

Disputation 3: On Universals in General

So far we've skimmed the surface regarding Logic's object and subject matter, but now we're getting into the meat of it, even though the treatise on Universals isn't yet within Aristotle's Logic proper, which he began with the Categories. Rather, this is more of an introduction to that Logic. This treatise is commonly called the Isagoge or Introduction by Porphyry by the philosophers. It was written by Malchus Porphyry, a Phoenician from Tyre, or a Jew, a Platonist by sect, formerly a Christian in religion but later a most wretched apostate. He wrote this book to explain the five terms necessary for understanding Aristotle's Categories. These are: Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident, which are called the Universals. We will first explain the Universal in general, which the Scotists posit as the object of this book, and then get into those specific terms.

Question 1: What and how many kinds of Universal are there?

The word "universal" signifies one thing in respect to many. There are complex and non-complex universals. A complex universal is a proposition from which many others are inferred, like "every whole is greater than its part," or one marked by some universal sign, like "every man is an animal," etc. A non-complex universal is a word or term signifying something common to many, like "man," "animal," etc. There are four kinds of non-complex universals: in being, in causing, in predicating, and in representing.

A universal in being is one thing able to be in many, like humanity, which is in Peter, Paul, etc. In predicating, it is one thing able to be predicated of many, like "man," which is predicated of Peter, Paul, etc. In causing, it is one thing that can cause many effects, like God, who produces all things, or the Sun, which contributes to all earthly productions, etc. In representing or signifying, it is a word signifying many things, like "dog," which signifies the domestic animal, the sea creature, and the constellation.

A universal in being is called metaphysical; a universal in predicating is called logical. We are dealing with these two, because the metaphysician considers essences in general and abstractly, while the logician considers the ways in which they can be predicated of each other or of inferiors in order to construct good propositions, divisions, and arguments.

Conclusion

A universal properly speaking, and as we are considering it here, is one thing able to be in and predicated univocally of many. This is the common view.

It is proven by explaining each of the parts. 1) It is called a "thing," and this stands in place of the genus. For by this it is in agreement with all real beings, or chimerical ones. 2) "One," or not composite or aggregated from many beings of different Categories, like "white," which is composed of a substance and whiteness, which is an accident of the genus of quality. 3) "Able to be in many," and indeed with a real multiplication, like animal, which is in man, lion, ox, etc. and is divided and really multiplied in each. 4) "And to be predicated," because by this very fact, that animal is in those many, it can be truly predicated of each. 5) "Univocally," because the nature which is called universal must be participated in by those to which it is common according to the same concept, and consequently must be predicated of them univocally.

From this you gather that four conditions are required for a true universal:

1) That it be something positive and not fictive; by this, negations, privations, and chimerical beings are excluded. Although a common concept of a being of reason as such could be given or conceived, and the same goes for privations and negations, nevertheless we are not dealing with those here, but only with those that pertain to the cognition of the Categories, which are positive real beings.

2) That this something also be one thing, which is found in those things with respect to which it is called universal. For if it is diverse in many, it is not truly universal. For example, the name "dog" is not something universal with respect to the domestic animal, the sea creature, and the constellation, because it is not one thing in them, but most diverse; it is not so with "man," which is one thing as to essence in Peter, Paul, etc.

3) That this one something be able to be in many with a division and multiplication of itself, as man is in Peter, Paul, and John, who are three men really and numerically. And by lack of this condition, the divine nature is indeed common with respect to the three persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, but it is not universal, because it is not communicated to them with a multiplication of itself; therefore they are not three Gods, but one.

4) That it be proximately able to be predicated of many, and this is special for the logical universal. For the three prior conditions are common to both the metaphysical and the logical. However, for some one common nature to be proximately able to be predicated of many, it must be cognized to be in them according to that concept.

Therefore, a universal is a concrete name saying for the material some nature underlying the universality, but for the formal, the universality itself or that unity according to which it respects many things in act or in potency.

Question 2: Does the Universal exist?

The meaning of the question is this: is there some nature that is one in itself, yet relates to many things, is found in many things, and is predicated of them?

Some have thought that there actually exist certain universal natures outside of individual things, which are like Ideas and exemplars, in the image of which individual natures are formed. And so they are called Ideas, specifically Plato's Ideas, because this view is attributed to Plato by Aristotle, but wrongly according to nearly all other philosophers. For it is not believable that a man of sublime intelligence would embrace such an absurd opinion. Plato calls Ideas, says Seneca, those things from which everything we see comes to be, and according to which all things are formed. They are immortal, immutable, immobile. What an Idea is, that is, what it seems to be to Plato, listen: an Idea is the eternal exemplar of those things which come to be by nature. These last words indicate that Plato admitted eternal ideas in the divine mind, as all theologians admit, but not created ideas existing outside individuals. The Doctor [Aquinas] thinks the same about Plato.

Others have thought that there are no universals other than certain words or formal concepts which can apply to many things, but not natures or things themselves. For instance, "man" does not apply to Peter, Paul, John, etc. except as a word or name, or at most as a formal concept which I have of it, which concept can apply to many. Thus spoke certain ancients, and Cratylus, Democritus, Hesiod, and others, whom we therefore call Nominalists, whose leader was our William of Ockham, a disciple of Scotus. And even today many more recent thinkers [hold this view].

Others maintain that there are truly common natures existing in many things with some true unity.

Conclusion 1

There are no common natures really existing outside individuals, that is, there are no Platonic Ideas. This is the common view.

Proof 1: Because such natures or ideas are either eternal or temporal, that is, either uncreated or created, but neither can be said, therefore they are not to be admitted. The minor premise is proved: 1. If they were eternal and outside God, some real, universal, and eternal beings would be admitted outside God, which is contrary to the faith and was condemned at the Council of Constance against John Hus, inasmuch as it follows from this that something real exists from eternity which is neither God nor a creature. Likewise by William of Paris in 1240 and 1276, and by Innocent III against Amalric, who said that the primordial causes of things, which are called Ideas, create and are created.

Proof 2: The universal natures we are discussing are the essences of individual things, for instance human nature, which is called universal, is the nature of Peter, Paul, John, etc. But

the essences of things cannot be separated from the things, therefore those universal natures do not exist separately. The minor premise is proved: because the same thing cannot be separated from itself, therefore an essence cannot be separated from the thing of which it is the essence; for it is the very thing itself.

Proof 3: Natures which are denominated universal ought to be predicated of their individuals, but a nature separated [from individuals] cannot be so predicated, therefore it is not truly universal. The major premise is clear from the definition of the universal. The minor is proved: because whatever is predicated of another must be identified with it or exist in it, but a nature separated from individuals is neither identified with them nor exists in them, therefore, etc.

Proof 4: Because those natures are either created or uncreated: if uncreated, then they are God himself, for nothing is uncreated except God; if created, then through a real and individual action, therefore they themselves are individual.

You will object: 1. What is united to individuals is corruptible, but universal natures are incorruptible, therefore they do not exist in individuals but separately.

I respond: I distinguish the major premise. It is corruptible as to existence, I concede the major; as to essence, I deny the major and the consequence.

You will insist: Corruptible and incorruptible things are separate, but essences are incorruptible and individuals are corruptible, therefore essences and individuals are separate.

I respond: I distinguish the major premise. What is corruptible according to essence and incorruptible according to essence, I concede the major; what is corruptible as to existence and incorruptible according to essence, I deny the major.

You will insist: 2. The intellect conceives a universal nature, for instance humanity, as if it were really distinct from individuals, therefore either it is deceived in so conceiving, and thus the universal is a pure being of reason, or the matter is so in reality.

I respond: I distinguish the consequent. It is deceived if it affirms that real distinction, I concede the consequence; if it only so conceives human nature, which is called universal, not considering individuals, and without an affirmation of separation, I deny the consequence. For thus it happens. The intellect conceives humanity according to its essential predicates, namely inasmuch as it is rational animal, according to which predicates it is found the same formally in Peter, Paul, John, etc., the individual differences of Peterness, Paulness, Johnness, etc. not being considered - in a word, the individual differences with which it is really identified and multiplied - but it does not assert any separation of the said nature from them.

You will object: 2. If universal nature existed in individuals, it would render them universal, as whiteness renders its subjects white, but the consequent is false, therefore it is separate.

I respond: I deny the consequence. Because the nature which is denominated universal is in individuals as a superior nature in inferiors, not as an accident or form in a subject, and universality belongs to it as it supposits simply, not personally; hence it does not itself render them universal, but is multiplied by them and made individual.

You will object: 3. Unless universal natures really existed, there would be no science of them; the consequence is false, therefore so is the antecedent. The major premise is proved: because science is only of an object that is immutable, incorruptible, and eternal, but individual natures are not such, therefore there would be no science of them.

I respond: I deny the consequent of the major premise, and I distinguish the major premise of the proof. Science is of an object immutable etc. as to essence, or as to the necessary connection of predicate with subject, I concede the major; as to existence, I deny the major and the consequence. For of such a kind are all the natures which we have said exist in individuals: they are immutable as to essence, not as to existence, and according to existence they are not the object of science.

Conclusion 2

There truly exist, on the side of the nature of the thing, natures which are truly and without fiction denominated as universal, not only with respect to the word, and formally, but also in their being. This is the common view of the Scotists and Thomists against the Nominalists. And it is the view of the Doctor [likely referring to a specific scholastic doctor like Aquinas or Scotus], who teaches that the universal is a being, and that a nature is not of itself this one here, or singular, etc.

Proof 1 against Heraclitus: Because there are sciences, otherwise there would not be such an ardent desire for knowing in man. But sciences are only about universals, therefore universals exist. The minor premise is proven: Sciences are about necessary and immutable things, but only universals are immutable and necessary, at least with respect to their essentials. Therefore sciences are only about universals.

Proof 2: By universal natures in being, we understand merely common natures, through which individuals agree and are similar to each other in the thing itself. But it is evident that such natures exist, therefore universals truly exist in being. The minor premise is proven: For it is evident that, with no intellect thinking, Peter and Bucephalus agree in animality, and Peter and Paul in humanity. Therefore it is evident that there exist natures, on the side of the thing itself, in which singulars agree.

Proof 3 against the Nominalists: Namely, universals are not bare words, nor bare common formal concepts, but there truly correspond to them natures or objective concepts corresponding to the words and formal concepts. In a word, not merely words, nor formal concepts, but the things signified by names or represented by concepts are universal. For when I say "Peter is a man", this proposition is true and formal. For it signifies that he has humanity. But it is not true, nor formal, of the word, nor of the formal concept, but of the

object and the thing signified by the name. Therefore "man" is not called universal, nor predicated of Peter, with respect to the word alone, nor with respect to the formal concept, but with respect to the thing signified, or the objective concept. The minor premise is proven: It is false that Peter is in the thing itself a word and a formal concept, therefore, etc.

The same is the case when I say "Man is a substance." For this predicate "substance" does not belong to the word, nor to the formal concept, but to the thing, or to the real nature of man. Therefore "substance" is not denominated universal with respect to the word, or the formal concept, but with respect to the objective concept, or with respect to the real nature itself.

It is confirmed: Because when it is said "God was made man", that is not true of the word, nor of the formal concept of man, but of human nature, which is signified by that word, and represented by the formal concept, therefore, etc. The same is the case when I say "Peter is a man", "Paul is a man", etc.

It is confirmed secondly: Because when I say "Man is a rational animal", neither the word is defined, nor anything singular, because there is no science of words, nor of singulars, and these are not defined, nor are they in many. But that definition, and the thing defined, is in many, namely in Peter, Paul, therefore, etc.

You will object: Whatever is in the nature of things is singular, therefore no universal is given in the nature of things. The antecedent is proven: Whatever is in the nature of things, except God, is in a certain place and time. But whatever is in a certain place and time is singular, therefore, etc.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: It is singular, or existing really and absolutely in singulars, I concede the antecedent. It is formally and adequately singular according to all formalities, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. The same to the proof. Peter is singular through Peterness, not through animality, nor through rationality, at least formally. Similarly, universals are in place and time through singulars, with which they are identified.

You will insist: Singulars would be universals, Peter, for example, would be called universal. For he would have a universal nature identified with himself, or he would simultaneously be universal and particular. The consequent is false, therefore, etc.

I respond by distinguishing the consequent: He would be called universal in some sense, I concede the consequent and the major. Absolutely and simply, I deny the major. For absolutely and simply he would be singular, and an individual of human nature. Considered, however, precisely as man, he would not be singular, but imports something common, and fundamentally universal, because man is the same as Peter, Paul, John by an identity, or unity of nature, which is called formal.

You will object secondly: It would follow that Peter is identified with Paul, but this is false, therefore it is false that humanity is predicated of them, and is common to them, except with respect to the word, or the formal concept. The major is proven: Those which are the same as one third thing are the same as each other. But Peter and Paul would be the same as one third thing, namely in nature, therefore also with each other.

I respond by denying the major, and distinguishing the major of the proof. First, if that third thing is incommunicable, I concede the major. If it is communicable, I deny the major and the consequence. For humanity, in which Peter and Paul agree, is communicable, and indeed with a multiplication of itself. Second, thus they are the same with each other by the same identity which they have in that third thing. And because they do not agree, except in a certain formal unity, but not numerical and real unity, therefore they are the same with each other formally, not numerically and really, namely, they agree in essence, they have the same humanity formally, or essentially taken, as will be better clear below.

You will object thirdly: The authority of Aristotle, saying that universals are nothing, and that species are a figment, and that only universals in signifying are given, therefore from Aristotle universals are not given, except with respect to words, because only they signify.

I respond by denying the consequence. For Aristotle, when he speaks thus, merely wants universals to be nothing outside singulars, that they are not substances separate, as the Platonists imagine, and he used things for names, and for him to be is the same as to signify, just as someone who would say "man signifies rational animal" would be speaking of the thing, or of the substance, as much as of the word "man". Therefore it remains that there are given on the side of the thing true universals in being which are neither substances separate from singulars, nor bare words, nor pure formal concepts.

Question 3: On the unity of universals, what it is and what kind it is

The first quality of nature, which is called universal, is unity, and the second is multiplicity. For it is defined as one thing capable of being in many. We are asking here about that unity, what it is and what kind it is.

Note 1. Unity is that by which something has it that it is undivided in itself and divided from anything else which is not itself. For example, the unity of Peter consists in that from which he has it that he is not divided in himself, and that he is divided from Paul, from John, from a stone, and from wood, etc. Therefore, that from which Peter and Paul have it that they are not distinct, or divided, or diverse between themselves, will be their unity. And there are as many kinds of unity as there are kinds of indivision or commonality of things between themselves.

Note 2. The distinction of unity into numerical or real and formal. The first is that by which a thing is so collected in itself and divided from others that it is entirely singular and individual, and makes up a number with others. Therefore it is called individual, singular, material and numerical unity. But formal unity is that which belongs to something by reason of its essence or nature, and is called formal because the essence of each thing is its form. And according to this, all those things are said to be formally one which agree in essence, and formally

distinct or many which do not agree in essence. Thus Peter and Paul are two individually, materially, singularly and numerically, because they have two numerical unities, or are distinguished by principles of singularity or individuation. These principles are called "thisnesses" (haecceities), because by them any thing is constituted as this and not another. They are also customarily expressed by the diverse names of "Petriness," "Paulness," etc. But because the same Peter and Paul agree in essence or humanity (for each is a man), therefore they are said to be formally one. And so that unity is called by Scotus a formal unity, less than numerical unity, because it stands with numerical multitude. It is also called a universal unity, because it respects many, at least fundamentally.

Note 3. Some formal unity is called specific, another generic. Specific formal unity is the negation of division or distinction in the whole essence. For example, Peter and Paul are one by a specific unity, because they are not distinguished in nature or in any essential formality, but only as regards individuality or "Petriness" and "Paulness," which are not essential entities or formalities. Generic formal unity is the negation of division with regard to partial and more universal entities or predicates. For example, Peter and Bucephalus are formally one by a generic unity, namely by reason of substantiality or corporeality or animality, because they are not divided and do not differ in those grades or entities, but they do differ in species and are two most diverse species.

With these things posited, it is asked whether the formal unity which is attributed to any nature which is called universal belongs to it of itself and independently of the intellect, or through the attribution of the intellect.

Conclusion 1

The formal unity required for universality belongs to the nature independently of the intellect.

The Doctor [Scotus] with all his own [followers] and others [holds this]. It is proven, firstly, from Scotus. For he teaches that a nature is not of itself this and singular, but there is some real unity in the thing without any operation of the intellect, less than numerical unity or the unity proper to a singular, which unity is the nature considered in itself, i.e., according to its properties considered in themselves. But for universality no other unity is required in the nature. Therefore, according to Scotus, the formal unity required for universality belongs to the nature on the part of the thing.

It is proven, secondly, by reason of the same. The unity of human nature in Peter and Paul, for example, according to which it is called universal, is not made by the intellect. Therefore it is real and independent of the intellect. The antecedent is proven, because on account of that unity humanity is truly predicated of them in the mode of one. But if it were fictive, it could not be truly predicated in the mode of one. Therefore it is not fictive. The minor is proven: if whiteness were not in the wall except through fiction, it would not be truly predicated of the wall. Therefore it is the same with humanity, namely it could not be predicated of Peter and Paul as one in species if it were not such except through fiction.

It is confirmed, because an angel, or God Himself, could predicate human nature of Peter and Paul. Therefore it does not have unity through fiction. For although God can make a being of reason, nevertheless He cannot make a fiction.

You may say, firstly, that that unity is indeed not fictive, but nevertheless it does not belong except through an act of the intellect, which abstracts it from singularities, while it conceives it without "Peterness" and "Paulness," which are its individual differences.

But to the contrary, because the intellect does not have the power to produce any real entity in its object. Therefore that unity is either fictive or not real, or it is not through the intellect. The antecedent is proven, for the intellect in knowing Peter and Paul as singulars does not produce or cause in them singularity or anything else real. Therefore neither [does it] while it conceives them under one nature.

This is confirmed, because it would confer unity to humanity for this reason, that it conceives it in the mode of one. But this does not suffice for it to be predicated of Peter and Paul in the mode of one. Therefore that unity is not from the intellect. The minor is proven, because if I conceived Peter and Paul in the mode of one individual or one man, I do not make it that they truly are one man, nor predicable in the mode of one man. Therefore it is so with humanity.

You may say, secondly, that this suffices for the nature to be predicated in the mode of one, not by an intrinsic denomination, but an extrinsic one, sought from the formal concept of the intellect thus conceiving it.

To the contrary, that is attributed to the formal concept, either because it is one in itself entitatively, or because it conceives the nature as one objectively. But neither can be said. Therefore the reply does not resolve the difficulty, nor does it evade the force of the argument. The minor is proven, because if I conceived Peter and Paul as one man numerically, they could not be so predicated, and it would not be true, although that formal concept be one, or although they be so conceived objectively. Therefore it would be so with humanity.

It is confirmed concerning the objective concept, because that objective concept which the intellect would give to humanity conceiving it in the mode of one, would either be in Peter and Paul, or it would not be. If it were, then [it is] before the operation of the intellect, otherwise it could not produce it in the nature more than whiteness in a wall, because it is not productive outside itself. But if it were not in them, therefore it could not truly predicate it of them any more than whiteness of a black wall.

The conclusion is proven, thirdly, because if humanity received from the intellect the unity according to which it is predicated of Peter and Paul in the mode of one, this would be done especially through that act by which they would be conceived confusedly, so that their individual plurality is not discerned. But this would not suffice for universality. Therefore it does not receive that unity from the intellect. The major is taught by the adversaries, who thus explain that unity. The minor is proven, firstly, because antecedently to that confused concept humanity has in them a sufficient unity for universality. Therefore that is not from that act of the intellect. The antecedent is proven, because humanity which is in Peter and

Paul is such that it can be conceived of itself as one and so predicated of them. And for universality nothing else is required. But that nature has this of itself and antecedently to that concept. Therefore, etc.

The same minor is proven, secondly, because through that confused concept of Peter and Paul it does not happen that it could be predicated of each of them singly. For it is false that Peter is those men confusedly conceived. Therefore the unity coming from that confused concept does not suffice for universality, because for this it is required that the nature be able to be predicated of any individual and said, "Peter is a man," and "Paul is a man," etc. The antecedent is proven, because that confused concept, or natures thus conceived as many, are not present in each single one. Therefore it cannot be predicated of each of them singly according to that unity.

You may say it can be predicated inadequately of each single one, which suffices.

To the contrary, because the whole which is conceived must be predicated of each single one. But the whole which is conceived is Peter and Paul known confusedly as one man. Therefore that whole concept must be predicated adequately. The major is proven, because in that concept the humanity of Peter is not distinguished from the humanity of Paul. Therefore the whole is predicated.

The conclusion is proven, fourthly, against those who teach that that unity is from the prescinding intellect, insofar as it considers natures, e.g., humanity, with the singularities not considered. For that humanity thus considered either is one apt to be thus in many or not. If it is not, therefore it is not rendered apt for universality. If it is, therefore it does not have that from the intellect, but of itself. This consequence is proven, for thus the intellect gives nothing to that nature beyond that separation through the intellect. Therefore if in such a state of precision it has unity in many, or apt to be in many, it has that from elsewhere.

You will object: Every real division removes real unity. But every nature is divided on the part of the thing in its inferiors, e.g., humanity in Peter and Paul, and animality in man and horse. Therefore every nature on the part of the thing is multiple. Therefore it has no unity on the part of the thing.

I respond: I distinguish the major. Every real division removes the real unity opposed to it, I concede the major. [Every real division removes the real unity] not opposed to it, but compatible [with it], I deny the major. And I distinguish the minor. Every nature is really multiple and divided, with a numerical multiplicity, I concede the minor. [Every nature is really multiple and divided] formally, I deny the minor and the consequence. For, as we have said, numerical multiplicity is not opposed to formal unity, and specific division is not opposed to generic unity, but they stand together.

Conclusion 2

The unity by which a nature is called universal, and which it has in lower things, is not something positive, nor a privation, nor a negation, nor an indifference to plurality.

To understand the conclusion, note that some think the unity that a common nature has, and by which it is called universal, is positively and formally the same in all lower things, and multiplied only in number or species; therefore they call this unity formal positive, and by force of this it follows that Peter and Paul are formally the same man, and numerically two.

Others think that unity is only privative, insofar as by the advent of singulars or specific or individual differences, it is deprived of some positive unity which of itself it ought to or could have, so that by those differences, e.g. by paulity and petreity, humanity is rendered multiple and divided or not one, yet remains one privatively because it is deprived of the unity owed to it.

Finally, others call it the unity of indifference or negative unity, because human nature, for example, although it is singular in Peter and considered with petreity, yet precisely of itself is no more determined to petreity or paulity than to any other human individual, and in this way it respects many indifferently.

As for the mind of the Doctor [Duns Scotus], (1) the individual authors of those three opinions strive to draw him to their side, but undeservedly, because he never dreamed of attributing to natures unity, neither positive nor privative, but truly indifferent in the way explained, namely that a material nature of itself does not import anything but its essential predicates, by which it is such or such a nature essentially, e.g. (2) equinity of itself is only equinity, nor is it of itself one or multiple, nor singular, nor universal, i.e. it is not of itself one with numerical unity, nor multiple with the plurality opposite to that unity, nor universal actually, etc., although it is never really without one of those, etc. Hence his commentator (3) says that they go completely astray who think Scotus posited a universal positively common on the part of the thing.

These things having been posited,

1st part proved: If humanity, for example, were positively the same in Peter and Paul and the other human individuals:

1. That which is in Peter could be truly and formally predicated of Paul, just as the divinity of the Father is predicated of the Son and vice versa.
2. The same nature positively and really would be existing and not existing, living and dead, etc., namely living in Peter and dead in Paul.
3. The same positively and really would be the humanity of Christ and Judas.
4. God could not annihilate one man without annihilating all.
5. Nor create a man anew, because it would already exist according to nature. And innumerable similar absurdities would follow against the faith concerning the mystery of the Trinity and Incarnation, and against the natural light of reason. Therefore that opinion is to be rejected.

But the consequences are proved: For 1. by which the divinity of the Father is really and positively the same in the Son, therefore the same is predicated of the Father and Son; but in this opinion humanity would be really and positively the same in Peter and Paul, therefore it could be predicated of both and all the same positively. 2. The same is true of the humanity

of Christ and Judas. 3. The same is true of the humanity and soul of the damned Dives and the blessed Lazarus, etc.

You will say these are absurd and follow from the same singular and individual nature, such as the divine nature, but not from a common nature positively and really multiplied in individuals, such as humanity. On the contrary, if petreity and paulity would not take away the real and positive unity of humanity, just as the personal properties of sonship and paternity do not take away the real and positive unity of divinity, why would the same predicates not be said? And if multitude or numerical division would not take away that positive real identity, why would they impede those predicates which follow from it? At least, why would it not be said that the whole humanity of Christ is damned in Judas, except for his singularity? Therefore this opinion rushes into the mysteries of faith, and although it could be explained in some sense in which it would not prejudice them, nevertheless on account of the very appearance it ought to be exploded.

2nd part proved: It implies naturally that the same created thing undivided is in many divided and distinct individuals, but this would happen if humanity, for example, were the same really positively in Peter and Paul, therefore that positive real unity of nature in its individuals implies [a contradiction]. The major is clear from this, that it is peculiar to the divine nature, and it is not grasped naturally, but by faith alone.

You will say it is not the same unity. For nature is undivided formally and divided numerically, materially, or individually.

On the contrary, because according to the adversaries the humanity which is in Peter and Paul is in the same way undivided in itself really as if it were not divided in them, therefore it is no more multiplied by the singularities than if they did not come to it. The consequence is proved. A wall is not multiplied under whiteness and blackness for this reason, that under each it is the same in entity; but according to the adversaries humanity is the same in entity and really under petreity and paulity, therefore under them it is not multiplied really, just as divinity is not under paternity and sonship.

3rd part proved: Those which are really identified cannot be separated, nor can one exist without the other; but the humanity which is in Peter can exist without the humanity of Paul, therefore it is not the same really and positively in each. The major is clear. For the same cannot be separated from itself, and separation is the most certain and evident sign of distinction. The minor is proved. Because if those humanities could not be separated, Paul dying, only paulity would die, which would be separated from its nature, which is most absurd, therefore, etc. The consequence is proved, because the whole humanity would be preserved and live in Peter.

2nd part of the conclusion proved: Because no other unity is owed to the humanity which is in Peter and that which is in Paul than that which they have in fact, therefore they are not deprived of any unity owed through inexistence in singulars. The consequence is good. For privative unity consists in the privation of owed unity. The antecedent is proved. For that unity of which they would be deprived would be either essential or a property; but they are deprived of neither anything essential nor any property, therefore, etc. The minor is proved. Because the essentials and properties of a thing, of which sort is unity, are inseparable from

the thing, therefore they cannot be separated. For they are really identified with the thing of which they are.

2nd, the same part is proved. Because if nature existing in singulars were deprived of its unity, it would not be well said to be one privatively, just as a blind man would not be well said to be seeing privatively, therefore the unity of a common nature is not said to be one privatively.

Finally, the same part is proved from the preceding. Because no positive real unity is owed to a nature existing in singulars, therefore it is not deprived of any positive real unity. The antecedent is proved. Because nothing is owed to that to which it cannot belong, not even divinely, but no other unity can belong to a common nature, not even divinely, than it does not have in singulars, therefore in singulars it is not one privatively in the sense of the adversaries.

3rd part of the conclusion proved: because the fact that the humanity of Peter, for example, prescindendo petreity, and of itself is indifferent to being in Peter or Paul, does not make it so that it can be communicated to many copulatively, therefore that unity does not contribute to universality. The consequence is supposed, because a nature which is said to be truly universal ought to be able to be in many, to be predicated of them, not disjunctively, e.g. of this or that, of Peter or of Paul, but copulatively of Peter and Paul, therefore although humanity, for example, according to itself and its essential predicates is not this or that, nor of Peter or of Paul, it does not follow that it has truly universal unity, because it cannot be except in one or the other singularity.

2nd proved from the reasoning of Scotus. For a common nature according to itself and its essential predicates does not include universality or singularity: humanity, for example, is only humanity, equinity is only equinity, therefore it does not have universal or singular unity.

Objection 1 against 1st part: Peter and Paul according to essential predicates are not distinguished really, therefore they are really the same in essence, and indeed positively. The consequence is clear. For real distinction is opposed to unity, and of what sort is the indistinction, of that sort is the unity. The antecedent is proved. They have the same definition, therefore they are not distinguished essentially.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent. They are not distinguished, i.e. they do not differ, but have similar natures, I concede the antecedent and the consequence of the proof; they are not really divided and distinct, or they are not two humanities really, I deny the antecedent and consequence. The same is true of the definition. For definitions objectively are really distinct, but formally they are not, insofar as through the same the humanity of Paul and Peter can be represented on account of the similarity of the objective definitions or natures of each.

Instance: Peter and Paul are no less similar in thisnesses or in individualities than in humanities, therefore if on account of the similarity in humanities they can be said to be one in essence and defined by one definition, so also on account of the similarity in thisnesses they can be said to be one in number.

Response 1: by retorting the argument, because if Peter and Paul are so similar in thisnesses as in essence, they will have as much real singular unity as formal unity; but this is against the adversaries, and what they will say for the disparity on the part of the thisnesses, we will say for the essences.

Response 2: I deny the antecedent. For thisnesses or individuations are ultimate differences, and they cannot be represented or defined so that the formal concept or definition of one (in case singularity can be defined, which is against the principles of logic and good definition) represent the definition of the other. For the formal concept of Peter, as Peter is, cannot represent Paul, as Paul, but rather ought to distinguish him from Paul.

Response 3: I deny the consequence. For besides the similarity between individuals, real undividedness is required for real unity, but for formal unity the similarity in essential predicates suffices, nor is real division an obstacle to it.

Objection 2: The humanity of Peter, precisely from petreity, from which it is distinguished formally, is not distinct positively from the humanity of Paul similarly prescinded, therefore it has positive unity with it. The antecedent is proved. For if they were distinct between themselves, they would not need individual differences, namely petreity and paulity, they would be distinguished numerically, but this is false and against the Doctor, therefore it is false that they are distinguished otherwise than through individualities. The major is proved. For the whole role of individuality is to make it so that two similar natures are distinct positively and really two; therefore, if those natures are already of themselves distinct positively, individuality will be superfluous.

Response: I deny the antecedent. For it is entitatively not diverse but similar, or rather it is neither distinct nor indistinct, but, to use the words of the Doctor, in that precision humanity is only humanity, and nothing else, it prescinds from all distinction and identity: for it does not import anything but its essential predicates, which are animality and rationality.

And so it is clear to the second and third argument.

Instance 1: About whatever thing formally it can be said either that it is one with another or distinct from it, for between being one and not being one, or being distinct, there is no middle, therefore the humanity of Peter, as formally distinct from petreity, is either one with the humanity of Paul or positively distinct.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent. Speaking simply and absolutely and on the part of the thing, I concede the antecedent; precisely and formally, or by reason of the formal, as it is considered according to its essential predicates only, I deny the antecedent and consequence. Therefore the humanity of Peter, on the part of the thing, and simply, and absolutely, is distinct from the humanity of Paul really and positively, but according to itself formally and precisely it is only humanity, as I was saying with the subtle Doctor.

Instance 2: If the humanity which is in Peter, as it prescinds from petreity, on the part of the thing and absolutely, is distinct from that which is in Paul, those humanities will be two distinct species, but this is false, therefore it is one.

Response: I deny the supposition of the major. For it supposes that the humanity of Peter prescind from petreity and considered formally according to its essential predicates, is distinct or one positively, which we have said is false, for thus it is nothing other than rational animal, or at most it is one negatively, or neither one nor distinct positively.

Objection 3: Man is said univocally of Peter and Paul, therefore humanity signified through that name is the same in each. For univocals are those of which the name is common and the signified ratio is entirely the same.

Response: I deny the consequence: and I distinguish its ratio. The signified ratio is the same by identity or unity of similarity, I concede the consequence; by real, positive unity and of undividedness, I deny the consequence. But of such a sort is the unity of the humanity of Peter and Paul, namely a unity of similarity, as we shall say presently.

Objection against 3rd part: Nature considered according to itself and prescind from singulars is not singular, therefore it is universal. The consequence is clear. For between singular and universal there does not seem to be a middle.

Response: I deny the consequence. Because considered according to itself it is such a nature and nothing else, e.g. humanity is humanity. It is indifferent between universality and singularity, and that indifference can be called a middle between them.

CONCLUSION 3

It seems that the real formal unity, upon which universality is based, is nothing other than the unity of similarity, through which all singular natures can be represented by the same concept that can apply to all of them. This conforms with Scotus, though many Scotists disagree.

It can be proven, however, to be in line with the Doctor's thinking and to be true. For he admits that in singular natures there is some unity on the part of the thing that is less than numerical unity, which they call formal unity, and which they retain in individuals. But it does not appear that natures retain any other unity in their individuals or inferiors besides that of similarity, in the sense explained. Therefore, according to Scotus and in truth, the formal unity of natures in their individuals is none other than that of similarity.

The minor premise is proven thus: If they had any other unity, it would be at most either positive, as some would have it, or privative, as others claim. But neither is true, according to Scotus' thinking or in truth. Therefore, etc.

The minor premise is proven because according to Scotus, the entire unity that belongs to some common nature by the nature of the thing is the unity of indifference, which we discussed above. Therefore, it is not positive or privative unity. Hence, it cannot be better

understood than as the unity of similarity or representability, and this belongs to natures on the part of the thing.

The antecedent is clear from these words of Scotus: (1) "That nature, according to the proper unity of nature, as it is nature, is indifferent to the unity of the singular." Therefore, etc.

It is confirmed because, although humanity, which is in Peter, considered precisely according to itself, is indifferent to "Peterness" and "Paulness", it does not follow that it is really one with the humanity that is in Paul, except through similarity or representability. Nor, consequently, can it be predicated of Paul, except insofar as there is similarity. Therefore, there is no other unity besides that of similarity or representability.

You may object that similarity is based on unity, but Peter and Paul are similar in nature. Therefore, they have some unity of nature that is prior to similarity. Hence, there is another formal unity on the part of the thing besides that of similarity. The major premise is proven by the Philosopher saying that those things are similar which are one. Therefore, etc.

I respond, firstly, that the Philosopher says that those things are similar which are one, and in speaking thus he indicates that similarity is that very unity itself. Just as if he were to say that risibility in man is the power to laugh, he would not signify that risibility is distinct from that power. Hence, with the major premise thus explained, I deny the consequence. For unity is similarity itself.

Secondly, I respond that the entire unity that can be imagined between Peter and Paul in nature, which precedes similarity, can be nothing other than representability through the same species or formal concept, such that those are said to be similar and one in nature whose nature can be represented by the same species or formal concept.

You may further object that the nature which is in Peter, as nature, and as formally distinct from "Peterness", either is or is not the nature which is in Paul. If it is, then it has positive real unity, and a unity other than that of similarity. If it is not, then it is not similar, since it can be discerned from that other nature. Therefore, that unity of similarity is false.

I respond by denying the antecedent. For, as I have often said, that humanity, as distinct or precision from "Peterness", considered according to its essential predicates, is only humanity. It does not express identity or distinction, because by the very fact that it is said to be distinct or not distinct, it is already being considered along with its properties, and not only according to its essentials.

You may object, thirdly, that the formal unity which Scotus asserts belongs to nature according to itself, and which contributes to universality, allows nature to be predicated of its inferiors by a predication expressing "this is this". But that unity of similarity is not sufficient for this predication. Therefore, another unity must be assigned.

I respond by distinguishing the major premise. It must be able to be predicated, etc., such that what is objectively conceived is either positively the same, or entirely similar and representable by the same concept or species, I concede the major premise. Such that it

must be positively the same in those many, I deny the major premise and the consequence, with a similar distinction of the minor premise.

For it is not required that the very same nature which is predicated of many should in fact and in reality be in those many of which it is predicated. It suffices that it be present through something entirely similar in the aforementioned sense. Otherwise, there would be no universal. For no one nature is thus in many really and according to itself.

You may object, fourthly, that the unity of the universal which Scotus acknowledged (1) is not universal on the part of the thing. But the unity of similarity is on the part of the thing. Therefore, it is not the unity which Scotus acknowledged. Hence, according to Scotus, the unity of the universal is not the unity of similarity.

I respond by distinguishing the major premise. It is not universal on the part of the thing proximately and formally, but by Logical universality, I concede the major premise. Fundamentally and remotely, or by Metaphysical universality, I deny the major premise and the consequence. But more on this below.

You may insist that for a nature to be formally and proximately universal Logically, it is only required that it be one by universal unity. But it has this on the part of the thing, according to us. Therefore, it renders the nature universal on the part of the thing. The minor premise is proven because it has that unity of conformity or representability or similarity on the part of the thing. Therefore, etc.

I respond by denying the major premise. For proximate universality must be considered by the intellect as prescinded from singularities, e.g., from "Peterness". Otherwise, it will not be one with the humanity of Paul, at least really, because it is really conjoined with "Peterness" and "Paulness", through which it is divided and rendered dissimilar and distinct.

Gather, first, that this formal and real unity, lesser than numerical unity, which we assert here, is nothing other in humanity (the same applies to the rest) than the similarity and agreement which Peter, Paul, John, and the other men have among themselves in essential predicates, such that the humanity of one can represent all the others. And through the same formal concept by which the humanity in Peter is represented, the humanity in Paul is also represented. Nor from the force of such a concept can one be discerned from the other, due to the perfect agreement which they have among themselves in their essential predicates.

Moreover, it is clear that this kind of conformity or similarity can be called unity, both from the common way of speaking (for when we see two things so alike that it is difficult to discern one from the other, e.g., in two drops of water or two solar rays, they are usually said to be one and the same), and because Aristotle himself (1) teaches that diversity is opposed to unity. Therefore, where there is no diversity, there is unity. But that similarity of forms or natures is the negation of diversity. Therefore, it is rightly called unity, and indeed formal unity, because nature or essence is the form of the whole thing.

It is also called real unity, because it is found in real natures independently of the intellect. For it is certain that the humanities of Peter and Paul are so similar of themselves that they

cannot be discerned from each other, unless singularities were to come to them. To these singularities are commonly assigned these six signs of diversity, contained in this verse: Form, Figure, Place, Stock, Name, Country.

QUESTION 4: On universal aptitude.

Another condition of universal nature is that it is apt to be in many things. And we must consider what kind of aptitude this is. For not every unity is compatible with plurality, nor does every plurality make for universality, as we said about the Divine nature, which cannot be numerically multiplied, and about the Divine Persons, who, although they are three in number, do not make it so that the Divinity, which is common to them, is called universal.

I suppose, however, that for some one nature to be called universal, it is not required that it actually be in many and be actually predicated of them, but it suffices that it be able to be in them and be predicated of them. Hence, as soon as the first man was created, or rather, before Adam was created, humanity could be called universal just as much as it is now. The same is true of the nature of the Sun, which, although it is alone in fact, yet many Suns are not impossible, and therefore its nature can be called universal.

I suppose secondly that a twofold universal is commonly distinguished, namely Metaphysical and Logical, as we have already said. The Metaphysical is described as one apt to be in many, and so stops at the consideration of essences in themselves; but the Logical adds predicability of many, and is described as one apt to be in, and to be predicated of, many, because Logic considers natures insofar as they are of themselves predicable of one another according to the various respects and orders which it apprehends in them. And because to be in many is prior to being predicated of them, the Metaphysical universal precedes the Logical, and is, as it were, its foundation.

The question here, therefore, is whether that aptitude to be in many ought to be real, such that no nature can truly be called universal unless it can really be multiplied; or whether it suffice that the intellect conceive it without repugnance to multiplication, and without singularity, although in reality it be such of itself. The Thomists think that in Angels all natures are of themselves incommunicable, for example, the nature of Michael is absolutely incommunicable, and yet it can be called universal not in reality, but in the intellect.

CONCLUSION

The aptitude of a nature to be in many ought to be real, on the part of the thing, so that if it were repugnant to it to be really in many, it could not truly be called universal. This is the view of the Scotists and others against the Thomists. For the Doctor teaches that if some nature were of itself this, it would be a contradiction to understand it under the aspect of

universality, just as it is a contradiction to understand the divine essence under the aspect of universality or universality.

It can be proved thus. If nature could be called universal without real aptitude, or with intrinsic repugnance to multiplication, the divine nature could be called universal; but the consequent is against all, therefore also the antecedent. The major premise is proved. Because nothing is lacking to the divine nature for universality except real multiplicability, therefore, unless that real multiplicability, or aptitude to it, be necessary, but it suffice to understand it without singularity, it will be able to be called universal.

You will say that it cannot be conceived without singularity, and therefore is not universal. To the contrary. Because this is said gratuitously, for it no more involves a contradiction to conceive divinity without singularity than without justice, without persons, etc.; but it is conceived without these, therefore it can be conceived without that.

Secondly, if for true universality nothing else be required than that the nature be conceived by the intellect without singularity, although on the part of the thing it could not be except singular, the lowest species could be called a genus; the consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent. The consequence is proved, because specific nature, for example, humanity, can be considered without conceiving its ultimate determination, as if it were conceived precisely as rational animal, because according to these predicates it does not involve repugnance to being communicated to many natures rather than to many individuals, although in fact that communication is repugnant, not this; therefore it could be called a genus as much as a lowest species.

Thirdly, it is of the essential nature of the universal that the nature which is so denominated be able to be in many; but a nature to which it would be repugnant to be in many would not have that aptitude, not even through the intellect; therefore it would not be universal. The minor premise is proved, because through the intellect that repugnance would not be removed, therefore neither would that aptitude be given. The antecedent is proved, because either that nature would be conceived with that aptitude, or with repugnance to being in many; but neither can be said. The minor premise is proved. For if it were conceived with aptitude, it would be conceived with a formality which would be impossible for it, as is supposed; therefore it does not become universal through this.

Secondly, if it is conceived with repugnance to being multiplied, then it is conceived with repugnance to universality.

You will say that it suffices that it be conceived in that way in which neither repugnance to plurality nor aptitude is apprehended, and then it will be indifferent, which suffices for universality. To the contrary. It cannot be conceived as indifferent to that which is essential to it, and to that which is repugnant to it; just as man cannot be conceived in a state of indifference to being rational and irrational; therefore no answer, because we suppose that plurality is as repugnant to that nature as irrationality is repugnant to man.

You will object that universality, according to the Doctor, is a relation of reason; therefore it suffices that reason apprehend that it can be multiplied, although this be repugnant on the

part of the thing. The consequence is proved, because for a relation of reason a term of reason suffices.

I reply by denying the antecedent, and especially concerning the metaphysical universal. For, in the first place, it is not a relation of reason, nor did the Doctor dream this; and although we should admit that the Logical universal expresses a relation of reason formally, yet it would be with a foundation in reality, which foundation would be real multiplicability in being; otherwise it would be a fictitious universality.

You insist that aptitude to be in, and to be predicated of, many is not present on the part of the thing, but through the intellect; therefore it suffices that some nature be able to be conceived with that aptitude, although it be repugnant to it on the part of the thing.

I reply by denying the antecedent. For aptitude to be in many is present on the part of the thing, and even to be predicated, at least remotely and fundamentally. For this is the very aptitude of being in many.

You object, thirdly, that in chimerical beings, to which all real existence is repugnant, we conceive the aspects of genus and species; therefore also in a nature to which real plurality would be repugnant, and outside the intellect.

I reply by denying the consequence, because aptitude to be in many belongs to a being of reason in the way in which being belongs to it; but to the nature which we suppose to be real, that real aptitude to plurality is repugnant; and, just as we conceive beings of reason after the manner of true being, so also we attribute to them genera, species, and individuals in their own way. But it is not so with this nature, which is supposed to be real; the plurality which would be attributed to it would be plainly chimerical.

You object, fourthly, that the specific nature of Michael, for example, conceived as the principle of his proper operations, and as distinct from the nature of Gabriel, does not necessarily involve singularity; therefore under this concept it is determinable, and that determinability seems to be indifferent to Michaelity, not on the part of the thing, but through the intellect; therefore through the intellect it is universal.

I reply by denying the antecedent, because determinability supposes an indifference which is not repugnant to that nature; but indifference to being determined through Michaelity is repugnant to it. Besides, the determinability required for universality ought to be in a nature which extends more widely than the determining difference, which would not be found in the nature of Michael with respect to Michaelity, in the opinion of the adversaries, namely, the Thomists.

You insist that a nature so conceived could be predicated of Michael, but it could not be predicated of him except as a species; therefore it would truly be a species, therefore after the manner of a universal. The minor premise is proved. Because it could not be predicated except as a species or genus or difference or property or accident; but it is not predicated as a genus, or property, or accident, or difference; therefore as a species.

I reply by denying the consequence and the minor premise of the proof. For it would be predicated as his singular form, adequate to Michaelity, not as something extending more widely; and if you wish, after the manner of a specific nature, but not through this would it have the true aspects of a species.

Question 5: Is there a universal apart from the mind?

Given what we've said so far about the nature and conditions of universals, and their distinction into metaphysical and logical universals, resolving this question that philosophers seem to argue about so fiercely isn't difficult.

So we're asking: does a nature have unity and aptitude for being in many things and being predicated of them apart from the mind? Because the whole essence of universality consists in these.

Conclusion 1

There is a metaphysical universal apart from the mind.

This is the common position of the Doctor, St. Thomas, and their followers, and it clearly follows from what's been said. Proof: A nature that is called universal in being, or metaphysically, receives nothing from the intellect that pertains to universality, therefore it is universal apart from the mind. The antecedent is proved: For this universality, nothing else is required in the nature besides unity and multiplicability, or aptitude for being in many; but the nature has neither from the intellect, therefore it receives nothing from the intellect by which it is made universal. The minor premise is clear from what's been said so far, where we also proposed some objections; we'll add the rest here.

It's clear, I say, from Scotus and the reasons given, that a nature receives neither formal unity nor multiplicability from the intellect: There is some real unity in a thing without any operation of the intellect, etc. And every quiddity, as far as it is concerned, is communicable, therefore, etc.

You'll object:

1. If the humanity in Peter is universal apart from the mind, then Peter is also universal. The consequent is false, therefore, etc. The consequence is proved: Peter's humanity is not distinct from Peter, therefore, if it is universal, he will be universal. The consequence is

proved: For what belongs to the nature of an individual apart from the mind, belongs to the individual itself, therefore, etc.

I respond:

1. I deny the major consequence of the first argument, the second consequence, and the major of the third, as is clear in divine things; for it belongs to the nature of the Father to be communicated to the Son, but not to the person of the Father, although a divine person is really identical to the divine nature.

2. I distinguish the same major: If it belongs to the nature of an individual taken specifically and materially, I concede the major. If it belongs only to the nature formally and precisely, as it is a nature, prescinding from individuation, I deny the major. But universality, or the aptitude for being in many, belongs in the way we explained above, namely it belongs to Peter's nature formally and in itself precisely from individuation, but it does not belong specifically and as it includes Peterness.

You'll object:

2. Peter's humanity is so proper to him apart from the mind that it cannot belong to another, therefore it is not universal, but plainly singular apart from the mind. The antecedent is proved: It is identified apart from the mind with Peterness, therefore it cannot belong to another.

I respond:

1. According to Scotus' view about common natures, I deny the antecedent. For considered in itself and precisely, it is indifferent to Peterness and Paulness; nor does it say anything else except its essential predicates (as we've often said), and although it is really identified with it apart from the mind, it does not follow that it cannot be conceived without it, and that it does not objectively prescind from it.

2. I deny the consequence. Because, given the explanation of unity and communicability we gave about the unity of conformity and similarity, the real identification of Peter's nature with Peterness does not prevent there being another similar one in Peter and Paul, with which it will be formally one, or one by that formal and specific unity, and numerically multiple, or individually.

You'll object:

3. If that humanity were universal of itself and apart from the mind, it could not be made singular, but the consequent is false, therefore, etc. The consequence is proved: Because it would not be changed by Peterness.

I respond: I deny the consequence. Because it is both singular and universal at the same time: it is singular really and formally, it is universal by reason of the essential commonality it has with other humanities, and singular by reason of the individuation with which it is really identified.

Conclusion 2

There is no logical universal apart from the mind.

This is the express teaching of the Doctor, that the universal is from the intellect, and indeed effectively, but originally or occasionally from a property in the thing, and that it is not a universal in act (apart from the mind) because it lacks that difference according to which the universal is completely universal.

And he teaches that a nature apart from the mind is not actually universal in the way something is universal made by the intellect, and a nature under universality is a logical concept [the Logician considers second intentions applied to first], therefore logical universality is a certain second intention[,] therefore it is from the intellect according to Scotus, etc.

But it is proved by the reason the same Doctor suggests. Because a nature receives formal logical universality through that by which it is constituted proximately predicable of many through the mode of one[,] but a nature has this from the intellect, therefore also universality.

Proof: In order for a nature to become proximately predicable of many through the mode of one, it must be cognized to be in many through the mode of one; but it cannot be so cognized except through an act of the intellect considering it precisely from singularities and comparing it to the same singulars in which it thus sees it multiplied, therefore, etc.

You'll object: With no intellect thinking it is true to say that Peter and Paul are of the same species; but species is formally a logical universal, therefore a logical universal is apart from the mind.

I respond: I distinguish the major: To be of the same species fundamentally, I concede the major. Formally, I deny the major. Peter and Paul have similar natures, or one nature by the unity of similarity, from which the intellect takes the foundation for conceiving it through the mode of one and predicating it of each one, this last thing is called a logical universal formally and proximately predicable of many.

From this you gather that the metaphysical universal is only the foundation of the logical universal. The former is called an inchoate universal, but the latter actual and complete. Hence Scotus says "it must be understood that a complete universal is what is in many, predicable of many not in act but in proximate potency, and such a thing is nothing except from the consideration of the intellect."

Who would not wonder that so many philosophers cite this Doctor to the contrary, namely for the universal apart from the mind?

QUESTION 6: On the universal effective cause, or by what operation of the intellect nature receives formal Logical universality.

We have it from the preceding question that logical universality pertains to the intellect, at least abstractive, by which it considers nature, which it calls universal without singularity, but we have not said whether such abstraction suffices for that universality, and that is to be examined in the present question.

Note 1. The operation of the intellect is either abstractive absolute or comparative. Abstractive knowledge is that by which the intellect considers one thing separately from another, with which it is really identical, for example, when I consider humanity, which is in Peter, not thinking of rationality, that knowledge is called precision, and indeed absolute, because it is not referred to anything else.

Comparative knowledge is that by which an abstracted nature is considered in relation to another, for example, humanity in relation to Peter and Paul, animality in relation to Peter and Bucephalus, etc.

Furthermore, comparative knowledge is either simple or composite. It is simple if it is done without judging, without affirming or denying, and it is composite if it is done with judgment, or by affirming or denying something about it, for example, by saying animality is in Peter and Bucephalus, etc.

Note 2. The intellect is usually called agent and patient. It is called agent insofar as applied to objects it forms and expresses species or images of them, and it is called patient insofar as it receives in itself those same species or images, and through them is as it were informed and rendered understanding.

Species or images, as produced by the agent intellect, are called expressed, and as received in the patient intellect, are called impressed, for example the intellect looking at Peter, and considering his nature precisely according to its essential predicates, forms an image of him, which represents humanity in itself, as if abstracted from Peterness, to which it does not attend; and this is called the operation of the agent intellect, and the expressed species of humanity.

Insofar as it receives that image in itself, and through it becomes understanding through humanity thus abstracted, it is called patient, and that same image is called impressed.

It is asked therefore here, whether nature is formally and Logically denominated universal through that absolute abstractive act of the agent intellect, or through the abstractive comparison of the patient intellect.

CONCLUSION 1

The universal is not made formally and completely through the abstraction of the agent intellect nor through a composite comparative act of the patient intellect, but through a simple comparison. This is the doctrine of Scotus with his followers and others, even Thomists.

For he says or supposes everywhere that universality is a relative denomination born from a locating act of the intellect, for considering the one nature of man in many, and from many by some property in the nature thus considered is moved to cause an intention, and having caused it attributes it to that nature, etc.

You see the comparative act of nature to the many in which it is known to be: and most clearly he teaches that nature is not made universal through the agent intellect, and before it has objective being in the possible intellect, and indeed it is not such that proximate potentiality belongs to it to be said of any, etc.

The conclusion has three parts. 1. is about the abstractive act, 2. about the composite comparative act, and 3. about simple comparison, through the possible or passive intellect.

Proof of part 1. That by which nature is made formally and completely Logically universal, is that by which it is made proximately predicable of many: but this is not done through an abstractive act, therefore the universal is not made formally and completely through an abstractive act.

The major is clear from the definition of the Logical universal. The minor is proven. Then nature is proximately predicable of many, when it is considered in them, but it is not considered in them through abstraction, therefore, etc.

The minor is proven. Because through abstraction it is rather considered outside of multitude, and is separated and understood from multitude, as one, therefore, etc.

But all this is true of the intellect both passive and agent, therefore, etc.

Proof of part 2 about the composite comparative act, because nature is proximately predicable of many before composite comparison, therefore it is not made formally universal through it.

The antecedent is proven. Because nature through that composite comparison is actually predicated of many, therefore it is formally and proximately predicable before composite comparison. The antecedent is clear: for potency and aptitude precede act or exercise.

Proof of part 3 about simple comparison; because through it nature is rendered formally and proximately predicable, therefore through it, it is made formally and Logically universal.

The antecedent is proven. For through it nature receives the denomination or extrinsic relation of unity to many, and is known in many, therefore through the same it is made proximately predicable of many.

You will object against the first part. Nature, as abstracted from singulars, is not singular, therefore it is formally universal.

The consequence is proven. Because there is no middle ground between universal and singular, therefore, etc.

I respond by distinguishing the consequence. It is metaphysically and fundamentally universal, or remotely and incompletely (as I say with Scotus), I concede the consequence. Logically and formally, I deny the consequence, and similarly I distinguish the antecedent of the proof.

The reason for the denial is easily clear from the foundation of the conclusion; for it is not proximately and completely predicable, unless known in inferiors, which is not done through pure abstraction, as was said.

Instance. Nature, as abstracted, is not determined through any singularity, therefore without other cognition it is proximately predicable of many.

I respond by denying the consequence. For besides that indetermination or indifference, it is required that the order or aptitude which it has to many be known.

You will object against part 2. Universals are constituted through predication of their inferiors, therefore actual predication or composite comparison makes the universal.

The antecedent is proven. For they are not defined through predicability, but through predication: for example genus is defined as that which is predicated of many differing in species, etc., therefore they are constituted through actual predication.

I respond by denying the antecedent of the proof. Through predication in potency, I concede the antecedent, through being actually predicated, I deny the antecedent and the consequence.

And the reason is, because that being predicated in the definition of universals is put in place of genus: but the universal in common, and as such, is defined through being predicated in potency or aptitude: in a word, through Predicability, therefore so it must be concerning the individual species of universal.

You will object against part 3. All comparison destroys universality, therefore the universal is not made through simple comparison.

The antecedent is proven. Because it destroys both universality and unity, and induces multitude, therefore it destroys universality.

The antecedent is proven. Because thus by comparing that nature to its individuals, it joins it to individuals, therefore etc.

I respond by denying the antecedent of the 1st argument, and I distinguish the antecedent of the second. It induces numerical plurality, I concede the antecedent, formal plurality, I deny the antecedent and the consequence.

For nature is called universal from formal unity, which occurs with numerical plurality, and through this it is completed in the notion of formally universal through that through which it respects that plurality.

CONCLUSION 2

The Logical universal depends upon the operation of the possible or patient intellect.

This is the doctrine of Scotus, who disapproves of the saying that the agent intellect makes universality in things through this, that it denudes the whatness existing in the phantasm, etc.

But it is proven by the reason of Scotus already alleged. Now nature is made formally and proximately universal through that operation through which it is made proximately predicable of many: but that is done only through the operation of the possible intellect, therefore, etc.

The minor is proven. The function of the agent intellect is to purify phantasms, and transfer them from the order of material things to the order of spiritual things, but the function of the patient intellect is to know objects through the reception of intelligible species formed by the agent intellect; and consequently its function is to compare abstracted nature to inferiors, therefore the function of the patient intellect is to render nature proximately predicable of its inferiors; the antecedent is clear from the consensus of all.

The consequence is proven. Because, as we have said, nature is made proximately predicable of its inferiors through comparison of it to them, or through this, that it is known to be one in them, as we have said, therefore, etc.

Proof 2. Because it is probable, as will be said in its place, that the agent intellect indeed abstracts nature, and purifies it from the materiality of phantasms, but not from singularity, therefore nature is not even fundamentally made universal through the agent intellect.

You will object to some authorities of Scotus, who seems to teach the contrary, for example when he says that it belongs to the agent intellect to make the non-universal universal, and in Quodlibet 15, where he teaches that by the power of the agent intellect ... from a singular representative a universal representative is generated, or a translation in objects from the corporeal to the spiritual, or from the singular to the universal is understood; therefore, according to Scotus, the universal is made through the operation of the agent intellect.

Some Scotists respond that the Doctor was problematic in this matter. Others, that he is speaking about habitual universal, not about actual universal: but I respond that it must be

understood concerning the universal fundamentally and remotely, or negatively or incompletely, not formally and proximately and completely, or concerning the universal in representing, insofar as the species, which the agent intellect expresses from some abstracted nature, represents singular natures, but not concerning the universal in predicating, because for this it is required that the intellect recognize its unity in many, for example in its singulars, as we have said from the same Scotus.

I also said negatively universal, because nature precisely as abstracted from singularities, is not universal except negatively, that is, neither universal nor particular, as was often said by the same Scotus.

QUESTION 7: On the predicability of universals, how universals are predicated of their inferiors.

It's not enough to say that the logical universal consists in being predicable of many. We need to say how this happens. For this, I assume that predication is an act by which the intellect judges something about something else. That which is attributed to another is called the predicate, and that to which it is attributed is called the subject - the subject of predication, to differentiate it from the subject of inherence or information.

Predication can be true or false, affirmative or negative. True predication is when we judge about a thing as it is in itself. False predication is the opposite, when we judge about a thing otherwise than it is in itself. Affirmative predication asserts something of another, while negative predication removes something from another.

Affirmative predication can be formal, material (or identical), or causal. Formal predication attributes something to another by way of form, either as a total or essential form, or as a partial, substantial, or accidental form. Identical predication predicates the same thing of itself, like saying "Peter is Peter", or of another with which it is united by reason of matter or subject, as when you say "the white is sweet" when speaking of milk, in which sweetness and whiteness are united. These propositions are verified by reason of the subject in the said sense.

Causal predication is when the cause is predicated of the effect, like if you say "anger is the kindling of the blood around the heart" or "man consists of soul and body". For the kindling of the blood, which is predicated of anger, is its cause; and body and soul are the two intrinsic causes of man.

Finally, formal predication can be direct (or natural), or indirect (or unnatural). Direct predication is when what is more apt to be predicated is predicated, and what ought to be the subject is made the subject. Indirect is the opposite, predicating what should be the

subject and making the subject what should be predicated. What is more universal should be predicated, and what is less universal should be the subject. For example, saying "man is animal" is direct predication, while "animal is man" is indirect. If two terms are equally opposed or extensive and common, they can be predicated directly of each other, like "rational is risible" or "risible is rational".

We need to recall what we said about concretes and abstracts, and add that concretes can be substantial or accidental. A substantial concrete signifies something subsisting in a form, like "man" who subsists in humanity, or signifies a form that can be predicated concretely and essentially. So if someone asks "what is man?", you rightly respond "a rational animal". You see that animality and rationality, which are conveyed formally through the concrete "man", are predicated concretely. This is also called a substantive concrete, because it is predicated substantively and not as something adjacent, as when you say "man is white" where "white" is said adjectivally.

An accidental concrete signifies a form that is outside the essence of the subject, like "white", or which can only be predicated of a thing contingently and qualitatively, like "white", "black", etc. These are also called adjectival concretes insofar as their forms are signified adjectivally, like "white", "black", "learned", etc.

Similarly, a substantive abstract is any form that belongs to the essence of the subject from which it is abstracted, e.g. humanity, rationality, animality, etc. An adjectival or accidental abstract is one that does not belong to the essence of the subject from which it is abstracted, like whiteness, blackness, learning, etc.

Recall also what we said about concretes and abstracts of first and second intention, and about abstracts of ultimate and non-ultimate abstraction.

With this in mind, we ask how natures that are called universals are predicated either of their inferiors or of each other concretely or abstractly. For all predication is either concrete or abstract, and in four ways: 1) concrete is said of concrete, 2) concrete is said of abstract, 3) abstract is said of concrete, and 4) abstract is said of abstract.

CONCLUSION 1

Superior concretes, whether substantial or accidental, can be truly and formally predicated of their inferiors. This is the common view.

Proof: For formal predication, it is only required that the predicate be in the subject and be predicated of it by way of form. But superior concretes are related to their inferiors in this way, therefore they can be truly and formally predicated of them. The minor premise is proven with respect to the second part, since the first part is certain.

To be predicated by way of form is to be predicated as something essential. But whenever a superior concrete is predicated of an inferior, it is predicated in this way. Proof of the minor: For to say "Peter is a man", for example, is the same as saying "Peter is one having humanity". But this is to predicate by way of form. Therefore, etc.

Conclusion 2

Abstract forms cannot be predicated of their concrete counterparts, and vice versa. This is commonly held along with the Doctor (1). For example, it is incorrect to say "humanity is man", "whiteness is white", or conversely "man is humanity", "white is whiteness", etc.

The first part is proven because the intellect cannot predicate something of another unless it knows the predicate is in the subject. But an abstraction, as such, is not apprehended as being in a subject, but rather as being separated from it. Therefore, an abstraction cannot be formally predicated of its concrete counterpart. The minor premise follows from the definition of abstraction, for an abstraction is understood as being pulled away from a subject or concrete thing.

The second part is proven by the same reasoning. For an abstraction, as such, is not considered as existing in a subject, but as separated. Therefore a concrete thing cannot be formally predicated of it, as if adjoining the concrete as a form.

This conclusion is confirmed in both parts. For when it is said through formal predication "whiteness is white", it signifies that whiteness is a subject having whiteness. And when it is said "white is whiteness", the sense is that white and whiteness are the same. But both are false in these senses, and therefore so is the predication.

You may object secondly that this rule is not true in divine matters, for this predication is true and formal: "God is Deity", and this: "Deity is God". Therefore an abstraction can be truly and formally predicated of a concrete, and a concrete of an abstraction.

I respond first by denying the antecedent as to the second part, namely that it is formal. It is indeed true, but identically, not formally.

I respond secondly by denying the consequent. For we are speaking here of created and finite concretes and abstractions, not of uncreated and infinite ones. For there is another reason why the latter can be predicated of each other in this way: because, according to the Doctor, any infinite thing by reason of its infinity demands to be joined to everything that is not repugnant to it. Hence, although an abstraction in divine matters is seen as separated from a concrete, it is still in it on account of infinity, and so can still be predicated of it.

You may object secondly that this predication is true: "quantity is quantified", and this: "a line is long". But quantity is an abstraction and quantified is concrete. The same goes for line. Therefore a concrete can be predicated of its abstraction.

I respond by denying the major premise absolutely and strictly. For in a good sense, when it is said "quantity is quantified", it is as if you were saying: that by which a thing has extension is that by which extension is had. And this is also false. For form relates as "by which", and a concrete as "what", and these should not be confused - but they would be confused in such predications.

As for what is said about a line, I respond by denying the minor premise. For a line is not an abstraction of length, but its form. For a line itself is what has length.

Moreover, it could be said that this is peculiar to the category of quantity - that it is both a measure of other things, and measured by other things, and conducts itself simultaneously as "by which" and "what". But the same is not true of concretes and abstractions in other categories.

You may object thirdly that these propositions are true and formal: "humanity is a being", "humanity is a substance", "is an animal", "whiteness is colored", etc. But in these, concretes are predicated of their abstractions. Therefore, etc.

I respond by denying the minor premise. For humanity is indeed an abstraction of man, but not of being, nor of substance, nor of animal - but it truly includes those levels. And generally speaking, the rule we put forward in the conclusion should be understood as applying to abstractions with respect to their proper concretes, but not to others, even if they are higher, mediate and more universal - as being, substance and animal are with respect to humanity.

As for whiteness, the major premise is false. For it is one thing to say that it is a color, another that it is colored. For "colored" expresses color as adjoining a subject.

You may object fourthly that these predications are true: "entity is a being", "a thing is a reality". Therefore concretes are predicated of abstractions, as in the first, and abstractions of concretes, as in the second.

I respond by making a distinction. They are true identically, I concede the antecedent. Formally, I deny the antecedent. For it is false that an entity or formality abstracted from a being is something having being, and that a thing is formally the same as an entity - although an entity is something of a being, and a thing has reality, but not vice versa, because a thing does not adjoin reality.

However, it should be noted that many propositions of this kind are customarily admitted, either by usage or on account of identity or in an identical sense. But strictly speaking logically, they are not legitimate.

Conclusion 3

The abstraction of a higher concrete cannot be predicated of the abstraction of a lower concrete, neither formally nor identically. For example, it cannot be said truly and formally that rationality or humanity is animality.

This is the view of the aforementioned Doctor (1) and his followers, and others.

Proof: The intellect does not predicate one thing of another except insofar as it considers them conjoined. But the intellect does not consider those two abstractions as conjoined, but rather as separated. Therefore it cannot truly predicate them in this way.

The minor premise is proven: Because one considering animality in the abstract does not consider it as existing in, adjoining or conjoined to humanity, but rather as torn away from it. Therefore, etc.

Confirmation: Because this proposition is not true in the formal sense: "man is humanity". Therefore neither will this be true: "humanity is animality". The consequent is proven: Animality is no more conjoined to humanity than humanity is to man. Therefore, if humanity cannot be predicated of man, neither can animality be predicated of humanity - even though humanity in reality includes animality, and man includes humanity.

You may object: This predication is true: "whiteness is a color". But whiteness and color are two abstractions of higher and lower concretes. Therefore, etc.

I respond as I already said, by making a distinction in the minor premise. They are abstractions of diverse concretes, I concede. They are abstractions with respect to each other, I deny, and consequently so. For whiteness is not an abstraction with respect to color, but with respect to white. And color is not an abstraction with respect to whiteness, but with respect to colored. It is not so with humanity with respect to animality, nor with animality with respect to humanity. For they are forms abstracted from each other, and therefore cannot be predicated of each other.

Conclusion 4

The concrete of a higher abstraction cannot be predicated of a lower abstraction - for example, animal of humanity. This is also the view of the Doctor (1) and others.

Proof: Whenever a predicate imports something that is not involved in the subject explicitly or implicitly, the predication cannot be true. For this reason it cannot be said of a body or a soul that it is a man. But humanity imports something that is not contained in that predicate animal, neither explicitly nor implicitly. Therefore, animal cannot be predicated of humanity, at least through a formal and proper predication.

The minor premise is proven: For humanity imports rationality, which is not contained in animal, neither explicitly nor implicitly. Therefore, etc.

Confirmation: Because no whole can be predicated of its part. But humanity is a subjective part of animal. Therefore, animal cannot be predicated of humanity in the abstract.

Conclusion 5

For concretes and abstractions of second intention with respect to each other, the rules of predicability are the same as for concretes and abstractions of first intention. This is also commonly held.

Proof: Because as far as predication between abstractions and concretes, it matters little whether they are of first or second intention. Therefore, just as abstractions of first intention are not predicated of abstractions, so it is with abstractions of second intention.

The antecedent is proven: Because for a predication to be true in any predicates, it is required and sufficient that they be in the subjects as they are enunciated of them. Therefore the reasoning is the same, etc.

These and similar propositions are formally true: "genus is universal", "species is universal". And these are false: "genus is universality", "genericity is genericity", in the formal sense.

Conclusion 6

Second intentions in the concrete can be predicated of the natures to which a similar predicability corresponds as to them - but not of the natures themselves in the abstract, nor of inferiors in the concrete. For example, it is allowable to say "animal is a genus", but not "animality", or "Peter is a genus". This is commonly held.

The first part is proven: Because animal has the same predicability that genus has. Therefore it can be predicated of it that it is a genus. And this signifies nothing other than that animal has the nature of a genus. And this is true. So it can be said "man is a species", etc.

The second part is proven: Because animality is an abstraction from animal and from genus. And as such it is not conceived as concerning, or adhering or existing in animal or genus. Therefore, as such, it cannot be predicated of it. Likewise it is not true that man is a genus.

Finally, it is proven: Because it is false that man or Peter can be predicated of many things differing in species. Therefore it cannot be said "man is a genus", nor "Peter is a species" - although man contains animal, and Peter contains man, which are so denominated.

Usage will teach these things more than rules. But note, as has already been suggested, that these rules hold only in created things, in which predicates and levels of being are limited - but not in divine matters, where all things include each other on account of infinity, and also on account of their singular and supreme simplicity. For example, in divine matters, on account of that identity, these and similar predications are tolerated: "the divine essence is good", "is wise", "is supreme", etc. - although they are false in the mode of signifying. But they are not so tolerated in created things.

QUESTION 8: How many types of universals are there?

Now that we've discussed the nature and properties of universals in general quite extensively, let's move on to dividing them into the five common species identified by Porphyry - namely, Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident. Here we'll examine whether that division is legitimate. Based on what's been said, I'm assuming the conditions of a universal are that it is an uncomplex term, predicamental, existing in many, or able to be said of many, and univocal. With that assumed, here is the

CONCLUSION.

There are five universals, both Metaphysical and Logical, and no more. This is the common view, and Scotus supposes it, saying (1) that a universal is predicated univocally of all those five.

Proof for the Metaphysical universals: There are as many Metaphysical universals as there are diverse ways in which some nature can be communicated to many. But there are five of those ways, no more and no less. Therefore, etc.

Proof of the minor premise: Every common nature is either

- 1) a whole essence
- 2) a material part of the essence, contractible or potential
- 3) an actual part of the essence, determining and constituting
- 4) something accidental, inseparable
- 5) something accidental, separable

If it's a whole essence, it's a species. If it's a potential, determinable part, it's a genus. If it's a determining, actual part of the essence, it's a difference. If it's something outside the essence and inseparable, it's a property. If it's separable and contingent, it's an accident. But nothing pertaining to a common nature can be conceived that doesn't reduce to one of those. Therefore there are only five ways of being in many.

Proof for the Logical universals: There are as many species of Logical universal as there are ways of being predicated of many. But there are only five of those ways. Therefore, etc.

Proof of the minor premise: Because the ways of being predicated of many follow the ways of being in many. But those ways are five, no more and no less. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proven from part 1.

A second proof from the Doctor [Scotus], in other words rather than meaning: Whatever is predicated of many is predicated either

- 1) essentially as a complete "what" (species)
- 2) essentially as an incomplete "what" (genus)
- 3) essentially as a "what sort" (difference)
- 4) convertibly as a non-essential "what sort" (property)
- 5) contingently as a non-essential "what sort" (accident)

Therefore there are only five species of Logical universal.

Objection 1, against the first part: There is nothing common that can be abstracted from all metaphysically universal natures. But this is required for there to be multiple species of metaphysical universal. Therefore there are not multiple species of metaphysical universal.

Proof of the major premise: The Doctor [Scotus] denies there is any generic nature in reality common to all generic natures. Otherwise there would be a genus of genus. Therefore, etc.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent. No one, real, positive nature [can be abstracted], I concede the antecedent. No formal nature, insofar as all common natures agree among themselves in this, that they are communicated to many, I deny the antecedent and the consequent. To the proof I say, Scotus is talking about a real positive genus, which we do not assert, nor is it necessary in our case.

Further objection: There is no greater reason why there should be something common to a substantial and accidental nature, as regards existing in many, than to a positive and notional or fictive universal. But there is not something common to the latter. Therefore it should not be given to the former either.

Response: I distinguish the major premise. [There is no greater reason] according to entity and proper mode of existing, I concede the major premise. According to the mode of existing in many precisely, I deny the major premise and consequent, likewise distinguishing the minor premise. For by the same reasoning one should philosophize about real beings and beings of reason, as to the mode of existing in many, although in themselves they differ, as beings from non-beings.

Objection 2: The natures of Angel, Human, Cow, Bird, etc. are common to many. But they are more than five; indeed, they are innumerable. Therefore there are also innumerable metaphysical universals.

Response: I deny the consequent. For although all those natures differ from each other in species, nevertheless they do not differ in the mode of being in their individuals, and so they agree in universality.

Objection 3: If accident and property were universals, there would be as many universals as there are categories. But the consequent is false. Therefore, etc.

Response: I deny the consequent, for the reason just given.

Objection, against the second part: There should not be more universals than inferiors. But there are only two inferiors. Therefore there are only two universals.

Proof of the major premise: It's clear from Aristotle. For in as many ways as one of two opposites is said, so is the other said. But universal and singular are opposites. Therefore there should not be more universals than inferiors. And so there are only two.

The minor premise of the first argument is also proven: Because whatever exists is either a species or an individual. Therefore there are only two inferiors.

Response: I deny the major premise absolutely. For from the fact that white and black are opposites, it does not follow that there should be as many black things as white things. Therefore the Philosopher is talking about modes of signifying, because there are as many significates of white as there are of black. And so that rule is not to the point.

To the minor premise I say: There are only two inferiors considered materially, I concede the minor premise. Considered formally, I deny the minor premise. The inferiors materially are the natures themselves according to themselves, as they exist. But formally they are those same natures considered according to the mode of existing in their inferiors, and being predicated of them. And so there are five.

Further objection: There are more than five ways of being predicated. Therefore there are also more than five logical universals.

Proof of the antecedent: The mode of predicating of a supreme and subaltern genus is diverse from the mode of a lowest genus. And the same is true of a subaltern and atomic or lowest species. The same for property. Therefore, etc.

Proof of the antecedent: Because a supreme or subaltern genus is predicated of many differing not only in species but also in genus. But a lowest genus is predicated of many differing only in species. A subaltern species is predicated of many also differing in species. But a lowest species is predicated of many differing only in number. Therefore, etc.

Response: I deny the antecedent and consequent. For those differences are only accidental. But the essential difference of those modes is sought from this, that they are predicated of a greater or lesser number of things differing, e.g., that substance is predicated of the corporeal and spiritual natures, and so of more things than animal, but always in the same way, namely in quid incompletely. But it is otherwise for species. For only the lowest is properly a species. But a subaltern is not called such, except in respect of a higher genus, but not in respect of the things below it, as we will say below. The same is true of property. For whether it follows upon a generic or specific nature, it is always predicated in quale convertibly.

Objection 2: Predicables are coordinations of the categories. But there are ten categories. Therefore there are also ten predicables.

Response: I distinguish the major premise. [Predicables are] coordinations according to mode of being and being predicated, I concede the major premise. According to number or

grade of being, I deny the major premise and consequent. But all the categories do not have modes of being or being predicated, except the five assigned.

Objection 3: Being is predicated of many. Therefore it is a universal. But it does not pertain to any of the five enumerated. Therefore there are more than five.

Response: Being is predicated transcendentally, I concede the major premise. Universally and categorically, I deny the major premise and consequent. For here we are talking about finite terms, not infinite or transcendental ones.

Objection 4: A definition is predicated of many. But it is not included under those five. Therefore there are more than five.

Response: Here we are talking about uncomplex terms. But a definition is a complex term. Hence I distinguish the major premise. It is predicated of many as a complex term, I concede the major premise. As an uncomplex term, I deny the major premise and consequent. Besides, it could be reduced to the mode of predicating of a species. For it is predicated as a whole essence and in quid completely.

Objection 5: A vague individual is said of many. But it is not said of many in any of these five ways. Therefore there are more than five.

Response: I distinguish the major premise. It is said of many divisively, I concede the major premise. Of many copulatively, I deny the major premise. Therefore it is not a universal. It is verified only of one, but indeterminately. For when you say "Peter is some man," it is the same as if you were to say "Peter is this or that man," so that that proposition and similar ones cannot be verified of one particular. Hence those terms - "a certain," "some" - are truly particular, not common, but indeterminate, as we have said.

Objection 6: In the mystery of the Incarnation, "man" is predicated of the Word and of God. For it is said, "The Word is man," "God is man," etc. But then that predicate does not pertain to any of the five modes. Therefore here "man" constitutes a sixth predicable.

The minor premise is clear. For it is predicated neither as genus, nor as difference, nor as species, nor as property, nor as accident.

Response: I deny the minor premise and the proof of the antecedent. For because "man" in Christ is entirely outside the essence of the Word and of God, and is united to it entirely contingently, it is predicated per accidens as something substantial, as Scotus teaches, (1) because, he says, it is not of the notion of the subject (namely, of the Word or of God), and comes to a subject existing in complete act, so that it can be absent from it, etc.

You ask: To which of those are reduced existence, subsistence or suppositum or personality, substantial union, and similar modes? Because they are not a whole essence, nor part of an essence, therefore they are not predicated as species, nor as genus, nor as difference. Likewise they do not flow necessarily from an essence, as a property, since they can fail to be present. And they are substantial, not accidents.

Response: We do not admit most of those modes. But we say that if they are considered aptitudinally, they are properties. For those aptitudes flow from essences. But if they are taken actually, they are accidents, because they can fail to be present.

Question 9: Is that division of the universal a genus into species, or is the universal univocal to those five universals?

The point of the question is whether the universal, as such, is a genus with respect to genus, species, difference, property, and accident, which we just listed, or a species of universal. In other words, is it predicated of them univocally? The question deals with the universal taken formally, not materially.

Conclusion.

The answer is yes, according to the Doctor [likely referring to a specific scholastic authority] and most others.

Proof: That which is predicated univocally of many things agrees with them according to the name and according to exactly the same signified concept. But the universal agrees in this way with genus, species, etc. Therefore it is predicated of them univocally.

Proof of the minor premise: The concept signified by the name "universal" is to be one apt to be in and be predicated of many. But this concept applies to genus, species, etc. Therefore, etc.

Proof of minor premise: It is true to say of genus that it is one apt to be in and be predicated of many. The same for species, difference, and the rest. That it is a genus is clear from the fact that those univocates differ in species. But what is predicated univocally of many things differing in species is a genus with respect to those univocates. Therefore, etc.

Objection 1: Univocates should participate equally in the concept of the univocal. But the five universals do not participate equally in the concept of universal. Therefore universal is not univocal to the five universals.

Proof of minor premise: For genus is predicable of more things than species and difference. Also, genus, species and difference are predicated of many things essentially, while property and accident are predicated accidentally. But to be predicated of more things and essentially is far more perfect than to be predicated of fewer things and accidentally. Therefore the concept of universal, as such, is not participated in equally by these five universals.

Response: Deny the minor premise and distinguish the major premise of the proof. Genus is predicated of more things than species and essentially, etc. This comes from the specific difference of such universals in particular (I concede the major premise) but not from the precise concept of universal as such (I deny the major premise and the conclusion). For just as animal is a univocal genus with respect to man and horse, even though man is nobler than horse, so also universal as such will be a genus with respect to the first, second, and fifth [universals], even though it may be nobler in some respects, because that inequality does not arise from the general and precise concept of universality, which consists only in the aptitude to be predicated of many, but from the particular concept of such universality.

Objection 2: If universal as such were a univocal genus to those five universals, the same thing would be superior and inferior, the same thing would be genus and species, and there would be a genus of genus. But the consequent is absurd. Therefore the antecedent as well.

Proof of consequence: Universal, as univocal and as genus to the others, would be superior to them and to itself in particular. It would be a genus with respect to the first universal, which is also a genus, and that genus would be a species with respect to universal as such, etc. Therefore, etc.

Response: Distinguish the major premise. The same thing would be superior and inferior, etc. under a different aspect (I concede the major premise), under the same aspect (I deny the major, minor premises and conclusion). Therefore universal as such and according to the common concept of predicability of many would be broader or superior to itself under the aspect of this or that predicability of many, e.g. predicability of many as an incomplete "what it is", which constitutes what is called genus. And that genus or first predicable is called a species with respect to universal as such. And that predicability as an incomplete "what it is" would be called the specific difference constituting that first particular universal which is properly called genus. And so there would be a common and supreme genus with respect to the particular genus. But what absurdity or inconvenience is there in that?

Likewise, that particular genus would be a species with respect to that common universal, and a genus according to its own name and special predicability.

You may ask: What is meant by a superior and inferior predicate?

I respond that a superior predicate seems to me to be that which signifies a more common nature, and an inferior predicate one that signifies a less common or singular nature under the same genus. Or as others explain it, a superior predicate is said to be that which is included in another, such that the consequence holds from the including to the included. For example, animal is said to be superior with respect to man, because it includes man in such a way that this consequence holds: "It is a man, therefore it is an animal." But an inferior predicate is that which includes another and the consequence does not hold from the included to the including. For example, one cannot say "It is an animal, therefore it is a man." According to the prior explanation, animal is broader than man, for it applies to all beasts as much as to men.

You may ask secondly: Are genera, species, and the other universals in the nature of things in reality?

I respond with a distinction. For if they are taken in the first intentional way, or fundamentally, for the natures which are so denominated, there is no doubt that many of them exist in reality and that others are possible. But if they are taken in the second intentional way, for those denominations or extrinsic relations which we call genus, species, etc., there is also no doubt that they are beings of reason, not fictitious or chimerical ones, but with a foundation in reality, as we said about the logical universal as such.

You may ask thirdly: Are they material or spiritual?

I respond that some of the natures which are denominated are material and others spiritual. For spiritual natures which are denominated as common and predicable of many differing in species and number as a "what it is" or a "what kind" are not impossible.

You may ask fourthly: Are those universals in the senses or in singulars, or outside the senses or singulars?

I respond that all of those which actually exist or can exist are in actual or possible singulars. For we rejected the ideas of Plato, and whatever exists is singular, and nothing can exist except in singulars.

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