of offense; That the nature of offense is found in every sin is supposed by Scotus in 4, distinction 15, question 1, number 4. Which Oviedo says is of faith in treatise 6, on sins, controversy 2, point 7. Since frequently in Sacred Scripture it is said: that sin is against God: as in Exodus 16, Leviticus 14, Numbers 14, Jeremiah 50, and often elsewhere. And the reason is manifest: because one violating the law by which one is obliged, offends and injures the legislator, therefore because every sin supposes the violation of divine law either immediately proceeding from God or through the mediation of His ministers, every sin will be an offense and injury to God.

You will say: One who invincibly is ignorant that God is the legislator truly and properly can sin against the dictate of his reason: But then he does not offend, therefore it is not of the intrinsic nature of sin that it be an offense to God; the consequence is certain, the major is proved: Because it stands well that someone knows theft to be against right reason, and that he invincibly is ignorant that God is offended by that act, either because he is ignorant that God exists, or because he is ignorant of the law by which God prohibited it, as St. Thomas asserts happened to the Philosophers in question 71, article 6, to the fifth. The minor is also proved, because it is of the nature of offense that it be voluntary; but in that case sin is not voluntary, as it is against God or His law, because invincible ignorance takes away the voluntary with respect to it, therefore in that case that sin does not have the nature of offense with respect to God. And it is confirmed, because it is of the nature of offense that the person who is offended is known: just as it is of the nature of homicide formally taken that it is known that the one killed is a man, whence one who kills a man invincibly thinking him to be a wild animal, is not a homicide, as is certain and Aristotle taught in 3 Ethics, chapter 1. I respond by noting first: That someone having invincible ignorance of God or divine law can be understood in two ways: first by ignorance opposed to formal and express cognition, by which God or His law are known explicitly in themselves. And in this sense we admit that there can be given invincible ignorance of God even as the author of nature. In the second way, by ignorance opposed to only implicit and virtual cognition, by which, namely, created law is known formally and expressly as subordinated to a superior, not determining whether such a superior is God or someone else. And in this sense

invincible ignorance of God cannot be given in one who knows the dictate of human reason to have the force of natural law obliging. And the reason for this is that since one cannot invincibly be ignorant, indeed rather evidently knows that one does not have being from oneself but has received it from another, therefore one cannot be invincibly ignorant that the dictate of one's reason is not the first rule and first law, and thus by knowing it, one necessarily should know it as subordinated to another, from whom one received it, and thus one implicitly knows God as Superior, to whom it is truly subordinated, and consequently by sinning against one's dictate, one sins virtually and implicitly against God.

But if you say: From this it only follows that one knows that one has received nature from another man, not however from God, whom one is invincibly ignorant exists. Against this, because one who would act against received nature, consequently acts against its causes per se, although one may formally and expressly be ignorant of them, and know them only confusedly; by this very fact that one knows one's nature to be not from oneself but from another. And hence it is that an exposed infant who curses his parents sins with the sin of impiety, although he does not know them distinctly, but confusedly. Since therefore the sinner evidently knows that he has received nature from another, whoever he may be, insofar as it is from himself sinning against his nature, he similarly sins against him who gave him nature, and consequently against all from whom he received nature, although he may not know them formally and expressly: Just as when someone formally and expressly wills to kill the first man occurring to him, whoever he may be, he is not excused from sacrilege or parricide, if the one killed is a priest or father: because in his mind he excluded no one occurring to him, even if in particular he was ignorant that he was a priest or father. In the same way one acting against one's nature, acts similarly against all causes per se of one's nature. With this supposed, I respond to the argument in form by denying the minor. To the proof I say, that although in that case sin is not voluntary, as it is against God expressly and formally known under the aspect of God, it is nevertheless voluntary as it is against God known virtually and implicitly under the common aspect of superior, which is sufficient that such a sin be in reality, and as it is committed by him, an offense to God. And from this it is clear to the confirmation.

17 But if you inquire: In what does the nature of offense in sin consist? Concerning this P. Lugo in *On the Incarnation*, disputation 5, section 5, has held a singular opinion, asserting that the nature of offense in sin consists in this, that one sins knowing and advertent that one's sin displeases God. This he calls formal offense, but the malice itself of sin he calls material offense. Which is the same as saying that the nature of offense in sin expresses in the direct that advertence, but in the oblique or by way of connotation the formal nature of malice. He takes care to adduce for himself Bellarmine, Suarez, Lessius, Conink, Zumel, Curiel, and from the ancients Alexander [of Hales], St. Thomas, and Bonaventure. But against him Oviedo says where above, number 111: ["All these authors Lugo has gathered in vain for his

opinion, of whom not one defends it, and he demonstrates this extensively."] But because I have been unable to find either in Scotus or in our authors anything about the constitutive of offense, I will say according to my small understanding, what I think.

I say therefore that Sin is constituted in the nature of offense against God, by this that it is, sin respecting God, whom sin displeases, and who can demand the reason; why have you done this? Thus Oviedo above, although he explains this with some obscurity. I understand this assertion thus. For someone to offend someone, truly in the offended person is required displeasure with the work of the offender from the rule of Law 27 in 6: "To one knowing and consenting, no injury is done nor deceit." In which sense Diana said in p., treatise 7, resolution 37, that if a Virgin willingly consents to her defloration, no injury is done to her, nor is such fornication stuprum. And thus while it does not displease him, against whom it is done, sin does not have the nature of offense. But this displeasure can be formal or virtual, and interpretative is sufficient, e.g., Peter steals a thousand reales from me, even if through a formal or virtual act it does not displease me, it is sufficient that it displease interpretatively, by not giving occasion that it be judged that I consent to the theft. Therefore in the case posited about the Virgin, if she does not consent either formally or virtually or interpretatively, namely by giving occasion to the violation, truly stuprum will be committed: Nor is it sufficient that evil displease me, that it be an offense against me: for homicide or theft, which in no way touches me, displeases me, and yet is not an offense against me. Beyond this therefore it is required, that the offended person have the right (although not of punishing, at least of demanding: why have you done this? And since God by infinite titles has this right. For He is Lord, Father, Superior, Benefactor, Creator, Legislator, and besides all sin displeases Him, it will be an offense to God. Therefore the nature of offense says two things, in the direct the right of demanding and displeasure in the offended person, and in the oblique malice itself. But if you say: therefore the being of offense is an extrinsic denomination derived from the right and displeasure of the offended person. I concede the consequence. But what then?

Now against Lugo I show: That even if the offender is ignorant of him whom he offends, still it is an offense: Which Lessius expressed in book 13, on the divine perfections, chapter 26, number 185. That God may be honored, it is sufficient, that from supernatural help a meritorious act be elicited. Let us pose the case: an infant or baptized child is given who has never lost grace, nevertheless because he has been raised in the forests, he is invincibly ignorant of God, he gives alms in honor of his creator, such almsgiving is an honor to God even if He is not explicitly known, therefore conversely not to correspond to help will be an offense to God, although the offended person is unknown. And it is confirmed: Ignorance excuses the nature of offense only in that case, when one in no way knows that action to be sinful: for if one knew, one would in no way do it, in which case the ignorance which excuses the offense, also excuses the sin, therefore in the case where one is ignorant of God,

and would know sufficiently from the dictate of reason "What you do not wish for yourself, do not do to another" that theft or homicide is sin, by committing them one would not sin. Which is absurd and should be admitted by no one. It is indeed true, that the offense is the greater, the more the offender knows of the majesty of the offended person.

### **How Sin is Disobedience, Ingratitude, Violation of Friendship, Irreligion, Spiritual Harm to the Soul; and How it Has the Nature of Injustice Against God**

Cardinal Lugo, On the Incarnation, disputation 5, number 97, on penance, disputation 16, section 5, § 2, Puente Hurtado, disputation 173, on charity, section 6, subsection 3, number 47, because they hold that every sin is prohibited by law, posit in every sin a special malice of disobedience. Abulensis, questions 141 and 142 on chapter 18 of Matthew, Ricardus in 4, distinction 22, article 11, because sin is against God, from whom we receive so many benefits, assert that every sin is ingratitude. Aegidius Conink, disputation 32, On Faith, doubt 5, numbers 34 and 43, asserts that every sin is a violation of friendship, since we acknowledge that God pursues us with the love of friendship. Likewise because every sin takes away reverence due to God, every sin seems to be irreligion. Lessius, book 4, On Justice and Right, chapter 4, doubt 8, number 63, posits every sin as pride since the sinner does not wish to stop at the bridle of the law. Lorca in 22, disputation 56, number 9, and Oviedo, treatise 6, on sins, controversy 2, points 3 and 4, where he disputes extensively on all these reasons, insinuate that every sin has a special malice from the harm which it brings to the soul: since every mortal sin wounds it and as if kills it.

18 But if in any sin all these circumstances were to change the species of malice, no confession would be valid, since no one explains all these circumstances either in number or specifically. Therefore with Suarez, disputation 13, On Penance, section 3, number 6, Alvarez and others I call these malices transcendental reasons, not truly constituting new sins. For which it should be noted, that one can sin in two ways, for example in this act "I will steal," first if formally or virtually he says, I will steal in order to break God's law, then the malice of disobedience with theft changes the species, and is not a transcendental reason, similarly if formally or virtually he says: I will steal in order to act against God my benefactor, there will be there a special sin of ingratitude. Again if he says: I will steal, in order to be an enemy of God, it will be a violation of friendship; Furthermore if he asserts I will steal, because I do not wish to subject myself to the law, it will be pride; Finally if the theft is done with the intention of harming one's own soul, it will be harm, etc. Secondly these circumstances can be found in theft, without any of the assigned wills, neither formal nor virtual, being given, in which case they are not special malices distinct in species or number.

This assertion which is the Conclusion is founded in a certain common doctrine which Diana adduces in part 1, treatise 7, resolution 48, where he inquires: Whether

one who has lingering delight in a married woman, without attending to her state, but only to the woman, is bound in confession to say that he has had lingering delight in a married woman? And with Bonacina, Vasquez, Filliucio, and very many others he responds negatively, because in such a case one does not delight in the married woman as married or in that object insofar as it is injurious to another, but insofar as it is delectable, therefore similarly in our case when one does not sin from express or virtual will, none of the assigned circumstances induces a new species of malice or a new sin to be disclosed in confession.

The reason by which this is proved, by which I attack Oviedo insofar as he says above in point 4, That whenever someone prudently believes himself to be in grace and sins mortally, in that harm to the soul there is a special malice against charity. I argue thus: Therefore through you it is a special malice, because since the life of the soul is of greater price than the life of the body, just as one who kills himself, sins against charity, rather one will sin, who kills his soul by taking grace from it, which is its life (which antecedent I judge false). But it is not a new sin against charity to kill oneself, if one does not do it with formal or virtual will of killing oneself: for although I know, that by eating this food, I will die, nevertheless although I eat inadvertently and die, it does not follow that my death is a special sin distinct from gluttony: because in me there was not formal or virtual will of killing myself, therefore the killing of the soul through mortal sin, while it is not done with express or implicit will, will not have special malice.

I argue more urgently thus: Although I know that I, reclining thus or otherwise, am the occasion of pollution either in wakefulness or in sleep, while there is no danger of consent, I am not bound to change position, nor is pollution following a sin, as with Sanchez, Lessius, and others Diana resolves above, because then neither formally nor virtually is the pollution willed and thus does not induce malice, therefore while I do not kill myself with formal or virtual will of killing myself, a new species of malice is not induced. And it is confirmed: A Religious not obeying the Prelate commanding under obedience, does not sin with a double sin, one against obedience, another against religion, as Diana says well above, treatise 7, resolution 16, except because neither formally nor virtually does he will to go against religion, by going against obedience, therefore while there is not express or virtual will, none of the assigned circumstances will induce a new sin or a new malice in any sin necessarily to be disclosed in confession.

You will say: Although indirectly from order, or omission some sin follows, it is sufficient that it be imputed: for example although death follows indirectly, because I do not wish to eat today, if I do not wish, death is imputed to me, therefore rather it will be imputed, that what directly follows is virtually willed; But from mortal sin directly follows the death of the soul, therefore this is sufficient that in any sin a new species of malice is induced from the harm brought to the soul. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent, if it follows indirectly or even directly from the end of the one operating, I concede. If it follows from the end of the work, I deny. In the

same way I distinguish the consequent, it will be virtually willed if it follows from the end of the work, I deny. If it follows from the end of the one operating, I concede. The reason for which is, because since the free or willed is only attended to as to the end of the one operating, because the one operating is only free, the action will not be willed from the end of the work. But since in our case such harm does not follow from the end of the one operating, therefore the harm is neither formally nor virtually willed: I adduce an instance. I go hunting, and seeing something moving which is hidden under some plant, I kill it judging it to be a wild beast or other brute, when truly I have killed a man, without there having been in me at any time the will of killing a man, such killing is not willed by me either formally or virtually: because although it directly follows from the end of the work, nevertheless not from the end of the one operating. Thus in our case: see what we have said above in question 12, number 48. And from this you will understand all the things assigned in the title to be transcendental reasons in sin, nevertheless not special malices: For they are general circumstances in every sin, which unless directly intended, do not give the species of malice.

Concerning the last circumstance posited in the title, How sin has the nature of injustice against God? We abstract for now from that question sufficiently controversial: Whether between God and men there is given a true nature of the virtue of justice, about which we have said some things above in the preceding question, number 11, and we will speak in the following, speaking about moral virtues in God: This should be certain among all. That there is between God and men a certain justice, which can be called legal in a broad way or potential, which consists in this, that in the creature there is a title of servitude to God, and in God there corresponds a title of dominion, by which title creatures are bound to obey God, and God can posit law for the creature, whose transgression He can punish, and demand the reason, why have you done this? As between a slave and Lord, husband and wife, religious and Prelate, there intervenes legal and potential justice: Therefore in sin there is a reason of injustice against God, which is proper and rigorous injury and legal injustice opposed to the virtue of religion. Which is thus proved from that of Psalm 31: "I have made known to You my offense and have not hidden my injustice"; And also by reason thus: Justice according to its common signification, as it abstracts from commutative, legal, and every species of justice, is defined as the will of preserving another's right, but injustice of harming another's right. Thus: A slave stealing a thousand reales from his Lord commits injustice against the Lord, because he harms another's right, by retaining another's thing with the Lord unwilling, therefore when a creature offends God, by harming at least in affection divine right, he commits injustice against the Lord.

It is confirmed first: One who obeys God, does justice by preserving divine right unharmed, therefore one who does not obey commits injustice, by harming. Therefore Scotus as above in 2, distinction 37, number 6, from himself we have said, calls sin the absence of due justice. It is confirmed secondly: Because God is the true

Lord of His creatures, therefore He has the right, that, with Him unwilling, we not use them, and consequently whenever anyone so uses them, he commits injustice and does injury to God; but whenever we sin, we use creatures, in that way which God does not absolutely will, that we use them, therefore whenever we sin, we do injury to God.

You will say first: Through sin God suffers no damage, therefore through sin injury is not done to Him. I respond: by denying the antecedent, for it is damage to Him, that someone uses His creatures otherwise than He wishes; And if this is not damage, truly it is not required for affecting someone with injury, that damage be inflicted: for who would doubt, but that if someone wished to retain Peter's own thing against his will, truly if he would suffer no other detriment from it, than that it would be done against his will, still injury would be done to him. But if you Respond that there is a disparate reason: because with respect to Peter that detention is injurious, either because it causes displeasure in him, or because if he were so patient, that it would not cause it, from its nature it is apt to cause it; but to use creatures against the will of God, does not cause displeasure in Him, nor can it cause it. Against this: because from their nature sins are apt to cause displeasure in God, if He were capable of displeasure; but that He is not, arises from His infinite perfection, which does not impede, but that injury is done to Him through that which could deservedly cause it, and He would be capable of. Then it is certain that sins displease Him.

You will say secondly: Nothing happens with God unwilling, therefore injury is never done to Him, which cannot be, except when something is done with the Lord unwilling. And it is Confirmed, because when some Lord permits, someone to use his goods, injury is not done to him, when he uses them, therefore since indeed God permits the creature to use His goods, that use is not injurious to Him. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent, with Him unwilling as to this that nothing happens, except with Him permitting, He could if He wished impede it, I concede, as to this that He does not have prohibitive will of some things which happen, I deny the antecedent, and I deny the consequence whose proof I also distinguish: injury is not done except something is done with the Lord unwilling, such that he does not permit, when he could impede, I deny, such that he does not have prohibitive volition, I concede. Similarly I distinguish the antecedent of the confirmation, when he so permits that he does not have prohibitive volition, let it pass; when he permits, such that he has such volition, I deny the antecedent. And certainly if a created Lord would prohibit someone, lest he use his thing and nevertheless he would use it, he would do injury to him, although the Lord as one stronger in strength could impede it, and would not wish to; indeed it is true, that from permission it could sometimes be gathered, that the Lord is in no way unwilling, according to that "he who is silent seems to consent"; but this never happens when he signifies his will to be that no one use his thing. As God signifies everywhere in Scripture that He does not wish that sin be committed by anyone.

20 You will inquire: How does aversion from God relate in any sin? I respond by omitting the confusion of others: And by supposing that in every sin aversion from God is found: which how it happens is easily understood, from the fact that sin is aversion from God, insofar as it connotes offense removing from the highest goodness, which in fact every sin has: for to be averted properly, is for one to be separated from another, and thus by the fact that someone offends someone, truly he is separated from the offended person. Which aversion exists in two ways, either gravely, because it dissolves friendship and this is proper to mortal or original sin, which expel grace: the bond of friendship; or it can avert dispositively, insofar as it disposes to dissolving friendship, as venial sin averts, about which Scotus in 1, distinction 17, question 7, in the reports at the end of the question says: accidentally to impede the increase of charity. And hence it is that conversion to the creature stands in this that he who averts himself from God, is more affected to the creature than to God: whence Curiel in question 82, article 30, doubt 3, calls all aversion from God virtual conversion to the creature. But what should be said about aversion from God as ultimate end, whether it is intrinsic to Sin? I respond negatively: because although every sin by the fact that it is an offense against God the legislator at least implicitly and virtually according to what is said above and in this sense aversion from God the legislator is also intrinsic to it; nevertheless not from God the ultimate end whether natural or supernatural: For it stands well, for someone to establish laws and precepts, without ordering the observers of the laws to himself as to an end, therefore since to ordain the rational creature to enjoy God the ultimate end, is from the pact and liberality of God Himself, aversion from Him as such will not be intrinsic to sin, which from its intrinsic reason only has to be an offense of God the legislator, and in this sense aversion from Him, nevertheless not as from the ultimate end. And according to this doctrine Scotus should be explained in 2, distinction 37, number 8, adduced by Felix, treatise on Sins, difficulty 3, number 3. Except hatred of God, which is formal aversion from God.