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PART FOUR. ON THE BOOKS OF THE SOUL, OR ON THE ANIMATE BODY.

DISTINCTION I.

On the soul, & its powers in general.

QUESTION I. What is the soul and how many kinds are there?

It should be noted that 1. Aristotle treated the soul as a principal part of all of Physics; therefore, a formal object must be established for this part of the total object of Physics; for this we recognize nothing other than the animate body, which is part of the natural body as such, since it has all the conditions for this. Although this treatise is titled “On the Soul”, the soul alone cannot be its object; for sciences are also named from the subject by which, or from the principal part; hence, although the passions of the rational soul seem to belong to it not only as the principle by which, but also as its sole subject, since it alone understands and wills; yet this is not true in reality; since they always belong to it in this state as conjoined, as that by which, not as that which, to the body; for actions belong to suppositis, consequently to the whole animate body: indeed, in this state the soul does not effect those operations independently of material phantasms, whose organs are in the animate body; nevertheless, we will also deal with the separated soul in this treatise; since even as such it

is always an incomplete being and essentially ordered to the body; and hence it is that in Physics the soul is dealt with more than the intelligences and the prime mover, as we dealt with them in bk. 8 of the Physics: because there the prime mover and the intelligences are considered only according to the accidental aspect, namely of motion, but the soul is investigated here according to its essentials.

It should be noted 2. That living things can be called those which can in some way perceive, such as God, Angels, men, brute animals, or which can nourish and augment themselves by the intromission of food; such as plants and animals. From which it is clear that there is not properly a univocal concept of life for God, Angels, animals, and plants (unless by "perceive" we also wish to understand nutrition, because trees also perceive and attract their nutrients, and not others, which however is said improperly) but the concept of life is equivocal; for a twofold life is posited, namely Physical and intentional; Physical life consists chiefly in nutrition, because it produces a Physical term: but intentional life consists in intentional actions, namely of cognition or appetite, about which more in their proper place concerning the sensitive and rational soul; hence the description of life by some is not to the point: that life consists in this, that a living thing has a principle of producing perfection beyond the state due to it in generation, such as to be nourished, to understand etc. which are not due to the living thing in the instant of generation, as heat is to fire etc. otherwise living things in the instant of generation would not be in a natural state, but a violent one; since there they are not yet nourished, nor do they perceive or understand, but perfect themselves in these little by little afterwards. They want this concept to be univocal to life for all living things; but it is not so much to the point; for even fire perfects itself beyond the state due to it in generation, because such magnitude is not due to it by force of generation. But if you say: this is not done by intromission; I say: therefore by this very fact recourse is now had to another concept of life. But if it were said with certain Thomists: fire has this from its generator, not from itself: certainly in this no disparity would seem to be seen; for why should it not also be ascribed to the parents of men that men are nourished, which however they do not say: indeed that description cannot belong to God, because God cannot acquire any perfection; since he lacks none, which is not due to him by force of his nature; hence we must stand by the more principal of the two prior concepts of life.

It should be noted 3. that Plato p'ose' three souls in man, one of which was in the brain, which Aristotle contradicts in bk. 1 and 2 On the Soul; who, in order to investigate well what the soul is and how many kinds there are, distinguished 4 grades of animate things, namely vegetative, sensitive, locomotive, and rational. He also distinguished five principal Powers of animate things, namely vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellective. He took those grades from their separability from the same subject; for in a certain living thing only the vegetative power is found principally, to which certain other partial ones are

subordinated, such as the nutritive, augmentative, generative power, and in such consists the lowest grade of living things: but sometimes in another living thing the sensitive power is found principally, to which other partial ones are subordinated, such as taste, touch etc. and indeed sometimes without the motive power, as in imperfect animals, such as oysters and shellfish, which cannot move themselves locally, and these constitute the second grade of animate things; but the locomotive power with the sensitive and vegetative without the intellective constitutes the third, and the intellective power the fourth grade. But the division of powers he took from the diversity of the mode of eliciting operations; for powers which operate without cognition, such as the vegetative, integrate the first power: but the sensitive powers, which tend to act through an organ and intentional species, integrate the second: but the appetitive power, which operates by way of inclination and tending to an object; where on the contrary the cognitive power operates by way of converting the object to itself, constitutes the third: again, the locomotive power, because it operates by following the cognition and appetite of the living thing, constitutes the fourth. And finally the intellective power itself makes the fifth; which, although it agrees with the sensitive power in cognition, nevertheless has a different mode of operating, namely organically. With these things noted,

I assert and say to the question, The soul is well defined as the first act of a Physical organic body having life in potency. This is from Aristotle, *On the Soul* 2, ch. 1, text 6, and Scotus in *Sentences* 4, d. 43, q. 2, §. I reply: saying that Aristotle defines the intellective soul in *On the Soul* 2, text 6, that it is the act of a Physical organic body having life in potency, and at the beginning of bk. 3, text 1, he seems to posit the intellective soul at least as a subjective part of soul previously defined in general. It is proved by explaining: it is called act, namely substantial, not accidental, because it is the reason for specifically distinguishing the living from the non-living: and it is an informing act, which always gives substantial being to the composite, constituting one per se with the body. It is called first. Not as if it informed matter first, because the form of corporeity does this; but because it is a more perfect and principal act, or because it is the first to perfectly complete. It is called of a body. This is of the material part of the living thing. It is called Physical. This is natural, not artificial. It is called organic. This is: having dissimilar parts and diverse members from matter and form of corporeity disposed to certain operations. It is called: having life in potency. That is, that the body ought to be disposed to receive life from the soul.

You will object: Aristotle in *On the Soul* 2, ch. 2, says, “The soul is that by which we live, sense, are moved with respect to place, and understand”: therefore the soul should be defined in this way. The consequence is proved. It is prior for a thing to be such in itself than to respect another; but to be the principle of those operations is for the soul to be in itself, but to be the act of a body is in relation to another: therefore. I respond by denying the

consequence. To the proof I distinguish the antecedent. If the being is complete and total, I concede; if incomplete and partial, I deny the antecedent; for such a thing rather expresses a relation to another, so that from both a whole may arise.

You will say: Aristotle, when he posited the prior definition, says that it is not yet clear whether the soul is informing or assisting: therefore it is not an informing act. On the contrary. Aristotle only means that it is not clear for this reason, because he has not yet proved it, not that the definition should not be understood in this way.

You will say: That definition belongs to other things besides the soul: therefore it is not so good. The antecedent is proved. It also belongs to Angels assuming bodies in which they exercise vital acts: therefore. On the contrary, I deny the antecedent and the proof; for Angels do not inform bodies, but only assist them and move them, as a sailor does a ship, and their operations are not properly vital with respect to bodies, but only apparently so.

You will say: At least that definition does not belong to every soul: therefore. The antecedent is proved; the rational soul separated from the body is not the act of a body: therefore. On the contrary, I deny the antecedent. To the proof I distinguish: the soul is not actually the act, I concede; it is not the act in aptitude and as to its inclination, I deny the antecedent; but this suffices.

You will say: The soul receives sensible and intelligible accidents: therefore it is rather a material than a formal act. On the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: it receives them as that by which, I concede; as that which, I deny; for such is the whole composite: indeed, the common subject of accidents does not argue for the identity of things, since accidents do not make the quiddities of things; for accidents are extrinsic to them.

You will say: The vegetative and sensitive souls are called material and corporeal: therefore they are material. On the contrary: they are called such for this reason, because they depend on matter and body in being and becoming, as material accidents do, not because they would not be formal acts.

You will say: The soul is the most perfect thing in an animal: therefore at least it is not the first act. The consequence is proved. The second act is more perfect than the first, because it is posterior in generation, and the first act is ordered to it, and our felicity consists in it: therefore. On the contrary, I deny the consequence. To the first reason for its proof I say: Not everything posterior in generation is more perfect, unless they are in the same genus;

but the second act is an accident, and the first is a substance, which actuates more perfectly, since it actuates simply, and an accident only secundum quid. To the second reason I say: That perfection of felicity is only accidental and secondary, not perfection simply and substantially, or of substantial entity; hence it is called only formal felicity, not objective.

You will say: If the soul were a substance, it would subsist per se; but this is not so; therefore. The minor is proved. What subsists per se can be separated from that in which it is; but the soul, especially the vegetative and sensitive, cannot be separated from their bodies: therefore. On the contrary, I distinguish the major. It would subsist per se either totally or particularly, I concede; always totally, I deny the major, and thus having distinguished the minor, I deny the consequence. To the proof I distinguish the major. If it depends in being, becoming and being conserved on matter, I deny; if it does not depend, I concede. But the vegetative and sensitive soul depend in this way; hence, although created substances also subsist per se, they cannot nevertheless exist without God, because they depend on him in being and becoming.

I assert and say 2. The soul is threefold, namely vegetative, sensitive, and rational. This is from Aristotle, *On the Soul* 2, and Scotus in *Sentences* 4, d. 44, q., §. Concerning this question, saying: Any part of flesh is animated by a sensitive soul because in any part some sensitive operation can be exercised, such as touch: any part is also animated by a vegetative soul, because any part of due quantity can have some vegetative action; but the sensitive and vegetative in man is the same soul as the intellective: understand as informing all parts of flesh which in man are generated from nutriment. It is proved: There are given some vital operations which are done by some soul through purely corporeal organs and qualities, and primary ones, as are the vegetations and nutritions of plants: there are also given other vital operations which are done by some soul through corporeal organs and qualities in some way incorporeal and intentional, as sensations and phantasies in brute animals: finally there are also given other vital operations which are done independently of corporeal organs and qualities, as volition and intellection in men: therefore in plants there is given only a vegetative soul: in brute animals besides it a sensitive soul: and in man besides both a rational soul. But that the soul in plants is only vegetative and not sensitive is clear; because plants do not sleep or wake, nor when hurt do they give a sign of pain, as is proper to the sensitive soul; that likewise the soul in brute animals is only sensitive and not rational is also clear, because otherwise they would be free to operate well or badly in the genus of morals, and to merit or demerit, which is false. Finally, that in man there is a rational soul is a matter of faith and reason, as we will hear through the course of this treatise.

You will object: Five vital powers are found, as was said above in note 3: therefore five souls should also be inferred. I respond by denying the consequence. For the number of souls is not taken from the same source as the number of powers is taken, since the same soul could have several powers, as is clear of itself.

You will say: At least there ought to be 4 souls, because Aristotle posited 4 grades of animate things. On the contrary, I deny the antecedent. Because that diversity of grades is not taken according to diverse souls but according to diverse powers really distinct in certain things; for some animals are not moved with respect to place, such as those congenial with stones and others, such as oysters etc., but some are moved from place, such as a dog: but the threefold division of souls is taken according to three essential differences, from which such vital operations as are assigned in the proof rightly proceed.

You will say: If there are three souls, they are either three genera or three species: but not the first, because the rational soul is not a genus; nor the second, because the vegetative and sensitive differ generically; since these souls constitute many genera, such as living things, of herbs, of roots, of flying things, of aquatic things: but the rational soul only constitutes the species of man. On the contrary: In speaking rigorously they are neither three genera nor three species; because they are incomplete beings; yet they can be called such souls generically distinct, one of which constitutes a most special species, namely the rational; but the others also subaltern genera; but they should rather be called three parts of species; for although animal is divided into brute and man, and the former is of many species, but the latter of only one, yet the division is good. Nor should souls be taken here, as one is superior and the other inferior, as making a predicamental series, but as disparate, namely with precision from each other.

You will say: Plants can also be said to sense because they have appetitive powers; for they flee harmful things, as the vine flees the laurel, loves the elm: therefore the three souls are still not adequately distinct. On the contrary: That appetite is not sensitive, but only natural, and a certain hidden Sympathy or Antipathy with the other: as is also the case in non-living things, namely the magnet and iron; where this agreement is founded only on the primary qualities, not on a soul.

You will say: At least in quicksilver another soul could still be inferred, namely only locomotive. On the contrary, I deny the assumption: Because that motion is not made by some vital principle, but it is moved on account of its excessive gravity, because, since it is

fluid, it shuns the dryness of the earth, and collects itself into a sphere; and because it weighs a great deal, it always seeks to be borne downward, as fire upward on account of its lightness; which, when it generates another fire, is not a vital generation; for it is not made by a conjoined principle of life, as is required from the preceding part, d. 2.

QUESTION II. Is every soul divisible or indivisible?

It should be noted that some animate beings are perfect while others are imperfect, which are also called insects. Perfect beings are those whose cut off and separated parts do not live, like an ox, horse, etc. Imperfect beings are those that mostly arise from rotten matter and whose separated parts live, of which kind are certain reptiles like little worms, snakes, etc., and also plants. With these points noted:

Proposition 1. Every soul informs the whole organic body.

The reason is: both because the Philosopher defines the soul to be the act of an organic body, and not of any certain member – therefore. Also because the informing soul is a constitutive part of the living body; but if the soul did not inform the whole body, it would not be its constitutive part. The minor premise is proven: according to the Adversaries it would be only in one part of the body, therefore it would be constitutive only of this part and not of the whole body. Also because in the whole body there are powers and faculties of the soul, for every part is nourished, grows, and senses. Therefore the soul informs the whole body.

Don't say: Many Philosophers, like Aristotle in book 16 on animals, and with him Scotus in Distinction 4, question 13, article 2, section "Ad quantum principale", and Distinction 49, question 14, section "Respondeo bit sunt", think the soul sits in the heart; and Matthew 15 agrees with them: "Out of the heart come thoughts". But others think it is in the brain, where the animal spirits are cooked up for sensations, as Plato and Galen feel, both of which are probable. And it suffices if it is virtually in the other parts of the body. Therefore it is not in the whole body.

On the contrary, those Philosophers should be understood, just as Scotus also, that the soul is in the heart inadequately but principally, not adequately. Moreover it is said to be in the heart because the heart is the workshop of vital spirits and the root of life, according to the

saying: "The heart is the first to live and the last to die." Or even in the brain, because there the vital spirits are manufactured which serve for sensations, by which life is directed for the most part.

Then, although God is by his power in the body, and an Angel in the celestial orb which it moves, nevertheless it is not called its essential part, but only assisting. So also the soul according to that explanation of power would be only assisting and not informing the other parts of the body. Despite these objections, it is nevertheless conceded that the soul, in order to exercise its more principal operations, establishes its principal seat in the heart, or even probably in the brain.

Proposition 2. The vegetative and sensitive souls are corruptible and mortal.

The reason is: because they are produced from the potency of matter. Therefore they are corruptible, just like the other substantial forms. The antecedent will be clear through the course of this material.

Don't say: Life cannot die, since they are contraries, just as light cannot be darkened; but even the vegetative and sensitive soul is essentially life. Therefore.

On the contrary, I distinguish the major premise. Life cannot die insofar as dying is opposed to an acquisitive change – I concede; insofar as it is opposed to production – I deny the major premise. In the first way, dying would regard life as a subject; but in the second way it expresses the desition [cessation] of a thing, and so it only regards the term, not the subject, just as light is not obscured as a subject, but as a term by desisting. With these points made:

I assert and say to the question: The vegetative and sensitive soul are divisible; but the rational soul is indivisible.

It is according to Scotus in Distinction 4, question 49, article 1, section "Per hoc ad fundamenta", who says: "The example concerning the intellectualive soul is to the opposite, because that soul respects matter in an inextensible and inextensibly way, and therefore it has no new part through this, that it perfects a new part of matter; but the opposite follows concerning that extensible form in matter."

The first part I' proven: That which can live separately, its soul is divisible; but a part of vegetative beings can live separately. Therefore the vegetative soul is divisible. The minor premise is proven: a branch cut off from a tree, grafted onto another, produces fruits according to its own species, not according to the species of the tree onto which it is grafted; but through cutting, its soul becomes divided from the other parts of the former tree. Therefore.

The second part Is proven: The souls of brutes, both of imperfect ones like worms, and of perfect ones like oxen, horses, etc., are educed from the potency of divisible matter or body, and depend on it in coming to be and being conserved, not otherwise than the souls of plants. Therefore also those souls are divisible. The consequent is proven: what is educed as to divisibility should be commensurate with the subject from whose potency it is educed. Therefore. The antecedent is proven: if it were not commensurate, it would follow that the same thing numerically according to its whole self would depend on the whole body from whose potency it would be educed, and also according to its whole self it would depend on any part of the body, from any of whose potency it would be educed according to its whole self and not through divisible parts; but this is repugnant, because it is repugnant for the same effect to depend simultaneously and actually on many adequate causes. Therefore. Indeed we see with our eyes imperfect animals, like earthworms, locusts, worms, when divided moving themselves and living for a long time, which would be false if their soul were indivisible; for then it would inform two discontinuous subjects.

The third part Is proven: The rational soul is spiritual, immortal, not educible but creatable; but none of these would be true if the rational soul were divisible. Therefore it is indivisible. The minor premise is proven: what are divisible into integral parts are material; for it belongs to the notion of spirit that it be indivisible, otherwise an Angel would be divisible. Then, if the rational soul were divisible, it would be corruptible and mortal; for through cutting off an arm, a part of the soul would be cut off, since it cannot retract itself; because that union was not effectively from the form: nor could the same matter naturally be informed by two forms: nor in the augmentation of man can it be dilated, because it would migrate from subject to subject. Finally, what are divisible are commensurate with a divisible subject, so that thus they can depend on it in coming to be and operating. Therefore, if the rational soul were divisible, it would thus be educible and not creatable.

You will object first against the first and second parts: There is no reason for multiplying the parts of any soul. Therefore. The antecedent is proven. Either it would be because they are

subjected in different parts of the subject, or because they cause different operations; but not the first: otherwise there should be posited as many souls distinct in species in one body as there are heterogeneous and diverse parts of the body; not the second: because the same rational soul exercises diverse operations in diverse parts of the body. Therefore also the other souls.

I respond by denying the antecedent. And I say the reason for multiplying is the reasons adduced in the first two proofs, and the diversity of the subject. And it does not follow that there should also be as many diverse souls as there are diverse parts of the subject; for the parts of the soul can be homogeneous; for the diversity of the subject does not make the heterogeneity of the received form; because we see that the same heat in species is subjected both in fire and in water, prime matter both in man and in brute. Nor does the part of the soul which is in the head determinately seek to be in the head, but it could also be in the foot; but it has been determined there by God. If, however, God conserved that part which is in the head outside of matter, it would be some whole, just as a part of water, while it is separated, and it would require all the organs; if, however, God infused it into other matter, it would constitute a complete animal, as is the case in trees, when a branch is implanted into another.

But if you say: therefore the individual parts seek all the dispositions of the whole composite, I distinguish: as long as they are parts – I deny; when they are a whole – I concede.

You will say: The souls of brutes and trees could be said not to be extended by reason of their entity, but by reason of the quantity of the subject. Therefore they are also indivisible.

On the contrary, I deny the antecedent. For it is absurd for the soul to be whole according to essence in any part, and for it to be divided at the division of quantity; for if a part of quantity is not the whole quantity, neither also is a part of the soul the whole soul; for the same thing cannot be at once a whole and a part. Hence, just as the rational soul is whole in the whole and whole in any part of the body, so the soul of brutes and trees is whole in the whole and part in part of the body.

You will say: If a worm is pricked in the tail, it retracts its whole self. Therefore it is a sign that the soul is indivisible.

On the contrary, I deny the consequent. For that happens because it has a continuous body and soul, therefore on account of the coherence of the parts, if one part is injured, also the other part is affected with pain through sympathy.

You will say: Aristotle in book 1 on the soul wants every soul to be indivisible; for perfect animals immediately die whole, just as men themselves. Therefore.

On the contrary: Aristotle should be understood concerning essential and specific indivisibility, that namely it is indivisible according to species. To the reason adduced I say that animals immediately die, not because their soul is indivisible; but because those animals require many organs, which are destroyed in disjunction. Hence, since the souls of perfect animals require a great apparatus and subordination of organs, both for their own conservation and the conservation of their parts, just as men, therefore when the principal organ perishes the others also perish, but the souls of imperfect animals do not require this.

You will object second against the third part: Whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver; but the body in which the rational soul is, is extended and divisible. Therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the major premise: it is received according to the mode of the receiver, that is: according to the capacity of the receiver – I concede; according to the entity and every affection – I deny the major premise. For otherwise an accident would also be a substance in a substance, and subsisting per se.

You will say: The indivisible cannot be adequate except in the indivisible; but any part of the body is divisible, and the rational soul is indivisible. Therefore it cannot be indivisible in all the parts.

On the contrary, I distinguish the major premise. Quantitative indivisible – I concede; substantial indivisible which is virtually divisible as to place – I deny the major premise.

You will say: Therefore the soul could be distant from itself, insofar as it would be in diverse parts and places, and so it could move and rest at the same time.

On the contrary, I deny what was supposed. For a proper instance should be taken to diverse adequate places, but the hand, for example, and the foot are only inadequate places, therefore it is only an extrinsic and per accidens distance. Nor is it unfitting for the same thing to move and rest according to diverse parts and places and powers, which the rational soul has more of from its perfection, for it is not a contradiction.

You will say: If the rational soul were indivisible, it would be so because it is spiritual; but this is not the reason. Therefore. The minor premise is proven: a point is indivisible and lacks parts, nevertheless it is not spiritual. Therefore, that something is spiritual is not the reason that it is indivisible.

On the contrary, I deny the minor premise. To its proof I say: Although a point does not have parts, nevertheless since it is something of a body, as a body is, therefore it is not spiritual but corporeal, yet not a body; but the rational soul is not something similar.

You will say: A long space of earth does not seem to be seen by the same indivisible vision; for what is near is seen more clearly, what is remote more obscurely. Therefore it seems to be seen by a divisible vision; and so also it will be understood by a divisible intellection. Consequently, the soul will also be divisible.

On the contrary, I deny the consequent. Or rather I deny what was supposed; for there is not one corporeal vision integrated from many extended parts representing that whole space; but there are many compenetrated visions, which nevertheless do not make one more intense vision. And so also in the intellect there are as many indivisible intellections extensively as there are species present in it; for it is not repugnant for the intellect to be able to cognize many things at once.

Question III. Are there multiple souls in the same living being?

Note 1: Recognizing a plurality of souls in the same living being in a more sensible sense is not as proscribed by the Church as it is to believe, with the Manichaeans, that there are two rational souls in man, one of which impels to good, the other to evil; which was condemned by the Eighth General Council Act. 10. Can. 11. Nor is it as rejected by common philosophy as it is to establish, with Plato and Galen, that there are three souls in man separated by place and subject, namely the vegetative in the liver, the sensitive in the heart, and the

rational in the brain; which common philosophy rejects; for in such a way man would not be one composite per se. In another better sense, however, Christian philosophy does not completely deny it, namely in this sense: whether in the same animal the vegetative and sensitive souls are found everywhere in the parts, and in man also the rational soul as really distinct forms, although subordinate, just as we posit the form of corporeity with the soul, as Maironius, Ockham, Zabarella and the Paris Regents judge probable, discoursing in almost the same way by proving and responding just as we do about the form of corporeity and partial forms; which others believe to be even more probable, thinking that at least successively in one living being multiple souls are found, namely first the vegetative, which upon the arrival of the sensitive would recede, which would also then depart upon the arrival of the rational soul, as St. Thomas says in 1. P. q. 118. Art. 2. Ad 2. With the greatest part of the physicians. However, both of these are more commonly denied in fact.

Hence, note 2: One thing can be contained in another either formally, as heat in fire, or virtually, and this in two ways: first, as containing what could produce the contained; thus the sun, which does not have heat formally, can nevertheless produce it. Second, although it could not produce the contained, it can nevertheless exercise its operations; thus the elements according to Scotus are in the mixed; and thus also according to him, whenever two forms are so related that one virtually contains the other, they are simultaneously impossible in the same subject. However, it is certain that one soul is not virtually in another, so that it could produce it, but it is so virtually that a nobler one exercises the operations of the other.

With these things noted, I assert and say to the question: In one living being there is only one soul formally and not several, not even successively. This is the view of Scotus in 4. D. 44. Q. i. §. Concerning this question, saying: "The sensitive and vegetative in man are the same soul as the intellective." He thinks the same in 2. D. 1. Q. 5. §. I say then to the question.

It is proved first: If there were several souls even successively in one living being, it would be because a brute vegetates before it senses, man vegetates and senses before he reasons; but on this account several souls are not to be posited: therefore. The minor is proved: a brute does not therefore not sense before, because it does not have a sensitive soul, or man does not therefore not reason before, because he does not have a rational soul; but rather because the body of the brute is disposed to cause vegetation before sensation, and man is disposed to cause both before reasoning: therefore.

It is proved second: If several souls could be successively in one living being, it would follow that there could also be three souls simultaneously in man; but very many, even among the adversaries, deny this: therefore. The consequence is proved. If in the beginning the fetus were animated by a vegetative soul, and then by a sensitive soul, there would be no reason why they would cease upon the arrival of the rational soul: therefore. The antecedent is proved: a form does not cease to inform, as long as it has the due dispositions; but it also has these while the rational soul is present; for there man still vegetates and senses: therefore. However, that several souls cannot be simultaneously in act is clear; because all the operations, for example, of man can come from one more eminent and perfect soul, namely the rational; for the same sensitive soul can be the principle of vision, hearing, smelling, why not also the same rational soul the principle of intellection, sensation, and nutrition. Likewise, did Christ by dying either lose the sensitive soul or not? If so, then what he once assumed pertaining to the integrity of nature, he again dismissed, which is against the theologians. If not, then he did not lose the vegetative and sensitive life, and thus would not have been truly dead, which militates against the faith.

It is proved third: If in a living being there were several souls formally essentially independent of each other, then, since one is found where the other is not, the living being could lose one soul on account of a defect of disposition to it, and retain the other inferior one, just as it retains the form of corporeity when the soul departs; but this is repugnant: therefore. The minor is proved. In such a way man could be made a brute or a plant; but this is repugnant: therefore. Indeed, conversely, beginning man would first be a plant, then a brute, and finally man, which is absurd.

You will object: Aristotle in 2. On the Generation of Animals says: "Man first lives the life of a plant, then of an animal, and finally of a man": therefore. I reply by distinguishing the words of Aristotle: First he lives the life of a plant in second act, that is, first he exercises those operations, I concede; first in first act, that is, first he has the essence and entity of the vegetative soul rather than of the rational, I deny. Therefore, because the body is first disposed to vegetation and sensation rather than to the use of reason, the rational soul first exercises the former.

You will say: Opposite operations cannot come from the same principle; but man has opposite operations; for sense opposes reason: therefore. On the contrary, I distinguish the major: In an agent operating by one power and potency, I concede; in an agent operating by several potencies, I deny the major. However, the rational soul has several potencies.

You will say: Where there is an operation, there is its principle and root; but in man there are the operations of the vegetative and sensitive souls: therefore also the very entities of those souls. On the contrary, I distinguish the major: There is its principle and root either formally or virtually, I concede; always formally, I deny the major. For the heating of the earth is done by the sun, and yet heat is not found formally in the sun.

You will say: Man formally vegetates and senses; but what contains another virtually is not formally such; as God, who virtually contains creatures. On the contrary, I distinguish the major: He formally vegetates because he formally has a sensitive soul, I deny; because he formally has the power and principle of sensing, which can also be the rational soul, I concede the major. However, there is a disparity with God; because God so virtually contains creatures that he can produce them, but the rational soul does not so contain other souls; but only because it can operate what the other souls operate.

You will say: Vital operations are immanent and must be received in the same effective principle; but vegetations and sensations cannot be received in the rational soul: therefore in man there are two other souls. On the contrary, I distinguish the minor: They cannot be received in the rational soul as the *quo* principle, I deny; as the *quod* principle, I concede the minor. Hence, just as the total principle of sensations is not the rational soul, but the whole composite of soul and body, so also this is the total receptive.

You will say: Man is mortal; but not through the rational soul, which is incorruptible: therefore through the other two. On the contrary, I deny the consequence and the supposition; for man is not mortal on account of the souls, but on account of the body; according to that: "the body, which is corrupted, weighs down the soul."

You will say: One form gives one being; but in man there are three beings, namely vegetative, sensitive, and rational: therefore also three souls. On the contrary, I distinguish the major: It gives one complete and adequate being, I concede; one inadequate being, I deny the major. For, just as in man those three beings are really identified, so they can come from one real form.

You will say: If in man there were only a rational soul, there would not be univocity of animals; but this is against the philosophers: therefore. The consequence is proved. Univocity is considered in terms of some nature participated by the univocates; but, if in man there is only a rational soul, and not a vegetative and sensitive soul, he would not have

a nature participated by animals: therefore. On the contrary, I deny the consequence. To the proof I say: for metaphysical univocity, such as that of genus, it is not required that there be some real form really participated, and physically; for this is only proper to the most special species, but it suffices that in the whole constituted there be some formality included in others, as the formality of animal in man and horse, although in man it is taken from the rational soul, and in the horse from the sensitive soul. Nor is it unfitting that the same non-ultimate being be taken from several forms; for the being of color in white is taken from whiteness, and in black from blackness.

You will say: We see that successively from old ants flies come to be, from caterpillars and silkworms butterflies: therefore thus in the same living being several souls succeed one another. On the contrary, I deny the supposition of the consequent that it is the same living being; for the first, as we see in silkworms, is plainly corrupted, and becomes other putrid matter, in which then from the sun new dispositions are induced for another living being, and so only prime matter passes from one form of corporeity and soul to another form of corporeity and soul; but not in the same living being of the same kind is there first one soul, and then another, since there is no reason why it would destroy the former.

You will say: The fetus before the induction of the rational soul is augmented and grows, and when pricked, contracts itself: therefore it first has a vegetative and sensitive soul before the rational. The antecedent is proved. The rational soul of the male according to the authors is first infused on the 40th day, of the female on the 80th day after conception. According to that in Leviticus 12, that a woman giving birth is to be purified on the 40th day if she bore a male, but on the 80th if a female. But before these days the fetus exercises the operations of life: therefore. On the contrary: Before the infusion of the rational soul the fetus does not properly vegetate vitally but is only augmented through the mere juxtaposition of parts, and the formative and directive power, and that it contracts itself, which however is rarely true, could happen through the animal and vital spirits communicated from the maternal uterus.

QUESTION IV. Are all solid parts informed by the soul?

It should be noted: In an animated body there are many parts: some are homogeneous, such as flesh, skin, bones, etc. Others are heterogeneous; such as the head, foot, hand, etc. Some are solid, such as flesh, bones, teeth, etc. Others are fluid, such as blood, phlegm, choler or yellow bile, milk, semen, fat or lard, marrow, etc. Some pertain to the constitution of the living body per se, such as the heart, brain, liver, etc. Others pertain to the necessary

conservation of those parts, such as the vital and animal spirits. Others are simply excremental, which are of no use and are generated from useless nourishment, such as sputum, tears, sweat, etc. Others adorn and defend the body; such as hair, horns, beaks, nails, feathers, etc. Of all these, some are not continuous with the other members, which grow by juxtaposition, such as sweat, etc. Finally, the body of a living thing is especially divided into three chambers, namely the belly, thorax, and head, in which it has three principal parts: in the belly the liver, in the thorax or chest the heart, and in the head the brain. In these three parts Plato also placed three distinct souls. In the present, we will resolve most powerfully concerning the solid parts, deferring to inquire about the fluid parts in the following question. With these notes, I assert and say to the question:

The solid parts, such as the head, bones, flesh, skin, etc., both pertaining to the constitution and to the adornment and defense of the body, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, are informed by the soul. It is of Scotus in book 4, distinction 44, question 1, section “circa istam quaest.” Saying: “The parts of flesh, which are generated from nourishment, are truly animated even by the intellectual soul... Because any part is animated by the sensitive soul because in any part some operation of the sensitive can be exercised, such as touch; any part is also animated by the vegetative soul, because any part of due quantity can have some action of the vegetative: but the sensitive and vegetative in man are the same soul as the intellectual.”

Likewise in book 3, distinction 16, question 2, section “sed contra ista.” Where he speaks in the same way about nails, hair, teeth, and others, as about flesh in relation to assumption by the Word.

It is proved: First, because the solid parts, such as the head, flesh, bones, teeth, grow and are augmented from within; but this is a vital operation and a sign of the soul: therefore.

Second, because all the solid parts of a living thing live: therefore they are informed by the soul; the antecedent is proved: all are nourished by the introsumption of nourishment, but this is to exercise vital operations; therefore. The major is proved. In teeth, bones, hairs, nails, horns, scales, feathers as well as in flesh are found either marrows or pores and nerves, or little veins and arteries; but there is no other reason for these, except that those parts, which are otherwise continuous with the parts of the animated animal, may be able to more easily perceive and draw to themselves nourishment from the blood and humor through those pores and veins, which they can take through those pores and nerves. A sign

of this thing is that sometimes the hairs of a man have turned white in one night through a vehement fright altering the nutritive humor.

You will object first: According to Aristotle in book 2 of *On the Parts of Animals*, chapter 1, just as a king should not be in all parts of the kingdom, but in one, from which he can govern the others, so the soul should not be in all solid parts, but in a certain principal one: therefore.

I respond: Aristotle only speaks about the soul with respect to the power of governing the other members through the vital spirits, but not that it is in one part, namely the heart, with respect to its substantial entity.

You will say: According to Aristotle, the soul is the act of an organic body; but the homogeneous solid parts are not organic: therefore.

On the contrary, I distinguish the minor: with respect to themselves, I concede; with respect to the body, I deny the minor. Hence, since both the homogeneous and heterogeneous parts are composed of homogeneous parts, if the soul is the act informing the heterogeneous parts, it will also be informing the homogeneous parts.

You will say: Aristotle says that the teeth are not continuous with the bones and flesh, and for that reason they fall out spontaneously: therefore they are not animated.

On the contrary: Aristotle only wants them not to be immediately continuous, but by means of ligaments and nerves; nor do they fall out spontaneously, but only from a defect of the vital power, as in old people: indeed, sometimes even the flesh flows and wastes away, hence it only follows that they sometimes die.

You will say: The teeth and nails grow through the whole life; but this is not a sign of vital growth, since living things have a limit of magnitude: therefore.

On the contrary, I deny the major. For they are not increased through the whole life, but are only nourished, namely by restoring what is consumed; for it is evident from experience that hooves, horns, beaks, the hairs of women, the manes of horses, have a limit of magnitude.

You will say: Therefore all those things feel, since they are informed by a sensitive soul; but this is false: for teeth and hooves, whether they are cut by a knife or burned, do not feel: therefore.

On the contrary, I deny what is inferred. For it is not immediately licit to infer: in these is a sensitive soul, therefore they feel; for similarly it would follow that even hooves, feathers, etc. Would be an animal; because what lives by a sensitive soul is an animal; for sensation only occurs where there are sensory organs; but in the aforementioned there are not those, but rather organs of nutrition, and so they should not feel.

You will object second: Many solid parts, such as hooves, hairs, beaks, etc. Are made from excretions which are expelled by nature outside the body; but animated parts should not be made from these things which nature rejects: therefore.

The minor is proved. First, because it seems absurd for these excretions in man to be informed by a rational soul. Second, because they cannot be informed by the soul of the whole, since sometimes they grow after the death of the animal: therefore.

I respond: I concede the major, I deny the minor. For it is not unfitting for excremental parts, but ones adorning and cherishing other more principal parts, to be made from useless nourishment; since they are also deficient in their perfection with respect to the other parts. Hence, to the proof I deny that it is absurd, because they are not excremental simply, but serve man, and for that reason they are continuous with the remaining parts, and thus according to their grades they can be informed by the rational soul.

To the second proof I say: After death, there is no vital increase, but by the juxtaposition of nourishment, which is expelled by a moderate heat; for otherwise such increase should last a long time, which is against experience.

You will say: Therefore any hair in Christ was united to the Word, and consequently even when separated it would still have remained united; for according to St. Damascene, "What he once assumed, he never relinquished."

On the contrary, I concede the first, I deny the second thing inferred. But St. Damascene should be understood concerning the more principal parts; for in the resurrection he did not reassume all the hairs which he had in life, but only those which were enough for adornment, which will also be the case in the Blessed, as Scotus speaks in both places cited in the assertion in the solution of the arguments.

QUESTION V. Are all fluid parts informed by the soul?

I assert and say to the question: The fluid parts, such as blood, milk, semen, vital and animal spirits, are not informed by the soul. It is of Scotus in book 4, distinction 44, question 1, section "ad argumenta," saying: "In the male, semen is not as something of the nature of that supposit, but it is in that one as in a vessel for the sake of the generation of another supposit: Hence it is not animated by the soul of that one."

Likewise in book 3, distinction 8, question 1, section "Hic tria videnda," saying: "The body of Christ can be taken strictly as it includes parts animated by the soul of Christ, of which sort blood is not, although it is in proximate potency to be converted into animated flesh or other things not formally animated, such as humors and spirits."

He also speaks in this way about the blood of the Blessed Virgin from which the body of Christ was formed, in book 3, distinction 3, question 2, section "sed contra hoc."

It is proved first: Because, if blood were animated, it should be continuous with the other parts of the body; but it is not: therefore. The antecedent is clear, because the soul of man is indivisible, and the soul of a brute is at least continuous: therefore it cannot be in parts that are not continuous; otherwise it would be in two discontinuous subjects. But the minor is proved both from Aristotle in book 2 of *On the Parts of Animals*, chapter 3, saying: "Blood is not continuous with the flesh, but is contained in the heart and veins as in a vessel"; but a vessel is not continuous with the liquid: therefore. Both because, if blood were continuous with the other parts of the body, pain would be felt in its emission, which is against experience: therefore.

From this it is also clear concerning all the remaining fluid parts; for milk, according to Aristotle, is blood twice cooked and not corrupted, because it is blood attracted through the veins to the udders and there cooked anew, where it receives whiteness and sweetness from the innate power of the udders. But ordinarily milk is only in females, because according to Aristotle, milk is menstrual blood well purged from dregs; for when females conceive, the menstrual flow ceases and they acquire milk, and for that reason old women and younger girls of 12 years, because they do not have the menses, also do not have milk.

Similarly, semen is blood thrice cooked, and finally the vital and animal spirits are nothing else substantially than certain purer and most subtle parts of the blood, serving the operations of life, purged in the heart or brain and distributed from there to the functions of life; those which are generated in the heart serve the vital operations of nutrition, etc., and are called vital spirits; but those which are produced in the brain serve for perceiving and sensing, and are called animal spirits: between which there is not an essential but only an accidental difference: therefore all those fluid parts are not informed by the soul, just as neither is blood, in which there is no vital increase, but only by juxtaposition, as wine is increased in a vessel by the infusion of a new part.

It is proved second: The fluid parts do not have their own little veins and nerves through which a vital operation could occur. Indeed, they very frequently flow off and are separated from the living body by ejection: therefore they do not seem to be informed by the soul.

You will object first: In Leviticus 17 it is said: "For the life of all flesh is in the blood." But blood is a fluid part: therefore.

I respond: That passage from Leviticus should be understood to mean that the soul is in the blood as in that on which life depends, but not as in an animated subject; for life is only cherished and nourished by blood; hence blood is only a part looking to the secondary constitution and integrity of the living thing, but not the primary.

You will say: The Council of Trent determines that the soul of Christ is under both species of bread and wine in the Eucharist by force of the natural connection and concomitance by which the parts of the Lord Christ are coupled together: therefore the Council supposes a connection of blood with the soul: therefore blood is animated.

On the contrary: The Council should be understood concerning a mediate connection, not an immediate one; for the soul, because it is the act of the body, has an immediate connection with the body, but the body with blood as a less principal part; and thus the soul also has a mediate connection with blood by means of the body.

You will say: If blood were not properly animated, the divine Word would have assumed two natures, namely the animated nature of the body and the inanimate nature of blood; but this is against the sense of the Holy Fathers: therefore.

On the contrary, I distinguish the major: two partial natures, of which one is contained in the other and is ordered to the other, I concede; two total natures not so ordered to each other, I deny the major; for the Word assumed all the parts looking to conservation and integration.

You will object second: What exercises the operations of life is informed by the soul; but blood exercises those: therefore.

The minor is proved: blood is moved, palpitates, and is fervent, etc., but these are operations of life: therefore.

I respond: I deny the minor; to the proof of the major, I distinguish: it is moved by itself from within, I deny; from without, I concede. For the parts in which blood is contained are moved and altered by the soul, and for that reason blood is also moved in sympathy with their motion; hence the motion of blood is made by the soul in the animated members, but not in blood, just as when water boils, that is not from the water but from the fire. Hence, when Aristotle and others say that blood is alive, they only want blood to be animated and to be alive metaphorically, as a spring is said to be living, quicksilver; for they only intend to explain the transition of blood into flesh and the other parts through nutrition, because it is the proximate nourishment, but not while it is under the form of blood, that it has a soul.

You will say: At least milk is not blood: therefore it can be animated.

The antecedent is proved: milk and blood have diverse properties; for milk is cold and white, blood red and hot: therefore.

On the contrary, I deny the antecedent; to the proof I distinguish the antecedent: they have diverse accidental properties, I concede; substantial, I deny the antecedent.

You will say: At least semen is animated by the soul: therefore.

The assumption is proved: what has the power of producing something animated is actually animated; but semen has the power of producing something animated: therefore.

On the contrary, I deny the assumption; to the argument I distinguish the minor: it has the principal power, I deny; the dispositive power, I concede the minor, as is clear from the preceding part, question 2.

You will say: At least the seeds of plants are nourished, they germinate when kept at home, as is clear in garlic, etc., but these are vital actions: therefore the seeds are animated.

On the contrary, I distinguish the consequent: Seeds which are fruits and seeds at the same time, I concede; which are only seeds, I deny the consequent.

You will say: At least the vital spirits, since they are the instrument by which the living thing works vital operations, should be animated: therefore.

On the contrary, I distinguish the argument: Since they are an instrument producing those operations by their own power, as the hand, the eye, I deny; producing by the power of another, I concede; for man only does vital operations with the vital spirits, e.g., vision in the eye.

QUESTION VI. Are the faculties really or formally distinct from each other and from the soul?

It should be noted that both inanimate and animate things have their powers, such as fire's power to heat, a living being's powers of nutrition, growth, etc. Among these, some arise from the soul itself, such as the intellect and will, while others arise from the whole animate being, such as the powers of vegetation, sensation, locomotion, etc. A power is nothing other than an active principle of operating, either organically and corporeally through certain organs, like the power of sight through the eye, or inorganically if it requires no organ for its operation, like the power of intellect in a separated soul. Similarly, an organic power is sometimes taken for the whole aggregate of the soul's perfection and the form of mixture constituting the organ of the body, e.g. the ear, eye – and is called a complete power. But sometimes it is taken partially for that perfection of the soul which concurs, for example, with vision, and is called an incomplete power. The question, therefore, is not about complete powers, for these are really distinct both from each other and from the soul. For the power of sight can exist without the power of hearing, as in a deaf person, and the soul in the state of separation and conjunction can exist without either. With this noted, I assert and say to the question: The soul's powers are not really distinct from each other or from the soul, but are formally distinct from the nature of the thing. This is from Scotus in 2, d. 16, q. un., §. I therefore say, affirming: The soul's powers are not really distinct from each other or from its essence. Also §. Therefore I say, asserting that the soul's powers are formally distinct both from each other and from their primary container. This is against the Thomists.

The first part is proven first: The soul is per se the principle of understanding, willing, seeing, etc.; therefore, it does not produce these acts through really distinct powers. The antecedent is proven: If it were the principle not per se but through some accident, then the soul would sin and be beatified only per accidens. But this is unfitting. Therefore, etc. The major premise is proven: When a first act belongs to something per accidens, a second act also belongs to it per accidens. But if the powers were really distinct, they would be first acts, being accidents belonging to the cause per accidens for understanding and willing as second acts. Therefore, etc.

The opponents respond by denying the last minor premise, namely, that the powers are accidents belonging per accidens to the soul. For although they are indeed accidents, they

belong per se to the soul as instruments by way of properties through which the soul exercises its operations.

On the contrary: To say the soul uses such instruments either denotes some activity immediately in the soul with respect to actions, or denotes a simple sustaining of the powers. If the first, then the intended conclusion is attained, namely, that the soul acts immediately and not through a distinct accident. If the second, then free acts could not be immediately imputed to the soul, but only to the will, which is unfitting. Indeed, we experience that when one power pays excessive attention to its proper action, the action of another is impeded or weakened. For example, although the eye has a visible species, if the soul does not attend but is excessively occupied with understanding, vision or hearing does not occur. Therefore, the soul immediately concurs per se to vital actions.

Nor should you object that this experience occurs from a lack of vital spirits which, if they flow to one power, abandon another. For on the contrary, those spirits do not flow by chance; otherwise there would be no reason why they flow to this power and not another. Therefore it comes from some universal intrinsic principle, namely, the soul. Nor can that experience come from an intimate subordination of powers, for not every power is subordinate to another, although to the soul, yes. For example, the power of sight is not subordinate to the power of hearing. Therefore, hearing should not be impeded by an excessively intense action of sight.

The second part is proven: Things that cannot even by divine power be conserved one without the other are not really distinct. But the soul's powers can neither by divine power be conserved without the soul, nor the soul without its powers. Otherwise there could be a soul that is not rational and that cannot exercise its operations, which is repugnant. Therefore they are not really distinct, but only formally. The major premise is clear from the contrary, because every absolute thing really distinct from another can be conserved without the other absolute thing.

The second part is proven: If the soul's powers were not distinct from the soul and from each other formally, contradictories would belong to them. Therefore, etc. The antecedent is proven: The powers emanate, but the soul does not. The soul is an essential part, but the intellect and will are not. The intellect understands, but the will does not, and this before every work of the intellect. Therefore, etc. Indeed, if they were not formally distinct, the Holy Spirit would be produced just as well through the intellect as the Son, because the intellect and will would not be formally distinct but would be formally the same. But

according to the Theologians, the Holy Spirit is produced only through the will. Therefore, etc.

You will object: In *On Memory*, ch. 10, Aristotle calls memory a passion and a habit. Also, he reduces powers to the second species of quality. But memory is a power of the soul, and habit and passion, potency and impotency in quality are really distinct accidents. Therefore, etc.

I respond: Memory imports two things, namely, that power or principle of remembering of the intellect, and the intellect itself with the intelligible species. And only under this latter aspect can it be called a habit. Then, by natural potency and impotency should not be understood the soul's powers, but rather some facility or agility and difficulty in acting, which are properly accidents in the second species of quality.

You will say: According to Aristotle, act and potency pertain to the same category and should be proportional. But vital acts are accidents of quality. Therefore, so are vital powers.

On the contrary, I distinguish the first part of the major premise: The act that is produced and the potency that produces are in the same category – I deny. The entitative act and the objective potency, i.e., the possible thing and the actually existing thing – I concede the major premise. I also distinguish the second part of the major premise: They should be proportional entitatively – I deny. Actively – I concede the major premise. For otherwise, neither could substance produce an accident, nor an accident produce a substance, according to the Thomists.

You will say: From Scotus in 4, d. 49, q. 14, §. I respond: Here both the visual and motive powers are intensified in the Blessed, but not substance. However, only quality is intensifiable and remissible. Therefore the soul's powers are accidents of quality.

On the contrary: Scotus is speaking only of extrinsic intensification, not intrinsic – that is, not by addition of degree but by removal of impediment on the part of the body. Hence, the reason that motion is swifter and vision more perfect in the Blessed is that in this life the soul is impeded by the body. Therefore, powers never receive more and less, but only their facilities and abilities do.

You will say: Dionysius distinguishes power and operation from the substance of an angel, to differentiate from divine simplicity. But according to the Scotists, those powers are formally distinct in God. Therefore they are really distinct in angels and the soul.

On the contrary: From Dionysius and other Fathers nothing else is proven than that the powers in angels are formally distinct, not really. Otherwise, the sufficient difference between the distinct powers of God and of an angel is that the distinction of powers is not with composition in God, but the distinction of powers in angels is with composition, which excludes perfect simplicity.

You will say: That which is simply spiritual should be really distinct from that which is simply material. But the soul's powers are simply material and the soul is simply spiritual. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, I distinguish the minor premise: They are material with respect to what they say in the direct sense – I deny. With respect to what they say in the indirect sense, i.e., with respect to the operation proceeding from an organ – I concede the minor premise. Indeed, our question here is not about complete powers from material organs, but about incomplete powers as perfections of the soul, which are spiritual, as we noted above in the observation.

You will say: Parts in a whole are really distinct from each other and, according to the Scotists, from the whole. But the soul's powers are parts of the soul. Therefore they are really distinct from the soul.

On the contrary, I deny the minor premise. For a part should not be of the same essence as the whole, and a part should be prior in origin to the whole. But the soul's powers are of the same essence as the whole, since each includes the whole essence of the soul. Nor are they prior to the soul, since they proceed from it. Hence they should be called only the soul's partial perfections formally distinct.

Second Objection: Powers are specified by their acts and operations. But a created operation is an accident really distinct from another. Therefore the soul's powers will be really distinct accidents.

I respond by distinguishing the major premise: They are specified by acts and operations intrinsically, i.e., they receive essential differences – I deny. Extrinsically, i.e., they are manifested a posteriori – I concede the major premise. For the relation to acts is not of the quiddity of a power extrinsically. But that substance is specified by an accident does not imply contradiction, just as, according to the Thomists, substance itself expresses a relation to the properties manifesting substance, which for them are really distinct accidents.

You will say: Powers receive really distinct habits, namely, the intellect receives the habit of faith, the will the habit of charity, which are separated. Therefore, the powers that operate through such habits are also separated.

On the contrary, I deny the consequence. For even according to the Thomists, the same soul according to essence receives really distinct powers, and through these, acts and habits. Therefore, much more can the soul, through formally distinct powers, receive really distinct acts and habits according to us.

You will say: If the soul's powers were formally distinct, they would be the same in reality. But this cannot be said. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proven: Things that are the same in reality can be predicated of each other. But the intellect and will cannot be predicated of each other. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, I deny the minor premise. To the proof, I distinguish the minor premise: They cannot be predicated in reality or concretely, i.e., the intellective is the volitive, and vice versa – I deny. Formally or abstractly, i.e., the intellect is the will – I concede. In the abstract they are predicated only in God by reason of his infinity.

You will say: The intellect enters into the essence of the will. Therefore, it should also be predicated of it in the abstract. The antecedent is proven: The will cannot will or nill an object unless it perceives in the object the aspect of good through the intellect by which the will is moved. Therefore, the intellective and volitive principle is the same, and one enters into the essence of the other.

On the contrary, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: It cannot will or nill as the principle that – I concede. As the principle by which – I deny the antecedent. For the will is moved by the intellect only improperly and properly by the soul

which, as understanding, moves itself as willing. Hence, because as understanding it moves itself, as willing it is, the ratio of understanding and willing cannot be the same; otherwise it would move and be moved according to the same ratio. Indeed, the will is a blind power. Therefore, to understand cannot formally belong to it, but only in reality and identically. Otherwise, that prime matter receives forms without powers formally distinct can be conceded, for to receive forms in matter, since it is passive, does not require diverse modes of receiving, as producing understanding, willing, etc., does. Otherwise indeed, as is clear from Physics I, the potency of matter is something formally distinct from matter, and there are as many particular potencies in matter as there are forms to be received. See more from Logic, D. 3, subdist. 3, q. 8, §. 7, to the second objection of the Nominalists.

QUESTION VII. Whether powers are specified by their acts, and acts by their objects, intrinsically or extrinsically.

It should be noted first that the specification of powers by their acts is nothing other than the denomination and formalization of the unity, distinction, and constitution of powers from acts, or of acts from objects. Thus, if the object is intelligible, it denominates and specifies the power concerned with it as intellective; if visible, as visive. Moreover, such specification is twofold, namely, intrinsic or a priori, and extrinsic or a posteriori. The first occurs not through acts in powers or through objects in acts, but through their own intrinsic differences and perfections. The second, however, occurs when from the cognition of an extrinsic thing we come to the cognition and manifestation of its essence, which depends on that extrinsic thing. Moreover, since objects are twofold, namely, adequate, beyond which powers cannot tend, as sound with respect to hearing, and inadequate, which are contained under the adequate object, as the sound of a bell, of a voice, etc., so also specification is twofold. One is adequate, through which something differs from everything else, as vision with respect to the visive power. The other is inadequate, through which one thing differs from another, but not from all, as inadequate acts which are contained under the adequate, as the vision of whiteness under vision as such. Otherwise, powers are also twofold, namely, disparate, which do not depend on each other in operating, as the eye on the ear, and subordinate, as sense and intellect, and will and intellect.

It should be noted second that for the constitution of the simply perfect specific identity of acts, the identity of the power and object is required under the same ratio of moving and terminating. For not any identity suffices for simply identifying; any difference, however, suffices for distinguishing. Moreover, that sometimes the diversity of powers alone suffices is clear from the acts of love of the fatherland and the wayfarer with respect to God as the same object. And yet they are distinguished in species, namely, a natural and a supernatural

act, which diversity is always on the part of the power or the tending principles, and not on the part of the object. And that the diversity of the object also sometimes suffices is clear because the understanding of an accident and of a substance in the same power of the intellect are distinguished in species. Likewise, intuitive and abstractive notions cohere in the same power with respect to the same thing under a diverse ratio of terminating, and for that reason are distinguished in species. Otherwise, finally, when a power is said to be specified by acts, it should be understood completely and as it were in the genus of formal cause, for initiatively and as it were in the genus of material cause they are specified by the essences from which they emanate, and so acts from the powers by which they are produced. Therefore, the visive powers of a man and of a lion are distinct in species because the essences from which they flow are distinct in species. With this noted, I assert and say to the question: Powers are specified by their acts, and acts by their objects only extrinsically and manifestatively, not intrinsically. This is from Scotus in 2, d. 16, q. un., §. To the first argument, saying: Powers are distinguished by their acts, this is true; yet it is not necessary that there be as much distinction in the powers as in the acts, although there is some distinction, for one visive power is of many colors. Also, in Quodl. 13, To those things, asserting: Acts are distinguished by their objects with respect to manifestation, because the distinction of objects is more manifest than the distinction of acts, and from the former as more manifest the latter is made known. Hence it can be conceded that acts are distinguished by objects as by certain extrinsic things on which the acts depend by an essential and proper dependence, yet they are not distinguished by them as by formal distinctives. This is against the Thomists.

The first part is proven: Both because an effect is not of the intrinsic entity of the cause, or a term of the foundation, but only the effect a posteriori and extrinsically manifests the cause, and a term its relation; but acts are effects of powers, and objects are terms of the dependence of acts. Therefore, powers are manifested by their acts, and acts by their objects, only extrinsically. And because an effect does not intrinsically specify by entering into the entity of the cause but only extrinsically, namely, by manifesting that the cause is such as produced such an effect. But acts are effects of powers. Therefore, etc.

The second part is proven: That which is outside the formal ratio of something does not intrinsically specify it and distinguish it from other things. But acts and objects are outside the formal ratio of a power and an act, for even if, per impossibile, there were no object, there would still be powers of souls. Therefore, etc.

The opponents respond by denying the minor premise and say: Since that relation to objects is a transcendental relation, it can be essentially imbibed in powers and acts, and consequently they can be intrinsically specified by it.

On the contrary: Although a transcendental relation could be really identified with absolute things yet not essentially and formally, because nothing respective can be of the essence of something absolute; otherwise it would be simultaneously to itself and to another, and so not to itself. Moreover, every being that is the principle of some operation is such a principle because it is such a being of itself. Hence the sun does not differ from a plant because it can generate more things, but because it has such a form in itself from which such diverse things are generated. So also, although the soul's powers are ordered to diverse operations, they do not differ essentially through them. For these powers are first such beings in themselves, and afterwards are ordered to such and not other operations. Indeed, although the distinction of objects always included the distinction of acts and powers, yet the specific unity of the object does not always imply the unity of the act and power, because powers distinct in species can be concerned with the same object through diverse acts, as the same object is of the intellect and will of the Blessed, yet the understanding is not of the same species as the willing. Similarly, the same place can be acquired by diverse motions, namely, straight and circular. Therefore, objects cannot sufficiently specify acts and powers intrinsically.

First Objection: In *On the Soul II*, 33, Aristotle says: For acts and operations are prior to powers in notion. Therefore, powers are specified intrinsically, because a priori, by their acts.

I respond and say that the phrase "in notion" is the same as "in the order of knowing," so that "notion" should be taken for notification and manifestation, inasmuch as acts and powers are manifested to us first. Or it could be conceded that acts are prior to powers, but not insofar as they have the ratio of effect, but rather of end of the power, as the Thomists want. But by this very fact the distinction is not specified intrinsically but extrinsically, as are end and efficient cause.

You will say: Therefore, a power could not be specified even extrinsically by its acts, and an act by its objects. This is proven: Specifically diverse acts are from the same power, as love and hate from the will, knowledge and opinion from the intellect. Indeed, the same power tends to diverse objects, as the intellect to the sensible and the intelligible. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, I deny the conclusion. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: Diverse inadequate acts – I concede. Adequate acts – I deny. For although such acts differ in species, yet because they agree in one genus, as nolition and volition in the elicitive genus, faith and knowledge in the genus of cognition, assent and dissent in the representative genus, for that reason they cannot specify powers. But that concerning the intellect with respect to the intelligible and the sensible is not valid, because subordinate powers, such as sight, the common sense, and the intellect, do not require diverse objects, since the superior is concerned with the object of the inferior.

You will say: No power of the senses can correspond to a single adequate object. Therefore, neither an adequate object nor adequate acts could specify powers extrinsically. The antecedent is proven: Such an object would be something abstracted from all the inadequate objects and common to them. But sense cannot perceive the universal. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proven: A real respect cannot be except to a real term. But the tendency of the power of sense is a real respect, and the colored as such abstracted is nothing real. Therefore, the real tendency of sense cannot attain and perceive the universal.

On the contrary, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the minor premise: The logical universal – I concede. The metaphysical universal – I deny. For even sense can perceive a nature, because even in sensation the nature is the ratio of moving, although not as precise from singularity, as the intellect can, for sense also attains a nature beyond singularity, although conjoined with it. To the proof, I deny the minor premise. For there are common natures on the part of the thing included in singulars, and so the common nature of color can terminate a real respect.

You will say: That which is distinctive of one thing should be something one and indivisible. But the objects of one power are many, distinguished in species. Therefore, there is not one common thing on the part of the thing. The minor premise is clear, because the object of the power of sight is white, black, red, etc.

On the contrary, I distinguish the minor premise: Many inadequate or material objects – I concede. Adequate and formal objects – I deny the minor premise.

You will say: Therefore, the object would rather be specified by the power. This is proven because the formal object of some power is denominated from the power itself, as the visible from sight.

On the contrary, I deny the conclusion and its reason. Because the formal object in reality is always something on the part of the object itself in which all things contained under the adequate object agree univocally. But because the objective ratio is often hidden, we are accustomed to explain it through the extrinsic denomination of the object from the power.

Second Objection: No one can perceive a power unless he understands the relation to the act and object. Therefore, the relation to the act and object pertains to the intrinsic specification of the power.

I respond by denying the antecedent. For any absolute being is conceived first in itself rather than in relation to another. Hence powers only by force of the name imply a relation of the absolute thing annexed to the act and object. Hence, if there were a word that signified the absolute entity of the power, it could be understood quiddatively without the object. Therefore, that relation is not of the formal concept of the power, but only accompanies it; otherwise the power would be in the category of relation, and not of quality, as the Thomists want. According to us, however, power is reductively in the category of substance, like the properties of a substance.

You will say: The relations of a power to acts, and of acts to objects, are so consubstantial to them that, upon the implication of the acts and objects, the powers would be implied. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: They would be implied through an intrinsic locus – I deny. Through an extrinsic locus – I concede, in the way that, upon the implication of the properties, the subject would be implied. Yet a property is not of the essence of the subject. Hence it is only proven that there is a real identity of the relation of powers to acts, not a formal and essential one.

You will say: Neither the act, or the object, or the relation would be the difference, or the essence of the power. But the difference of the power is taken from these, which is the

relation, not as an accidental relation, but as the principle of the relation. But this is something intrinsic and essential to the power. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, I deny the minor premise. For the intrinsic difference cannot be taken from these, since the act is posterior to the power. But an essential difference of the prior cannot be taken from the posterior. Hence that in the major premise, where it is said that that difference is only the principle of the relation, destroys itself. For the principle of a relation is not the essential relation itself, but rather the cause of the relation. Therefore, the Thomists here agree with us, because the absolute essence itself is the cause of the relation. Hence, finally, it should be observed that powers can also be defined absolutely without relation to acts, because the relation is outside the essence of the power, but that which is outside the essence of something can be defined without it. Moreover, that Aristotle defined them with a relation is only a posteriori, and for the sake of greater clarity.

DISTINCTION II On the Vegetative Soul.

QUESTION I. On various inquiries about the vegetative soul.

You may ask 1. Is there a vegetative soul? Before answering, note that there were some who said that only one soul, namely the rational soul alone, exists in the nature of things, and therefore they posited that brutes and plants are endowed with reason, as the Manicheans, according to St. Augustine in book 1 on the morals of the Manicheans, chapter 17, who therefore also condemned as guilty of mortal sin all those who forcibly cut off a leaf from a tree. But very many others among the ancients admitted only two souls, namely the rational and the sensitive, and this in two senses; some, because they thought that plants are also sensitive, such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras: Others, because they did not at all place plants among living things, such as the Stoics, with whom the Cartesians will gladly associate themselves, since they too plainly deny a sensitive soul to brutes, as we will see in the following distinction. With these things observed, I respond: A vegetative soul exists entirely in the nature of things. So Scotus supposes in Distinction 1, question 1, assertion 2, cited. The reason is: Both because it is not obscurely gathered from Scripture in 1 Corinthians 15: "Foolish one, what you sow is not brought to life unless it dies first, and what you sow, you do not sow the body that is to be, but a bare kernel, perhaps of wheat or

of some other grain"; but what is brought to life and dies must be living: therefore. Both because plants have a true internal principle of acquiring for themselves some perfections either not due by force of generation or through vital action; for they are nourished, generate, and grow, just like animals through the intake of food, therefore since nutrition is an act proceeding from it, plants will now be animated with a vegetative soul. Likewise plants dry out while the same form of corporeity remains; therefore they will necessarily have some soul; for multiple subordinate forms are found only in living things, as the Scotists teach beyond the rest. But it is clear that the soul in plants is purely vegetative; because, where there is sense, there is sleep and wakefulness. Likewise the organs of sensing and pain; none of which we experience in plants.

Nor should you say: The operations of plants, such as nutrition, are also found in non-living things, as in a magnet, which is nourished by iron and converts it into its own substance if it adheres to it for a long time. Likewise, fire digests food, for it sucks up the more subtle parts of oil and rejects the excretory parts and is increased through intake. This also seems to be the opinion of St. Augustine in *On the Spirit and the Soul*, chapter 9, saying: "Just as we see that even twigs and herbs are moved and have growth without a soul." To the contrary: I deny the antecedent. For nutrition happens in two ways: either properly through the intake of food, by which the nourished thing draws food to itself by its own power and dispenses it to all its parts, so that each is nourished and grows, and only living things are nourished by this nutrition, but not a magnet and fire; for fire does not thus attract oil from the pores of a wick, but at the same time destroys the oil with the wick and converts it into fire. Or it is taken improperly through the juxtaposition of food. And in this way it is also suitable for non-living things such as fire, stones, and metals. To St. Augustine I say, if that book is held to be his, that he only speaks of life in its principal meaning, which does not at all belong to plants.

You may ask 2. What is the vegetative soul? I respond: The vegetative soul is the first act of a physical organic body potentially having vegetative life. The reason is from the definition of soul as such given in the preceding Distinction, question 1. Nor should you say: Aristotle in book 2 of *On the Soul* says: "The vegetative soul is the principle of generating something similar to itself": therefore it should be defined in this way. To the contrary: Aristotle there only explains the vegetative soul with respect to one more outstanding work for it, but not with respect to all things absolutely, and he clearly defines it otherwise there.

You may ask 3. Is the vegetative soul multiple in species? I respond: Yes, the reason is because diverse operations in species argue for diverse forms in species; but in vegetative things there are multiple diverse operations in species: therefore. The minor premise is

clear, for a different power is discerned in one plant than in another, diverse fruits come from diverse trees; diversely organized bodies indicate diverse souls, because any soul requires suitable organs for its operations; but vegetative things have diversely organized bodies, as is clear in the pine, cherry, elder, etc., therefore.

Nor should you say: Diverse organized members in one living body do not argue for diverse souls: therefore neither do diverse organized vegetative bodies. To the contrary, the disparity is: Because diverse members in one living thing only integrate one body for adequately receiving one soul, which by its nature requires all those members collectively: but the diversity of organized bodies constitutes multiple adequate bodies for diverse adequate souls.

You may ask 4. Which powers and acts most of all belong to the vegetative soul? I respond: Three powers most of all, namely nutritive, because, in order for a living thing to be preserved, it is necessary to be nourished; augmentative, because a living thing cannot exist in a minimal quantity, and thus must be increased; and generative: because an individual cannot be perpetual, so it generates something similar to itself, so that it may continue on in its species. Hence it also has three acts, namely generation, augmentation, and nutrition, which four other acts still serve, namely attraction, expulsion, retention, and digestion or concoction.

Nor should you say: A vegetative and living thing can exist without the generative power, as is clear in sterile plants and animals: therefore the generative power does not belong to the vegetative soul. To the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: in second act, I concede; in first act, I deny. For although certain things may be sterile, the generative power is not unsuitable for them because of this; but this only happens on account of an impediment or imperfection or defect, as is clear in those things which come to be from putrefaction.

You may ask 5. How are the aforementioned powers distinguished from the soul and among themselves? I respond: Formally from the nature of the thing, and not really; the reason is both from the preceding Distinction, question 6, and because, if the generative power were really distinct from the nutritive power, it would either be a substance or an accident. Not a substance: otherwise there would be multiple substances in the same soul. Not an accident: because this cannot produce a substance by generating. Indeed, nutrition is partial generation, and a new substance is never produced in nutrition without that substance equivocally producing a new quantity as the term of augmentation: therefore, since these powers are never separable, they will be distinguished only formally, not really.

Nor should you say: A vegetative thing is indeed always nourished, but does not always grow and increase: therefore these powers are really distinct. To the contrary, I distinguish the second part of the antecedent: It does not always grow by the acquisition of a greater part of quantity, I concede; by the acquisition of a new quantity, whether greater or lesser or equal for what was lost, I deny the antecedent. You will say: At least a vegetative thing does not generate all the time, as it is nourished: therefore these powers are really distinct. To the contrary, I deny the consequence. Because that does not happen on account of a lack of power, but arises from other defects, as is clear in eunuchs. You will say: The nutritive power is dispersed through the whole body, but the generative power resides in the part that concocts the seed: therefore they are still really distinct. To the contrary, I distinguish the second part of the antecedent: The generative power with respect to second act and its organs, I concede; with respect to first act and in itself, I deny the antecedent. For it is diffused through the whole body in such a way. Whence only a formal distinction is proven, not a real one.

You may ask 6. How are the aforementioned acts of the vegetative soul distinguished? I respond: Really. The reason is: because things that are separated are really distinct; but nutrition and generation are separated: for, as long as a living thing lives, it has the operation and act of nutrition, because the natural heat consumes something of the radical moisture, which is restored through nutrition; but it does not always have the act of generation.

Nor should you say: Nutrition is the generation of a new substance, and both happen in an instant: therefore they are not really distinct. To the contrary, the disparity is: because nutrition regards a part, but generation regards the whole substance. Likewise, nutrition regards the former individual, but generation regards a new one to be produced. Finally, by parity, although generation and illumination happen in an instant, they nevertheless differ from elsewhere.

You may ask 7. Does the same individual persevere from generation to death, although it is always nourished and increased through newly added parts? I respond: Yes, the reason is because the identity of something is to be taken most of all from the identity of matter and form: but the whole matter and form always remain in the same individual: therefore. The major premise is clear: because those parts are intrinsic and essential. The minor premise is proven. For although the parts may be altered and rendered impure, nevertheless they remain the same according to matter and form; for although a tree may lose branches, a river waters, a city may acquire and lose people, nevertheless it is always said to be the

same: therefore also the matter and form and the whole individual; because it is always true to say: the individual remains according to its whole self.

Nor should you say: The individual only remains the same equivalently, not truly: therefore. The antecedent is proven: A place is only equivalently the same, while the parts of the surrounding body, e.g., recede through the wind, and other new ones approach surrounding the same body: therefore, since new parts always approach the individual through nutrition, this only remains equivalently the same. To the contrary, the disparity is: because through the blowing of the wind all the preceding parts of the air recede, and others arrive; but in a vegetative thing only slight and meager parts perish while the rest remain, just as, although hairs may be cut off, nevertheless the same human being remains.

DISTINCTION III. On the Sensitive Soul.

Question I. Is there truly a sensitive soul?

It should be noted: Descartes, since he thinks that the body is nothing other than a formally extended substance, or extension itself; but the soul is nothing other than a thinking substance or thought itself; hence he deduces that neither thought can consist with extension, nor extension with thought in the same principle; consequently in brutes lacking thought there is no soul, nor sense, nor true sensation, but they are pure machines or automata, which move from the mere disposition of organs, & artificial structure of parts like a clock, as he says in responses 4 to objection 4, page 126, saying: Whence we are compelled to conclude no principle of motion at all to be acknowledged by us in brutes themselves besides the sole disposition of organs, & the continuous influx of spirits, which are produced by the heat of the heart attenuating the blood. He wants therefore the blood in brutes to be in place of the soul, & from its motion alone, pervading the brain, nerves, & muscles, the various motions of brutes to proceed, which motion of the blood he explains in the dissertation on method n. 5. Page 29. But how ruinous those two adduced foundations of his may be is partly evident from book 1 of Physics, where we proved a natural body to be a true substance consisting of matter, & form & not mere extension, or a congeries of accidents: but it will be partly evident below concerning the rational soul, & its legitimate definition. Therefore with a few remaining things I Assert & say to the question. There truly

exists in brutes a sensitive soul, or an imaginative power cognitive of an object, endowed with senses, & corporeal affections. Thus Scotus supposes in 4.D. 45. Q. 3. §. About that. Saying: The acts of brutes although they could probably be preserved by not properly placing remembrance in them, but only an imaginative cognition of an object, which is of past things, nevertheless, what we see in their acts, are more easily preserved by placing memory in them. and it is against Descartes. It is proved 1. From the word of God attributing life, sense, & cognition to brutes: Life Genesis 1. And God said let the earth bring forth the living soul after its kind, cattle, & creeping things, & beasts of the earth . . have dominion over all living things, which move upon the earth. Likewise Genesis 7. All men, & all things in which is the breath of life on the earth, died. Where the death & life of men, & beasts are enunciated with equal rigor of speech, & understanding. Sense, for to hunger Psalm 103 the young lions roaring, that they may seize, & seek their food. Likewise Psalm 146. Who giveth to beasts their food, & to the young ravens that call upon him. To thirst: Psalm 41. As the hart panteth after the water brooks. Likewise Psalm 103. The wild asses shall wait in their thirst. To desire coition Jeremiah 5. They were as fed horses in the morning: every one neighed after his neighbour's wife. Likewise 2 Peter 2. But these, as natural brute beasts - - - sporting themselves with their own deceivings while they feast with you; Having eyes full of adultery, and that cannot cease from sin. An imaginative cognitive power. Isaiah 1. The ox knoweth his owner, & the ass his master's crib. Likewise Matthew 10. Be ye wise as serpents, & harmless as doves. Therefore. The Cartesians respond that scripture attributes these things to brutes by metaphor, as it attributes life to waters, saying John 4. If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith to thee, Give me to drink; thou wouldest have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water. Likewise Psalm 103. The sun knoweth his going down. On the contrary: Although scripture more often attributes some things to beasts by similitudes, it by no means attributes life, sense, & cognition; for otherwise in the same way we could infer that even men live, feel, & perceive only metaphorically, because many things are attributed to them by scripture only in this way. For if on account of the recounted operations in men we are compelled to construct a soul, why not also profess a soul in beasts, while we discern the same things in them? It is proved 2. Both because, where there are organs of the senses, & all indications, by which a soul can be known, there is a soul; but in beasts there are almost the same things, which are in our bodies, for the same structure of organs is discerned, of the eye, ear, feet &c. in the same seat of the soul prepared, and those actions similar to ours, which are directed by some cognition, as we see in the hunting dog knowing the wild beast, which it pursues, in birds, & predatory beasts desiring their prey, in domestic dogs distinguishing their master from others, by sight, hearing, & smell. Likewise feeling the blow of a staff, & crying out at the pain, and fleeing, & sometimes leaping upon the striker. Both because, if all those operations of brutes proceeded from the mere certain disposition of parts, how could we prove in infants, or phrenetics, or those sleeping, who manifest no other operations, than sensitive ones, that there is some soul; especially, since according to Descartes man is discerned from brutes by thought alone, or by being conscious to himself of what is done

within him. The Cartesians respond: This can be sufficiently proved from the reasoning of such a man sometimes intervening. On the contrary. What, if however he should never reason? Or how will you know that he is more conscious to himself, than brutes; since the operations of a brute are perceived by its senses no less, than those of that man? From which it is evident that not only the distinction of man, & brute, but also the necessity of the soul is called into doubt. You will object with the Cartesians: All the operations of brutes can be elicited, & explained through the mere mechanical disposition of organs, & corporeal motions without any internal living principle of motions: therefore. The antecedent is proved: God could by his skill fabricate such a machine: therefore & thus it was made. The antecedent is again evident: because & human artificers have constructed wondrous machines, which walked, spoke, flew; as that iron fly of Charles V. fabricated by Charles of Königsberg; & many others by others, of which histories speak. The consequence is equally proved. For God does not act in vain, nor employ many things, where fewer suffice. Since therefore a mechanical construction suffices, that ambulatory motions, & speeches can be made, a sensitive soul will be useless; nay the divine wisdom, & power, is more commended, if in such an ordination, & mechanical proportion of so many parts of the body it effects these operations, than, if the same were attributed to one sentient, & cognitive principle. Resp. First by retorting the argument: God could also by his skill construct a machine of man, so that it might accomplish all things, which man does: therefore & the soul of man would be superfluous. Likewise God could equally closely bind some sensitive soul to the body of a brute, as he bound the rational to the human body: therefore & he did it; since & this redounds to the greater commendation of the divine wisdom, & power, as is evident of itself concerning the soul of man. Secondly: although we may concede that God can found such machines, which can exercise some operations similar to animals, yet we could scarcely conceive, how those machines without any internal direction can exhibit all such operations, which we see in brutes; for who would not rather suspect some participation of reason of cats in catching mice, of foxes, & apes in craftiness, of bees in forming a republic, of ants in preparing, & preserving food? It is therefore better to refer all those things to a sensitive soul, than to a mechanical construction. More of these things in what follows.

QUESTION II. What the sensitive soul may be, the sensible object, & the medium of the senses?

It should be noted first: In sensitive animals three operations are chiefly observed, namely sensation, appetite, & locomotion, to which consequently three powers correspond, namely the sensitive, appetitive, & locomotive. The first perceives sensible things, & is divided into external, & internal senses. The external are material faculties affixed to an external corporeal organ, & are called material cognitive powers, as sight hearing, smell &c. The

internal are, whose organs do not appear externally in the body, as phantasy, sensitive memory &c. concerning which it will be said in their places. The second power desires the advantageous, & flees the disadvantageous; & is divided into the irascible, & concupiscible appetite. The third serves to acquire the desired, & flee the disadvantageous by moving from place to place.

It should be noted 2. Sense is a vital power, which is concerned with a sensible object, which can be sensible per se, which namely is attained by sense by reason of itself; as heat sound. &c. & sensible per accidens, which is attained by sense by reason of another, as substance is sensed by reason of accidents. Likewise one is a proper sensible; another common: The first is, which is perceived by only one sense, as color by sight, sound by hearing: the other is what is attained by several external senses as motion, number &c. These things having been noted the first Proposition is posited. The sensitive soul is not made effectively, but dispositively from seed, but effectively from God: the reason is: because a living thing is not produced from a non-living thing; but seed is not a living thing, as is evident in this part D. 14 q. 5. Both because an effect in act presupposes a cause in act; but when the sensitive soul is produced, the seed is no longer, but is corrupted, & passes into the embryo, from the embryo into the body, from which the sensitive soul is educed by God the Author, since no other competent created cause can be assigned; as we have often said in previous things. Nor may you say: If seed were not effective of the sensitive soul, then any animal could be generated from any seed; but this is not so: for a lion, or ox &c. is not made from any seed. Therefore. The major is proved: because, if it does not concur effectively, it would hold itself as matter, which is successively in many things. On the contrary. I deny the consequence. Because seed is at least a dispositive cause with its operating form, & therefore human seed disposes otherwise, than leonine. You will say: If a brute did not concur to the production of the sensitive soul, neither would the brute be the parent of the produced against the common opinion: therefore. On the contrary. I deny the consequence. For it suffices, that by means of the seed decided from the progenitor a due organic preparation is made to educe the soul, as man is called the Father of the son, although he does not effect the rational soul. You will say: If the sensitive soul is produced by God, it will also be created, as the rational soul, which is unsuitable. On the contrary. I deny the consequence: For God not only creates, but also educes; but he makes the rational soul from nothing, & therefore creates it; but the sensitive he educes from the organized body. Proposition 2. The common sensible is for the most part fivefold; namely, motion, rest, number, figure, & magnitude. To which still other common sensibles can be reduced. As position, distance &c. to motion: smoothness, roughness &c. to figure. The reason is: because all those can be perceived by several senses, as magnitude by sight & touch, & hearing &c. thus Scotus speaks in 2. D. 3. Q. 16. §. Others say: asserting: it is evident concerning the common sensible, which is per se the object of sight, as magnitude, & figure, although they may be per se the object of the visual power, nevertheless they do not include the first formal motive reason of sight,

without which there is no seeing, as is color, & light. Nor may you say: Motion is in continuous flux & rest is a privation; but flux, & privation are perceived only by reason, not by sense: therefore. On the contrary. I distinguish the minor. According to the formal concept I concede. According to the material, & imperfect I deny. For it is sensed that water flows, a stone falls, a man walks, & rest here ought not to be taken for the lack of motion, but for the persistence of a thing in place. You will say: Brutes do not number: therefore number is not among sensibles. On the contrary. I distinguish the antecedent. They do not number by adding, repeating, as men I concede. They do not number, that is: they do not know discrete things, as three men, 4 stones &c. I deny the antecedent. Proposition 3. The common sensible generates a species of itself distinct from the proper sensible, although never without this concomitant: the reason is: because diverse objects produce diverse species; but the common sensible is distinct from the proper: therefore. Hence, if from afar a tower is seen, its magnitude is perceived by the sense; but the color of the tower itself is not discerned; but magnitude is of the genus of the common sensible, but color of the proper sensible: therefore. Nor may you say: Magnitude is quantity, which is of the genus of passives: therefore it does not act, & beget a species of itself distinct from the species of the proper sensible. On the contrary. I distinguish the antecedent. It is passive with respect to real action I concede. With respect to intentional action I deny the antecedent. These things having been proposed. I Assert & say 1. The sensitive soul is the act of an organic body having sensitive life in potency. It is evident from the definition of soul as such posited according to Aristotle, & Scotus D 1. Q. 1. From these It is to be Collected 1. That sensitive life consists in the senses, of which some are internal, some external, & the latter are for the most part five namely. Sight, hearing, smell, taste, & touch. The reason is on account of the 5 organs, & 5 sensible objects found in sensitive animals. as will be evident q. next. As well as concerning the internal senses in their place. You will object: There is one sensitive power, namely the brain, which in diverse organs produces diverse acts: therefore there is one sense. The antecedent is proved: although the eye may exist, & the visible object, if however the optic nerve proceeding from the brain is injured, vision is impeded, because the visible species are unable to travel to the brain. I respond by denying the antecedent. For there are diverse organs distinct from the brain, but vision is only impeded on account of the animal spirits, which are unable to flow from the brain through the nerves to the organ of the eye. You will say: Taste is a certain touch: therefore it is not distinct. On the contrary. I distinguish the antecedent. It is a certain touch materially I concede. Formally I deny. For it has another object, namely flavor, which is a second quality distinct from the 4 primary ones, which are the object of touch. You will say: One sense is only of one contrariety; but the sense of touch is of many, namely of the 4 qualities: therefore it is manifold, & thus there are many senses. On the contrary. I say those 4 qualities agree in one formal tangible object, & in a certain unnamed genus, as all colors in being visible. Touch therefore is one by an intrinsic unity, but manifold from objects. You will say: Hunger, thirst, pain, pleasure &c. are sensed; but not through any of the aforesaid: therefore there are many senses. On the contrary. Those things, if they are taken for acts of the sensitive

appetite, are not sensed per se by an external sense: but if they are taken materially, thus they are perceived by the sense of touch; for hunger bespeaks a compression of the stomach, because the empty veins endeavor to attract nourishment from the stomach. But pain supposes an injury, or is a contraction, & dilation of parts caused by cold or heat. Finally sadness supposes a contraction of the heart, & pleasure a dilation. It is to be Collected 2. That there are given internal senses in the sensitive soul; for brutes remember those things, which they have seen, smelled, a dog knows the voice of its Master, mice flee a cat &c. But they are called internal; because those senses are neither moved, nor changed by external objects, & only exist within the brain, nor do they appear without. But these senses for the most part are found to be only three: namely the common sense, phantasy, & sensitive memory; for what belong to the common sense, do not belong to the phantasy; for the common sense is changed by the external senses; but the phantasy is not: since it also perceives absent things, as is evident in dreams, both because some easily perceive, but remember with difficulty. But the other internal powers, as the estimative, & cogitative, & others can be reduced to the phantasy; for this thinks, & estimates concerning objects both present, & absent, as is evident in dreams. For complete knowledge of these see Logic D. 2. Q. 7. In the note. You will object: Aristotle wants the phantasy, & sensitive memory to be passions of the common sense: therefore essentially there is only one internal sense. And therefore St. Augustine only acknowledges an imaginative power. On the contrary. Aristotle is to be understood that they are passions of the common sense not really, or formally, but only presuppositively. For the phantasy supposes the common sense. But Augustine acknowledges the phantasy, but does not exclude the others.

You will say: The common sense, phantasy, & sensitive memory have the same object: therefore they are only one sense. On the contrary. I deny the consequence. For this is so because they are subordinate powers, but whatever the inferior power attains, the superior also attains, & here something more.

It is to be Collected 3. That there is a sensitive appetite in the sensitive soul, because it is a sentient power, by which the animal pursues the good, & advantageous, but flees the evil, & unsuitable. But appetite is one innate, another elicited. Concerning these see book 1. Phys. D. 2. Q. 7. Concerning the appetite of prime matter. But for the most part the sensitive appetite is divided into concupiscible, & irascible. The first is borne to the delectable good, the second, to the arduous good, & the difficult to obtain, and so endeavors to repel evils contrary to the delectable good. These appetites are accompanied by the locomotive power of the sensitive soul not pure, but sensitive locomotive. As was said D. 1. Q. 1. This locomotive is twofold: organic, which resides in material organs, the other inorganic through which the separate spiritual soul transfers itself from place to place by its own choice.

I Assert & say 2. The sensible object is a real, singular, accidental, corporeal, or material being. It is deduced from Scotus q. 6. On the soul v. to the first in opposition. Asserting. It must be said, that the object of sense is only an accident of the third species of quality: whence 7. Of the Physics it is said, that those things, according to which alteration occurs, do not differ from sensibles; but it is certain through the Philosopher c. on quality, that alteration is in the species of quality. It is proved by explaining. It is called a real being: because the sensible object sends a species of itself into the sense; but, what is not real, cannot have a real species of itself. It is called singular. Because no nature exists, unless it may be singular. It is called: accidental. Because substance does not have a proper sensible species; otherwise someone could see the absence of the substance of bread in the Eucharist. It is called corporeal, & material because the object of the senses ought always to be extended, & material, because sense is something extended, & material, and because sensible accidents are always such.

From these It is to be Collected 1. That sense can be deceived 16 concerning its proper sensible, & sometimes concerning the common, insofar as this is specific, as motion, number &c. The reason is experience, because the sun in the morning appears red smaller than the earth, a staff in water broken, a tower to sailors to move, the neck of a dove variously colored; but these things are not so: therefore. Nor may you say: The object is not known by the senses, unless it may exist, but in honey no bitterness exists, or color in the neck of a dove: therefore sense cannot perceive those things, & thus neither err. On the contrary I distinguish the minor. No apparent I deny. No true I concede the minor. For on account of the diversity of the medium the sense does not apprehend those things, as they are in themselves, and so founds a difformity to them.

You will say: The aforesaid send such a species to the sense: therefore it cannot err, because it perceives the object, as it is represented by the species. On the contrary. I deny the consequence. For, if the sensation is considered in relation to the object represented by the species, it never properly errs at all. But the deception, & truth ought to be considered with respect to the object existing in itself; for from the fact that the thing is, or is not, speech is called true, or false; hence, since the sense does not apprehend the object, as it is, it is deceived.

You will say: Truly honey v. g. is made bitter by the bilious humor in the mouth of the sick: therefore the sense apprehends it, as it is. On the contrary. Even in this it is deceived, because it then thinks the bitterness to be intrinsic to the honey.

It is to be Collected 2. That sense also for the most part cannot be deceived, & err, if namely 4 conditions are present. The first is: that the organ may be rightly disposed, by defect of which sweet things seem bitter to the sick. The second: that there may be no obstacle in the medium, by defect of which a red face is seen through a red glass. The third: that between the object, & the sense there may be a suitable distance by defect of which a distant tower is seen as black from afar. The fourth: that the object of sense may be proportioned to the power, by defect of which atoms are not seen, & these things having been posited sense is not deceived concerning the sensible, as the axiom of the Philosopher wants.

It is to be Collected 3. That an excellent, & vehement sensible can injure the sense by both a real, & an intentional action. The reason for the first is: because fire besides intentionally impressing a species by a real action producing intense heat destroys the eye. The reason for the second is; because excellent whiteness, or the light of the sun injures the sight, since those frequently walking in snow afterwards do not see as well, as before: & the firer of bombards can become deaf through the vehemently impressed species of sound; the reason for which is, because sense for sensation requires a due temperament, which can be dissolved & corrupted by a great force of sensibles; which nevertheless does not take place in the intellect through the most perfect intelligible, because the intellect is spiritual, nor does it have a certain temperament, which could be dissolved.

It is to be Collected 4. That many sensibles can be perceived at once by the sense. The reason is experience: because sight can perceive many colors, hearing many sounds; better however it perceives one, than many; according to that: The sense intent on many things is less to each.

It is to be Collected 5. That a sensible placed above the sense does not cause sense in sight, hearing, & smell, but it does in taste, & touch. The reason is: because the former senses require a medium, so that they can effect their sensation, as will be evident immediately; hence a sensible placed above the eye impedes vision; with the ears & nostrils closed hearing, & smelling are impeded; but not so in taste, & touch: as experience proves.

I Assert & say 3. The medium of sense is nothing other than some space receptive of the sensible species; through which the object acts on the sensitive organ; which can change the sense in two ways: either according to real being, as fire heats touch through its real quality of heat, or according to intentional being diffusing the sensible species into the sense. It is deduced from Scotus q. 3. On the soul v. to the first principal concerning the sense of touch saying: The medium ought to be denuded from tangible qualities altogether (say the same

concerning other sensible qualities, of which it is the medium) or according to their excellences. Air, & water hold themselves thus; insofar as they are media.

It is to be Collected 1. That sight, hearing, & smell, never exercise sensation, except through a medium; but not taste, & touch. The reason for the first is: because a sensible placed above the sense does not cause sensation, as is evident above from collig. 3. The reason for the second is: because there is no touching, or tasting, unless the tangible is immediately touched by the touch, & honey does not seem to be able to be tasted, if a medium is interposed between the taste, & the honey.

Nor may you say: Aristotle posited 5 media for the 5 senses: therefore all exercise themselves through a medium. On the contrary. He is to be understood concerning internal media, or sensible species; but not concerning external ones, which ought to be interposed between the sensible object, & the external sense.

It is to be Collected 2. That air, & water can be a suitable medium for vision, hearing, & smelling: because color is seen, sound is heard, & odor, & stench are smelled in air, & equally in water, but less on account of its thickness; hence fishermen are not accustomed to utter words, while they fish; but cast foods, which the fish smell. Wherefore, if Aristotle were cited against water, he would be to be understood concerning the medium, & subject especially, principally, & more properly.

QUESTION III. Do intentional sensible species exist that are impressed upon the senses?

It should be noted first that sensible species are nothing other than objective representations or images and figures of things, which are qualities that stand in for objects and contribute to sensation. These species are called “impressed” because they are imprinted on the sense. The sensation that happens by their means is called the “expressed species,” because it formally expresses the sensible object, and through it the sense is said to be formally cognitive. There is no doubt that the expressed species exists, because the eye certainly could not see without vision. But there is doubt only about the intentional impressed species – “intentional” because it makes the power tend toward the object, and it has a diminished mode of being receding from the reality of the object, since it is more subtle than the thing by which it is produced, not because it has intentional being as a being of reason and not real being.

It should be noted second that some have wanted sensible species to be substantial corpuscles transmitted from objects to the sense, or transmitted atoms. But it is clear that this is false, because otherwise penetration would naturally follow, for many sensible species are received in the same eye and in the same air. Therefore, it should rather be said that species are intentional qualities and accidents, for such species are produced by accidental objects. Therefore, the species produced cannot be substances. Moreover, species are always of a different nature than objects, for species are of intentional being, but objects are of real being, although in representing they are of the same nature. With this noted,

I assert and say in response to the question: Impressed sensible species are given in the external and internal senses. This is from Scotus, who says: "Every impressed species represents that from which it is impressed under that aspect under which it is impressed by it; and if it is impressed by another, still it represents under the same aspect under which it would represent if it were impressed by the object; otherwise it would not be a true species of it." And: "The visible species in the eye and the intelligible species in the intellect is the image of the object which represents it as the reason for knowing, not as known, and immediately without discourse." And finally: "I say that the species in the sense, imagination, and intellect is not one and the same, but one and another."

This is proven: Because Aristotle teaches that we could not remember past things or have an act about them unless something were supplying the role of the object. But in the case of remembering past things, the object is not present. Therefore, species supplying its role must necessarily be admitted. Also because the eye sees itself in a mirror just as it sees other things positioned behind itself. But this is because the species of the eye and objects positioned behind are in the mirror. Therefore such species are given. Also because when dreaming, people have various species of people once known, which they then cognize as if they were present. But this could not be the case unless sensible species are given in the internal sense. Therefore.

You may object: Contraries in the highest degree cannot naturally exist at the same time in the same subject. But if sensible species of white and black were given, for example, they would be contraries in the highest degree. Therefore they cannot exist at the same time in the eye.

I respond by denying the minor premise. For they are not contraries, since they are of a different nature than the objects of which they are only virtual likenesses. Hence they do not have real being, properly speaking, and so neither do they have a contrary, properly speaking.

You may say: In the presence of the principal agent, the vicarious species is useless; but the sensible object itself is the principal agent. Therefore...The minor premise is clear regarding sight, which sees if it has the object present at a proper distance.

On the contrary, I distinguish the major premise: If the principal agent can cause the effect which the vicarious species can, I concede; if it cannot, I deny the major. Therefore, although notions arise from the power and the object, it does not follow through this that the species is excluded. For it only follows that the power and the object are required as causes, but not as the reasons for acting, which are the impressed species. Therefore the object is only present at a certain distance locally and physically, but not intentionally and vitally, except through impressed species. For the real entity of the object, e.g. of a tower, cannot exist in our eye; therefore only its species and figure can.

You may say: Nothing can be the reason for knowing and seeing something else which is not first seen in itself. But impressed species are not seen by the eye. Therefore, neither are they reasons for acting.

On the contrary, I distinguish the major premise: If the reason for seeing is a known medium, as creatures through which God is known, I concede; if it is a medium for knowing, I deny the major premise, as is clear in a mirror, where it is not necessary to know the mirror before the objects represented in it are seen.

You may say: Aristotle, cited above, rebukes philosophers affirming that sensible species are received in the sense so that sensations may be produced. Therefore...

On the contrary: He does not rebuke them for admitting sensible species, but because they taught that the power is entirely passive and does nothing for the production of sensation.

QUESTION IV. Do sensible species concur effectively in sensation?

It should be noted first: Impressed species are sometimes effectively produced by an object, sometimes by another species, but never by a power, because the object is a sufficient cause so that, duly applied, it may produce the impressed species. Similarly, we have the experience that the species of one object, e.g. of a man, impressed in a mirror, produces in another mirror positioned opposite it another similar species. But a power, because it is merely passive with respect to a species, although active with respect to sensation, cannot cause it.

It should be noted second: The species of the Internal senses do not depend on objects in being conserved in such a way that they cannot remain without them. For we remember past things which are absent and a sound remains for a while in hearing. But the species of the external senses depend on objects in being conserved; for without a sweet object there is no species of sweetness in taste, for these species are immediately corrupted when the object is corrupted, e.g. the species of white is taken away when white is taken away. But the former species are corrupted in another way, namely like a habit, either through contrary acts virtually, or with respect to variation of the subject, whether entitatively or dispositively, but they are never corrupted from the mere cessation of acts. Therefore, these species could be destroyed by the variation of the subject. For this reason it happens that some object is thought of again for a longer time, another for a shorter time, on account of the proportioned or disproportioned disposition and tenacity of the subject, which indisposition can be supplied by the frequent repetition of acts. You will hear more about habits in the following Distinction. In the meantime, with this noted:

Proposition 1: External sensation of an absent object cannot happen naturally. There are two reasons for this: 1) Because the difference between the intellect and the sense is that the object of the former is singular existing in itself, but of the latter is universal and abstracted from actual existence. Therefore... 2) Because the sensible species naturally vanishes from the external sense when the object is not present, as is clear regarding the eye with respect to an absent wall that was seen before. Therefore...

And do not say: External sensation is accompanied by a certain quality, as is clear when we go from the light of the sun to the shade, where a certain light is left behind which seems to be discerned in the eye. Therefore...

On the contrary: This only happens from an injury to the sense, for it suffers from a vehement sensible, as is certain when we gaze at the sun with fixed eyes. For then certain changes and alterations of the organ happen, by reason of which certain visions are thought to exist, but nevertheless are not.

You may say: When the projector is absent, the impulse remains in the thing projected. Therefore, the visible species can also remain in external sensation when the object is absent.

On the contrary, there is a disparity: because that impulse depends on the projector only in becoming and not in being conserved. But the visible species depends on the object in becoming and in being conserved.

Proposition 2: External sensation could happen supernaturally through an impressed species in the absence of the sensible object. The reason is: because God can effect whatever secondary causes can, where there is no contradiction, and he can supply their causality. Therefore, he could also supply the causality of a present object, for since God produces intelligible species in the minds of angels according to some, why could he not also produce sensible species in us? For no contradiction appears.

And do not say: No power can go outside the latitude of its object; but the object of sense is a singular, existing and present thing. Therefore, not even through God can there be external sensation in the absence of the object.

On the contrary, I distinguish the minor premise: it is singular absolutely, I concede; it itself is always present, I deny the minor premise. For through God's power an impressed species of it would suffice, and so through God we could taste honey without honey in itself, but in another eminently containing it, namely an impressed species.

If some authors were cited against this, they should be understood to be speaking about ordinary power.

You may say: External sensation is intuitive. But this regards a present object, so that it may differ from abstractive cognition. Therefore...

On the contrary: That sensation would still be intuitive — not indeed immediate, but mediate, namely in another eminently containing the object, namely an impressed species made by God, just as creatures are seen intuitively in God.

Nor does it follow that sense can have abstractive cognition, for this, properly taken, is repugnant even through God, because it implies that the external sense is borne outside its adequate object. But if it tended toward something absent, this would happen, and so sight could also be borne to something not produced, which is outside the object of sight, which is only colored light — not something unproduced and absent. Therefore, at most, the external sense abstracts terminatively, not effectively, when it sometimes sees one quality in an object and not another.

Proposition 3: The impressed sensible and intelligible species is not a formal but a virtual and objective likeness of objects. The reason is: because a formal likeness formally expresses the object, but the impressed species does not express it, but is only the reason by which it is expressed by sensation itself. Therefore.

And do not say: Sensible species are formally similar to objects. Therefore, they are formal likenesses.

On the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: representatively, effectively, and intentionally formally, I concede; physically and really formally, as two white things, I deny the antecedent.

You may say: In the air, various species of colors appear, as also on a wall through reflection, as when a red veil is hung at a window with the sun shining — the whole house becomes reddened. Therefore, sensible species are a formal likeness of the object.

On the contrary, I deny the consequence. For this does not happen because the species are discerned by us, but because the air is diffused with mixed species, just as through green glass all things appear green. With this posited:

I assert and say in response to the question: Sensible species concur effectively with the power to cause sensation, which is the expressed species and formal likeness of the object. This is from Scotus, who says: "The intellect of an angel as a more principal cause can cause, that is, through the sensible, that notion." But the intellect, as the other partial cause, effectively causes the notion; therefore, so does the corporeal or sensible species. And it is from Scotus in all the places where he wants the object to concur in the genus of efficient cause with the power to cause the notion, for the species plays the role of the object.

This is proven: 1) Because the impressed sensible species determines the power, which is of itself indifferent and insufficient for sensing, to first act by adding some new activity to the power. But this is to concur effectively, because without that added activity the power only has incomplete activity. 2) Because the notion is generated from the power and the object; therefore, if the power concurs effectively, so does its object and species, since that is a cause without which the effect cannot be had and to which the effect is also assimilated, for sensation as expressed species is similar to the object and its impressed species.

You may object: Sensible species are indivisible; therefore, they cannot concur effectively in divisible and material sensation.

I respond by denying the antecedent. For sensible species are produced divisibly, just as they represent the object divisibly, which is divisible. Moreover, a species can represent an object in a more perfect or imperfect way, or one part more perfectly than another, because a remote part is not seen as perfectly as one that is near, which is a sign of divisibility in the species. And just as extension in an object argues for extension in the species, so also intension in an object argues for intension in the species, because it is similar to the object.

You may say: Light and heat are produced indivisibly by fire and the sun, but those are sensible species. Therefore...

On the contrary, I deny the major premise. For one part of light radiates from one part of the sun, as is clear when the sun is eclipsed. But since such species are always intentional, they emanate suddenly from objects and not discretely or successively, but as it were imperceptibly, such that one part is not said to be made by another, but the whole species by the whole object. Therefore, it can also be said to be produced indivisibly, or rather in an instant.

You may say: If the species concurred effectively, it would be because it determines the power, as was said in the proof. But this reason does not make it concur effectively. Therefore... The minor premise is proven: The intellect can determine the will, although it does not effectively produce the act of the will with the will. Therefore, the eye could also be determined by the species, although it does not act efficiently.

On the contrary, there is a disparity: Because the will is complete in power for eliciting an act, e.g. of love, and is not completed by the intellect. Hence no action is exchanged by it. But both the sensitive and the intellective power are always incomplete, because without the species of the object they do not contain the object in the aspect of being perceptible.

With this posited, I assert and say:

Sight is the sensitive power perceptive of colored light. The organ of sight is the pupil of the eye, or the crystalline humor situated in the middle of the eye. This is from Scotus, who says: "The organs of the visual power are the two eyes; the organs of the auditory power are the two ears; the organs of the olfactory power are the nostrils; the organs of the tactile power are the hands; the organ of taste is the tongue." But that in the assertion it is added "the pupil of the eye or the crystalline humor" is deduced from Scotus, who puts the phantasm, which is something more perfect than the phantastic species, in the humor or animal spirit, by which the species and phantasms are easily disturbed by reason of the mobile and inconstant subject. And therefore, he universally holds that the sensible species is in some part of the body proportioned to the action of the object, e.g. for the eyes, in the pupil of the eye, which is diaphanous like a medium; for the ears, in a certain airy substance included in them; for the nostrils, in the mamillary cartilages, etc. But that sensation is in the whole organ, that is, he wants the species to be subjected in some particular part of the organ, as in some humor or spirit, but sensation in the whole organ or in the solid body, which Scotus there calls the "mixture."

This is proven: The pupil is, as it were, a gem placed in the center of the eye, bright and transparent in the manner of a mirror, having behind it an opaque body, so that reflection of the species may occur. Therefore, this part is the most apt organ of sight, for no other more apt part is found in the eye, which is constituted out of S. tunics, three humors, 7. Muscles, and two nerves led curvedly from the brain.

And do not say: The visual power is one; but the pupils of the eye are two; therefore, these are not the organ of sight, but rather that conjunction of the two optic nerves, one of which goes from the right part of the brain to the left eye, and vice versa, and they are united in the middle.

On the contrary: The visual power is indeed one, but distributed into two eyes like a tree into branches. But provident nature made this so that from any part it may be able to see objects, and, if one is injured, the other may remain. But those nerves and other things of this sort are indeed necessary for seeing as dispositions and conditions, but not as the formal reason for seeing.

You may say: What does not have life does not elicit vital vision; but that crystalline humor of the pupil does not have life, since it is a fluid part. Therefore...

On the contrary, I deny the minor premise. For that humor is not properly fluid, going here and there, but is solid, always remaining in one place.

The adequate object of sight is not light alone or color alone, but some third unnamed thing common to those, and it will be able to be called a visible natural body, or colored light. This is from Scotus, who says: "The object of sight is not the visible as visible, that is, relative to sight, but color or something absolute." And: "Magnitude and figure do not include the first formal motive reason of sight, without which there is no seeing, as do color and light." And finally, responding more clearly: "They say, how is light visible per se, since the colored is the first object of sight, and light is not seen through the nature of color? Therefore, sight will not be one sense. I say that each is visible per se, and yet sight is one power, because the more perfect a power is, the more it can [perceive] than a more imperfect one...But the sense of sight shows us more differences of things (Metaph. I c. 1). And things known per se differ more than contraries in the physical genus, which alone are cognized by the other sensitive powers. Therefore, I say that neither of those is the first adequate object, but it is something indifferent to this and that, and it is unnamed. Just as is clear concerning touch, for it senses two contrarieties, neither of which is reducible to the other, and yet it does not exceed the genus of touch; nor is it several senses formally. Similarly, the common sense is one, and yet it senses whatever is sensible per se, and its adequate object will be one thing common, abstracted from all particular sensibles, yet not a complete universal. Or it can be said in another way, that when there are two objects of one power in a certain analogy, then one of those will be the first object, and in virtue of that first one all the others will be cognized – yet it is not necessary that they be contained under it. And then it can be said that light has the first aspect of visible object, not because it is the formally adequate object,

but because in virtue of it all things which are not such are seen formally. For light can be without color, but color cannot be without light, for it depends in visibility on light, because in order to sense or see color, it is necessary for light to co-act, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, if it falls in the composition of color.”

I have adduced this rather long text because it can be of service to all the other senses concerning their diverse sensibles.

This is proven: Neither light nor color contain all things which fall under the sense of sight; therefore, they cannot be its adequate object. The antecedent is proven: A species is visible, and yet it is neither light nor color; indeed, heavenly bodies are not colored, and yet they are seen; color is visible, yet it is not light; light is visible, yet it is not color. Therefore, there will be some third thing containing each.

And do not say: Aristotle establishes color as the object for sight, sound for hearing. Therefore, color alone is its adequate object.

I respond that Aristotle should be understood to be speaking of the partial object, not the total object, for in the same place he also says that light pertains to the visual power.

You may say: Scotus says that color contains light in itself, since it is in a terminated body; therefore, color is a sufficient object of sight.

On the contrary, it should be understood to contain it in itself only as a partial cause, for that containment of color is not virtual, potential, or formal, as is required for the adequate object of a power – about which Scotus is not speaking there – but is a containment of concomitance of a partial cause.

QUESTION VI. What are the organs and objects of hearing, smell, taste, and touch?

I assert and say firstly: Hearing is the power to perceive sound, whose organ is a certain substance similar to air enclosed in the eardrum, and its object is sound. This is from Scotus

in Book 1, Distinction 3, Question 3, where he argues against the view that if the formal nature of the object of a power were its relation to that power, then the primary object of sight would be visible in the first way per se, since visibility would be the formal nature of the object. It would then be easy to assign primary objects, since the primary object of any power would be correlative to that power, like visible for sight and audible for hearing. But the Philosopher did not assign primary objects of the powers in this way, but as certain absolutes, like color for sight, sound for hearing, etc. The rest is deduced from Scotus in the previously cited question.

It is proven: In the structure of the ears, various passages are found in which the species of sound are refracted and impeded from striking the organ directly and harming it. Besides those externally apparent parts of the ears, there is found at the beginning a certain membrane called the myrinx or eardrum. Within the cavity of this eardrum is enclosed a certain thin substance called the innate air, because it is similar to air and is animate. This myrinx is sustained by three ossicles, and to it descend two nerves from the brain, through which the species are conveyed to the internal sense. But nothing is more apt to be assigned as the receptacle of accidental species than that aerial substance. The minor premise is proven: Sound is described as a sensible quality resulting through the ear from the violent collision of certain bodies suitable for this. But such a quality is most aptly received in that aerial substance. And from this it is clear that sound is the object of hearing.

Nor should you say: A common sensible cannot be the object of a particular sense like hearing. But sound is a common sensible. The minor premise is clear, because Aristotle holds that sound is motion, which is a common sensible. To the contrary, I deny the minor premise. Aristotle only means that sound is motion causally, not formally. For sound is caused from the motion of two colliding bodies.

You will say: Sound cannot diffuse its species through a medium to reach the organ of the ear. The antecedent is proven: It cannot be diffused successively, since sound requires being produced all at once and has no contrary. Nor can it be diffused instantaneously, since in thunder the lightning is seen before the sound resulting from the collision. Therefore. To the contrary, I deny the antecedent. To the proof I say that sound successively emits its own proper species, just as it successively occurs, and this up to a certain distance of space in which it is perceived simultaneously by all existing there. Nevertheless, the species of sound are of such a nature that in being conserved they do not depend on the causing object to such an extent that they do not remain a little while and are conserved by God, and that they are productive of other species in a further part of space, and then cease, again producing other species up to the end of the sphere of activity. This is clear from the fact

that when the wind blows, sound is perceived more clearly and remotely towards the part into which the wind propels it, because the air having species productive of others is impelled more there. This is not so with visible species, for they are produced without local motion immediately by the object and in the same time through the whole sphere of activity. This is the reason why in thunder the lightning is seen before the sound is heard.

Here it should be observed that an echo is a reflected sound encountering a cavernous body which returns to the one who produced it. The explanation is the similarity to a ball thrown at a wall which bounces back. It should also be known that in an animal for producing voice or sound there are two passages proceeding to the internal parts. One is straight, through which food is sent into the stomach, and is called the esophagus. The other is oblique, winding, and circular, through which breathing occurs, and is very narrow. Hence, if any food enters into it, one coughs until it exits. And if rheum descends from the brain and enters this passage, the animal dies of apoplexy. Through this passage one goes to the lungs, which are like the bellows of the heart, drawing in cold air and emitting hot air. Therefore, if by some force air is extracted through this, which is commonly called the rough artery, voice is formed with the aid of the other instruments, like the throat, palate, tongue, teeth, lips, etc.

I assert and say secondly: Smell is the sensitive power perceptive of odor, whose organs are the mammillary caruncles, and whose adequate object is odor. This is deduced from Scotus cited above. It is proven: In the structure of the nostrils, besides the external parts, nerves are found proceeding from the brain to the extremities of the nostrils, and below the brain the mammillary caruncles. But nothing is more apt for receiving odors than those caruncles. The minor premise is proven: Because the organ of olfaction ought to be dry. Hence, those who suffer from phlegm smell with difficulty. But the brain is moist. Likewise, for olfaction respiration is required, which would not be necessary if the sensorium of smell consisted in the nerves. Indeed, those nerves extend all the way to the extremities of the nostrils, in which however we do not smell. Therefore, the sensorium of smell is those mammillary caruncles, which are spongy and porous and therefore most apt for receiving odors, which are defined as sensible qualities inhering in mixed bodies arising from a certain temperament of the primary qualities with dry predominating over moist on account of heat. For on this account in the summer time, because dryness thrives, odors are especially exhaled. But if an odor is produced in moist places, it will rather be a stench. From these things it is clear that odors are the object of the sense of smell.

Nor should you say: Aristotle holds that odor is a vapor. But vapor is a vaporous substance, whence the odor of an apple is diminished by the attraction of the hands. Therefore, it is not

a quality but a smoky substance, otherwise as an accident it would pass from subject to subject. To the contrary, Aristotle means that odor is a vapor causally and subjectively, not formally. For odor is not separated from the apple, but evaporates through the finer substantial smoky parts in which the odor is conveyed. Nevertheless, odor is sometimes only intentionally sensed through species, as flowers at a great distance, because there many species and exhalations remain in the air which do not exactly depend in coming to be and being conserved on the odor first evaporated, as is clear concerning the species of sound. But sometimes it is really sensed through real qualities, as is clear in burnt incense or perfumed water mixed with pure water. And so also fragrant hands touching retain the fragrance, because some vapors remain in their pores.

I assert and say thirdly: Taste is the sensitive power of flavor, whose organ is the two nerves running through the tongue and palate, and its object is flavor. This is deduced from Scotus cited above. It is proven: In the structure of the mouth, besides the bone, flesh of the tongue, and palate, two nerves are found running through the tongue and palate. But these are most apt for receiving flavor. The minor premise is proven: Because the flesh of the tongue is only the medium of receiving flavor. For although the flesh of the tongue remains, if the nerves are destroyed, we will not taste. And although experience teaches that tasting occurs in the tongue, and more principally in the tip than the root of the tongue, nevertheless it occurs not only in the tongue but also in the palate, as is clear in those whose tongue has been cut out, who nevertheless optimally distinguish sweet from bitter. Therefore, those nerves are more apt for perceiving flavors, which are defined as qualities from the mix of the primary qualities and the commingling of dry terrestrial with moist, with heat cooking it. From this it is clear that flavors are the object of taste.

Nor should you say: Taste attains to water. But this is tasteless, because it is elementary. Therefore, the object of taste is not only flavor. To the contrary: Pure water is not tasted, but only touched. Hence it is always mixed which taste perceives. You will say: At least ashes are bitter. But in them there is no moisture. Therefore, flavor is not from moist and dry. To the contrary, I say that ashes are rather tasteless, and if there is anything bitter in them, it comes from the matter of the burnt wood. Indeed so much moisture is usually mixed in flavors, but not in all, as is clear in gingers, cinnamons, etc.

I assert and say fourthly: Touch is the sensitive power perceptive of tangible qualities, like heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, etc. Its organs are the nerves diffused and extended through the whole body, and its object is all tangible qualities. This is deduced from Scotus cited above. It is proven: In the structure of touching, which is diffused through the whole body, a certain nerve proceeds from the brain through the whole body compacted in the

manner of a rope, and is divided into various branches, as is seen in the leaves of trees. Through these nerves animal spirits are led from the brain to vivify the parts of the body. But this nerve is covered and clothed with flesh and skin as an external medium, through which the object or its species reach touch. But nothing is more apt for the sensorium of touch of tangible qualities than such nerves. The minor premise is proven: The organ of the sense of touch ought to be continuous with the organ of the common sense and with the brain, because the common sense ought to receive the species of the external senses. But neither the skin nor the flesh is continuous with the brain; the nerve extended through the whole body is, however. Therefore, this is the organ of tangible qualities, especially of those primary ones which are defined in Part 2 concerning the elements. From these things it is clear that they are the object of touch.

Nor should you say: Aristotle posits the sensorium of touch to be the flesh. For if the flesh is pricked, it senses pain. Therefore. To the contrary, Aristotle is speaking according to another's opinion. For he rather posits the heart as the organ of touch, thinking that the nerves originate from the heart, whereas anatomists show them to proceed from the brain, to whom assent should be given. You will say: If the primary qualities were the object of touch, even the natural heat in the hand could be sensed by the hand. But this is contrary to experience. The major premise is clear, because that heat is per se sensible and approximated to the organ of touch. To the contrary, I deny the major premise by parity. For even the tongue does not sense its own flavor through taste. Hence I distinguish the proof: It is approximated in real being, I concede; in sensible being, I deny. For this requires a distinction of subjects, because sensation occurs through species which are by nature produced in a passing way. And although bones are contiguous to flesh, their hardness is nevertheless not sensed—obviously on account of habit. For the sensation of that hardness cannot be interrupted.

QUESTION VII. What are the organs of the internal sensitive powers, and the appetitive and motive powers?

It should be noted firstly that there is a controversy between philosophers and physicians concerning the location of the organ of the interior sense, or common sense. For Aristotle in the book *On Sleep and Waking* and in *On Youth*, chapter 2, and elsewhere, places it in the heart. But Galen in the book *On the Causes of Symptoms*, chapter 8, and in the book *On the Use of the Pulses*, locates it in the brain. Scotus, attempting to reconcile these opinions, attributes the remote principle of sensing to the heart, where the workshop of innate heat is and the vital spirits are produced, but he ascribes the proximate and proper organ of the common sense to the brain. In Question 10 on the soul he says: "For the organ of the

common sense is related to the others as the center to lines proceeding from it to the circumference or terminated at it, as if the common root of the particular organs. And the power of the common sense existing in it is like a king sitting on his throne judging the acts of the particular senses terminated at it representing their proper objects to it. But where is that organ situated? Concerning this there is a controversy between physicians and philosophers. For the physicians say that it is in the head. Their reason is that the common sense receives its change from the particular senses, and so its organ ought to be situated near the organs of the particular senses. But the organs of all the particular senses are in the head. Furthermore, it has been ascertained by experience that through a lesion of the common sense, fantasy is injured, which would not be necessary unless it were near the organ of fantasy, which is in the first cavity of the brain according to Avicenna. The Philosopher holds the opposite of this in the book *On Sleep and Waking*, saying that the first sensitive part is in the heart, etc. I reply: It can be said that the common sense has its origin from one thing and its completion from another, because the organ of the common sense has its origin from the heart, just as all the organs of the particular senses do. It should be imagined, therefore, that certain veins or nerves proceed from the heart to the brain, in which the organs of all the senses are originally contained. But in the brain they make a cone, and from the brain nerves proceed to the external organs making a base. And so the organ of the common sense has its origin from the heart, but in the brain it has its completion. This is also clear from the fact that people get a headache from excellent study, in which the interior sensitive powers labor greatly, but they do not so feel pain of the heart." It should be noted secondly what and how many the aforementioned powers are, and what their objects are. This is easily gathered from the present distinction, question 1, assertion 1. Nevertheless, concerning the appetitive power it should be observed that the sensitive appetite naturally appetizes, just as sense naturally senses. Therefore, according to Damascene in Book 2, chapter 29, brute animals in their actions do not act but are acted upon. Moreover, there are as many particular appetites as there are senses. For in distinct senses distinct apprehensions are had; therefore also diverse appetites, because according to Scotus everything intelligible is appetible. And just as a thing has its proper entity, so also its proper inclination to itself. And so according to the multiplication of the senses the appetites are applied. Hence in the rational soul there is only one appetite, because there is only one intellect. Similarly, concerning the motive power, it should be observed from Scotus in Book 4, Distinction 10, Question 7, where he teaches that one is organic and the other non-organic. The non-organic is that which moves the whole body at once in a non-ordered way through the parts, in the way in which the motion of an animal body occurs in progressive motion, and is of a different nature from this power or progressive virtue, because that has an action of moving the whole body immediately, not part after part. But this cannot move the whole unless it moves the parts in an ordered way, and part after part, as we see in our progressive power, which moves certain parts first, and through them others, and then the whole body. They are therefore of a different nature, as is clear from their properties and actions, which are of a different nature. With these things noted, I

assert and say firstly: The internal powers, or internal senses, reside in the brain as in their organs, not in the heart. This is from Scotus cited above in note 1, Question 10 on the soul. Likewise in Book 1, Distinction 3, Question 4, where he says: "The imaginative power conserving sensible things apprehends them according to the diversity of the flow of the humors of the head as things of which they are likenesses." It is proven: First, because where the sensory nerves originate, there the internal senses ought to have their seat. But they originate from the brain and not from the heart, as is clear from note 1 and from anatomists. Therefore. Secondly, because if the heart of an animal is suddenly extracted from its other members, we still find that some sensation occurs in the head of the animal. Therefore. Thirdly, because with a lesion of the head and brain the internal senses are injured, and those who indulge in excessive study feel pain not in the heart but in the head. Therefore. Hence anatomists divide the brain into two halves, of which one is to the right side and the other to the left, and they divide it again into an anterior part of the head, which is called the sinciput, and into a posterior part, which is called the occiput. In the anterior part of each half there are two sinuses and cavities; in the posterior part there is one other. In the first sinus resides the common sense, which perceives all the objects of the external senses and discerns them. In the second remains fantasy, or imagination, which perceives and discerns not only present things but also absent ones. And in the third is the sensitive memory, which conserves the individual species of all the objects which are transmitted from the external senses through the common sense and fantasy to the memory residing in the occiput.

You will object: The heart is called the principle of life, since the vital and animal spirits are in it. Therefore it is also the principle of sensation. Therefore also the seat of the internal senses. I respond: The heart is indeed the principle of the vital spirits, but not of the animal spirits, which are for sensing. Anatomists show that these proceed from the brain. You will say: What is the principle of sensation ought to be a part continuous with the other members. But the brain is a discontinuous part, since it is in the head as in a vessel. Therefore. To the contrary, I deny the minor premise. For the parts of the brain are made continuous with the nerves and the other members by which sensation is effected. Indeed it is also diffused through the whole spine. Hence what some say is false, that the brain does not sense and feel pain when it is wounded. For although it does not sense so vehemently on account of its soft temperament, it nevertheless truly senses, and when a large wound is received in it the animal is affected with immense pain.

I assert and say secondly: The concupiscible and irascible appetites reside in the brain, not in the heart. This is deduced from Scotus cited in note 1. It is proven: The senses reside in the brain. Therefore also their appetites. For sense and appetite are not really distinct, and so they inseparably occupy one place. Nevertheless, these appetites have a great connection

and influence to the heart. For the pain of the concupiscible appetite is with a compression of the heart, and the delight of the concupiscible appetite is with a dilation. Likewise the pain of the irascible appetite is with a heating, because anger is an kindling of the blood around the heart.

You will object: The passions of the appetite—joy, love, hatred, etc.—are attributed to the heart. Therefore the sensitive appetite resides in the heart. I respond: Although those passions are attributed to the heart, nevertheless the rest, which belong to the other parts, are not. Wherefore the heart indeed rejoices with its own appetite, but not with such an appetite as is adapted to sense. Hence, in order for the heart to exercise its appetite, it ought to be irrigated with animal spirits flowing from the brain.

Here note: The sensitive appetite is subject to the will politically, not despotically. The reason is that the sensitive appetite for the most part obeys the will, although sometimes it also rebels against it, and so strongly that it even draws the will after itself, as the Apostle confesses in Romans 7: “I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind.” Hence, since political subjection is that by which someone so obeys the one commanding that he can nevertheless simply resist, as republics are subject to a prince, but despotic subjection is that by which someone is so subject that he cannot resist the one commanding, as slaves and servants to masters, therefore the sensitive appetite is only politically subject to the will.

I assert and say thirdly: The non-organic motive power has no proper seat. It is called non-organic for this reason, and resides in the rational soul. But the organic motive power resides principally in the muscles. This is deduced from Scotus cited in note 2. It is proven: For producing the motion of an animal, two things are necessary on the part of the organ, namely that it be endowed with sense and deliver impulse. Softness is conducive to the first; firmness and consistency to the second. Hence provident nature has conjoined both, namely ligament, which is somewhat harder, with softer matter that is very sensitive. And both—that is, the ligament and the nerve—it has cut into minute parts, as it were, and entwined with flesh and veins, which heaping together is called a muscle. This requires being fostered by a perennial influx of animal spirits. A sign of this is that those who are driven around in a circle for a long time suddenly collapse, obviously because the animal spirits accustomed to being led through a straight nerve, wandering from the beginnings of the nerves by that circular bending, turn elsewhere and desert the muscles.

Here note: The motive power indeed effects motion per se as a total cause. Nevertheless, the elicitive power also proximately concurs to this, but remotely the appetitive power as

commanding and the cognitive power as directing. For progressive motion occurs for the sake of embracing a good object and fleeing from a bad one. And the motive power of itself is indifferent to any motion. And when it moves itself, it does not move rashly, but from a certain end. Therefore it needs a determining and directing cause, as are the appetite and the cognitive power.

QUESTION VIII. Are there insensate species in the internal senses?

It should be noted first, that three kinds of species are usually distinguished at present; namely, sensate, composite, and insensate. Sensate species are those that represent a thing in the same way as it was in the external sense, such as the internal species of a wall. Composite species are when one thing is made from simple things, such as when we imagine a golden mountain, the species of such a composite are not in the external sense, but only the species of its parts. Insensate species are said to be those which represent a thing known to the external senses under one aspect, but unknown under another, such as when a sheep apprehends a wolf as an enemy, the species represents the color, figure, and other such qualities known to the external senses of the sheep; but it represents the enmity unknown to the sheep, and so the species representing the enmity is called insensate, that is, not sensed by the external sense, although it is known with its object by the internal sense.

It should be noted secondly, that Scotus does not categorically declare himself on this matter, whether there are insensate species, but he seems to lean more towards the negative view. For in Book 4, Distinction 45, Question 3, § “Moreover it is not necessary”, he declares how an ant, whether recently born or ten years old, gathers grain at one time and not at another, although it has never known the time of winter and summer. Likewise, how birds, whether in their first year of life or at any age, build nests in certain gathered twigs, which they have never before perceived by sense; for he saves this by the natural complexion of brutes, to which that species perceived by the external sense is thus and thus delightful, saying: “But why an ant gathers at one time and not at another, it is necessary to give a reason on the part of its complexion; why it is delightful to it to gather grains thus and thus, and not thus, whether this is attributed to natural industry or to other causes.” And a little later, concerning the nesting of birds and the feeding of chicks, he adds: “Because it is delightful to brutes in this way, from wherever it may be, at least the cause must be convincing intrinsically from the complexion now disposed or altered in such a way to gather such and such twigs to make a nest, or to compose it thus; and that is not otherwise delightful when the complexion is otherwise disposed: and from this delight, not however

from apprehension of the past, as past, they operate.” Since Scotus therefore thinks that in these things brutes operate not from apprehension of the past (the same would have to be said about apprehension of some insensate species), but from the delightfulness of the complexion being disposed or not disposed in such a way with the species perceived by the external sense, he seems rather to construct by those words of complexion or of natural industry a natural instinct than some insensate species beyond that sensible by the external sense, as will be more evident from the texts to be adduced in the assertion. These things having been noted, therefore,

I assert and say to the question: There are no insensate species.

This is deduced from Scotus in Book 4, Distinction 12, Question 3, § “And if you ask”, saying: “If with the proper sensible the common sensible causes its own species (otherwise how would it be properly sensed?), nevertheless it cannot cause this without the proper sensible accompanying it: not indeed as if this were prior to the sensible quality primarily, and thus according to itself possible to be separated from it; but not prior in acting on the sense, and thus insofar as it is of this kind it is not separable from the proper sensible.” He therefore means that without the proper sensible or without the sensible species another insensate species is not formed. Likewise, Distinction 45, Question 3, “next to this”, saying: “The sensitive [power] does not perceive primarily except some sensible quality (whence in Book 2 of *On the Soul*, the Philosopher, in order to concede that vision is in some way perceived by sight, says that it is in some way colored), but it does not receive a proper species except of some such quality.” Therefore, not some insensate species, which is not a quality primarily and properly sensible. And it is against the moderns.

It is proved first: If such insensate species were to be posited, it would be on account of experience, by which, for example, a sheep flees a wolf, a bird returns to its nest; but not for that reason: therefore. The minor is proved: although a sheep sees a wolf, nevertheless it does not perceive its enmity. Therefore. The antecedent is proved: either it would perceive the enmity by means of the sensible species of that wolf, or by another species, or without a species? But not the first: because that species is the same in a sheep as in another wolf, which nevertheless does not flee. Nor the second: because that species would not have a cause of itself, but would have to be infused into the brute by God, which is absurd. Nor the third: because for every sensitive cognition the concurrence of the object is required by means of a species; indeed, otherwise by that very fact it would not perceive through an insensate species.

It is proved secondly: Both because a material phantasm of a wolf can concur with the intellect to impress an immaterial intelligible species of the wolf itself on the intellect: therefore also the external vision of a wolf can concur to impress a species of lupine enmity on the imagination of animals, and consequently another insensate species is not required. And because that aspect of enmity, as a certain mode founded in the sensate species, is represented in the way in which common sensibles are represented through the species of a proper sensible modified: therefore without a particular insensate species. A sheep, therefore, through the sensate species itself, knows a wolf as an enemy, or as contrary to itself, just as an inexperienced bird also flees rain through the species of wind. And because enmity conceived in a purely abstract way can neither be represented through any sensible species, whether sensate or insensate, since in such a way it is rather an immaterial object: therefore recourse should not be had to an insensate sensible species. And because beings should not be multiplied without necessity; but animals can act by some natural instinct alone, by seeking what is suitable and fleeing what is unsuitable: therefore.

You will object: The internal sense cognizes things not cognized by the external sense: therefore it must have insensate species. The antecedent is proved: It cognizes the delightful good, as a dog upon seeing bread; but the delightful good is not cognized by the external sense: therefore. The major is proved: If it did not cognize the delightful good as such, its appetite would no more be borne towards bread than towards a stone, contrary to experience: therefore.

I respond: I deny the consequence. For a dog is only borne towards bread as a delightful good from a natural instinct implanted in it by the author of nature, and thus also a sheep flees a wolf for this reason, or on account of the external accidents of the wolf contrary to it.

You will say: The internal sensate species of a wolf is the same in a sheep and in another wolf, and yet it is apprehended by the wolf as a friend and by the sheep as an enemy; therefore by one species and another; because the same species cannot represent contraries.

On the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: the species is the same with the same natural instinct, I deny; with a diverse natural instinct, I concede the antecedent. The sensate species, therefore, does not represent contraries, namely friendship and enmity; but the natural instinct is borne towards or shuns what is suitable or unsuitable; from which the aspect of friendship or enmity is then derived.

You will say: Either that instinct is conjoined with some internal cognition, or not? If not: therefore an animal would be no more borne towards its operation than a stone, which, when it is above, falls down: if it is conjoined: therefore there is a cognition there of an insensate thing, namely of good or evil, or of what is suitable or unsuitable to a thing: therefore.

On the contrary, I say that it is conjoined with an internal cognition conserving the thing perceived by the external sense as contrary or suitable, derived from external accidents, to which the instinct of nature is added and impels to embrace or flee.

You will say: Therefore all the internal senses would be superfluous, since they would cognize nothing else than what the external senses do.

On the contrary, I deny what is inferred. For they are necessary in another way, namely the common sense, so that it may discern between external sensations; the imagination, so that it may also perceive absent things; the sensitive memory, so that it may conserve species for a longer time.

You will say: Animals, in diseases they have never sensed before, seek medicinal herbs: sheep raised at home, which have never seen nests, nest and give birth at home: therefore from cognition and species, not sensate: therefore insensate.

On the contrary, I deny the consequence. For they do this from the instinct of nature, and their natural complexion being disposed otherwise and otherwise.

QUESTION IX. Can the senses perceive anything spiritual by divine power?

I assert and say to the question: The senses can attain to nothing spiritual even by divine power. This is [the view] of Scotus in Book 4, Distinction 49, Question 11, § “to the arguments”, saying: “A sense cannot be a non-organic power, or it cannot not be an organic power, and therefore it cannot be elevated to apprehend the immaterial, nor even the sight of the Blessed, but it can indeed be elevated within the genus of material things to see the sun.”

It is proved first: No power by its formal nature can attain to anything beyond its adequate object; but the spiritual is outside the adequate object of sense: therefore. The major is proved: if it could tend beyond, the power would be changed: therefore. The antecedent is proved: Just as wood, from the fact that it in no way operates vitally, is argued not to be able to operate even possibly, and if it could, the power of wood would be changed from non-vital to vital: therefore sense would be changed: and thus it would be sense from the supposition, and not; because it would be more than intellect, since it could perceive every spiritual thing; for there is no greater reason for one than for another, and it could also perceive every material thing. Indeed, if the eye could see the spiritual, it could also see sound, and the ear could taste, etc., and thus the eye would be an eye and not, because it would hear: and the ear would be an ear and not, because it would taste; which things are contradictory.

It is proved secondly: If sense could attain to the spiritual, it could also attain to the aspect of intelligibility, of the universal, of a relation of reason, and consequently it would be intellect, and thus it would be sense and not sense, which is contradictory. See more about these things in our Theology, Volume 2, Treatise 5, Distinction 3, Question 3.

You will object first: In Job, Chapter 19, it says: "In my flesh I shall see God my Savior": therefore a material power, such as the sense of the eye, etc., can perceive the spiritual.

I respond and say that Job is to be understood [as speaking] of the vision on the day of judgment; for he says, "on the last day I shall rise from the earth", but then the Blessed will see Christ in the flesh, and the divine essence with the intellectual eye; and so there the discourse is about the incarnate God. Moreover, the Prophets sometimes saw God through an apparition made by an Angel.

You will object secondly: A spiritual soul can inform an extended body: therefore also a spiritual vision could inform a bodily eye.

I respond: I deny the consequence. The disparity is: because a rational soul is not a form depending on the body, but having its own subsistence: but an accidental form of vision is not so, which depends in its eduction on the subject for its being. Or, if it were produced by God, it would depend in informing on the subject.

You will say: The intellect can be elevated to see God: therefore also the eye to see the spiritual. The consequence is proved: The uncreated God is more distant from the created intellect than the created spiritual from the created eye.

On the contrary, I deny the consequence. I distinguish the reason: it is more distant in entity, I concede; objectively, I deny. For God is contained under the object of the natural inclination of the created intellect. Hence some proper concept can be had naturally from what is common about God, and therefore there is an inchoate power in the intellect; but a spiritual thing is in no way contained under the object of sense, since it is insensible, because immaterial.

You will say: The eye can see the supernatural light of glory in heaven: therefore also an Angel. The consequence is proved: An Angel is of the natural order with the eye: but the light of glory is of the supernatural order.

On the contrary, I deny the consequence. For the light of glory is not supernatural as to entity, but as to mode, insofar as God produced it in heaven; whence it does not exceed the object of natural sight and therefore the eye can be elevated to see it; for, since the eye here is concerned with light, it will also be able to be elevated in heaven to see celestial light, which probably does not differ in species from our light, but only in intensity.

You will say: Either spiritual vision would be repugnant to the eye, because it is spiritual, or because it is vital? Not the second: for the eye is also vital. Not the first: for a material body can be elevated to an indivisible and spiritual existence, as is the body of Christ in the Eucharist: therefore.

On the contrary: It is repugnant on account of both: for although they agree in the generic nature of vitality, nevertheless [they do] not [agree] in the specific [nature]; for otherwise the eye could transcend its adequate object and could also perceive sound, and hear, which is contradictory. Nor does the existence of the body of Christ compel [us to say otherwise]; for non-vital powers can more easily be elevated than vital ones to something supernatural: indeed, that existence of the body of Christ is not absolutely existing spiritually whole in the whole and whole in each part, but only as to mode; since it is only a certain material respect extrinsically adventitious integrated from multiple partial presences, as many as there are proportional parts of the body to the place indivisibly.

DISTINCTION IV. On the rational soul

QUESTION I. What is the rational soul, the intelligible object, the object of the will, and the first thing known?

It should be noted firstly that before we come to the explanation of the rational soul, it is worth inquiring about its name; for it is taken in various ways even by sacred scripture. For first it is taken for the whole man, Genesis 12: "Abraham took the souls which he had made in Haran", that is, all the men whom he had begotten there. So also by St. Paul in Romans 12: "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." Secondly, it is taken for the flesh and body, Job 6: "To the hungry soul even bitter things are sweet." Thirdly, for life, Genesis 37: "Do not kill his soul." Also Matthew 2: "They are dead who sought the child's soul." Fourthly, properly for the spiritual substantial form informing the human body, which is called the rational soul. Soul, because it animates and gives life, motion and sense to man. Rational, because it is the principle of reasoning. Now that such a rational soul exists in the nature of things is beyond all doubt; for experience, by which we know that we reason, and will what is fitting, and are unwilling to what is unfitting, demonstrates it clearly enough.

It should be noted secondly, from Scotus in Book 4, Distinction 43, Question 2, "I reply", that all philosophers commonly placed "rational" in the definition of man as his proper difference, understanding by "rational" that the intellective soul is an essential part of him. Nor is any philosopher of better repute found who would deny this, except – as Scotus says – the accursed Averroes, who in his fiction about the third book *On the Soul* claims that the intellect is a certain separate substance joinable to us by means of phantasms – which conjunction and fiction of his neither he himself nor any of his followers have so far been able to understand, much less to explain or maintain that a man understands through that conjunction. For according to him man would formally be nothing but a certain irrational animal of outstanding quality, namely through a certain irrational and sensitive soul more excellent than other souls. This is an error peculiar to Averroes alone, and a most evil one, not only against the truth of theology but also the truth of all sound philosophy; for it destroys science, because it takes away from man all acts of understanding as distinct from acts of sensing, and all free acts of choice as distinct from acts of the sensitive appetite; and so all acts of the virtues, which are not done without choices according to right reason – an error which should be utterly banished from the company of men using natural reason.

It should be noted thirdly that there is a great dullness in our soul for detecting the natures of things, but a greater one in detecting the essence of its very self, as Seneca says in Book 7 of the Natural Questions, chapter 24: "That we have a soul by whose command we are both impelled and called back, all will acknowledge; but what that soul, the ruler and lord of us, may be, one will no more easily explain to you than where it is. One will say that it is a spirit, another that it is a certain harmony, another a divine power and part of God, another most rarefied air, another an incorporeal potency; there will not be lacking one to say that it is blood, one to say that it is heat. To such an extent is the soul unable to be clear about other things that it is still seeking itself." With which St. Augustine agrees, as witness Fr. Frassen: "These shadows are to be lamented, in which the faculty which is in me lies hidden from me, so that when my soul questions itself about its own powers it does not readily think it should be believed, because for the most part what is within it is hidden. And it is surely to be lamented that the soul, which knows and investigates all things outside itself, is ignorant of its own nature." Hence it has come about that not only the common run of philosophers but also their princes have had various and opposing opinions about the human soul.

Hence it should be noted fourthly that the sages of the Greeks made more glorious claims than others about the nature of the soul, albeit sometimes with errors, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias who, reading Aristotle's Book 2 On the Soul, chapter 10, which says "The agent intellect is immortal, separable, coming from without, communicating with no action of the body", interpreted it to be God. Likewise Simplicius, albeit erroneously as to plurality, attributed several intellects to man, within and without, which he affirms to be immortal. Themistius and Averroes in the schools of the Arabs, albeit also erroneously as to unity, taught that there is one immortal mind of all men. But Avicenna asserted with more subtle study that there is in each man a singular immortal soul, which almost all the more learned Egyptians followed. Among the Latins Seneca discoursed about it more rightly than the others, defining it to be a spiritual intellect ordered to beatitude in itself and in the body; and with him Cassiodorus, saying that it is a spiritual substance created by God, the vivifier of its own body. Descartes, distinguishing himself from these by his excessive itch for novelty, ineptly asserts that the whole essence of the rational soul consists in thought alone, just as the nature of body consists in extension alone; but how well, will soon be clear.

I assert and say firstly, in reply to the question, that the essence of the rational soul cannot be constituted in thought alone. This is what Scotus supposes in Book 4, Distinction 12, Question 1, "To the question", saying: "In defining the soul, the Philosopher in Book 2 On the Soul, text 6, at once posits the body which is perfectible by it, or the whole composite of which it is a part, and he posits nothing pertaining to the essence of the soul, but only this, that it is an act, which signifies a respect of the soul to that of which it is the form." Therefore Aristotle, and Scotus, suppose that the essence of the soul is known to us in no

other way than through that respect to the body of which it is the act and form, from which as proper principle come forth our thoughts and rational operations. This is against Descartes.

It is proved: The essence of a thing is altogether inseparable from the thing, to such an extent that the one cannot even be conceived without the other; but thought is not always with the soul, as is clear in the recently animated embryo, in the sleeping man, or one struck by apoplexy, especially according to Descartes who teaches about his first principle (no. 9) that "to think is nothing other than to be conscious of what is going on within oneself". Therefore, the major is certain, the minor is also clear. For how would the embryo or the apoplectic not remember this thought when reason is restored to him? It therefore appears that in these the soul for the most part remains in the body without any thought at all.

Also because, if the nature of the soul were nothing other than thought alone, it would follow that the soul would perish as often as a previous thought vanishes and a new one arises. Indeed souls would be most evil and would be dispersed, according to Proverbs 6:18, "A heart that devises wicked thoughts," and Job 16, "My thoughts are scattered." The Cartesians reply that we are playing with the equivocal term "soul"; for "soul" should not be taken for a transient thought as a mode of the soul itself, but for the mind or thinking substance, which can never be absent from the soul; for thus Descartes speaks of his first principle, nos. 63 and 64: "Thought and extension can be regarded as constituting the natures of intelligent substance and of corporeal substance; and then they should not be conceived otherwise than as the very thinking and extended substance itself, that is, as mind and body." Or it could also be said according to Descartes, Letter 5, "Although this thought and that thought and the other vanish, yet thought remains, etc."

Against this, as to the first point: Either Descartes understands by that subsistent thought or thinking substance the very substance of the soul and its intellective power which can produce various thoughts even if it actually elicits none; or the actual thought or operation of the soul itself. If the first, then he brings forth nothing new, except that he most wickedly abuses the word "thought", usurping the act and operation of the soul for that entity and faculty of it. For all philosophers declare that the substance and faculties of the soul remain invariant under its various operations. If the second, then the argument adduced above about the variation and dispersion of souls has force.

Against this, as to the second point: First, because the sleeper or apoplectic does not have even an indefinite thought. Also because, if when this and that and the other thought vanish

there yet always remains in the soul a thought, then one and the same thought would be many diverse thoughts, and the same soul would form many diverse souls – which is ridiculous. Also because, if that remaining thought were something indefinite as some Cartesians claim, then, since it would not tend to a determinate object, it would be nothing thinking, and so the soul itself would be indeterminate, and would be continually determined when the thought is determined through an object; consequently, when the thought is determined to a trunk, the whole essence of the soul will be determined to a trunk – which is likewise ridiculous. Also because what exists in the nature of things are these determinate individuals; therefore the rational soul existing in us is also such, and not an indefinite and indeterminate thought. For by the very fact that it is always a thought, it is a certain determinate one which always remains such; otherwise, if it did not always remain such, but because another was always substituted in its place, it would always be another and another soul – which certainly is ridiculous once more.

You will object: The soul should have a clear idea of itself; but it perceives nothing more clearly in itself than that it thinks; therefore its whole essence consists in thought alone. I reply: Either deny the major, as is clear from Remark 2 out of Seneca and St. Augustine; or rather deny the minor. For although the soul through a reflexive act distinctly knows that it thinks, it does not yet distinctly comprehend what it is and how it forms its thought. Indeed I no less clearly know that my soul is the principle of all the motions which are made by me than I know that I think; why therefore could I not say against Descartes that the essence of the soul consists just as well in the principle of human motions as in thought? Finally, it is false to suppose that whatever I judge myself to perceive clearly is in reality such as I perceive it; for when one judges thus of a thing and another judges otherwise, it often happens that the thing is otherwise than someone thinks he distinctly perceives. Certainly it would be a great wonder if only those things which Descartes thinks he clearly perceives ought to be such in reality, and not also those things which others judge they clearly perceive to the contrary. Indeed, this mode of argument is still more wondrous: “I conceive the thing thus; therefore it should be such” – as if concepts could never be false!

You will say: The essence of the soul should be constituted in that through which it is first distinguished from the body; but this first and most powerfully occurs through thought; therefore, the minor is clear. It is proper to body to be extended, with which it is repugnant for thought to agree. On the contrary: Distinguish the major. Through that by which it is distinguished only from body, deny; from body and everything which is not soul, concede the major. Hence although the soul would be distinguished through thought from body, it would not yet be distinguished from the angels; since the angels also differ from body and are devoid of all bodily extension, and, like the soul, are capable of thought. Or rather, deny the minor. First because actual thought is accidental and can be absent from the soul. Also because thought, since it is an operation, presupposes a potency or faculty by which it is

elicited; therefore it itself cannot be the essence of the soul; for essence in a thing presupposes nothing of which it is the essence. The essence of the soul should therefore rightly be constituted in something else, which the following assertion will reveal.

I assert and say secondly: The rational soul is the act of an organic Physical body having life potentially rational; or it is an incomplete spiritual substance apt to inform an organic body to effect a rational animal. This is from Scotus in Book 4, Distinction 43, Question 2, “I reply”, saying: “The Philosopher defines the intellective soul in Book 2 On the Soul, text 6, that it is the act of an organic Physical body having life potentially,” and at the beginning of Book 3, text 1, “about the part of the soul by which it knows and understands”, where he seems to posit the intellective soul as at least a subjective part of the soul previously defined in general. He therefore supposes this definition to be legitimate and commonly accepted, since he posits no other anywhere. The first definition is therefore clear from the definition of soul as such given in Distinction 1, Question 1. But the second will appear in what follows, where it will be clear of both how they were given in conformity with rational operations, namely intellective and volitive ones, by which the soul is indicated.

From these it should be gathered first that the whole rational life consists in intellect and will, and the intellective memory which according to many is not formally distinct from the intellect, but only from a diverse connotation, insofar as the same principle of the intellective potency, as it perceives and collects new species of things, is called the intellect, and as it conserves and perceives the previously collected and conserved species in itself, is called the intellective memory, which can never forget if it acts independently of the sensitive memory – forgetting per se occurs only in the latter, because the species can be destroyed there, and so concomitantly also in the intellective memory. Now in the intellect the philosophers commonly posit three operations, and Scotus also with them in his questions on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, Question 3, “It is said”, remarking: “For since the act of reason is threefold: the first, namely, the understanding of indivisibles; the second, the composition or division of those simples or indivisibles; the third is discourse formed from the known to the unknown.” Which he repeats in Book 1 of the *Posterior Analytics*, Question 46, “To the proof it is said”, asserting: “It is said that the operation of the intellect is threefold: one is the understanding of simples; the others are composition or division... The third is the discursive operation from premises to conclusions.” About which he discourses more clearly for the instruction of logic in the Proem to the *Second Work on the Perihermeneias*, saying: “As the Philosopher says in Book 3 On the Soul, text 21, the operation of the intellect is twofold: one, which is called the understanding of indivisibles, according to which the intellect is said to form simple concepts; the other is the operation of the intellect according to which it composes and divides, and is called composition or division. To these two operations a third is added, which is to discourse from one thing to

another, as from the known to the unknown. The book of the Categories is about those things which fall under the first operation of the intellect; because to determine about that belongs to one who determines about the soul, because it belongs to him whose it is to determine about substance to determine about its operation; for the book of the Categories is universally about simple concepts, or about concepts which the intellect forms, or which are intelligible insofar as they are divisible and ordinable in a genus per se. The book of the Perihermeneias is about the second, and not about the operation of the intellect; for the intellect composing or dividing forms the enunciation, which is intended in this book... But about those things which fall under the third operation of the intellect are the books of the New Logic, in which it is taught when one should proceed from the known to obtain cognition of the unknown." Although, however, Aristotle cited above by Scotus posits only the first two operations, the third is nevertheless well inferred from the second. The reason for all of which is that after the reception of the intentional species in the intellect there follows a vital act which is called apprehension, because through it the object is in a way drawn into the potency by which it is apprehended, and it is called the first operation. If then another object is also apprehended, another vital act can follow by which the one is compared to the other, and this is called composition and judgment, because it composes those two concepts with each other assertively or negatively in judging, and it is the second operation of the intellect. Finally, when it compares the compositions themselves with each other, considering that one can be inferred from the other, this is its third operation or discourse.

Note, however, from Scotus in Book 4, Distinction 47, Question 1, "I reply", that judgment can be taken broadly and strictly: broadly for any cognition, especially when something is known in any way in relation to another, as the Philosopher said in Book 2 On the Soul, text 145, that the common sense judges about the sensibles of the other senses; but strictly for a complex through another, that is, through terms or principles in judging them having been conferred, that it is so or not so. In the first acceptation judgment does not differ from apprehension, and is found in sense and brutes; wherefore also according to Scotus in Book 2, Distinction 6, Question 1, "To the second", apprehension is sometimes comparative; for it happens that the possible is apprehended which is truly impossible, and this without error, because error is found only in judgment, not in apprehension, and so is understood that saying in Book 2 of the Physics, "Abstraction involves no falsity." Such apprehensive comparison is common to sense with intellect; for it is certain that by the internal sense some fashion themselves to be kings and princes, and delight in that without strict judgment, however. It should be gathered secondly that the intellect is an immaterial, inorganic potency, so that it exercises its operations in no part of the body. The reason is that an organic potency perishes when the composite is destroyed; for when the eye is plucked out the proximate power of sight perishes; but the intellect does not perish when the man is destroyed, as is certain in separated and beatified souls before the re-assumption

of their bodies, which have most perfect intellections. Nor should you say: The intellect in its operations depends on the internal sense and its organ; therefore it is an organic potency needing the aforesaid organ. On the contrary: Distinguish the antecedent. It depends as a reason for acting, deny; presuppositively, in the manner of a servant attending and administering phantasms, concede the antecedent; from this, however, it does not follow that it needs an organ in its operations.

You will say: When the organ of the common sense is injured the intellect is injured; therefore it depends on it as a reason for acting. On the contrary: Distinguish the antecedent. It is injured intrinsically, deny; extrinsically, that is, it is impeded by the disordered phantasms on which the intellect depends for this state, concede. For through God it could come about that one injured in the brain should have excellent intellection, as is also clear in ecstasies who, all operation of the senses having ceased, operate by the intellect alone.

It should be gathered thirdly that in this state the intellect in all its operations depends on phantasms. The reason is that when the phantasy is injured, the intellect is impeded, as is clear in the foolish; and we forget many things; and finally, when we desire to understand something, we form for ourselves an idol or image so that we may conceive more easily, as God the Father in the manner of an old man. Therefore the intellect for this state depends on phantasms, which dependence does not arise from the nature of the intellect; for otherwise the separated soul could not understand; nor from the fact that the soul is united to the body, for otherwise after the resurrection in glory it would also thus understand; but it arises, as St. Augustine and Scotus in Book 1, Distinction 3, Question 4, "But it remains", will have it, from a cause both theological and philosophical, namely both from the guilt of original sin, in punishment for which this imperfect mode of understanding has been given to us – since, however, the Virgin Mother always lacked original guilt, it should be believed that she understood independently of phantasms, as men in the state of innocence if it had persevered; and on account of the natural connection of the intellect and phantasy for this state, so that the superior faculty cannot operate without the service of the inferior, which is the phantasy, the divine Wisdom so disposing. Nor should you say: Scotus in Question 3 of the Universals, "To the third", wills that the intellect depends on phantasms only in its first motion, but not in its second and the other acts following. On the contrary: Scotus should be understood to mean that the intellect does not depend as essentially in the second motion as in the first, in which it receives from the phantasy a co-principle for effecting the act of the intellect; but in the second motion there is only an accidental and qualified dependence founded on concomitance alone, and the natural connection of those potencies is not operating simultaneously. That the phantasy can act without the senses, namely by night, but never the intellect without the phantasy, experience gives the disparity, because we

dream without the operation of the external senses, but we never understand without phantasms.

It should be gathered fourthly that the will is likewise an inorganic potency, and alone formally free among all the potencies of the rational soul, from which the other potencies are free only participatively and dependently on the command of the will. The reason is that the will alone can freely determine itself to acting, and so act that, all the requisites for acting having been posited, it can fail to act. Hence the intellect cannot be free; otherwise by the same sin someone would sin twice, namely once through the intellect and once through the will; nor can the sensitive appetite be free, for otherwise someone could sin through it with the will unwilling – indeed brutes would sin. Now the reason why the sensitive appetite is not free is its nature; because it is an organic and material potency; but such a potency is always determined to a certain genus of appetibles, so that when that is apprehended it cannot fail to be fitting, nor can the appetite fail to approve it; but on the part of the will such a reason cannot be given, except its nature; and therefore Scotus does not infer freedom from immateriality; otherwise the intellect would also be free; but from freedom he infers immateriality. The freedom of the will, however, need not be proved, but is supposed as a manifest truth, like contingent being, about which Scotus in Book 1, Distinction 39, single question, “As to the first I say”, wills: “Those who deny that any contingent being exists should be exposed to torments until they concede that it is possible for them not to be tormented.” Nor should you say: The will cannot choose anything other than what the intellect judges should be chosen; therefore, if the intellect is not free in judging, neither will the will be free in choosing. On the contrary: Distinguish the antecedent. Not so that it is borne to the unknown, concede; not so that it is determined by the judgment of the intellect to choosing precisely that which it has judged should be preferred, deny the antecedent; for when two goods are proposed the will can choose the lesser, the greater having been rejected, which the intellect judged should be preferred.

I assert and say thirdly: The adequate object, both intelligible and volible, is being most commonly taken, indeed not for the intellect under the precise aspect of the true, and for the will under the precise aspect of the good, but under the aspect of being. This is from Scotus in Book 1, Distinction 3, Question 3, “With these things seen about being”, saying: “The true is not adequate to the intellect, either according to community or according to power.” And a little later: “The true is not said in quid of all things intelligible per se, because it is not said in quid of being.” Also in Book 4, Distinction 49, Question 4, “In connection with this”, saying: “That the true is the object of the intellect is false, just as that the good is the object of the will is doubtful.” Also in Question 8, “I reply”, saying: “The first object of the human intellect is being.” Finally in Book 4, Distinction 50, Question 6, “I

reply”, saying: “All being is the object of the will under the aspect of good, and of the intellect under the aspect of true.”

The first part is proved: Being most commonly taken comprehends all intelligibles whatsoever, either as species, or as modes, or differences, or as properties, or accidents; therefore being most commonly taken is the adequate intelligible object for the intellect. The consequence is proved. If not being most commonly taken, then being under the aspect of the true; but the intellect does not understand all things under the aspect of the true, but also under the aspect of unity, multitude, falsity, goodness, evil, etc., all of which, however, are being most commonly taken; therefore.

The second part is proved: It is reasonable that any appetitive potency should be adequate to its cognitive in objective sphere; therefore the will also should be adequate to the intellect in object; hence it understands nothing to which the will cannot be borne, as Scotus often says: “Everything intelligible is appetible and volible.” Indeed, according to Scotus in Question 6 below to be cited, the will is more perfect than the intellect; therefore it is fitting that it not be confined to a lesser sphere of object and have a more imperfect object; but if not being most commonly taken, but good were its object, it would be more imperfect, because being is more perfect than its property, namely good; therefore.

You will object first: If being were the adequate intelligible object of the intellect, the latter could know all things which are contained under being; but it cannot, because it cannot distinctly know God and angels. The antecedent is clear; because the senses can perceive all things which are contained under their adequate objects; therefore the intellect more so. I reply with Scotus in Question 1 of the Prologue, “To the first principal argument”: Distinguish the major. If being were its object both from the nature of the potency and as motive object, concede; if being is only the object from the nature of the potency, but not the motive object, deny the major; hence, since for this state God or angels do not move our intellect through themselves, nor through their proper species, the intellect therefore cannot have a clear cognition of them. To the senses, however, the disparity is that they do not have a diverse state of attingency; hence neither can their object be so divided as that of the intellect itself.

You will say: The lowest intellect has the lowest object; but the intellect of the rational soul is lowest, since it is surpassed by the angel; therefore its object will not be being most commonly taken, but material being. On the contrary: Distinguish the minor. It is lowest in

entity and perfection, concede; in capacity and receptivity, deny the minor; for it is also of infinite capacity, like the intellect of the angel.

You will say: Our intellect knows the subject of sensible accidents; therefore its object will be being and material quiddity. On the contrary: Distinguish the antecedent. It knows through the proper species of that, deny; argumentatively, concede the antecedent; for from the cognition of accidents acquired through their proper species the intellect arrives at the concept of substance; hence the intellect is only capable of the species of material substance according to itself, but not for this state; otherwise it could also know the absence of that species of substance in the Eucharist, which is false.

You will object secondly: Potencies are distinguished through distinct objects; but the will and the intellect are distinct potencies; therefore the object of the will should be the good, and of the intellect the true, and not being. On the contrary: Distinguish the major. Disparate potencies, concede; subordinate ones, deny the major; but the intellect and will are subordinate potencies; and for that reason the object of each can be being; for the superior potency can know whatever the inferior can, and something more.

You will say: The appetitive potency differs from the cognitive through this, that it tends through an act of pursuit to an object fitting to it as such, so that the cognitive must propose to it this aspect so that it can be moved; therefore the good alone is the object of the will. On the contrary: Distinguish the antecedent. To an object fitting as such either formally or virtually and fundamentally, concede; always formally under an explicit proposition of such, deny the antecedent; hence by the very fact that the good is a necessary property of being, the intellect in understanding being implicitly says it to be good, and so the will can will it qua being.

You will say: No reason proves that the appetitive potency must be adequate to its cognitive in object, but it suffices that the object of the appetitive is subordinated to the object of the cognitive. On the contrary: Deny the antecedent. For that reason by which the cognitive is seen to be the servant of the appetitive and ordered to it is convincing enough. Hence the appetitive can command the cognitive to know every being, and then can will or nill it. The cognitive, however, cannot know all things so that the appetitive could also not will all things. For which reason, if the appetitive can will certain things known to it, and not will others, it can necessarily be borne to all things. Indeed, even if the intellect proposes being precisely abstracted from goodness, the will can will it.

From these it should be gathered that the motive object of the intellect for this state is nevertheless sensible being as such, comprehending all things which can be perceived by the external senses; and the motive object of the will is the good to be pursued by it, or the evil to be shunned by nilling for the sake of that good. The reason is that the adequate motive object of the intellect and will is that without the aspect of which the intellect and will cannot be moved to understanding or willing anything; but for this state such a being is sensible being; since the intellect for this state does not understand unless it is moved by sensible phantasms, and the will desires nothing which it does not find good for itself, since it never desires evil; therefore the aforesaid are the motive objects of the intellect and will.

I assert and say fourthly: The object first known by a priority of origin is the singular itself of the most special material species. This is from Scotus in Book 1, Distinction 3, Question 2, "Therefore in speaking of it", saying: "The first actually known confusedly in the order of origin is the most special species, whose singular more efficaciously and strongly first moves the sense, whether it be audible or visible or tangible; for whatever individual most strongly moves the sense, its species is first known by confused cognition." It is proved: The universal cannot be known unless the singulars are first known, and their agreement, so that the common nature may be abstracted from them; therefore the singular is known before the universal; hence Aristotle teaches that those things are better known which are nearer to sense – of which sort are singulars – than the less universal, and finally the more universal. See more which we have said in Dialectic, Prologue 1, about the first known.

You will object: Things are accustomed to be perceived confusedly before distinctly; but to be conceived confusedly is to be conceived under a more common concept; for nature tends from the more imperfect to the more perfect; therefore the concept of the most universal being is most imperfect, since any inferior adds something to it; therefore the singular alone of being is the first known. I reply: Distinguish the major. Before distinctly, as this noun wishes, because at first we cannot have many acts of a thing consisting of diverse parts, so that it would be expressed clearly and distinctly as to all, concede; confusedly, that is, in its universal, deny the major; nor does nature always tend from the more imperfect to the more perfect; for one also proceeds from the more perfect cognition of the premises to the conclusion, from the effect to the cause. Hence nature proceeds thus only then, if there is an impediment, and if the more imperfect is a necessary disposition for the more perfect; otherwise, however, a disposed cause acts as much as it can. Therefore, at most it follows that being is the first known by a priority of adequation, but not of origin; for from being itself one only begins the clear and distinct cognition of inferiors, but not first cognition in itself.

From these it should be gathered first that the intellect abstractively understands the material singular through its proper species, albeit not under the aspect of singularity. The reason is that our intellect posits a difference between the universal and the singular, and between two singulars; therefore it knows each in some way under its proper species; for one positing a difference between two knows each. Indeed the intellect corrects sense about the singular, e.g., branches appearing broken in water; therefore it knows the singular, and indeed through its proper species; for the sensible singular, just as it impresses its proper species on the sense, so also on the possible intellect by the aid of the agent intellect; which singularity, however, is not formally sensible per se, but only a condition of the sensible mover, so it is not included in the nature sensible per se, and so it is not understood through its proper singular [notes] from what is part of the object understood.

Nor should you say: Aristotle teaches that the intellect is of universals, and sense of singulars; therefore the intellect does not understand the singular. On the contrary: Aristotle is speaking precisely; that is, the senses perceive singulars alone, but the intellect perceives singulars and also universals; but not exclusively, that is, only universals and not singulars.

It should be gathered secondly that the universal is better known through one and the same species of the singular than through another proper one. The reason is: As the singular is related to the universal in being, so also in representing or in species; but the singular contains the universal essentially, and the inferior all the superior grades; therefore what represents the singular formally will also be virtually representative of the universal.

Nor should you say: No species is per se representative of an object under opposite aspects, as is the aspect of the universal and the singular; therefore... On the contrary: Deny the supposition, namely, that they are opposites, if the universal is understood for the community and indifference of the nature, because this agrees with the nature intrinsically, and singularization extrinsically. Likewise the singular includes all that is common; hence rather the one includes the other than is opposed to it.

You will say: At least that species would represent the singular distinctly and the universal indistinctly; but this is a true opposition; therefore... On the contrary: That species would not represent in the same way; but primarily and distinctly the singular, but secondarily and indistinctly the universal, which is contained virtually in it; for it receives that species and represents the common nature.

Question II. Is the rational soul immortal, and is its immortality demonstrated not only by faith but also by natural reason?

It should be noted: Before the introduction of the light of faith, there was some obscurity concerning the immortality of the soul in the school of the Peripatetics, who contradicted Plato's assertion of the soul's immortality. Therefore, Plato denied that the rational soul is united to the body as an informing form, but only by a contact of assisting or moving power, as a sailor is in a ship. He granted that the body is a garment of the soul, not its matter. For he did not understand, while maintaining the principles of the generation of forms in matter, how an intellectual substance could exist in matter as a form without depending on it for its being, activity, and remaining when the whole is destroyed. Therefore, he held that the intellective soul is rather an assistant and mover of the body. Others, like Aphrodisias and Averroes, plainly held that the intellect is a separate substance that can be joined to the body through phantasmic impressions.

However, Aristotle, rigorously wishing to insist on the principles of the generation of forms and their dependence on matter or a subject for being and operating, so that they cannot remain when the whole ceases, and acknowledging that the intellective soul is a form informing the human body, rendered the constitution of the rational soul and its incorruptibility or immortality somewhat obscure. The Stoics and Epicureans were even more perplexed about this, assertively teaching that the rational soul is mortal and corporeal. Therefore, the present question is raised on the occasion of these philosophers. To examine it accurately, a single proposition is put forth.

The rational soul is immediately created by God and is spiritual. The reason is from the preceding part on generation and corruption, Distinction 2, question 1, proposition 3, and a fuller account can be taken from what will be said here in the proofs of the second assertion.

I assert firstly in response to the question: The rational soul is immortal. This is a matter of faith and the view of Scotus in Book 4, Distinction 43, question 2, where he says: "As Augustine says in *On the Trinity* 13, chapter 9, the proposition of the immortality of the soul is not held by reason, but by the Gospel when Christ says in Matthew 10: 'Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul.'" Scotus also states in *Quodlibet* 9: "The intellective soul remains in its being outside the body when the being of the whole is destroyed, because its being is altogether incorruptible, both essentially and accidentally."

This is proved first from Genesis 2, where it is said to Adam: "On whatever day you eat from it, you shall die the death." Therefore, by not eating from that forbidden fruit, he was created immortal with respect to soul and body. Also, Wisdom 3: "Even if in the eyes of men they suffered torments, their hope is full of immortality." And Wisdom 5: "But the just shall live forever." Also, Luke 16: "So that when you fail, they may receive you into eternal dwellings... And it came to pass that the beggar died and was carried by the angels into Abraham's bosom." And in Luke 23, Christ says to the thief dying with him: "Today you will be with me in Paradise." All the texts of Scripture and the Fathers that speak of the resurrection of the dead and the retribution of merits serve this purpose. For the immortality of the soul is a fundamental article of our faith, and almost all articles and dogmas of faith would not stand without it.

Secondly, it is proved by a particular definition against certain philosophers in the Lateran Council under Leo X, which states: "Since in our days some have dared to say about the nature of the rational soul that it is mortal, and some rashly philosophizing have asserted that this is true according to philosophy, with the approval of the sacred council we condemn and reject those who assert that the intellective soul is mortal." In this definition of the Council, not only is the truth of faith proposed, but also the rashness of those who assert that the soul is mortal according to philosophy is condemned, and rightly so, because almost all philosophers, and the most important ones, even Aristotle who is more inclined to that opinion as we will hear in the following assertion, defend the immortality of the soul except for a few. For those principles that could stand in the way, namely the eternity of the world, the necessity of the first cause acting, etc., are errors.

You may object: In Ecclesiastes 3 it is said: "The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both is equal." Also, in Wisdom 2 it is said: "After this we will be as if we had never been." Therefore, men are not immortal, just as beasts are not. I respond with St. Jerome that the first passage should be understood with respect to the constitution of the body and the being of the whole, but not with respect to the being of the soul. Or it is only asserted from the perspective of the ungodly, that is, the impious say this. The second passage should similarly be understood from the perspective of the impious, as is clear from the context near the end that follows: "This is what the wicked thought, and they were deceived."

I assert secondly: That the intellective soul is immortal is shown most probably by natural reason, and although it is not rigorously demonstrated with evidence, it is nevertheless very naturally proven, persuaded, and as it were demonstrated. This is the view of Scotus in Book 4, Distinction 43, question 2. I do not add his further text, but whatever I adduce for us and

for the objections, Scotus has it almost in those terms. As for the second part, it is against St. Thomas.

The first part is proved first by authority: Aristotle, in *On the Soul* 1, text 66, calls the intellect perpetual, incorruptible, divine, and separable from the body. Also, in *On the Soul* 2, text 21, he says: “The intellect is separated from the rest, as the perpetual from the corruptible.” And if it is said about the operation, that it is separated in this way, it is also separated according to being, because operation follows being. Also, in *On the Soul* 3, text 12, he makes a distinction between sense and intellect, because an excellent sensible thing corrupts the sense, so that afterwards it senses a less sensible thing less, but an intelligible thing does not do this to the intellect. For after the intellect has understood the highest intelligible thing, it understands lower things more. Consequently, since the intellect is not weakened by operating, it will be incorruptible in being.

Furthermore, in *Metaphysics* 12, chapter 1, text 16, Aristotle says: “The moving causes, as previously existing, are those which are like the reason, i.e., the form, and are simultaneous with the thing caused as a whole. For when a man is healed, then health also exists. But if something remains afterwards, it must be investigated. For in some cases nothing prevents it from being so, for example, if the soul is such – not every soul, but the intellect.” Therefore, he thinks that the intellect is a form that remains after the composite is destroyed, but not before.

Moreover, in *On the Parts of Animals* 2 and *On the Generation of Animals* 2, chapter 3, Aristotle holds that the other souls are brought forth from the potency of the seed, but the intellective soul comes from outside, and it alone is divine. Therefore, the soul does not receive being through generation, but from an extrinsic cause. Consequently, it cannot receive non-being through corruption or through any contrary corruptive cause, because its being is not subject to any such cause, since it is immediately from a higher cause.

From these, natural arguments are formed. Hence it is proved secondly by arguments:

First, because according to the Philosopher there is one principle in *Physics* 3, text 48, that natural desire is not in vain. But in the soul there is a natural desire to always be, for it naturally flees death.

Second, because in Physics 7, text 22, Aristotle holds that matter is that by which a thing can be and not be. Therefore, that which does not have matter does not have such a potency of not being through natural causes.

Third, because in Ethics 3, chapter 11, and Ethics 9, chapter 9, Aristotle holds that the brave person according to natural reason should expose himself to death for the preservation of the republic. Therefore, according to natural reason the immortality of the soul is known. For no one can desire his own non-being for the sake of any good of virtue either in himself or in another, according to Augustine in On Free Choice 3. Non-being cannot be desired, but if the soul were not immortal, the one dying would receive total and perpetual non-being.

It is proved thirdly by the arguments of St. Thomas in Part 1, question 75, article 6. First, because that which is corrupted is either corrupted by a contrary or by the lack of something necessarily required for its being. But the intellectual soul does not have a contrary, nor is the being of the body simply necessary for its being, because it has its own being per se in the body and outside the body. Second, because a simple thing cannot be separated from itself. But the intellectual soul is simple. Therefore, it cannot be separated from its being, because it does not have being through another form. It is otherwise with a composite, which has being through a form that can be separated from matter, and thus the being of the composite is destroyed.

The second part is proved first because the authorities of Aristotle adduce probable arguments but not demonstrative ones. For the Philosopher himself seems to be doubtful, since he seems to speak variously in other places, as will be seen in the objections. Hence it also follows that it is probable that he was always doubtful in this conclusion, inclining now to one side, now to the other, but always more towards its immortality. Also, because not everything said assertively by the philosophers was evidently proved by them through necessary natural arguments, but frequently through probable ones when they did not have others, as the Philosopher himself says in On the Heavens 2, concerning two difficult questions, text 60: "About the other stars the Egyptians and Babylonians say many things that we believe about each of the stars."

Furthermore, the authorities of Aristotle can be answered not ineptly. To the first, he speaks doubtfully in that text, and does not prove his assertion there by evident reason, but extols the intellectual soul because of its excellence, by which it exceeds all other forms and all other sensitive operations in man. To the second: it does not follow that if the intellect does not need an organ in operating, which is destroyed, it is also incorruptible in animating,

because it would still be posited as the principle of operating its proper operation for the whole composite itself. But the whole composite is corruptible. Therefore, its operative principle is also corruptible. That is why in *On the Soul* 1, text 66, he also says: “The intellect is corrupted in us when something interior is corrupted.” To the third: it is per accidens that an excellent sensible thing corrupts the sense because it dissolves the temperament of the organ, and an intelligible thing does not do this to the intellect because it does not have an organ. Hence it does not follow that it is incorruptible, unless it is proved that it does not depend in being on the whole, which is corruptible. To the fourth, it can be said that this is not demonstrated by necessary reason, but only by probable reason. To the fifth: it is very doubtful what Aristotle thought about the beginning of the intellectual soul, since he holds that God moves the heavens by a sempiternal motion, and therefore it does not seem how he could newly produce or create the soul, except always with the body, and indeed necessarily only from the newness of the patient, not from the sempiternal agent, just as in fire and the form of fire there is no other production. Hence he would hold that the animation of the organic body is only an accidental production of the soul itself. But the reason why we posit two productions, one from the non-being of the soul to its being, which is creation, and another from the non-animation of the body to its animation, which is the production of the animated body through its proper mutation, is because we have the first production from what is believed, but Aristotle does not.

Secondly, the arguments deduced from the Philosopher do not seem sufficiently demonstrative. First, because the first argument would equally conclude about a brute, for it also naturally flees death. Indeed, it is enough that this desire is fulfilled in the succession of generable individuals, even if not in a single individual. But when it is said that one who flees one opposite does not flee it except out of love for the other opposite, and thus one who flees death flees it for the sake of life, this must be granted for certain times, but it does not follow that it is for infinite time. That is why the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 5, saying “We do not want to be unclothed,” brings this forth being assured by faith. And we certainly do not want this naturally, that is, this unwillingness is according to natural inclination. But it is not known by natural reason that it is according to natural inclination. Indeed, if we are speaking of an innate appetite, the possibility of always being must first be shown by natural reason, because such an appetite must be for what is possible, otherwise the same thing would be proved through itself and there would be a begging of the question. But that possibility is not known by natural light, as we said before. But if it is a question of elicited appetite, it must be proved that this act is in accordance with right reason and not erroneous, because the will can also be for impossible things. But such an appetite cannot be in conformity with right reason unless the possibility of being in this way forever is established, which is not established by natural light, as we said before.

The second argument does indeed describe matter well, but it should not be understood in such a way that matter is that reason only by which the thing of which it is a part can be and not be, but also the thing that is received in it. Otherwise the form of fire could not not be, since matter is not a part of the form of fire, but only of the composite.

The third argument is only probable, because philosophers dispute whether the brave person according to right reason should expose himself to death for the republic. And granting that it is certain, it could be said that such a brave person for a long time in the future bestows a very great good on himself and the common good by performing such a great act of virtue. Hence he would deprive himself of this good in a vicious way by omitting that act for the sake of preserving his momentary being, which according to right reason should never be done, even if man does not know that his soul is immortal. On this, see our Theology, Volume 2, Treatise 4, Distinction 17, Question 4, Assertion 1.

Thirdly, St. Thomas's arguments are subject to various exceptions. For concerning the first, it could be said that the soul has at least mediately the same contrary as the body of which it is a part and to which it is inclined. Hence its having being per se the same in the whole and outside the whole is either understood as contrasted with being per accidens, or as befitting the composite itself in the genus of substance. If in the first way, then even the form of fire, if it were without matter, would have being per se and would be incorruptible. If in the second way, then it is false that the soul without the body would have being per se, because then its being would not be communicable to another, just as the composite is not. Therefore, this consequence is deficient: the soul has being without the body; therefore, it does not need the body. For in the second sense the antecedent is false, and in the first sense the consequence is lacking, unless it is added there that it naturally and without a miracle has such being per se. But then such a proposition is only believed, not known naturally.

Concerning the second, it can also be said that not every corruption happens through the separation of one thing from another. For if the being of an angel were posited as really distinct from its essence, it would not be separable from itself, and yet it would be destructible through the succession of an opposite to that being.

The third part is proved first by an argument of Scotus which, if not rigorously demonstrative, is at least very natural and as it were demonstratively convincing. There is given in us some immaterial cognition which is not effected by a material organ, nor does it exist in an extended or material mode, and it is of various objects under immaterial and

abstract aspects, apart from material conditions such as here and now or singulars. No sensitive cognition can be an act of this cognition under such aspects. Therefore, for it there is given in man some specific intellectual form or some immaterial mind, which can suffer nothing from the materiality or corruptibility of the body with respect to its corruption.

The first part of the antecedent is proved by various experiences adduced by Scotus. For we experience in ourselves that we know the universal in act. We experience that we know being under some aspect more common than the aspect of the first sensible object even with respect to the highest sensitive power. We experience that we know relations consequent upon the natures of things, even non-sensible things. We experience that we distinguish every genus of sensible things from something that is not of that genus. We experience that we know relations of reason, which are second intentions, namely of genus, species, etc. We experience that we know that act by which we know these things, and that according to which that act is in us, which is through a reflexive act upon a direct act and its recipient. We experience that we assent to complexes without the possibility of contradicting and erring, as to first principles. Finally, we experience that we know the unknown from the known through discourse, so that we cannot dissent from the evidence of the inferred cognition.

The second part of the antecedent is also proved, namely that none of these acts can be according to any sensitive power. For no power can know something under a more universal aspect than the aspect of its proper object, just as sight does not know under an aspect indifferent to color and sound. Therefore, that cognition which is of something more common and universal, or which distinguishes one extreme from the other, especially that which distinguishes being under an aspect more common than any first sensible object, cannot be any sensation. The same is clear concerning relations of reason and reflexive acts, because sense cannot be moved to know something unless it is included in the sensible object as sensible. But a relation of reason is not included in anything as existing, and sense is always of what exists as existing. Furthermore, something quantified and extended is not reflexive upon itself and its own power. Finally, to assent to complexes, to discourse, and to assent to the evidence of an intellection imply relations of reason, and therefore cannot fall under a sensitive power.

Concerning this argument, it should be observed first, from Scotus in the cited assertion, that if someone obstinately denied that these acts are in man, one should not dispute with him, but say to him that he is a brute, just as with one saying "I do not see color there" one should not dispute, but say "You lack sense, because you are blind." So, since by interior perception we experience these acts in ourselves, it should be said to one denying them

that he is not a man, because he does not have that interior vision which others experience themselves to have.

It should be observed secondly that although by that natural argument Scotus strives to demonstrate chiefly only that the immaterially intellectual soul is the true specific form of man, it is equally valid for demonstrating in its own way the immortality of the soul. For Scotus there infers, in the consequence of the first enthymeme, that it is proved in this way from the immateriality of cognition that it is received in the soul as an immaterial and unextended subject. From this it can also rightly be inferred that the immaterial soul does not necessarily depend on matter. Consequently, the soul can be separated from matter and thus subsist per se and in itself. That is, since it belongs to the rational soul to be intellectual of all things, indeed also volitive freely, it has no aspect of body. For if it were to use a material and extended organ, its operation could not be so universal and free, as is clear in the senses above. And therefore from its nature it also seeks to be when it is separated from them. Hence, when Scotus says that the immortality of the soul is not evidently demonstrated, he should be understood to be speaking from the principles of Aristotle, about which Scotus speaks most, but not from the principles of others and his own.

It should be observed thirdly that the aforementioned argument from immateriality is also adduced by St. Thomas, but because he does not sufficiently declare immateriality, which can be taken in various ways, namely either without a material organ, or without extension in itself, or as compared to the object, Scotus clearly demonstrates that the first two immaterialities should be proved from the condition of the object which that act of immaterial cognition regards, which he himself exactly shows and proves.

Secondly, it is proved first because every being has its own end instituted by nature, in which it perfectly rests and is beatified. But the rational and immaterial soul in this life does not attain such an end. Therefore, another life must be given. Consequently, the soul must be immortal in order to attain it after death. But the minor is clear, because such an end in this life would be especially the cognition of abstract substances. But this is not such an end, for otherwise only the wise would attain this end, whereas the ultimate end should be able to be obtained by all or the greater part. Indeed, many are most unhappy and miserable in this life. Therefore, they must have their happiness to be expected for their instituted end in another life. That is why the Apostle consoles such people in 1 Corinthians 15: "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable."

Secondly, because we have a natural desire for clearly knowing God. For when we apprehend God, we immediately desire to know him clearly, as any person of sound mind experiences in himself.

Concerning these last two arguments, it should be observed that they are somewhat theological. Therefore, for a better understanding of them, our Theology should be consulted, Volume 2, Treatise 5, Distinctions 3, Questions 1 and 2, where we treat extensively the possibility of the clear vision of God and man's natural desire for it.

You may object against the first and third parts: Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 7, at the end, text 60, holds that all the parts that can remain separated from the whole are elements or material parts of elements, and besides these it is necessary to posit in the whole some form by which the whole is what it is, which cannot remain separated when the material part is destroyed and the whole does not remain. Therefore, if he granted that the intellectual soul is the form of man, he does not hold that it remains separated from matter when the whole does not remain.

I respond that Aristotle there was speaking precisely about purely material things according to their material forms, about which what he says is entirely true. But since elsewhere he also acknowledged that in man there is an intellectual, immaterial form that is separable, perpetual, and as it were divine, he should have thought far differently about the form of man than about the forms of other material things.

You may say: according to Aristotle, what begins to be ceases to be. Therefore, in *On the Heavens* 1, text 102, he holds against Plato as impossible that something has begun and is perpetual and incorruptible. He says the same thing in *Physics* 3, the chapter on the infinite, text 60.

On the contrary, in the cited place Aristotle is only speaking about those things that begin through generation, which also commonly cease to be. For he knew little about new creation, or was very doubtful about it. Moreover, although he does not believe that the heavens began, he nevertheless grants that they were caused and remain incorruptible in perpetuity. Why would he not also think this about the rational and immaterial soul that he proved? But that he says the heavens and the world are necessarily from eternity and did not begin is an error and in no way proves his point.

You may say: The rational soul in operation depends on the body. For as Aristotle says, one who understands must examine phantasms. Therefore, it also depends in being on the body, because operation follows being. Consequently, it is mortal, just like the body.

On the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent. It depends on the body for this state, I concede. According to its nature and absolutely, I deny the antecedent. For this state of ours is penal. But to understand, absolutely speaking, abstracts from the body, as is clear in angels and the separated soul can still understand and will. That is why many philosophers also held that our soul, because of its immateriality and spiritual operation, is as it were an assisting form in our bodies.

You may say: The body is corruptible. Therefore, so is the soul. The consequence is proved. There should be a proportion between matter and form. Hence Aristotle holds that those who are soft in flesh are apt in mind.

On the contrary, I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that such a proportion is sufficient, that the body is related as potency and the soul as act, although the soul is spiritual and incorruptible. Finally, the statement about those soft in flesh does not imply a similarity in nature between the soul and the body, but a connection between powers. For the affections of man ordinarily follow the temperament of the body, and because those soft in flesh have the best imagination, they also have the best mind, which depends on it – but only in this state of punished nature.

Question III. Whether intelligible species are necessary for intuitive and abstractive cognition?

It should be noted from Scotus in 1. D. 3. Q. 6. & 7. §. Contra istam opinionem. Also q. 8. & 9. §. Ad quæstionem. & in 2. D. 16. Q. Un. §. Rationes istae. That the intellect in understanding is not merely passive, but also active; because a vital act cannot be totally produced by a non-vital thing; but intellection is a vital act: therefore it cannot be produced by the object alone, consequently the intellect also concurs actively; yet it is not the total cause, but the more principal partial cause, because, if the object did not also concur on its part, the intellection would not be a likeness of the object, and the intellect with greater effort could produce a more perfect intellection about a less noble object, which is unfitting. Since, however, the intellect is a more indeterminate cause, and less limited to producing its

effects not only of one, but of any object whatsoever, therefore in natural cognitions, though not in the beatific vision, it will be the more principal cause.

It should be noted secondly, likewise from Scotus cited above, that the intellect as to the present is most powerfully divided into the agent intellect, and the possible intellect; concerning which see Logic D. 2. Q. 7. Advertisement 1. But concerning abstractive cognition see Logic D. 3. Sub. 3. Q. 11. In the addition. With these things noted:

First proposition. There are intelligible species, which are nothing other than permanent spiritual qualities, which are like seeds of objects for fecundating the intellect for cognition. The reason is the same with proportion concerning intelligible species to the intellect, as concerning sensible species to sense, about which we spoke in the preceding q. 3. To these add Scotus in 1. D. 3. Q. 6. §. Contra istam opinionem, saying: An intelligible species (beyond phantasy) is posited in man on account of preserving a greater perfection of a more perfect nature than of an imperfect nature, or at least an equal one – an intellectual nature, as intellectual, does not have an object sufficiently present to itself, if it does not have it except in a presence begged from the phantastic power: but this greatly debases the intellectual nature, as intellectual it is because that is removed from it, which is of perfection in a cognitive power, and is found in a sensitive power, as in the phantastic power. Also in 4. D. 45. Q. 1. §. Alia opinio: saying: An intelligible species is a simple immaterial or spiritual unextended form. Finally quodl. 13. §. Ad argumenta principalia. Asserting: An intelligible species is an absolute quality. Nor may you say: A quality can be intensified and diminished; but this cannot be done in intelligible species; therefore they are not given. The minor is proven. Because, if a species were increased more through many cognitions, then through it the intellect would always be facilitated more: therefore habits would thus be superfluous. On the contrary, the minor is denied. For it is clear from experience that the more often some object is cognized, the clearer the species is excited; nor from this is a habit superfluous; for a habit serves for facility and promptitude of operating, but an intense species serves for understanding more clearly and distinctly. You will say: Therefore the intellect through reflection on itself could experience these species, just as it experiences its acts and habits; but we do not experience species: therefore they are not given. On the contrary, I say that the intellect through reflection on itself experiences species argumentatively, just as it experiences its acts; for it experiences itself cognizing abstractively, namely absent things, which it deduces cannot be done except by means of species. You will say: At least those intelligible species, if they were spiritual, ought to be created by the intellect; but no creature can create: therefore either they are not spiritual, or they are not made by the intellect. On the contrary it is by retorting the argument: the acts of the intellect are spiritual: therefore they also ought to be created by the intellect, which is false. Therefore something spiritual, which is of greater perfection than something

material, can educe from a proportionate subject something naturally owed to it, as are the acts of the intellect and intelligible species. Furthermore even a material object can concur effectively objectively to something spiritual at least intentionally, as we teach in Theology concerning the intellection and cognition of Angels.

Proposition 2. The agent intellect is necessary for the productive cause of intelligible species. The reason is: because in the soul there ought to be not only a receptive principle of species, as is the possible intellect, but also an effective principle; but this is the agent intellect: therefore. The minor is proven. Such a principle is not the possible intellect, or phantasm, or the immediate object itself in the separate intellect: therefore the agent intellect: the antecedent is proven. Not the possible intellect; because the action of the soul in understanding is twofold, one preparative of the object, or translative of the object from the order of material things to the order of immaterial things: the other is the productive action of the intellection, by which the intelligible object made through it is actually understood; but although the second action belongs to the possible intellect, yet not the former: therefore. The minor is proven. An operative power presupposes the object about which it operates: therefore it cannot prepare that for itself through its own action, but presupposes it prepared by another, namely the agent intellect, according to which the Philosopher in 3. De anima tex. 17. & 18. Says: It belongs to the agent intellect to make all things, just as to the possible to become all things. Nor can phantasms or a material object be the effective principle of intelligible species; for they are material, but an intelligible species is spiritual: therefore. It should be well noted then that the agent intellect is only necessary on account of purifying the species of sensible things from materiality; for the effective principle of intelligible species of spiritual things can totally belong to spiritual things themselves; for since they are actually intelligible and proportioned to the spiritual intellect, they do not need extrinsic illustration by which they are transferred to the order of intelligible things; but for intelligible species of material things Scotus acknowledges the agent intellect to be so necessary that he also posits it in Angels for abstracting species from sensible things immediately, just as in us it abstracts from phantasm, as he discourses in 2. D. 3. Q. 11. §. Contra ex eisdem. And finally in 4. D. 45. Q. 2. §. Ad quæst. He says: The agent intellect with the object is a sufficient active cause of an intelligible species, nor less with an object outside than with a phantasm. Nor may you say: An agent will is not given: therefore neither an agent intellect; for thus the intellect is related to intelligible things, as the will to volible things. On the contrary. The disparity is because, when the object is actually understood, it is also actually volible; whence no action is required on the part of the will preparing the object; but through the actually understood intellect it is sufficiently prepared for the will: yet a material object not yet purified from materiality is not proportioned to the intellect. You will say: The same remaining the same always effects the same: therefore if the agent intellect and phantasm from the beginning in the first encounter effect only an image of the singular, neither will they thereafter be able to effect an image of the

universal; but such a species of universals is given in the intellect: therefore the possible intellect effects it, not the agent. On the contrary, I distinguish the major: the same both formally and virtually, I concede; the same formally, but diverse virtually, I deny the major. Therefore a phantasm of the singular is related as virtually manifold, because it contains a more common nature, and a less common one, and thus in the first encounter with the agent intellect it can effect a species of the less universal, and thenceforth in another encounter a species of the more universal, which in reality can be the same, as was said in this q. 1. Assertion 4. Colligation 2. With these things proposed:

I assert and say 1. To the question: For intuitive cognition an intelligible species is not absolutely necessary. It is from Scotus in 1. D. 2. Q. 7. §. Sed hic restat. Saying: Intuitive cognition is of the object, as the object is present in actual existence, or in another eminently containing the whole entity of it. Also in 2. D. 9. Q. 2. To the third principal, saying: Intuitive cognition cannot be had through a species of the object, which can remain with the object absent; for this is against the nature of intuitive vision; which is of a thing not actually existing, and presently. It is proven: Both because a species is only substituted in place of the subject to supply the immediate concurrence of the object, if the object is absent, or only sensible, and not actually intelligible: therefore if the object is present, and actually intelligible, it will produce intuitive cognition, and a species would be superfluous. Both because it is repugnant for intuitive cognition to be had through something related in the same way in representing, whether the thing is present or not; for intuition tends to a present object as present; but an intelligible species is permanent, nor does it depend on the object in being conserved, and it indifferently represents a present or non-present thing: therefore a species cannot concur to intuitive cognition. Hence it is very probable that no cognition of our intellect for this state is immediately intuitive; because the intellect never bears on a thing under its proper existence, but always as it appears in a phantasm, or intelligible species; yet we do not entirely exclude an intelligible species from intuitive cognition; because it can sometimes intervene, as an effect prior to intuitive cognition, e.g. when an Angel intuitively cognizes another, a species is preimpressed by the object in the intellect of the seeing Angel, so that conserved in it, it may constitute memory, which is altogether necessary, lest the intellect, as often as it wishes to repeat an act about an object otherwise cognized, be forced to return to the object to intuit species. For the rest however, sensory intuition can well be done through a species immediately flowing from the object with the object present, but not through a permanent species without the object. You will object: The cognition of the external senses is intuitive, and yet it is done through a species; therefore also the intuitive cognition of the intellect. On the contrary. The disparity is because the species of the senses depend in becoming and being conserved on the actual influx of the present object, and therefore can be a coprinciple of intuitive cognition; but intelligible species equally remain with the object present or absent, and indifferently represent each: therefore they cannot thus concur to intuitive cognition. You will say: A

material object is not actually intelligible, but is made such through a species: therefore its intuitive cognition cannot be had without a species. The antecedent is proven. The object ought to be proportioned to the power; but a material object is unproportioned to the intellect: therefore it ought to be made such through a species. On the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: it is not actually intelligible by abstractive intellection, I concede; by intuitive, I deny the antecedent. For a material object as to intuition is actually intelligible, as much as is from itself, although it cannot be understood by an intellect bound to the senses. Hence to the proof I distinguish the minor: it is unproportioned in being, I concede; in moving, I deny the minor. For even a material object can immediately move an intellect not bound to the senses, just as a material phantasm itself moves the bound intellect. You will say: Every cognition comes about through assimilation: therefore through its species of the object. On the contrary, I deny the consequence. For the cognition itself is an actual expression and formal assimilation of the object: therefore a species is not necessary; hence Scotus posits an agent intellect in Angels only on account of species, so that it can also cognize abstractively. With these things posited:

I assert and say 2. Intelligible species are necessary for abstractive cognition. It is from Scotus in 1. D. 3. Q. 6. §. Ad quæstionem ergo: saying: When therefore it is taken, that a species in the intellect is not the cause of the presence of the object, I say; that this is false concerning the presence under the aspect of knowability, at least in abstractive cognition, about which we are now speaking. It is proven 1. From intellectual memory we remember past things; but this cannot be done without intelligible species; therefore: the minor is proven. Sensitive memory with sensible species does not suffice, for this is not in the separated soul, which can remember: nor can it be done through a habit, by saying, with one intellection made a habit is then acquired, by which we remember; for a habit is not made by only one act, rather what is representative of the object in causing does not hold from the side of the power, but of the object; but a habit holds from the side of the power, and a species from the side of the object to be supplied: therefore that cannot be done without intelligible species. It is proven 2. Both because the intellect through abstraction cognizes universal natures; but such cannot be represented perfectly in a phantasm, but only in an intelligible species: therefore such is necessary. The major is clear; because abstractive cognition is that through which a nature is attained not only purified from materiality, but also from individual conditions so that here and now through the species the universal nature alone is represented: therefore. Both because we often cognize objects not present and existing: therefore species ought to be present to the intellect in place of the objects; but that cognition of non-present and non-existing things is abstractive: therefore. You will object: That intelligible species for abstractive cognition would either be the immediate cause of the intellection with the intellect, or rather the object shining forth in the species? Not the first, otherwise not the object, but the species would be understood. Not the second: because the object in the species has only diminished being, which cannot

be the real cause of a real cognition. I respond. And I say that the species itself is the immediate cause; yet it does not follow that not the object itself, but the species is understood, because the species does not concur to the intellection, except as it is vicarious of the object, and although it is the principle of abstractive cognition, yet its terminus is the object in the species, and thus also the object itself is cognized. You will say: We cognize many things abstractively without species, as God, intelligences etc. Because these cannot send species to the intellect by the ministry of the senses. On the contrary, I deny the assumption; for although cognition is always done through a species, yet it can sometimes be done through an alien species indirectly, as is concerning God and intelligences. I add. Our intellect can understand many things simultaneously and at once through the mode of many: yet not by one and the same act; unless the objects are subordinated through the mode of superior and inferior, but by many and distinct acts. The reason for the first is; because vision attains many disparate objects: therefore also the intellect. Indeed the intellect understands correlatives; but these are necessarily many: therefore. The reason for the second is; because one species of many disparate quiddities cannot be given: therefore neither an expressed species of many objects. The antecedent is clear. Because any act whatsoever is determined to a certain adequate object of its own, from which it takes unity and specification: therefore one act and one species cannot present many disparate things; for the unity of the posterior naturally depends on the unity of the prior; but an act is posterior to the object as the measured to the measure: therefore. But the reason for the third can be deduced from q. 1. Assertion 3, in colligation 2.

Question IV. Is understanding formally producing a mental word?

Note 1: According to Scotus, a created mental word can be described as an act of intelligence produced by perfect memory, not existing without actual understanding, representing the divine word to us. It is called an act of intelligence because it is a form actuating the intellect and making it formally and actually understanding. It is said to be from fecund memory, i.e. from the intellect informed and pregnant with an intelligible species which is the seed of the object. It is said to not exist without actual understanding, since the word informs and denotes the actually understanding intellect, subsisting as long as actual understanding remains. Finally, it is said to represent the divine word, because we must investigate the origin and nature of the divine word from a certain likeness to our word. However, in the production of the divine and our word there is this difference: in divinity the production or speaking, as Scotus says, is not prior to the understanding by which God formally understands, nor is it the action or making of the essential understanding by which God is understanding. But in us speaking is always prior to understanding. The reason is that an intellectual creature always understands through

produced understanding. Since it does not have the object present to itself, it must make it present by producing its own word, which is the object intentionally present. But the divine intellect is always operative before productive. For theologians hold that every perfection simply, not including respect to creatures, in divinity is prior to the notional. Nor does the divine intellect produce the word in order to understand or from necessity, like the created intellect, but only from its fecundity and excellence.

Note 2: In any understanding there are three things: the action by which the intellect is called productive of understanding; the passion by which the intellect is called receptive of understanding or expressed species; and the vital quality of understanding by which the intellect is called formally understanding. Hence understanding, mental word, mental concept, operation or act of the intellect, and notion are synonymous. But understanding and producing understanding are not the same, because production, which is called speaking, is only causally, not formally understanding. For the mental word is truly produced by the intellect through the species as a fecund seed by an action distinct from the word. That action, as I said, is called speaking, as is clear from the vocal word which is produced by true locution and speaking. That the action is distinct from the word is also clear: an action is distinct from its term when the effect so proceeds from the cause that it can be produced by another. The same mental word in its entity could be produced by different principles, e.g. by God, or by a power with or without a habit. Otherwise, an act done by a power with a habit would depend essentially on it so it could not be done without it, and then the habit would give the power simply, not easily, contrary to the nature of acquired habits.

Note 3: Our understanding is not formally and properly an action, because every properly called action always has some produced term, but understanding is not productive of a term, but is itself the ultimate act and perfection of the intellective power by which it perceives. For according to the Philosopher, to understand is not to act but to be affected in a way. That is, formal understanding is the reception of that quality, the mental word, which is produced by speaking and received in the intellect itself. From this it is clear that understanding consists inchoatively in that operation of the intellect by which the mental word is produced, but consummatively and formally in the reception of that mental word. Since it is the expressed likeness of the understood thing, it will undoubtedly inform the intellect by adhering to it and assimilate it to the known object, and thus make it understanding. Scotus clearly expresses this, saying: Speaking is not formally any act of understanding, but it is an act of the intellect. But no act of understanding is formally productive, but some other act formally naturally preceding or following can be productive, such as the act of speaking. Thus he expressly says: Speaking and understanding are not the same formally, because understanding is a perfection simply, but speaking is not. With this noted:

First proposition: The created mental word is understanding itself. The reason is from Scotus, saying: I concede that the offspring notion is truly generated, but that production is not actual understanding, because actual understanding is not an action of the genus of action, but is a quality born to terminate such an action, which is signified by speaking, or in general by eliciting. He therefore means to say that the mental word is what is produced by speaking. But understanding is produced by speaking. The minor is proved: To be produced by speaking is nothing other than to be produced by an action of the intellect. But understanding is produced by an action of the intellect. Indeed, the mental word is that which is the image of the object. But understanding is such. Hence Scotus finally concludes, saying: Therefore, the word is actual understanding. This is confirmed by Augustine: For our thought reaching that which we know, and thence formed, is our word. Do not say: Augustine says the word which sounds outwardly is a sign of the word which lies hidden within. But the external word is not a sign of understanding, but of the understood thing. Therefore, not understanding but the understood thing is the mental word. On the contrary, the minor is denied. For the external word signifies both, understanding or concept and the understood thing, but first the thing; understanding in relation to it, insofar as it is a means to signifying the thing. Nor is the proposition "Man is an animal" false, as if it should be "The understanding of man is the understanding of animal." For the truth of propositions depends on the principal signified. You will say: Augustine says the phantasm of Carthage in memory is its word. But by phantasm he understands the intelligible species. Therefore, the intelligible species and not understanding is the word. On the contrary, Augustine can be understood either of actual imagination through phantasm, and is related in the same way as understanding, or if he is understood of the intelligible species, he only wants it to be the word causally, not formally. For not the impressed species or virtual likeness of the understood thing, but the formal and expressed, which is understanding itself, properly exhibits the object present in the aspect of the understood object. For through the impressed species it is only present habitually in first act in the aspect of the intelligible object, but through the expressed or understanding it is made actually present in second act in the aspect of the understood object. You will say: The word is produced, but understanding is not. The minor is proved: Understanding is an action. But an action is not done, but is that by which something else is done. On the contrary, the minor is denied. To the proof, I distinguish the major: it is an action of the genus of action, I deny; it is an action of the genus of quality by which it perceives, I concede the major. And thus with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence.

Second proposition: Not any understanding is a word, but that which is naturally generated and produced by fecund memory, i.e., by the intellect together with the object present in itself or in species. The reason is that two conditions are required to constitute the mental

word. First, that the understanding be truly generated and produced, for lack of which the divine essential understanding in the three Persons is not a word. For although it is from fecund memory, it is not truly produced, but emanating, since the divine understanding Father produces the Son. Second, that it be produced naturally, not freely, for lack of which vision in the blessed is not a word, because freely produced. Do not say: The Word or divine Son is made through understanding. But this in divinity is not truly produced, since it is common to the three Persons. On the contrary, I distinguish the major: it is made through unbegotten understanding, I deny; through begotten, I concede the major. And thus with the minor distinguished, I deny the consequence. For only the essential understanding is in the three Persons, but not the notional and begotten. For this is only in the Father, through which the Son is made as word. Hence a further difference between the divine and our word is that ours constitutes us formally understanding, but the divine word does not constitute God formally understanding, because the divine Father does not understand through begotten but unbegotten notion. Therefore, we produce understanding from need; but the divine Father from plenitude of perfection, because fecund memory naturally produces offspring, which in us is an accident really distinct, because fecundated by a species which is an accident. But the memory of the divine Father is fecundated by the object of the divine essence itself really identified, and therefore produces offspring which is substance. With this posited, I assert and say to the question: To understand is not formally to produce a mental word. From Scotus saying: But no act of understanding is formally productive, but some other act formally naturally preceding (in creatures) or following (in divinity) can be productive, such as the act of speaking. It is proved first: Understanding is not a productive action of the word. Therefore, to understand is not to produce a mental word. The antecedent is proved: Understanding does not have a term which it would produce. Therefore, it is not a productive action. The antecedent is proved: If understanding were productive of a term, it would be impossible for us to understand understanding itself without its term which it would produce, just as it is impossible to understand heating without the heat produced. But we can perceive understanding without another term produced besides the represented object. Therefore, the minor is proved. In the cognition of an angel by which it intuitively knows itself, it does not perceive anything other than its understanding about itself. Therefore, we can also perceive other understandings in this way.

It is proved second: The productive action of heat does not make a hot thing, but it has this from the heat produced by that action. Therefore, also the productive action of a mental word does not render the intellect formally understanding, but this will be had from the produced quality of understanding. Therefore, to understand is not to produce a word. But the antecedent is clear, because to be hot is to have heat, not to produce heat.

It is proved third: If God alone caused understanding in the created intellect, as we will say in the next question, God would not be said to understand by that understanding, but that intellect in which the understanding was caused. Since the aspect of the vitality of understanding does not consist essentially in physical life, i.e., in motion and origin from a living principle, but in intentional life, which implies perception and expression of the object, and coupling of the power with the object by means of a vital act. Therefore, just as to precede understanding is not immediately to understand, so to understand is not to produce a mental word.

It is proved fourth: The mental word must be said and made through some true physical action productive of some term, as is clear in the vocal word. But understanding itself is not such a true physical action. The minor is proved: to understand is an immanent action, because besides it there is no work effected, as in a transient action as its term. Therefore.

You will object: The intellect does not produce a mental word except by speaking. But it does not speak except by understanding. Therefore, to understand is formally to produce a mental word. I respond: I distinguish the minor. The intellect does not speak except by finally understanding, I concede; except by formally understanding, I deny the minor. For to understand is only the term and end of speaking, from which the intellect is denominated not understanding, but rather making to be understood.

You will say: That understanding is terminated to something made. Therefore, to understand itself can formally be to produce some word. The antecedent is proved. A habit is made from frequent understandings. Therefore, understanding itself is terminated to something made. On the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: to something in the aspect of a real produced effect, I deny; in the aspect of a declared object and intentional effect, I concede the antecedent. To the proof I distinguish the antecedent: a habit is made from frequent understandings or acts as principles by which and together with a power, as fire heats with heat, I concede; from acts as actions of the genus of action, as heat is produced by heating, as is the question here, I deny the antecedent. Otherwise it would follow that a habit is a mental word, contrary to the common understanding.

You will say: To understand is to live. But to live is to operate from within. Therefore, to understand is to operate, but something other than a habit, consequently a mental word. On the contrary, I distinguish the major: it is to live with physical vitality, I deny; with intentional vitality, I concede the major. But that vitality includes physical action, not this

which alone is of the concept of understanding, although in us it regularly has physical vitality annexed accidentally, insofar as it is produced by a power in which it inheres.

You will say: Understanding itself includes the action by which it is produced. Therefore, to understand itself is to produce and operate a word. The antecedent is proved: otherwise understanding could totally come from within. But this is not so. Therefore. On the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: it includes formally, I deny; presuppositively, I concede the antecedent. For that action by which understanding is produced does not pertain to the formality of understanding, since such is had in God, namely essential and unbegotten understanding, without such action. Hence understanding is not a proper physical action, but only analogical and intentional.

You will say: Every act of the intellect is essentially understanding, as of sight, vision. But the word is produced through an act of the intellect. Therefore, through understanding, and so to understand is to produce a word. On the contrary, I deny the major. For speaking is indeed an act of the intellect, but not formally understanding, but only causally, which is also true of vision and other vital acts. For to understand formally is only to operate vitally intentionally by expressing the object, for which formal effect a physical action is not required, just as for no other formal effect of another quality, although operation and action are usually confused. But in vital powers they are two distinct things. For action signifies production and elicitation, but operation signifies the vital act itself by which the operator is informed, or in God is identified with it. Therefore, in producing a vital act a power exercises physical life, but in operating through it, i.e., tending into the object, intentional life.

QUESTION V. Can understanding be produced by God alone in the created intellect?

It should be noted that what we will say here about understanding should also be said, with appropriate modifications, about other vital acts such as hearing, seeing, etc. Vital powers should be considered in two ways: some are imperfect and only productive of their acts, such as nutrition, locomotion, etc. Others are perfect and both productive of acts and operative with them, such as all the senses, intellect, and will.

The former powers are so essentially connected with their effects, and vice versa, that if they were produced by God alone, they could not be called intrinsically vital acts, but only

extrinsically, insofar as they are produced by an extrinsic agent having life. Hence through such acts the powers could not be said to nourish themselves, but to be nourished.

The latter powers are not so connected; hence, if they were produced by God, they could be called vital acts, because the vitality of those acts does not depend on production, but on the operation of the powers on their objects. This consists in the reception of the acts, and in tending through them to their proper objects, of which they are the expressed likenesses, and in the denomination they bestow on the powers, so that they are said to be formally understanding, willing, etc. With this noted, I assert and say to the question:

An understanding can be produced by God alone in the created intellect without the latter's cooperation, and it would still be a vital act. And the intellect in which that understanding was placed would vitally perceive through it. This is the view of Scotus in 1, d. 3, q. 7 and 8, §. ad auctoritatem, where he says: "Understanding, insofar as it is that by which we formally understand, is a form received in the intellect; but we do not understand through it insofar as it is caused by the intellect, if it is caused by it. For if God were to cause it and impress it on our intellect, we would understand no less through it."

The first part is proven: 1. God can by Himself alone produce an effect, if it is an absolute being, which He can efficiently produce together with a created cause, since there is no contradiction. But God produces understanding, which is an absolute quality, with the created cause efficiently. Therefore, He can produce it by Himself alone. Indeed, even if the intellect were to concur also in the genus of material cause, God could still supply its causality in the genus of efficient cause, as is clear from Physics, book 2, d. 4, q. 3.

It is proven secondly: The intellect or another perfect vital power with respect to understanding or operation is an extrinsic cause, since they do not belong to the intrinsic constitution of the transient act. But God can supply the genus of an extrinsic cause. Therefore, He can produce understanding by Himself alone without the concurrence of the intellect.

The second part is proven: Vitality in those acts is an essential difference. But nothing can be without its essential difference. Therefore. Note, however, that this vitality is only operative, not productive, as is clear from the note.

The third part is proven: Through that act which God would produce by Himself alone, the intellect would formally understand by using it. But this is to operate vitally. Therefore. The major is proven. The production of the act does not contribute to vital operation, but only the tendency of the power to the object. All this would be had in the supposed case. Therefore. The antecedent is clear from the preceding question.

You will object: A vital act by its intrinsic nature is an immanent act. Therefore, it requires being produced by the principle in which it is received. But that act would be received in the created power, not in God. Therefore.

I respond by denying the consequence. For it suffices for the nature of an immanent act that it be in a power operating through it, even if not in a power efficiently causing it.

You will say: A vital act requires an intrinsic principle. But this would not be present. Therefore. On the contrary, I distinguish the major. An intrinsic principle either formally or eminently, I concede; always formally, I deny the major. Therefore, God would be the eminent principle supplying for the intrinsic one. Indeed, the major could be denied, because even the object concurs to the immanent action, and yet it is extrinsic.

You will say: There can be no vital operation without attention. But without the action of the power there is no attention. Therefore. On the contrary, I deny the minor. For attention is the tendency of the power through an act to the object, and not production. For God understands and attends most of all through unproduced acts.

You will say: Through that understanding, the created intellect would understand and not understand. But this is a contradiction. Therefore, so is such an understanding. The consequence is proven. It would understand, as is supposed, and it would not understand, because to understand is the same as to produce an understanding.

On the contrary, I deny the consequence. And I say that it would understand. Therefore, I deny the second part and its reason, because to understand, according to Aristotle, is to undergo something. Hence, if the intellect only produced the understanding and did not receive it, it would not understand. But if it received it, even if it did not produce it, it would understand.

Therefore, that understanding produced by God is still vital, because by its nature it would require being produced by a vital power, just as heat has the nature of heat even if it were miraculously produced by God.

You will say: Understanding is a mental word. But an essential relation to the producing power is essential to a mental word, since it naturally requires being produced. Therefore. On the contrary, I distinguish the major. It is a mental word taken either materially or formally, I concede; always taken formally, I deny the major. For taken formally, it expresses the relation of something produced in a natural way to what produces it, which relation is separable from understanding. Hence, an understanding produced by God would not be a mental word formally, but it would still be an expressed likeness constituting the intellect as formally understanding.

You will say: A living being is distinguished from a non-living being by having in itself the active principle of its proper perfection. Therefore, if understanding came to a power from without, it could not in this way be living, and consequently it could not operate vitally through it, and so it would not be a vital action. On the contrary, I distinguish the major. A living being is thus distinguished from a non-living being by physical and productive life, I concede; by operative and intentional life, I deny the major, as is clear in this part, d. 1, q. 1, note 2.

You will say: At least volition cannot be from God without the concurrence of the power of the will. Therefore. The antecedent is proven. The will in which that volition made by God would be received would not be free, which is contrary to the nature of volition. On the contrary, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish: it would not be free with a productive freedom, I concede; with an operative freedom, I deny, because through an act of this kind the will would still tend to the object freely and voluntarily.

You will say: Therefore, the will could be borne to the unknown, namely, if God were to place a volition of an object unknown by the intellect. But this is repugnant. Therefore. On the contrary, I concede the major and deny the minor. For this would not be unfitting for God, for through God there could be given a volitive soul and not an intellective one, as many hold. Or it could be said that God would also have to produce in the intellect a cognition of that object.

You will say: Therefore, God could place vision, taste, etc., in a stone, because they are material, like a stone. Therefore, a stone would see, taste, etc., for a form cannot fail to bestow its formal effect. But this is repugnant. Therefore. On the contrary, I concede the first consequent and deny the second. For to see formally is not to have vision, but through vision to tend vitally to the object, which does not belong to a stone. Hence, I distinguish the last reason: it cannot fail to bestow the primary formal effect, which is to inform with vision, I concede; the secondary effect, which is to see, I deny, for this can be impeded.

QUESTION VI. Is the will more perfect than the intellect?

I assert and say to the question: The will is more perfect than the intellect. This is the view of Scotus in 4, d. 49, q. 4, §. *juxta hoc*, where he says: "That the will is more noble than the intellect is probably concluded by the argument taken from the greater eligibility of volition than of intellection." And a little later he adds: "The will commanding the intellect is a superior cause with respect to its act; but the intellect, if it is the cause of volition, is a cause subserving the will as having the first action in the order of generation." This is against the Thomists.

It is proven first: The will alone is a free power having dominion over its act and also over the other powers, since it is the Queen moving the other powers and commanding the intellect. Thus I will, thus I command; the will stands in place of reason. Therefore, it is more perfect than the intellect.

The adversaries respond that the intellect also moves the will by directing and commanding, which is a more perfect kind of moving than merely moving by commanding. On the contrary, this is rather a ministry than a command. For the intellect through practical judgment does not command the will, but serves it by advising and referring, like a counselor to a prince. Therefore, the will can command the intellect to propose different advice.

It is proven secondly: That power is more noble in which there is a more noble habit. But the habit of charity is most noble, according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 13: "But the greatest of these is charity." And it is in the will. Therefore.

The adversaries respond that the Apostle is speaking of the state of the wayfarer, for in heaven the light of glory, which is in the intellect, is more noble. On the contrary, this is from St. Augustine, that no gift of God is greater than or equal to charity. Indeed, the Apostle says to the Ephesians 3 that the charity of Christ is supereminent to knowledge. But Christ was not only a wayfarer but also a comprehensor.

It is proven thirdly: A more perfect act argues to a more perfect power. But the act of the will is more perfect than the act of the intellect. Therefore. The minor is proven: The supreme act of the will is love, by which we love God, and the supreme act of the intellect is the knowledge of God. But the former is more perfect, because it unites one more to God, the supreme good, since aversion is repugnant to the act of love, but not to intellection. And this is so not only in the genus of morals but also of nature. For love unites the lover to God more than the knower, since anyone desires more to be loved than to be known.

You will object first: A power rational by essence is more perfect than one rational by participation. But the intellect is rational by essence, the will by participation, since of itself it is a blind power, which cannot operate unless it is led by reason. Therefore. I respond by distinguishing the minor. The intellect is an adequately rational power by essence, I deny; inadequately, I concede the minor. For if "rational" is taken for being intellectual, as it is distinguished from sensitive, in which sense human nature is called rational, then both the intellect and the will are powers rational by essence, and so man differs from brutes by both intellect and will. Indeed, more so by will, for freedom is the greatest perfection distinguishing man from brute. And although the cognitive power is better known than the volitive power, since some have denied the latter, attributing everything to fate, still it does not follow that man cannot be distinguished from brute more perfectly on the part of the volitive power, which does not have free will, although it has spontaneity. But if "rational" is taken only for cognitive with discourse, it does not belong to the will. But the argument could be turned back: a power free by essence is more perfect than one free by participation. But the will is free by essence, the intellect by participation. Therefore. Nor is the will properly blind and ignorant, but rather non-seeing and non-knowing, since the will by its nature is not capable of knowledge, but only of volition. Hence, not to know does not import an imperfection in the will. For imperfection is not a simple negation of form, but of a perfection and form due in a capable subject.

You will say: The cognitive power is more perfect than the appetitive power, because according to Aristotle, the happiness of human life consists in contemplation, which is in the intellect. Therefore. On the contrary, I deny the antecedent. For they are equal, or the appetitive surpasses it, because the cognitive power is instituted by nature to minister to

the appetitive power. To Aristotle I say that he did not distinguish the intellect from the will in the aspect of a physical operative principle, but took them for the same principle as opposed to nature, and so wisdom includes both operations, because wisdom is the same as savory or wisdom with affection. Contemplation is indeed the most perfect operation of the intellect, but not if it is compared with the enjoyment of God, which is in the will.

You will say: The act of the intellect is purer, because it contracts no impurity from the object, for to understand evil is not evil. But the act of the will contracts evil, because to will evil is evil. Therefore. On the contrary: The intellect is also rendered false by a false object. You will say: This is not the impurity of evil. On the contrary: This is not to the point. For otherwise, sense would be more noble than the will, because it is less impure in this way. Therefore, the intellect is incapable of such impurity.

You will object secondly: Where there is greater dependence, there is greater imperfection. But the will depends more on the intellect than the intellect on the will, because nothing is willed unless it is foreknown, but many things are known which are not willed. Therefore. I respond by denying the major. For form depends more on matter than matter on form, and yet form is more noble. Indeed, the intellect depends on phantasm, and yet it is more perfect. Therefore, the will only depends on the intellect for the showing of the object, as a master on a servant going before him with a torch in the dark, whose ministry he needs, but not so that without the intellect the will could not command and direct. For it can authoritatively command against the intellect, although the intellect directs by way of counsel.

You will say: Proper command is not an act of the will, but of the intellect. Therefore. The antecedent is proven: If command were in the will, because it moves the intellect and the other powers, there would also be command in the appetite of an animal. And an angel, when it moves a stone, would be said to command it. But this is unfitting. Therefore. On the contrary, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I equally deny the antecedent. For there is disparity, because the appetite of an animal does not move itself, but is moved by an appetible object, and so it does not move the other faculties or the motive faculty by dominion, but the latter is impelled by an appetible object by means of the passive impetus of the sensitive appetite. Nor does an angel command a stone, because for this the intimation of a decree is required as a necessary condition, which is not in a stone, but it is in the other powers from the will.

You will say: It is commonly said from Aristotle: "Reason commands and appetite obeys." And from Sacred Scripture, "By wisdom kings reign and princes decree justice" (Prov. 8:15). Therefore, command is in the intellect. On the contrary, Aristotle takes reason for the whole rational nature from intellect and will, which the sensitive appetite obeys, but not the rational appetite, which is the will. Moreover, kings reign by wisdom directively, not imperatively, physically, and really, but at most morally.

You will say: Kings command through laws. But these are acts of the intellect. Therefore. On the contrary, I deny the minor. For law, considered as a rule, indeed pertains to the intellect, but considered as a command, and as to the substance of the act, pertains to the will, since it is nothing other than the decree or good pleasure of the prince.

You will say: The act of command is expressed by "Do this." But this is in the intellect. Therefore. On the contrary, I deny the minor. For that is in the will, since it is rather in the intellect, "this is to be done," which only denotes a moral command. Hence, at most, a practical judgment could be called a moral command by way of a dictate, but not a physical command with real dominion. For while that practical judgment stands, the will can command the opposite.

QUESTION VII. Is it only the divine will, or rather its efficacy, that is the extrinsic root of created freedom?

It should be noted first that to act freely here is not taken to mean acting spontaneously and uncoerced, nor acting with satisfaction. For in this way freedom would not be essentially opposed to naturalness, because universally every agent, when it acts according to its inclination, is said to act spontaneously, like animals and stones. Likewise, since animals act according to the inclination of their appetite, they certainly also act with satisfaction. Therefore, to act freely here must be taken to mean intrinsic indetermination to opposites, as it excludes intrinsic determination to one thing.

Furthermore, there are also two types of voluntariness: free from coercion, and thus every free act is voluntary. Secondly, as a certain species distinct from the free, which is voluntary and in agreement with the natural inclination of the will, against which the will does not fight back. However, this voluntariness, which is effectively from the will according to its inclination, is distinguished from the free, and can stand with the necessary, like beatific love. Indeed, such voluntariness is somehow opposed to the free, since in the same act it

can diminish the notion of freedom. For while the agent acts freely and voluntarily, in acting it approaches the motions of delight, and the more vehement the motion, the more the will is drawn to act, and thus the voluntary is increased and the free diminished. For the more it is drawn to one part, the less it remains indifferent to both.

It should be noted secondly that the use of freedom here is nothing other than the exercise of the free faculty and looks to the second act of the free power, which not only supposes the active indifference of the bare power, but also its indifference under the necessarily required things proximately apt and disposed to act. Moreover, concerning this freedom, as it were of contradiction and contrariety, just as concerning the composite and divided sense, see more in Logic D. 4, q. 5, and in Physics Book 2, D. 3, q. 7.

With these things noted,

Proposition 1. The will in the instant of time, while it operates, operates freely. So Scotus supposes in Book 2, D. 5, q. 2, §. It is argued thirdly. The reason is: because, if in that instant it would not operate freely, it would never be free, or produce a free effect. Therefore, the antecedent is proven: the will would otherwise be free, it would be most free in the time immediately preceding the operation. But not then. Therefore, the minor premise is proven. There it was only free because it was able to exercise free use in the following time. Therefore, it would not be actually free. The consequence is proven: no one sins in what he has done or is going to do, as is drawn out by St. Augustine, Epistle 107, but in what he does. But one sins by actual freedom. Therefore, if it was free in the time before, it would never be actually free; indeed it would never produce a free effect, because the effect is not called free unless it is actually done by a free cause. The consequence is proven: a cause is not a cause unless it actually causes. Therefore, it is not a free cause unless it actually operates freely.

Nor should you say: The effect is free because it was able not to be posited in being, not because for then in the instant in which it is, it is able not to be. Therefore, on the contrary, I deny the antecedent, because before it was not a being. Therefore, neither an effect actually free.

You will say: The will in the instant of operation determines itself to one part. Therefore, it does not remain free and indifferent. The consequence is clear. For that action can no longer not be, according to that: Everything that is, when it is, it is necessary that it be.

On the contrary, I deny the consequence. To prove it, I distinguish: That action can no longer not be in first act – I deny it; in second act – I concede. For although the will is determined in second act, it is nevertheless still indifferent in first act. For it actually operates from an indifferent power, which it always retains, since the determination of the second act does not remove the indifference of the first act. Moreover, that axiom only infers that the action of the will is necessary from supposition, but not simply according to its essence.

You will say: It implies for the same instant that the cause has an elicited and suspended action. But in the instant of operation the action is elicited. Therefore it cannot be suspended and free.

On the contrary, I distinguish the major premise: for the same instant jointly at the same time – I concede; disjunctively – I deny the major premise. And this follows from the force of the freedom of the power. For freedom does not say the power of simultaneity to opposites, but the simultaneity of power.

Proposition 2. The intrinsic root of the liberty of the created will is not the indifference of judgment, but the indifference of the power of the will itself.

The reason for the first is: both because the intellect cannot indifferently regulate the will to do this or not do this, except by demonstrating one thing and sophisticatedly or probabilistically discussing the other or both. But this cannot be in divine freedom. Therefore, neither in freedom as such. The minor premise is clear, because God does not sophisticatedly or probabilistically discuss any object. But the major premise is proven: Since those conclusions for both parts are contradictory, they cannot both be true. Therefore, certain judgment about one and false about the other will demonstrate, so that it may indifferently induce the will, which is unfitting. Then because the indifference of the intellect to judging the opposite arises from various means and motives which concur to judging more probably. But this does nothing for freedom, which even when all things required for acting are posited can not act. Therefore,

The reason for the second is: because the indifference of the will is formally found in the will. Therefore, it is something of the will, and radically in it, because the mode and specific difference of a thing emanates from that same thing of which it is the mode and difference.

Consequently, freedom is in the will alone formally and radically, whose nature it is to be able to tend indifferently or not tend to the object.

Nor should you say: From the greater or lesser attention of the intellect to the goodness or malice of the object, freedom in the will is increased or diminished. Therefore, judgment is its intrinsic root. The antecedent is clear, because the first motions are not called free but necessary.

On the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: physical freedom is increased – I deny it; moral freedom – I concede. For moral freedom especially depends on such attention. For in order for someone to act rightly or not rightly morally, knowledge of the honest good or opposed evil is required. For freedom simply and physically, however, knowledge of the natural good is sufficient, and thus there is freedom in children before the use of reason. Therefore, the judgment of the intellect is only required as a condition, not as the cause of freedom.

Moreover, the first motions are entirely necessary, but they are not acts of the will, but of the sensitive appetite. Or if they are acts of the will, they are excused from sin not so much from a defect of full deliberation as from a vehement passion drawing the will into consent with itself on account of the connection.

You will say: God necessarily loves himself as to exercise. But this is because no defect appears in him which he could understand. Therefore, on the contrary, I deny the minor premise. For God is not unable to cease from self-love for that reason, but because self-love is an absolutely simple perfection. Moreover, it is repugnant for God to lack any absolutely simple perfection.

Proposition 3. Freedom in act is not essential to the act, but accidental.

The reason is: because the same act in number or species is made necessary from free and vice versa. Therefore, freedom is accidental to it. The antecedent is proven: Through a change of attention the same act from necessary is made free or free made necessary. Indeed, in the act of love, the concurrence of God prepared could have been lacking, which concurrence being deficient that love would be necessary, and that being given the same love in number would be free.

Nor should you say: Vitality is something essential to the act of willing. But freedom is a mode of vitality. Therefore, on the contrary, I distinguish as to these and similar arguments the minor premise: remote freedom, that is: pure indifference and bare power is a mode of vitality – I concede; proximate freedom, that is: which having all things required for acting could not be in act – I deny the minor premise.

You will say: A free principle is essentially diverse in the notion of principle from a necessary principle. Therefore, also the effect of a free principle must be essentially diverse from the effect of a necessary principle. But by nothing else than by freedom. Therefore, on the contrary, I deny the antecedent. For each mode of operating, namely freely proximately and operating necessarily by necessity opposed to this freedom, can belong to the same principle constituted under diverse disposition. Hence, if by a non-free act a natural act is understood, it seeks to be produced by a diverse principle. If, however, a necessary act excluding only proximate freedom is understood, it can be produced by a free principle, although not proximately free, but remotely under the diverse disposition said in the proposition.

Proposition 4. Freedom in act does not add a relation or intrinsic real mode over the entity of volition, but an extrinsic denomination coming from the proximate indifference of the volitive power.

The reason is: because freedom in act corresponds as term to the freedom of the power as principle. But this is not for the will a physical reason for acting, but only for denominating it freely producing. Therefore, it cannot make a real relation of the freely produced to result in the produced act to the will freely producing, but only an extrinsic denomination of the freely produced by the accidental mode of freedom. The consequence is proven: The physical reason for producing in the cause is usually the reason for founding a relation of reason to the effect to be produced.

Nor should you say: Therefore, the acts of the will would not be more free than the acts of the other powers, which are also denominatively free. On the contrary, I deny what is inferred. Because the acts of the external powers are only denominatively, remotely, and mediately free. For they are not free except by means of the internal act. But the acts of the will are denominatively, proximately, and immediately free from the will producing them.

Moreover, not all acts which are subject to the will must be denominatively free. For the heating which is subject to the divine will is not free, but only those which by their nature seek to be produced by an indifferent principle. Hence, to the free power taken specifically there certainly corresponds something real and physical in the act, since it is physically operative. If, however, it is taken reduplicatively free, since as such it is not a reason for acting in the free power, but rather a certain accidental mode affecting the free power and denominating it as such, it cannot derive any physical reality into the act; but only an extrinsic denomination of being able to be made or not made.

With these things posited, I assert and say to the question: Only the freedom of the divine will, not its efficacy, is the first extrinsic root of created freedom. It is from Scotus in Book 1, D. 2, q. 2, §. Having shown it to be, saying: Something is caused contingently. Therefore, the first cause causes contingently. Therefore, the will causes. Proof of the first consequence: Any second cause causes insofar as it is moved by the first. Therefore, if the first necessarily moves, any necessarily causes. Therefore, if some second cause contingently moves, the first will also contingently move, because the second cause does not cause except by the power of the first cause, insofar as it is moved by it. Proof of the second consequence: There is no principle of operating contingently except the will or something concomitant to the will, because anything else is from the necessity of nature, and thus not contingently. Therefore, the same also in Book 1, D. 8, q. 5, §. To the arguments for the opinion of the Philosophers, asserts: In contingent things there is some first which is immediate and yet contingent, because it does not stand to the necessary. For the contingent does not follow from the necessary. And therefore here it is necessary to stand to this: the will of God wills this, which is contingent and yet immediate, because no other cause is prior in reason to the will, why it is of this and not of the other. Namely, the contradictory.

It is proven first: It is impossible for a being by participation, or a creature, to remain if a being by essence, or God, does not exist. But created freedom is freedom by participation. Therefore, if there were no free will in God in acts to the outside, neither could freedom and its use remain in us. But thus the extrinsic root without which our freedom would not be is only the freedom of the divine will containing ours. Therefore, the subsumed minor premise is proven: If it were not only the freedom of the divine will, then its efficacy. But not this. Therefore, the minor premise is proven: If God were to act outside not only by freedom but by his efficacy, no action would be in second causes, or if they were to act, they would act necessarily. But this is against the immunity of our freedom. Therefore, the consequence is proven. Both because the first cause naturally respects the caused thing prior to the second. But if it were to respect it with the efficacy of infinite power, it would by nature totally produce it first, and nothing of the second cause. Therefore, then because the cause would be moved insofar as moved, and necessarily moved would necessarily move. But the second

cause acts insofar as it is moved by the first, and if by efficacy from this, then it would necessarily be moved, since efficacy cannot be changed for any sign, consequently second causes would also necessarily act and move.

It is proven secondly: The efficacy of the divine will cannot be a fitting root of created freedom. Therefore, only the will of God is the extrinsic root of created freedom. The antecedent is proven: If God were the root by his efficacy, then he would act as much as he could, not as he willed. Therefore, he would necessitate. But this is not a fitting root of freedom. Therefore, the consequence is proven: If God per impossibile were despoiled of freedom and still remained of infinite power and efficacy, either the divine power would be applied according to the ultimate of its potency, or it would be tempered? Not the second, because in whose power the action is not, neither in his power is the mode of acting and tempering. If the first, therefore God would necessarily apply second causes by his infinite power and efficacy.

You will object: The efficacy of the divine will alone is the cause of things outside and disposes contingent causes to produce such effects. Therefore, it is the first extrinsic root of created freedom. The consequence is proven: Whatever is in things is contained in the omnipotence of God alone by reason of its efficacy. But the mode of operating freely and naturally is something real in created things. Therefore, it is contained in the efficacy of God, consequently this is the root.

I respond, I distinguish the antecedent: The efficacy taken absolutely – I deny it; modified by freedom – I concede the antecedent. For the divine efficacy acts outside as it wills and in the way it wills. For infinite efficacy and highest freedom constitute the divine will as cause to the outside, so that efficacy is the effective principle of all things as to the thing, and freedom as to the mode of being. And thus second causes can also be considered in two ways: either as they have the power of acting precisely, or as they have the power of operating in such a way, namely freely or naturally. In the first way they are entirely contained in the efficacy of the first cause. In the second way, however, they are contained only in the precise notion of the highest freedom of God. For from that notion it most greatly arises that second causes attain effects proportioned to their nature, insofar as the divine will freely concurs with free causes by exhibiting concurrence prepared for either, but with natural causes freely indeed, but by exhibiting concurrence to one.

You will say: Plurality proceeds from unity, the non-uniform from the uniform. Therefore, it is not repugnant for the contingent to have its act and root from the freedom and necessary efficacy of God.

On the contrary, I deny the consequence, because just as the non-uniform can only come from the uniform in first act, so the contingent can only come from the necessary in first act, but not in second act. For an impossible contingent effect is from a necessarily acting cause.

You will say: The freedom in us is not an absolutely simple perfection, but participated from the freedom of God. Therefore, from the supposition that the divine freedom is lacking, it would not be necessary for created freedom to be lacking, consequently it could still be from the efficacy of God.

On the contrary, I deny the consequence. For although the perfections in us that are participated have mixed imperfections and are not absolutely simple perfections, in their metaphysical concept, however, they prescind from the created and the uncreated, and can be called absolutely simple perfections. And thus they cannot remain in us if they were lacking in God, which is also to be said of freedom.

To these I add: A pure free omission is possible, so that the will from its freedom omits independently of every positive act of the will, which would be the direct cause, so that it positively does not want to hear Mass; or the indirect cause of such an omission, as wanting to play at the time of Mass, yet not independently of every positive act of the intellect. It is deduced from Scotus in Book 2, D. 42, q. 4, §. To the fourth question. Where he acknowledges the sin of omission, and therefore free. Likewise in Book 3, D. 25, q. 2, §. Therefore I say. Where concerning the act of faith he acknowledges a pure omission of the will, saying: When the credible is present, the intellect can believe through an infused habit, provided the will does not move against it.

The reason for the first is: because the will is free both by the freedom of contrariety and of contradiction. Therefore, just as the freedom of contrariety can be immediately exercised through contrary acts, so the freedom of contradiction through an act and its omission and immediate lack. For the freedom of contradiction does not include in its essential concept the ability to will and to not will, but the ability to will and simply not will the object, as is clear from the definition of that freedom, which is not to operate or to will not to operate, or to operate something else, but to operate and simply not to operate. Indeed, it would be

against the nature of the freedom of contradiction if it were exercised through two positive acts. For such are never contradictory.

The reason for the second, however, is: because if the intellect in no way adverted to the object, neither distinctly nor confusedly, the omission could not be called voluntary. Because nothing is willed which is not foreknown. Hence, then the omission without foreknowledge would not be its privation, but negation, which is also found in a stone.

Nor should you say: The voluntary proceeds from the will as from a principle. But pure omission does not proceed, since it is nothing. Therefore, on the contrary, I distinguish the minor premise: it does not proceed from the will as acting – I concede; not as not acting, although it could act – I deny the minor premise. For such a procession suffices for the privative voluntary, as is the case where the act which is omitted could be present according to the capacity. Moreover, although omission is not a productive vital exercise, it is nevertheless a privative operative exercise of the power. And this privation of operation can constitute the will from that part which is the power of not doing, although not from that part which is the power of doing.

You will say: The free is a certain difference of being. Therefore, it cannot belong to pure omission, which is non-being. On the contrary: The freedom belonging to an act or its omission is only an extrinsic denomination coming from the indifference of the power. See more about these things in our Theology, volume 2, treatise 6, question 7, article 4.

QUESTION VIII. In which powers or subjects of the soul are habits placed, and how are they corrupted?

It should be noted: It is certain that there are habits. For we experience that after frequent acts of the same kind a certain facility in operating arises in us, which we previously lacked. Moreover, a habit is nothing other than a permanent quality disposing the subject not to the simple, but to the easy and prompt operation acquired in the powers from the frequency of acts.

It is called a quality. Because a habit is active, like a quality, and because it perfects the subject to operate from the outside, it is in the first species of quality. For if it were from the inside and from nature, it would be some facility innate, as in those who are able to study or

run, which can come from a certain temperament of men and the influences of the heavens, it is not properly a habit, but a power or impotence in the second species of quality.

It is called permanent: to distinguish it from a transient act.

It is said to be from frequent acts: to distinguish it from an infused habit.

It is said: in the powers of the soul. To distinguish it from the inanimate, in which there is not habit, but nature, which is not otherwise accustomed, as Aristotle wants, for example, in a stone to be carried downward. For that which is most determined to one thing cannot be more disposed, as a stone to fall more downward.

It is said: to operate easily and promptly: because, as Scotus teaches in Book 3, D. 33, q. Un., §. This opinion, saying: Habits are posited in the powers not only so that through them the powers may act rightly, but so that they may act delightfully and promptly. Because one can act rightly without a properly acquired habit, as is clear in a father newly converted from vice to good, to whom if reason dictates that something opposed to his accustomed vice is to be chosen, although he chooses it, he does not do so delightfully. For the whole vicious habit is not corrupted immediately in the first act; indeed, it is either nothing or little remitted.

With these things noted,

Proposition 1. Habits are distinguished from acts in number and species.

The reason is: both because a habit is something left by acts, but acts pass away. Then because a habit is a quality by its nature not depending on the actual influx of the power, and is a first act; but an act is a quality depending in becoming and being conserved on the actual influx of the power, since it is an actual tendency to the object, and is a second act. Therefore,

Nor should you say: Act and habit are concerned with the same formal object. Therefore, on the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: in the same way – I deny it; in diverse ways – I concede the antecedent. For a habit is not only specified by the formal object, but also by

the tendency to it, which is diverse. For an act attains the object immediately, but a habit mediately through an act.

From which it comes about that an act is simply more perfect than a habit, and not according to a certain respect, namely as to duration. For the end is more perfect than the means, since this is ordered to that. But an act is the end of a habit, since these are for the sake of operating. Therefore,

Proposition 2. Habits are produced by acts similar to those to which the habits incline as by a total cause.

The reason is: because the power cannot be productive of a habit. Therefore, it is produced by acts. The antecedent is proven: If, for example, the will as a power were the total or partial cause of a habit, it would produce it freely. But not this, because although the will would not want a habit of justice to be produced by acts of justice, it would nevertheless be produced by them. Therefore, and this is the same for the other powers.

Nor should you say: A habit is more perfect than an act. Therefore, it cannot be produced by it. The antecedent is clear, because a habit is an equivocal cause of an act, which is always more perfect than the effect.

On the contrary, I deny the antecedent. For an act more immediately unites the power to the object, and a habit is ordered to an act as to an end, as we said in Proposition 1 to the objection. To the proof I say: A habit is only a partial equivocal cause of an act, which need not be more perfect.

You will say: A habit is just as much increased from the perfection of the effort of the power as from the perfection of the act. For the more one strives, the greater facility he effects. Therefore, a habit is effected immediately by the power.

On the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: it is increased from the perfection of the effort immediately – I deny it; mediately – I concede the antecedent. For the greater intensity in an act, for example, of the will can be taken from the nature of the free or the voluntary, while it is elicited against a difficulty with greater or lesser force. For the more

the effort of the power, the more it perfects the perfection of the free in the act. Hence, only insofar as the effort of the power is the cause of a more intense freedom in the act, is it the cause of a more perfect habit. Nor can a greater effort of the power be given unless a more perfect act is also assigned to it, and thus more immediately the habit is perfected and increased by the act.

You will say: When the vicious act ceases, the will conserves the vicious habit. Therefore, it also concurs to its production, because what can conserve can also produce.

On the contrary, I distinguish the antecedent: It conserves directly – I deny it; indirectly, insofar as it does not produce contrary acts destroying it – I concede the antecedent. If, however, Scotus were cited in Book 1, D. 17, q. 2, §. Against this opinion, conceding that the power is the common cause of the act and the habit, he is to be explained concerning the mediate cause. For there he only intends to teach that a habit concurs to an act effectively and partially. Moreover, observe that if the power is not habituated by a contrary habit, any act in it will cause something of the entity of a habit, because there is no greater reason for one than for another. If, however, the power were habituated by a contrary habit, even an intense act will not be able to cause a perfect habit immediately, but an imperfect one. Because, however, a most intense act is equivalent to many remiss ones, it can in a bare power as one cause a habit, just as many remiss ones.

Proposition 3. The power and the habit are two partial causes of the act both as to substance and mode, and indeed as two subordinate causes, as two dragging a ship. The power, however, is more principal, because it uses the habit, and is unlimited extensively. So Scotus supposes in Book 1, D. 17, q. 2, §. In the third way, saying it can be said that a habit is an active partial cause, with which the power itself is also a partial cause with respect to the perfect act proceeding from the power and habit, although it could be a total cause with respect to the imperfect act preceding the generation of the habit.

The reason for the first is: because a habit renders the power operating easily. For it inclines the power to the act, but this indicates the power as active and not passive. Likewise, a habituated power employs a lesser effort to produce an act, as 4, than if it were without a habit, and thus a habit supplies the active concourse of the power, because the greater or lesser effort of the power is its greater or lesser concourse. Therefore, both are partial causes.

The reason for the second is: because what is essentially prior cannot depend on any cause on which the essentially posterior does not depend in its own way. Therefore, in the act the following mode cannot depend on the habit, on which the act depends, although not totally, but only partially. Or, if it is posited that the power alone concurs to that mode, the habit would be superfluous.

The reason for the third is: if the habit were properly a superior or principal cause, from which the power would have the power of acting, the habituated will would be necessitated in operating. For a habit is a natural cause, since it is naturally and necessarily produced, which cannot be said. Therefore,

Nor should you say: Therefore, a habit would be necessary simply to produce acts exceeding the powers of the power, and not according to a certain respect to operate easily. On the contrary, I deny what is inferred. For it suffices that the power can produce similar acts in itself, so that a habit may not be said to be necessary simply, but according to a certain respect.

With these things proposed, I assert and say first: In the rational powers, namely the intellect and the will, habits can be posited. It is from Scotus in Book 3, D. 33, q. Un., §. To the first argument therefore, saying: A habit is removed from pure natural agents, because they are most inclined of themselves. In the intellect, however, which acts more naturally than the will, a habit is not denied, because it is not most determined or inclined of itself. Nor is this indetermination from the imperfection of the active, but from illumination, which is the perfection of the active. For other merely natural things are so determined to one thing that they cannot be opposed to the contrary, or at least contradictorily. The will, however, is not so determined.

It is proven: A habit is for this, so that a power may operate more easily, more quickly, or more intensely in one of these ways. Therefore, habits are to be posited in those powers which we can know only a posteriori and see that now from frequent exercise, although they remain the same, they operate more perfectly and more intensely than before. But both the intellect and the will are such powers. Therefore, the minor premise is clear concerning the intellect, which has indifference to speculating and penetrating easily and with difficulty. Likewise concerning the will, which is indifferent to contrary acts, and can operate more intensely and more remissly.

You will object: The intellect is most determined concerning first principles, for which reason error cannot occur concerning them. Therefore, a habit is not to be posited in it. Likewise, habits act naturally, and the will freely. Therefore, a habit is not given in the will, since it cannot concur to a free act.

I respond to the first: I deny the consequence. For that highest determination of the intellect is not an obstacle, since it still has indetermination and difficulty for intensity and remission. To the second we will say later.

You will say: That facility could come from the command of the will, or from the perfection of the species acquired through the exercise of acts. Therefore, on the contrary, I deny the antecedent. For without the will a habit of first principles can be had. Likewise, there are given habits which cannot be through species of things acquired by exercise, such as art, prudence, science, etc. For the species do not incline except to the cognition of their proper objects. But the newly acquired facility in the intellect not only facilitates the cognition of things previously known, but also of similar things. Indeed, the species does not hold itself on the part of the power, but of the object. Hence, however much the species may be perfected, it will not be able to facilitate the power intrinsically.

To the second objection, however, I deny the consequence. To the proof I say that a habit is a cause subordinated to the power, and in this way it can concur to a free act, although it is a natural cause. For although the will cannot be borne to an unknown object, the greater intensity coming from a habit can nevertheless be unknown. For in order for the appetite to operate, the cognitive power need not foreknow the act of the appetite itself, but only the object.

I assert and say secondly: In the sensitive powers, both internal and external, whether in men or in brutes, and also in the locomotive power, but not in the vegetative power, habits can be posited. It is from Scotus in Book 3, D. 33, q. Un., 9, to the question, saying: It can nevertheless be conceded that if the willing will can command the sensitive appetite, either by moderating its passion, or by commanding prosecution or flight, if they are acts of the sensitive appetite, it can leave from right commands some habit in the sensitive appetite, inclining to this, so that the sensitive appetite may be delightfully moved to sensible things from the command of the will. Likewise, §. To the first it can be conceded, saying: It is conceded that in a part of the body there can be power and habit, as is clear in the hand of a writer and a painter. For my inexercised hand is unsuitable in that faculty which is for playing the lyre, but exercised it is suitable, which is only by a suitability inhering in the

hand, which suitability is conceded to be a certain power, because a certain quality making suitable for a work of moral virtue. Moreover, this is conceded further concerning the irrational, as concerning a horse for certain acts to which it is accustomed, but it is not found in the merely inanimate. For from custom a stone is not thrown upward more easily.

The first part is proven: Those powers sometimes seem from more frequent use to operate more perfectly. Therefore, habits can be posited in them. The antecedent is proven concerning the sensitive appetite. For if brute animals more often indulge in sensible things, they are withdrawn from them with great difficulty. Concerning memory Aristotle teaches that custom contributes much to remembering. For no freedom is required in the powers for positing habits, because otherwise a habit concerning first principles could not be made in us either. Indeed, freedom in other powers besides the will is only from the outside, and thus it is not of the intrinsic nature of a habit.

The second part is proven: Both because the external power of the writing or lyre-playing hand is unsuitable when inexercised, but suitable when exercised. Therefore, habits can also be in the external senses. Then because from use objects can sometimes please which previously displeased, as is clear in sight and taste. Therefore,

The third part is proven: The locomotive power well exercised in the art of dancing, or by more frequent walking, is more suitable for performing those duties than when not exercised, as is clear equally concerning the hand moved in writing and lyre-playing. Therefore, a habit can also be placed again in it.

The fourth part is proven: The vegetative power is most determined to one thing, and we see that from continual nutrition no facility is made, but rather vegetative things are weakened. Indeed, that habit would be an accident. Therefore, it could not incline to substantial nutrition.

You will object against the first part: A habit is that which we use when we will. But brute animals do not have such power. Therefore, habits are not given in their internal sensitive powers.

I respond, I distinguish the major premise: a human habit - I concede; any habit - I deny. It is true, however, that habits in brute animals are not so rigorously habits as in men.

You will say: Scotus in the cited assertion wants that if from this, that the sensitive appetite is subject to the will, it is receptive of a habit. Therefore, a habit can also be generated in a part of the body frequently moved from the command of the will, and thus in the locomotive power, which does not seem fitting to Scotus.

On the contrary: Scotus there does not decide that question, but only wants the will to be the proper subject of virtue, which he proves from the things conceded by the adversaries conceding habit and virtue in the sensitive appetite. Therefore, Scotus inquires, more so in the will, which is imperative of the appetite. For he concedes there that although the habit left in the sensitive power is not properly a virtue, it is nevertheless properly a habit, and in some way a virtue, because it inclines to those things which are consonant with right reason. And in this way Scotus likewise admits that consequence concerning the motive power.

You will object against the second part: The external sensitive powers have no indifference, either of intensity or of perfection, except insofar as objects are applied to them now more perfectly, now more imperfectly. Therefore, a habit is not acquired in them from the inside.

I respond: I deny the consequence. For it suffices that by means of objects they can be intensified and perfected, and thence operate more delightfully and more promptly. Otherwise, habits could not be placed again in the internal powers either, since all are perfected by means of objects. Indeed, the external powers are not perfected from the mere application of the object either. For if the same object under the same perfection is applied to two, the power more often attaining it will penetrate it more perfectly than the other power attaining it only once or twice.

You will object against the third part: No quality facilitating every difference of position in motion and to every place can be given. Therefore, there cannot be a habit in the locomotive power. The antecedent is clear, because we see that every quality only inclines to some definite motion, as the most perfect form of charity to the motion of prosecution. Therefore, neither will a more imperfect form, such as motion, be able to be indeterminate to every where. But such an indeterminate habit to every where would have to be in the motive power, which is of itself to every where. Therefore,

Hence Scotus in Book 4, D. 49, q. 14, §. I respond, denies that the agility of the body of the Blessed is a habit rendering the body of the Blessed more apt to be moved locally, but it is only the removal of a twofold impediment, namely of one from the joints and bodily organs, and of the other from the thick humors which render a man sluggish.

I respond, transmitting the antecedent, for it suffices for our intention that in the locomotive power there can be determinate and particular motions, as is clear in the art of dancing or lyre-playing, and thus at least for these particular habits could be posited. Moreover, that Scotus denies for the gift of agility in the Blessed a habit by way of some quality, he rightly denies, because that agility is not acquired through frequent acts in the Blessed, so that thence they may move themselves more delightfully and more promptly, but with the impediments removed, the very nature of the soul perfected by God in natural things and specially fortified effects this, which cannot be said of us with the impediments standing, which must be removed gradually and little by little, and by this very thing through some habit or perfection facilitating.

I said transmitting the antecedent, because it could be denied. For the facility of walking to any where is proportioned to the locomotive power, since its object is any naturally attainable where. But the object of charity is only the good prosecutable for its own sake. Indeed, charity can also extend itself to the objects of all the virtues at least imperatively to be prosecuted for the sake of God the highest good.

You will object against the fourth part: Men and certain animals are accustomed to be habituated both in quantity and quality of foods, and plants, if they are accustomed to be watered more often, when then it is ceased, immediately dry up, where others not so accustomed last longer. Therefore, the vegetative power can also be habituated.

I respond and say that that habituation is not from a new habit, but from the varied temperament of living things, which can be changed through custom. Hence, he who uses food sparingly, after a time the natural heat in him is weakened, so that he cannot eat more henceforth without harm. The same is true of the quality of foods and the irrigation of plants, which acquire a subtle and flowing humor which easily vanishes.

I assert and say thirdly: Habits are corrupted by the variation of the subject, either by contrary acts mediately and virtually, or by disparate acts per accidens; by contrary habits, however, formally; never, however, from the cessation of acts. It is deduced from Scotus in

the cited advertisement, saying: For the whole vicious habit is not corrupted immediately in the first act (namely, the contrary); indeed, it is either nothing or little remitted.

The first part is proven: The subject can be varied in two ways: first, as to entity, as when through nutrition the parts of the body are restored, consequently the organs of the powers in which there are material habits, which are necessarily destroyed at the destruction of that part; consequently, in the new part there will not be a habit. Secondly, as to dispositions, because through certain new qualities habits in the sensitive organs can be corrupted; for that reason also at the change of the body its inclinations are changed; consequently also in the intellect, which for this state depends on bodily phantasms, of which thing the sign is that often after sicknesses, although the species are recovered, the former facility is nevertheless not had.

The second part is proven: Contrary acts, although they are not a form opposed to a habit formally, but only virtually and mediately, because they can produce an opposite habit, which formally destroys and expels the other habit, are nevertheless for that reason the virtual and mediate cause of the corruption of a habit. Therefore, they virtually corrupt a habit.

The third part is proven: The power in which a habit is, is of limited power. A habit, however, is a greater inclination beyond the innate power of the power. But the power will scarcely be able to be inclined through habits to so many and such varied objects. Therefore, through many newly generated habits the former are diminished; namely, with their acts destroyed per accidens through new disparate acts, which nevertheless should rather be said to impede the former habits, and for that reason destroy them per accidens.

The fourth part is proven: Two contrary qualities mutually repel and destroy each other. But two contrary habits, for example, of temperance and intemperance, are two formally contrary qualities. Therefore, one will destroy the other formally.

The fifth part is proven: If, ceasing an act, a habit immediately and gradually failed, then if someone elicited remiss acts with some delay, he would never acquire a habit. Because the first part caused by the first act would immediately fail before the coming of the second act. If, however, it remained for some time and afterwards ceased, a cause of cessation would have to be assigned, which would not be the cessation itself, since it is a pure lack and negation of the act. Therefore,

You will object against the fourth part: One having a vicious habit, as 8, eliciting the first act of the opposite virtue, would be retarded in the will from that act. Therefore, the vicious habit exists in that instant in which the contrary act is made; otherwise, the habit would exist and not exist. Nor can it be destroyed afterwards by the second act, because the vicious habit always has the same activity. Therefore,

I respond and say that in the first instant the habit of virtue is produced inchoately, and the vicious habit is remitted. Nor is it true that in that instant the will is retarded by the vicious habit as to the whole intensity, as before that instant, because the will has already overcome the resistance of the vice by determining itself to the good.

You will object against the fifth part: A habit is lost by forgetfulness alone. But this is a cessation of acts. Therefore,

I respond: This happens per accidens, insofar as the cessation from acts is the cause for contrary acts to be commonly elicited. For he who does not exercise acts of temperance often exercises acts of intemperance.

DISTINCTION V

On the Separated Soul

QUESTION I. On various questions about the separated soul.

You ask 1. Whether the soul in the state of separation is of the same nature as the Angels.

I respond that it is not, as can be deduced from what Scotus says in Distinction 1, Question 5, in response to the second principal argument: "An Angel is such a nature unto itself, and a soul is such a nature unto itself, so they are primarily distinguished in species, not indeed as two species, but as a species and part of a species, because the soul is not properly a

species, but part of a species.” Understand this to refer to the state of separation. The reason is: because even the soul in the state of separation is an essentially incomplete being ordered to something else, whereas an Angel is a complete and perfect being, and incapable of composing something else.

And don't say that St. Augustine in Book 3 of *On Free Choice of the Will* says “An Angel and a soul are equal in nature, but unequal in office,” therefore they are the same. Against this is what Scotus says in the cited place, that St. Augustine is to be understood as referring to an equality of nature in relation to their object, but not to the essential predicates of their specific natures; for a soul and an Angel are born to rest in one object, inasmuch as no intellectual nature is apt to rest for its perfect beatitude except in an infinite object; or he is only to be understood as referring to an equality of nature in the generic grade, but not in the specific, which for this state is unknown.

You ask 2. Whether the state of separation of the soul is natural to it, or violent?

I respond that the state of conjunction with a mortal body is connatural to it, the state of separation from it is more natural, and the state of conjunction with a glorified immortal body is most connatural to it. This can be deduced from what Scotus says in *Quodlibet* 9, on the third question, saying: “From this it is clear how the separated soul is said to be imperfect in being; because in the way in which it is united, it can be called perfect in being, not essentially and primarily, but participatively; indeed it is equally perfect in its own proper being when separated and when conjoined; but when conjoined it is perfect through the being of the whole participatively, although not primarily, and as to this the separated soul would be imperfect, because it lacks that very being of the whole; and it could be said that this imperfection would be an imperfection simply speaking, because it lacks that being which is a perfection simply speaking, although not its own perfection. Indeed this is a greater perfection than its own being, because it includes that being.”

Likewise in Book 4, *Distinction* 49, *Question* 12, in response to the third principal argument: “Since the soul cannot be perfectly happy when conjoined to a mortal body, it desires to be perfectly beatified, and consequently desires to be conjoined to a body, but an immortal one, because then it will be perfectly happy.” Finally, on the glorified body after the resurrection, in *Question* 14, he says in agreement with St. Augustine in Book 21, *Chapter* 10: “I say that the weight of the body weighing it down is taken away, for ‘the body which is corrupted weighs down the soul’ (Wisdom 9:15). And therefore this weight weighing it down is taken away.— And this is clear concerning the sense of touch, which naturally according to its own inclination would delight in the sensible or tangible object, and likewise

taste, which nevertheless in the Blessed do not have acts of this sort, such as tasting and eating, nor yet are they there violently without their acts, because they follow the inclination of a higher appetite, namely the will; so also it is when something heavy ascends lest a vacuum be formed, and as it is in the macrocosm, so in the microcosm; whence it is more natural for a body to be perfected by the soul, and for it to become a fitting perfectible for it, and for it to be moved by a motion befitting the soul (suppose a blessed one) than for it to be moved by its own motion to the center, and therefore according to the inclination of a higher nature it would rest naturally, but in a qualified sense unnaturally.”

The reason for the first is that the soul is an essentially incomplete substance ordered to another in which it fulfills its appetite; therefore that state is natural to it. The reason for the second is that a corruptible body is not matter proportionate enough to an immortal soul; and so it informs it in a losable way by its nature, for which reason that state is not so connatural; for it weighs down the soul and impedes it in its more perfect operations, so that according to the natural course the soul would exist separated for longer than conjoined to a mortal body; therefore the state of separation is more natural. Nevertheless, in these two states it suffers some privative violence, because in a mortal body it is deprived of an unimpeded mode of operating, and when separated it is deprived of sensitive operations; although this is not positive violence.

The reason for the third is that in that state every appetite of the soul is perfectly fulfilled, and it perfectly carries out its operations, since it informs the glorified body in an unlosable way, in which it understands without recourse to phantasms. From which it also follows that the separated soul does not naturally desire reunion with a mortal body, because it receives no perfection from it either in being or in operating, but rather detriment; but it has a natural appetite for a glorified body.

And don't say: therefore that reunion of the soul to the glorified body is owed to it. Against this, I deny the inference, for an inclination to perfection does not immediately induce a debt, for the soul is inclined to grace, yet this is not owed to it. Light perfects air, yet it is not owed to it. Hence there is only a debt when, namely, the agent induces the ultimate dispositions to the perfection. Indeed, there is given a natural appetite without the possibility of attainment in the one appetizing; for the resurrection is natural, as opposed to violent, but not as supernatural. See what we said in Book 2 of the Physics on obediential potency.

You ask 3. Whether the inorganic powers remain in the separated soul?

I respond that the intellect, will, memory, and inorganic locomotive power remain. This can be deduced from what Scotus says in Book 4, Distinction 45, Question 2, in response to the question: “The separated soul can acquire cognition of a previously unknown object, and this with respect to both intuitive and abstractive cognition.” Likewise in Question 3, in response to the question: “The separated soul has some intellective memory remaining in it which it had when conjoined.” Finally, in Book 2, Distinction 25, single question, in response to the first argument: “The separated soul has the power of moving itself to this or that place, for to be moved in this way befits a most imperfect being.”

The reason is that these powers are connatural perfections of the soul everywhere owed to it, indeed really indistinct from its essence, as has been proven in its place; therefore [they remain]. Finally, the soul of Christ descended into limbo; therefore [the locomotive power remains].

You ask 4. Whether the vegetative and sensitive powers also remain?

I respond that they do not, as can be deduced from what Scotus says in Quodlibet 9, on the second question: “The separated soul cannot sense for this reason, because it does not have what is receptive of sensation, which is the organ, nor the formal basis of sensing, which is the total form of the organ itself.” The reason is that those powers are material and organic, founded in the composite of body and soul, which the soul uses as an organ, but it is repugnant for something corporeal to remain in the soul after the destruction of the body; therefore [they do not remain].

And don't say: Things that are really identical cannot be separated; but even the sensitive powers according to Scotus are really identical to the soul; therefore these too remain after separation. Against this, I distinguish the major premise: [They cannot be separated] according to that aspect under which they are identical, I concede; according to some other aspect, I deny the major. But the sensitive powers are only identical to the soul under that aspect by which they are perfections and principles of operating, not insofar as they are the whole complete power composed of a corporeal organ and that perfection of the soul. Hence I distinguish the consequent: [They remain] radically, I concede; formally, I deny the consequence. For the powers radically are nothing other than the essence of the soul, from which they come forth; but formally they express a relation to producing their complete act.

You will say: in the separated soul there will be pain and the gnashing of teeth; but these occur in the sensitive principles; therefore [the sensitive powers remain]. Against this, I say that pain of the flesh is only an affliction of the soul arising from the flesh, and occurs

through a certain dissension of it; just as pain of the soul is sadness arising from those things that happen to us against our will; from which it follows that pain is a passion consequent upon sensitive apprehension in the sensitive appetite, but sadness in the intellective and volitive; therefore the former pain is not in the spirit, but the latter, which occurs through the binding of the intellect to a sad object, by which the senses would otherwise have to be tormented. But the gnashing of teeth is taken there metaphorically to excite our understanding more.

You ask 5. Whether the intelligible species and habits which it had before remain.

I respond that they do, as can be deduced from what Scotus says in Book 4, Distinction 45, Question 3, in response to the question: "The conjoined soul cannot use an intelligible species without a phantasm, but the separated soul will be able to, not on account of some new perfection, but because that order of powers (namely, the intellective and sensitive) in operating which now exists will not be there." Likewise in the same place he says: "The separated soul has habitual knowledge of all those things which remained in it up to the separation."

The reason is that intelligible species in the intellective memory are spiritual accidents; therefore they can remain without the body; for they do not have a contrary by which they would be corrupted; and this is also the natural reason why the soul is immortal, since it does not have a contrary destructive of itself. Indeed, souls can remember past things, as is clear from Luke 16 concerning the rich man; but this occurs through species. Finally, the sciences will remain, which are habits; therefore [the intelligible species remain].

And don't say: Paul teaches in 1 Corinthians 13 that in the future life the sciences will be destroyed; therefore [the intelligible species do not remain]. Against this: He is talking about the gift of knowledge accompanying faith, which would be destroyed along with faith itself by reason of its obscurity, not about naturally acquired sciences.

You will say: In Ecclesiastes 9 it is said, "the dead know nothing more." Against this: The Wise Man is speaking in the person of the impious.

You will say: Furthermore it is said, "neither work, nor reason, nor knowledge will be in the nether world." Against this: This is to be understood of profitable and meritorious knowledge unto salvation.

You will say: Sciences are destroyed by sickness, and more so by death. Against this: They are destroyed per accidens, because sickness destroys the sensible species which in this state subserve the sciences, but not in the other state.

You ask 6. Whether the separated soul understands by composing and discoursing?

I respond that it does, and more perfectly than when it is conjoined. This can be deduced from what Scotus says in Book 2, Distinction 1, Question 5, in the conclusion to that question: "The soul does not discourse about principles, but about conclusions... furthermore, the blessed soul in the beatific object does not discourse about it; but it does discourse about an object known naturally."

Likewise in Book 4, Distinction 45, Question 1, in the third response to the arguments for the opposite: "According to Avicenna in his Physics, Part 6, Chapter 1, the separated soul will see the truth more clearly than the conjoined soul, and Wisdom 9 agrees with him: 'the body which is corrupted weighs down the soul.'"

The reason is that not even the intellect of the Blessed is a pure act, but is potential and receptive of many acts, especially concerning those things which it sees in itself and not in the divine essence. Furthermore, discourse only requires an order of nature, not of time, so it will suffice that the principle of the discourse be known prior in nature. Indeed, the intellect of the soul is specified by objects; therefore it is multiplied to the multiplication of knowables; but principles and conclusions are diverse knowables, especially if they are probable; therefore at least with respect to those things for which it does not have species, it can discourse not only virtually but also formally from the things it knows.

You ask 7. Whether the separated soul knows everything which it knew before through prior species.

I respond that it does, as can be deduced from what Scotus says in Book 4, Distinction 45, Question 3, in response to the question: "The separated soul can remember all those things which the conjoined soul remembers, because of whatever things there was sensitive memory, of them there was intellective memory on account of the concomitant intuitive cognition accompanying every perfect sensitive perception; but it cannot remember by every remembrance by which the conjoined soul could (suppose not by sensitive remembrance)."

Likewise in the first and second arguments for the opposite he says: "That the separated soul remembers past things which it itself knew is clear from Luke 16, where Abraham says to the rich man, 'Son, remember that you received good things in your life,' and from what St. Augustine says on that verse of Psalm 108, 'Let his children be fatherless,' namely, that the dead have memory of us."

The reason is that it has an intellect and prior species which are principles of cognition, as is clear from the fifth question; therefore [it knows everything which it knew before].

And don't say: The human intellect by its nature is turned to phantasms; but the nature of the soul is not changed after death; therefore, in order for it to understand after separation, recourse must be had to species to be infused into it by God, and consequently it does not understand through prior species. Against this, I deny the major, for the exercise of the intellect by its nature abstracts from phantasms; and its bondage to them is only accidental and penal for this state; therefore, since it has prior intelligible species, infused species are superfluous. Indeed, it seems unfitting for species to be infused by God into damned souls; for such infusion of species pertains to the adornment of the soul, but God should not adorn damned souls. But although the souls of infants dying in their mothers' wombs do not know by previously acquired species, yet infused species are not necessary for them, because they will be able to know things through acquired species. Hence:

You ask 8. Whether the separated soul knows new things through species collected from those things.

I respond that it does. This can be deduced from what Scotus says in Book 4, Distinction 45, Question 2, in response to the question: "The separated soul can acquire cognition of a previously unknown object, and this with respect to both intuitive and abstractive cognition."

The reason is that a new object presented to the soul is either spiritual or material; if it is spiritual, no other infused species spiritually representing it is necessary, since it is of itself proportionate to producing its species in the intellect; if it is material, then there is present in the separated soul the agent intellect, which purifies material things and abstracts intelligible species; therefore no other infused species are necessary, nor can the intellect emanate any from itself, because by such emanation it could know all created and creatable things, since in this way the intellect would not have a determining object producing the

species; and there is no greater reason why it could emanate these and not others concerning any knowables whatsoever.

Finally, if the separated soul could not have species from presented objects, it would be of an inferior condition to a stone, because every creature, when a patient is present with a common influx, can operate, and the soul would not be able to when an object is presented. See more on these matters in our Theology, Volume 3, Treatise 7 on the Angels, Distinction 4, Question 2, Assertion 3, against the Thomists.

And don't say: Material objects cannot immediately move the intellect and impress species, but only by means of the senses; therefore they must first be attenuated and spiritualized, so that the intellect can then abstract species from the phantasms. The antecedent is proven: The object must be proportioned to the power; but the material is not proportioned to the immaterial. Indeed, there cannot be a transition from one extreme to the other without a middle; therefore, in order for a thing to be in the intellect spiritually, it would have to pass through the sense, because it is not in the separated soul; therefore [material objects cannot immediately move the intellect].

Against this, I deny the antecedent. For since our intellect can abstract intelligible species from a phantasm, which is also material, why not from the immediate material object itself? And although it is attenuated through the phantasm, and is less material, it is nevertheless truly still a material being. Indeed, the separated intellect is more unimpeded in operating; therefore it will also be able to abstract from the plainly material object itself. To the proof I say similarly: the material phantasm has agreement with the intellective power, so why not also the material object, at least of mover to movable, even if not of similitude or commensuration? For otherwise not even God could understand material things. It follows, therefore, only that the object would not be the total principal cause, but it could nevertheless be a partial cause, and through its intelligible species, of the cognition of it.

To the second proof I deny the supposition that sensation is always a means to intellection; for what is a means to a weaker and bound power need not be a means to a stronger and loosened one, as is clear concerning the replication of a body; but the loosened intellect is more unimpeded in operating, nor is the sensible a means for spiritual cognition, since it is not in an Angel, but is an extreme distinct from the intelligible; hence not even is that species which the material object emits to the intellect of the separated soul material, but immaterial, made so by the power of the agent intellect; nor must it be diffused through a medium, because the medium is not capable of this form, but it is effected immediately in the intellect, for it is not unfitting here for an action to occur immediately at a distance.

You ask 9. Whether the separated soul knows itself, its powers, and its species intuitively.

I respond that it does, as can be deduced from what Scotus says in Book 2, Distinction 3, Question 11, in response to the principal arguments: "I concede that the soul of itself is actually intelligible and present to itself; and from this it follows that it can understand itself if it were not impeded (suppose now through conjunction with the body); but when St. Augustine in *On the Trinity*, Book 10, Chapters 7 and 10, says, 'The soul always knows itself,' this is to be understood of first act, perfect and entitative, on the part of both the power and the object; which nevertheless is not always present in the character of an object actually intelligible, because then a cognition of it would immediately follow; but it is only always present to itself in the character of an entity."

Observe, however, that other external objects are not attained unless they are sufficiently proportioned to it; for a disproportionate distance impedes intuitive intellection even in a loosened intellect, nor is it necessary for that approximation of the object to be immediate, but it will be enough for the soul to approach to that place from which it could before, and as far as it could before in the body, receive species from the object intuitively.

You ask 10. Whether the separated soul can move other things, such as throwing a stone?

I respond that it can, as can be deduced from what Scotus says in Book 2, Distinction 8, single question, on the third point, saying by parity about an Angel: "I say that it can cause local motion in an assumed body, and so a progressive motion, and the reason is that there is no body so imperfect in the universe that it does not have in its active power some 'where' (this is clear concerning something heavy with respect to the center); therefore much more does an Angel have this with respect to a body."

Likewise in Book 2, Distinction 2, Question 6, against the conclusion, he holds that Angels move the heavens. Finally, in Book 4, Distinction 49, Question 14, in the response "Here there are...", he says expressly about the separated soul: "The separated soul can move its own body immediately, such as a cadaver, because it does not exceed its motive power, and likewise, when it is in the body, it can move organically; therefore on its own part it has the power [to move] organically and non-organically."

A further reason is, from Scotus just cited in Book 4, that this is not to be denied to the soul by reason of its perfection; otherwise neither an Angel nor God could move another; nor by reason of imperfection; otherwise neither could bodies. Besides, everything that moves

itself can move other things; but the soul moves itself and the body when it is in the body; therefore it can also move other things.

And don't say: The soul cannot move external bodies except by impressing an impulse; but such an impulse cannot occur except by means of a body. The minor is proven: when it impresses this, it would have to impress it through impenetrability; but the soul is rather penetrable than impenetrable; therefore [it cannot move external bodies]. Against this, I deny the minor, for an Angel impresses motion on the heavens, and yet lacks a body.

But although the impenetrability of the hand with the stone helps at the beginning of the motion, yet it does not in the progress; because the impulse of the stone continues with the hand separated; therefore an impulse can occur absolutely without the impenetrability of the mover, for although an Angel or soul cannot educe from the potency of a subject accidents disposing to the generation of a substance, yet they can educe other qualities ordered to 'where', and so move themselves and other things, as the soul moves itself and the body when it is in the body.

You ask 11. What kind of 'where' does the separated soul have?

I respond: an indivisible 'where' on the part of the entity of the soul, and a divisible one on the part of space, so that the whole soul according to one part, in which it was in the body, corresponds to one part of space, another to another, so that the soul can move itself from one place to another continuously and successively; consequently, just as that successive motion is through parts after parts, so the 'where' produced through motion is such (namely, divisible).

This can be deduced from what Scotus says by parity about Angels in Book 2, Distinction 2, Question 9, in response to the third principal argument: "Although an Angel in itself is indivisible, yet it occupies a divisible place, and so with respect to place it conducts itself as if it were divisible, and therefore it can be moved in a divisible place continuously, although it is conceded that an indivisible cannot be moved in this way, or if it occupies a punctual place, and so exists punctually, it cannot be moved continuously so as to always have punctual being."

Then, because "it does not seem [to be] the reason why it is denied that an indivisible is moved, even if it were an indivisible of quantity existing per se; therefore it can be conceded

that an Angel having a punctual 'where' can be moved continuously, so as to always exist in a point."

But in Book 4, Distinction 49, Question 14, in the response "Here there are...", he says: "A 'where' definitively befits the soul, which on the part of the subject is indivisible, and on the part of the terminus divisible." Whereas earlier in Distinction 10, Question 7, in the response, he said: "The soul, just as with respect to many other things it is similar to an Angel, so also with respect to the non-organic power of moving a body." And the reason is that the soul in its quasi-local extension has certain limits of magnitude, beyond which it cannot dilate its presence; for the power occupying place is finite in the soul.

Concerning its smallness, however, it is not so certain; perhaps it can contract itself into a smaller and smaller space to infinity; although it is probable that the soul can be under as small a size as a human body can be, since it is essentially determined to another, and is not of infinite power of diminishing itself.

You ask 12. What kind of figure does the separated soul have?

I respond: It does not have its own proper figure, but a quasi-figure such as it had in the body (namely, erect, round on top, then dilated in the shoulders, and extended down to the feet).

This can be deduced from what Scotus says in Book 4, Distinction 12, Question 2, in the section "Here there are two opinions", and Distinction 49, Question 14, in the response to "That...", in the first place saying by parity: "An Angel cannot be white, because it is in no way susceptible of this form, whether that form were posited to be divisible or not.... One reason is extension in the form itself, and non-extension in Angels." But figure, since it is a certain terminus of quantity, would always have to be divisible and extended.

But in the second place he says: "The saints in heaven will not have a position in heaven except erect, but not of sitting; for the inclination of parts seems to be repugnant to agility, but erection or standing seems to be a position befitting a body insofar as it is an instrument of the soul, because then it is more apt and prompt to operate.— This is confirmed by St. Augustine in his book *On the Symbol*, where in expounding that Article 'sitting at the right hand of the Father,' he says that it should not be understood of a bodily sitting, for Stephen saw Jesus standing."

The reason is that this does not have anything absurd about it, for since the soul ought to contain itself in a certain space, and is always operative, such a quasi-figure and position will not be repugnant to its perfection; for it has as it were become accustomed to it, and is going to return to it through all eternity from the day of Judgment. Therefore it is probable that the soul takes the greatest delight in that figure which it had conformable to its operation, as much through the time of separation as then through the time of glorious conjunction, contemplating its Creator and glorifier in the heavens, who also wills to glorify our souls; concerning which let what has been said in this treatise be enough.

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